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Department of the Army
Report Summary
Operation TAILWIND
Report, 20 July 1998
Purpose. This report provides the results of the Department of the Army’s
review into allegations that Sarin Nerve gas was used during Operation TAILWIND.
Conclusion. Research reveals no evidence of any use of Sarin, nor was it a goal
of Operation TAILWIND to target U.S. Army defectors. Additionally, there is no evidence
that Sarin nerve gas was stored by the Army in Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand.
3. Approach. The Department of the Army’s review into the alleged
use of Sarin Nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND focused on three specific research
efforts.
a. First, we conducted a search for targeted documents which
relate to the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND. We searched in the National
Archives’ Washington National Record Center and within the Army organizations which
could be expected to have been involved in any such use of Sarin during Operation
TAILWIND. These searches revealed that there are no existing documents which indicate that
the Department of the Army participated in the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND.
(1) The Army Declassification
Agency did a search of their database using eighteen specific keywords (listed on page 2
of their report, see tab entitled Archives Search). The search identified 132
folders which required additional review. Of these, 130 were at the National
Archive’s Washington National Record Center (WNRC) (located in Suitland MD) and 2
rolls of microfilm which are at the Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks
(Carlisle, PA). All folders and microfilm were reviewed. This in-depth review of the
contents of each folder and microfilm was NEGATIVE for Operation TAILWIND information.
(2) The Technology Management
Office within the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army released a message to all Army
organizations which could be expected to have documentary evidence of any use of Sarin
during Operation TAILWIND. Each organi-zation was tasked to review their current files
area and records holding areas, for all classified and unclassified documents that
reference Sarin or TAILWIND during the period 1 Jan ‘70 and 31 Dec ‘75. This
search resulted in four organizations reporting information pertaining to Sarin –
none of which was related to Operation TAILWIND.
(a) The following Army organizations conducted document searches:
U.S. Army Forces Command
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
U.S. Army Special Operations Command
U.S. Army Pacific Command
U.S. Army Materiel Command
Military Traffic Management Command
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
National Guard Bureau
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Center for Military History
The Army Judge Advocate General
The Army Inspector General
The Army Surgeon General
Office of the Secretary of the Army
Program Manager, Chemical Demilitarization Office
(b) TAB A contains the results of document searches directed by the
Technology Management Office and the Army Declassification Activity.
b. Second, the Center for Military History telephonically
interviewed six of seven individuals identified as possibly having firsthand knowledge of
Operation TAILWIND and, thus, any use of Sarin Nerve gas. SGT Jay Graves declined
to be interviewed, but provided a statement to the Special Forces Association. None of the
interviewees had personal knowledge of the use of Sarin or any lethal chemical agent
during Operation TAILWIND. All stated that the purpose of the mission was to attack
installations on the Ho Chi Minh trail and create a diversion for another operation. Adair
[one of the individuals interviewed] also stated that there was no mention before or after
the mission about defectors or Caucasians in the area of operations. Adair himself
saw no Caucasians during the operation except his fellow soldiers. Young [one of
the individuals interviewed] saw the gas being sprayed, did not use his damaged mask when
the [tear] gas drifted over him, and reported that those who breathed the gas
"coughed, choked, but otherwise were not slowed down." Hagen [one of the
individuals interviewed] also saw the mist [tear gas] drifting over their position. His
mask had a bullet through the filter and when he breathed the gas, "I started
throwing up, (and) fell to the ground in convulsions. In discussions with others after the
mission, others said that once the effects wear off, you’re fine." Schmidt
[one of the individuals interviewed] noted "it was typical to carry masks…it was
a normal part of SOG kit." He felt the gas used was stronger than normal tear gas,
but "did not hear any rumors to the effect that nerve gas was used on TAILWIND, or
that it was ever used on SOG missions." Thus, the interviews conducted reveal that
none of the individuals interviewed have any knowledge of the use of Sarin during
Operation TAILWIND.
(1) Each interview attempted to
gain answers to the following:
(a) Document any information regarding the use of lethal chemical munitions in Vietnam.
(b) Identify the exact storage location (base and country) of any lethal chemical
munitions known by the interviewee.
(c) Identify the authority empowered to authorize the tactical use of lethal chemical
munitions in support of Special Operations Group (SOG) missions.
(d) Identify the name and role of any soldier who might have additional information
regarding Operation TAILWIND.
(2) The following lists the
individuals who were interviewed:
(a) Individuals interviewed:
| Name |
Identified as a result of |
| SGT Minton, FNU |
Provided FAC audio tape from SOCOM
archives |
| MSG Adair, Morris N. |
From USARV list of awarded individuals |
| SGT Young, David L. |
From USARV list of awarded individuals |
| WO1 Watson, William D. |
Referral |
| SGT Schmidt, Craig |
Early Bird Article |
| SGT Hagen, Michael E. |
From USARV list of awarded individuals |
| SGT Graves, Jay |
Early Bird Article (Declined to be
interviewed, but provided a statement to the Special Forces Association.) |
(b) At TAB B are the interviewer’s recapitulation of these interviews
and the Army documents which tasked that the interviews be conducted.
c. Third, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics tasked the
Army Materiel Command to provide answers to specific questions raised during internal
DoD/Army discussions. We know that during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND, the Army
had weapons containing lethal chemical agents stored within the continental United States
and in Okinawa. There is no evidence that any lethal chemical agents were released
for employment during the time of Operation TAILWIND. Following are the specific research
questions:
(1) What was the quantity of
Sarin the US Army controlled then and now?
(2) Where were lethal chemical
munitions stored during the time of the operation?
(3) In what form was the lethal
chemical agent stored (i.e., large drums, or weapons)?
(4) Who managed the custody of
the lethal chemical agents? Who had authority to issue lethal chemical agents from the
storage sites? Was any ever issued?
TAB C contains the results of the research and the Army documents tasking the
research.
d. The Army researched additional issues which arose while
developing this report.
(1) The Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Logistics, DA, analyzed two ship-ping documents related to an undated
summary of an alleged January 1970 shipment of 2.75" rockets. The research revealed
that the shipping labels do not conform with marking requirements in place at the time of
Operation TAILWIND, for ammunition con-taining lethal chemical agents. Thus, the presence
of the shipping label does not indi-cate a presence of Sarin. TAB E contains
the analysis of these documents.
(2) The Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, DA, orchestrated research to determine (a) which DoD agency
was the executive agent for lethal chem-ical agents, and (b) who had command and control
of the lethal agents stored in Okinawa during the timeframe of Operation TAILWIND.
(a) The Center for Military History interviewed MG (Ret) John Hayes, the former Commander,
2nd Logistics Command, Okinawa, where Sarin was stored during the timeframe of
Operation TAILWIND. According to MG Hayes, the Army was the overall executive agent for
the U.S. chemical stockpile at that time. MG Hayes had command and control of the Sarin
stockpile in Okinawa during TAILWIND. During his command, MG Hayes never released
or approved the release of any lethal chemical agents for use by any U.S. Forces
serving in Southeast Asia.
(b) TAB F contains the interview notes of MG(Ret) Hayes and other related
documents.
4. Costs. It cost the Department of the Army approximately $38,418 and
1,795 workhours to conduct this research. Detailed costs are identified at TAB D.
Annotated Index
Results of searches for Army documents within the
National Archives’ Washington National Record Center and the Army reveal that there
are no existing documents which indicate that the Department of the Army participated in
the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND
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TAB A |
Results of interviews of individuals who participated
in or had personal knowledge of Operation TAILWIND reveal that none of the individuals
interviewed have any knowledge of the use of Sarin during Operation TAILWIND
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TAB B |
Results of specific research conducted regarding the
types of munitions and chemicals available for use during the time period of Operation
TAILWIND reveals that while lethal agents were stored as weapons, available Army documents
indicate that no lethal chemicals were stored in Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand during the
timeframe of Operation TAILWIND (1970).
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TAB C |
Detailed costs
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TAB D |
Analysis of shipping label and packing document
allegedly related to a 1970 shipment of unusual weapons to Okinawa, provided by DoD for
Army evaluation.
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TAB E |
| Interviews of MG (Ret) John Hayes, former Commander, 2nd
Logistics Command, Okinawa, during the TAILWIND period, confirming command and control of
lethal chemical munitions and disposition of these munitions under his command. |
TAB F |
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