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MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

PART V

OF

APPENDIX B

MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND STUDIES AND OBSERVATION GROUP AND THE STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE INCEPTION, ORGANIZATION, EVOLUTION

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PART V

C MACSOG: INCEPTION, EVOLUTION, EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS

A. (S) INTRODUCTION

1. (S) This part elaborates MACSOG and provides the overall background data needed in connection with the various covert/PM programs of operations in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. These programs are outlined in the succeeding appendices. In presenting this part, a horizontal or functional approach is used, i.e., the subject area described is presented across-the-board as it relates to all of the MACSOG activities. In-depth detail of this subject area as it pertains to a specific program, e.g., SALEM HOUSE, is set forth in the succeeding volume dealing with operations in Cambodia.

2. (C) The principal subject areas of this part, presented in this sequential order, are:

a. Activation of MACSOG.

b. Mission and Objectives.

c. Organizational Development.

d. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

e. Command and Control.

f. Operations and Intelligence.

g. Contingency Planning.

h. Personnel and Training.

i. Logistics.

j. Counterpart Relationships - The Strategic Technical Directorate.

B. (S) ACTIVATION OF MACSOG

1. (S) COMUSMACV activated the Special Operations Group (SOG) on 24 January 1964, with an initial military personnel strength of six officers and two enlisted men. SOG was under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff, MACV. Further,

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it was designated as a separate staff section of MACV with J-5 exercising special cognizance of actions accomplished.*

2. (S) The unit name was subsequently changed to Studies and Observations Group (SOG).*

3. (S) The rationale for the activation of MACSOG was the need for a joint [redacted] organization to execute the approved portions of OPLAN 34A. (b)(1) (b)(3)

C. (TS) MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

1. (TS) Based on initial joint State-DOD-CAS guidance,* the overall mission of MACSOG as stated in OPLAN 34A was:** (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

* 1. (TS) Annex A, 1964 MACV Command History, p.I-1. The activation order was General Order 6, Headquarters MACV, 24 January 1964.

[redacted]

** (TS) Annex A, 1964 MACV Command History, p.3.
*** (TS) MACV Letter to CINCPAC, "SOG Missions, Objectives and Programs, FY-4/66--FY-67 (U)," 10 May 1966. SOG Control #0002397-69, p.4.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

4. (TS) CINCPAC approved the above mission statement. He added that the assignment of additional approved operations, such as SHINING BRASS and psychological warfare missions, to MACSOG by COMUSMACV was considered appropriate in view of the transition of MACSOG at a later date to the status of a joint UW task force, as stated in the current contingency plans.**

5. (TS) A comparison of the above original (Joint State-DOD-CAS) and revised (CINCPAC-COMUSMACV) mission statement follows:***

Joint State-DOD-CAS****	CINCPAC-COMUSMACV#
a. Overall political control in Saigon - Ambassador	a. . . . with the concurrence of the US Embassy

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 37284, DTG 210229Z Oct 65.
** (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 182128Z Nov 65
*** (TS) Chief, Special Operations Division, OSACSA, Memorandum to General Anthis, "Change in Statement of Mission (U)," 22 November 1965.
**** [redacted]
# (1) (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 37284, DTG 210229Z Oct 65.
(2) (U) COMUSMACV Msg 07850, DTG 120337Z Nov 65.
(3) (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 182128Z Nov 65.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Joint State-DOD-CAS	CINCPAC-COMUSMACV
b. Overall operational control - COMUSMACV. Planning, liaison, logistics, training and advice - joint MACV/CAS Task Force, reporting directly to COMUSMACV. Chief of Task Force to be a colonel-level military officer selected by COMUSMACV; Deputy Chief of Task Force to be a CAS officer [redacted]	b. COMUSMACV will exercise his operational control through the normal MACV command channels. Normal staff relationships pertain. In conjunction with CAS and as directed by CINCPAC, COMUSMACV will advise, train and support RVN military and PM forces in out-of-country UW and psychological warfare activities, and will exercise operational control of SOG assets.
c. All operations against NVN will be under the Task Force described above, and all in-country resources of the US military [redacted] will be available for support of approved operations.	c. As directed by COMUSMACV and with the concurrence of the US Embassy, SOG will advise, train, and support counterpart forces in out-of-country UW warfare and psychological warfare operations.
d. Concurred in by State, DOD, and CAS.	d. SOG will conduct unilateral planning for UW warfare activities under existing COMUSEASIA plans, and will be prepared when directed to activate and command the JUWTF SEASIA.
	e. Noted by the Ambassador.

6. (C) The original charter under which MACSOG was established was the result of a joint DOD-CAS-State document. The revised charter was submitted by COMUSMACV and approved by CINCPAC. There was no participation or coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or elsewhere in DOD, State and CAS.*

7. (S) Current publications cite the MACSOG mission as follows:**

a. Exercise operational control over US forces and personnel assigned or attached to MACSOG to execute such missions as may be directed by COMUSMACV or competent higher authority.

b. Advise, assist and support the GVN and RVNAF in planning, coordinating and implementing such missions as may be mutually agreed upon between the US and GVN and as directed by COMUSMACV

* (TS) Chief, Special Operations Div., OSACSA, Memorandum to General Anthis, op. cit.

** 1. (S) Hq USMACV Directive 10-11, "Organization and Functions-Command Relationships and Terms of Reference for USMACV (U) 1 November 65, p.21.

2. (S) Hq MACSOG Organization and Functions Manual, 20 Jun 196 p.1.2.

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c. Coordinate activities of MACSOG with other US forces and agencies in all matters of mutual concern and in consonance with policies prescribed by COMUSMACV.

d. Prepare unilateral US and coordinated US/GVN plans for contingency or general emergency operations as directed by COMUSMACV; develop GVN capabilities to provide support for US forces as may be required under existing assumptions or agreements pertinent to such contingency or general emergency operations.

e. Act as Commander (designate), JUWTF for SEASIA. Develop for implementation, upon order, plans for UW warfare in SEASIA.

f. Provide intelligence and counterintelligence support to COMUSMACV.

g. Coordinate post-SAR personnel recovery matters in SEASIA.

8. (TS) The scope of the MACSOG mission was expanded with the initiation of cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia in 1965 and 1967, respectively. Though influenced by political restrictions and/or evolving requirements, the broad overall mission has continued unchanged since 1967. The current abbreviated mission of MACSOG is:*

> To plan and conduct covert/clandestine operations in NVN, Laos, and Cambodia and special operations in SVN, as directed, in such a manner that operations can be plausibly denied by the US and RVN governments. These operations are planned and conducted in coordination with various other US agencies and with the RVNAF STD.

9. (TS) Current publications list MACSOG's objectives as follows:

* Hq MACSOG Year-End Review Vietnam 1968, p. 7.

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a. To accomplish the mission, it was MACSOG's objective with respect to NVN to:

1. Produce an adverse effect on the NVN economy.

2. Cause the NVN to expend and divert military and governmental resources to defense and internal security operations in reaction to our efforts.

3. Increase US/RVN capabilities to collect strategic and tactical intelligence in NVN.

4. Engender resentment and foment dissatisfaction on on the part of the NVN populace against the NVN government.

5. Convince the NVN leadership that its support and direction of the war in SEASIA must cease.

6. Create a prevailing feeling of distrust, suspicion and uncertainty in NVN. Promote war weariness and engender the feeling that the war is futile, wasteful and contrary to national welfare.

b. With respect to operations in Laos and the DMZ, it was MACSOG's objective to:

1. Increase US/RVN intelligence collection capabilities in Southern Laos.

2. Destroy or disrupt VC/PL/NVA support facilities in Southern Laos.

3. Retard VC/NVA infiltration of personnel, supplies and materiel through Southern Laos into Cambodia and RVN.

4. Deny the use of Southern Laos as a sanctuary for the VC/NVA.

5. Prevent continued enemy exploitation of the Lao population.

6. Assist in the location and recovery of US and Allied personnel who are evading capture, have escaped confinement or are in confinement.

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c. The objective of MACSOG operations in Cambodia was to:

1. Increase US/RVN intelligence collection capabilities in Cambodia.

2. Destroy or disrupt VC/NVA support facilities in Cambodia.

3. Limit VC/NVA infiltration of personnel and supplies from Cambodia into RVN.

4. Create security problems for those enemy forces using the Cambodian area as a sanctuary, training area and logistics base.

5. Determine the extent of support being provided the insurgents in RVN by the government of Cambodia.

6. MACSOG's objective in operating the Joint Personnel Recovery Center was to return a maximum number of US and Allied evadees and escapees to friendly control.

10. (~~TS~~) Inter-Relationship Of 5th SFG and MACSOG Missions

a. The question as to whether there has been a duplication or lack of economy of effort by MACSOG, with its mission of out-of-country operations, and 5th SFG, with its mission of in-country operations, has surfaced on several occasions. One occasion, for which documentation is readily available, was in May 1966, when the question as to which organization, MACSOG or 5th SFG, should be assigned the Cambodian cross-border mission. At that time, the MACV J-3, in a memorandum to the Commanding Officer, 5th SFG and the Chief, MACSOG:*

(1) Noted that the observation had been made that there was a duplication of effort on the part on the 5th SFG and MACSOG.

* MACV AC of S, J-3 Memorandum for Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group and Chief, Studies and Observations Group, 30 May 1966. This memorandum and the ensuing report are attached as Annex H to this Appendix.

(2) Requested that the Commanding Officer, 5th SFG and Chief, MACSOG together prepare a report including, but not limited to, the following:

(a) The advantages and disadvantages of the then present system of operations.

(b) The duplications that existed.

(c) The agency which should assume functions wherein duplication of effort was involved.

(d) Recommendations for future operations.

b. The above report, submitted to the MACV AC of S, J-3 in June, is appended as Annex H. In essence:

(1) Commanding Officer, 5th SFG Group recommended that the mission for carrying out the then cross-border operations (SHINING BRASS) into Laos and such operations into Cambodia, should the requisite authority be obtained, be assigned to the 5th SFG. Hence, the 5th SFG would be assigned both out-of-country and in-country missions. In justification of that recommendation, these major operational considerations were advanced:

> CO, 5th SFGA should assume responsibility for the SHINING BRASS portion of the SOG mission. The personnel in SHINING BRASS are all SF prefix three qualified personnel and therefore must remain assigned to a Special Forces Unit. This plan is in keeping with COMUSMACV considerations of four months ago as stated in Msg from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, (~~TS~~) 05405, 190921Z Feb 66:
>
> > We do not wish to transfer SHINING BRASS to the 5th Special Forces Group at this time, but we anticipate such a recommendation will be forthcoming within the next six months based to some extent upon the development within the 5th Special Forces Group of the capability for operations into Cambodia. Recognizing that present authority includes only clandestine intelligence operations, we intend for the present to use this new capability for operations just inside the border on the Vietnamese side.
>
> CO, 5th SFGA already has responsibility for the special operations of Project Delta* and Det C-5.* Det C-5 (Project HORSE) is scheduled to expand. C-5 is operating

* At that time, Project Delta comprised mainly in-country operations. From the summer of 1964, when cross-border operations into Laos commenced, until 7 March 1965, DELTA included such operations. On the latter date, COMUSMACV transferred the responsibility for cross-border operations into Laos from the 5th SFG to MACSOG. The 5th SFG established Detachment C-5 as a control headquarters for field operations.

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both in VN and across the border. It is more logical to consolidate special operations under 5th Group than SOG because 5th Group already has responsibility on both sides of the border. Further Det C-5 is presently operating a clandestine agent net which is an area in which SOG is not operating.

To consolidate in country activities of Det C-5 and Project Delta under SOG is not feasible under present circumstances because a major revamping of SOG would be necessary in order to provide the means to coordinate missions within South Vietnam. This coordination is a relatively simple matter for the 5th Group because of the existing communications and camp facilities.

The reaction force companies would be consolidated under the 5th Group for more effective utilization and training. The force can be used to reinforce a SF camp or, alternately, to react to a contact or to intelligence gathered by any one of the special operational units.

(2) Chief, MACSOG recommended that his organization retain the mission for executing out-of-country operations and be assigned the Cambodian mission, should the requisite authority be forthcoming; further, that the 5th SFG retain its mission for carrying out in-country operations. Hence, Chief, MACSOG held the view that there should be no change in organizational responsibilities for implementing out-of-country and in-country missions. In justification of that recommendation, these major operational considerations were advanced:

SOG assets in being and command and control system in being can be used in Laos and shifted to Cambodia if and when such operations are approved whereas the 5th must build teams and exploitation forces which may not be used for an indefinite period or may never be used. This is not efficient utilization of forces. SOG could transition while expanding to the new mission by additional recruiting.

SOG, by its highly successful operations in Laos, has gained the confidence of higher authority, the State Department and CAS that it can carry on covert operations across a hostile border, without compromise of the program.

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SOG is more likely to get early political approval for Cambodia cross-border operations because of its covert nature. Once approved, SOG would not be subject to the same veto power held for its Laotian operation by the Embassy Vientiane because the US has no Embassy in Cambodia. Therefore, SOG would be just as responsive to MACV direction as 5th SFGp would be, as MACV has OPCON of SOG

11. (~~TS~~) Views Concerning the MACSOG Missions

Approximately fifty individuals, formerly or then currently, associated with MACSOG's activities were interviewed in connection with this study. Representative of their views concerning the missions and objectives assigned to MACSOG are the following (their detailed views on this subject are presented in Annex I.):

a. Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA (1964-1965). The objectives of OPLAN 34A were not clearly spelled out so we did not know exactly what we were trying to accomplish.

b. Lieutenant Colonel David H. Arno, USAF (1964-1966). The basic mission of MACSOG could probably have been better stated. If the mission had been stated so that the initial teams could have been oriented toward developing an indigenous base of support, then the various actions required to carry out the mission could have accomplished; these UW operations could have possibly proved a major threat to the North Vietnamese regime. I feel that a truly covert operation probably should be conducted by CAS.

c. Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA (1966-1968).

(1) The MACSOG mission was not always completely clear because it was misinterpreted by some who were in a position to provide support or to pass on our plans and programs at the CINCPAC level. There were some agencies and activities (CAS, and Army and Air Force intelligence units) that considered they had the right to conduct operations in NVN without coordination

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with MACSOG. It was my understanding that MACSOG would have the total responsibility for the conduct of current operations into NVN; further, that MACSOG would have the responsibility for coordinating any other operations into NVN.

(2) The mission should have been explicit that: SOG would conduct all covert operations including UW, guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion, etc., in the area under the control of NVN; CAS Saigon would exercise coordination responsibility for intelligence operations.

d. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan D. Carney, USA (1966-1968).

(1) We were, by charter, prohibited from carrying out left unilateral operations, and were forced into a partnership with the South Vietnamese who never believed in the agent program. If, in the future, we are going to conduct special operations in Asia, we should do them on the basis of unilateral, not allied, operations. The conduct of pure intelligence collection missions into denied areas in Asia would probably be best left to CIA and the military should get out of it entirely.

(2) The basic concept of the establishment of a subversive movement or a guerrilla-type operation in denied areas is sound. However, MACSOG was forbidden from engaging in such activities, thus reducing its scope to low-level black operations, entirely intelligence oriented and largely unsuccessful.

e. Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN (1966-1969).

(1) The military Services have a definite responsibility to participate in US covert actions.

(2) In the MACSOG context, physical harassment by itself seldom achieves much of anything. In order to bring heavy pressure to bear on the opposing regime, physical harassment

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must be either tied-in to some large, perhaps psychological, objective or be of such a nature that it will make the enemy think that he is threatened politically.

(3) The real objectives of the FOOTBOY Program were not adequately spelled out by Washington; further, the Program was not backed by a well thought out concept.

(4) Intelligence collection was never properly MACSOG's primary mission. If intelligence collection was to be the primary mission, the FOOTBOY Program should have been assigned to as intelligence agency. (The implication here was that psychological warfare should have been MACSOG's primary mission.)

(5) It is doubtful that MACSOG ever had a really clear-cut mission. The listing of objectives was rather a shotgun approach. SOG never had a statement of what the FOOTBOY program was intended to achieve and what SOG should do. The concept of the original program was rather shallow and was motivated largely by a frustration syndrome, i.e., we have the units so we should use them. It did not make sense to use them unless we had a well conceived mission. There was too little assessment of North Vietnam vulnerabilities and how they could be exploited. The mission of physical destruction, e.g., should have been tied to some well-identified vulnerability.

(6) By the time of the standdown in November 1968, the FOOTBOY Program was in the stage in which we were developing a mission statement that was predicated North Vietnamese vulnerabilities and on our real capabilities or assets.

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D. (TS) MACSOG ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

1. (TS) General

a. As indicated in paragraph above, at the time of its inception on 24 January 1964, MACSOG was assigned six officers and two enlisted men. Organized as a Joint MACV/CAS task force to execute the approved portions of OPLAN 34A, i.e., covert operations against NVN, MACSOG initially depended largely on TDY personnel augmentations for the accomplishment of its mission.

b. Since its inception, MACSOG has:

(1) Developed and operated three major programs involving operations in three countries -- North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. These programs, presented in detail in succeeding appendices, are:

(a) The FOOTBOY (C) Program. Covert operations against NVN. FOOTBOY (C) contains these four sub-programs

1. PLOWMAN - maritime operations.
2. TIMBERWORK - agent team operations.
3. HUMIDOR - psychological operations.
4. MIDRIFF - air operations.

(b) The PRAIRIE FIRE Program. Cross-border operations into Laos.

(c) The SALEM HOUSE Program. Cross-border operations into Cambodia.

(2) Prepared and operated under five JTDs in order to meet the organizational and personnel needs generated by evolving missions and objectives. Personnel strengths authorized in the initial (1964) and current (1969) JTDs are:

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	1964	1969
Officers	54	128
Enlisted Men	60	265
Civilians	30	11
Total	144	404

In addition to authorized assigned personnel, Chief, MACSOG has under his operational control various field organizations, the main elements of which include three command and control (C&C) detachments which handle airborne/ground operations, a training detachment at Camp Long Thanh, and naval training teams. US personnel for the C&C and training detachments are provided by the 5th SFG. The naval personnel rotate from Coronado, California on a six-month TDY basis. The organizational aspects of the detachments, which include both US and indigenous personnel, are presented in paragraph 4, below.

(3) Basically, this section of the study traces the organizational evolution of MACSOG from its initial JTD to its current one. In tracing this evolution, organizational changes are set forth in the context of the MACSOG:

(a) Missions, objectives, and functions, and the the headquarters and field organizations needed to accomplish them.

(b) External relationships which influenced the MACSOG organizational setup, e.g., with Headquarters, USMACV.

(c) Counterpart relationships with the South Vietnamese STD.

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2. (TS) Organizational Expansion

a. 1964

(1) As reflected in paragraph B1, above, MACSOG's personnel strength on 24 January 1964, its activation date, was six officers and two enlisted men. Personnel needed for initial operations came largely from TDY augmentation.

(a) CINCPAC established TDY Navy support for the US Naval Advisory Detachment at Danang (NAD) as follows:*

1. Repair and Maintenance Team -

a. First increment - two officers, 11 enlisted men.

b. Second increment (for support of four boats) - seven additional enlisted men.

c. Third increment (for support of six boats - five additional enlisted men.

d. Fourth increment (for support of eight boats) - six additional enlisted men.

2. Boat Training Team: strength to vary depending on the number of boats and the rate at which Vietnamese crews completed training, based on an allowance of two officers and ten enlisted men per PTF.

3. Seal Training Team: two officers and ten enlisted men.

4. Marine Reconnaissance Team: one officer and three enlisted men.

* 1. (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 292126Z Jan 64.
2. (TS) Annex A, 1964 MACV Command History, pp. I-1--I-4.

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(b) CNO provided that Headquarters, Support Activities, Saigon would handle the administration of personnel records for Mobile Support Team (MST) and boat training teams.*

(c) Meanwhile, with the review and approval of portions of OPLAN 34A, the SecDef, based upon recommendations from CAS, COMUSMACV, and CINCPAC, had ordered that certain personnel be moved to Saigon on a priority basis (see paragraphs B3b(2) and (3), to Part IV, above). [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

(d) In February 1964, concurrent with the forwarding of the initial MACSOG JTD to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC authorized a TDY Army augmentation of one officer and fifteen enlisted men to assist in the training of Vietnamese agents at Camp Long Thanh.*** COMUSMACV had requested the Commanding General, USARYIS to provide this augmentation by 25 March 1964, and to emphasize the following pre-deployment training.****

1. Demolition and sabotage cross training.
2. Survival techniques pertinent to SEAsia.
3. River and obstacle crossing techniques.
4. Advanced first aid.
5. Tactics. Methods of instructing all of the above subjects. (b)(1) (b)(3)

* 1. [redacted]
2. (TS) Annex A, op. cit., p. I-2.
** 1. Ibid.
2. [redacted]
3. (TS) JCS Msg 4120, DTG 211951Z Dec 63.
*** 1. Ibid., p. I-3.
2. (S) CINCPAC Msg 292126Z Jan 64.
**** (S) COMUSMACV Msg 140730Z Feb 64.

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(2) With respect to permanent personnel, as noted in the preceding paragraph, in February 1964, COMUSMACV submitted the initial MACSOG JTD to CINCPAC for approval. It called for a total of 167 personnel -- 138 military and 29 civilian. In forwarding the JTD on 17 March 1964 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC recommended that the total figure be reduced from 167 to 96 (68 military and 28 Civilian).* Meanwhile, COMUSMACV recommended that further consideration be given to approval of the original figure (167).** The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved an interim figure of 100.*** Subsequently, CINCPAC submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a revised JTD for 128 personnel (97 military and 31 civilian).**** The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved that figure, plus two additional Air Force spaces.#

(3) Miscellaneous personnel changes, both TDY and permanent, during 1964 are as follows:

(a) On 13 July 1964, COMUSMACV requested TDY Marine agumentation of one security officer and four enlisted men. This augmentation was to improve the security of the PTFs and the USNAD in general.## CINCPAC approved the request and the personnel were placed on TDY pending a JTD change and the arrival of PCS personnel.###

* (S) CINCPAC Letter, "Proposed Table of Distribution, Special Operations Group, USMAC Vietnam (U)," 17 March 1964. CINCPAC 5320/40, Serial 00385.
** (S) COMUSMACV Msg DTG 280505Z Mar 64.
*** ( ) JCS Msg 5622, DTG 021812Z Apr 64.
**** (S) CINCPAC Letter, "Revised Special Operations Group, USMACV, Joint Table of Distribution (U)," 24 April 1964, Serial 00589.
# (S) JCS Msg 7391, DTG 141955 Jul 64.
1. (S) COMUSMACV Msg 6036, DTG 130911Z Jul 64.
2. (TS) Annex A, op. cit., p. I-4.
1. (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 132334Z Jul 64.
2. (TS) Annex A, op. cit., p. I-4.

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(b) On 17 August 1964, COMUSMACV requested an increase of three officers and fourteen enlisted men to enable the MACSOG Communications Branch to operate on an around-the-clock basis and to handle the security requirements set forth in the preceding paragraph. Two officers and four enlisted men of this increase were to be carried on other TDs. CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the request.*

(c) In August 1964, COMUSMACV requested that the enlisted element of the TDY Army augmentation at Camp Long Thanh (paragraph 2a(1)(d)) be increased from fifteen to twenty-one. The justification therefor was that, based upon six-months' experience, a larger and more diversified mobile training team was needed.**

(4) In September 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following permanent manpower authorization for MACSOG:***

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	16	19	13	6	54
Enlisted	16	18	14	12	60 (b)(1) (b)(3)
Total	32	37	27	18	114

[redacted]

(5) Meanwhile, following six months of operational experience, COMUSMACV/CINCPAC submitted for JCS approval a revised MACSOG JTD which would be effective 1 January

* (S) JCS Msg 141225 Sep 64.
** MACSOG Msg 7225, DTG 010705Z Aug 64.
*** 1. (S) JCS Msg 9003, DTG 241725Z Sep 64.
2. (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum, "Revised Studies and Observations Group (SOG), USMACV, 1 January 1965 JTD (U)," 5 January 1965.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

1965. This JTD would add 1 USIS civilian space [redacted]

c [redacted] A recapitulation of the foregoing changes is as follows:*

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	+7	+2	+1	+1	+11
Enlisted	+11	-3	+2	-3	+7
Total	+18	-1	+3	-2	+18
[redacted]					
USIS					+1
[redacted]					

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(a) The basis for the CAS personnel reduction was that they would occupy positions where:

1. This contribution to executing MACSOG programs was necessary and unique from the standpoint of their training and experience.

2. The function required a particular qualification not otherwise available.

(b) The addition of the USIS civilian space, agreed to by USIS, was for the purpose of providing policy and programming coordination related to US operated or influenced broadcasts.

(6) Final action on the proposed 1 January 1964 JTD was completed during that month and is covered in the preceding paragraph.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

b. 1965

(1) The proposed January 1965 JTD was approved as CINCPAC submitted it, [redacted]

* Ibid.

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had recommended the space be converted to Military (Army).

(a) Consequently, effective 1 January 1965, the MACSOG JTD authorized the following personnel:*

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	23	21	14	7	65
Enlisted	26	16	6	9	67
Total	49	37	30	16	132
[redacted]					
USIS					1
[redacted]					

(b)(1) (b)(3)

(b) At Figure B-3 is an organizational chart of MACSOG as of 1 January 1965.** (b)(1) (b)(3)

(2) On 7 August 1965, COMUSMACV, with CINCPAC concurrence, requested an augmentation of nine military personnel spaces, thereby increasing the total personnel authorization from [redacted]*** The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the request.**** A breakout of the nine spaces is as follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	3	1	1		5
Enlisted	3	–	–	1	4
Total	6	1	1	1	9

The justification given for the above increase was that:

(a) MACSOG had been directed to prepare a detailed JUWTF operational, administrative, and logistical plan for UW operations in SEAsia, and to maintain detailed estimates of resistance potential in that area.

* 1. Ibid.
2. (S) JCS Msg 3714, DTG 131517Z Jan 65.
** (S) MACSOG JTD, 1 January 1965, Part II, p. 1.
*** 1. (S) COMUSMACV Msg 27654, DTG 070556Z Aug 1965.
2. (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 280555Z Aug 65.
3. (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum, "Studies and Observations Group, USMACV (U)," 1 Sep 1965.
**** JCS Msg 1153, DTG 091447Z Sep 65.

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Figure B-3

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1965



*Augmented by TDY/
TDY MTT's as required

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(b) The preparation of the above plan in a timely manner was beyond the then current personnel resources of MACSOG.

(c) This augmentation would constitute the MACSOG Plans Branch, then non-existent. In addition to carrying out the above tasks, the Branch would assist in preparing inputs for other operations plans relevant to SEAsia.

(3) In November 1965, COMUSMACV/CINCPAC submitted for JCS approval a new JTD reflecting an increase of 63 personnel spaces.*

(a) A recapitulation of those spaces follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	35	22	24	8	89
Enlisted	57	19	28	10	114
Total	92	41	52	18	203
[redacted]					
USIS					2
[redacted]					

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b) A breakout of the increase of 63 spaces follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	9		9	1	19
Enlisted	28	3	12	—	43
Total	37	3	21	1	62
USIS					1
Grand Total					63

* 1. (S) CINCPAC Letter of 16 November 1965. Serial-001605.
2. (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum, "Proposed JTD for Studies and Observations Group, USMACV, 15 October 1965 (U)," 7 December 1965

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(c) Key changes in the proposed JTD were:

1. The addition of -

a. A Plans Branch (previously approved as an augmentation - paragraph D2b(2), above).

b. A Medical Section.

c. A Special Assistant for Airborne Operations, an Army colonel, to supervise SHINING BRASS.

d. A Civilian Personnel Officer for administering foreign nationals.

e. A Liaison Officer to the South Vietnamese counterpart organization, then known as the Strategic Technical Service.

f. An Executive Officer.

2. Redesignation of the CAS deputy to Special Advisor to Commander, SOG.

(d) Justification for the above increase was that a general increase in personnel was needed to support SHINING BRASS,* a new program, and OPLAN 34A operations.

(e) In the process of staffing the proposed 15 October 1965 JTD, the Navy questioned the requirement for a Special Assistant for Airborne Operations and recommended the addition of a Comptroller Section,** All Services concurred in the addition of a Comptroller Section.*** The Air Force considered that if the position of Special Assistant for Airborne Operations were retained, two new positions -- a Special Assistant for Air Operations and a Special Assistant

* SHINING BRASS was the code name assigned to cross-border operations into Laos, which began in September 1965

** (S) Navy Personnel Policy Memorandum for the Director for Personnel, The Joint Staff (J-1), "Proposed Joint Table of Distribution for Studies and Observations Group (SOG), USMACV, 15 October 1965 (U)," 22 December 1965. Navy PM 17-65. (Responsible for the financial planning and budgeting for the funding of OPLAN 34A and SHINING BRASS, the Navy pointed out that such funding during FY 66 should amount to at least $15 million and that a Comptroller Section of five Naval personnel should be added to the JTD.)

*** (TS) Chief, Special Operations Division/OSACSA Memorandum to General Anthis, "MACSOG Proposed JTD (U)," 27 December 1965

for Maritime Operations -- should be added, both in the grade of O-6.* CINCPAC's views on the foregoing were requested.** The Service staffing of the JTD was completed in 1966, its ultimate disposition is set forth in succeeding paragraphs.

c. 1966

(1) In response to the JCS request for his views on the requirements for a Special Assistant for Airborne Operations and a Comptroller Section, as indicated in the succeeding paragraph, CINCPAC:***

(a) Provided additional justification for the Special Assistant and recommended that other Section Chief positions not be upgraded.

(b) Concurred in the addition of the Comptroller Section.

(2) Accordingly, in approving the 15 October JTD on 2 March 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized an increase of 67 spaces for MACSOG.****

(a) With that approval, the manpower breakout of MACSOG was as follows:#

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total	
Officer	35	24	24	8	91	(b)(1)
Enlisted	57	21	28	10	116	(b)(3)
Total	92	45	52	18	207	

[redacted]

USIS 2 [redacted]

* (TS) Air Force Policy Memorandum for the Director for Personnel, the Joint Staff, "Proposed JTD for Studies and Observations Group, USMACV, 15 October 1965," 23 December 1965. AF PM 19-65.

** (S) JCS Msg 9523, DTG 292111Z Dec 65.

*** (S) CINCPAC Msg 192102Z Jan 66.

**** The initial COMUSMACV/CINCPAC recommendation was an increase of 63 spaces. The difference of four spaces was accounted for by the addition of a Comptroller Section of five and the subtraction of an existing space from another MACSOG staff agency and the converting and shifting of it to the Comptroller Section.

(S) JCS Msg 5162, DTG 021850Z Mar 66.

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(b) At Figure B-4 is an organizational chart of MACSOG embodying the structural changes in the 15 October 1965 JTD.*

(3) In February and March 1966, COMUSMACV/CINCPAC recommended further MACSOG manpower changes.

(a) The net additions were:**

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	2		8	2	12
Warrant Officer	1				1
Enlisted	5	7	8	5	25
Total	8	7	16	7	38

(b) The primary justification for the above increase was the need for personnel to handle expanded SHINING BRASS activities.

(c) With JCS approval on 4 May 1966, the manpower authorization for MACSOG was:***

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total	
Officer	38	24	32	10	104	(b)(1)
Enlisted	62	28	36	15	141	(b)(3)
Total					245	

[redacted]

USIS 2

[redacted]

(4) In April and May 1966, COMUSMACV/CINCPAC recommended the net addition of one Army officer space and two Air Force enlisted spaces to the MACSOG JTD.****

* (S) MACSOG JTD, 15 October 1965, Part II.

** 1. (S) COMUSMACV Msg 033, DTG 200225Z Feb 66.
2. (S) COMUSMACV Msg 0538, DTG 070920Z Mar 66.
3. (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 250513Z Mar 66.
4. (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS Memorandum, "Changes to MACSOG JTD (U)," 7 April 1966

*** (S) JCS Msg 1047, DTG 042047Z May 66.

**** 1. (S) COMUSMACV Msg 1026, DTG 151152Z Apr 66.
2. (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 222333 Apr 66.
3. (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 142059Z May 66.
4. (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 070218Z Jun 66.
5. (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum, "MACSOG JTD Changes (U)," 14 June 1966.

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Figure B-4

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

AS OF 15 OCTOBER 1965



*Augmented by TDY/TDY MTTS as required

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(6) During the staffing of the proposed personnel increase outlined in paragraph (5) above, COMUSMACV/CINCPAC recommended the addition of five spaces to the MACSOG JTD for manning of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, SEAsia.*

(a) A breakout of those five spaces follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
Officer	1	1	1	3
Enlisted	1	1	_	2
Total	2	2	1	5

(b) Justification for the above spaces was that they were needed to establish a JPRC. The center would: serve as a focal point for the coordination and collation of all information and intelligence bearing on personnel recovery; plan and coordinate the operational aspects of recovery for assistance of US/Allied personnel either detained or held prisoner by enemy forces.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the increase on 19 October.** This approval resulted in the following revised MACSOG JTD:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	40	25	33	10	108
Enlisted	63	32	38	15	148 (b)(1)
Total	103	57	71	25	256 (b)(3)
[redacted]					
USIS					2
[redacted]					

* 1. (S) COMUSMACV Msg 41342, DTG 140420Z Sep 66.
2. (S) COMUSMACV Msg 2924, DTG 150717Z Sep 66.
3. (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 230314Z Sep 66.
4. (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, "MACV Studies and Observations Group (SOG) JTD Changes," 7 Oct 66.

** (S) JCS Msg 5932, DTG 192356Z Oct 66.

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(a) Justification for the increase was on the basis that additional personnel were needed in the Airborne Section and the Air Operations Section.

(b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the increase on 21 June 1966.* This approval resulted in the following revised MACSOG JTD:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	39	24	32	10	105
Enlisted	62	28	38	15	143 (b)(1) (b)(3)
Total	101	52	70	25	248
[redacted]					
USIS					2
[redacted]					

(5) In September 1966, COMUSMACV/CINCPAC recommended an increase of three Navy enlisted spaces to the MACSOG JTD.**

(a) Justification for the increase was the need for communications technicians to support a new communications sub-station.

(b) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the increase on 20 October 1966.*** This approval resulted in the following revised MACSOG JTD.

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	39	24	32	10	105
Enlisted	62	31	38	15	146
Total	101	55	70	25	251
[redacted]					
USIS					2
[redacted]					

* (C) JCS Msg 4833, DTG 211458Z Jun 66.
** 1. (S) COMUSMACV Msg 3004, DTG 220147Z Sep 66.
2. (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 272021Z Sep 66.
3. (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum, "Studies and Observations Group JTD, 15 October 1966 (U)," 3 October 1966.
*** (S) JCS Msg 5937, DTG 200010Z Oct 66.

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(7) In November 1966, COMUSMACV/CINCPAC recommended a net addition of four personnel spaces to the MACSOG JTD.*

(a) A breakout of these four spaces follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	2		1		3
Enlisted	1		–		1
Total	3		1		4

(b) Justification for this increase was the need for: an officer to provide overall research and development coordination and supervision; an officer to develop procedures and plans for search and recovery operations, to coordinate with external agencies, and to brief air crews of all Services on escape and evasion (E&E) procedures in SEAsia; an officer to develop a survival and E&E program for all Army aviation in the theater and to coordinate the program, and an NCO to assist the operations officer in the development of plans and procedures for search and recovery activities.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the increase on 6 December 1966.** This approval resulted in the following revised MACSOG JTD.

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	42	25	34	10	111
Enlisted	64	32	38	15	149 (b)(1) (b)(3)
Total	106	57	72	25	260
[redacted]					
USIS					2
[redacted]					

* 1. (S) COMUSMACV Msg 3527, DTG 020104Z Nov 66.
2. (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 160212Z Nov 66.
3. (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum, "MACV Studies and Observations Group (SOG) JTD Changes (U)," 22 November 1966.

** JCS Msg 9654, DTG 061806Z Dec 66.

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d. 1967

(1) On 30 October 1967, COMUSMACV forwarded for CINCPAC and JCS approval a new MACSOG JTD.* Subsequently approved by CINCPAC, the JTD embodied a manpower increase of 141 (from 275 to 416).**

(a) A recapitulation of the above 416 spaces follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	77	27	40	11	155 (b)(1) (b)(3)
Enlisted	138	52	47	14	251
Total	215	79	87	25	406
[redacted]					
USIS					1****
[redacted]					

(b) A breakout of the increase of 141 follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	35	2	6	1	44
Enlisted	74	20	9	-1	102
Total	109	22	15	0	141
CAS					-4
USIS					-1
Grand Total					141

* (S) Enclosure to COMUSMACV Letter, Proposed Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) for Studies and Observations Group, USMACV, for 1 October 1967, (U)," 30 October 1967. Serial 001413.

** 1. Ibid., p. 1.
2. (C) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum, "Proposed SOG JTD, dated 1 October 1967, (U)," 17 November 1967.

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

**** Number of USIS personnel decreased from 2 to 1.

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(c) Justification for the above increase was that two additional major programs, DANIEL BOONE and MUSCLE SHOALS, had been added; in addition other operations had greatly increased in scope.*

(d) The staffing of the above proposed JTD was completed in 1968.

e. 1968

(1) A major staffing action attendant to the proposed MACSOG JTD, to be effective 1 October 1967, centered around the transfer from MACSOG to the 7th Air Force 44 personnel spaces for operating C-123 aircraft. In this connection, MACSOG and 7th Air Force agreed to the consolidation of supporting USAF assets at Wha Trang under a Deputy Commander of Special Air Warfare.** The transfer of these 44 Air Force spaces, concurred in by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC, commensurately decreased the proposed JTD from 416 to 372 spaces. Actual transfer was made on 15 August 1968.***

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* 1. COMUSMACV Letter, op. cit., p. 1.
2. (TS) Annex G, 1967 MACV Command History, p. G-1. The DANIEL BOONE Program initiated in June 1967, involved cross-border operations into Cambodia. The MUSCLE SHOALS, later changed to IGLOO WHITE, Program was initiated in October 1967. It was an air-supported anti-infiltration system near the 17th parallel. MACSOG activities in support of the system were largely incorporated into the Laotian cross-border operations, i.e., the SHINING BRASS, later changed to PRAIRIE FIRE, Program.

** 1. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG, 030120Z Jan 68.
2. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 108, DTG 071006Z Jan 68.
3. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 081650Z Jan 68.
4. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 02255, DTG 201130Z Jan 68.
5. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 020135Z Feb 68.
6. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 032253Z Feb 68.
7. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 732, DTG 120530Z Feb 68.
8. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 060125Z Mar 68 (repeated to JCS in Msg DTG 150321Z Mar 68).

*** (TS) Annex F, 1968 MACV Command History, pp. F-2, and F-3.

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(2) With ensuing JCS approval of the JTD, MACSOG was authorized the following manpower:*

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	77	27	20	11	135
Enlisted	138	52	23	14	227 (b)(1) (b)(3)
Total	215	79	43	25	362
[redacted]					
USIS					1
[redacted]					

(3) At Figure B-5 is an organizational chart of MACSOG as contained in the above JTD.**

(4) On 3 October 1968, COMUSMACV directed a decrease of 11 military spaces, thereby reducing the MACSOG manpower authorization [redacted] en[redacted]***

(5) On 7 December 1968, Chief, MACSOG reorganized the headquarters into more clearly defined lines and staff organization. At Figure B-6 is a chart depicting that organization.****

f. 1969

(1) COMUSMACV, in his letter of 18 November 1968, proposed adjustments and/or augmentation to six MACV JTDs. The MACSOG JTD requested the decrease of eleven military spaces set forth in paragraph e(4), above.#

* (Ø) JCS Msg 4339, DTG 2218492 Mar 68
** Enclosure to COMUSMACV Letter, op. cit., Part II, page 48.
*** 1. Annex F, op. cit., p. F-2.
2. (Ø) Personnel Directorate (J-1) Memorandum, "CORDS, USMACV JTD, Nov 68 (U)," 6 January 1969, paragraph 3e(5). J1M-8-69.
**** Ibid., p. F-A-1.
\# 1. (Ø) COMUSMACV Letter, "Proposed Change to USMACV JTD," 18 November 1968.
2. (Ø) Personnel Directorate (J-1) Memorandum, "CORDS, USMACV JTD, Nov 68 (U)," 6 January 1969, paragraph 3e(5). J1M-8-69.

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Figure B-5

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART AS OF 30 OCTOBER 1967



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Figure B-6

MACSOG ORGANIZATION OF DECEMBER — 1969

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART AS OF 7 DECEMBER 1968



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(a) A recapitulation of the adjusted JTD follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	71	24	19	11	125
Enlisted	138	52	23	13	226
Total	209	76	42	24	351
[redacted]					
USIS					1
[redacted]					

(b)(1) (b)(3)

(b) In subsequent staff actions one DOD-supported Navy civilian was added to the above JTD. Thus, MACSOG was authorized 362 personnel: 125 officers, 226 enlisted, and 1 civilian, [redacted] and 1 USIS personnel.*

(2) On 22 February 1969, COMUSMACV forwarded for CINCPAC and JCS approval a proposed change to the MACSOG JTD.** This change involved a net addition of 12 military spaces, increasing the manpower authorization [redacted]

(a) A recapitulation of the JTD, after incorporating into it the above changes, follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	68	27	19	8	122
Enlisted	130	78	23	10	241
Civilian	—	1	—	—	1
Total	198	106	42	18	364
[redacted]					
USIS					1
[redacted]					

(b)(1) (b)(3)

* (S) JCS Msg 1308, DTG 281955Z Jan 69.
** (S) COMUSMACV Letter, "Proposed Change to USMACV Studies and Observations Group Joint Table of Distribution, 30 October 1967," 22 February 1969. MACV Serial 001386-69.

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(b) A breakout of the additions, deletions, and adjustments follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	-3	+3		-3	-3
Enlisted	-8	+26		-3	+15
Civilian	—	—		—	—
Total	-11	+29		-6	+12

(c) Justification for the above changes was the need for a Naval Mobile Support Team of 39 personnel This team would provide continued maintenance support of craft used in maritime operations. Since 1964 that support had been performed by naval personnel on a TDY basis. The provision of such personnel on a permanent basis would simplify strength accounting procedures.

(d) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the adjusted JTD as reflected above.*

(3) On 12 April 1969, COMUSMACV forwarded for CINCPAC and JCS approval a proposed revision to the MACSOG JTD.** This revision involved a realignment of military personnel authorizations, with no change in the total number of authorized personnel. CINCPAC approved the revision in May 1969.***

(a) A recapitulation of the revised JTD follows:**

* JCS Msg 5551, DTG 261934Z Mar 69.
** 1. (S) COMUSMACV Letter, "Proposed Revision to USMACV Studies and Observations Group Joint Table of Distribution (JTD)," 12 April 1969. Serial S001997-69.
2. (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum for Record," USMACV SOG JTD, March 1969 (U)," 20 May 1969.
*** CINCPAC Msg 130219Z May 69.

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	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	66	28	19	6	119
Enlisted	139	72	23	10	244
Civilian	—	1	—	—	—
Total	205	101	42	16	364

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

USIS	1

[redacted]

(b) A breakout of the adjustments follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	-2	+1		-2	-3
Enlisted	+9	-6			+3
Civilian	—	—		—	—
Total	+7	-5		-2	0

(c) Justification for the above adjustments was to align personnel authorizations with mission requirements.

(d) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the revised JTD as reflected above.*

(e) At Figure B-7 is an organizational chart of MACSOG as contained in the above JTD.**

(4) On 24 May 1969, COMUSMACV/CINCPAC recommended that the MACSOG JTD be increased by 55 military personnel spaces. The change would be effective in September; meanwhile, documentation for the change would be provided.***

* (~~S~~) JCS Msg 9763, DTG 212040Z May 69.
** (~~S~~) Part II to Enclosure 2 to COMUSMACV Letter, Proposed Revision to USMACV Studies and Observations Group Joint Table of Distribution (JTD)," op. cit.
*** (~~S~~) CINCPAC Msg 242236Z May 69.

Figure B-7

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART AS OF 12 APRIL 1969



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In subsequent staffing actions the figure was decreased from 55 to 49.*

(a) A recapitulation of the revised JTD follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	77	28	20	6	131
Enlisted	168	72	31	10	281
Civilian	—	1	—	—	(b)(1) (b)(3)
Total	245	101	51	16	413

[redacted]

USIS	1

[redacted]

(b) A breakout of the additions follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	+11		+1		+12
Enlisted	+29		+8		+37
Civilian	—		—		—
Total	+40		+9		+49

(c) Justification for the above increase was the need for additional personnel to handle the increased scope of the PRAIRIE FIRE and IGLOO WHITE (formerly MUSCLE SHOALS -- the anti-infiltration system) programs.

(d) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the revised JTD as reflected above.**

* 1. (Ø) COMUSMACV Letter, "Proposed Change to USMACV Studies and Observations Group (SOG) Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), March 1969," 1 September 1969.
2. (Ø) CINCPAC Msg 112327Z Sep 69.
3. (Ø) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum, "USMACV Studies and Observations Group JTD (U)," 15 September 1969. J1M-294-69.
4. (Ø) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum for Record, "USMACV Studies and Observations Group JTD (U)," 7 October 1969.

** (Ø) JCS Msg 1672, DTG 072109Z Oct 69.

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(5) On 25 September 1969, COMUSMACV recommended that the MACSOG JTD be reduced 19 military spaces.* CINCPAC recommended approval.**

(a) A recapitulation of the revised JTD follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	76	26	20	6	128
Enlisted	161	63	31	10	265
Civilian		1			1
Total	237	90	51	16	394
[redacted]					
USIS					1
[redacted]					

(b)(1) (b)(3)

(b) A breakout of the reductions follows:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officer	-1	-2			-3
Enlisted	-7	-9			-16
Civilian					
Total	-8	-11			-19

(c) Justification for the above reductions was that they were a part of an overall CINCPAC reduction program.***

(d) The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the revised JTD as reflected above.****

(e) At Figure B-8 is an organizational chart of MACSOG as contained in its Organization and Functions Manual of 20 June 1969.#

* 1. (C) COMUSMACV Letter, "Proposed Change to USMACV Studies and Observations Group (SOG) Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), March 1969," 25 September 1969.
2. (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1) Memorandum,-"USMACV Studies and Observations Group JTD (U)," 10 October 1969. J1M-323-69.

** (C) CINCPAC Msg DTG 012116Z Oct 69.

*** (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 262159Z Sep 69.

**** (C) JCS Msg 2703, DTG 171432Z Oct 69.

\# (S) MACSOG Organization and Functions Manual, 20 June 1969, p. ii.

Figure B-8
STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART AS OF 20 JUNE 1969



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3. (U) MACSOG Staff Organization

There is no effort here to trace the organizational evolution and functions of MACSOG's individual staff components. These data are in the MACSOG Command Histories (1964-1968) and, more currently, in the MACSOG Organization and Functions Manual at Annex J to this Appendix.

4. (TS) MACSOG Command and Control Detachments

a. Basic to the conduct of cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia (currently the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE Programs, respectively) are the MACSOG command and control (C&C) detachments. Personnel assets for that purpose are organized into three such detachments: Command and Control North (CCN) at Danang; Command and Control Center (CCC) at Kontum; Command and Control South (CCS) at Ban Me Thuot.* Operational details concerning these detachments are outlined in paragraph , below.

b. While the internal organizations of these detachments may vary somewhat, each of them is organized along battalion lines and consist of: a headquarters element, a reconnaissance company, two reaction or exploitation companies, and a security company. The reconnaissance company is authorized 30 teams, each generally composed of three US and nine indigenous personnel. At Figure B-9 is an organizational chart depicting the three detachments, as well as the structure and strength of each.**

c. The current organization of these detachments was evolved over a period of some five years. Cross-border

* 1. (S) Part IV to Enclosure 2 to COMUSMACV Letter, "Proposed Revision to USMACV Studies and Observations Group Joint Table of Distribution (JTD)," 12 April 1969, p. IV-2. Serial S001997-69.
2. (TS) Chief, MACSOG Letter to Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group, "Proposed Reorganization (U)," 31 December 1968.

** (TS) Chief, MACSOG Letter, "Commander's Notes," 13 February 1969. SOG Control # 0002565-69.

Figure B-9

MACSOG
COMMAND AND CONTROL DETACHMENTS
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS AS OF 13 FEBRUARY 1969



COORDINATION

TOTALS OFF 100 EM 615

* Incl in CCN
** Omc; om CCS

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operations into Laos commenced in the summer of 1964 under the code name DELTA and, subsequently LEAPING LENA.* From then until 7 March 1965, these operations were conducted by the 5th SFG with ARVN teams inserted through parachute drops. Generally, these operations were not considered productive, one of the main reasons being the absence of US personnel on the teams. On 7 March 1965, COMUSMACV transferred the responsibility for the program from the 5th SFG to MACSOG and changed its code name to SHINING BRASS.**

d. The basic field operations elements of the C&C detachments are, first, the reconnaissance company which consists of thirty reconnaissance teams and, second the exploitation companies. These elements have been supported by three types of facilities: a training base, the C&C detachment headquarters, and the forward operating bases (FOBs), which were later redesignated as mobile launch teams (MLTs). A brief description of the organizational development of these supporting facilities follows:***

(1) Camp Long Thanh had been activated for sometime in support of training for other MACSOG programs. When the concept for cross-border operations was approved, training techniques were initiated and facilities of the camp were modified or established as necessary to support training of reconnaissance teams and exploitation forces. Classrooms, equipment, training areas, and an air strip were already available. Minor modifications were required to initiate training.

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Theodore Leonard, USA, pp. 1-3.
** (TS) Annex N, 1965 MACV Command History, pp. II-B-1 to II-B-4
*** (TS) MACSOG Reconnaissance Techniques, 1 July 1969.

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(2) The first C&C facility was established on the air field at Danang to control the preparation, launching, operations, and recovery of reconnaissance teams dispatched into Laos. The C&C detachment: supervises the FOBs (MLTs); prepares operations orders; coordinates with various supported and supporting elements, including air support elements; and coordinates communications, administration and logistic support for FOBs (MLTs), reconnaissance teams and exploitation forces. Subsequent to initiation of Cambodian cross-border operations, a second C&C detachment was established at Ban Me Thuot. These two elements were then designated C&C North (CCN) and C&C South (CCS). The heavy enemy activity in the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and SVN and the requirement for increased surveillance in that area brought about the establishment of C&C Central (CCC) in Kontum in January 1969.

(3) Initially, an FOB was established at Danang with the C&C detachment. Eventually, there were six FOBs scattered from just south of the DMZ to Ho Ngoc Tau, near Saigon. The FOB was designed to be relatively self sufficient, having a small staff of personnel, its own encampment and its own security force. This was generally the home base of the force which remained ready for commitment to exploit targets located and developed by the reconnaissance teams. FOBs were charged with providing administrative support, conducting advanced and unit training, briefing, staging, infiltrating, exfiltrating and debriefing of reconnaissance teams and exploitation forces and they acted as the field operations agencies for C&C detachments.

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c (4) The MLT concept was implemented in January 1969. This concept envisioned a small, mobile staff element being satellited on a friendly installation (usually US) located as close as possible to the area of operation of the reconnaissance teams. The MLT depend on the friendly force for security. There are two MLTs on each C&C detachment TD. In addition, CCN is authorized a "Liaison Detachment" which fulfills the MLT functions on a semi-permanent basis at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. This seven man detachment is known as Support Facility (SUPPFAC), Nakhon Phanom (NKP), and operational control is retained by Ground Studies Group (SOG-35).

e. The C&C detachments report directly to MACSOG, more specifically, to the Director of the Ground Studies Group (OP-35), who supervises command over them. US personnel on duty with the detachments are assigned to the 5th SFG and under the operational control of Chief, MACSOG. In this connection, the administrative relationship between the Commanding Officer, 5th SFG and the Chief, MACSOG is elaborated in paragraph ___ below, which deals with personnel and training aspects.

5. (TS) MACSOG Position within MACV

a. It will be noted in paragraph B1, above, that, upon its activation on 24 January 1964, MACSOG was designated as a special staff section of MACV, with J-5 exercising special cognizance of actions accomplished. This position

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accorded MACSOG appears to be at variance with the basic joint State-DOD-CAS guidance, cited in paragraph C, above which called for the formation of a MACV/CAS task force to carry out the approved portions of OPLAN 34A.

b. In this connection, the available documentation indicates that in August 1968, MACV J-5 studied MACSOG's status and relationship to J-5. The results of that study are summarized as follows:*

(1) Discussion

(a) MACV J-5, in coordination with CAS, Saigon, planned the establishment of SOG. Upon SOG's establishment MACV J-5 had primary staff cognizance. This appears logical, since SOG was established as a result of MACV J-5 planning and was initially staffed by only six officers and two enlisted men. As time progressed the SOG organization was greatly expanded. The J-31 study in September 1965 indicated that following a year and a half of SOG's growth the MACV J-5 position was one of a central point of contact within the MACV staff in order to limit knowledge and to provide security for the sensitive 34A program.** In the

* MACV J-54 Memorandum for Record, "MACV J-5 Relationship with SOG," 16 August 1968. J-54 (Chief, Special Plans) forwarded this memorandum to J-5 on 19 August 1968.

** (TS) MACV J-3 Memorandum for Brigadier General DePuy, "34A Project," 8 September 1965. The enclosure to that memorandum is a study of OPLAN 34A the purpose of which was: to determine the validity and effectiveness of current organizations and programs in support of OPLAN 34A and to make recommendations for future actions in support of this plan. Paragraph 3e to the enclosure/study stated in essence that: the former MACV Chief of Staff had acted in the capacity of immediate superior to Chief, SOG and had provided the necessary general officer supervision required to solve a substantial number of major SOG actions. The Chief of Staff had forwarded to COMUSMACV those SOG matters requiring his personal attention; MACV J-5 had acted as the central point of contact for the MACV staff; under that arrangement, SOG brought all matters requiring MACV staff action to the J-5 Section which staffed them, as necessary to other appropriate agencies.

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last three years (September 1965 to August 1968), the number of MACV staff members cleared for access to SOG information has increased to forty-three. SOG conducts frequent coordination with J-2, J-3 (COC), J-5 and occasional coordination with other MACV staff sections. It would appear that "security for sensitive programs" is no longer a prime justification for a MACV J-5/SOG special relationship, particularly in view of MACV Staff Memorandum 380-7, dated 16 July 1968, which states that the authority to grant access to SOG information within MACV rests only with COMUSMACV, Deputy COMUSMACV, MACV Chief of Staff, MACV J-2, and Chief, MACSOG.

(b) A review of special operations (e.g., PRAIRIE FIRE, DANIEL BOONE) indicates that when such new concepts were initially being considered MACV J-5 coordinated the study effort. Once these operations were approved, the programs were turned over to SOG for implementation.

(2) Conclusions

(a) SOG is not a MACV staff section but rather a supporting command, equivalent to a Field Force, under the operational control of COMUSMACV.*

(b) SOG coordinates a majority of its matters (mostly operational) with MACV staff sections other than J-5.

* (C) MACV Directive 10-11, "Organization and Functions - Command Relationship and Terms of Reference for USMACV (U)," 1 November 1968. Paragraph 9a(10) of that directive lists MACSOG under the MACV category of "Component Commands, Subordinate Commands, Advisory Groups and Detachments," In Annex A of the directive an organizational chart is presented which depicts SOG as a separate organizational reporting directly to COMUSMACV.

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(c) The "special" position MACV J-5 may have had as a planner of the original SOG (eight personnel) has been overtaken by events with the growth of SOG [redacted], and the establishment of a plans branch within the SOG organization. (b)(1) (b)(3)

(d) MACV J-5 is not really a "cover" for SOG within the MACV staff as some may think, since existing clearances permit SOG to deal directly with almost all staff sections as well as most major component and supporting commands.

(e) The MACV J-5 function to "monitor" the activities of SOG is interpreted as meaning "to keep abreast of SOG policies, programs and operations" for purposes of permitting an educated approach in matters related to special operations and UW planning. Additionally, MACV J-5 is an interested agency for SOG planning functions requiring MACV staff review or coordination.

6. (TS) Views Concerning the Organization of MACSOG

On the subject of the organization of MACSOG, representative views of persons interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association are set forth below. Their detailed views on the subject are presented in Annex K.

a. Colonel William R. Becker, USAF (1964)

The MACSOG organization started out rather loosely and grew rapidly in different directions, none of which had been predicted. The organization had to be constantly changed and added to. Perhaps this sounds as if MACSOG was rather disorganized from the standpoint of organization, but that is not so. I would contrast the MACSOG organization with a JUWTF. When I last saw it, the JUWTF organization

was to have a set JTD and would come into existence when a SOG-type organization was needed. Any future SOG must be tailored especially to the situation or theater in which it will be operating. I cannot visualize any two SOGs being the same. When I was assigned to SOG, the organization needed was not the same even within a three or four month period. The organization has to be flexible and adaptable to changing conditions, in order to be able to assume new missions and operate under new concepts.

b. Lieutenant Colonel David H. Arno, USAF (1964-1966)

(1) A covert operation should be conducted by a clearly defined task force or command. It is only by forming an organization such as JUWTF can the Services provide the necessary personnel and other resources. MACSOG would have operated more efficiently if it had been so organized.

(2) Although a truly covert operation is difficult for a uniformed Service to perform, it can be done provided there is a clear understanding of what covert operations necessitate, including the special funding and personnel arrangements needed if the operation is to be covert. I feel that a truly covert operation probably should be conducted by CAS.

c. Colonel Edward A. Partain, USA (1964-1965)

If the military is to be involved in SOG-type operations, an organization, with the necessary personnel, should be set up beforehand. One example of an organization for this purpose is a JUWTF.

d. Colonel John J. Windsor, Jr., USMC (1965-1966)

A SOG-type organization should be task organized exactly as it was, i.e., have task elements that can be added like building blocks to the task force based upon the nature of the operations to be conducted.

e. Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, USA (1965-1966)

Organization and operations in accord with the JUWTF concept were not accepted at various higher echelons. I had to use the basic MACSOG organization as it existed upon my arrival although I felt that the application of a true JUWTF operational concept would have enabled us to produce better results.

f. Colonel John T. Moore, Jr., USAF (1965-1966)

MACSOG should have been organized and operated in a JUWTF.

g. Lieutenant Colonel Vincent W. Lang, USA (1965-1966)

The JUWTF provides a command structure far more suited for special operations than that of MACSOG.

h. Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA (1966-1968)

(1) I am not completely sold that the JUWTF organization, as taught in our Service schools, is the most efficient way of performing UW missions. I object to retaining Service components within the JUWTF concept. Unconventional warfare should be conducted as a national effort, in which the Services lose their identity. While this type of organization requires personnel of particular skills that are attained as a result of duty in a Service, I see no real advantage to retaining component identity and organization within the JUWTF concept. There should be a task force tailored in each case for the particular area of operations. The task force should include those Service personnel of the appropriate skill but not Service components representing the concepts and doctrines of a particular Service.

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MACSOG is really a joint task force.

(2) The establishment of a JUWTF of the type portrayed in our manuals and in some of our war plans should be tied to the establishment of a theater of operations under a single commander rather than trying to apply the concept under the present unusual command relations in Southeast Asia.

i. Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN (1966-1969)

(1) I am opposed to the JUWTF organization insofar as it is applied to a program such as FOOTBOY, that developed into an integrated subversion program in which many UW techniques were employed. The reason for my opposition is that I see the JUWTF organization as an extension of conventional military organizational concepts and of Service parochialism; these extend down to the lowest operating level through the inclusion of component commanders in the organization. In working to achieve a fully integrated program, we should organize functionally, with resources assigned to enable the carrying out of functions regardless of Service. The organization should be completely integrated or, if it is compartmented, it should be compartmented along functional and not Service lines.

(2) The JUWTF concept does have advantages, however, particularly in the more conventional unconventional operations. When using either US forces primarily or purely direct action-type forces, e.g., ranger forces, on raids, military reconnaissance, or more conventionalized UW operations, a JUWTF may offer advantages simply because it is an understandable organization from a Service viewpoint. There is also an advantage in providing logistic

support of conventional items; I might add here, however, that this advantage is negated to some degree in that the JUWTF concept is inappropriate with respect to the provision of logistic support of sophisticated unconventional warfare items needed for covert operations.

j. Colonel Benton M. Austin, USA (1966-1967)

I am sure there were better ways to organize the MACSOG effort than were used. Perhaps the distribution of Service representation was not as well balanced as it should have been. In addition, the competition for personnel between MACSOG and the 5th SFG would not have been of the magnitude it was if, in the first place, MACSOG had been tailored for its mission. The JUWTF organization, with its own Special Forces operational base and equivalent air and naval units, would have been advantageous.

k. Colonel Robert C. Kendrick, USA (1966-1969)

(1) I have often wondered why MACSOG and the 5th SFG were not put under a single headquarters or control agency. The personnel who run MACSOG's field operations are assigned to the 5th SFG, under the Headquarters, US Army Vietnam, while MACSOG itself is under Headquarters, MACV. Should Chief, MACSOG and Commanding Officer, 5th SFG not get along well together, MACSOG's operations could be impaired. Moreover, I feel that administrative and logistical systems could be streamlined, with savings in personnel, if MACSOG and the 5th SFG were placed under a central command.

(2) With respect to the current organization OP-35, who commands the forces engaged in cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia, should move out of Saigon and establish his headquarters closer the the scene of his operations, possibly in Kontum. Such a move would facilitate coordination of these operations.

l. Colonel Eugene A. Wahl, USAF (1966-1967)

(1) I definitely feel that there is a place in the military establishment for an organization such as MACSOG. When we stopped bombing the north we should have been stronger there than we were; in fact, we should have had a strong covert capability there and, with cessation of the bombing, we should have increased our covert activity.

(2) The need for intelligence is so great that MACSOG should be expanded to enable it to obtain the intelligence.

m. Colonel George A. Maloney, USA (1967-1969)

(1) Cross-border operations require a highly trained and very responsible organization if they are to be successful. Such an organization tends to be top-heavy and its cutting edge is not as proportionately large as that of conventional forces.

(2) Equipment such as helicopters should not be used to perform dual roles of supporting both special and conventional operations. This applies not only from the viewpoint of security, i.e., plausible deniability, but from the need to respond rapidly to sensitive operational situations, e.g., extracting a team on an emergency basis.

n. Colonel Harold K. Aaron, USA (1967-1969)

(1) Chief, MACSOG was responsible for so many operations of varied scopes that his span of control far exceeded his capabilities. Limiting his responsibilities to operations against North Vietnam would have been a practical approach to the span of control problem.

(2) There was a proposal to create two Special Forces groups in South Vietnam -- one for in-country operations and the other for out-of-country operations. These groups would have been under a single commander. In my view, this proposal had considerable merit.

(3) I think that the JUWTF concept bears some consideration in its application to MACSOG.

o. Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF (1968-1969)

(1) MACSOG could operate as a JUWTF. Also, it operates effectively now.

(2) In all of our programs, except for cross-border operations, we are basically the advisor. With that exception, the Vietnamese presumably run the programs. Thus, we have this dichotomy of the functions of MACSOG: advisory; operational; quasi-operational (in the case of the Air Operations Group); advisory and support (in the case of MAROPS).

(3) MACSOG should have its own helicopter resources. These can be either dedicated or assigned to SOG.

p. Colonel Herbert O. Graeser, USA (1969).

MACSOG grew like topsy. Perhaps there was no way of foreseeing the type of organization that would eventuate. However, when the 5th SFG, which has a separate mission of its own and reports to US Army Vietnam, has to furnish personnel, on an operational control basis, to MACSOG, which reports to MACV, there are built-in problems that have caused some friction. This is not to say that the problem cannot be worked out by the two unit heads, but there is no need to create problems if control of the resources and the operations themselves can be placed under a single organization. In short, the operations have been conducted along personality lines rather than organizational lines.

q. Lieutenant Colonel James R. McCarthy, USAF (1968-1969)

What we needed to do was to organize a unit, maybe a JUWTF, in which each Service would provide a package. Organize and then operate and not vice versa as in the case of MACSOG.

r. Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh, USA (1968-1969)

(1) The reorganization of MACSOG in December 1968 was designed to provide a complete joint and special staff and to organize the various staff and operating elements, such as OP-34 and OP-35, and OP-31 and OP-32 into actual field commands. Prior to December 1968 they were independent staff agencies.

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(2) An organization such as MACSOG must be joint in that these are Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine type functions which must be pulled together.

(3) The 5th SFG Group should be divorced from SOG, which should have been provided with its own organic reconnaissance capability. A Special Forces unit should have been organized and provided to MACSOG not only for security but for control and administraion reasons.

(4) It is essential that helicopter assets, both troop carrier and gun ships, be organically assigned and dedicated to the MACSOG mission. Seventy percent of the assets being used by MACSOG in July 1969, for example, are fragged from helicopter units of the general support type or are organic to US divisions. These aircraft and their crews are generally rotated by their parent units into the MACSOG mission approximately every two or three weeks. Therefore, the C&C Detachments are habitually training new crews in the techniques of insertion and extraction, and briefing them on the rules of engagement which apply in the various operational areas. This lack of dedicated aircraft has resulted in numerous aircraft accidents and losses of of team members. In addition, it precipitated an incident of international proportions due to the lack of familiarity with the operational area and the inadequate training of the crews.

(5) By not handling important administrative and morale matters, e.g., decorations, for those personnel under his operational control only, Chief, MACSOG lacks a principal tool of command.

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(6) However, my working relationships with the 5th Special Forces Group were close and effective. I do not believe I could have had any better support from any other unit except one that was directly assigned to MACSOG for complete control administration, etc.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* (TS) MACV J-31 Memorandum for Brigadier General DePuy, "34A Project," 8 September 1965. Paragraph 36 in the enclosure to that memorandum contains limited information on the transfer of assets. (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted]

*** (TS) JCS Msg 1119, DTG 052116 Jun 63.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* Annex A, 1964 MACV Command History, p. II-9.

** [redacted]

*** (S) Memorandum for Capt Cady, from LTC William J. Ryan, SACSA/Exec Officer and Military Secretary, "MACSOG Documentation," 14 November 1969. SACSAM-906-69S. (This memorandum forwards CIA inputs to the Documentation Project.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

c [redacted]

[redacted]

* 1. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 062351Z Jun 64.
[redacted]

(b)(3)

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[redacted]

* By NSAM 280, dated 14 February 1964, the President established a committee "for the management of US policy and operations in SVN."

** [redacted]

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c

[redacted]

t

j

* (TS) JCS Msg 9660, DTG 092026Z Oct 64.

** (TS) JCS Memorandum for the SecDef, "North Vietnam Operations (U)," 19 May 1964. JCSM 426-64. As presented in Part IV (OPLAN 34A), above, the President approved initially a four month program of actions against NVN. That program covered the period 1 February-31 May 1964 and was referred to as Phase I within the total program of twelve months. Phase II would begin on 1 June 1964.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* 1. (TS) Deputy SecDef Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. (TS) JCS Msg 6829, DTG 122101 Jun 64.
** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 5521, DTG 280351Z Jun 64.

[redacted]

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* The subject of a resistance movement in NVN is treated in Appendix C (Operations Against NVN). In the final analysis, US policy precluded the development of this movement. For example, see JCS Msg 2455, DTG 241352Z Sep 65 (TS), which in essence stated that national policy would not authorize resistance and guerrilla warfare. Plans for such warfare would be processed as contingency plans.

[redacted]

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* (S) Enclosure to SACSA informal memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff, 12 June 1964.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

c

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* Ibid.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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[redacted]

* (TS) JCS Msg 7903, DTG 131727Z Aug 64.

** 1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

c [redacted]

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 0921, DTG 111119Z Jan 65.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

c [redacted]

* 1. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 0978, DTG 120730Z Jan 65.
2. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 130321 Jan 65.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* (TS) JCS Msg 3897, DTG 191348Z Jan 65.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 12802, DTG 200038Z Apr 65.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

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(b)(3)

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c

[redacted]

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

c [redacted]

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 531, DTG 260315Z Aug 65.
** (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 080407Z Sep 65.
*** (TS) MACV ACofS J-5 Disposition Form to COMUSMACV "Growing Discord Between CAS and SOG" (TS LIMDIS SPECAT)," 30 March 1966.
**** (TS) Tab A to MACV ACofS J-5 Disposition Form, op. cit., p. 3.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 592, DTG 050220Z Sep 65.
** (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 091213Z Sep 65.
*** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 630, DTG 091218Z Sep 65.
[redacted]
\# (S) JCS Msg 1513, DTG 141330Z Sep 65

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 162149Z Sep 65.
** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 670, 150853Z Sep 65.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

** (c) COMUSMACV Msg 840, DTG 050526Z Oct 65.

*** [redacted]

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* 1. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg DTG 160710Z Oct 65.
2. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg DTG 160712Z Oct 65.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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[redacted]

* (TS) JCS Msg 4638, DTG 211415Z Oct 65.
** 1. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 976, DTG 231005Z Oct 65.
2. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 231820Z Oct 65.
3. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 272139Z Oct 65.
*** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 1276, DTG 030720Z Dec 65.
**** (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 1288, DTG 040350Z Dec 65.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

c

[redacted]

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 1354, DTG 110124Z Dec 65.

** [redacted]

*** (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 160105Z Dec 65.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* (TS) CCMUSMACV Msg 44209, DTG 180150Z Dec 65.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg DTG 270327Z Dec 65.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 010009Z Jan 66.

** 1. (TS) CINCPAC referred specifically to JCS Msg 3995, DTG 212235Z Jan 65 as containing the procedures which should govern the submission and approval of proposed 34A operations.

2. [redacted]

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[redacted]

* (TS) JCS Msg 1716, DTG 161511Z Sep 65.
** (TS) Annex N, 1965 MACV Command History, p. II-B-1.

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[redacted]

* (TS) Chief, Special Operations Division/OSACSA Informal Memorandum to Major General Piers, "Attached Proposed Answer to Mr. Colby," 1 March 1966.
** (TS) Tab A to MACV ACofS J-5 Disposition Form, op. cit., p. 4.

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*1. (TS) (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 090335Z June 65.
2. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 290502Z Aug 65.
3. Tab A to MACV ACofS J-5 Disposition Form, op. cit., p. 4.
4. [redacted]
5. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg DTG 150936Z Nov 65.
** (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 302130Z Oct 65.

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* 1. (TS) SACSA Memorandum for the Deputy SecDef, "Operation Plan 34A (U)," 30 November 1965.
2. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 240245Z Nov 65.

** (TS) Tab A to MACV ACofS J-5 Disposition Form, op. cit., p. 6.

*** Chief, MACSOG Disposition Form to Colonel Schweiter, 16 January 1966. Chief, MACSOG commented on General Anthis - Hutchin exchange of letters regarding CINCPAC's SOG mission statement.

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* (S) CINCPAC Msg DTG 2203422 Jan 66.

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* (TS) JCS Msg 4931, DTG 282014Z Feb 66.
** 1. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg DTG 010953Z Apr 66.
2. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 251830Z Apr 66.
3. (TS) Chief, Special Operations Division/CSACSA Memorandum for Major General Peers, "CAS/SOG Coordination and JTD Problems (S)," 26 April 1966.
*** (TS) SACSA Memorandum for Mr. William E. Colby, Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Support of OPLAN 34A, North Vietnam Operations (TS)," 27 April 1966. SACSA M-435-66.

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* (TS) MACV ACofS J-5 Disposition Form, op. cit., p. 2.

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* (TS) Tao A to MACV ACofS J-5 Disposition Form, op. cit., p. 4.
** Ibid., p. 5.
*** (S) JCS Msg 7891, DTG 141955 Jul 64.

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(b)(3)

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* (TS) Enclosure A to Chief, Special Operations Division/CSACSA Memorandum for the SACSA, "Vietnam Trip Report," 17 July 1964.
** (S) JCS Msg 9003, DTG 241725Z Sep 64.
*** (S) Personnel Directorate (J-1), Manpower Division, OJCS, Memorandum, "Revised Studies and Observations Group (SOG), USMACV, 1 January 1965 JTD (U)," 5 January 1965.
**** (TS) Chief, Special Operations Division/OSACSA Informal Memorandum to Major General Peers, op. cit.
\# (TS) Tab E to MACV ACofS J-5 Disposition Form, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

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** 1. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 302150Z Oct 65.
2. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg DTG 050909Z Nov 65.
3. (TS) Tab A to MACV ACofS Disposition Form, op. cit., p. 5.

*** (TS) SACSA Memorandum for Mr. William E. Colby, Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit.

**** 1. (S) Memorandum for the Record by LTC Harold F. Bentz, Jr., USA, Special Operations Division/CSACSA, "OPLAN 34A [redacted] - Meeting Between Major General Peers and Mr. Bill Colby (S)," 17 May 1966.

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F. (~~TS~~) COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. (~~S~~) General

a. Due largely to political sensitivities, MACSOG operations have been subjected to tight controls at the Washington level. According to various authorities in the field that control, especially tight at the outset, has handicapped the effective planning and conduct of MACSOG's operations.

b. This section outlines the policies and procedures governing the approval of proposed operations and the attendant roles of the various field and Washington-level agencies. Maritime operations (MAROPS) and air operations (AIROPS) are generally treated separately because they involve different political implications.

2. (U) The Overall System for Command and Control

a. MACSOG Internal System. The MACSOG internal system for command and control is outlined in the MACSOG Organizational and Functions Manual at Annex J.

b. COMUSMACV Command and Control. As set forth in paragraph D, above, MACSOG is a subordinate organization of MACV. The basic authority for MACSOG's establishment states that it would be under the operational control of COMUSMACV.*

c. CINCPAC Command and Control. MACSOG's activities have been subject to CINCPAC's review and recommendation as to approval or disapproval. With the passage of time, higher authority has granted CINCPAC approval authorities on operations. These are outlined in succeeding paragraphs.

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d. JCS Command and Control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed and recommended to higher authority the disposition to be made on MACSOG proposed concepts, plans, and operations. Within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSACSA, in particular the Special Operations Division, has served as the action agency. Generally, the channel through which the Joint Chiefs of Staff obtain the requisite authorities for MACSOG activities has been the Deputy SecDef. The latter is a member of the 303 Committee (formerly the 5812 Committee), the interdepartmental (State, DOD, CIA) agency which monitors and, where appropriate, recommends to the White House the disposition to be made on proposals involving MACSOG concepts, plans, and operations.

3. (TS) Approval of Maritime Operations

a. MACSOG operations were authorized to commence on 1 February 1964. From then until 1 June 1964, the period of Phase I, COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and higher authority approved each proposed individual operation.

b. Initially, it was planned that during Phase II, the period from 1 June 1964 to 1 October 1964, proposed maritime operations (MAROPS) would be approved in principle by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the SecDef, the DCI, and the Secretary of State.* Then, CINCPAC would submit a monthly program of operations using the approved listing. This procedure continued until 4 August 1964, when all MACSOG MAROPS were halted incident to the NVN attack on US destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

* (TS) JCS Msg 6829, DTG 122101Z Jun 64.

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c. MAROPS were resumed in October 1964 and the above approval system was continued with the added requirement that each individual operation be approved just prior to its execution. The mechanics of this procedure are enumerated in the memorandum from the Deputy SecDef, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, to the Assistant SecDef (ISA), Mr. John M. McNaughton, dated 30 September 1964, which is quoted below:*

This will confirm the procedures to be used in connection with 34A maritime operations.

At the beginning of each month, I will coordinate with Mr. Bundy and Mr. Thompson the proposed schedule for the forthcoming month. This document will then be the agreed schedule for planning purposes. Thereafter, until further notice, each operation listed on the above-mentioned schedule will be approved in advance by State, Defense and the White House. General Anthis will be responsible for preparing the draft message and will submit it to me for initialling. Thereafter, you will be responsible for coordinating the message with State and the White House. In this connection, you or your designee will take with him General Anthis or his designee to answer any questions which State or the White House may have. Each such message will be initialled by Mr. Thompson and Mr. McGeorge Bundy or their respective designees.

Any changes in the schedule of maritime operations after it has been agreed upon must be approved by Mr. McNamara or me upon recommendation of General Wheeler.

d. The above procedure is presented pictorially in Figure B-9.

e. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 8 December 1964, submitted to the SecDef a proposed revision to the MAROPS approval procedure.** This procedure was also addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a separate memorandum to the SecDef.*** The new procedure would be as follows:

---

* Deputy SecDef Memorandum for Mr. McNaughton, 30 September 1964. SecDef Control Number X-5593.

** 1. (TS) CJCS Memorandum for the SecDef, "Operation Plan 34A-Maritime Operations," 8 December 1964. CM-295-64.
2. (TS) JCS Msg 2524, DTG 022320Z Dec 64.

*** (TS) JCS Memorandum for the SecDef, "Intensification of OPLAN 34A Maritime Operations," 12 December 1964. JCSM-1042-64.

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FIGURE B-9

APPROVAL PROCEDURES FOR OPLAN 34A MARITIME OPERATIONS (U)*



*THIS PROCEDURE IS OUTLINED IN A MEMORANDUM FROM DEP SECDEF VANCE TO MCNAUGHTON, 30 SEPT. 64.

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(1) COMUSMACV would submit a 30-day program for approval by CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and higher authority. (No change in the previous procedure.)

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff would forward the Washington-level approval to COMUSMACV for planning purposes. (No change in the previous procedure - only a change in semantics.)

(3) COMUSMACV would submit package of up to five missions each from the 30-day program for execution approval by CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and higher authority. Unless otherwise directed, the approval of each package would constitute final approval for execution of the included missions at the direction of COMUSMACV, in coordination with the American Ambassador, Saigon. (This "packaging" concept was a change in the previous procedure. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff said that this "streamlining" of the MAROPS approval procedure should not only facilitate increased mission frequency, but that it should also provide COMUSMACV with sufficient scheduling flexibility to exploit better operational intelligence and favorable weather. From the operators' viewpoint, however, the approval procedure remained highly restrictive. These views are presented in paragraph __, below.)

f. The Deputy SecDef approved the above proposed procedure.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff then informed CINCPAC of those increments that were approved for early implementation.** In carrying out this procedure, COMUSMACV would

* (TS) Deputy SecDef Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Intensification of OPLAN 34A Maritime Operations (S)," 14 December 1964.

** 1. (TS) SACSA Informal Memorandum for the Director, Joint Staff, "OPLAN 34A - MAROPS Approval Procedure," 9 December 1964.

2. (TS) JCS Msg 2927, DTG 151627Z Dec 64.

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include the following as action addressees of his messages: White House, CIA, JCS, SecState, OSD.*

g. That Washington-level approval requirements were of continuing concern to SACSA was reflected in his talking paper to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff of 18 December 1964.** The paper was prepared in connection with the Chairman's then impending discussions with COMUSMACV on 21 December. The substance of the talking paper was as follows:

(1) Washington level interest in OPLAN 34A activities often required information beyond that normally expected from the field.

(2) Occasionally MACSOG would propose a new concept or request approval of a modified procedure without providing the requisite justification.***

(3) Because of the high level concern as to the DRV response to 34A actions, their detailed justification would enable the field to obtain approval of proposed actions.

(4) Field commanders should submit only those proposed actions which could be adequately supported as contributing directly to the objectives of OPLAN 34A, and which were accompanied by sufficient detail to enable the actions to be supported and defended at the Washington level.

h. In January 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the various procedures which they had promulgated concerning

* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 18333, DTG 240852Z Dec 65.

** (TS) SACSA talking paper for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for discussion with COMUSMACV on 21 December 1964, "OPLAN 34A-Washington Approval Requirements (U)," 18 December 1964. SACSA TP-24-64.

*** This example was given as one of inadequate justification. In his msg 16062, DTG 090925Z Dec 64, COMUSMACV requested approval of a concept employing certain UDT swimmers in attacks against SW ATONs or inoperative radar sites ashore. Needed information, not given, included the state of training or capability of the South Vietnamese Navy to accomplish the mission, the required escort force and the views of the US Country Team.

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MAROPS. As a consequence, in a message to CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff codified these procedures as follows:*

(1) COMUSMACV would submit to CINCPAC (info JCS) a package and/or increments of maritime missions in response to JCS request, or approximately 10 days prior to completion of the MAROPS package and/or increments then approved for execution. An increment might contain from three to five missions, and a package would normally contain increments to cover a 30-day period of operations unless otherwise specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) CINCPAC would comment on the proposed package and/or increments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expeditiously as feasible.

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit the proposed package and/or increments, as modified by CINCPAC comments, to higher authority for approval and would tranmit to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV approval of the package and/or increments as obtained. The approval would specify missions approved for execution at the discretion of COMUSMACV and any conditions imposed by higher authority.

(4) Subsequent to receipt of the package and/or increment approval for execution, and prior to execution of the missions, COMUSMACV would transmit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC, and such other subordinate commands as CINCPAC might direct, detailed mission information to include:

(a) Mission code designation and/or target name.

* (TS) JCS Msg 3995, DTG 212235Z Jan 65.

(b) Numbers and types of ships (and aircraft if maritime air support was to be provided).

(c) Routes.

(d) Planned sequence of events.

(e) Scheduled dates/times of departure and return.

(5) As to modification procedures and operational reports:

Prior to launching the maritime (and air) missions approved for execution, COMUSMACV might make minor route changes that did not substantively change the concept of a mission, and he might change departure times as dictated by operational conditions, provided that he notified the following by FLASH precedence: American Ambassy, Saigon; CINCPAC; such other commands as CINCPAC might direct; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Upon departure of a maritime (and air) mission, COMUSMACV would transmit a launch message by FLASH precedence to the activities named in paragraph (4) above, with the mission code designation and date/time of launch. Spot reports of unusual incidents occurring during mission would be transmitted by FLASH precedence. Abort reports would be transmitted when missions were known to have aborted. After-action reports would be transmitted following a debrief of missions. The reasons and rationale for departure from planned sequence of events would be included in any of the above reports when such departure was known to have occured.

i. As the MAROPS Program against NVN evolved, CINCPAC was granted these authorities:

(1) March 1965 - to approve and execute the following three missions:*

(a) DRIFT - distribution of gift kits and transistor radios ashore and offshore.

(b) CADO - psychological deception operations executed by agents, infiltrated and exfiltrated by rubber boats/PTFs, on isolated stretches of the NVN coast.

(c) SWALLOW - raiding parties from PTFs and SWIFTs capture NVN personnel in isolated areas for psychological/intelligence exploitation, similar to LOKI (junk capture) missions.

Subsequently, CINCPAC designated the codeword CADO to cover the three actions.

(2) June 1965 - to conduct PTF harassment/interdiction missions against Tiger Island.**

(3) July 1965 - to permit PTF commanders, returning from unsuccessful psyops/intelligence MAROPS to place interdiction/harassment fires on certain military targets.***

(4) November 1965 - to employ PTFs in shipping interdiction missions up to 20 degrees north latitude; to deliver psychological leaflets by 81 mm mortar round.****

* (~~TS~~) JCS Msg 7776, DTG 251842Z Mar 65.
** (~~TS~~) JCS Msg 3610, DTG 091719Z Jun 65.
*** These targets were: Cap Lay Radar, Thuong Luat, Dong Hoi O. P., Thanh Yen O. P., Cap Vinh Son Radar, Mach Nuoc Radar, Ap Tan Dinh Security Post, Ly Hoa O. P., Ron O. P., Cap Mui Dao O. P.
**** (~~TS~~) JCS Msg 7364, DTG 291649Z Nov 65.

4. (TS) Approval of Air Operations

a. As set forth in paragraph E2b, above, prior to 14 October 1964, CIA handled the routing and approval of OPLAN 34A air operations (AIROPS). On that date, DOD assumed the responsibility and the following approval procedure, based upon COMUSMACV's recommendations, became effective:*

(1) COMUSMACV would submit a monthly schedule.

(2) This schedule, incorporating CINCPAC's comments, would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval by higher authority.

(3) When obtained, this approval would represent final Washington authority for executing missions. However, COMUSMACV would obtain a political clearance for each mission, 24 hours prior to the mission, from the American Ambassador, Saigon and, concurrently, provide intentions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would so inform the SecDef, DCI, and SecState. (By later oral agreement, the Washington level notification process was accomplished by electrical transmission of all air operations intent messages from the NMCC to the State Department. This retransmission was an essential part of the overall procedure.)

(4) MACV would continue to submit launch, recovery, abort, and spot reports.

b. On 20 October 1964, SACSA informed the Deputy SecDef of the following:**

* 1. (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, DTG 150309Z Aug 64.
2. (TS) JCS Msg 9660, DTG 092026Z Oct 64.
** (TS) SACSA Memorandum for the Deputy SecDef, "OPLAN 34A Air Operations-Notification of Intent.

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(1) COMUSMACV had indicated that the requirement of 24-hour notification of intent to execute individual air operations was operationally undesirable for these reasons:*

(a) The weather forecast service was not reliable for more than 12 hours in advance of mission launch. Mission flight crews were briefed after the 12-hour forecast.

(b) The earlier the notification of intent, the greater was the probability of compromise.

(c) Should weather force a delay, additional communications were required.

(2) Since the notification of intent messages did not require an answer, the above time factor should be reduced from 24 to 12 hours.

c. The Deputy SecDef approved the reduction in time from 24 to 12 hours for the notification of intent to execute individual air operations. On 21 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff so notified CINCPAC.**

d. As in the case of MAROPS, (paragraph h, above) in January 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the various procedures which they had promulgated concerning AIROPS. As a consequence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a message to CINCPAC, "codified" these procedures as follows:***

(1) Approximately 10 days prior to the estimated completion of the AIROPS package then approved for execution, COMUSMACV would submit to CINCPAC (info to JCS) an AIROPS package, planned for a 30-day period of operations. Each mission included in the package would specify, as minimum information, the mission objective and concept of operation.

* 1. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 160822Z Oct 64.
2. (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 172006Z Oct 64.
** (TS) JCS Msg 1023, DTG 211800Z Oct 64.
*** (TS) JCS Msg 3995, DTG 212235Z Jan 65.

(2) CINCPAC would submit comments on the proposed package to JCS as expeditiously as feasible.

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit the proposed package, as modified by CINCPAC, to higher authority for approval and would transmit to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV approval of the package as obtained. The approval message would specify missions approved for execution at the discretion of COMUSMACV and any conditions imposed by higher authority.

(4) Subsequent to receipt of the package approval for execution, and at least 12 hours prior to the intended execution of missions, COMUSMACV would obtain political clearance from the American Embassy, Saigon and would transmit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC, and such other subordinate commands as CINCPAC might direct, detailed mission information to include:

(a) Mission code designation.

(b) Numbers and types of aircraft.

(c) Routes.

(d) Planned sequence of events.

(e) Scheduled dates/times of departure and return.

(5) CINCPAC was to retain authority for the tactical conduct of missions.

(6) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to be included as an information addressee on all COMUSMACV requests for additional air missions in furtherance of approved concepts or mission objectives.

(7) CINCPAC would continue the then current coordination and notification procedures, including the requirement for obtaining concurrence of the American Ambassador, Saigon.

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(8) While operational and approval authority rested in CINCPAC, the final political decision remained with the American Ambassador, Saigon and the State Department in Washington. Because the final responsibility still rested in Washington, SACSA had to assure that:

(a) The air missions met the criteria set forth in JCS 2343/730 of December 1965.

(b) COMUSMACV/CINCPAC continued to file intentions to execute air missions in adequate time for disapproval should the political situation dictate.

(c) All messages pertaining to air operations were given timely distribution to the State Department so that the system would operate in accordance with basic directives and agreements.

(9) The modification procedures and operational reports for AIROPS were the same as those for MAROPS. See paragraph h(5), above.

e. On 15 February 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified CINCPAC that he had been delegated the authority to approve and execute specific OPLAN 34A air missions in support of mission concepts and objectives that had been approved at the Washington level.* These modified procedures pertained:

(1) The requirement for approval of new concepts and/or mission objectives continued to rest with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority.

(2) When authority was granted to CINCPAC for the execution of missions in furtherance of new concepts or mission objectives, subsequent approval authority would be with CINCPAC.

* (TS) JCS Msg 4050, DTG 152235Z Feb 66.

5. (TS) Views Concerning Command and Control

c

On the subject of command and control, the representative views of persons interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association are set forth below. Their detailed views are presented in Annex M.

a. Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA (1964-1965)

By the time we obtained in-country approval of a program, it had been subjected to major change. Then we sent the program out of country. By the time it was returned to us, the program had been further changed, we were out of time to implement it, and the constraints were many.

b. Colonel William R. Becker, USAF (1964)

If we are to participate in clandestine type operations, we need a national level planning and coordinating agency for that purpose. The actual planning of such operations can be accomplished more effectively in the field; the Washington level organization should consist primarily of the agencies needed to ensure the requisite coordination with other operations and to obtain the necessary approval for conducting the particular clandestine operation.

c. Commander Kenneth N. Bebb, USN (1965-1966)

The long, extended chain of command for obtaining approval of small MAROPS caused extreme frustration to personnel of the Naval Advisory Detachment in Danang. Further, it resulted in a lack of motivation and a loss of incentive to plan in detail on the part of MACSOG planners.

d. Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, USA (1965-1966)

Tight control in Washington "hamstrung" MACSOG operations. This control affected the timeliness of the operations. Strangely enough, the authority to conduct some operations had to come from the White House. (b)(1) (b)(3)

e. Colonel John T. Moore, Jr., USAF (1965-1969)

[redacted]

(2) An important factor affecting the capability of the military to conduct covert operations is the organization for that purpose i the Joint Staff and the Services. There should be an office at the DOD level of the necessary expertise to plan, execute, and coordinate covert operations in such a way that they can be truly deniable. The Services should likewise have the requisite staffs for those functions.

f. Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA (1966-1968)

(1) A problem area resulting from the overall organization for the command and control of MACSOG was the difficulty in limiting the member of persons knowledgeable of MACSOG activities. The arrangements for command and control dictated that certain staffing of these activities be done at the headquarters of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC.

(2) Covert actions should not be handled routinely. Decisions must be obtained at the national level without the need to handle covert actions in the same manner as conventional ones. Persons who do not have a real need-to-know should not be involved.

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c (3) There should be a completely integrated organization at the national level for handling covert actions. This organization would include DOD, State, and CIA. It would interface with those agencies and constitute a mechanism for obtaining decisions at the national level for the conduct of specific operations. Other important functions of the national organization would include:

(a) Personnel selection and management.

(b) Personnel training.

(c) Procurement, storage, and delivery of certain materiel.

(d) Contingency planning.

(4) CIA cannot be manned in peacetime to conduct "large-scale" covert operations such as those being conducted in SEAsia. Consequently, there is a need for military paticipation.

g. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathon D. Carney, USA (1966-1967)

(1) We needed a more simplified and prompt system for obtaining approval of covert actions than the one we had to use in MACSOG.

(2) If we are to conduct covert operations, we need in Washington some sort of group, consisting of highly qualified personnel, to plan and coordinate such operations on a worldwide basis.

h. Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN (1966-1969)

(1) The Special Operations Division (SOD) of OSACSA, charged with handling covert matters at the DOD level, is at the bottom of the Joint Staff hierarchy and woefully understaffed. The staffing of a covert action involves going through layer after layer of conventional hierarchy. SOD, or the entity which is to handle covert matters must be placed high enough in the organizational structure and headed by a person of sufficient rank to facilitate prompt access to the decision-makers.

(2) As a result of the inadequate organizational machinery within DOD for handling covert matters there is virtually no link between SOD and the 303 Committee. This link should operate through the Deputy SecDef but, because of SOD's isolation at the bottom of the Joint Staff

hierarchy, it is difficult to present a proposed action to the Committee.

i. Colonel Robert C. Kendrick, USA (1966-1969)

COMUSMACV should be authorized greater latitude in carrying out approved concepts.

j. Colonel Robert C. Kingston, USA (1967-1969)

I am not suggesting that a control body be placed over the American Ambassador or field commander, particularly not in VN or Laos, but, in my opinion, there is a need to establish a national agency to coordinate covert operations. Staffed by DOD, State, and CIA, this agency would ensure that there was no overlapping or duplicating of such operations and that assets were properly controlled.

k. Colonel Harold K. Aaron, USA (1967-1969)

We need an interagency committee in Washington which can promptly handle covert activities.

l. Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USA (1968-1969)

We need a rapid reaction chain of command, unfettered with conventional thinking, for handling covert actions.

m. Colonel Herbert O. Graeser, USA (1969)

The lines of intelligence dissemination and command and control need to be clearly delineated. To a large degree MACSOG operations have been run along personality rather than organizational lines.

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G. (TS) MACSOG Operations and Intelligence

1. (U) Introduction

a. This section covers overall aspects of MACSOG's operations and intelligence activities, including an overview of MACSOG's principal programs. Details concerning these activities and programs, are set forth in succeeding appendices.

b. Of particular importance here are the views of personnel interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association. Those views are encapsuled in paragraph 3 below. They are presented in detail in Annex N. In addition, in Annex O are presented various standing operating procedures (SOPs) and models of techniques of operations. The latter were obtained in the form of interviews and, in some instances, are in fact interviews in their entirety. Collectively, these views, SOPs, and models are intended to enable the reader to gain an insight into some of the finer points of MACSOG's activities.

2. (TS) An Overview of the MACSOG Principal Programs

MACSOG's principal programs and a brief description of each are outlined below.

a. FOOTBOY

(1) This is the codeword for MACSOG's operations in NVN. Initially, that program was simply referred to as the 34A Program. FOOTBOY consists of these four sub-programs:

(a) PARBOIL - maritime operations.

(b) HUMIDOR - psychological operations.

(c) TIMBERWORK - airborne operations.

(d) MIDRIFF - air operations.

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(2) FOOTBOY and its sub-programs are documented in Appendix C.

(3) With regard to FOOTBOY, these documentaries are presented in Annex O:

(a) MAROPS by Commander Normal H. Olson, USN

(b) A representative agent team insertion into NVN by Lt. Col. Ernest T. Hayes, Jr., USA.

(c) Representative air operations missions in NVN by Lt. Col. James R. McCarthy, USAF.

b. PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE

(1) These two programs are treated together here because both of them involved cross-border operations and are conducted by MACSOG's three Command and Control (C&C) Detachments, namely: C&C North (CCN) in Danang, C&C Center (CCC) in Kontum, and C&C South (CCS) in Ban Me Thuot.

(2) PRAIRIE FIRE, formerly SHINING BRASS, is the codeword for MACSOG cross-border operations into Laos. These operations are conducted by teams, each of which consists of both American and indigenous personnel, for the purpose of locating and interdicting VC/NVA concentrations and routes of infiltration. CCN and CCC control the operations.

(3) SALEM HOUSE, formerly DANIEL BOONE, is the codeword for MACSOG cross-border operations into Cambodia. As in the case of PRAIRIE FIRE, SALEM HOUSE operations are conducted by teams, consisting of American and indigenous personnel, for the purpose of locating and interdicting VC/NVA concentrations and routes of infiltration. CCC and CCS control the operations.

(4) Details concerning PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE are contained in Appendices D and E, respectively.

(5) As set forth in paragraph D (Organizational Development) above, the CMC Detachments are MACSOG field commands. Hence, an appreciation of their composition and activities are fundamental to an understanding of MACSOG. It is with this in mind that those documentaries, presented in Annex O, were obtained through visits to the field:

(a) CCN SOP.

(b) CCC SOP.

(c) MACSOG Reconnaissance Team Techniques.

(d) Initial Mission of a SHINING BRASS Reconnaissance Team.

(e) Operations of Command and Control Detachment Center.

(f) Operations of a Reconnaissance Company in Command and Control Detachment Center.

(g) Operations of an Exploitation Company in Command and Control Detachment Center.

(h) Operations of Command and Control Detachment South.

3. (~~TS~~) Views Concerning MACSOG's Operations and Intelligence. On the subject of MACSOG's operations and intelligence, representative views of persons interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association are set forth below. Their detailed views on the subject are presented in Annex N.

a. Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA, (1964-1965)

(1) The biggest mistake in OPLAN 34A was the assumption that we would take over assets in being. Unfortunately, the assets did not exist in the sense that we thought they existed and as we had been briefed by CIA.

(a) [redacted] None (b)(1) (b)(3) was capable of conducting a successful operation. The physical setup in Danang was not conducive to effective MAROPS and the boats were all SWIFT - type boats which were limited in their capability, both as to range and carrying capacity. Consequently, our MAROPS assets consisted of very little, namely, a naval base commanded by a questionably capable (b)(1) (b)(3) major in the South Vietnamese army. He was entirely ineffective.

[redacted]

(2) Our intelligence of North Vietnam was extremely limited. Our photographic coverage was not good and the mapping left much to be desired. However, once the military took over, everyone wanted immediate results.

(3) I stress the importance of weather reporting in this type of operation. Once we were able to obtain the benefits of the satellite weather program, we had a fine weather facility and this was a real asset to effective operations.

(4) One of my big disappointments was that we could not start a resistance movement in North Vietnam. Had we been able to get one started in 1964, we would be enjoying the benefits of it today. These benefits would include a better bargaining position at the peace talks in Paris and of a counter organization to the NLF. I cannot understand why, as a nation, that we fail to appreciate the value of guerrilla warfare which constitutes one of the most effective measures that the communists have employed against us.

(5) Had we employed MAROPS more effectively than we did, we could have had complete control of the North Vietnamese coast line up to a depth of three or four miles.

(6) AIROPS were more of a problem than MAROPS. To a large extent the problem stemmed from the question as to what our agents would do once they were infiltrated into North Vietnam. Certainly the agents could not collect very much intelligence when they were hiding in the hills in an effort to protect their lives. When MACSOG took over, we had on our rolls a number of so-called agents who in actuality were unqualified. However, we could

not release them in South Vietnam because they had been briefed and rebriefed on operations in North Vietnam. Our solution was to put them in the North; many of them were captured in the process.

b. Colonel William R. Becker, USAF, (1964)

(1) An unanswered question was the extent of cover that military personnel should have been under in their operations as members of MACSOG. Were military personnel to be covered in the sense that they were not acknowledged as military personnel to anyone within South Vietnam, were they to be acknowledged only to a select few, or were they to be openly military personnel except for those agents to be dropped outside the country? In our attempts to get answers to these questions, we drew practically a complete blank. Outside of MACSOG no one seemed to be really interested in this question as a significant policy matter.

(2) There was also the problem of determining adequate cover for the entire MACSOG operation in the event of difficulty. What was to happen in case we lost an aircraft over North Vietnam? We did not have an adequate plan for this purpose. The plan was simply a repeat of what CAS had used and this was a rather thin and unim (b)(1) (b)(3) aginative one. It did not answer any of the hard questions. The aircraft (C-123's) we were using were obviously attributable to the United States. [redacted]

[redacted]

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

c. Lt. Col. David H. Arno, USAF, (1964-1966)

(1) CINCPAC did not prepare a 34A Plan which tasked the components to support the MACSOG operation. Consequently, MACSOG operated from a MACV plan which did not provide a clear statement of responsibilities, functions, and missions of the components toward the 34A operation. Thus, MACSOG experienced unnecessary difficulty in obtaining personnel approval of JTD's, budgeting, providing equipment and basic support to aircraft, and so forth. Had CINCPAC prepared an OPLAN which assigned responsibilities to the components and which established an organization for control of the resources necessary MACSOG's operations, the support to the MACSOG would have been better and faster than it turned out to be.

(2) Some of MACSOG's organizational problems, of course, were created by the haste to become operational. For example, OPLAN 34A set forth a requirement for six additional C-123 type aircraft. However, there was no statement as to flying hours required, sortie requirements, and related matters upon which the air components that was to provide the aircraft could make any rational determination as to whether the six aircraft constituted a real requirement or not. Also, there was no clear

statement as to who was responsible for providing them. In this connection, there was confusion in SOG as to how the aircraft were to be configured and the type of equipment needed on them. The aircraft were to be sanitized but there was no clear statement as to what was meant by sanitization. To the Air Force, sanitizing an aircraft meant completely removing all identification marks and serial numbers from the aircraft and all of its component parts, black boxes, and so forth, so that nothing on the aircraft could be officially traced to the United States. This is an expensive and time consuming process since the aircraft had to be completely disassembled and then reassembled. When this was explained to MACV, it was understood then that such a degree of sanitization was not required. The decision was then made to merely paint the airplane, remove the tail numbers, and maintenance records from the aircraft.

(3) With respect to the selection of the aircraft to be used MACSOG, the Air Force was not asked as to its views concerning whether the C-123 was the best aircraft for the purpose intended or what special equipment should be installed on the aircraft. (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted]

(5) An example of the implications raised by the lack of a better or different organization for conducting 34A operations was the matter of aircraft accidents. One of the

MACSOG C-123s had an aircraft accident with US personnel aboard and immediately there was a problem of how the accident should be handled. Since the aircraft would not fly under USAF regulations, was not even on the Air Force inventory, but did have Air Force personnel aboard, there was a question of responsibility for an aircraft accident investigation. It was not until about the third accident involving the C-123's that these problems were straightened out. I might add here that the MACSOG aircraft had a rather high non-operational rate. It was felt at PACAF that this rate was attributable to the lack of standing operational procedures and flying safety programs that are normally found in an Air Force unit.

(6) A basic problem area for MACSOG was the haste with which it had to take over CAS operations and to become operational. Had MACSOG been given more time to organize before initiating operations, it could have properly established its organization with the necessary trained and experienced personnel and, thus, enabled more effective operations. For example, none of the original Air Force personnel assigned to MACSOG had any previous background in conventional warfare operations. This was despite the fact that at Hurlburt the Air Force had a group of personnel trained and experienced in such operations. A result of this haste to become operational was that MACSOG merely continued to do what CAS had been doing without any real change in direction, scope or effect of the program itself.

(7) Although the C-130's which have been equipped for covert operations are an improvement over the earlier C-123's, we still do not have the capability to, at will, insert unconventional warfare teams or resources into an enemy country in all types of circumstances. Improvement is needed in terrain avoidance of radar and navagational aids.

d. Commander Kenneth N. Bebb, USN, (1965-1966)

(1) In the MAROPS program the cumbersome system for obtaining approval of proposed operations made it difficult for MACSOG to take advantage of current operational intelligence. If, for example, MACSOG planned a kidnapping at a specific village in North Vietnam, by the time approval was obtained to carry out the operation, the situation might have changed drastically so that the mission would have to be aborted. In short, MACSOG should have been given the authority to conduct certain types of missions without having to go to Washington for approval.

(2) Winter MAROPS out of Danang were sometimes very difficult because of weather conditions. There was no solution to this problem. However, it was difficult to convince Washington that our operations had to be curtailed during the Monsoon seasons.

(3) The full capability of our UW forces was never used. For example, we could have used US submarine operations to good advantage but never did.

(4) The 34A operations became unrealistic once the United States commenced overt air operations in North Vietnam. The program was then no longer covert. It was not even clandestine.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

e. Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, USA, (1965-1966)

[redacted]

(3) Assuming that MACSOG had been charged with carrying out "denial" missions, they should not necessarily have been affected by our bombing halt. By curtailing MACSOG operations during the periods of bombing halts, we blew the activities of the Sacred Sword Patriots League, that is, we divulged the fact that it was the United States that was supporting those activities.

f. Colonel John T. Moore, USAF, (1965-1966)

(1) MACSOG's air operations were extremely limited because of the shortcomings of the C-123 aircraft. Eventually we were successful in obtaining the C-130 aircraft as a replcement for the C-123.

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(1) Though the air operations were categorized as being covert in support of covert ground operations, the aircraft were not sanitized to the extent that they could be plausibly denied as being US Government aircraft. The only sanitization of the aircraft that had been done or was done before each mission was to remove all tags or any documents or papers that would indicate the unit of assignment. However, even a superficial investigation would have indicated that the aircraft was being maintained with USAF parts coming out of US docks. Once the United States started overt bombing operations in North Vietnam, we did not press the matter of getting the aircraft sanitized. The overt presence of US military aircraft over North Vietnam negated the requirement for the air effort itself over North Vietnam being covert.

(2) We ruined the covertness of our MAROPS by installing on the boats used for that purpose equipment that was clearly of US military manufacture and by our military operations in support of those boats when they were out on a mission. In the latter instance, several times when our boats were in trouble US Navy aircraft off our carriers in the Yankee area came to their assistance. In addition, damaged boats returning home were sometimes escorted by a US destroyer. This close association between overt US Naval forces and "covert" operations blew any cover that MAROPS were non-US sponsored.

(3) An essential for the conduct of effective agent team operations in North Vietnam was the development of a resistance movement there. Each time we requested authority to develop a resistance movement, we were told

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from Washington that this was against US national objectives in Vietnam. It is true that a resistance movement would have been counter to our overt national objectives. The United States was not publicly advocating overthrow of the North Vietnamese regime. Ostensively, a resistance movement would have been directed toward overthrowing the regime. However, this tying together in Washington of a covert operation with covert national objectives is, in my view, an error. The United States will never be able to get a truly covert operation guide if it continues to do this.

(4) In my opinion, our agent team operations in North Vietnam could not be effective without some degree of cooperation from the native population, friendly or coerced. From this viewpoint, MACSOG was really denied the opportunity to conduct effectively agent operations because it was denied the authority to start a resistance movement. It would have been feasible to start this movement along the Lao-NVN border and to gradually spread it eastward into North Vietnam from that base area.

(5) It is incorrect to weigh or judge a covert operation against an overt national objective. The fact that the covert operation has to be deniable should not inhibit the United States from doing something that is contrary to our stated national objectives. This apparent inability at the seat of government to separate the two predicates against our effective conduct of covert operations.

(6) My opinion is that the military should never have completely taken over the MACSOG operations. These operations never, in my view, became so large as to necessitate that takeover.

8. Lt. Col. Ralph R. Garrison, USAF, (1965-1966)

(1) Because of the air defense build-up in North Vietnam, the C-123 aircraft was sometimes unsuitable for resupply missions in support of our agent teams. Working with the 7th Air Force, we set up resupply missions using F4 aircraft for that purpose. These missions were very successful.

(2) The 7th Air Force also gave us very fine support in transporting our teams by CH-3 helicopters from Nakhon Thanom to North Vietnam. This means of

infiltration was desirable because the air defense in North Vietnam would in many essence not permit overflight of the C-123 to areas in which we desired to insert our teams.

h. Lt. Col. Ernest T. Mawes, Jr., USA, (1965-1969)

(1) We would send instructions to our agent teams in North Vietnam, but there was no positive way of finding out whether they were carrying out the instructions we had given them. In checking the casualty list, we noted on several occasions that the radio operators were reported as being a casualty immediately after insertion. We conducted a study of this particular situation and though the study was inconclusive, we surmised that the reporting of these radio operators as being a casualty might indicate that the agent team was under enemy control. In following up this lead, we requested that the [redacted] check on the radio operator's fist, the recording of the individual's characteristic in sending Morse code. We discovered that such records had been confused and thus, we could not identify the individual with a particular tape. In any case, one result of the study was that we paid much closer attention to the communications from the agent teams for indication that the teams might be under enemy control. (b)(1) (b)(3)

(2) Assigning missions to the agent teams was a real challenge to us because we seldom had enough detailed information of with which to select a promising target. In one instance we had the idea of dropping rockets to a team and having the team fire them remotely against the Dien Bien Thu airfield. The rockets of the 4.5 inch type

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which had been tested at Camp Long Thanh and had proved successful. We developed a device for laying the rockets by azimuth and for evaluation using a protractor. In addition, we obtained firing tables developed from ordnance experience. The rockets were dropped to the team, but we had not knowledge that they were actually fired at the target.

(3) The infrequency of good flying weather necessitated that we develop a system whereby we could fly a resupply mission to any of the agent teams on any particular day. The determining factor would be the weather report of that particular day. Such a system was needed because some teams had not been resupplied for periods of up to eight or nine months. Consequently, the teams had run out of food and we had reports of agent members dying of starvation. Any time we could get to the team we would resupply it. In this way, if weather permitted we would increase the frequency of our resupply missions with a view toward dropping enough supplies so that the team could cash them thereby having some flexibility regardless of weather.

(4) I cannot recall any instance in which we provided any form of documentation to the team that would enable it to pass freely as bonafied residents of North Vietnam.

(5) In communicating with the team, we would prepare the message in English at MACSOG headquarters. Then, we would have the STD personnel translate the message into Vietnamese. Then we would take the message to the Embassy where it would be encoded and transmitted to [redacted] the team. (b)(1) (b)(3)

(6) With the bombing halt in November 1968, there was a standdown on our air operations over North Vietnam. Consequently, we were no longer authorized to resupply or reinforce the teams in North Vietnam.

(7) I am almost completely against the concepts of agent teams. In my view, we have not put enough effort into analyzing each target area and then putting the finger on someone in that area who has access to what we want. We have put strangers into a hostile area with no base from which to operate. The doctrine for the conduct of agent team operations should proved for the initial infiltration of a pilot team to assess whether a team could actually survive in a particular area. If it could then reinforcements could be flown in to the pilot team.

i. Lt. Col. Vincent W. Lang, USA, (1965-1966)

(1) Some of the agent teams were not isolated properly before going off on a mission. The Vietnamese camp commander had the keys and access to the isolation area as did US personnel. On more than one occasion, the camp commander, as a result of instructions from his Vietnamese headquarters from Saigon, would remove agent personnel from the isolation area and return them to a training program or authorize them R and R. US personnel would loan out the team being authorized R and R after the fact. Violation of isolation procedures was not conducive to good security.

j. Colonel Robert C. MacLane, USA, (1966-1967)

(1) A basic constraint on the agent team was that it had to keep its operations in a low key. The team could not engage in any activity that could turn into a

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

resistance type movement. This is one of the reasons why our teams were small. They could not create too much of a problem for the North Vietnamese regime.

[redacted] Of course the Vietnamese are rather small in physical stature and they had a difficult time carrying the radio in addition to their other equipment. Aside from its weight disadvantage, the radio was noisy. To my knowledge, we still do not have the small, lightweight radio needed for agent operations. The radio should have a CW capability as well as a voice one.

(3) We tried to insert the teams with enough supplies, equipment, and food to last them about three months. The handling and cashing of these items and the process of getting away rapidly from the drop zone or landing zone required time. However, the authorities always wanted to know, within 24 hours, how the team was getting along. Later, when the teams were in position, they did report.

k. Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA, (1966-1968)

(1) The MACSOG mission was feasible of accomplishment but the changing missions sometimes made it difficult to use these same resources for the new mission. For example, prior to the overt bombing of North Vietnam, the agent teams were action teams, i.e., they had been recruited and trained to conduct sabotage in demolition attacks against key targets in North Vietnam. These teams had been infiltrated into North Vietnam with that mission as their sole reason for being. When the overt

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bombing started in North Vietnam, it was no longer necessary to hand place demolitions to knock out bridges or railroads so, the decision was made to realign the missions assigned to the agent teams. Unfortunately, a decision was made to leave the same individuals in North Vietnam and to divert them to road watch and intelligence collection teams. That decision was a basic error because the recruitment of the action agent is quite different from that of the intelligence agent. The training is completely different and the method of handling of individuals should be accordingly different. The new mission of intelligence collection and the establishment of nets for this purpose was not feasible for the type of people who had already infiltrated into North Vietnam.

(2) Another difficulty encountered in attempting to accomplish the new mission was the constraints placed upon MACSOG which rendered parts of the mission impossible to accomplish. It must be assumed that the establishment of MACSOG signified that the United States wanted to establish a covert capability to bring pressures to bear in a covert way against North Vietnam. A basic criterion for the establishment of this type of asset was that the operation be feasibly deniable. Of course, the purpose of this deniability was to prevent the United States Government to exercise pressure on the enemy outside of its official troubling pronouncements and policy toward North Vietnam. When constraints were placed upon the operations of these teams and on the recruitment and dispatch of additional teams that were tied directly to the overt announced public policy of the United States

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toward North Vietnam, they tended to subvert the original purpose of establishing MACSOG and made its mission far more difficult to accomplish. At least two reasons were given for imposing these constraints. First, the US overt policies did not advocate the overthrow of the Ho Chi Minh regime. This is a failure to separate the overt from the covert policies of our government and it was wrong. Second, there was a fear that the resistance movement in the North might get out of hand and might need continued support to prevent the individual to survive in the event that we agreed to extend down of overt overflights. Again, this is fallacious because we could have developed a capability for covert penetrations to resupply these teams, with the essentials for survivable even though we were continually denying that we were flying over North Vietnam.

(3) The restrictions against resistance operations made it exceedingly difficult to recruit good personnel into the program. The high quality personnel who had been guerrilla leaders in operations against the French and who were perfectly willing to go back in an attempt to activate their organizations in the mountains of Vietnam simply would not be recruited to go back to the simple task of counting trucks or burning intelligence maps in North Vietnam, unless there was some hope, some promise that they would be able to retrieve their former positions of power and responsibility among their own people.

(4) Another problem created as a result of constraints relates to the cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia. Constraints forced us to apply the same type

of gradualism in the escalation of the operations in those countries which was so singularly unsuccessful in the conventional operations against North Vietnam.

(5) Yet another type of restriction placed on our operations which reduced our effectiveness related to the use of technology to assist us. We were denied the authority to use a chemical contaminance to assist us in destroying or rendering useless a large quantities of rice and other food stuffs which we located in the enemies supply lines deep inside his sanctuary in Laos. It was physical impossible to evacuate the rice and it was extremely difficult to destroy it. We requested authority to use a chemical compound known as bietrex to place on the rice which would render it unpalatable for human consumption and thereby useless to the enemy. This request was disapproved.

(6) Another constraint placed upon us was the denial of an incapacitating weapon. We needed a weapon comparable to that used for capturing wild animals, that would incapacitate a man without killing him. We never received this weapon despite our best efforts to obtain it. In this connection, our problem was that a person we really wanted for interrogation might be killed in the process of being captured. If we could have attacked him with an incapacitating agent, his probabilities of survival would have increased.

(7) The constraint that the SFPL stand down at the same time that the US forces stood down exposed the direct connection between the two and this is precisely what we worked so hard to avoid. Thus, we completely compromised our covert operations.

(8) It was not only feasible to organize a resistance movement in North Vietnam, but also quite desirable from the point of view of exerting pressures on the enemy in a place where they could least stand up.

(9) There must be an acceptance on the national level that, if we are going to use covert operations to influence our national policy objectives, i.e., if we are going to employ covert operations in the same way that the enemy uses them against us, we must accept the idea that such operations have to be conducted in a manner in which they can be denied. The policy need not necessarily conform to our publicly-announced national objectives and national policies.

(10) The overall impact of MACSOG's covert operations was very beneficial to the United States. The possession of that capability created in the minds of the enemy a strategic threat that he must at all times contend with.

l. Colonel Dennis P. Casey, USMC, (1966-1967)

Early in MACSOG's operations, the execution of air missions was controlled almost exclusively by MACSOG. Later we learned that our messages concerning air operations were not being dissimilated to the proper people. Moreover, some of our Martine operations were being interfered with by friendly aircraft. Finally, the 7th Air Force insisted on coordinating all flying activities, including those of MACSOG. This improved coordination and control of missions.

m. Lt. Col. Jonathon D. Carney, USA, (1966-1967)

(1) MACSOG's efforts at clandestine operations in TIMBERWORK and PRAIRIE FIRE were severely limited by

the lack of adequate data to use in briefing, training, and equipping agent personnel and team members.

(2) MACSOG's agent operations have been inept and unproductive. The CAS operation, which MACSOG inherited in 1964, was no more successful. Unfortunately, MACSOG accepted the CAS modus operandi in toto and perpetuated it for some time. Neither DOD or CIA had any success in agent operations that merited the efforts expended.

(3) The responsibility for all denied area agent operations would have better been given to the CIA with Service collection agencies subordinated to or placed in support of CIA.

(4) With respect to cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia, American commanders in the field did not know what MACSOG was doing or why it was being done or what the results were or why they should commit their resources to support MACSOG. The resources referred to here pertain primarily to helicopters. Our situation was extremely difficult in regard to gun ship support, the only kind of support the troops on the ground could receive when they got in trouble. The Air Force responded with what they could with certain exceptions. However, the time response was on the order of three or four fold as compared as to what we could expect from gun ships operating from our bases on the border. For cross-border operations, we needed adequate American helicopter units dedicated to that work. There were never adequate dedicated helicopters to support our cross-border programs.

(5) The American personnel in the cross-border program were initially all special forces personnel. We

found that the average special forces trooper was good for something on the order of six missions in Laos on patrol. At the end of that time he had extended a large portion of his nerve and courage. This was entirely understandable and not intended as a derogatory comment concerning these personnel. We needed a better system of rotating personnel through the patrolling activities. For this purpose we also needed a larger manpower base which would enable us to rotate personnel between training or administrative or operational planning type roles.

(6) MAROPS were hindered throughout its history by the refusal to commit American participation north of the 17th parallel. We were totally dependent upon the Vietnamese to perform these operations. There was a question as to whether the things the boat crews said happened in the North really did happen. In most cases, we were able to track the boats, know where they were, and have some indication of what they were doing, but the reports as to what happened when contact was made with the enemy were never fully reliable.

n. Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN, (1966-1969)

(1) With respect to MAROPS, in my view we overlooked a large intelligence potential; further, that the soft type of intelligence available to us through MAROPS was never fully exploited in Washington. On one occasion, SACSA tried to get CIA and DIA interested in taking the mass of raw information available and having it thoroughly researched by a competent team of behavioral scientists in order to obtain a picture as to actually what was going on among the population of North Vietnam. Both agencies indicated no real interest. In my opinion,

no where in the US Government was there anyone really looking in depth at the human situation in North Vietnam. That is the political and social dynamics created by the bombing.

(2) The entire agent team program was rather ill-conceived. The teams were so called black guerrilla type teams that were put in intially to conduct physical harassment. Later, they were reoriented to intelligence collection primarily. The only places in which the teams could be inserted were in remote areas; in such areas, there just is not much intelligence to collect. this point to a fundamental principle of conventional warfare, that is, you cannot do much in the way of active operations in a denied area unless you first start out in the long slow painful process of building some sort of a base of support in the population.

(3) An example of the lack of coordination and the sometimes countered productive efforts of MACSOG's operations are illustrated by MAROPS. For a long time, one of the purposes of MAROPS was to sink enemy junks. It gradually dawned on us that maybe we were using the wrong approach. We had the SSPL trying to establish itself as the dissident organization having the best interest of the Vietnamese people at heart and telling people along the coast line how terrible the Hanoi regime was. This was intended to develop support for the SSPL. Concurrently, our PTF's, purportedly, owned and operated by the SSPL, were sinking North Vietnamese junks. This did not make sense. We began to realize that if we were going to portray the PTF's as SSPL boats, that we had to cause them to act like the

SSPL would act toward the North Vietnamese people; therefore, we began to deemphasize interdiction. Enemy junks were not to be sunk unless there was good reason.

(4) Even with all the mistakes we made, I think the FOOTBOY operations were very significant. However, it is sometimes difficult to convince conventional thinkers in the military that the program was significant because they tend to take a positivistic view and want to derive a well-defined input/output ratio. Unfortunately, we simply cannot produce such a ratio when we are dealing with what are essentially sociologically based operations.

(5) Overall I consider that both the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE Programs have certainly contributed to our efforts to interdict enemy infiltration into South Vietnam. My feeling is that both programs have been well worth the cost.

(6) My personal observation of the related matter of escape and evasion in general is that we have retrogressed since World War II in this important field. There have been some technical advantages in gadgetry, but virtually nothing has been in North Vietnam to establish effective ENE nets. In part, this was because of the limitations placed by national policy on organized activities in North Vietnam, that is, activities to organize elements of the North Vietnamese population. We have done virtually nothing to assist our captured personnel, who are instructed in the military code that it is their duty and responsibility to try to escape. It seems to me that this is rather hollow guidance that we do absolutely nothing to assist if they do make that attempt to escape. Where escape

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attempt have been successful, notably in the case of Lt. Dingler, they had to make it out strictly on their own.

(7) There are a lot of small hardware items that can, and should, be developed for covert operations. In general, these items should be smaller and lighter and, in the case of communications equipment, have greater range and reliability.

(8) My concern in covert operations extends to the procurement and sanitization of equipment used in these operations. This is a mandatory requirement. Sanitization must be far more comprehensive than simply removing a few identification plates and painting. I refer to a recent newspaper item indicating that in Nha Trang, parked on a back lot, were transport aircraft painted in black. We are just kidding ourselves when we used this kind of equipment and think we can plausibly deny it.

o. Lt. Col. Kenneth W. McNiven, USAF, (1966-1967)

(1) We had communications difficulties from our facility in Saigon in handling air operations which originated from bases removed from the Saigon complex. Because of security requirements and the lack of hot line facilities, in many cases our hands were tied coordinating air ops plans. This resulted in our recommendation to have an air operations command post which would have hot line communications direct to air facilities and the base camps from which forces would launch.

(2) It took the C-130's an inordinate length of time to get combat ready. They were delayed in commencing operations due to equipment requirements and in-country

training problems. From an air Force standpoint, command relations were rather tenuous for a while. Main missions were laged on with very short notice. This caused us a great deal anxiety in attempting to get the support from 7th Air Force. On many occasions, the 7th Air Force FRAG's for the next day's combat operation were already cut. The 7th Air Force would have to divert air assets from laid-on strikes. Consequently, our relations were strained. As might be expected, the 7th Air Force was constantly badgering us for better advanced planning. One of the reasons why MACSOG was deficient in pre-planning was that the decision makers were in Saigon and the missions were run from Nha Trang and/or other bases outside Saigon. Nothwithstanding, the cooperation we received from the 7th Air Force was outstanding. They recut their FRAGs and provided us with as much support as they could. In 1967 we staffed a request to establish a modern command post to handle air operations.

p. Colonel Benton M. Austin, USA, (1966-1967)

We found so much rice that it was difficult to dispose of it. We asked for authority, where appropriate, to contaminate the rice. Our request was denied because of the concern over the possibility that the United States would be accused of chemical or bacteriological warfare. This was another constraint placed upon us.

q. Lt. Col. Harold J. Rose, USA, (1966-1968)

(1) To assist in the conduct of air strikes in support of MACSOG, we had FAC's stationed at Khe Sanh, Kontum, and Phu Bai. In addition, an American NCO rode in the back seat with the FAC. The NCO in the back seat would

make contact with the team on the ground and we had certain signals worked out which enabled us to identify the team. When the team leader spotted the target, he would back off from it, mark his position, and give them azimuth and direction to the target. The air strikes would then be directed by the FAC who got his information from the team leader on the ground. If the FAC could not see the target and the team leader on the ground knew exactly where it was, then the latter would move the next strike over, similar to that of adjusting artillery.

(2) Walking over land into Laos was impractical. In two or three days a team on the ground could cover only a mile or so and by that time they were tired and generally in poor combat condition.

r. Colonel Eugene A. Wahl, USAF, (1966-1967)

(1) With respect to air operations, one of our biggest problems was the fact that MACSOG did not own their aircraft. Although MACSOG had a responsibility for scheduling the aircraft, none was assigned.

(2) The United States is not using to the maximum its technological capability in the field of covert operations. We should have V/STOL - type aircraft with the requisite electronic aids for 10 point naviagation. Our communications capability should be improved to the point that teams could communicate anytime of the day or month with 100 percent reliability regardless of atmospheric conditions. At the best time communications, or the lack of it, is certainly one of the biggest stumbling blocks to conducting covert operations.

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s. Colonel Robert C. Kendrick, USA, (1966-1969)

(1) Agent teams are inserted into denied areas such as North Vietnam should be initially small in number. The size of the team could then be increased once it has been shown that the team can operate and survive in the area of insertion. The big problem is not in inserting them, but in their ability to survive and to carry out their assigned mission. With respect to infiltration, we must have some means of doing this periodically as a means of finding out just what the team is doing.

(2) A basic mistake in our team operations was the fact that we inserted them without giving the team adequate means of communication. For example, these teams need not only the capability to communicate reliably with their base or headquarters but to call in tactical air as needed.

(3) The entire agent program could have been improved by assigning to the teams perhaps one or two American personnel in order to provide the requisite leadership and to improve radio communications.

(4) Until such time as communists control on the populace are weakened, we would be hard pressed to conduct guerrilla warfare in communists controlled territories. In the case of North Vietnam, without first weakening commerce control over the North Vietnamese in the areas in which desired to operate, it would have been practically impossible to form guerrilla bands and to conduct guerrilla operations.

(5) In view of the efficient manner in which the communists control their population in North Vietnam, it was very difficult to introduce into that country

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personnel not indigenous to the particular area of operations, regardless of how well they were documented, and then expect them to be able to survive for any appreciable period. Moreover, without a contact in the area of operations, a team will find it very difficult to operate effectively.

(6) Battalion-size exploitation forces should be authorized for employment in Laos. If we were authorized to put in larger forces than at present along certain routes in Laos, our operations would be much more effective in impeding or interdicting communists movement of vehicles hauling men and materiel into South Vietnam. In addition, we should be granted authority to conduct, on occasions, operations outside the PRAIRIE FIRE zone along certain routes west of the zone. Those routes are not being covered by Lao forces.

(7) MACSOG wanted to establish an intelligence net using the friendly natives throughout the Laos panhandle. The authority for establishing this net was granted but, because of the efficient controls of the communists forces in the area, MACSOG was unable to recruit or establish the net. Further, MACSOG sought approval to develop a guerrilla force in the PRAIRE FIRE area; this force would number approximately 3,000. We were not able to get approval of the proposed project. However, had approval been obtained, I feel that the project would have met the same fate as the intelligence net, again because of the efficient controls which the communists exercised over the population. For example, once a village or hamlet committed an overt act against the North Vietnamese, drastic measures would have been taken not only against the perpetrators but against the members of the village or hamlet.

(3) In the conduct of covert operations, until the commanders in the field are permitted certain latitudes the operations are simply going to continue to be cumbersome, frustrating, and to a large degree ineffective. There are too many people trying to control and influence MACSOG operations.

t. Colonel Robert C. Kingston, USA (1967-1969)

(1) In the procurement of safehouses, proper security precautions were not taken; this applies both to the strategic technical directorate and to MACSOG personnel. No American should ever go near or in a safehouse at least until it has been established. If an American must go into the house, such entry should be limited to the American case officer and sophisticated anti-detection measures should be carried out. Several of the safehouses supporting My operations 34 activities were owned by officers of the Strategic Technical Directorate. We had in some instances no idea as to how long these houses had been used for that purpose or whether those South Vietnamese officers had been blown? as intelligence officers. To make matters worse, some of the agent teams stayed in the safehouses so long that obviously the teams were compromised. Such compromise was engendered, among other things, by the lack of control of the members of the team once they entered the house.

(2) A safehouse should be used only once and for the housing of one team.

u. Colonel Harold K. Aaron, USA (1967-1969)

(1) There was inadequate helicopter support of MACSOG.

(2) MACSOG attempted without success to gain authority to deepen the area of penetration in Laos. Had MACSOG been given this authority, it would have to dilute the communist security and warning system.

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As it was, the enemy had developed, after experiencing MACSOG operations, a highly sophisticated alert and warning system. All or practically all of the landing zones in Laos were well known to the communists who had posted these with security forces and it was only a short time after one of our insertions that the enemy could react.

(3) In my view, our intelligence on Laos was poor and improperly collated. Consequently, the teams were sometimes inadequately prepared to accomplish their assigned missions.

(4) We did not do as much as we could have done for our personnel who were captured by the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army. For example, we did not have in being a quick reaction capability to respond to intelligence of prisoner of war camps in which Americans were being held. A highly trained, highly selective, force should have been available for immediate operations in order to capitalize on perishable intelligence before the enemy had an opportunity to move our prisoners to another location. Often a period of some seven to twelve days had elapsed between the time that we had gained intelligence of a possible PW site and the time our force to be committed in that area was launched. Consequently, we usually found a "dry hole." I am convinced to this day that, in times of prisoner recovery operations in Vietnam, we are not geared properly for rapid response to recover our personnel.

(5) We need to clarify our doctrine and techniques which have emerged from MACSOG's operations. Up to this point we have done little to take advantage of the experience gained through MACSOG in both the intelligence and operations fields and to use this experience as a basis for training.

(5) Cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodi were over-controlled and over-centralized in Saigon. Many of the people there had little appreciation for the problems of the launch commanders . For example team inserted into Laos would request emergency extraction; authority for such extraction had to com from Saigon. I consider that the launch commander o the C&C detachment commander should have authority for the extraction.

v. Colonel George A. Maloney, USA (1967-1969)

(1) The military problems attendant to establishi a cross-border program, while great, are miniscule i comparison to the problem of obtaining political authority to initiate and to carry out these progra

(2) For the conduct of cross-border operations, w is needed is organization responsive to a relatively small number of people who on a continuing basis, co duct high-risk missions in enemy areas behind enemy lines. This organization must have highly responsi helicopter and communications systems. And essential effective operations is a retrieval system which wil permit the introduction of sufficient force to gain quickly local superiority so that a team may be extracted from a hot spot very quickly.

(3) American personnel from the reconnaissance t must be minimum in number. This means that indigen troops must be trained to attain acceptable skill l Such skills must include map reading, navigation, weaponry, artillery and tactical air support, commu cations, first-aid, and the basic English needed fo communicating.

w. Staff Sergeant Russell R. Allen, USA (1967-1968)

(1) Initially the STRATA teams carried too much equipment. In some instances members of the team, weighing perhaps 124 lbs. nothing wet, carried 80 lbs or more. Obviously, such weight impaired the ability of the individual to move. We were able to eliminate a certain amount of that equipment.

(2) The STRATA teams were made up entirely of Vietnamese personnel. The performance of the teams could have been improved if Americans had been authorized to accompany them on their missions, either as leaders or advisors. Americans trained with the teams. Unfortunately however when the teams were committed the Vietnamese all of a sudden found themselves without Americans and this caused them some confusion. Americans might have been authorized to accompany the STRATA teams for perhaps three or four missions, after which the Vietnamese could be committed on their own.

x. Lt. Col. Jefferson C. Scott, III, USA (1968)

(1) Our helicopter operations were impeded by a lack of spare parts and the availability of helicopters. Though improved upon, the spare parts problem was not solved during my tour with SOG. Further, though we were able to improve the number of helicopters operationally available on a day-to-day basis, we simply did not have enough dedicated helicopters needed to optimize the effectiveness of our operations.

(2) The impatience on the part of American authorities to produce results on the various MACSOG programs is not always warranted. Some of these programs take months and perhaps even years to develop the expertise

required to carry them out effectively. This problem is compounded somewhat by the fact that an officer has one year to serve on his tour of duty in Vietnam and during that time he must produce results; if he does not, the program is often judged as no good. For example there was the THUNDERCLOUD program which was cancelled due to lack of results. This program involved the use of North Vietnamese Army captives as ralliers on the 3-man agent teams in South Vietnam. The members of this team had volunteered to enter enemy-held territory in South Vietnam posing as North Vietnamese Army soldiers. Their mission was to collect intelligence, to conduct combat operations, and to capture prisoners. In some cases these teams were highly successful. They were able to walk up to another North Vietnamese Army soldier, convince the soldier that the members of the team were his comrades in arms, and to capture him. Unfortunately, in some cases during the extraction phase, the prisoner was killed or wounded while attempting to escape or he escaped when the extraction operation came under enemy fire. I feel that if this program had been allowed to run for six more months, it would have produced outstanding results.

y. Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF (1963-1969)

(1) In the FOOTBOY program high level political decisions and restrictions had a direct influence on the effectiveness of the program. One of the vitiating factors was the linking together of our overt bombing of North Vietnam with accompanying restrictions on our MACSOG programs. Obviously this direct association destroyed the usefulness of the SSPL and its activities directed toward the North Vietnamese population. Another

vitiating factor, with tragic results, was the termination of the support of our agent teams in North Vietnam. In the eyes of the Vietnamese, some of these teams were not compromised. And the United States abandoned them. The Vietnamese, of course, recalled that they recruited the members of their teams from their own nationality and in some cases members of the teams were personal friends of case officers in the South Vietnamese Army. Some of those recruited had been induced to go into North Vietnam with the guarantee that they would be supported by the United States. In short, the Vietnamese feel we have betrayed them. Should the United States attempt to initiate programs of this type in the future, we will find that the Vietnamese have long memories.

(2) With the cessation of our bombing of North Vietnam, the accompanying restriction on dropping leaflets into that country was both unreasonable and unrealistic. We still could get much good out of the black PSYOP leaflet program if the aircraft were allowed to drop the leaflets using the wind-blow technique while flying well off the coast of North Vietnam.

(3) Generally psychological warfare programs can be explained to the American public only with great difficulty. These programs are better off in CIA. It would be disastrous to the military if some of the more sensitive psyops programs became public and were traced to the military.

z. Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh, USA (1968-1969)

(1) With regard to MAROPS, the imposition of restrictions specifying the distance north of the 17th

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parallel to which these operations could be conducted resulted in the fact that the enemy was able to ascertain our area of operations and to intercept our boats with less difficulty. Of course, the cessation of MARCOPS on 1 November 1968 greatly reduced the intelligence we had been gleaning from fishermen who were picked up, detained and interrogated. In addition, this restriction pretty well finished the SSPL.

(2) Our restrictions on depths of penetration in Laos and Cambodia were quickly detected by the enemy who was then able to deploy his observers and weapons in such a manner as to relatively easily intercept our aircraft and ground teams. In Cambodia, the restrictions placed on us against the use of tactical air and other support meant that we had to forfeit the attack of lucrative targets. We were not able to get approval of the proposed project. However, had approval been obtained, I feel that the project would have met the same fate as the intelligence met, again because of the efficient controls which the communists exercised over the population. For example, once a village or hamlet committed an overt act against the North Vietnamese, drastic measures would have been taken not only against the perpetrators but against the members of the village or hamlet.

(3) In the conduct of covert operations, until the commanders in the field are permitted certain latitudes, the operations are simply going to continue to be cumbersome, frustrating, and to a large degree ineffective. There are too many people trying to control and to influence MACSOG operations.

(4) The restriction against our using ethnic Cambodians in the SALEM HOUSE Program was contrary to all generally accepted agent-type or intelligence-type operations where every effort should be made to use personnel and equipment which would enable our to operate undetected when penetrating Cambodian air-space or terrain.

(5) In a broad sense our operations into Cambodia were generally easily detected insofar as determining the nationality of the intruder was concerned because our aircraft were of a US manufacture and the Americans on the teams were easily distinguished from the other team members. However, the cover story used if our teams were picked up in Cambodia was that the team had been on a reconnaissance mission in South Vietnam, had gotten lost, and had wandered into Cambodia. This cover story however was contradicted by the requirement for sterile fatigues and initially at least for unmarked aircraft. This latter restriction was imposed by the SALEM HOUSE operations order which simply stated that the operations should be conducted in such a fashion as to be plausibly deniable. The attempt to pin down this aspect of the operation was exceptionally difficult. Sterilization of the aircraft, that is, attempting to paint out the numbers and insignia was rather illogical and was certainly frowned upon by commanders who provided us with the aircraft.

(6) In Laos, as in Cambodia, we faced a situation in that which our supporting aircraft, namely VNAF H-34 helicopters, dedicated to MACSOG though unmarked were clearly discernible as MACSOG-type aircraft in that

they were painted in the distinctive fashion of green and black paint and easily identified as a unit operating under other than normal circumstances.

(7) In North Vietnam our operations, of course, were conducted by all indigenous personnel dressed in either black pajamas or the North Vietnamese Army uniform; no US personnel accompanied them. If the teams could be infiltrated undetected, they could very well deny any connection with US forces if captured. However, if they were detected when being inserted they could be clearly identified as being sponsored and operated by US units.

(8) It is important to underscore the fact that both PRAIRIE FIRE and SHADY HOUSE operations became more of an overt combat/intelligence type of exercise than perhaps had been originally intended. Thus, we were inserting teams in a fashion which was more overt than covert. These teams were inserted in daylight with US markings on the aircraft and it was obvious when the aircraft left South Vietnam for Laos or Cambodia that it was on a special type of operation and certainly was easily detected.

(9) Prior to the Tet Offensive of 1968, MACSOG forces were principally deployed out of country. Following Tet, and because of the need for more reconnaissance units in country, COMUSMACV authorized the field force commanders to target MACSOG units against in-country locations. This authorization resulted in about 90% of the MACSOG effort, insofar as the cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia were concerned, being turned to reconnaissance in-country in support of the field forces. The field force commander would task the

commanding control detachment directly for the mission. That detachment would then notify Headquarters MACSOG which, if it had no objections, would concur and the operation would be carried out. Consequently, the MACSOG reconnaissance capability was appreciably degraded in that the in-country operation proved debilitating and many personnel were wounded or injured. As a result, MACSOG's capability to return to cross-border operations was somewhat limited following this in-country reconnaissance period. In the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE operation, it has become practically impossible to insert a team without having the aircraft detected either enroute to the insert point or during the insert itself. An "aerial armada" of perhaps five to seven aircraft, descending into Laos or Cambodia easily identifies the fact that an operation of some magnitude is taking place. Attempts to insert teams through the use of one or two aircraft only have been generally unsuccessful in that the team commanders and pilots consider as extremely important adequate joint-ship support.

(10) Attempts to deploy helicopters under conditions of limited visibility or darkness have, in the MACSOG experience, been practically impossible. The aircraft and/or the pilots have proven to be incapable either because of design limitation or of pilot training to land teams after dark in denied areas. Overcoming these limitations would appreciably reduce casualties and enhance immeasurably the chances of success of a reconnaissance mission. The lack of a capability for operating at night with helicopters is one of the principal deficiencies existing today in the matter of employing

helicopters for the PHOENIX type of reconnaissance or intelligence operations.

(21) It should also be pointed out that a large number of Army pilots are not instrument qualified in helicopters and, as a result, they are not capable of flying under conditions of limited visibility. On the other hand, many Marine helicopter pilots have been so trained and have been much more effective in landing our teams during periods of adverse weather.

H. (TS) CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. (TS) General

a. In the event of general war and/or when activated by CINCPAC, COMUSMACV becomes Commander, US Forces Southeast Asia (COMUSSEASIA). COMUSSEASIA is tasked to establish a JUWTF to conduct UW in Southeast Asia. MACSOG becomes the JUWTF Headquarters and is augmented with an Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA component. The general mission of MACSOG in relation to the JUWTF is to:

(1) Prepare plans for the conduct of UW operations.

(2) Maintain continuing estimates of the resistance potential available in UW operational areas.

(3) Plan for the operation of a personnel recovery and escape and evasion program in SEAsia.*

b. This section covers MACSOG's contingency planning to accomplish its possible role as a JUWTF and its current role as a subordinate command under MACV.

2. (TS) JUWTF OPLAN 1-67

a. In furtherance of its planning responsibilities, MACSOG prepared JUWTF OPLAN 1-67 during the summer and early fall of 1967. Approved by MACV in March 1968, MACSOG promulgated the plan in April 1968. It supports four COMUSSEASIA OPLANs, namely:

(1) COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 1-67, 6 July 1967. This is a general war plan which envisions a CHICOM - North Vietnamese attack to capture SEAsia. The plan provides for general warfare and US operations under the control and direction of JUWTF SEAsia.

* (TS) MACSOG Fact Book, p. 46. MACSOG TS Serial 000545-69.

(2) COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 32-64, 1 December 1963. This plan provides for the conduct of operations, including UW, in SEAsia in a situation short of general war in which NVN, with or without Communist China, attacks to seize, occupy, and control any friendly or neutral country in SEAsia. The control and direction of UW operations would be exercised through a JUWTF.

(3) COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 39-65, 14 June 1965. This is a unilateral plan providing for the employment of US and Allied Forces to conduct limited war in defense of SEAsia in the event Communist China possibly assisted by NVN and/or North Korea attacks Taiwan, South Korea, or SEAsia. Control and direction of UW operations would be exercised through a JUWTF.

(4) COMUSSEASIA/COMUSMACV OPLAN 22-66, 25 August 1966. This is a unilateral plan for assistance to revolutionary outbreaks in NVN. Phase I provides for MACSOG to continue the preparation of plans, as well as training, advice, and operational assistance to STD. Phase II provides for the activation of JUWTF and for the use of all measures short of direct intervention with major US Forces. Phase III provides for activation of USFEASIA and for direct intervention with major US Forces to assist a revolutionary outbreak in overthrowing the Government of NVN.

b. JUWTF OPLAN 1-67 provides for the conduct of UW operations in coordination with other military and political actions in the defense of SEAsia. The area encompassed by the plan includes not only SEAsia but these southern provinces in Communist China: Yunan, Kwangsi, and that portion of Kwantung west of the railroad extending from Fort Bayard to the Kwangsi border and Hainan Island. The plan

is intended to provide the flexibility necessary to meet the requirements of a wide spectrum of situations, ranging from a limited war arising from an escalation of the current campaign, to one of unrestrained general warfare to defeat decisively CHICOM and to reunify VN. A strategic war reserve of weapons and equipment is established in Okinawa for the support of UW in SEAsia. The stockpile would be in support of 49,000 guerrilla troops during the first 180 days of JUWTFs operations.

c. A JUWTF commanded by Chief, MACSOG, is established for the conduct of UW operations. All Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA UW Forces in SEAsia are placed under his control.

d. In connection with the development of JUWTF OPLAN 1-67, on 4-6 April 1965, MACSOG and MACTHAI representatives met in Bangkok to establish agreements on working relationships between the two organizations.* As concluded, those agreements included the following:

(1) A single UW OPLAN would be developed to provide for UW activities in support of conventional forces operations under COMUSSEASIA OPLANs.

(2) For the purpose of UW planning, SEAsia would be considered as a single geographical complex without regard to political boundaries. Areas of responsibility for MACSOG and MACTHAI would be assigned based upon ethnic groups, geography, and their existing assets.

3. (~~TS~~) OTHER PLANNING

* (~~TS~~) MACSOG Memorandum of Agreement, 6 April 1965. This agreement was signed by Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA, Chief, MACSOG, and Colonel G. M. Dawes, USMC, Chief, E&P Division of MACTHAI

a. "37" Series OPLANs. During the period 1967-1968, MACSOG prepared other OPLANs, all within the "37" series. These plans will not be elaborated upon here since they were cancelled.*

b. Paris Talks

(1) In his memorandum of 24 May 1968 to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the SecDef:**

(a) Stated that the President had asked the Departments of State and Defense to provide him with their views on what should be done in the event that the discussions with the North Vietnamese in Paris fail to proceed satisfactorily toward a peaceful settlement.

(b) Requested:

1. The judgment of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on the steps which the United States should take under five postulated situations involving overt US offensive actions against NVN.

2. An examination of possible US strategies if the Paris talks broke down completely or were abandoned.

(2) The response of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, insofar as it pertained to MACSOG operations, contained the following proposed actions:***

(a) Actions under the five postulated situations involving overt US offensive actions against NVN:

* (~~TS~~) CINCPAC Msg 102022Z Sep 69.

** (~~TS~~) SecDef Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Possible US Courses of Action if Paris Talks Stall or Break Down," 24 May 1968. I-35539/38.

*** 1. (~~TS~~) CJCS Memorandum for the SecDef "FOOTBOY (C)-Possible Courses of Action if Paris Talks Stall or Break Down (C)," 4 June 1968. CM-3372-68.

2. (~~TS~~) SACSA Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject as in 1, above, 31 May 1968. SACSA M-398-68S.

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1. Current Situation

a. Expand the notional agent team network. Service and support notional teams by radio broadcasts. Make deceptive/diversionary drops to notional teams only in conjunction with authorized drops to actual agent teams where no additional risk is involved.

b. Continue STRATA Team operations in the area from 17-00N to 19-00N.

c. Infiltrate new, long-term agent teams into NVN for intelligence collection as approved on a case-by-case basis at the Washington level.

d. Extend maritime operations, including the detention of NVN personnel, to a northern limit of 20-30N.

e. Infiltrate agents into NVN by sea for intelligence collection and psychological, but not physical destruction, missions as approved on a case-by-case basis at the Washington level.

f. Continue black and gray radio operations in accordance with thematic guidance provided from the Washington level.

g. Deliver black leaflets, deceptive materials and radio receivers to North Vietnam, including the areas north of 20-00N by sea delivery, balloon delivery or winddrift from aircraft flying over authorized areas.

h. Except as specifically approved at the Washington level, limit supporting air operations to the area south of 19-00N.

2. Resumption of attack air and naval bombardment to 20-00N

a. Take the actions outlined in paragraph 1, above.

b. Authorize the conduct of maritime cross-beach operations to 20-00N.

3. Return to the pre-31 March 1968 bombing limits

a. Resume all FOOTBOY (C) operations in accordance with the guidance in effect as of 31 March 1968.

b. Execute previously planned deceptive operations which could be executed within the then existing authorities.

c. Reorient FOOTBOY (C) in accordance with a revised concept to exploit fully North Vietnamese vulnerabilities. (A revised FOOTBOY (C) concept had been prepared for submission at the appropriate time.)

d. Establish new and viable long-term agent team assets in NVN in numbers sufficient to support the credibility of the program and to exploit North Vietnamese concern over internal control.

e. Increase the tempo of actual operations and the extent of notional operations.

4. Expansion of bombing to all military targets and ground penetration of the DMZ

a. Take the actions outlined in paragraph 3, above.

b. Approve planned actions to expand the credibility of the SSPL by the establishment of third country cells and the development of assets

in NVN to induce passive non-cooperation with the regime.

5. Retaliatory bombing only

Continue the actions outlined in paragraph 3, above, to maintain pressure on the North Vietnamese regime. Control actions selectively to insure the concentration on those most likely to have relatively quick results. Such actions should not, however, be limited to areas in which retaliatory bombing was authorized.

6. Breakdown or abandonment of Paris Talks

1. If a decision was taken to continue the then current strategy, continue FOOTBOY (~~O~~) operations as in paragraph 4, above.

2. If a decision is taken to expand the ground war into North Vietnam, employ FOOTBOY (~~O~~) assets to develop increasingly active indigenous support for allied operations in North Vietnam.

c. Post-Hostilities

(1) MACSOG, pursuant to MACV directives, has planned extensively for the post-hostilities period. Some of this planning is outlined in Appendix C (Operations against North Vietnam). In this connection, the specific type of successor organization to MACSOG has not been determined. Basically, however, MACSOG contemplates that the functions to be carried on by a MACSOG type organization would fall into two broad categories, both of an intelligence nature: verification, and reconnaissance and surveillance. The extent of these activities will depend, of course, upon whatever cease-fire settlement, if any, and supporting agreements are arranged.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(2) Illustrative of the manifold post-hostilities issues are the following, all of which were submitted as recommendations in the report of a working level conference convened at Hq PACOM in November 1968.*

(a) That SOG be reconfigured as a Joint Special Operations Advisory Detachment.

(b) That STD be reorganized and assigned a new role as the special operations staff element of the Joint General Staff.

(c) That RVNAF be advised and assisted in the development of a small but high quality special operations capability.

(d) That an appropriate number of PTFs be continued on loan to RVNAF.

(e) That selected VNAF air assets be earmarked for support of an improved GVN special operations capability.

(f) That indigenous ground force assets now under SOG control be disbanded and efforts directed toward the improvement of the LLDB (ARVN Special Forces) within the ARVN force structure.

(g) That provision be made for appropriate US advisory detachments for GVN air, ground and naval special operations elements.

(h) That the black PsyOps assets be transferred to CAS.

(i) That, in the event the United States does not desire to retain the VOF assets, these assets be transferred to GVN.

* ~~TOP SECRET~~ CINCPAC Memorandum to COMUSMACV, "Conference on MACSOG Programs," 9 November 1968. Serial 000495. The enclosure to that memorandum is a report of a conference on MACSOG programs, convened at Hq PACOM on 5 November 1968 to review the then current and future plans for the conduct of MACSOG operation

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4. (~~TS~~) Views Concerning Contingency Planning

On the subject of contingency planning, the representative views of persons interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association are set forth below. Their detailed views are presented in Annex P.

a. Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, USA (1965-1966)

(1) MACSOG should be retained in some form in the post-hostilities period and not be turned over to CAS. A lot of thought and detailed planning must be given to the functions of intelligence and surveillance. This should include the use of the [redacted] for surveillance on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. (b)(1) (b)(3)

(2) We need the requisite national organization for formulation of concepts, and the delineation of roles and missions to carry out responsibilities in such fields as UW, CI, psychological operations, civic action, police field forces.

b. Colonel John T. Moore, Jr., USAF (1965-1969)

(1) I see no requirement for covert operations after a cessation of hostilities because we are not in a position to organize anything in NVN. Whatever assets we had in NVN, if any of them were loyal in the first place, have been lost by now.

(2) What is going to be needed is of continuing capability to watch the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to counter subversive forces there.

c. Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA (1966-1968)

(1) It is unlikely that there will ever be a cessation of hostilities from the enemy's point of view.

(2) We should continue psychological pressures on the enemy and intelligence collection.

(3) MACSOG will have to be renamed and relocated in the MACV organization. Depending on the type of US force remaining in SVN, it would be possible to create a cover activity to conceal the primary mission of MACSOG's successor organization, which would conduct UW operations.

d. Captain Bruce E. Dunning, USN (1966-1969)

(1) We need to become more sophisticated than at present in our UW planning. Much of our contingency planning for UW is extremely artificial.

(2) It is likely that we will need to continue cross-border operations for some time in order to keep the enemy under surveillance. For that purpose we will need some sort of SOG organization.

(3) STD has a small army which it now controls, hopefully, under MACSOG's supervision and guidance. Politically, this could be dangerous in the future. We should try to influence the South Vietnamese in disestablishing the STD as such and placing its command and control resources in a special operations staff element of the JGS. STD would not be an operational command. South Vietnamese special operations resources would be returned to the armed forces and they, with US assistance, would develop their own special operations capabilities.

(4) Should there be a need to conduct special operations in Thailand or any other country, we will have a requirement to a MACSOG-type operation.

e. Colonel Eugene A. Wahl, USAF (1966-1967)

We should retain the nucleus of MACSOG in the event such an organization has to be reactivated in the future.

f. Colonel Harold F. Aaron, USA (1967-1968)

Just prior to completing my tour with the 8th Special Forces Group, Chief, MACSOG and I were working on the post-hostilities posture of the ARVN in terms of a JUWTP. I believe that the classic JUWTP concept would be an appropriate one to use as a guide in establishing a post-hostilities South Vietnamese organization of covert operations.

g. Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF (1968-1969)

Chief, MACSOG has worked very hard with his South Vietnamese counterparts in determining their appropriate UW-type organization for the post-hostilities period. One possibility, which has been considered, is to return STD assets to their respective Services; earmarking those assets as dedicated to UW. In addition, convert STD into a CINCLANT type staff-contingency command under the Joint General Staff. Then, that staff-contingency command would task the appropriate Service for whatever UW assets were required to conduct UW operations, upon the completion of which the assets would revert to the control of the Service.

I. (TS) Personnel and Training

1. (U) Introduction

a. This section embodies general considerations pertaining to MACSOG's personnel and training function.

b. Of particular importance here are the views of personnel interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association. These views are encapsulated in paragraph 8, below. They are presented in detail in Annex Q. Collectively, they are intended to enable the reader to gain insight into some of the finer points of MACSOG's activities, points which are not necessarily reflected in more formalized writings or reports.

2. (TS) General

a. As noted in preceding sections of this report, the 5th Special Forces Group provides MACSOG with US personnel to man the CAC detachments, which include reconnaissance teams and exploitation forces. Assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group, these personnel are under the operational control of MACSOG and under the administrative control of the Group.*

(1) The administrative responsibilities of the Group embody all of the functions of personnel management, including these specific items: proficiency pay; assignments, reassignments, and requisitioning of personnel; reenlistment; casualty reporting; officer efficiency reports; ordinary leave; R&R; extension and curtailment of foreign service tours; security clearances; COS, warrant officer, and direct commission applications;

* (TS) Commanding Officer, 5th SFG Memorandum to MACV AC of S, J-3, "Joint Report of Investigation to Determine Whether there is Duplication by 5th SFGA and SOG (TS)," 4 June 1966.

dependent affairs; military pay, military requests for pay actions, travel and TDY; records management; awards and decorations; and disciplinary matters.

(2) Problems have arisen in the area of disciplinary actions. A soldier assigned to the 5th SFG and under the operational control of MACSOG may be relieved of his duties and returned to the Group. Reasons for the soldier's relief might not be clearly relayed to the Commanding Officer so that he may take appropriate administrative or disciplinary action. Meanwhile, SOG expects an immediate replacement from the Group. Thus, the Commanding Officer of the Group is placed in the position of operating a holding and house-keeping detachment for SOG. The former has responsibility for personnel matters but has no authority to control SOG personnel. A hypothetical case in point: a SOG soldier gets drunk and disorderly and causes serious trouble in a Saigon bar. Technically, the Commanding Officer of the Group is responsible, but he has no authority or daily control over the soldier's activities. Normally, the Commanding Officer might see this soldier only when he arrives and departs Vietnam.

(3) Casualty reporting has presented a problem in that the Group has this responsibility, but the SOG communications system is separate from that of the Group.

(4) SOG personnel operate from existing Special Forces camps. This places two operational units under the same roof but they work for entirely independent agencies. This is not necessarily conducive to good relations or maximum productive effort.

b. All MACSOG personnel must have a TOP SECRET clearance;

some must have special clearances in addition to [illegible],
Though this information has been disseminated to the
military services personnel have arrived in MACSOG lacking
the appropriate clearances. This lack has resulted in
individuals either not being assigned initially to the
position they were sent to occupy but being assigned in a
limited capacity for perhaps three to six months until the
required clearances were obtained. In short, inherent in
this discrepancy is the unsatisfactory use of manpower.

c. MACSOG has been acutely aware of the highly important role of indigenous civilians in promoting the success of the organization. These civilians are from different ethnic groups, including Vietnamese Montagnards, Chinese, Cambodians, and Filipinos. In this connection, MACSOG has developed a wealth of civilian personnel regulations, and pay structures for both administrative and field operational personnel. Illustrative regulations are contained in Annex R.

3. (~~S~~) C & C Detachments

a. In June 1967, COMUSMACV directed the Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group to maintain the C&C detachments at 100 percent strength in US personnel*

b. The reconnaissance team is basic to MACSOG's conduct of cross-border operations. It follows that MACSOG has devoted considerable attention to the qualifications of the team's members and, in particular, those of the team leader. This subject is dealt with at length in the encapsuled interviews of personnel who have been associated with MACSOG, paragraph below, and in other detailed views presented in Annex Q. In this connection, during his

* (~~S~~) COMUSMACV msg 21045, DTG 191006Z June 1967

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visit to MACSOG in September 1968, the SACSA suggested that Chief, MACSOG solicit the help of a disinterested agency in analyzing the elements of the program and in recommending Special Forces personnel who would serve as reconnaissance team leaders.*

c. Though the C&C detachments play a highly important role in the war in Vietnam, the nature of this mission is such that they cannot receive public acclaim for their performance, however valuable. Recognition of US personnel in the form of awards and decorations is critical to maintaining a high morale. This is also true in the case of personnel, e.g., aircrews who support the detachments.**

4. (~~TS~~) Recruiting of Indigenous Personnel

a. The recruiting of indigenous personnel is accomplished through the Liaison Service of STD and the Liaison Bureau of MACSOG Operations-35. The C&C detachments requisition through both ARVN and US channels for personnel to fill vacancies. Indigenous personnel recruited for and assigned to these detachments are called Special Commando Unit (SCU) (pronounced "Sue") personnel. Screening is initiated with the recruitment process and is continued for as long as the individual is with the program.***

(1) 1964 Command History****

(a) The inability to obtain good recruits was a limiting factor in airborne operations potential. At that time civilians off the street and a few volunteers from the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were being

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* (~~TS~~) Memorandum for the Record by Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF, Deputy Chief, SOG, "Briefing for Major General De Fuy (U)," 25 September 1968.

** (~~TS~~) Chief, MACSOG letter, "Commanders Notes," 13 Feb 1969.

*** (~~TS~~) MACSOG Reconnaissance Techniques, 1 July 1969.

**** (~~TS~~) Annex A to 1964 MACV Command History, pp. II-P-1--II-P-3.

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collected for training. Experiences has indicated that bloodied veterans made the best agents.

(b) The recruiting SOP of the STD included these considerations

1. Phase I - Indirect Contact

a. Come in contact with representatives of the local area of recruitment for pre-investigation of identification and collection of preliminary information concerning possible agents for the program. Establish the list of candidate agents.

b. Good health. Qualified for jump training. Aged between 21 and 35. Having no more than two children. Being not the main support of the family or the only son. Evidence sought to guarantee anti-communist spirit (e.g., having relative killed by Viet Cong or being ex-cadre of SVN government). Being adventurous people such as: hunters, divers, woodcutters who are familiar with hard life.

c. Being of primary education level or usual readers of daily papers.

2 Phase II - Direct Contact.

a. Direct contact with candidate agent to confirm foregoing points.

b. Candidate agent should volunteer to comply with discipline and withstand hardship in training and on mission. Agent may go on mission in-border for a period of one or two years.

c. Military salary -

Agent	Army Pay	Recruitment Bonus	6 month inducement bonus	Hostile area
NCO	No Change	15,000$	15,000$	150$ per day
EM	No Change	9,000$	9,000$	150$ per day

d. Civilian salary -

Salaries a little better than the Army's. Free food served.

In training:

	Basic Pay	Airborne arms bonus (jump)	Wife	Each child
Agent	2,000$	500$	350$	250$

On mission:

	Basic Pay	Jump Bonus	Wife	Each Child	Hostile Area Opns Bonus	6 Month Inducement Bonus
Agent	3,000$	500$	350$	250$	4,500$	9,000$

e. Refusal by the agent to execute the mission assigned without proper cause might result in the agent being prosecuted before court martial or forfeit of his recruitment bonus or six month inducement bonus.

3. Phase III - Direct Contact

Case officer contact candidate agent once more to be sure that he has fully understood and accepted the conditions stated above.

(2) 1965 Command History*

(a) Until September 1965 recruiting was the direct responsibility of the Strategic Technical Service (STS). In September the Airborne Operations Section undertook to develop realistic recruiting objectives based on projected operations. A detailed study was conducted to determine the ethnic composition and quality of recruits necessary to meet these forecasted needs. It was determined that 198 recruits were needed during the forthcoming seven-months period. This figure included a 10% attrition factor for losses incurred during training.

* (TS) Annex H to 1965 MACV Command History, pp. II A-15--II A-16.

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(b) This study also determined that the target of the recruitment program should be South Vietnamese Montagnard tribesmen who formerly resided in, and/or who had relatives in the objective area, the northwestern part of North Vietnam. These minority Montagnard tribes moved to South Vietnam in 1954 and since that time had lived in villages apart from the lowland Vietnamese populace, largely in the vicinity of the highland towns of Ban Me Thuot, Kontum and Pleiku, and the coastal towns of Danang and Nha Trang.

(c) A unilateral recruiting system was employed. This system put the Chief Recruiter in contact with the target prospects but he was controlled directly by the US handler:

1. The leader of a former North Vietnamese Montagnard minority group was selected as the Chief Recruiter. He was selected primarily because of his many contacts with the other chiefs of the minority tribes located in the vicinity of the areas mentioned above.

2. Recruitment started two months after the initial contact was made between the Chief Recruiter and the US handler. It consisted of a trip to the vicinity of Dalat for the purpose of re-establishing contact with the minority group leader in that area. Five days after arrival, a group of 26 candidates was recruited. Transportation was requested and four days later the new recruiter was picked up and airlifted to Camp Long Thanh where they were processed and began their training.

3. After the first recruitment trip, it was felt that "regional recruiter" should be employed in each of the possible areas and kept in place. They would be directly under control of and communicate with the Chief Recruiter. These regional recruiters were recruited and brought into Saigon. There they received detailed instructions on their missions and were given the necessary training in clandestine operations and communications to enable them to operate effectively. They were then escorted back to their respective areas of operation to begin the steady flow of recruits into Camp Long Thanh. Some of the recruits were picked up by C-123 and transported to Long Thanh, others arrived by other modes of transportation.

4. Thus, at the beginning of December, a complete recruiting net was in operation. The schematic organization of this net was as follows:

US Handler

Chief Recruiter

Commo Helper — Administrator & Finance

Dalat — Nha Trang — Pleiku — Bau Me Thuot — Koutan — Danang

(3) 1966 Command History*

(a) In August 1966 the Airborne Operations Section developed a new set of recruiting objectives. These objectives were part of a study that was to determine the most desirable ethnic composition and quantity of

* (~~TS~~) Annex M to 1966 MACV Command History, p. 73.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

recruits to meet projected operational requirements for agents.

[redacted]

(c) OP-34 recruited a total of 92 agent recruits during the year. Of these, 24 were recruited in Laos and 68 in SVN. The ethnic breakdown was as follows:

Vietnamese	68
Meo	20
Thai	1
Nung	1
Lao	2
TOTAL	92

(4) 1967 and 1968 Ground Histories. New histories do not address the subject of indigenous recruiting.

c. In February 1969, Chief, MACSOG announced the following recruiting procedure:*

> Recruiting will be authorized when the CAC Det Co determines the [illegible] strength has reached a level that requires additional replacements and the number required is sufficient to warrant training. The CAC CO will advise the Commander, Ground Studies Group of the number of personnel and ethnic group required. After approval by the Ground Studies Group US personnel from the Liaison Detachment, accompanied by representatives from the ARVN Liaison Service, will report to the CAC Detachment and conduct the recruiting. Following this procedure is necessary to avoid unpleasant incidents that may occur with GVN representatives if proper clearances are not obtained prior to recruiting. CAC Dets are not authorized to recruit.
>
> As soon as practical after SCU are recruited, they must be sent to Saigon for a complete physical examination. The exam normally takes one day. Personnel will be housed, fed and escorted by a member of the Liaison Det and the Liaison Service while in Saigon. Appointments for this exam will be made thru the Admin/LOG Officer, Ground Studies Group.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* (~~25~~) Chief, MACSOG letter, "Commanders Notes," 13 February 1969.

** (~~25~~) Memorandum for the Record by Colonel R. B. McRae, Chief, Eastern Division, OSACSA, "Exchange of Views with CIA," 19 July 1965.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

5. ~~(S)~~ Morale and Welfare*

a. US Personnel. In addition to one R & R and one seven day leave during a normal one year tour in Vietnam, members of the CAC Detachments have other privileges to aid in morale building. These include:

[redacted]

(2) Accomplishments and fetes of heroism are recognized through the awards and decorations program.

(3) Monetary compensation is available for prisoner capture and may be $100.00 or more.

(4) As the end of a person's tour approaches, his services are recognized with a plaque presented by his CAC Detachment compatriots.

b. Indigenous Personnel. Many activities are established to enhance welfare and morale. These include:

(1) Medical support is provided for troops and their families.

(2) Schools are established to give basic education to dependents. Instruction is conducted about two hours each day.

(3) At Christmas, dependent children are given toys.

(4) Standard TET bonus for all indigenous personnel amounts to one month's pay. Thus, these personnel receive 13 months' pay per year.

* ~~(TS)~~ MACSOG Reconnaissance Techniques, 1 July 1969.

(5) VN awards and decorations (and US also for recognized fetes) are given the indigenous team members for their actions and accomplishments. It is interesting to note that the VN, especially the Montagnard, prefer more tangible rewards such as watches or portable radios.

(6) A bonus of 5000$VN ($42.35 U.S.) or its equivalent is given to each VN member of a team which captures a prisoner.

(7) SCU personnel receive a bonus for extended service. This is not a "re-up" bonus but monetary recognition for service already performed.

6. (~~S~~) Discipline, Law, and Order

a. The STD Liaison Service provides each C&C Detachment Commander with an ARVN cadre in order to assist him in handling matters concerning SCU personnel. Matters involving the hiring and firing of these personnel are usually referred to the senior member of the ARVN cadre. In this connection, the following is extracted from a set of instructions promulgated by Chief, MACSOG:*

> The report established between the C&C commander and the ARVN commander will be that of a counterpart. The matter of "saving-face" should be understood by all US personnel and not taken lightly. The loyalty of minority groups which SOG employs has always been questioned by GVN authorities. To instill loyalty to the GVN "cause" requires patience and understanding of these minority ethnic groups, their ideals, mores, taboos, and customs. SCU disciplinary problems will be referred to the ARVN Counterpart for recommendations and/or appropriate action.

7. (~~S~~) Training. This paragraph covers training in general. Details are in Appendix C (Operations Agent North Vietnam). In addition, the succeeding paragraph incorporates individual

* (~~TS~~) Chief, MACSOG letter, "Commanders Notes," 13 February 1969.

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views on training of personnel who have either served in or been otherwise associated with MACSOG.*

a. The initial training for all indigenous members is given at Camp Long Thanh.

b. Further training and integration into a reconnaissance team or an exploitation force is accomplished at the CAC detachment. This training is under the supervision of the company commander concerned. US members accompany and participate in all training. Emphasis is placed on planning and conducting training which encompasses all of the essential combat skills.

c. Emphasis is also is placed on developing leadership qualities in all personnel, especially those personnel filling leader/command positions.

* (~~TS~~) Chief, MACSOG letter, "Commanders Notes," 13 February 1969.

~~TOP SECRET~~

S. (~~28~~) Views Concerning Personnel and Training.

On the subject of personnel and training, representative views of persons interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association are set forth below. Their detailed views on the subject are presented in Annex Q.

a. Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA, [illegible]).

(1) With respect to the procurement of indigenous personnel -

(a) The South Vietnamese Navy cooperated fully in furnishing MACSOG with the required number of Naval personnel. Generally, these personnel were well trained and adapted to the NAROPS Program rapidly.

(b) The South Vietnamese Army was not as forthcoming as the South Vietnamese Navy in providing personnel for the program. The army was very reluctant to release personnel for the program. They did not understand nor be briefed on. Consequently, we had difficulty in procuring personnel for airborne operations.

(c) As to obtaining personnel for our PSYOPS Program, we recruited from the universities and place ads in the various newspapers. The response was very good and, from an educational standpoint, we were able to get all of the PSYOPS personnel needed.

(d) The Chinese air crews were outstanding. Not only were they good flyers, but they were also very cooperative.

(e) Our agent team assets at being in Camp Long Thanh were of questionable capability. We found that

these teams did not want to be infiltrated into North Vietnam. In fact, we had to force them into the aircraft on numerous occasions.

(f) With respect to training, the training facilities at Camp Long Thanh were unsatisfactory. We had to start from scratch to build a training base, which included recruiting personnel suitable for agent team operations in North Vietnam.

(g) We had difficulty in getting agreement from the South Vietnamese armed forces on a standardized pay scale. Details of this type should be considered early and the subject of pay should be settled before operations are launched.

(h) As a peripheral matter which weighed heavily on the minds of our indigenous personnel, the matter of taking care of the agent's dependents should be resolved before these personnel are committed to action.

b. Colonel William R. Becker, USAF. (1964)

(1) Initially the selection of US personnel for assignment to MACSOG seemed to be based more on the availability of personnel of the correct grade and length of time remaining in the theater than on qualifications for MACSOG type operations. The initial group, taken collectively, was a wealth of ignorance. Only one person had any background at all in the operations we were to conduct.

(2) We had a problem in security clearances. That problem stemmed largely from the discrepancy between the security clearance afforded by the military and that afforded by CAS. Personnel assigned to special operations

must have adequate security clearance with all of the agencies with which they are to deal. For example, with respect to air operations, CAS was reluctant to disclose the details of such operations during the transition period from CAS to MACSOG responsibility; I think this reluctance was because CAS considered that our personnel might not have had the proper security clearance.

(3) We wanted to obtain South Vietnamese air crews to replace [redacted] Chinese air crews. We hoped that, through their completion of an intensive training program, the quality of the South Vietnamese would compare with that of the Chinese, who practically refused to participate in any training program to improve their proficiency. The South Vietnamese proved to be more receptive to training than the Chinese and their quality, upon completion of their training programs, was at least as good as that of the Chinese. The use of South Vietnamese air crews, of course, assuming that their performance was satisfactory, would be advantageous to MACSOG from the point of view of retention and control of their activities. Unfortunately, the South Vietnamese themselves were difficult to control. They were very independent and seemed to feel that they were doing us a favor when they went on a mission. They did not see the mission from a nationalistic point of view but as something they were doing to please the Americans. In addition, they were independent in the sense that they had a higher loyalty to Air Commodore Ky than to the accomplishment of their particular air force mission assigned to them at the time. Thus, their training and operational control turned out to be political. For

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[illegible] this created a difficult situation. Competent wise, however, they were an improvement over the Chinese.

c. [illegible]

(1) The caliber of the Chinese air crews ranged from [illegible] to very poor. The first crew we received was outstanding. As the later crews arrived, their caliber deteriorated until we finally reached a point where we were unable to use some of the crew members; we usually salvaged the crew by exchanging personnel from one crew to the other. In this connection, one of the first problems we encountered was our shortage of instructor pilots for training the Chinese crews. We had fighter pilots but none had been checked out in C-123 aircraft. Consequently, we had to obtain an instructor pilot from the Air Force.

(2) The South Vietnamese air crews were almost completely unsatisfactory. They were uncooperative, delayed in every way they could, held out for more money and gifts, and, in short, did everything they could to keep from flying a mission. We simply could not control them and, even though we had frequent interviews with General Ky, results were not forthcoming.

(3) We were very much concerned about the caliber of the agent teams we inserted into North Vietnam. The consensus was that the members of the agent teams were unqualified for the missions assigned to them. These personnel lacked motivation and, for the most part, lacked the basic intelligence to conduct such a difficult mission. Some of them had to be forced out of the airplane at the drop zone.

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d. Colonel Edward A. Partain, USA. (1964-1965)

(1) We recruited personnel for our agent teams through our counterpart agency, the SVN. In this recruiting process, we asked for individuals who had either lived in a specific area or belonged to a specific tribe in the North. The personnel whom we received through this process were, in general, unmotivated, lacking in zeal to serve, and untrustworthy.

(2) Most of the US personnel assigned to MACSOG, while dedicated, hardworking, and willing to learn, were not trained in many of the various types of activities with which they would be concerned. This was especially true in such activities as agent handling, communications, and code techniques. If US Army personnel are to perform these activities, the associated training should be accomplished by the CIA.

(3) In addition, the training of US personnel assigned to MACSOG activities should include such matters as language, history of the area concerned, minority groups and covert operations in general. Personnel for such an assignment should be carefully screened for character as well as professional competence. There are personnel in the US Armed Forces who are willing to devote their careers to this type of activity; however, as yet we do not have a system which assures them repetitive assignments in the field without the possibility of them being penalized promotion-wise or school-wise.

e. Lt. Colonel William C. Harper, III, USA. (1964-1965)

(1) At Camp Long Thanh the training program for the South Vietnamese consisted of about 28 weeks which was copied after the special forces training program at

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Fort Bragg. The South Vietnamese were capable of absorbing the instructions. For example, they became very high quality communications operators. They learned weapons, but some of their shooting could have been greatly improved upon. The South Vietnamese learned to be reasonably effective medics and they could navigate and otherwise operate effectively in the jungle. The biggest training problem was developing leadership and teamwork.

(2) The evidence of poor leadership in the teams was especially apparent when it came time for them to be launched. Frequently, the teams would refuse to go. We always got them aboard the aircraft but it was a difficult job to do so.

(3) Most of our recruits at Camp Long Thanh came from the Saigon-Cholon area. They were highly mercenary, generally unreliable, and unmotivated. The training of these personnel could have been greatly enhanced if US personnel in sufficient numbers had been available for this purpose.

f. Lieutenant Terry K. Lingle, USN, (1964-1965)

A large percentage of the MACSOG logistics personnel were of low caliber. Many of them had very limited knowledge of actual supply procedures. Perhaps the worse problem of all was their lax attitude toward drinking and carousing with the local women.

g. Commander Kenneth N. Bebb, USN, (1965-1966)

(1) One of the key problems in the MARDPS field was the lack of trained crew personnel for the boats. CINCPAC assisted in providing naval personnel in Danang to expedite the training program for the South Vietnamese.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

h. Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, USA, (1965-1966)

Originally, special forces operated the CIDG Program, which embodied the training of various tribal groups as mountain scouts and strike forces in an area and people denial role. In general, our special forces were very effective in this program, but when they were committed to more conventional roles, there effectiveness greatly depreciated. We need small groups with the capability for advising para-military forces, particularly in the more backward nations. However, we should use conventional soldiers to train conventional forces; the former can do the job better than can special forces personnel.

i. Colonel John T. Moore, Jr., USAF, (1965-1969)

(1) The Chinese crews on the C-123 aircraft were highly competent professionally. They were well motivated and had a genuine interest in accomplishing the mission.

(2) The South Vietnamese C-123 crews were highly qualified in that aircraft and could effectively accomplish the mission. However, we had several problems with them. Foremost among these problems was their attitude toward accomplishing the mission. They played the part of prima donnas insofar as their availability was concerned. They would not permanently station themselves at Nha Trang, the base of operation, but stayed in Saigon.

These crews then would come to the Army only to fly their missions. They would not fly on weekends, during any Vietnamese holidays, or on one of those inauspicious days that, due to their superstitions, they frequently have. In fact, these crews caused such difficulty that we finally disqualified them from flying any more combat missions.

(3) The South Vietnamese helicopters, however, were probably as qualified as, if not better so, than most of the US helicopter crews employed on the infiltration/ exfiltration missions. There was no question about their courage or their accepting the normal operational hazards of bad weather, bad terrain, etc. They would fly under conditions that some of the US crews would hesitate to fly in.

(4) The South Vietnamese boat crews were also highly qualified, motivated, courageous, and aggressive. This was not true, however, with respect to the across-the-beach teams we trained. We never seemed to be able to instill in them the leadership required for this type of operation. Perhaps the lack of South Vietnamese leadership was the most critical factor. In addition, US supervisory personnel considered lack of aggressiveness as a major factor in their failure to accomplish the mission.

J. Lt. Colonel Ralph R. Jamison, USAF, (1965-1966)

(1) The Chinese C-123 crews were well disciplined and were given proficiency training frequently. They were highly professional. Though the Chinese crews flew the 34A missions only during the light of the moon, we used them for psychologically operations missions

during the dark of the moon. As North Vietnamese air defenses were built up, the Chinese became more and more reluctant to fly missions over North Vietnam; consequently, the [illegible] missions we obtained approval for [illegible] use of Chinese C-123 crews.

(2) In 1964 we attempted to qualify VNAF crews in the C-123s to perform 34A missions. That program was subsequently dropped in favor of retaining the Chinese crews since the latter were better motivated and qualified.

k. Lt. Colonel Raymond L. Call, USA, (1965-1966)

The success of our cross-border program was influenced in large measure by the fantastic performance of the South Vietnamese helicopter pilots. They flew some of the most decrepit, beaten up pieces of junk that were ever built.

l. Lt. Colonel Ernest F. Hayes, Jr., USA, (1965-1969)

(1) The selections of the captains or junior operations officers for the long term agent operations were based primarily on a personal interview with each of the officers under consideration. This interview was conducted either by me or my superior officer. In the conduct of these interviews, we looked, among other things, for qualities of imagination and close attention to details. None of these officers had had actual experience in the conduct of agent operations. At that time, it was quite apparent that we had a real need for personnel of such experience. The members of the agent teams committed in North Vietnam were given a great deal of training. This training included not only that of an individual nature, but also field training exercises.

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(2) For US personnel engaged in agent operations, one year tours are inadequate and unsatisfactory. The minimum tour should be either 18 months or 24 months. It takes that long to become completely acquainted with counterparts and with the details of operations.

m. Major Peter C. Andre, USA, (1965-1966)

(1) The STD designated the team leaders of the teams in training at Camp Long Thanh. There we established a leadership reaction course similar to the one at Fort Benning. We observed that the leaders selected by the STD seemed to be the natural leaders of the team. With respect to the recruitment of team members, the regular South Vietnamese Army unit did not want to release their personnel for this type of operation. Consequently, with few exceptions, the team members had no prior military training.

(2) Once the teams were formed up we would commence their basic training, which included such subjects as weapons, petroleum, and map reading, after which we would give them basic jump training. Then we would give them tree training; this took place near Dalat where the team would be dropped into the mountainous area. The training program also included such specialties as intelligence, demolition, and communications. We tried to handle all of this training through our Vietnamese counterpart, the STD. The latter would give the training, but we would oversee it to insure that it was correct.

(3) When the agent teams had completed their basic training and their team training, they would be placed in isolation and kept there until MACSOG ordered their

insertion. Of course, during their period of isolation we would continue training them in the more advanced techniques. Inside the isolation area were permanent [illegible] who took care of the team insofar as the cook-ing and other administrative requirements were concerned. (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted]

n. Lt. Colonel Vincent W. Lang, USA, (1965-1966)

(1) As a rule, the trainees at Camp Long Thanh were extremely poor with the exception of one Meo team from Laos. Ninety percent of the personnel were grossly lacking in motivation and were unable to assimilate the instructions. We were somewhat successful with some of the teams because of one factor -- a good team leader. (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted]

(3) Camp Long Thanh was a secure base camp area. Administratively, we had everything we needed including 2 300 KW generators, plus air conditioners. Our training facilities were extensive. These included airborne training facilities with everything required except for the 34 foot tower. Tower training was conducted at the South Vietnamese airborne center at Saigon. The isolation area in the camp could handle two or three teams.

o. Colonel Robert C. MacLane, USA. (1966-1967)

[redacted]

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

p. Colonel John M. Singlaub, USA, (1966-1968)

(1) Upon my arrival in MACSOG, I found that the training of some of our US as well as indigenous personnel had not been realigned in accordance with the changed mission. I refer specifically to the fact that the US special forces personnel were coming to South Vietnam with their training oriented primarily to the counter-insurgency role rather than to the unconventional warfare role. Although the specific tasks that we wanted the special forces personnel to accomplish under the shining brass (later the PRAIRIE FIRE) program was not directly related to occupational warfare. In fact, many of our operations were more closely related to UW than to CI training which the special forces received at Fort Bragg. Therefore, I had developed a simple training program in order to enable our cross-border teams to accomplish their reconnaissance and later their reaction force operations.

(2) MACSOG was involved in black and gray psychological operations. However, our personnel from the Army and Air Force were trained in white psychological operations and did not really understand covert operations. Consequently, we placed considerable effort on training the US personnel who were in-country and on setting up a

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program training in the United States to be conducted by CIA. In the latter instance, psychological operations personnel would undergo additional training after they had completed the course at Fort Bragg and before they were sent to South Vietnam. This proved to be very successful and enabled MACSOG to conduct a reasonably good covert PHYSOPS Program.

(3) One of the limitations to MACSOG intelligence activities was the poor quality of the intelligence personnel assigned. Remedial action in this area necessitated a major effort on my part.

(4) During my tour in MACSOG, I attempted to increase the Vietnamese participation in some of the technical aspects of our operations. For example, we obtained quality South Vietnamese personnel for maintenance work in the MAROPS Program. We trained a rather large number of maintenance personnel in engine maintenance, and to lesser extent, in electronics, and armament maintenance. The ultimate object of this training was to completely Vietnamese MAROPS.

(5) The Vietnamising of the air crews involved a different problem and was not a success. We developed a plan to train six 123 aircraft crews to replace ultimately the Chinese crews. In the training of the Vietnamese crews, they had become accustomed to the fine linen on the USAF bases and decided that the facilities at Danang were not adequate for their new positions in life. They desired to live in Saigon and to fly occasionally from Nhan Trang. In my judgment, the air crews should have been stationed in Nhan Trang all of the time. When I discussed the problem with the Chief of Staff of the

Vietnamese Air Force, I felt that he was anxious to get back these crews as a cadre for the UC119 Program which was about to be started in the VNAF. Thus, I agreed to release the crews and to cancel the C-123 training program insofar as the South Vietnamese were concerned. This meant that we were to retain the Chinese crews who, by this time, had reached a high level of proficiency.

(6) A problem area which reduced the effectiveness of the overall MACSOG operations was related to the lack of trained US personnel for this type of activity. The military Services do not now have nor did they then have a system which would enable them to identify those personnel especially qualified in the field of special operations. Such inexperience, combined with the relatively short one year tour, adversely affected MACSOGs operations.

(7) Related to the problem of providing qualified personnel to MACSOG was the fact that the JTD did not accurately describe the qualifications needed for the particular job. The JTD must either have a section explaining in greater detail the requisites for the job or some written description to better describe training and background needed for the job. This would assist the personnel officers in selecting suitable individuals.

(8) The indigenous personnel working for MACSOG were [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) Chinese nationals, and Vietnamese nations. The last category, of course, consisted of a variety of ethnic groupings. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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[redacted] The Chinese consisted of primarily of air crews manning the C-123 aircraft. They constituted some of the most professional crews I had ever seen. As already noted, the Vietnamese employed by MACSOG were actually ethnic groupings. For example, initially the teams that we employed PRAIRE FIRE were made up of Nungs. Presumably these Nungs were members of the 5th Chinese Division which had been formed from among the Chinese population in North Vietnam. Many of them had a good background in the military and they made good soldiers. Later, however, these Nungs found that they could make more money by working as guards for civilian construction concerns and took up that less hazardous occupation. Subsequently, the Chinese used for our cross border operations were recruited from the Saigon-Cholon area. They had no previous military training and were generally referred to as the "Cholon Cowboys." These city dwellers became less and less a part of the MACSOG organization. In their place, we recruited personnel from the Montagnard tribes.

(9) Our efforts to form South Vietnamese teams with no US personnel in them met with initial success but when it came to final operations the team was something less than successful. When we tried to use South Vietnamese leadership on the team was a breakdown in communication. The team could not call in air strikes to save itself at a critical time because of language difficulty and because the team leader lacked confidence in himself.

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(10) South Vietnamese Air Force crews were employed with great success in support of MACSOG. The pilots proved to be superior to those whom we received from the US military services primarily because the former were knowledgeable of the terrain, having lived in it for many years. In addition, the South Vietnamese pilots seem to be more willing to go in to help extract a team than the US pilots, even though there were US members on the team which was to be extracted. In some cases, US pilots felt that the risks were too high. I was never aware of any South Vietnamese helicopter pilot ever suggesting that he should not accept the risks. Many of them died very heroic deaths trying to rescue some of the teams.

(11) We also had a few South Vietnamese pilots flying our U-17 liaison type aircraft and they performed well. These pilots sometimes lacked good judgment in accepting risks, but they nevertheless showed great courage and skill in flying.

(12) The use of South Vietnamese as crew members on the MAROPS boats worked out rather well. There was a sufficient motivation in terms of the financial rewards that they could get for performing these missions and, although we sometimes felt that there was malingering after crossing the 17th Parallel, by and large they performed adequately in the fights. There were some instances in which the South Vietnamese, all on their own, exhibited outstanding leadership in the face of the enemy.

(13) With respect to the maritime action teams, we were never able to get personnel of sufficient

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quality, that is, in terms of intelligence and physical fitness, to form good teams. These teams were to be trained to perform underwater demolitions and to infiltrate the coast by sea in order to capture prisoners or to destroy specific targets. Despite efforts to improve their training, they never did reach a level of training that had my complete confidence. Perhaps one reason for this failure was the fact that the US trainers were on a TDY basis. These trainers would come to MACSOG for six months TDY and then depart. This produced a situation in which one group of advisors would start a training program but before the training has reached a level of proficiency the advisors would rotate. Then, a new group would come in with a completely different idea on how the training should be conducted. This created morale problems and was an inefficient way of operating. The SEAL personnel (the UDT personnel assigned to that mission) should have been on PCS to MACSOG and not on TDY. We had considerable difficulty recruiting personnel for the agent teams to be inserted into North Vietnam. The best Vietnamese personnel could not be sold on the idea of going into North Vietnam for an extended period of time with the sole mission of counting trucks or some other low level intelligence mission. The personnel originally recruited as action team members were both highly motivated and action type personnel. When they were sent to North Vietnam, there was no intent to keep them in that country for several years. It was the US bombing of North Vietnam that suggested these

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personnel should be retained as intelligence collection and target acquistion teams in North Vietnam and remain in place in that role. They were subsequently captured and the radio nets were doubled back to deceive us by the North Vietnamese enemy. I cannot blame the quality of the personnel who accepted this doubling as a deficiency of the personnel. They were recruited for action team members and then were put in a position which would have required a completely different personality and type of individual. That was an error in the highest echelons that is, the decision to convert these teams.

(14) I attempted to develop a personnel evaluation system which was to be a scientifically designed test requiring no knowledge of any special language but a test which could be administered to trainees with a view towards checking their basic intelligence and ability to follow instructions and to absorb new instructions. This project was underway but the contractor who had bid on it started to escalate his price and the project was eventually dropped. Some means of evaluating indigenous personnel before spending great resources on training them is a very important part of improving our effectiveness in this area.

(15) There must be a procedure established which would permit the organization that conducts covert operations to obtain qualified, experienced personnel. We have through the years built up a valuable resevoir of personnel who have had some experience in a phase of covert operations. The Services should insure the establishment of a system wherein the names of those

who have had covert operational experience can be retrieved and the individuals assigned to this type of operation for repeat assignments without adversely affecting their careers.

q. Colonel Dennis T. Casey, USMC, (1966-1967)

Our lack of success in across the beach operations and in amphibious raids can be attributed to the lack of suitable personnel for training in these types of operations. The MACSOG airborne operations were unsuccessful for the same reasons. The recruit wanted the money but he had little interest or patriotism in trying to achieve the objectives of our programs.

r. Major Frank Jaks, USA (1966-1969)

The ideal US reconnaissance team leader would be of E-6 or E-7 grade, with approximately ten years' service, and not over thirty years of age. A light weapons infantryman or an operations specialist would be preferred.

s. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathon D. Carney, USA (1966-1967)

(1) The Vietnamese do not have the physical stamina of the Americans. As the war progressed, we found it very difficult to obtain Vietnamese recruits with suitable qualifications. Consequently, we attempted to recruit from among the nungs but found that their numbers had been depleted. We then recruited from among the Montagnards with good results.

(2) One of the major problems confronting us in the SHINING BRASS Program was the competition with the 5th Special Forces Group for suitable personnel. For cover purposes, personnel assigned to MACSOG passed through the 5the Special Forces Group Headquarters at

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Natrang, where they were administratively processed. The Commanding Officer of the 5th Special Forces Group had his own problems which, to him, were just as important as those of MACSOG. For some time this competition resulted in strained relations between MACSOG and the 5th Special Forces Group.

(3) There was a conspicuous lack of data which we needed for the proper briefing of our agent teams as well as for training and equipping them. This lack of data included such important items as money, individual documentation which we could have duplicated, and North Vietnamese clothing, uniforms, or equipment which could have been duplicated and issued to our agents before we inserted them into North Vietnam.

(4) The recruitment of agent personnel was inept, their subsequent training of questionable value, and their retention in South Vietnam after they had been trained was for too long a period of time. The last consideration increased the chance that the entire mission would be blown before it ever began.

(5) With respect to agent handling, it was not until 1967 that we had assigned to us intelligence trained personnel who could operate effectively in that field. The twelve month rotation cycle crippled our overall effectiveness in the handling of agents. We made the same mistakes time after time. Many of these mistakes could have been obviated if we had had personnel continuity. The MAROPS organization and its installation at Danang were the best structured and equipped of any that we had in MACSOG. There were however definite organizational weaknesses in that the

US Navy operational planning staff was inadequate personnel-wise to provide the necessary operational direction to the Vietnamese. We did not have US Naval personnel prepared and trained in small boat operations. Frequently we had to use SEALs or cruiser personnel or aircraft carrier personnel for jobs requiring expertise in planning across the beach operations for small boats and teams transported on these boats. One of the most serious problems confronting us in the MAROPS field was the decision that the members of the SEAL teams responsible for training and preparing the Vietnamese in this activity would be on a six months rotational basis. The SEAL teams, therefore, were handicapped in producing results with the Vietnamese. For example, the oriental penchant for waiting things out could have been counterproductive to our overall MAROPS effort. The Vietnamese could wait for a SEAL team to be rotated on the basis that the next one might be "better."

(6) With respect to indigenous personnel--

(a) The most severe limiting factor to successful operations by MACSOG was the quality of indigenous personnel available to us.

(b) Generally, the quality of the mercenaries available to us was uniformly low.

(c) In the establishment of similar organizations in the future, an understanding should be reached with the host government to prevent US approval/rejection authority over cadre assignments. The US commander and his staff should be authorized to choose from within the indigenous personnel available

these individuals considered best suited for a particular job.

(d) Future SOGs must be organized better to control, if not actively conduct, recruitment. The requisite tests should be developed to enable the proper selection of recruits for training in MACSOG type activities.

(7) In connection with the development and preservation of US expertise for unconventional warfare--.

(a) MACSOG's problems have been aggravated by the continued assignment to it of US personnel whose qualifications for the particular job in MACSOG have been questionable. Now, however, MACSOG has provided an excellent training ground for personnel in the UW and many have become experts in that field. Unfortunately, little is being done either to enable their identification for future use in the field or to develop further their specialization. In short, I fear that we will lose that expertise. In short, I fear that we will lose that expertise. Thus, when the next SOG is activated, we will repeat our same mistakes in the assignment of personnel to this highly important activity.

(b) We should establish a system with which to identify our personnel qualified in UW and to maintain and improve their qualifications through assignment management. In addition, the system should provide for the input of new personnel on a continuing basis. MACSOG should have an in-house counter intelligence/espionage capability. The SOG security section simply does not contain the

kind of specialization necessary in this field. The SOG continually fears the possibility of its penetration by the enemy. Future SOGs should have a highly qualified counter espionage specialist, under suitable cover, who could carry out the necessary personnel surveys and could monitor all related activities of concern to MACSOG.

(8) MACSOG should be exempt from short tour assignments in the case of certain key personnel. Tied into such a policy, of course, would be such matters as home leave benefits during the officer's assignment to MACSOG.

t. Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN (1966-1969)

(1) In carrying out UW operations, practically all of the military Service functions, air, maritime or ground, require different techniques than those of conventional warfare. Moreover, each of these functions necessitates an entirely different frame of mind and background on the part of personnel carrying out such specialized operations. Thus, our training systems must take these requirements into account.

(2) Training must include that of a joint specialized nature and there should be in being facilities where this training could be conducted.

u. Colonel Benton M. Austin, USA (1966-1967)

(1) The Nungs who were in the SHINING BRASS Program during its early days were much better qualified than the Chinese who followed them. The latter, "Cholon Cowboys," lacked motivation and their principal incentives for joining MACSOG seemed to be receiving the enlistment bonus and evading the draft in the Vietnamese Army.

(2) During my tour in MACSOG, we began to receive Montagnards who were superior to the Chinese available to us at that time. In addition, the average Montagnard demonstrated more compassion than did the Chinese, that is, the Montagnard was more concerned as to what happened to his teammates and would be more apt than the Chinese to carry a wounded man under fire back to the safety of a covered position or to a waiting helicopter.

(3) Recruiting was carried out under the auspices of the South Vietnamese authorities. The system of recruitment made possible certain abuses which I was unable to prove. For example, the South Vietnamese "contractor" received a bonus for each individual he recruited; I had the feeling that the contractor arranged to have personnel recruited so that he could receive the bonus. Further, these personnel would subsequently go AWOL and later be recruited time and again under different names.

(4) The basic nature of MACSOG's operations were such that the selectivity of personnel was generally more important than in other types of military organizations. However, we had problems with personnel who could not resist the temptation to steal highly desirable items of equipment and of supplies. Simple accounting procedures, or perhaps the lack of such procedures, made it possible for a person to take advantage of the situation. Therefore, there is a definite need for careful screening of personnel being assigned to a SOG type organization for character as well as professional qualities.

(5) Special Forces personnel assigned to the [illegible] BRASS program constituted, on the whole, some of the finest men I have ever seen. Many of them had volunteered to return for additional tours in a very dangerous activity.

v. Lieutenant Colonel Harold J. Rose, USA (1966-1968)

In the beginning, US personnel were Special Forces. A large percentage of these personnel lacked proper training and motivation for MACSOG type operations. Possibly one reason for this situation was that the Special Forces had been used to set up various indigenous camps and to train indigenous personnel and had not really been involved in the UW type mission. Upon arrival in my organization, many of these Special Forces personnel were shocked to learn the type of mission in which they had become involved. I sent some of them back to the 5th Special Forces Group. The indigenous personnel under my control were mostly Chinese and Montagnard. The Chinese were largely from Cholon; so they did fairly well on operations but if they had ever been given an opportunity to go to Saigon on leave, we would probably have lost them all. The Montagnards did well in about everything. When they returned from operations they wanted to return to their families and to stay with them until the next operation. Consequently, we did not have the problem of the Montagnards going AWOL because they had no place to go.

w. Colonel Eugene A. Wahl, USAF (1966-1967)

Everyone who has served in MACSOG should be identified as having experience in this area and an

effort should be made to retain him in a similar type organization. The point as that we should maintain such expertise and further develop and control it. While I was assigned to MACSOG I do not think the air operations group had one person with previous experience in that type of operation. Upon the reassignment of those personnel not one of them was reassigned to a special operations type activity.

x. Colonel Robert C. Kendrick, USA (1966-1969)

Chief, MACSOG has been hampered in the accomplishment of his mission by the type of personnel made available to him. He has not received his fair share of the best personnel. This has not only included personnel in the higher grades, many of whom have lacked high level schooling and high level staff experience, but in personnel qualified as reconnaissance team leaders.

y. Colonel Robert C. Kingston, USA (1967-1969)

(1) There was a glaring lack of professional background and professional training of both the US and South Vietnamese personnel in intelligence operations. Working for me were several Special Forces officers who were professionally motivated, intelligent, aggressive, and oriented toward counter insurgency and guerrilla warfare type operations. They did not, however, have a sound professional background in intelligence operations, procurement, training, and infiltration and exfiltration techniques of agents or agent teams. Some of the US Army Military Intelligence Branch officers I had did not, in actuality, have this training or this professionalism which I believe they should have had upon assignment to MACSOG.

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(2) Recruiting was handled largely by the STS officers. I believe, as in everything STS did, that there was a glaring lack of a proper appreciation for security. This situation enabled the possible penetration both of MACSOG and of STS.

(3) By March 1967, the date of my arrival in MACSOG, the usefulness of Camp Lon Thanh as a training location for agents for agents had long passed. There is no doubt in my mind that the local population knew what was going on, including what the personnel were being trained for. Thus, there was a possible compromise of everyone who went into or out of the camp.

(4) Personnel assigned to Operations 34 should have some knowledge, if not experience, in agent operations. Personnel should not be assigned arbitrarily to that office.

(5) A guide for the recruitment of indigenous personnel would be of great assistance in a future MACSOG type operation. During my tour in MACSOG, a team from the American Institutes for Research (AIR) visited ARPA in Saigon. Dr. J. Altman, a member of the team, was to design a system for agent recruitment, selection, training, testing, evaluation, rejection, retraining and eventual disposal. This system was to have been a guide for the handling of Asian indigenous personnel. It would be based on culture, environment, ethnic groups, linguistic differences, and, in short, the entire spectrum. It would have a means for the selection of team leaders, assistant team leaders, radio operators, demolition experts, right on down the line. The project was written up but was not accepted, as I

understand it, because of the large expense involved. In my opinion, we have a requirement for this type of project. The time to accomplish the project is not when we are in a conflict but before it starts.

z. Colonel Harold K. Aaron, USA (1967-1968)

(1) Shortly after my arrival as Commanding Officer of the 1st Special Forces Group, I received a mission to provide "A" Detachments to MACSOG for its command and control detachments. Of course, there were many problems involved in carrying out this mission. Two of the problems involved selection of the best qualified personnel and their training. After carrying out a very detailed selection process, the personnel were trained in Okinawa for approximately six weeks.

(2) My criticisms of MACSOG were generally in two areas of endeavor. One was the improper utilization of highly trained personnel who had been organized as a team in Okinawa and sent to Vietnam. Upon arrival there, the tendency was to break up the teams rather than to try and keep them together. The other area concerned logistical support for these teams and their mission. Many of the teams--members of the teams spent a great deal of the time trying to obtain uniforms and equipment for the indigenous personnel as well as spare parts for rifles.

(3) In the assignment of personnel, my policy was that the top priority would be given to the command and control detachment. All incoming personnel to the 5th Special Forces Group who had volunteered for the command and control detachment were immediately segregated and sent to those detachments for further

training. We did not put them through the command orientation course, a training period of some twelve days, that was given to 5th Special Forces Group personnel. I also surveyed the 5th Special Forces Group for volunteers for assignment to the command and control detachments and there were some.

(4) The process of obtaining volunteers for the MACSOG units was not efficient. First, we depended upon the individual's willingness for the assignment and that did not necessarily mean he was the best man for the job. Here is where some sort of a testing program might be developed to determine whether one man is more suited for this type of assignment than another. Since all of these 5th Special Forces Group personnel were volunteers, it would be impossible to determine those having the best potential for cross border operations or command and control detachment missions.

(5) Other problems in the personnel field of concern to MACSOG included casualty reporting, the rendition of efficiency reports on command and control detachment personnel, and awards and decorations. Of course, there was the continuing disciplinary problem. With respect to awards and decorations, I had a board which personally reviewed and recommended disposition of all recommendations. I had the authority to award the Bronze Star Medal for valor and the Army Commendation Medal. If MACSOG had a disciplinary problem with a member of a command and control detachment, the man was usually returned to me for either removal from the Special Forces, for Article XV action, or for

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court martial. Such matters were coordinated between the command and control detachment commander and Chief, MACSOG. In some instances, the documentation concerning the disciplinary matter was rather superficial or incomplete. I could decide whether the man in question would remain in the Special Forces or be removed.

(6) Initially, I felt that the commanders of the command and control detachments, while they were aggressive and had a lot of guts, drive, and force, left a great deal to be desired in terms of judgement, planning ability, and general efficiency. I attempted, through the Infantry Branch, to improve the caliber of lieutenant colonels assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group, not only for [redacted] operations but also for MACSOG operations. In this connection, my practice was to nominate lieutenant colonels to Chief MACSOG as the commanders of the command and control detachments. Chief, MACSOG was free to accept or reject my nominations. I tried to give Chief, MACSOG some of the best officers I received but we did not often receive the best lieutenant colonels. To some extent I attributed this to the lack of interest by the career branch in Special Forces as well as to the lack of interest by regular Army combat arms officers in Special Forces because they felt it would not help their careers and future advancement. Only toward the end of my tour as Commanding Officer of the 5th Special Forces Group did the better officers begin to arrive for commanding the command and control detachment.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(7) In connection with awards and decorations, I should add that some of the personnel in the C&C

detachments felt that these detachments were not getting a fair share of decorations and there were constant reports to this effect. I investigated this matter and found that the C&C detachments were in fact receiving decorations for valor on the order of at least three to four times that of any other unit of comparable size in the 5th Special Forces Group.

(8) Chief MACSOG approached me on one occasion about his having the authority to make impact awards, that is, the Bronze Star and the Army Commendation Medal. I had no objection to this and suggested that he obtain this authority from COMUSMACV who was his direct superior. I do not know whether or not he received the authority. As a general rule, I have a system which enabled me to receive a teletype message recommending a person for an impact award; we would process the recommendation within 24 to 36 hours and, if approved, approval would be given to the C&C detachment commander to make the award of the appropriate decoration. Basically, this system was rapid and responsive in recognizing the individual immediately after he had performed the act of heroism.

(9) With respect to promotions, I instituted a program whereby the C&C detachment commander had the authority to promote up to specialist fourth class/ sergeant and to reduce staff sergeants and below. Because of Department of the Army regulations, other authorities in this connection were retained under my personal control.

(10) We should give greater attention to the proper selection of personnel for MACSOG-type operations than

for other types of operations. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case. We do not have a reservoir of qualified people in covert operations and are not maintaining personnel in a constant state of training. We should be able to draw from this reservoir the personnel we need for covert operations.

as. Sergeant First Class Gerald A. Sanders, USA (1967-1968)

(1) As to cover, personnel assigned to MACSOG should have complete civilian documentation prior to reporting for duty. It would be a good idea to have civilian registration on all cars and vehicles assigned to MACSOG, this would eliminate the tie-in with the U.S. military. (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted]

(3) The awards and decorations system for MACSOG was poor. This had an adverse effect on morale. Chief, MACSOG should be delegated the authority for awards and decorations up to and including the Silver Star. The entire awards and decorations system should be streamlined. We had trouble in getting awards through the administrative chain because of security classifications.

(4) The STRATA teams were primarily of Cambodian descent. The Cambodians seemed to do a better job than did the Vietnamese. These teams should have had US do the show to include the team leader and the assistant team leader.

(5) One of our problems in the US personnel field was that we had personnel being assigned to us who were not fully qualified in the MOS in which they were to perform duties. For example, I had had no previous training in communications or intelligence and had never been in the infantry. Yet, I was assigned as the operations and intelligence sergeant in operations 34. The person I replaced was in the same category. He, too, was an administrative sergeant.

bb. Sergeant First Class Donald A. Payton, USA (1967-1968).

(1) Intelligence and training for the agent teams was conducted in safe houses located in the vicinity of Saigon. From a security point of view, the procurement of these safe houses was in question and the system could have been improved on if an American linguist in Vietnamese could have been present and looked over the situation. Such a procedure might have had the additional advantage of obviating the exorbitant rates were were paying for use of safe houses. Once the team was moved into the safe houses, the Vietnamese case officer should have monitored their activities more closely than he did. In some cases, the agents brought into these houses relatives or friends. Compromises could have been the result. In fact, there were cases where members of agent teams did leave the safe house and go to Saigon.

For example, one instance involved members of an agent team who were not native Vietnamese. During a routine curfew check of ID cards, our agents were picked up by the Vietnamese national police because they did not possess the ID card carried by the local Vietnamese in Saigon. This meant that MACSOG personnel had to go to the national police in order to get these agents released. Their release entailed a great amount of paper work and enabled more people to become knowledgable of our activity.

(2) A two or three week training period in a safe house would be ideal. The training period certainly should not be longer than that. Once the safe house training is completed and final arrangements made for insertion into North Vietnam the agents should be considered promptly.

(3) In most cases the case officers were adequately qualified. One way we could improve on the qualifications of the branch case officer would be to give him language training.

cc. Major George W. Caspard, USA (1967-1968).

The Cambodians in our training program were already highly trained in paramilitary operations and had had considerable combat experience. In fact, I recall that 40 out of 50 exhibited some kind of a wound from previous operations.

dd. Lt Colonel Jefferson C. Seay, III, USA (1968).

During my tour in MACSOG we attempted to recruit from regular Vietnamese armed forces units in order to obtain highly qualified, highly trained, and well-motivated personnel. Our primary targets were the

Vietnamese airborne divisions, marine units, and rangers. Our attempts met with some reservations from conventional commanders' headquarters. I assisted the Vietnamese operations officer in getting some personnel from the J-3 the Joint General Staff to go into these Vietnamese units to recruit in small numbers on a private program. This permission was granted. However, the results were not as good as we expected. Very few personnel were obtained in this manner.

ee. Colonel Herbert O. Graeser, USA (1969).

(1) Opinions have been advanced that there is no need for US personnel on cross border teams. I disagree. Teams consisting only of indigenous personnel could not have done the job the way it needed to be done. When employing these teams, not only the language barrier but the judgement factor become paramount. There is a decided limitation as to what can be expected from an all indigenous team operating under US control. For one thing the presence of US personnel is a comforting factor to the indigenous personnel who accompanied them. Often an all indigenous team falsified or aborted its mission prematurely because of the team's fear of being abandoned. With US personnel accompanying the team, photography, selection of information to be reported, selection of the area to be investigated and the decision as to when to evacuate the area under enemy pressure are controlled by a US individual whose decision is more in keeping with the thought processes of the US individual who has to evacuate the mission. This is not to say that indigenous personnel do not perform well. They do. However, when separated from US personnel, in most

cases, their efficiency falls to an unacceptable degree.

(2) The personnel who run these cross border operations do not need to be Special Forces. These operations are no more than those of a reconnaissance or combat patrol type. The expertise of the Special Forces individual is, of course, very useful as he is an extremely well trained person. However, the knowledge of unconventional warfare or of special operations is really needed at the planning level, that is, at the MACV or MACSOG level, rather than on the operating level. The actual operations could be done by any long range patrol or by any infantry trained unit.

ff. Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF (1968-1969).

(1) I think that the military services could do a great deal to improve their capability in the field of conventional warfare and in the advanced direction of the personnel assigned to such duties. The Army and Marine Corps generally prepare personnel for these operations reasonably well. The Air Force, especially in such areas of psychological operations, has a very limited experience. Clearly, the Air Force should screen its personnel for key MACSOG assignments.

(2) The Army has a problem concerning the quality and experience of team leaders for cross border operations. The leader they have now is several notches under the team leader of two or three years ago. The Army is having trouble finding qualified replacements. A person, even though he is a green beret type, cannot be expected to produce in this environment unless he is a top quality product.

(3) The Air Force has to be more selective in

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scrutinizing their personnel for staff experience. Also the Marine Corps has a similar problem. The Air Force is prone to send a man to MACSOG just out of the academic on his first staff assignment or on a task that is new to him. This puts the Air Force officer at a disadvantage and adversely affects the MACSOG operations.

(4) Of a general annoyance nature it is a fact that personnel come to MACSOG with a lack of the requisite security clearances. This has occurred a few times in so far as the Air Force is concerned. But to a greater extent in the Army. I cannot recall any occasion of the Navy or Marine Corps doing this.

(5) The Vietnamese are quite capable of running both sophisticated and unsophisticated military operations but I think they are also prone to stand back when we do it for them. It is not laziness on their part as much as it is a hesitancy to get in and try to compete with the aggressive Americans. The Vietnamese have done a good job with their VNAF; their 211th Squadron was provided little or no US advisory effort yet it gave us some of the best helicopter support of any organization in the country. I think the same is true of the crew operations of the MAROPS boats. I contend that if the Vietnamese know they have to run the programs, including the cross border ones, and they are given the responsibility they will perform in a fine manner.

gz. Lt Colonel James R. McCarthy, USAF (1968-1969).

The Chinese pilots were the finest indigenous ones that I have ever seen. Their capabilities exceeded anything I had seen in the Vietnamese air force and some

of their capabilities exceed what I had seen in the United States Air Force. These pilots were able to fly their missions at 500 feet at night over mountainous terrain without the aid of radar. There was no doubt in my mind that others could have performed day in and day out with the same high degree of mission accomplishments as did these Chinese pilots.

hh. Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh, USA (1968-1969)

(1) US personnel assigned to MACSOG have, for the most part, had no previous connection with an effort of this type. Officers assigned to the MACSOG staff were in most cases, ill prepared to function as agent handlers or in any type of intelligence operations of a covert or clandestine nature. In short, military personnel have not been properly trained for MACSOG type operations. An exception to this is the large number of exceptionally well qualified psychological operations officers who understand these operations but not so much from the black side as from the overt or white PSYOPS side.

(2) During my tour in MACSOG personnel shortages have existed in all the command and control detachments. The most serious aspect of this problem, however, is not the shortage of personnel as such but the shortage of qualified and experienced personnel. The TOE for our reconnaissance teams calls for an E-7, 11B or F. In most instances, we have had a shortage of at least 50% of the proper MOS and grade and, in most instances, none had been previously qualified or trained as reconnaissance personnel. The exceptions were those individuals who had previously been assigned to this program and

had returned to it after a outside tour.

(3) The lack of proper training and qualification for the reconnaissance team members is, to my mind, a most serious personnel deficiency in MACSOG. Graduates of the Ranger School at Fort Benning would appear to be the most suitable type of individual for this type of operation provided they have the motivation and interest. If the Army is going to continue to develop highly specialized reconnaissance elements for special operations the individuals must be carefully selected, must be volunteers, and must be trained in the proper tactics and techniques. Motivation is a key point and it is erroneous to believe that just because a man is elected to go to ranger school or to some form of reconnaissance school that he automatically would be capable of the type of mission which MACSOG is involved in.

(4) To overcome the training deficiencies which were so obvious in our reconnaissance team personnel, a reconnaissance team leaders course was established at the SOG training center at Camp Long Thanh. It is a two weeks course prepared for and given especially to reconnaissance team members. In this connection I have found that a great number of our new special forces personnel come into this program with no appreciation of the methods of observations and reporting citings, cannot read a map, have never been taught the fundamentals of leadership, and lack an understanding of joint air-ground procedures.

7. (~~TS~~) LOGISTICS.

Supplementing the coverage on logistics, as presented in Annex I, are these representative views on that subject by persons interviewed in connection with the MACSOG association; their detailed views on logistics are presented in Annex S.

1. (~~S~~) Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA, (1964-1965).

At the time of MACSOG's activation in 1954, there was no in-country logistic system. Equipment and supplies were procured by the Headquarters Commandant in Saigon. We had to set up a separate logistics system operating out of Okinawa. There should have been a logistics plan to support MACSOG before we had to commence operations.

2. (~~S~~) Colonel William R. Becker, USAF, (1964).

The advent of MACSOG was not the firt time the United States had engaged in covert operations. However, none of the equipment MACSOG was using at the time of its inception in 1964 was designed specifically for covert operations. Such operations have certain basic inherent requirements technologically. Generally, however, many of these requirements can be handled with the equipment we now have.

3. (~~TS~~) Colonel Leroy V. Grossheusch, USAF, (1964-1965).

a. We were to receive six 123 aircraft and crews on 1 August 1964. There was a considerable delay,however, in getting the aircraft ready for their combat mission. This delay was caused to a large extent by the installation of equipment at Clark Air Force Base. This installation required frequent trips back and forth from Saigon to Clark. In addition to the time it took to install the necessary equipment and, in addition, to paint the aircraft, there was also delay in arrival of the crew. (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted] These negotiations

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drag on during which time the crews tended to lose their proficiency. At MACSOG we were anxious to have the Chinese perform the maintenance because we had seen the excellent manner they had accomplished this function on their own aircraft. [redacted] the United States Air Force would perform the flight line maintenance. The maintenance we received from the Chinese was far superior to that we had been receiving from Clark Air Force Base. In my view, it would have been to our advantage to have the entire maintenance function performed by the Chinese.

(b)(1) (b)(3)

c. Because of congestion and lack of space, we concluded that our air operations could not be performed very effectively from Tan Son Nhut. Besides, there was the problem of cover which would be difficult to retain at Saigon. Therefore, we decided to move our air operations to Nha Trang. The South Vietnamese finally agreed and we built quarters in Nha Trang for the Chinese crews, as well as our American crews. The South Vietnamese were provided quarters in the same building and, as far as we were concerned, these quarters were far superior to anything that any of the other South Vietnamese had. However, the Vietnamese were never satisfied with the quarters at Nha Trang.

4. (S) Lieutenant Terry K. Lingle, USN, (1964-1965).

Supply discipline as such hardly existed in MACSOG. No one was required to account for anything and, therefore, the entire supply operations was lose. Probably the worst problem was that, from top to bottom, the distribution of items to friends for favors was condoned, permitted or indulged in by numerous personnel in MACSOG.

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5. (S) Commander Kenneth N. Bebb, USN, (1965-1966).

a. As the MAROPS program expanded, and as more boats were added to the inventory, logistics problems became nightmarish. The operators were ahead of the logisticians.

b. Decisions were made to increase the inventory boats without first establishing the requisite system, such as provisions for fuel, piers, warehouses, and trained personnel. Consequently, when the boats arrived in Vietnam, we were ill prepared to get the most out of them.

c. A great deal of psychological warfare equipment was sent to Vietnam. This equipment included such items as radios, transmitters, generators, and a multitude of related items. We had a difficult time keeping track of this equipment. Much of it was lost and a workable supply system was not established. In addition, funding constituted a problem; the question as to who provide the funding, DOD or CIA, involved a continuous hassle.

6. (S) Colonel John J. Windsor, USMC, (1965-1966).

a. We had no problems in the supply and procurement of weapons, parachutes, and related items that was needed for our operations. We did have problems, however, in obtaining especially equipped C-123 replacement aircraft and permission to convert those aircraft to the C-130. In that connection, we had difficulty obtaining a parachute-retarded receptacle for dropping from high speed aircraft and low altitude. Ultimately, we were able to obtain a few suitable containers from the Marine Corps. In short, the aircraft and the dropped containers were our principal logistics problems.

b. The South Vietnamese, who provided MACSOG with helicopter support, were equipped with old H-34 helicopters.

In addition to the mileage of these helicopters, which frequently them undergoing maintenance, the South Vietnamese were issued less than 50 percent of the authorized figure. The South Vietnamese did the very best they could but it would have helped MACSOG a great deal if they had been issued better equipment in the first place.

c. Beginning in 1966, we made great strides in obtaining new, more suitable equipment. For example, our MAROPS were improved through the use of better radios on the boats. I might add, however, our preparation for covert operations apparently did not receive sufficient emphasis between the time the war ended in Korea in 1953 and the time the United States entered the Vietnam war in 1965. In short, during that period we should have accomplished more than we did in the R&D field.

7. (S) Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA, (1966-1968).

a. Upon my arrival in MACSOG, I found that the logistical support arrangements had been overtaken by the changing environments. Specifically, MACSOG had a logistical support arrangement which had been established before the advent of the large logistical complex in South Vietnam. During my tenure, we made significant changes in the MACSOG logistical support procedures, for example, by establishing interservice support agreements so that logistical support could be drawn locally rather than centrally procured and centrally distributed. In addition, we reduced inventories and established a MACSOG planning-programming-budgeting cycle in which the operational plan for the ensuing fiscal year was prepared by the MACSOG staff. Specific programs, in turn, were prepared by the subordinate commands based upon the overall MACSOG plan.

b. In a MACSOG type organization, there must be a procedure for purchasing new items of equipment or for the design and fabrication of new equipment without having to follow the routine system. For example, the scientific advisor to MACV finally obtained an open end contract for an electronics firm which permitted him to send a request directly from his office to the electronic firm for the design of a given piece of equipment to do a specific job. This arrangement was invaluable. Comparable arrangements should be made for other items useful in the conduct of covert operations. [redacted] The very formal process of writing out military characteristics and having to justify the equipment at every echelon should be set aside insofar as MACSOG is concerned. (b)(1) (b)(3)

c. I do not feel that we are using our technological capability to the maximum advantage in covert operations. We have been forced, in most cases, to use items that are on the shelf in the military inventory for very special purposes. Yet, the operations in which MACSOG is involved require, in many instances, very specialized equipment. We should have our scientific brain power concentrate on solving some of the technological problems, the solutions of which would enhance MACSOG's operations. For example, we have not been able to produce an incapacitating weapon which would enable us to simply incapacitate an individual and, therefore, save him for later interrogation instead of perhaps killing him in an ambush. We need a good contaminate for rice. We need to improve our wire tap capabilities.

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Eventually, the National Security Agency sent a scientist to NACSCG, and with his assistance, we are developing better wire tap equipment. This is an ad hoc arrangement however which should be formalized by having a direct link into some laboratory or to [illegible] where the laboratories can be asked to produce the particular item of equipment.

8. Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN, (1966-1969).

a. If we are going to operate covertly, the equipment has to be conductive. In most cases, equipment cannot be procured through service channels with the expectancy that the operation will be covert. A primary example in this regard is the PTF, both the original NASTY used in the FOOT BOY Program and the later ones, the procurement of which commenced in 1967. The original NASTY was procured by the Navy from Norway. Theatrically, this boat would have been sanitized through the removal of nameplates and etc. However, one can refer to James Fighting Ships and see that, in 1964, the United States Navy procured 13 Norwegian NASTY class PTF's and that a certain number of them was later transferred for use in Southeast Asia. Certainly, it would be fairly obvious that those PTF's are the one operating out of Danang.

b. From the point of view of covert operations, the funding system and related bureaucratic procedures in the Department of Defense are basically in contradiction to the need for non-attributively. For example, the Navy had to justify the procurement of PTF's at each echelon up to and including the Secretary of Defense. In approving such procurement, the Secretary of Defense then directed the Secretary of the Navy to procure the PTF's. Then, the Navy included the PTF's in the Navy shipbuilding budget.

Ultimately, the requirements were levied on the Naval Ships System Command. This bureaucratic procedure means that hundreds of people in the Naval Ships System Command knew that the Navy was procuring peculiar type boats which had not been in the fleet before. All of the contracts for the construction of these boats were stamped SECRET. But a review of the January 1964 edition of Naval Ships System Command Technical News and again in the July edition of that same publication, which is unclassified, will reveal photographs of the PTF's along with an article which indicates when the PTF's were delivered to the US Navy. The point is that for covert programs, there should be funding directly from the SecDef, not funding by the Service, out of the contingency fund of some sort that can be properly covered. CIA has been handling this sort of thing for years. The present conventional matter of authorizing a covert program and than directing a Service to assume budgetary and funding responsibility for that program is unsatisfactory.

c. No one at the Washington level scrubs out the MACSOG's budget. The Navy has the funding responsibility and, because of the nature of the MACSOG operation and organization, the Navy simply puts on a "sponsored by SACSA" label. The Navy has taken the position that when MACSOG submits a budget, all the Navy can do is to fulfill it, and that the Navy is not in a position, because of need to know, to judge the validity of the budget or the justification. Therefore, SACSA goes before Congress every year and justifies the budget. However, SACSA is not scrubbing out the budget because that office simply does not have the capability, that is, a controller capability. In short, the

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MACSOG budget is not scrubbed out at a level higher than Headquarters, PACOM. In Washington, we take the budget the way it is submitted to us and hope we get the money.

9. (S) Mr. Colonel Hennah W. McGuire, USAF, (1966-1967).

Upon my arrival in MACSOG, there was a heavy backlog of logistical supplies to be moved in order to construct barracks and other type buildings for indigenous personnel and special forces camps under the operation control of MACSOG. Much of the cargo could have been airlifted by the 7th Air Force. However, because of the classification problems with some of the cargo, it was very difficult to have the logisticians make a complete switch into the 7th Air Force system, consequently, MACSOG hauled tremendous tonnages with MACSOG available aircraft. Finally, in cooperation with the logisticians, we were able to identify a cargo suitable for movement by the 7th Air Force. We continued to move special cargo with aircraft under MACSOG control.

10. (S) Colonel Robert C. Kingston, USA, (1967-1969).

Some of the logistical support procedures incident to Operations 34 type activities were handled in such a manner as to comprise the personnel involved in the operations or at least to break suspicion or undue notice on both US and indigenous personnel.

11. (S) Colonel Harold K. Aaron, USA, (1967-1969).

I felt that there was a great deal of duplication in the logistical support of MACSOG and of the 5th Special Forces Group. The group probably had the most efficient logistical system for the amount of people employed in that system than any where else in-country. In short, the group had the structure of an efficient supply system. However,

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in 1963 MACSOG established its own logistics installations and system. There was very little in the MACSOG logistic system that was not present in the SPIT FIT Special Forces System, that is, both organizations use the same radios, indigenous uniforms, rations, ammunition, concrete, and etc. With very little extra effort or people, the group could have supplied the MACSOG command and control detachments and even their forward operating bases with all classes of supply with at least equal efficiency as MACSOG.

b. This duplication in logistic system did not pertain solely to Vietnam but also involved the counterinsurgency support office (CISO) on Okinawa which had to deal with two separate activities, both MACSOG and the 5th Special Forces Group in the [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

12. (S) Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF, (1968-1969).

a. One of the most trouble free areas in the entire MACSOG activity, at least from the command view point, was our logistical support. We had considerable latitude in our budget, what we could buy, and how we could procure it. We had the transport capability to move items in-country when required. Basically, logistics constituted a minor problem.

13. (S) Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh, USA, (1968-1969).

The counterinsurgency supply office in Okinawa has constituted a very effective means through which MACSOG could procure peculiar items of equipment. A MACSOG type organization could not depend upon a traditional service requisitioning system to procure those items of equipment. In this organization, it is essential that there be a special procurement channel and that such be available without regard to where they will be used, that is, in the United States or elsewhere.

TOP SECRET

X. (TS) COUNTERPART RELATIONSHIPS - THE STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE

1. (U) Activation of a MACSOG Counterpart Organization.

a. The RVNAF, on 12 February 1964, from assets deriving from their Special Bureau, organized a MACSOG counterpart organization known as the Strategic Exploitation Service (SES). In common with OPLAN-34A, the objectives of SES included: aerial reconnaissance, beach reconnaissance, communications and electronics intelligence, tactical unit reconnaissance probes, psychological operations, and physical destruction operations.

b. SES was later redesignated as the Strategic Technical Service (STS). It is currently designated the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD).

2. (S) Evolution of the STD. MACSOG has prepared a history of the STD and its predecessors. That history, at Annex T, presents the evolution of the organization and its tie-in with MACSOG.

3. (TS) Views Concerning the STD. On the subject of the STD, representative views of persons interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association are set forth below. Their detailed views are presented in Annex U. In those views, frequent reference is made to a Colonel Ho; he headed the STD.

a. Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA (1964-1965).

Colonel Ho, the head of the STD, was rather weak militarily. He was not a disciplinarian. However, I am convinced that we did not want the strongest man in South Vietnam as my counterpart. Certainly, we want strong junior officers and strong operators, but the head of the STD did not need to be so strong. In this way, he is more subject to our influence.

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b. Colonel John T. Minham, USA (1964-1965).

(1) The MACSOG-STD overall relationship was outstanding during my tenure in MACSOG.

(2) Colonel Mo and his STD personnel frequently pointed out that we Americans were in Vietnam for a year only, but that the South Vietnamese had been fighting a war for some 15 years and did not know how much longer they would continue to fight it. This attitude tempered their outlook in general; for example, they were not so ambitious and energetic as the Americans. In general, I felt that the STD personnel were capable.

c. Lt. Colonel Vincent M.Lang, USA (1965-1966).

The counterpart system, in my opinion, was totally inadequate. For example, in the establishment of a training camp such as Long Thanh, we should have minimized host country participation as much as possible. If we were unable to operate without a great deal of host country participation in the command and control element, then we should at least establish some sort of a joint command and control system headed by a US officer.

d. Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA (1966-1968).

(1) Upon arrival in MACSOG, it was my impression that the Americans and South Vietnamese were attempting to accomplish the same thing, but that their success was limited because of their physical separation and their seeming inability to tie together closely the multitudinous details associated with any specific mission. As a consequence, we established a co-located facility manned by MACSOG and STD officers. This facility was established under the cover of the AG Joint Translation Center. Such a cover would explain why American and

South Vietnamese personnel were entering the secure compound.

(2) One of the greatest assets which Colonel Ho and his senior personnel possessed was their apolitical nature. Most of them had managed to remain aloof from any single political party or any single group of military officers and, thus, they survived the various coups. I believe, however, that the majority of the STD personnel were patriotic in the highest meaning of that word. Their greatest limitation was their lack of experience in the covert operations field.

(3) The official MACSOG-STD relationship should have been that of an advisor to his advisee. In practice, we functioned as the commanders of two joint military organizations and coordinated our activities to insure that we were accomplishing our mutual mission with effectiveness.

(4) To some extent, the MACSOG-STD relationship was complicated by my feeling, on several occasions, that the STD had been penetrated. However, I had no clear cut evidence that such was the case.

e. Colonel Dennis P. Casey, USMC (1966-1967).

My dealings with Col Ho were very pleasant and cordial. Anything we attempted to sell Col Ho with respect to the participation of the VNAF pilots or other Vietnamese personnel was difficult. We could talk to Col Ho but results were never forthcoming. In this regard, I had no positive evidence to prove that the STD has been penetrated. Nevertheless, in my opinion, it had. For example, many of our agent teams were lost almost immediately upon being inserted. This led me to believe that the North Vietnamese knew where and when the team was being inserted.

[redacted]

f. Lt. Colonel Jonathan D. Carney, USA (19.1-1967).

There was continuity in the STD and this may have been one of our problems. We in MACSOG, myself included, were fearful that the STD had been penetrated and that this was the paul reason for the continuing string of failures in our attempted operations in North Vietnam. Some of the STD personnel had been engaged in the program from [redacted] 1961. These personnel were uniquely positioned and, if there had been a penetration, it was complete. (b)(1) (b)(3)

g. Major George W. Gaspard, USA (1967-1968).

The STD did not want to assume the responsibility for issuing ID cards to those ethnic Cambodians in the program. This was a very simple problem, but it remained and manifested itself throughout the whole STRATA Program. In short, though these Cambodians were in the program, they were not issued legal identification.

h. Lt. Colonel Jefferson Seay, III, USA (1968)

(1) As Liaison Officer, I represented Chief, MACSOG at the headquarters of the STD. MACSOG and STD were located approximately ten miles apart. It took me approximately 15 minutes to travel that distance in a no-traffic situation and close to an hour in a peak traffic situation. In short, a good portion of my time was traveling to and from STD. In my opinion, the two organizations should have been co-located. Because they were not co-located, there was a tendency on the US side not to take coordination trips to STD to discuss mutual problems. Consequently, the South Vietnamese sometimes had the feeling that they were being left out.

(2) Organizationally, I do not feel that MACSOG and STD meshed very well. In the field, there was a great deal of cooperation in working together. At the MACSOG-STD level, the organizations did not lend themselves to close coordination in terms of staff set ups and the physical separation further complicated this problem. For example, one MACSOG staff officer might have to deal with perhaps three STD staff officers to get one job coordinated. MACSOG and STD should have been generally organized along the same lines. In my view, it would have been more efficient in terms of operations to have set up a combined organization.

i. Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh, USA (1968-1969).

(1) With some minor exceptions, the current STD organization is proper and sound. One organizational improvement would be the upgrading of the head of the STD from Colonel to General Officer. This change would give the head of the STD greater access to the Joint General Staff and presumably greater support from that staff.

(2) Personnel of the STD should be better prepared to conduct unconventional or covert type operations. There is a real requirement for establishing a training facility for this purpose.