

**AIRCRAFT  
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD  
REPORT**

**US ARMY UH-60  
BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS  
87-26000 AND 88-26060**

**VOLUME 17**

**TABS V-104A thru V-121**

**AIRCRAFT  
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD  
REPORT**

**COPY**

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**OF**

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**LIST OF WITNESSES**  
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MATTHEWS, PERRY J.....	CW2.....	V-001
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002A
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002B
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-003
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-003A
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-003B
DAWSON, KENNETH D.....	Captain.....	V-004
CONTROL WITNESS 02.....	AWACS Co-Pilot.....	V-005
CONTROL WITNESS 03.....	AWACS Flight Engineer.....	V-006
CONTROL WITNESS 04.....	AWACS Instructor Comm Tech.....	V-007
CONTROL WITNESS 05.....	AWACS Instructor Navigator.....	V-008
CONTROL WITNESS 06.....	AWACS Aircraft Commander.....	V-009
CONTROL WITNESS 07.....	AWACS Instr Comm Syst Op.....	V-010
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FOSTER, CHRISTOPHER T.....	Captain.....	V-030
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W.....	Captain.....	V-031

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RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J.....	Colonel.....	V-032
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S.....	B-Gen.....	V-033
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034A
BICKET, JOHN S.....	Major.....	V-035
WHITE, BARTON W.....	Senior Airman.....	V-036
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N.....	Lt Colonel.....	V-037
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.....	Chief Master Sergeant.....	V-038
RIVERS, GLORIA H.....	Civilian.....	V-039
NORMAN, TODD B.....	Airman First Class.....	V-040
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR.....	Sergeant.....	V-041
ZAHRT, JOHN W.....	Lieutenant Colonel.....	V-042
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.....	Colonel.....	V-043
(RESERVED).....		V-044
COGGINS, LYNDON R.....	Sergeant.....	V-045
YOUNG, LAVERM.....	Major.....	V-046
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.....	Major.....	V-047
MENARD, MICHAEL J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 4.....	V-048
HENRY, WILLIAM E.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-049
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050A
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050B
KOCH, KENNETH J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2.....	V-051
BOULEY, WILLIAM R.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-052
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-053
BEACHLER, CORY C.....	Sergeant.....	V-054
BOWEN, DEON M.....	Sergeant.....	V-055
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.....	Specialist.....	V-056
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.....	Specialist.....	V-057
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.....	Specialist.....	V-058
INGRAM, JOHN.....	Civilian.....	V-059
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM.....	Civilian.....	V-060
STREET, TERRY W.....	Civilian.....	V-061
NEUSER, STEVEN T.....	Captain.....	V-062
JOLY, MICHELE.....	Captain.....	V-063
TAHSIN, MOWFIK.....	Civilian.....	V-064
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-065
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-066
AMIN, MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-067
CARLSON, MICHAEL A.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2.....	V-068
SANDERS, DONALD L.....	Major.....	V-069

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SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major .....	V-069A
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major .....	V-069B
FRASER, GEORGE M. ....	Captain.....	V-070
GANZE, ELIZABETH .....	Captain.....	V-071
SHORT, JOHN E. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-072
LARREAU, ROD P. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-073
DAIGLE, CONNIE S. ....	PFC.....	V-074
DEWITT, TERRY A. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-075
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....	CFAC Mission Dir (Mad Dog) .....	V-076
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....		V-076A
DONOVAN, JOHN C. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-077
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078A
KENT, JEFFREY L. ....	Captain.....	V-079
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-080
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-081
NOLAN, WILLIAM C. III .....	First Lieutenant .....	V-082
MANION, KEVIN J .....	Captain.....	V-083
NILSEN, CARL R., JR. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-084
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C., JR. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-085
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-086
GODIN, ROBERT A. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-087
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II.....	Master Sergeant .....	V-088
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.....	Captain.....	V-089
FEMENELLA, JAMES C.....	Senior Airman .....	V-090
HUNT, JOSEPH F. ....	Colonel.....	V-091
EMERY, CURTIS H. II.....	Colonel.....	V-092
FELS, JAMES D. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-093
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C. ....	Major .....	V-094
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR. ....	First Lieutenant .....	V-095
PINTER, MICHAEL W. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-096
O'BRIEN, JAMES R. ....	Colonel.....	V-097
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097A
WIGGINS, BURTON D. ....	Major .....	V-098
MUSTAFA, ALI.....	Civilian.....	V-099
THOMPSON, GERALD B.....	Colonel.....	V-100
THOMPSON, GERALD B.....	Colonel.....	V-100A
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL .....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-101
BALL, TERRY G.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-102
BROWNE, JAMES S. ....	Captain.....	V-103

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BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain	V-103A
NYE, MICHAEL A.	1st Lieutenant	V-104
NYE, MICHAEL A.	1st Lieutenant	V-104A
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN	Captain	V-105
PINGEL, STEPHEN R.	Colonel	V-106
HENSON, ALLEN T.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-107
HASSELL, LEONARD G.	Colonel	V-108
WHITE, LARRY D.	Major	V-109
WITCHER, CARL J.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-110
CUMBEE, MARK K.	Lieutenant	V-111
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR.	Colonel	V-112
BETHEL, PAULETTE M.	Major	V-113
STEVENS, PHILIP R.	Captain	V-114
FOLEY, JOHN M. II	Civilian	V-115
THOMPSON, ALAN.	Colonel	V-116
MASON, WILLIAM D.	Major	V-117
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant	V-118
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant	V-118A
BRONSON, MATTHEW F.	Staff Sergeant	V-119
MAHER, ROGER D.	Colonel	V-120
ROGERS, JAMES R.	Staff Sergeant	V-121

**LIST OF WITNESSES**  
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED .....	Civilian .....	V-065
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED .....	Civilian .....	V-066
AMIN, MOHAMMED .....	Civilian .....	V-067
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL .....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-101
BALL, TERRY G. ....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-102
BEACHLER, CORY C. ....	Sergeant .....	V-054
BERNARD, ANDREW T. ....	1st Lieutenant .....	V-118
BERNARD, ANDREW T. ....	1st Lieutenant .....	V-118A
BETHEL, PAULETTE M. ....	Major .....	V-113
BICKET, JOHN S. ....	Major .....	V-035
BONG, JAMES I. ....	First Lieutenant .....	V-003
BONG, JAMES I. ....	First Lieutenant .....	V-003A
BONG, JAMES I. ....	First Lieutenant .....	V-003B
BOULEY, WILLIAM R. ....	Staff Sergeant .....	V-052
BOWEN, DEON M. ....	Sergeant .....	V-055
BRONSON, MATTHEW F. ....	Staff Sergeant .....	V-119
BROWNE, JAMES S. ....	Captain .....	V-103
BROWNE, JAMES S. ....	Captain .....	V-103A
CARLSON, MICHAEL A. ....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-068
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-081
COGGINS, LYNDON R. ....	Sergeant .....	V-045
CONTROL WITNESS 02.....	AWACS Co-Pilot .....	V-005
CONTROL WITNESS 03.....	AWACS Flight Engineer .....	V-006
CONTROL WITNESS 04.....	AWACS Instructor Comm Tech.....	V-007
CONTROL WITNESS 05.....	AWACS Instructor Navigator .....	V-008
CONTROL WITNESS 06.....	AWACS Aircraft Commander .....	V-009
CONTROL WITNESS 07.....	AWACS Instr Comm Syst Op .....	V-010
CONTROL WITNESS 08.....	AWACS Communication Tech .....	V-011
CONTROL WITNESS 09.....	AWACS Mission Crew Commander .....	V-012
CONTROL WITNESS 10 .....	AWACS Instr Mission Crew Cmdr... ..	V-013
CONTROL WITNESS 10.....	.....	V-013A
CONTROL WITNESS 11.....	AWACS Senior Director .....	V-014
CONTROL WITNESS 11.....	.....	V-014A
CONTROL WITNESS 12.....	AWACS Instr Weapons Director.....	V-015
CONTROL WITNESS 13.....	AWACS Enroute Weapons Director.....	V-016
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CONTROL WITNESS 14.....	AWACS Tanker Weapons Director .....	V-017
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CONTROL WITNESS 15.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Officer.....	V-018
CONTROL WITNESS 16.....	AWACS Advanced Air Surv Tech....	V-019

**LIST OF WITNESSES**  
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
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CONTROL WITNESS 18.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-021
CONTROL WITNESS 19.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-022
CONTROL WITNESS 20.....	AWACS Instr Comp/Display Tech ...	V-023
CONTROL WITNESS 21.....	AWACS Airborne Radar Tech.....	V-024
CONTROL WITNESS 22.....	AWACS Airborne Radar Operator ...	V-025
CONTROL WITNESS 23.....	ACE/DUKE.....	V-026
CONTROL WITNESS 23.....		V-026A
CONTROL WITNESS 24.....	AWACS TAOR Weapons Director...	V-027
CONTROL WITNESS 25.....	F-15 Wingman.....	V-028
CONTROL WITNESS 25.....		V-028A
CONTROL WITNESS 26.....	F-15 Lead.....	V-029
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....	CFACC Mission Dir (Mad Dog).....	V-076
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....		V-076A
CUMBEE, MARK K. ....	Lieutenant.....	V-111
DAIGLE, CONNIE S. ....	PFC.....	V-074
DAWSON, KENNETH D.....	Captain.....	V-004
DEWITT, TERRY A. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-075
DONOVAN, JOHN C. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-077
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.....	Lieutenant Colonel.....	V-080
EMERY, CURTIS H. II.....	Colonel.....	V-092
FELS, JAMES D. ....	Lieutenant Colonel.....	V-093
FEMENELLA, JAMES C.....	Senior Airman.....	V-090
FOLEY, JOHN M.....	Civilian.....	V-115
FOSTER, CHRISTOPHER T.....	Captain.....	V-030
FRASER, GEORGE M. ....	Captain.....	V-070
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C.....	Major.....	V-094
GANZE, ELIZABETH.....	Captain.....	V-071
GODIN, ROBERT A. ....	Technical Sergeant.....	V-087
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR.....	Colonel.....	V-112
HASSELL, LEONARD G.....	Colonel.....	V-108
HENRY, WILLIAM E.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-049
HENSON, ALLEN T.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2.....	V-107
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050A
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050B
HUNT, JOSEPH F. ....	Colonel.....	V-091
INGRAM, JOHN.....	Civilian.....	V-059
JOLY, MICHELE.....	Captain.....	V-063
KENT, JEFFREY L.....	Captain.....	V-079
KOCH, KENNETH J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2.....	V-051

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034A
LARREAU, ROD P.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-073
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G.....	Technical Sergeant.....	V-086
MAHER, ROGER D.....	Colonel.....	V-120
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-095
MANION, KEVIN J.....	Captain.....	V-083
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II.....	Master Sergeant.....	V-088
MASON, WILLIAM D.....	Major.....	V-117
MATTHEWS, PERRY J.....	CW2.....	V-001
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.....	Specialist.....	V-058
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.....	Specialist.....	V-056
MENARD, MICHAEL J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 4.....	V-048
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.....	Specialist.....	V-057
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002A
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002B
MUSTAFA, ALI.....	Civilian.....	V-099
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.....	Major.....	V-047
NEUSER, STEVEN T.....	Captain.....	V-062
NILSEN, CARL R., JR.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-084
NOLAN, WILLIAM C., III.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-082
NORMAN, TODD B.....	Airman First Class.....	V-040
NYE, MICHAEL A.....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104
NYE, MICHAEL A.....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104A
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097A
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM.....	Civilian.....	V-060
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-053
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S.....	B-Gen.....	V-033
PINGEL, STEPHEN R.....	Colonel.....	V-106
PINTER, MICHAEL W.....	Lieutenant Colonel.....	V-096
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RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J.....	Colonel.....	V-032
RIVERS, GLORIA H.....	Civilian.....	V-039
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.....	Chief Master Sergeant.....	V-038
ROGERS, JAMES R.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-121
SANDERS, DONALD L.....	Major.....	V-069
SANDERS, DONALD L.....	Major.....	V-069A

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major .....	V-069B
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N.....	Lt Colonel .....	V-037
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-085
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W. ....	Captain .....	V-031
SHORT, JOHN E. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-072
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.....	Colonel.....	V-043
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STREET, TERRY W.....	Civilian.....	V-061
TAHSIN, MOWFIK .....	Civilian.....	V-064
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR. ....	Sergeant .....	V-041
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN .....	Captain.....	V-105
THOMPSON, GERALD B. ....	Colonel.....	V-100
THOMPSON, GERALD B.....	Colonel.....	V-100A
THOMPSON, ALAN.....	Colonel.....	V-116
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078A
WHITE, BARTON W.....	Senior Airman .....	V-036
WHITE, LARRY D. ....	Major .....	V-109
WIGGINS, BURTON D. ....	Major .....	V-098
WITCHER, CARL J. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-110
YOUNG, LAVERM .....	Major .....	V-046
ZAHRT, JOHN W. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-042
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**CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES**  
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MATTHEWS, PERRY J.....	CW2 .....	V-001	
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002	
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CONTROL WITNESS 03.....	AWACS Flight Engineer ...	V-006	
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KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034A.....	
BICKET, JOHN S.....	Major.....	V-035.....	
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SCHMITT, MICHAEL N.....	Lt Colonel.....	V-037.....	
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ZAHRT, JOHN W.....	Lieutenant Colonel.....	V-042.....	
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.....	Colonel.....	V-043.....	
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MENARD, MICHAEL J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 4.....	V-048.....	
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HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050.....	
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050A.....	
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050B.....	
KOCH, KENNETH J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2.....	V-051.....	
BOULEY, WILLIAM R.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-052.....	
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-053.....	
BEACHLER, CORY C.....	Sergeant.....	V-054.....	
BOWEN, DEON M.....	Sergeant.....	V-055.....	
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.....	Specialist.....	V-056.....	
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.....	Specialist.....	V-057.....	
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.....	Specialist.....	V-058.....	
INGRAM, JOHN.....	Civilian.....	V-059.....	
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM.....	Civilian.....	V-060.....	
STREET, TERRY W.....	Civilian.....	V-061.....	
NEUSER, STEVEN T.....	Captain.....	V-062.....	pgs 19-22,24,26,30,37,51
JOLY, MICHELE.....	Captain.....	V-063.....	
TAHSIN, MOWFIK.....	Civilian.....	V-064.....	
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-065.....	
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-066.....	

**CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES**  
(Arranged in Tab Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM</u>
AMIN, MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-067	
CARLSON, MICHAEL A. ....	Chief Warrant Officer 2 .....	V-068	
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major .....	V-069	
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major .....	V-069A	
SANDERS, DONALD L. ....	Major .....	V-069B	
FRASER, GEORGE M. ....	Captain.....	V-070	
GANZE, ELIZABETH .....	Captain.....	V-071	
SHORT, JOHN E. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-072	
LARREAU, ROD P. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-073	
DAIGLE, CONNIE S. ....	PFC.....	V-074	
DEWITT, TERRY A. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-075	
CONTROL WITNESS 34 .....	CFACC Mission Dir (Mad Dog) .....	V-076 .....	pgs 44-46
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....		V-076A	
DONOVAN, JOHN C. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-077	
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078	
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES .....	Captain.....	V-078A	
KENT, JEFFREY L. ....	Captain.....	V-079	
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-080 .....	pgs 39-41
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-081	
NOLAN, WILLIAM C. III .....	First Lieutenant .....	V-082 .....	pgs 4,6,7
MANION, KEVIN J .....	Captain.....	V-083 .....	pgs 5,7
NILSEN, CARL R., JR. ....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-084	
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C.,JR .....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-085	
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-086	
GODIN, ROBERT A. ....	Technical Sergeant .....	V-087	
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II.....	Master Sergeant .....	V-088	
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.....	Captain.....	V-089	
FEMENELLA, JAMES C.....	Senior Airman .....	V-090	
HUNT, JOSEPH F. ....	Colonel.....	V-091	
EMERY, CURTIS H. II.....	Colonel.....	V-092 .....	pgs 4, 21, 24, 30, 31
FELS, JAMES D. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-093 .....	pgs 5,12
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C. ....	Major .....	V-094 .....	pgs 6-8,14
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR.....	First Lieutenant .....	V-095	
PINTER, MICHAEL W. ....	Lieutenant Colonel .....	V-096	
O'BRIEN, JAMES R. ....	Colonel.....	V-097	
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097A	
WIGGINS, BURTON D.....	Major .....	V-098	
MUSTAFA, ALI.....	Civilian.....	V-099	
THOMPSON, GERALD B.....	Colonel.....	V-100	

**CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES**  
(Arranged in Tab Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM</u>
THOMPSON, GERALD B.	Colonel	V-100A	
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL	Lieutenant Colonel	V-101	
BALL, TERRY G.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-102	
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain	V-103	pg 2
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain	V-103A	
NYE, MICHAEL A.	1st Lieutenant	V-104	
NYE, MICHAEL A.	1st Lieutenant	V-104A	
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN	Captain	V-105	
PINGEL, STEPHEN R.	Colonel	V-106	
HENSON, ALLEN T.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-107	
HASSELL, LEONARD G.	Colonel	V-108	
WHITE, LARRY D.	Major	V-109	
WITCHER, CARL J.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-110	
CUMBEE, MARK K.	Lieutenant	V-111	
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR.	Colonel	V-112	
BETHEL, PAULETTE M.	Major	V-113	
STEVENS, PHILIP R.	Captain	V-114	
FOLEY, JOHN M. II	Civilian	V-115	
THOMPSON, ALAN	Colonel	V-116	
MASON, WILLIAM D.	Major	V-117	
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant	V-118	
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant	V-118A	
BRONSON, MATTHEW F.	Staff Sergeant	V-119	
MAHER, ROGER D.	Colonel	V-120	
ROGERS, JAMES R.	Staff Sergeant	V-121	

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**TAB V-104A**

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**NYE, MICHAEL A.**

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V-104A

## **SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY**

**FIRST LIEUTENANT MICHAEL A. NYE**  
**HHC, 5/158 Aviation**  
**Giebelstadt, Germany**

The interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Black at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, on 14 May 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

### **EXAMINATION**

I am 1LT Michael A. Nye. I am assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 5/158 Aviation, Giebelstadt, Germany.

On 28 April 1994, I testified before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board investigating the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

My testimony on 28 April 1994 regarding the mission brief was in error in one respect. As the unit detachment commander, you are authorized to sign the mission briefing statement and subsequently serve as air mission commander. In my previous statement, I said the unit detachment commander cannot sign the mission briefing statement and subsequently serve as air mission commander.

My answer was not completely clear and accurate. What I should have said was the person who serves as the unit detachment commander should try not to subsequently serve as air mission commander.

Also, regarding the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Mode I Codes in and out of the TAOR, I would like to add the following comments to my statement. The Mode I Code you use going into TAOR would be 42. You use Mode I Code 42 enroute to Zakhu, in the TAOR, and when returning to Diyarbakir.

During this interview, CW5 Meline showed me a copy of what he identified as the ATO, Mode I provision (ATO PC1103, dated 14 April 1994 -- Aircraft Accident Investigation Board evidence tag #459), which I examined. I do not know what this particular provision is; this is the first time I have seen it. I do not understand the written guidance on Page 8. The words are unclear, and I have never been told about Paragraph B on that page.

**NYE**

Eagle Flight has been doing these missions three to four times a week for 2 1/2 years, starting in October 1991. I have never been told that I've been squawking the wrong code.

I do not have any further information, statement, or evidence that I wish to present.

(The standard witness caution was given. The interview terminated on 14 May 1994.)

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I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **MICHAEL A. NYE**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



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**SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, U.S. Army**  
**Legal Advisor**

**NYE**

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TAB V-105

V-103

THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN

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V-10a

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## SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

**SCOTT ALLEN THOMAS**  
**43d Air Refueling Squadron**

The telephonic interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Mudge at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1014 hours, 29 April 1994. Colonel Dennis Stanley Yoder, Staff Judge Advocate of Third Air Force at Mildenhall AB, England, checked the ID card of the witness and verified the identification of the witness. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

### EXAMINATION

My name is Captain Scott Allen Thomas. I am assigned to the 43d Air Refueling Squadron, Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington. My normal duties are as an aircraft commander of a KC-135, air refueling aircraft, and my duties are to provide refueling support for other aircraft in order to effectively conduct a mission. My responsibilities on 14 April were to depart Incirlik Air Base enroute to the No-Fly-Zone over northern Iraq. At that time I would meet numerous aircraft in order to refuel them, provide them gas, in order for them to continue with their mission as directed. I've been doing this job for approximately four years and the number of times I've done this is innumerable. I have probably conducted that mission at least seventeen times prior at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

Between 0650 Zulu and 0730 Zulu on 14 April 1994, without the actual advantage of having the exact times in my head, what did happen approximately at that time was, just prior to refueling a EF-111, call sign Elvis, I heard Duke, the command agency for the entire operation, call Tiger flight. He gave a clock position to all aircraft and he said, "Tiger flight," the clock position, and I can't quite remember what it was, "engaged." We took that as meaning that there was a flight of two F-15s engaged in some sort of hostile activity.

From that point, we did not hear further radio transmissions. Our Have Quick was not operating on that day, so basically, in the AOR area, we did not hear much. The next thing we did hear that sounded significant was, "Splash two," and we think that came from the Tiger flight of two F-15s, meaning that whoever they had engaged had just been shot down, and meaning that two aircraft had been shot down.

For the next fifteen to thirty minutes, we began to hear details over the radio as expressed by Duke. Duke started reporting to all other aircraft coming into the area that two Hind -- Iraqi Hind helicopters had been shot down in the southeast corner of ROZ 2, ROZ 2 being the area of which we were operating in the No-Fly-Zone. As I said, all subsequent aircraft who came into

**THOMAS**

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the area received the information from Duke and numerous times we heard Duke inform an incoming aircraft, such as a new player in the area. And when they reported on radio, Duke advised them that there had been two Iraqi Hind helicopters shot down in the southeast corner of the ROZ 2 area.

At that time, basically there was no other information given to us. We just assumed that's what happened and continued refueling the last two receivers that we had and then departed back to Incirlik Air Base.

The frequencies we were listening to at that time were the AWACS controller, which would be Cougar, and I'm pretty sure that's two-five-seven decimal three, and then the Duke frequency, which, off the top of my head, I'm thinking it's three-four-five-one-five. I also had the secondary air refueling frequency, one-twenty-six decimal six in my Victor radio and, at that time, that was the main frequency we were monitoring. I never heard any calls from Eagle flight at any time.

I did not hear Tiger flight express any information on the engage. If that did happen on the radio, we did not hear him on those three frequencies. All we did hear was, "Tiger flight engaged," the clock position, and for us, I think it was twelve o'clock, and then moments later we heard "Splash two." That information came from the Duke. The information, the clock position and where they were engaged was from Duke. And again, the "Splash two," I could not positively identify it, whether it was Duke or Tiger who said that.

That is the extent of my knowledge of the engagement. All the information I got is what I received by listening to the radio and Duke's comments to the traffic coming into and out of the AOR.

I know that the majority of the time that Duke reported to all aircraft it was two Hind helicopters. I do recall hearing Iraqi Hind helicopter at some point in time, but my degree of certainty is not the level at which I wish it was. I know he said two Hind helicopters numerous times, but I thought Iraqi was added to one of those calls at least once. The point at which it was added was at a later time. And also, to clarify a little bit more here, that information, the Iraqi Hind, basically could have come from one of my receivers through boom earphone conversations. Now that I think, it might have been they just clarified Iraqi Hind helicopter. That was basically it. We do have boom interphone. None of the receivers that we refueled after the incident knew any information. They were basically just telling us information about the Hind helicopter over boom interphone which is secure.

I did not at any time hear any radio calls which could have been originating from the aircraft being intercepted.

We had both UHF and VHF GUARD frequency monitored at the time. I did not hear any


**THOMAS**

calls on GUARD.

I indicated I had one-twenty-six decimal six set in my Victor radio. By that I mean my VHF radio and I guess I should clarify it a little bit further. At any time we have a Victor radio on, a VHF radio or a UHF radio, GUARD is automatically monitored so we were identifying two-forty-three decimal zero at all times.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of Captain Scott Allen Thomas, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**THOMAS**

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**TAB V-106**

V-103

**PINGEL, STEPHEN R.**

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V-104

V-104A

V-105

V-106

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**STEPHEN R. PINGEL, COLONEL  
Third Air Force  
RAF Mildenhall, UK**

**COLONEL AT LEE:** The time is 1207 on the 29 April 1994. This interview is being conducted telephonically with the witness and Colonel Dennis Yoder, the Staff Judge Advocate of Third Air Force at RAF Mildenhall, with the individuals conducting the questioning at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. The persons present at Incirlik are Major General Andrus, Colonel Fain and I am Colonel At Lee. All times referenced within the identification material are Incirlik Air Base local.

Colonel Yoder, have you had opportunity to identify the witness for this interview?

**COLONEL YODER:** Yes I have. I have his ID card in front of me and I know him personally. His name is as indicated, Colonel Stephen R. Pingel.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** I thank you. Colonel Yoder, you may leave the interview room and we'll proceed from here.

**COLONEL YODER:** Okay. Thank you very much.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Thank you.

**COLONEL PINGEL:** I'm going to pick up the receiver. How do you read?

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Read you fine.

**COLONEL PINGEL:** Okay, good. That's a lot better.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is an Aircraft Accident Investigation conducted under AFR 110-14. The purpose of this

**PINGEL**

accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

WITNESS: Yes I do.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS: Yes I do.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No I don't.

COLONEL AT LEE: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon, speak slowly, clearly and loudly. Remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others who do not have your technical training will be able to understand.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it is necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such and we will make appropriate arrangements.

Do you have any questions regarding this?

WITNESS: No, I do not.

COLONEL AT LEE: If you'll raise your right hand, I'll put you under oath.

WITNESS: Okay.

(The witness was sworn)

**PINGEL**

## EXAMINATION

1Q: Would you state your name and grade?

1A: Stephen R. Pingel, Colonel.

2Q: And your organization.

2A: Third Air Force, Director of Operations.

3Q: And your station is Mildenhall -- RAF Mildenhall, England?

3A: That's correct.

COLONEL AT LEE: Colonel Fain?

### (Questions by Colonel Fain)

4Q: Good morning.

4A: Good morning.

5Q: Would you please briefly describe to me your relationship to the CTF or Combined Task Force at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey?

5A: My relationship now?

6Q: Your relationship in previous temporary duty.

6A: I was the -- the C-3 at Incirlik from September to the first part of January.

7Q: And that is January of 1994?

7A: That's correct. I'm sorry. September of '93 to January of '94.

8Q: In your position as a C-3, would you please describe to me the chain of command under which you operated?

8A: I was the Operations and Plans director for General Pilkington, the -- the commander, if you will, of CTF. He was the -- I was part of his staff for the operation and plans portion of his staff.

9Q: And what was the makeup of the organization underneath you in that capacity?

9A: My organization -- I had several officers and enlisted folks that worked for me. I had a -- a plan -- or a plans portion of it that worked plans within -- within the environment of the CTF and I also had an operations portion which worked for me under the -- working current

**PINGEL**

operations type things.

10Q: Could you briefly summarize the mission of the C-3 with respect to daily operations in the CFT -- or CTF organization?

10A: With respect to daily operations, we worked mainly the things that dealt with the host nation as far as a daily schedule and that was to work take off times and those sorts of things with our host nation. We had a counterpart on the Turkish staff down -- they were downstairs at the time, that we worked things like slips in take offs and that sort of thing, on a -- on a -- on a daily basis, and that was our involvement in the daily operation.

11Q: Did you have written or published guidance beginning with higher headquarters directives through operating procedures that you used within your organization?

11A: We had a -- as I recall, we had checklists for our people that worked in the, what we called the JOC, the Joint Operations Center is what it was called. We had checklists and so forth that had been developed apparently through the months that we did that.

COLONEL FAIN: We're standing by for a minute for jet noise.

WITNESS: I understand.

12Q: Do you recall higher headquarters OPLANs or CTF directives that governed your operation?

12A: No, nothing specific. Now, I do recall the PROVIDE COMFORT operation, or whatever it was called, Op Order or the Plans, but nothing that would direct specifically what the C-3 or the people within C-3 were to do on a daily basis.

13Q: And from whom did you receive the majority of your guidance?

13A: From the Commanding General.

14Q: Returning to our discussions of the daily flying mission, how did you receive inputs from agencies with regard to flight activity for long term or short term flights?

14A: Sir, the -- the 39th DO, Colonel Richardson's office and his schedulers, or his scheduler, I remember -- I don't know exactly what his office symbol is, but Major White.

15Q: Okay. What kind of information did you or the JOC receive from the military coordination center, or MCC, regarding Eagle Flight activities?

15A: We -- we received -- the only time we received anything were when they planned special missions to specific locations in northern Iraq and I'm afraid we might get into a classified area here, but in general, when they had planned a -- a unique, if you will, a unique trip. We would get that information often times two to three days prior to coordinate with our flying activities.

16Q: Were you familiar with the Air Tasking Order, the daily flight Air Tasking Order?

PINGEL

16A: Yes.

17Q: On the occasions that you referred to a specific mission that you received information of two to three days in advance, was that information on the Air Tasking Order?

17A: To my knowledge, it was, but I do not recollect specifically how it was annotated on the ATO -- on the Air Tasking Order.

18Q: The Air Tasking Order, as you said, was built by Major White, the frag shop or fragmentary order shop. Do you know how that information would be passed to that organization? The information I'm referring to is the Eagle Flight information.

18A: Oh. I don't recall -- I don't recall specifically how that information got there. A lot of times I do know that I often would call myself or have one of my -- I had one officer detailed to work scheduling issues. Often times we would make a call. I do remember sometimes we would get a hard copy of their proposed -- of the Eagle Flight proposed itinerary which we would, in turn, route to the frag shop and to the 39th DO and so forth.

19Q: To cover the first point, how would that information be routed?

19A: Through distribution or if -- depending on the timing of the trip, I recall times when I detailed somebody to handcarry it to the frag shop.

20Q: And the person that you detailed would be in the C-3; is that correct?

20A: That's correct. One of my NCOs that worked for me there in the JOC.

21Q: You said that you had a particular individual with the delegated task to provide the coordination. Could you identify that individual by duty position?

21A: I don't recall exactly what his duty position was. I don't remember the -- the exact name we called him on the wiring diagram, but I identified him as working my scheduling type issues and working with the frag shop. And that individual varied -- not varied, but rotated twice while I was there. I don't recall what we called him, other than -- and I don't want to use a name here unless you want me to, but that individual was my -- what I called my scheduler, and I don't remember the official name that we had for him, duty title, on his -- on the, if you will, the wiring diagram for the C-3.

22Q: Could you identify the individual by name, please?

22A: Yes. Major Don Mobley was one of them. And I cannot remember the one that was there -- I cannot remember his name, the first guy that was there that worked for me when I first got there.

23Q: Were these individuals Army or Air Force personnel?

23A: They were Air Force -- mostly Air Force personnel.

24Q: During your tenure as the C-3, did you have an Army Liaison Officer?

**PINGEL**

24A: Yes, I did.

25Q: And what was his function?

25A: To -- mainly to operate the Eagle Flight at -- at their rear location and the details of working those sorts of -- of problems.

26Q: Was he exposed to Eagle Flight daily operations information, flight schedules, etcetera?

26A: Yes, I think so. To the best of my knowledge, I believe he was.

27Q: Would your liaison officer, or the individuals previously identified by name, be responsible for providing flight information that was available to you or to the C-3 to the scheduling shop within the CFACC or Combined Forces Air Component Commander's division?

27A: Yes.

28Q: Was that a standard procedure?

28A: That -- yeah, that was -- I don't think that was written down as a standard procedure, but that was how I used those individuals to do that function. And again, there was no -- as far as I knew, there -- there -- could recall, there was no set procedure, and oftentimes we would get their specific flight information via a fax or via a phone call from the MCC, either their operations officer or the commander would either talk to me or my deputy.

29Q: That information would come directly to you and not to the Joint Operations Center duty officer?

29A: There were times when it came directly to me and sometimes, depending on the time of the day, and if there was somebody on -- on duty -- if I -- for example, if I were on duty at the time, normally they would talk to me. If we were not on duty at that time, then it would go through the Joint Operations Center duty -- duty officer.

30Q: And when received by the Joint Operations Center duty officer, what would you expect him to do with that information?

30A: If -- if it came during the -- during non-duty hours, then the first thing the next day, they would -- they would inform me as well. Then I would take a look at that and have, depending on the timing on it -- involved, would have it sent to the frag shop, either -- either handcarried or, if it was a longer lead time then, it would go to the frag shop via the distribution.

31Q: Could you categorize that transfer of information as frequent or infrequent?

31A: During the time I was there, about once every two weeks or ten days.

32Q: Did that occurrence that you just described coincide with the Eagle Flights -- the Eagle Flight activity?

32A: No. This was -- again, this would happen on a routine -- or not -- not a routine basis, but an unroutine -- on a special, if you will, and I'll use that term, special mission for Eagle Flight.

**PINGEL**

33Q: On what was considered a routine mission, and I'm talking about other than purely administrative flights to Zakhu, was that information available to the frag shop?

33A: That didn't -- that information did not come through the C-3, so I don't know the answer to that.

34Q: On the special missions that you described, did that information include take off time from Zakhu and route of flight?

34A: Yes. Now not -- not a specific route of flight, not by geo refs or anything like that, but we had certain -- often times we'd talk in terms of villages and so forth, if that's what you mean by route of flight. But we did have proposed times, take off times, proposed times over certain points, etcetera.

35Q: And to re-ask the question in a different way, was there a formal process in effect to get that information to the CFAC or to the frag shop?

35A: There was nothing written down, as I recall, which would, I think, be interpreted as a formal chain of events.

36Q: Were you aware of meetings within the CTF at which both C-3 and CFAC would be represented, in which flight information for Eagle Flights would be discussed?

36A: No.

37Q: Are you aware of the Airspace Control Order or ACO?

37A: Yes.

38Q: Were you involved in the process of developing that ACO?

38A: No.

39Q: To the best of your recollection, are you aware of a provision in the ACO that requires AWACS coverage prior to OPC, or Operation PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft, operating in the AOR?

39A: Yes.

40Q: During your tenure, did that requirement also apply to the UH-60s from the MCC, the Eagle Flights?

40A: I don't recall specifically if that was written, but -- and I'm -- and I'm trying to remember now what kind of guidance we had given to them on that, but I don't recall the specifics of that. Ask the question again. Let me -- let me listen to the question again, please.

41Q: During your tenure, are you aware whether or not the provisions in the ACO that required AWACS coverage before OPC aircraft entered the AOR, also applied to the Eagle Flights?

41A: No. I -- I don't recall if it did or not apply to the Eagle Flights.

**PINGEL**

42Q: During your tenure, the latter portion of your tenure, do you recall conversations with the operations officer from Eagle Flight, which I believe -- well, Lieutenant Nye would be the name, regarding helicopter operations and deconfliction with fighters in the AOR?

42A: Yes we -- we had worked on -- on documenting some confliction problems that we had had with the -- with the Eagle Flight and OPC aircraft.

43Q: Could you describe the nature of the conflicts that Lieutenant Nye brought forward to you?

43A: To the best of my recollection, there had been times when they suspected the -- the Eagle Flight guys had suspected friendly aircraft had locked onto them with their air to air radar which, in turn, triggers their radar warning receivers, that somebody had, in fact, locked on with a -- an air-to-air radar. That was one of the -- the portions of their concern.

Another portion of their concern, which -- which we had attempted to document, were surface to air threats in certain areas as well.

44Q: Are you aware of Lieutenant Nye requesting to develop procedures so that both the helicopters and the fighters would be on the same frequency when in the AOR?

44A: Yes I am. I think -- yes, I am aware of that and I think we -- we attempted to do that.

45Q: Can you tell me how you attempted to do that, please?

45A: Oh, this is -- this is quite a while back.

46Q: I understand.

46A: I -- I think we were -- we went to the -- the CFAC DO -- the 39th Director of Operations, and I don't remember specifically who actually did the leg work, whether it was Lieutenant Nye or somebody else on the C-3 staff, but I do remem -- recall giving direction to -- to work with the DO and his staff to attempt to -- to work out those kinds of prob -- work out that -- that problem.

Now, I don't specifically recollect what the -- the outcome of that was.

47Q: To the best of your recollection, was the problem solved to your satisfaction?

47A: To the -- now, there were different times when we had -- we had worked this issue and -- and again, I would like to categorize two different sets of Eagle Flight operations. In one were the special missions, and the other being, if you will, the routine missions, and I don't mean just the transient into and out of Zakhu, but routine missions in the A -- in the area of responsibility.

48Q: I understand.

48A: The ones that I felt comfortable with were the special missions and I didn't -- don't recall a major problem with the, if you will, the routine missions in the area. I don't know if that answered -- answered your question or not, but at -- that -- that issue varied -- not -- varied is not the right word, but that issue ebbed and tide, if you will, during my tenure and there were times when it

**PINGEL**

seemed like it worked well, and there times when we had gotten feedback that it was not working as well, that is, the communication between the Eagle Flight and the AWACS.

49Q: And what was your view of the procedures in effect to make the fighters aware of the presence of Eagle Flight and to deconflict them, both from a safety purpose and from a tactical standpoint?

49A: The procedures, I don't know that there were any specific procedures, other than normal AWACS deconfliction when -- when both -- when both sets of aircraft were in the vicinity of each other. I do not -- I am not aware or recall any written procedures that would -- would necessarily deconflict from a safety standpoint.

50Q: From your point of view, what agency would be responsible for coordinating the fighter and helicopter activities in the AOR at the same time?

50A: From a planning standpoint or from an execution standpoint, because I think from the execution standpoint, it would be the AWACS controllers. From a planning standpoint, I should think that would be a -- a -- CFAC or the 39th DO responsibility.

51Q: Upon arrival of your successor, did you have overlap and discussions regarding the procedures in effect?

51A: Yes we did.

52Q: And can you tell me the approximate length of that overlap?

52A: Number of days? We had probably three or four days overlap.

53Q: Upon your departure, were you comfortable that he understood all aspects of his mission?

53A: Yes, I was.

54Q: In your discussions with your replacement, did you ever discuss the procedures for passing flight information, in particular with regards to Eagle Flight, through the JOC to the CFAC or any individual or group within the CFAC's organization?

54A: As far as from a planning standpoint? Yes, we did.

55Q: And did he appear to have a good understanding of that procedure?

55A: Yes.

56Q: And would you relay that procedure one more time for the board?

56A: The -- again, I'm not sure it was necessarily a writ -- in fact, I'm not -- I don't recall that it was a written procedure, but again, on the special missions, we got that information to the scheduling office in the -- in the 39th DO, in the frag shop, if you will. That information got to them as -- as quickly as possible, depending on the timing involved. If -- if it was to be within the next twenty-four to forty-eight hours, I made sure that we handcarried that letter or that suggested itinerary down to the frag shop. If it was further out than that, we, like I say, normally

**PINGEL**

put it in distribution, and that -- that being the procedure to get the information to the -- the -- the 39th frag shop.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

57Q: Just to clarify. Did you understand that that was a requirement for the C-3 to ensure that that information would get to the CFAC -- to the frag shop?

57A: No sir, I don't remember that -- that as a written requirement.

58Q: But did you understand that that was the responsibility of the CFAC, even though it was not written? Of the C-3 -- I'm sorry. The responsibility of the C-3, even though it was not a written procedure?

58A: Yes sir. I -- I knew that we had to coordinate with -- we had to make the connection with the Eagle Flight operations and the -- the -- the frag shop.

59Q: And were you -- were you comfortable that your replacement also understood that?

59A: Yes sir. At the time I -- yes.

COLONEL FAIN: Could we ask you to stand by for a minute while we have a brief discussion?

(There was a discussion among board members)

WITNESS: Certainly. I understand.

COLONEL FAIN: I have two questions of an unclassified nature to define missions that you've previously discussed.

60Q: The first question is, as you refer to routine missions, are you referring to missions within the security zone?

60A: That's correct.

61Q: And special missions would be missions outside of the security zone?

61A: That's correct.

COLONEL FAIN: Thank you. That's all the questions that we have for you. Is there anything you would like to add that might shed light or information regarding the incident of 14 April, in the way of background information regarding C-3 operations?

WITNESS: Well, I -- yes, I would like to add, if you will, my two cents. I think, based on the line of questioning and so forth, you have been able to paint a fairly accurate picture of a not very regimented, not very procedurally established flow of information that ran between the CTF -- well, that's not -- flow of information between all the players that operated in -- in the Operation

**PINGEL**

PROVIDE COMFORT II operation.

I -- that was my initial impression as I got into the C-3 in September. I recognized that. I attempted, as much as possible, to influence and organize, if you will, organize the flow of information. One of the -- one of the continuing problems that distracted us were the daily operations, and we did not have a chance, to my own satisfaction, to implement those, what I would have considered much more rigid, regimented procedures for that sort of thing.

And that -- that's an overall impression of, if you will, from my standpoint, again, tainted by probably three months being out of the operation, but as I look back at it, that -- that is an overall assessment, or at least an overall impression that I had and have on that operation.

And that -- that -- that's kind of my summary of -- summary, if you will, and that's -- that was really all I wanted to add.

COLONEL AT LEE: Colonel Pingel, you're reminded that this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately. You may report it to a board member.


COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No, I don't.

COLONEL AT LEE: Local time is 1246 and this interview is concluded.

### REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by Stephen R. Pingel to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, was recorded by me by stenomask, and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

  
BRUCE H. PEGGS, DAFC  
Court Reporter  
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

PINGEL

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**TAB V-107**

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**HENSON, ALLAN T.**

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**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY  
OF  
CW2 ALLEN T. HENSON  
C COMPANY 6/159th Aviation Regiment  
Giebelstadt, Germany**

The interview was conducted by Lt Col Scott C. Black and CW4 Douglas C. Sousa, at Pirinclik AB, Turkey, beginning at 2123 hours, 28 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

**EXAMINATION**

My name is CW2 Allen Thomas Henson. I'm assigned to Charlie Company 6/159 Aviation Regiment out of Giebelstadt, Germany. I am the maintenance test pilot-maintenance officer for Eagle Detachment located in Diyarbakir, Turkey.

I've had several different rotations with Eagle Flight starting in March of 92 up to the present. I usually come down for two months with a four month break prior to coming down an additional two months. I was here in September of 92 and performing my duties on, I believe the 6th.

I was doing a two ship TAOR to Bashur with an Air Force team to look at the airfield and survey it for aircraft coming in. Prior to landing I had a radio conversation with Cougar to have some aircraft check us because we would be on the ground for a short period of time. During that time we were on the airfield and the survey team was surveying the airfield. Two F-111s flew over just at the time we were getting ready to crank. I hadn't started the engines at that time, but was getting strapped in. The F-111s flew over, did what looked like a return to target, did a low pass, and continued on their way.

A couple days later I was in Incirlik at the club. I was talking to a friend. I don't remember who the friend was. Another pilot that was with me, CW2 Teagarden, was talking to one of the F-111 pilots that we had previously helped with a maintenance problem at Batman. He told him about the two F-111s that made a pass over, popped their safety's and had returned to blow us off the face of the earth. He had popped safety's and at the last minute the guy said those look like two Black Hawks. Mr Teagarden called me over and the guy repeated the same thing to me.

Nothing really happened after that. Capt Howden was the commander at the time and he was one of the pilots that was with us. As far as I know he knew about it and that was about as far as it went.

**HENSON**

The mission to Bashur was not in the security zone. There is a runway located there with no buildings. The Air Force was looking at possibly using it for whatever purposes they needed and they were doing a survey on it.

My position was just a pilot in command. Even though I'm the maintenance officer, I fill the duties as a pilot in command as well. When I landed, I was under control of AWACS in the TAOR that day. When we landed Mr Teagarden did communicate with AWACS. He told them we were on the ground and he requested AWACS to have somebody check on us to make sure everything was okay.

The way I remember what was said, "Eagle one's arrival Bashur field will, call off, request to have fixed wing to just verify and check on us periodically." Cougar at the time had pretty much just blew us off and didn't pay no attention to us and then I saw those two F-111s. It didn't take very long after the call. I would say I was on the ground no more than 45 minutes or so. Then I got back in the aircraft and started the run-up procedures. When I was in the aircraft I distinctly remember the door was open, we were facing to the south, and the F-111s came screaming over. They were coming from the west because we were facing south and I watched them go over and turn. They were flying probably 1500 feet AGL and not in a particular formation. They were not side by side, but staggered. One was ahead in front of the other one and the other one was off to it's right or left of either one. They were separated, they weren't tight.

When I first noticed them I could hear the noise. I looked and could see them coming from right to left as I was facing south. So they would have been coming from the west to east. At that point I do not believe the avionics were on. I was just getting strapped in. I don't believe we even cranked up on the APUs yet, we were just putting on the shoulder harnesses; the doors were still open. We just thought at the time the F-111s came over that Cougar was following up on us and making sure everything was okay. After the first pass, it seemed to me being in Army aviation, what we call return to targets, because they just banked up, banked sharp and came right back over top.

They banked to the left. They did not travel to the rear of the aircraft because they were slightly in front us. They came to our left, came up and then came right back around like they were returning to target. They came in the same line as they did the first time. The guy at Incirlik said that they had already popped their safety's and was getting ready to wax us.

They were still loose during the second pass. There was a definite separation between them. They were not tight when they came across the first time and they weren't tight when they came across the second time. The second time they came across I would say that they were a little lower. I'd say they were down to about 1000 feet AGL. I was not concerned because we already coordinated with Cougar and just thought they were doing their job. We lifted off after they passed over probably no more than five minutes; as fast as normal run-up procedures.

**HENSON**

I contacted AWACS on the way out. I don't remember saying anything of any importance, just we're off of our stop enroute to Zakhu. Because from then we went on back to Zakhu.

I didn't talk to them about the fast movers nor did I talk at all with either the F-111s or AWACS about the other flight. At the time we were down on the ground we did not talk to anyone. They had a TACSAT set up in which they were talking to Zakhu and they were communicating with them, that was already folded up and put in the aircraft. I did not talk to the actual F-111 pilots. The pilot I talked to was one of his partners or peers. I do not remember his name or his unit. The conversations took place at Incirlik Air Base club a few days after.

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions and the interview was concluded at 2140 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of CW2 ALLEN THOMAS HENSON, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA  
Legal Advisor

**HENSON**

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**TAB V-108**

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**HASSELL, LEONARD G.**

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**VERBATIM TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**LEONARD G. HASSELL, COLONEL  
CTF PROVIDE COMFORT, Chief of Staff  
Incirlik AB, Turkey**

**COLONEL AT LEE:** The time is 1844 on the 28th of April 1994. The persons present are the witness. In addition, Major General Andrus, Colonel Bennett, Group Captain Doggett, Mister Brummell, Colonel Fain and Colonel At Lee.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is an Aircraft Accident Investigation conducted under AFR 110-14. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

**WITNESS:** I think so, yes.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

**HASSELL**

WITNESS: I think, so, yes.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: Not at this time.

COLONEL AT LEE: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon. Speak slowly, clearly and loudly. Remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others that do not have your technical background can understand.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it is necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: Not at this time.

COLONEL AT LEE: Please stand and I'll put you under oath.

(The witness was sworn)

#### EXAMINATION

1Q: Would you state your name and grade?

1A: Leonard G. Hassell, Colonel.

2Q: And your organization?

2A: TDY organization or permanent?

3Q: TDY.

HASSELL

3A: I'm the Chief of Staff for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

4Q: And your station?

4A: I'm TDY from -- TDY here to Incirlik Air Base.

5Q: And your permanent station?

5A: Is Headquarters, USAREUR, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineering.

COLONEL AT LEE: Colonel Fain?

**(Questions by Colonel Fain)**

6Q: Would you provide for the board a very brief outline of your military experience to date?

6A: Commissioned in 1968. First assignment was in Okinawa from '68 to about '70. '70 I went to Puerto Rico, was a reserve advisor in Puerto Rico for four years. Then went to the advanced course. Then went to Fort Lewis, Washington -- excuse me. Went to school, then went to Fort Lewis, Washington. From Fort Lewis, Washington went to Norfolk, Virginia. From Norfolk, Virginia went to Japan. From Japan went to the Pentagon. From the Pentagon to Hawaii and from Hawaii back here -- to Europe.

7Q: And what type of missions or what type of background would you consider . . .

7A: I'm a registered professional engineer.

8Q: Engineer. And what is your duty title at your permanent duty station?

8A: I'm the USAREUR Environmental Engineer.

9Q: And what is your duty title in your current TDY or temporary duty assignment?

9A: I'm the Chief of Staff for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

10Q: And how long have you been in that position?

10A: Since the 12th of February.

11Q: And are you familiar with the operations of the military coordination center or MCC?

11A: Yes.

HASSELL

- 12Q: If possible, could you provide an unclassified description of their mission?  
12A: To show a presence, a U.S., French, British and Turkish presence in the security zone.
- 13Q: And by the security zone, you're talking about . . .  
13A: In northern Iraq.
- 14Q: Would you describe the MCC's relationship to the Combined Task Force, CTF?  
14A: MCC is just another command, just like JSOTF or another organization under the CTF headquarters. It is unique in that it has British, French, U.S. and Turkish as well as American officers and enlisted assigned to it. It is also unique in the fact that it is in northern Iraq.
- 15Q: Is there a U.S. Army chain of command associated with the MCC?  
15A: Yes there is. There are two co-commanders at the MCC. One is a U.S. Army officer and the other is a -- normally, since my time here, has been a -- a Turkish officer, normally an Army officer.
- 16Q: And to whom do they report?  
16A: To the CTF co-commanders, Turkish and the U.S. co-commanders.
- 17Q: So the U.S. co-commander would be whom?  
17A: Brigadier General Pilkington.
- 18Q: And what is the MCC's relationship to the Combined Forces Air Component, or CFAC?  
18A: I'm not sure I understand -- relation -- what you're getting . . .
- 19Q: Is either organization in the other's chain of command . . .  
19A: Yes.
- 20Q: . . . or chain of control?  
20A: Yes, the CFAC is also commanded by Brigadier General Pilkington.
- 21Q: Would you consider the two organizations to be co-equal in that structure?  
21A: Yes.

HASSELL

22Q: Are you familiar with how the MCC daily flight operations are integrated into the OPC or Operation PROVIDE COMFORT mission?

22A: Not the details of how it's integrated, but I'm -- I'm familiar with it, yes.

23Q: Who's responsibility is it to integrate the flight operations of the MCC with the flight operations of the remainder of the OPC package?

23A: I'm not sure I can answer that -- know the answer to that question.

24Q: With regards to the MCC flight operations, are you aware of a requirement for them to comply with the Airspace Control Order published for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT operations?

24A: Would you say that again? I was writing notes on the question you asked me before.

25Q: Sure. With respect to the daily flight operations, are you aware of any requirement for the MCC flight operations to comply with the Airspace Control Order, which is the ACO, as published for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT missions?

25A: I'm not sure I know the technical answer to that, but I would say that yes, all of the flights should be integrated.

26Q: Are you familiar with OPLAN 91-7?

26A: I believe that's -- I do not remember the exact title of that OPLAN . . .

27Q: It was the implementing instruction, initially as a message in July of '91, that provides the basis for the different functions of organizations within the CTF.

27A: I'm not familiar with that document under 91-7, no. I'm not familiar with that at all, not as 91-7.

28Q: What documents are you familiar with that would govern the operations of the CTF?

28A: I've read the -- the SOPs, I've read the EUCOM mission statements. I've read the various demarches that have been published by the United Nations and that govern our -- our operations in -- in northern Iraq and in Turkey.

COLONEL FAIN: I think we need to take a break for a minute, please.

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 1855.

(The interview was recessed at 1855, 28 April 1994)

HASSELL

(The interview as reconvened at 1856 hours, 28 April 1994)

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 1856 and those individuals who were present when we recessed are once again present.

**(Questions by Colonel Fain)**

29Q: Going back to the mission of the MCC, can you tell me the nature of the operations that they conduct?

29A: They daily visit the Kurdish villages. They show their presence by those visits and they talk with various people who come to the House and ask for an audience of the -- the four nation members that are there at MCC.

30Q: Would you consider the MCC's operations to be a portion or a part of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

30A: Very definitely.

31Q: Would you consider their operations to be integrated into the daily flight operations of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

31A: I would, yes.

32Q: To the best of your knowledge, are the other elements of the CTF, the CFAC in particular, aware of the flight activities of the MCC?

32A: To the best of my knowledge, they are.

33Q: Do you know what type of information is provided in order to build the Air Tasking Order or ATO, from the MCC to the command structure for the purpose of building that ATO?

33A: No, but I would not even -- I don't know how you build an A -- build one of those.

34Q: The ATO is simply, or in its most simple form, a daily flight schedule published for each day. It usually has the lines for each of the flight activities . . .

34A: Okay.

35Q: On the 14th of April, for example, the lines listed for the Eagle Flights as part of the MCC were simply listed as "as required" lines with "as required" take offs. Do you know when and

HASSELL

how additional information is passed regarding the take off times and flight plans and flight intentions of the Eagle Flights?

35A: It's my understanding that Eagle Flight contacts -- and I'm not sure who they call there from Zakhu when they know the -- the visits, times. When I arrived, Eagle Flight was only flying from Diyarbakir into Zakhu. Eagle Flight was not flying in the security zone and it was not until sometime the first part of March, about the middle of March, that Eagle Flights started flying in the -- in the security zone again.

36Q: Do you know who approved those flights?

36A: Yes. General Pilkington approved all flights, both within the security zone and outside of the security zone. The forms that were -- were faxed from MCC to -- to us here had the authority -- I could sign or the General could sign them, if the General was unavailable or was not here. But because the issue was -- we always dialogue and I can't think of -- there were not many at all flights that I know of, even after the restriction was lifted, to fly inside the security zone.

37Q: And the documents that you referred to that were sent forward for approval, that either you or the CTF/CC could sign, were what type of documents?

37A: They were a request for approval to fly in the security zone, or outside of the security zone, whatever the -- whatever the particular mission was.

38Q: To the best of your knowledge, were flights conducted inside the security zone without that type of approval process?

38A: I don't know of any flights -- I know that there were no flights -- I don't know of any flights outside the security zone that did not have the approval on them.

39Q: Were you aware of the flight activity outside of the security zone on the 11th of April?

39A: Yes. Yes I am.

40Q: Are you aware of the approval process for that flight?

40A: I am aware that the flight on the eleventh by the four co -- by the four senior military folks from each one of the four nations here. All four of them were on the aircraft.

41Q: Are you aware of any restrictions to the flight plan or time of flight for that mission?

41A: No.

HASSELL

42Q: Are you aware of the flight activity on the 14th of April that resulted in the incident?

42A: Yes.

43Q: Were you aware of the flight plan, or route of flight, or take off times, of that flight prior to the fourteenth?

43A: Yes.

44Q: Was the information regarding that flight plan passed outside of CTF/CC? My question, to make it clearer, obviously the MCC was in the loop on one side. Was the information passed to any other agency within the CTF organization?

44A: I know it was passed to -- I know the request was faxed in to the JOC and was brought down to the command group. I know that we dialogued on it. I know that the coalition chiefs, to the best of my knowledge, all four of the coalition chiefs were aware of the mission. Normally our missions are briefed, in not great detail, but on -- on the slide in our Monday, Wednesday, Friday staff meetings. To say specifically who knew -- who knew specifically that they were going down to meet Mister Barzani and Mister Talabani, the dialogue had gone on for some time to send them down to introduce, not only the new U.S. commander, but also to introduce the new Turkish commander to -- to the UNGCI folks in Irbil.

45Q: Did you attend the meeting on Wednesday of that week that you referred to?

45A: No, I did not. I was on my four day pass.

46Q: Are you aware, then, whether or not the flight information for that flight was presented on the slides that you mentioned?

46A: No, I'm not.

47Q: Could you describe for me the communications link that you would expect to exist between two organizations that you've described as parallel in the structure, that of the MCC and the CFAC?

47A: Obviously the -- the staff is that organization that passes the data and the information from one organization to another that's under the -- the command of the -- the same command.

48Q: Is there a particular agency in the staff that you would expect to complete the link between the MCC and the CFAC?

HASSELL

48A: It would be the operations. The operations folks are the ones that normally handle operation type -- type of functions.

49Q: And is operations C-3 in this case?

49A: C-3.

50Q: Are you personally aware of a restriction that requires all aircraft operating in the AOR to be under AWACS coverage?

50A: I'm not personally aware of such a regulation.

51Q: Are you aware of a restriction that requires aircraft entering the AOR to be preceded by fighters with AAI radars to sanitize the airspace?

51A: No, I'm not. I mean -- no. I don't know that level of detail of what's going on in those organizations.

COLONEL FAIN: Sir, do you have any questions?

Clarifications?

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

52Q: You referred to the JSOTF, that's the Joint Special Operations Task Force?

52A: I'm sorry, yes.

53Q: Okay. I think it was inferred, but perhaps not expressly stated; what is the relationship between Eagle Flight and the MCC, in terms of command and control?

53A: The MCC works -- excuse me, Eagle Flight works under the -- is controlled by the MCC commander.

54Q: And what is the relationship between MCC Forward and MCC Rear?

54A: MCC Forward is -- is -- the operation at Pirinlik and Diyarbakir they are commanded by the people at -- in Zaku.

55Q: So MCC Rear is a subordinate entity to MCC Forward?

HASSELL

55A: To MCC Forward.

56Q: Do you -- can you explain the function of MCC Rear?

56A: MCC in -- in Princirlik and Diyarbakir basically, in easy terms I would say, are a through-put for both logistics supplies and anything that has to go into the House, people, visitors, everything that goes -- excuse me. Most things that go into Zakhu go through Diyarbakir or Pirinlik.

57Q: And the House refers to what?

57A: Excuse me, the House is the MCC in Zakhu.

58Q: And in the chain of command, how would you describe your position as it relates to the MCC?

58A: We both have the same boss.

59Q: Is it accurate to say then that you are not in the chain of command, unless you're acting for General Pilkington?

59A: I'm not in the chain of command at the House?

60Q: No, not in the chain of command between the MCC and General Pilkington.

60A: That's correct.

61Q: Are there occasions where you would be in a command position?

61A: If, as an example, like tomorrow, Colonel Thompson is coming here to testify, there always -- there normally is -- has been an O-6, U.S. Army type, at the House. And I will go forward tomorrow and while he is down here, I will -- I will be out there and then we will switch off on Sunday.

62Q: And would you act in General Pilkington's place on any occasion?

62A: When General Pilkington is not here.

63Q: You referred to a flight on the eleventh that went into the AOR, and we've talked about security inside the security zone and outside the security zone. All of your references to inside and outside the security zone have been to flights within northern Iraq, north of the thirty-sixth

HASSELL

parallel?

63A: Oh yes. Yes.

64Q: The flight on the eleventh, who was the approval authority for that?

64A: All of the coalition chiefs were on the aircraft. I would say the approval authority for it -- General Pilkington approved, he was on the helicopter on the eleventh.

65Q: And the flight on the fourteenth, you discussed there having been a discussion concerning who actually approved that flight.

65A: Say that again?

66Q: The flight on the fourteenth, you made reference to discussions regarding whether the flight on the 14th of April should be approved.

66A: If I said whether the flight should be approved, it was -- I don't know of anybody that questioned whether the flight should be approved. It was dialogued as to where they would fly, it was dialogued as to who exactly would be on the aircraft, but the approval -- I don't know of any time that anybody questioned the necessity to -- to fly to Irbil and see Mister Barzani and Mister Talabani.

67Q: And do you know who approved the flight on the fourteenth?

67A: To the best of my knowledge, General Pilkington approved that flight.

68Q: And in approving it, was he approving the route of flight? Where it is they would go and in what order?

68A: He approved that the helicopters -- to the best of my knowledge, he approved the helicopters going into Irbil and going to visit the headquarters, and then landing again at the headquarters for Mister Barzani and Mister Talabani, the same location that he had gone to on the eleventh.

69Q: Are you aware of any actions to convey that information to the CFAC?

69A: The information that the flight was going on the fourteenth or the eleventh?

70Q: Either day. Let me break it down in two parts. Are you aware of any effort to convey the information regarding the flight of the eleventh to the CFAC, when it was going and where it was

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going?

70A: I was not part of any, that I can recollect, any dialogue where the CFAC and the C-3 were present. As I said, normally these types of missions are discussed during our Monday, Wednesday, Friday coalition staff meetings. I was on my four-day pass and was not there for any of those meetings, so I do not know specifically whether on those days they were brought up. I do know that it was common knowledge in OPC and CTF, in the headquarters, and I'm sure with all of our units that -- that they were flying on -- on -- on the eleventh as well as on the fourteenth.

71Q: Does the CFAC ordinarily attend the meetings you described, the Monday, Wednesday, Friday meetings?

71A: Yes.

72Q: And the person you're referring to is Colonel Kula or who? Was it someone else?

72A: I would not say he was there every single time, but there was always an O-5 -- normally there was an O-6 there from the CFAC or a couple of times an O-5 came, depending upon the visitors that were in town, but always there was an O-6 or an O-5 from CFAC at our meetings.

73Q: Other than the possibility of those meetings, are you aware of any information regarding the flight of the fourteenth being passed to the CFAC?

73A: You know, we're constantly dialoguing. I mean, it's not like -- I know that -- gee whiz, I saw Colonel Kula three times today in various meetings and we discussed numerous issues. I do not remember a specific meeting or a specific time, but like I said, it was common knowledge that the flights on both the fourteenth and the eleventh were -- were taking place.

74Q: Do you have any knowledge whether it was known by the C-3, Colonel O'Brien . . .

74A: That the missions were taking place?

75Q: Yes.

75A: Yes. I mean, it was known by, I would think, by our C-1.

76Q: Your C-1 is . . .

76A: Personnel.

77Q: Personnel?

77A: Personnel. To the best of my knowledge, both the flights on the eleventh and the

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fourteenth were widely known here because of who was on the flights on the eleventh . . .

78Q: Were their destinations and times of departure from each place widely known?

78A: I don't know the answer to that. I -- I would imagine that we all knew -- most of us knew when they left here and know that it's so many hours to Diyarbakir, so many hours to Zakhu.

79Q: What were the four days that you were gone on pass?

79A: I left on the -- I left -- I'm not sure exactly what day I left. I can find out though. It was on -- I was on the tour with the chapel here. I went -- I departed and came back with them, so I can -- I can find out the exact time I got back and the exact time I left.

80Q: Do you remember the day of the week -- of the week you came back?

80A: Sunday. Excuse me, Sunday the 13th we came back, because we did not get back in time to go to church, I remember that, yeah. My wife and family were to leave on Monday, the 14th. That was . . .

81Q: You're talking about the month of April?

81A: Excuse me. I'm sorry. I've got the wrong calendar here. I'm looking at March.

82Q: Okay. Making reference to the month of -- the calendar for the month of April, what were the dates then?

82A: I'm confused here. I think we left -- I think my four day pass was beginning at six p.m. on the sixth to six p.m. on the tenth. My family was supposed to leave on the eleventh, the day of the airline strike, and they were not able to get out on the eleventh. The twelfth we went back out; the thirteenth we went back out; and, the fourteenth we went back out to the airport.

83Q: To try to get them on a plane?

83A: Yes. So I was not on pass, I was on pass six -- from 1800 on the sixth, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth and came back for duty at 1800 on the tenth.

84Q: When you are absent, who acts in your place?

84A: Normally Colonel O'Brien acts in my place. When I go forward to Zakhu tomorrow, he'll act in my place tonight.

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**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

85Q: And are there any specific understandings between you and General Pilkington as to when you do or do not assume command in his absence?

85A: There's no written policy. There's no written policy.

86Q: What is your understanding?

86A: When he is out of the office, normal actions, I -- I act on in his place. If I know that he's flying, or he's going to be gone for an extended period of time, I will act in his stead, signing documents, releasing plans. If I know he's going to be in the area or be back in several hours, unless it's something that's time sensitive and critical, we'll wait on it.

87Q: Returning for a moment to the discussions about the flight of the 14th of April, you said "We dialogued on it." Who -- who was "we?"

87A: Let's see, we would be the staff, the CTF.

88Q: Do you have any specific recollections of who was involved in those discussions?

88A: No, I don't have any specific recollection. I can't even tell you the exact times of the dialogue, but I know that because -- the reason I know we dialogued on it is because we had a new MCC, U.S. type commander, that we wanted to introduce to Mister Barzani and Mister Talabani. Mister Barzani and Mister Talabani had, on several occasions, visited the House in Zakhu, and it's courteous to go visit them when they come up to Zakhu to visit you. I also know that we had a new Turkish commander -- co-commander there at MCC who had not been to Irbil to meet the UNGC -- the U.N. folks there in Irbil.

89Q: In the course of your testimony, we've made reference to a CFAC. Is it correct that that could refer either to the Combined Force Air Component or the Combined Force Air Component Commander depending on how many "Cs" are at the end?

89A: Yes.

90Q: And clarifying that, the questions that were put to you regarding the CFAC, does that require any -- any modification in your responses? Were you in any way misled as to whether we were talking about an individual or an organization?

90A: I was talking about an individual. I was never referring to any O-6 that commands the organization, although I -- I know that we have had numerous conversations and dialogues with -

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- with the commander as well as the other O-6s that are in the organization, be they operations or logistics across . . .

91Q: So if I understand you, you weren't referring to the individual when you're talking about information being passed or discussed.

91A: I was not talking about the individual, I was talking about the organization.

COLONEL AT LEE: Thank you.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

92Q: Just to clarify, to the best of your knowledge, was there any procedure established, or any provision made, to ensure that information regarding take off times and route of flight on Eagle Flights departing Zakhu and going out of the security zone, was there any provision for passing that information to the CFAC and down to the fighter squadrons and to the AWACS?

92A: Sir, I have no idea about the procedures to pass it to the fighter squadrons or to the -- to the pilots in the aircraft. I don't know of any written procedures that would require a piece of paper to go from one -- one person to another. I know that dialogue was constant. I know that when we got requests -- I don't think we got over two or three, at the most three, to fly the helicopters because, as I said, when I first got here, all we did was fly from Diyarbakir to Zakhu and so when the helicopters went anywhere other than Zakhu, once the approval was given for that, it was something that was widely discussed and -- and was dialogued.

93Q: It sounds like it was discussed in the command section.

93A: When I say discussed, I mean discussed between folks in the C-3 organization. We're always constantly dialoguing the CFAC folks from that organization, be they at the O-6 level or at the major or the captain level. I would feel confident myself that there was -- that whenever we were flying outside of the security zone -- or excuse me, flying outside of the security zone, that the folks in the CFAC organization were knowledgeable about that, sir, because there weren't that many, because when I arrived, we didn't fly anywhere other than Zakhu to Diyarbakir. So it was - - to fly the helicopters beyond Zakhu was -- was something that would have been an event that would have required dialogue.

94Q: But with the dialogue, as far as you know, there was no procedure to ensure that that information was passed to the -- either the fighters or the AWACS?

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94A: Sir, I'm not knowledgeable about any procedures, but I wouldn't be -- I don't know of any dialogue procedures between AWACS and the fighters.

95Q: Do you know of any procedure of passing that from the command section, where the flights would be approved, to the CFAC other than just in discussions?

95A: I don't know of any formal procedures, sir. I would imagine that the operations would do that because I know that the Operations folks had their normal meetings with the folks upstairs in -- in the -- in the JOC where those kinds of operation type things were discussed.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Okay, that's fine.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any further information, statements or evidence that may be helpful to this investigation that you wish to present?

WITNESS: No.

COLONEL AT LEE: You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation or the questions, answers or discussions in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding the testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately. You may report it to any member.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: Could I get a copy of my testimony?

COLONEL AT LEE: Not immediately, but a copy of it will be available if and when the release authority, the Secretary of Defense, determines that it is releasable.

WITNESS: Okay.

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 1931 and this interview is concluded.

**HASELL**

**REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE**

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by Leonard G. Hassell to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, was recorded by me by stenomask, and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.



BRUCE H. PEGGS, DAFC

Court Reporter

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

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**VERBATIM TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**LARRY D. WHITE, MAJOR  
39 Operations Support Squadron  
Incirlik AB, Turkey**

**COLONEL AT LEE:** The time is 0812 on the 28th of April 1994. The persons present are the witness. In addition, Colonel Fain, Colonel Armen, Colonel Velluz, Mister Brummell, I'm Colonel At Lee.

This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation under AFR 127-4. It is an Aircraft Accident Investigation conducted under AFR 110-14. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

**WITNESS:** Yes sir, I do.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

**WITNESS:** Yes sir, I do.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Do you have any questions?

**WITNESS:** No sir, I do not.

**WHITE**

COLONEL AT LEE: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon, speak slowly, clearly and loudly. Remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others who do not have your technical background can understand.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it's necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No sir, I do not.

COLONEL AT LEE: If you'll stand and raise your right hand, I'll put you under oath.

(The witness was sworn)

#### EXAMINATION

##### (Questions by Colonel At Lee)

1Q: State name and grade.

1A: Larry D. White, Major, United States Air Force.

2Q: And your organization?

2A: 39th Operations Support Squadron.

3Q: And your station?

3A: Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

COLONEL AT LEE: Thank you. Colonel Fain?

##### (Questions by Colonel Fain)

4Q: Would you start by providing us with a brief summary of your military career, please?

4A: Sir, I'm an F-4G Electronic Warfare Officer. I'm a 1980 graduate from the United States Air Force Academy. I -- my first assignment was to Mather Air Force Base where I went through navigator, tactical navigator electronic warfare school. I then PCSd to George Air Force Base where I completed F-4 replacement training unit and also F-4G Wild Weasel School there. I then

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went, in January of '93, to Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany and spent three and a half years there as a line -- electronic warfare officer in the F-4G in the 81st and 23rd Squadrons.

My next assignment, beginning in November of 1986, was at Headquarters, 17th Air Force, as -- and the 65th Air Division, I was dual-hatted, in charge of fighter electronic warfare operations and F-4G staff officer. I then moved with the 65th Air Division to Weisbaden Air Base, in September of 1987, and remained there as a staff officer, electronic warfare staff officer, until June of 1991. And then from there, I went to the Air Force Electronic Warfare Center at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, as the Chief of the SERENE BITE exercise program for the Air Force.

I arrived here at Incirlik in July of 1993 and I am currently the Chief of Current Operations or the Current Operations Flight Commander in the 39th Operations Support Squadron. In my CFAC role, or Combined Forces Air Component role, I am the Chief of the Mission Planning Cell. I'm also qualified as a mission director here. I am flying in the -- in northern Iraq as an F-4G electronic warfare officer also.

5Q: And with respect to your duties as the overseer of the frag shop or fragmentary order shop, have you been in that position for the entire nine months or so that you've been here?

5A: Yes sir, I have.

6Q: Could you describe for me the chain of command under which you work?

6A: Sir, I work directly for Lieutenant Colonel Pinter. He's the 39th Operations Support Squadron Commander who, in turn, works for the Operations Group Commander which, I believe, still officially is -- or at the time of the accident was Colonel Richardson and is now -- his deputy was Lieutenant Colonel Dougherty. He worked, of course, for Colonel Emery -- at the time of the accident, I'm sorry, that was Colonel Kula, they had already had the change of command, the 39th Wing Commander, and in the CTF, of course, he comes under Brigadier General Pilkington.

7Q: And what are your responsibilities with respect to producing the daily Air Tasking Order?

7A: We are responsible for assimilating all the inputs possible in order to produce a single Air Tasking Order, tasking document, under which all PROVIDE COMFORT operations are -- are executed. In addition, we publish a daily schedule and those documents mirror each other in many respects. One document has some things that the other does not and that's based on the different purposes of that. Essentially the Air Tasking Order is used to execute missions in northern Iraq. The daily schedule is used in particular to meet host nation requirements in terms of takeoff and land times scheduling and also for base support functions.

8Q: And what type of written or published guidance do you have in the way of regulations, operating instructions, etcetera, that governs the production of the Air Tasking Order?

8A: In regards to the Air Tasking Order in particular, we had under development -- it's been

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since finalized, but it began back in October of '93 to write very specific operating instructions with regards to the scheduling process here at PROVIDE COMFORT and the -- and also some of the reconnaissance tasking procedures. There's -- in particular, there's two OIs. One -- I don't recall the number, but one is entitled Scheduling. It's fifty-five something. And there's a second one, entitled Reconnaissance Tasking Procedures. Again, fifty-five something.

The -- some of the process here are very specific, again because of host nation requirements. For example, the ATO form, that is a specific one that -- that we don't generate with a computer product that generates it. It's essentially generated with a -- with a word processing format for transmittal to -- to the Turkish authorities and to higher headquarters. It actually goes out by message in addition to hard copy around here. And -- and that's predominantly the guidance -- the written guidance that we have with regards to it. We do have some -- there's written guidance that we have -- I've assimilated for the frag shop in regards to some of the rules that would apply to here, scheduling guidelines and things like that.

9Q: The operating instructions or OIs that you referred to are what level OI?

9A: Sir, they're both 39th Operations Group, but in particular, the scheduling OI was, in addition to being signed by Colonel Richardson, the Operations Group Commander, it was also signed by Colonel Kula and Brigadier General Pilkington.

10Q: And you said that that process, to develop that OI, began in October but was just completed. Could you describe that for me?

10A: Well, sir, it's -- it had been undergoing essentially minor revision since about November. The bulk of it was written in October, was issued as a draft and the procedures in it changed very, very little. It was fine tuning more than anything else. And at the time of the accident, there -- there had been a tremendous effort here to document all that we had done in the flying game. It was something that Colonel Richardson was very hot for us to do and, with anything, the number of things from the start, that going and documenting them was a little bit -- little bit difficult, but we had been issuing this draft about three times just to keep people updated and -- because we were documenting the procedures that were in place, so there was new -- no ground breaking type of activities along with this finalization, it was just documentation of what we, in fact, were doing.

11Q: Do you know what slowed the process of getting the document signed and made official?

11A: I don't think there was any particular thing that would have slowed the process, sir, it was just staffing, the number of agencies, and we were doing a number of them at the same time. I, in particular, had five operating instructions that we were finalizing and we were trying to keep them all going at about the same time as opposed to focusing on one and getting that on out and doing the others, but I don't think there was any -- worked very closely with the frag shop, or as we title it, the ATO element, in terms of actual production of the -- the Air Tasking Order. And I worked very closely with them. They had a very substantial continuity book and we inserted the cross role information and I spot checked the Air Tasking Orders as a general rule and, of course, I got

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a lot of help with that from my chain of command too, so I think that the process itself was fairly well nailed down and that there was good understanding on their part in terms of what was -- what was to be done, yeah, on the part of the actual ATO programmers, the three officers TDY here to produce the ATO.

12Q: The scheduling OI, is it finalized . . .

12A: Yes sir.

13Q: And do you recall the date that it was finalized?

13A: The end of -- end of April, sir. And that was just essentially the -- the way it panned on out, unfortunately, timing wise from -- the process had been initiated back in October.

14Q: In discussing the format of the Air Tasking Order, you said that it was worked on a word processor so that it could be transmitted. What were the guidelines you used to develop the actual order of the information contained within the ATO?

14A: The actual order I had from my predecessor. I understand that the exact format given to us was requested by the Sector Operating Center II, Diyarbakir. They are responsible for the airspace in which we operate in Turkey. We transmit the ATO by message. It goes to our higher headquarters for informational purposes, but specifically the purpose of that message is to inform SOC II of our plans for the day. They then reply with their approval process which is their ATO format and -- back to us, and we get it -- we then are informed of which missions have been approved and so our ATO format mirrors the format that they use. So that was directed to us.

15Q: With respect to the location of the Mode I and Mode II codes, as they're printed in the ATO, were you given guidance or given a format that included their location in that Air Tasking Order?

15A: I'm not familiar specifically with what the original document was. I -- I inherited the format and all along we've made minor changes, but I wasn't -- I'm not familiar with any changes that were made in the actual way the IFF information was presented in there. Essentially, the majority of the IFF information is -- is at the end in special instructions where they specifically talk about Mode -- Mode I, III and IV. And the Mode II is actually included on that -- on each mission's individual tasking line.

16Q: Do you consider the ATO format usable for aircrews?

16A: Yes sir, we've -- we've looked at this a number of times and constant discussion. Colonel Richardson has very much encouraged us to look at things that we're doing and make it as user friendly as possible. And that's my guidance to the -- to the frag shop is that, you know, we're here to provide a service. One -- as the Combined Forces Air Component Commander, I think we've taken that responsibility seriously in terms of trying to assimilate as much as we can and make the ATO a single executable document. In addition, the flying schedule is -- is, here again, a single executable document for local flying, and I'm sure you're familiar with it that we have what's called the flow sheet on the front, something that's easily -- easy for the aircrew to take

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with them in the cockpit and get a snapshot look at any period of time of who should be where and when.

We've -- we've gone back to the aircrew and there's been a number of discussion items with regards to the fact that we do have a very -- it is somewhat labor intensive, the actual frag shop was TDY manned with three officers and four enlisted specialists, what we used to call Ops Admin 271s and are now called 1C0s. But, it's somewhat labor intensive because we're not using the automated planning tools that are available in other theaters. For example, the CTAPS, Contingency Tasking -- I'm not completely familiar with what the acronym means, but it's a planning system used for production of ATOs. Because we use our own different format, we can't use that. However, in our discussions with the aircrews, we're familiar with documents produced under that. Every feedback that we have is that they view our document as more executable because we've been able to take some of the stuff that's standard and all the lines in CTAPS' format and bring it back in the special instructions section, like -- like we have and reduce it on down.

Again, the guiding drive -- the guiding driver there would be something that -- again, we want to make it as easy on the aircrew as possible. We're here to provide them something that -- that -- I don't want to see them involved in long periods of time trying to break down the frag and understand it. Of course, with my experience flying out there as well as my chain of command, we had an opportunity to see that and, not only to ask people and get their head nods or smiles and tell us the words they want to, we get a chance to watch them as they break down the frag and see how they flip on through there. And everything that I've observed, in addition to the nice words they like to give us, everything I've observed is that it seems to be very friendly -- a user friendly format, and so overall, I think we were happy with the format but we didn't view it as having a lot of flexibility to change it. But we would have addressed that if -- if we thought there was a need out there, and essentially, we were of the opinion that there was no need to change the format of it.

17Q: Have you had comments, discussion or inputs from other than Air Force units? For example, the Army units or the other coalition force units with regards to the frag?

17A: In terms of format, sir, we have JSOTF, which is Joint Special Operations Task Force, and Army Eagle flight representation at the meetings where said topics are discussed. And the particular format for those would be what's called the Detachment Commander meeting or the DETCO meetings that were -- they're held basically twice weekly. They used to be in the mornings -- in the afternoons, but basically twice weekly throughout my entire tenure here. And when I was here TDY, I -- in my intro, I guess I passed over the fact that I was here TDY for the AFEWC from December to February of -- December of '92 to February of '93 -- March '93, as the electronic warfare liaison officer and advisor to the Operations Group Commander, so I've had the opportunity to see, not only my time here, but also I worked very closely with the operations process back then too.

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And there's always been, to my knowledge, a very open format with the opportunity for them to comment on it, and I can't recall there ever been any comments or suggestions to change that. There's been some explanation about, you know, why are we different than CTAPS and we've always responded with the fact that we're responding to host nation request. But I've never had any feedback that I could recall, though we've actively sought it, that there was something in there that was unclear and we needed to do. I'm sure, if we went back through and looked at the history of them, we could find some fine tuning stuff, like changing a word here and changing a word there, and I view that as the normal course of events and always trying to make things just a little bit better and a little bit more understandable.

18Q: Okay. The DETCO meetings that you referred to, are you aware of Eagle flight's attendance or representative attendance at those meetings?

18A: Sir, I -- I couldn't tell you exactly what percentage they had been. I would -- I would say that I'd be fairly confident that the -- they normally have one officer here at all times. It's normally been a junior officer, a lieutenant, provides the interface and provides tasking inputs to the actual ATO element in building 376 for inclusion in the -- in the daily schedule. But I'm fairly certain that I'd be confident in saying that they were aware of the meetings. Now, whether they had particularly made it to any certain percentage of them, I couldn't say, but my general recollection is that I would normally see them there.

19Q: In discussing the building of the frag or the ATO, can you tell me how you receive inputs, scheduling inputs, requirements, etcetera, that you use to build that daily product?

19A: Sir, would it be helpful to you if I were to outline the entire process from -- because I am responsible for the long range to short range tasking process.

When we arrived here, Colonel Richardson asked -- asked me to start developing what he called the three-month schedule which, in fact, we still call that. As I understand it, and this is from just looking into historical documents in the files, is that we started off with essentially, you know, everyone shows up at the duty desk at 1600 and they figure out what's happening tomorrow. And that's evolved -- when I was TDY here, I saw more of a long range focus, you know, at least on the next month and, as I said, Colonel Richardson asked me to start looking three months, and from my first time here, we produced the first three-month schedule about fifteen days after I arrived. And it's -- it started out and it's actually fairly close to what we started off with. We've added one or two more things to help people in the execution of it, but there's a -- bottom line.

Say, for example, this is -- this is April. The first of the month -- the long range scheduling is actually resident in my -- my office, in 39th OSS. We've kept the long range portion with the permanent party and I have an NCO who's specifically responsible for long range schedule. But he started building that from the first of April and that would have handled May, June and July. We then go through, have a meeting, first -- first Tuesday of the month with the unit detachments -- unit slash detachment schedulers. Again, there normally has been an Army

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representative at this but they've been cognizant of it and entirely welcome at this. But we would take inputs from the -- the units and said this is what we think the projected down days are going to be. This is why we're doing things and we're going to input things you'd like to change. And we normally get a fair amount of input from the schedulers. A lot of druthers. I mean, probably the most classical is the fact that -- I'm not a particular football fan, but I realize, in talking to everybody, that it was probably smart to take the day after the -- the -- the Super Bowl down -- as a down day. And the whole idea being is that we want to -- we're trying to make people -- one, that they have some input, and two, that we are cognizant of things that are going to impact people. If we flew that day, you know, we'd have to take into account the fact that just about everybody is probably either watching the game or trying to tape it or do something that night, you know, slept the afternoon prior so they could stay up and watch the game.

But that's the kind of thing, and I -- maybe not the best example to use, but I think one that shows that what we're trying to do is -- is look at the realities of the situation. Of course, we started looking at that, you know, in November of '93 then. But anyways, we've developed this three-month schedule. We -- the unit input -- schedule input, then the next thing is that we go and work any problems as a result of that, deconflict and then we brief the detachment commanders and that's where we get probably the majority our input. And again, with the Army representative at that meeting, he would have the opportunity to comment on that. I can't tell you of any specific cases I recall of them asking for something in particular, but I do know they write furiously on down there and they're providing any input on back from my observations.

We then issue that and it goes through the standard process all the way up through my chain of command, reviewed by Colonel Pinter, Colonel Richardson and then Colonel Emery. And it was signed by the CFAC but, before it was published, one, we would coordinate with our LG, in accordance with Ops Maintenance coordinated planner under USAFE Reg 66-5. We would also give a copy to the C-3 prior to the final briefing to the general and allow him some time to comment on it and -- and get any input he felt necessary. And then we would brief it normally as a table top review by General Pilkington and we would resolve any problems.

Normally, I think if there's any things that -- that have to be worked on out, it's in relation to some host nation desires because, of course, their required support of us is impacted by -- by Turkish holidays, and we certain . . .

In the three-month's schedule itself, we actually have a list that we developed at Colonel Richardson's behest last year that is a snapshot over the year of the entire holiday process. We have a little chart there and it says everybody's holidays and who takes that holiday, and we try to build our down days so as much as possible, we honor all four nations holidays. And other things in there are things like the sunset tables, and this starts getting into the rules of, you know, how we fly here and how we -- and generally our goals in, like I said, the rules that we have.

**WHITE**

Now, once that three-months schedule is coming out, it does come out monthly so actually it is sort of a monthly schedule. But, for example, you know, for this month April, it would have been published in the February, March, April schedule, in the March, April, May schedule and in the April, May, June schedule, so before it went final, and we view only the first month as final, before it went final there was opportunity for two months of comment on that particular schedule. And we're very open.

At the same time, the cutoff for input from anyone is the tenth of the month. And copies of that go to all the detachments here, all the staff agencies, copies go to -- to the JOC which is our interface with Eagle flight, or as it's now called, the JOIC, the Joint Operations Intelligence Center.

From that document -- that's really the primary execution document in terms of the windows -- what we call the windows, the Z-times that we're actually going to be flying in Iraq, swap outs and things like that. Most of the unit schedulers have that posted. I know just about everyone around has that posted around in an appropriate place based on its classification, but readily available.

From there we develop a weekly schedule and this Thursday -- we're finalizing right now next weeks schedule, Monday to Sunday, and in that document, cutoff is the close of business Monday. We get all the training inputs, in terms of local training sorties, JSOTF is considered all training here, and then one thing we would get is normally the -- the desires from -- from Eagle flight too -- what they want to do in the local area, because again of specific host nation requirements to -- to declare our sorties to them. And they were fairly good about that input and getting -- we've been working with them in terms of feeding in to us at the right time -- the right information at the right time. That had been very successful for about the last month.

And then that's an unclassified schedule. The three month is classified but the weekly is mainly -- it doesn't have any times on it or anything like that, but it does give everybody a generalized flow -- training sorties have times, Iraqi sorties are -- has a generalized flow so people can understand, you know, what kind of turn they're going to have to generate and they may not necessarily know that it's eight o'clock versus ten o'clock versus nine thirty, but they do have an idea of what the -- what the flow will be and the turns are, so again, we're trying to give people as much information as possible as consistent with OPSEC and -- and classification considerations.

The final part of the process is two days prior, we begin the ATO process with selection of the reconnaissance targets and then, that's -- that's done up at CTF. It's actually a desire list the day prior. We finalize that -- finalize all the planning. The cutoff time is 0900 local for inputs from any unit. Now, what 0900 does is, anything that we receive before that time is actually -- the ATO is built that way. Now we've probably actually started building the ATO, the actual words, the night prior, but there's nothi -- no problem at all in terms of adjusting the flow sheet, taking in the inputs, making everything look right. Again, my tasking to the ATO element, those

**WHITE**

seven personnel is that my only concern from them is that the ATO be one hundred percent accurate. Now we're not going to be there but as we keep striving for that -- and I've been extremely happy with -- and I think everyone has been with the quality of the ATO.

Now, it's finalized at 0900 with unit inputs. Ten hundred we would get the final recce tasking and any kind of targeting that we're doing for the day, places we want people to overfly, and special kind of things, and I really can't get more into that without getting classified.

But at eleven o'clock, it's probably in final format and they're actually printing up the final copy of it, cross checking it, and they normally cross check it at least twice if not more. And then it goes out the door for reproduction and our -- our time lines that we're required to have it to Turkish officials, both message and hard copy format, by 1400 local daily and to the units by 1500. As a general rule, we're fairly successful in meeting that time line. If we don't we, by exception, call them individually and I can only recall maybe a handful of times in the time I've been here that we haven't met that. But at the same time, they have both the classified Air Tasking Order coming out and the unclassified daily schedule. Again, two specific purposes of them. One, takeoff and landings from -- from Incirlik, that would be in the daily schedule and then the other one being the actual tasking and the deconfliction kind of things in the Air Tasking Order.

20Q: Okay. Well let me ask a couple of specific questions now about Eagle flight's inputs. I understand that the long range schedule, those inputs and reviews, can be done at the DETCO meeting and they have hard copy they can review for a period of up to three months -- or two months -- before the final month becomes final.

The second inputs would be the inputs to the weekly schedule. Could you describe to me how you receive those inputs and what the quality and type format of those inputs is from Eagle flight?

20A: Yes sir. It's pretty much a free format kind of thing is that we would get from them number of aircraft, takeoff and land times desired and type of mission, and any kind of airspace requirements. Again, that would fall in the general category of really the same way that we -- we handle them just like any other flying unit here. We -- we've tried to and so we would expect those type of inputs from them by close of business Monday.

Like I said, the last month they've been fairly -- fairly good in terms of getting those, but again, so . . .

21Q: How . . .

21A: . . . we would get . . .

22Q: Excuse me, go ahead.

22A: We would get that normally directly from the little liaison officer that's here, the junior

**WHITE**

officer, normally a lieutenant. One of the names I was familiar with was Lieutenant Gies. I think he left about a month ago and now it's another lieutenant, I only know his first name, but we would get that directly -- and I -- and I actually wouldn't see those. That would go directly into the frag shop because the way we -- we discussed it, the long range scheduling are handled with permanent party because of the completeness of that and then the frag shop executes from that to develop a weekly and the -- the daily schedules, the ATO.

The information changes a little bit but I'd say with fairly -- fair certainty that the monthly schedule probably goes about ninety to ninety-five percent of the way it was initially forecast.

23Q: The Army Liaison officer to whom you referred, where is he located and who does he work for?

23A: Sir, I -- I understand that he -- and this is my understanding only, I don't know for sure, that he works for the C-3 and he's normally up in the CTF building.

24Q: The takeoff times for Eagle flight, as listed on the daily ATO, are provided through what means?

24A: If we would get those, they would -- they would come through the -- through the JOC or the JOIC and this is -- I understand you need to be referring specifically to the sorties into Iraq, sir.

25Q: That's correct.

25A: Yes, that would come through the -- the JOC. We carry in there the -- we review the ATO which shows that there's a number of lines in there that address Eagle flight. We carry them, "as required." About half of them will be "as required," per normal, meaning that one of the requirements that we have here is that if we have to execute additional missions in addition to those planned under any kind of emergency procedure, they would have to have a mission number on there, and this is, again, to meet host -- host nation requirements. So we have a number of lines in there and you'll see that for every aircraft, "as required," and that's just in case we have to execute, which you can tell the difference between ones that are forecast to go and the ones that are forecast to go, and either one of the two terms have either an "A" prefix or a "B" prefix to the mission number. The ones that are planned is -- "as required" from the start have a "D".

If we didn't have any inputs, we would anticipate there's normally some sort of helicopter activity, but I was never given anything that said this is the overall plan for the month or for the week, so I could never say, "Hey, you're supposed to have a mission tomorrow and you haven't told us where you're going." All I could do was publish what they told me that they were going to fly. If we got it, we published it is probably the easiest way of putting it, sir.

26Q: Let's use the Air Tasking Order for the 14th of April as a specific example. The Eagle flight lines, in particular, Eagle One and Eagle Two, are listed as "as required" for takeoff time,

**WHITE**

land time, gate time. Are you aware of that particular Air Tasking Order?

26A: Yes sir. And that just means we had received no input from them. And I would know -- at our level, I would have no idea whether they were planning to fly one or three or four, or even not -- not to fly at all. That information was, I think, resident in the JOC and we did have some trouble getting that.

27Q: And you said upon occasion, though, you did receive inputs. What did you do with those inputs when you received them?

27A: Sir, they -- they were plugged right into those lines. If they told us they were flying from -- from, you know, Diyarbakir to Zakhu at -- at said time to set time, we would publish those times in there. Again, because we, you know, in accordance with the CFAC responsibilities, or JFAC, if you will, in the developing documents you can -- you find throughout our joint service at least, publications, that the desires at the CFAC/JFAC is the single source contact of deconfliction in the area of responsibility, and that would be within our responsibilities and what we would view as our job is to publish that, any information that we had regarding any flights at all.

Same goes for U.N. helicopter flights, any kind of third party players that are transitioning the AOR, we would ensure that would get on out. Probably the difference, at least in my mind and I think from what I had seen, is that coalition sorties that are planned in there, tasked under PROVIDE COMFORT, would go in the ATO. Others that are going through there would probably be disseminated through the intelligence system because that was intelligence information. My experience is as Duke, that information would, of course, get to the Air Surveillance Officer who would be cognizant of all those sorties coming in and out for identification purposes.

28Q: And how would that information get to the Air Surveillance Officer?

28A: Normally through the JOIC.

29Q: And in your experiences as a Duke, would you be notified by the Air Surveillance Officer of that activity?

29A: Absolutely. Normally the way we'd be notified is that he would identify the flight by the IFF that it was -- that it had on there and at the activity matching the flight plan and they would do that correlation in the back, so we would be -- I think we'd be notified through its symbology, any kind of heads up as a result of what they had identified.

30Q: Going back to the inputs for the daily frag for Eagle flight and the "as required" lines, would you consider it usual practice to receive inputs or would it be unusual to receive the inputs as far as takeoff, route of flight . . .

30A: I -- I'd be hard pressed to say exactly, in percentage wise what it is. We certainly -- I would anticipate we probably didn't get a hundred percent of them. I -- I really have no idea of what percentage we got of them.

**WHITE**

31Q: Are you provided, after the fact, information as to how many Eagle lines flew the previous day, for example?

31A: No sir.

32Q: You discussed problems receiving information regarding Eagle flight. You said it was difficult from the JOC or JOIC. Could you explain those problems to me, please?

32A: Some of the problems, I think I had talked about earlier, had been with the inputs from -- locally, but what I had been getting is like two weeks at a time and then I wouldn't get a week, and we -- we asked them to focus on meeting the time line, you know, this Monday for the following -- this Monday for the following week, a big group of them at once, and like I said, we'd been very successful in that in the last month.

From the -- the JOIC, I think there was just a feeling that -- that I had, you know, when I fly as Duke that there were missions on there coming up "as required" that we were executing a lot, if you will, through the day. There was not the heads up notice, that you will, like we try and have everything. As I -- as I explained earlier that, if we had something before 0900, it could come out in the written word, that way we didn't have to rely on an update procedure that we'd call a Battle Staff Directive to give the times. In -- in my view, I want to try and make the ATO as complete as possible from the start because when you start making pen-and-ink changes, does everybody have, you know, pen-and-ink change number one and pen-and-ink change number two? And, of course now, since the accident, we -- we identified a shortfall that it would probably be good to put them on the flow sheet, something we hadn't done previously, and now, of course, we have the information and it's on that visual depiction that every aircrew has when they're flying in the AOR.

33Q: So each of the aircrews would have also had the Air Tasking Order and had you had the information, it would have been available in that format.

33A: Yes sir.

34Q: Let's talk for a moment about the procedures airborne since you're qualified as a Duke. Can you tell me how long you've been qualified as a Duke and approximately how many missions you've flown?

34A: Sir, I've been qualified as a Duke since -- initial qualified as of September of -- or August of '93 and then I flew a few missions there and when I went back for F-4 requalification training, I essentially went non-current and then I requalified again in, I believe it was, early February, and I have a total of fourteen missions now sir.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

35Q: You indicated that now you have the information put on the ATO and you include that on the flow sheet.

35A: Yes sir.

**WHITE**

36Q: That is the information for Eagle flight. Where are you getting the information from to put it down?

36A: Sir, we get it from the JOIC as -- as was envisioned before. It's just we're getting a little more information now.

37Q: You stated as a Duke that if Eagle flight were to arrive or announce their presence, that you would get that information from the Air Surveillance Officer. Was that a standard procedure?

37A: Oh absolutely, sir. Air Surveillance Section was responsible for monitoring the tracks and identifying the tracks if at all possible. Normally the first indication I'd have is, you know, you'd see the funny helicopter symbol on the -- on the AWACS. It's very distinctive and you'd, oh, okay -- and, of course, the neumonics with it, E-E-0-1 is how it would normally be tasked or E-E-0-2. You'd look at that and then you could cross reference in the ATO just where he's going or the BSDs, whatever information we had in regards to it, or some of it was executed, essentially, by the "as required" lines, that they would call the JOIC and the JOIC would pass that information along.

One of our divisions that we have, and if you're familiar with the, you know, the NATO or standard process, you normally have your combat plans section -- your combat operations. We call our combat plans the Mission Planning Cell and our combat operations are the mission -- the Mad Dogs and the Dukes. The ATO transfers to them at AWACS show time. That was the dividing line. So, information received after that time wouldn't be included in a BSD or ATO or anything like that. It would be passed along verbally by Maddog and Duke. So if the Eagle flight decided to execute a line or go somewhere that wasn't planned, they would call the JOIC who would activate the line with the Turkish authorities through SOC II at Diyarbakir. At the same time, the JOIC would call Mad Dog who would then relate to Duke any information that we had regarding their sorties.

38Q: In your experience as the Duke, could you describe for me a typical situation, route of flight, that type of information, for an unannounced or "as required" Eagle line now appearing on the scope?

38A: Normally, we would -- we would see them on a -- on a flight profile out of Diyarbakir and they would go via their -- their routing. They have some -- they have some points in terms of standard routing to and from -- Diyarbakir to Zakhu, kind of a down, across and over flight plan, and that's normally all that I saw. However, in the -- any information that both AWACS, Duke, Mad Dog all had, their -- they have route of flight points listed in terms of -- they're all coded with alpha -- letters of the alphabet and they can say -- but I was never a part of this, I never saw this as Duke, "We're going to point Gulf," "We're going to point Hotel," or something like that, so we would be aware of their -- their route of flight.

39Q: You never saw that. Did you ever hear radio transmissions from Eagle flight announcing any of those points?

**WHITE**

39A: I've heard of those before, yes sir.

40Q: What type . . .

40A: From others.

41Q: Excuse me.

41A: From other Dukes I've heard of, "Yeah, the Eagle was up and they -- and they said they were going to point Gulf and we flipped through there and sure enough, that's where they went. But that never occurred on -- on any of my watches is the way to say it.

42Q: Would it be normal procedure, if you received that information, to pass it to anyone else?

42A: Yes sir. Normal interface for me, Duke is -- would be to the Mission Crew Commander or to the Senior Director. In the case of something like that, if I had information that would have involved the identification of a flight, I would probably talk to the Air Surveillance Officer direct.

43Q: Would you ever pass that to the fighter aircrews?

43A: Sir, if I pass it to the Senior Director, he would inform the AOR controller who would tell the aircrews. But again, since I had never seen that, I -- I could never tell how that worked, but that's the way I would anticipate it to occur.

44Q: Would you deem it unusual to have an Eagle flight in the AOR prior to arrival of the first fighters?

44A: I would say yes, sir, but it's really conjecture. I have no real basis for that.

45Q: In your experience, you've never seen that.

45A: No sir.

46Q: As a Duke, in your experience, what frequencies did you monitor?

46A: As -- I would normally monitor, depending upon the route of flight, and I'll just say with the TAOR unless you have a -- or the normal window, if you will, unless you have other questions, sir.

47Q: TAOR is fine.

47A: Right. We have four frequencies available. One of them would be the Turkish SATCOM for the -- this -- this area here, of which the primary interface is from the AWACS back to the command link, used by both the Duke to Mad Dog and Mad Dog to Duke and also by the AWACS Mission Crew Commander to his -- to his Ops. That was also monitored by the JOIC.

The other three radios, and we've done some refinements to the comm procedures. In fact, another one is coming on now, but initially what we would monitor would be the Duke, primary, then the AOR Have Quick frequency and the AOR clear frequency. And about a month or two ago, we initiated a change to change the Duke primary to a Have Quick frequency so now

**WHITE**

most Dukes, and this will vary from AWACS crew and the Duke, but I think it's -- it's fairly standard that we would monitor Duke Have Quick, Duke clear and AOR Have Quick.

48Q: And Duke clear is what again?

48A: It's a UHF frequency, sir. That -- that was essentially the old Duke primary, but as we looked at it and -- one of my great concerns is OPSEC. As we looked at the information that was passed along the Duke frequency, we realized that -- and with the -- the departure of the French aircraft which were the only non-Have -- F-1s, which were the only non-Have Quick aircraft that we had here, we looked at it and said, "Well, we can go to an all Have Quick net on this so that we reduce the amount of information that we're giving away.

49Q: Do you know if the Eagle flight UH-60 helicopters are Have Quick capable?

49A: I've learned since then that they probably are not. But, of course, they would have come up -- a Have Quick, the AOR controller would -- depending on what frequency they came up, if they come up the enroute frequency, the enroute control would deal with them. If they came up the AOR clear, then the AOR controller would -- would deal with them. I can't ever recall talking to an Eagle flight on one of the Duke frequencies, though.

#### QUESTIONS BY GENERAL ANDRUS:

50Q: Reference the ATO, specifically the Mode I and code information for Eagle flight, for the helicopters. Where in the ATO was that information found?

50A: Sir, if the Mode I -- if I'm not mistaken, would have been in the special instructions section, I think it was paragraph three and, where it talks about AOR Modes and the non-AOR Modes. The non-AOR Modes are unchanging. We get from -- it comes from the actual 2-TAF, Turkish Second Air Force aerospace order that I have where we get through the -- through the process there and it's rolled into our local aerospace coordination order, but it's standard here. It doesn't change. There's one for fixed wing aircraft and one for helicopters.

The daily Mode I for the AOR is generated by random -- or generator program inside the frag shop and that changes. And that's all located in the same section.

51Q: Is the code for helicopters for both outside of the AOR and inside of the AOR found in the same place in the same section in the ATO?

51A: If -- as I recall, sir, they're one line right above the other.

52Q: Clarification. Has that been changed since the accident?

52A: We've only made a minor change to the -- to that section since the accident. What we did was we took the Mode IV and kicked it up to the top because that's the primary means, if you will, of a friendly or foe. But before it was Mode I, Mode II, Mode III, Mode IV. Now it's Mode IV, I, II and III what turns the actual. The format of it, sir, I don't think it's changed at all.

**WHITE**

53Q: Specifically referring to the helicopter section, prior to the accident, was the Mode I code for helicopters, in this case Eagle flight, for both the AOR and outside of the AOR, listed together in the same section?

53A: Yes sir, to my knowledge and to my recollection it was.

54Q: A couple of things to clarify. I may have mis-heard you. I want to be sure the record is clear. It's the non-AOR codes which are unchanging?

54A: That's correct, sir.

55Q: Is it the AOR codes which change on a random basis.

55A: On a daily basis, sir. Yeah, it's a random generator but it's a daily change. And that's -- I would think that -- and both the fixed wing and the rotary wing, there's a distinction made for the non-AOR codes but there is no such distinction for the AOR codes.

**(Questions by Colonel Fain)**

56Q: In the area where the AOR Mode I is listed, there are three pieces of information in that line. Do you recall what those three pieces of information are?

56A: Well it should be, if I recall, it would be -- it would be Mode I AOR single code, then it would be non-AOR, one code for fixed wing and one code for rotary wing.

57Q: That's the way it is today. Prior to the 14th of April, do you know what was included with the Mode I in that line?

57A: No sir, I don't recall. I don't recall any changes to it.

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

58Q: You were talking about radio procedures on the AWACS or calls received in the clear. You said that you'd expect the AOR controller or the surveillance officer to receive the calls if they were on other than the Have Quick.

58A: Yes sir.

59Q: What would you expect them to do with that information when they received the call?

59A: Well, sir, they would -- the -- the primary -- primary method would be to make sure that we had the aircraft and were correctly tracking it for identification purposes, so that if there was a call received from detection of that track by -- by any means available, by a fighter, that they would be able to reply, "Yes, that's a friendly helicopter, " or -- or, you know, know that's an unknown. So it's primarily from the standpoint of an identification purpose.

There would be no need necessarily to integrate that at this time.

60Q: What do you mean by that, no need to integrate that?

**WHITE**

60A: Well, there was a substantial difference in our operations with -- with the operations prior to and after an incident in December of '93 with the AOR -- with the MCC teams, is that there was a lot more ground activity and integrated ground air operations as a result of that -- more general activity in the security zone. Then, after that incident, and I don't think I should get too in-depth in that, we kind of pulled on back.

On occasion, before, if they were making a very substantial -- making a real substantial trip outside of the AOR, in particular, say down a trip for whenever to investigate things, I recall them going to Al Sulaymaniah, there would have been direct coordination with me prior to that, say, "Hey, we're looking at a flight from this time to this time with this -- with this accident. Is your aerial coverage expected to be available there? Will that be a problem?" And we looked at the AOR coverage and say, "No, that mat -- that meshes," or "No, it doesn't mesh, could you change the window?"

And we used to shift the windows or shift the helicopter flights and if they were going substantially out of their normal operating area, that we would be there to provide air cover for them, and that's -- none of that has occurred since December of '93, the MCC incident, and my, I guess, assumption based on that, was that they weren't doing those anymore as a result of that. I know there was some restriction on their operating and I'm not familiar with what they were allowed to at all and how that changed as a result of this incident, but my -- my assumption, I guess, is probably the best way to put it, is that since they were no longer coordinating with us, they were no longer making these trips.

61Q: Would you expect the controller on the AWACS who received the call on an inter-frequency to inform the Duke?

61A: Yes sir, I would. Actually he would inform the -- based on the way AWACS works, he would -- he or she would inform the Senior Director and the Senior Director and the Duke normally sit side by side in the AWACS and we would cross-talk that information.

62Q: In informing the Senior Director, would the Duke be able to hear that call?

62A: Yes sir. If it was done by intercom, we -- it would be over that -- that net, or there's the possibility it could go with the selective intercom or send a little message across, and then the SD would nudge me and say, "Hey, we've got this." That's what I would expect. Particularly if there was any question or any -- any thought that anything that was occurring was out of the ordinary, needed to be an issue.

63Q: Okay. You were referring to the ASO, the Air Surveillance Officer as receiving information. Were you -- and you said that if you received information from the Mad Dog you'd talk to the ASO directly.

63A: Yes sir.

64Q: Were you distinguishing between the ASO as opposed to the TAOR director or would

**WHITE**

you talk to whoever was handling the flight?

64A: I would talk to whoever is handling the flight. The context in which I discussed that was initial identification and that, particularly if I had anything coming up. But more than likely I would also, again, not having done this, but just looking at how I would understand AWACS Ops and how I would approach it, I would also at the same time inform the SD that we would have -- and that would be a -- a -- the ASO part I mentioned in regards to a specific question regarding information I had about identification. Then the second part of that would be any information I had involving mission changes. I would inform the Senior Director who would then ensure dissemination to the appropriate controllers.

Also, as in my responsibilities, Duke, if I had anything that would impact the mission on check in, I would inform the fighters at that time, you know, fall outs, additions and things like that. Again, not having handled it, I wouldn't say how I'd done -- I could just conjecture how I would based on my training as a Duke and understanding the AWACS interface.

65Q: You're talking about receiving or you had heard that they received information regarding routes of flight and referred to "Alpha" or letter designations. Had you heard of anything other than letter designations? Meaning, for instance, turning points within their travel from one point to another?

65A: No sir.

66Q: You talked about draft OIs that had gone out some time in the last year or early part of this year. Were people instructed to follow those draft OIs?

66A: Yes sir.

67Q: Okay. And who directed that?

67A: Sir, I did to the frag shop in terms of -- that was mainly in regards to the time lines that we had with them. Just -- just prior to the accident, we also distributed -- put together a schedule handbook. Again, it was -- falls within the -- trying to make it as easy as possible. If I can't put the plug in, it's based on the fact that I have schedulers turning over probably every two weeks in a lot of units as they cycle on down here. So we had put together a scheduler handbook and distributed that to all the units too, just -- regarding these same time lines. And I can't recall exactly when they came on out but I'm pretty sure it was before the accident.

68Q: Were these actions taken with the approval of the Ops Group commander?

68A: Oh, absolutely. I think with his encouragement would probably be a better way of putting it because we -- it was in draft format for about a month before that. The whole idea being is that the OI process is a very formal process with a review. But at the very least, I could get the information out to the schedulers, single packet information in their hand, and about six pages explaining the interfaces, and a number of other things that wouldn't necessarily be in the OI. You know, I put some of it in the fighter pilot terminology to make sure they did it and that kind of thing. The whole idea being is that -- try and smooth this process as much as possible.

**WHITE**

69Q: You were talking about passing information to the Turkish officials for approval of the flight plans and I understood you to reference SOC II and you said that . . .

69A: Sector Operations Center, is that correct sir? Thank you. It's . . .

70Q: That's fine. I just needed clarification of the term, so thank you.

70A: Oh.

71Q: You were talking about attendance at DETCO meetings? Who ran those meetings?

71A: Sir, those were normally run by the Operations Group Commander or the Deputy Operations Group Commander, Colonel Richardson or Colonel Dougherty. In a strange incidence that one of them weren't available, then Colonel Pinter, the OSS Commander would run those. But Colonel Richardson focused very much on those and essentially viewed that as his -- his primary method of effecting the operations in the AOR. And so, he -- he wanted very much to try to make those and, too, we focused very much in terms of getting all the right people there.

72Q: You referenced the term AFOOC in terms of training you received?

72A: AFEWC, sir? I'm sorry.

73Q: AFEWC?

73A: I worked . . .

74Q: I just need to know what it means.

74A: Air Force Electronic Warfare Center.

75Q: Thank you, that's fine.

75A: They're now on a -- just for you, they're now termed, since the beginning of October of '93, they're now called the Air Force Information Warfare Center, AFIWC, A-F-I-W-C.

76Q: Is it correct that CTAPS is a system using common format for joint operations?

76A: My understanding of it is, sir. I don't have very much in-depth of it, just general knowledge of the system and capabilities . . .

77Q: Okay.

77A: . . . and advantages, disadvantages.

78Q: Did you feel any obligation, when you did not receive information from the Army for your ATO, to go in search of it or, since you said the inputs went directly to the frag shop, when it didn't appear on the ATO, to go in search of it?

78A: Sir, I -- I -- we knew the majority of their missions were admin sorties in and out, and we, in particular, weren't too concerned about the admin because there's only about, you know, essentially five kilometers inside of Iraq that they go. The ones that would go east of Zakhu, that we would be the most concerned about. We didn't go and specifically look for them because we

**WHITE**

had no idea of when they were doing these missions. That information wasn't passed on down to us in terms of, if you will, the big picture from -- from Eagle. And I think that -- and I said that -- and this is probably something that -- a mistake I made in terms of assuming that, as a result of December '93 activities, that there was a cut back and that they were no longer doing the type of missions that would be of concern to us.

79Q: You would have expected the information regarding the big picture from what source?

79A: The JOIC, sir.

80Q: And what we've referred to as the JOIC is interchangeable in common discussion here with what is also called the JOC, the Joint Operations Center?

80A: That's correct. I -- I'm trying to use the new term. As I understand it, they have renamed themselves for about a month and a half.

COLONEL AT LEE: Okay. And, for the record, I would note that Colonel Andrus has been in and out of the interview at various times.

I believe I may have said Colonel Andrus. If I did, I meant Major General Andrus. Excuse me, sir.

81Q: Do you have any further evidence, information or anything you wish to add at this time?

81A: No sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: You are reminded that this is an official investigation. You're ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No sir, I do not.

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 0913. This interview is concluded.

**WHITE**

**REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE**

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by Larry D. White to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.



**BRUCE H. PEGGS, DAFC**

**Court Reporter**

**Incirlik Air Base, Turkey**

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**VERBATIM TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**CARL J. WITCHER, LT COLONEL  
HHC 2-68 Armor**

**COLONEL AT LEE:** The time is 1703 pm the 29th of April 1994. The persons present are the witness. In addition, Major General Andrus, Colonel Bennett, Mister Brummell, Colonel Fain and Colonel At Lee.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation under AFR 127-4. It is an Aircraft Accident Investigation conducted under AFR 110-14. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

**WITNESS:** Yes sir.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

**WITNESS:** Yes sir.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Do you have any questions?

**WITCHER**

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority.

For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon. speak slowly, clearly and loudly. Remember your testi -- excuse me, remember to explain your testimony so that others who do not have your technical background can understand.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it is necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: Please stand and I'll put you under oath.

(The witness was sworn)

## EXAMINATION

### (Questions by Colonel At Lee)

1Q: State your name and grade.

1A: My name is Carl Joseph Witcher, my grade is O-5.

2Q: United States Army?

2A: Yes sir.

3Q: Your organization?

3A: My organization is currently the CTF C-3.

4Q: And your duty station.

4A: My duty station -- my duty position or my duty station?

5Q: Your duty station. Incirlik Air Base?

5A: Incirlik Air Base.

**WITCHER**

6Q: In Turkey?

6A: Yes sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: Colonel Fain?

**(Questions by Colonel Fain)**

7Q: Would you very briefly describe for the board your military background?

7A: Sir, I have sixteen years and ten months of Army service. I have had positions, mostly in tank battalions. I've been a platoon leader, an executive officer in tank companies; I've been a maintenance officer, I've been an instructor at West Point teaching military instruction to cadets; I've served as a company commander at Fort Lewis. I've had two company commands. I've served as an operations officer in an infantry, a motorized infantry test battalion at Fort Lewis, and I've served as a plans officer at Second Armored Division Forward. And my most recent positions have been a tank battalion executive officer. That's -- that's it, sir.

8Q: Is Incirlik Air Base a temporary duty station for you?

8A: Yes sir. This assignment is and has been a four month TDY assignment for me.

9Q: Can you tell me the date that you started this assignment?

9A: Sir, I started on 25 January 1994.

10Q: When you arrived at Incirlik to begin your current position, were you given training or overlap with your predecessor?

10A: Yes sir, I had overlap with my counterpart who was a -- also an Army officer.

11Q: And what is your duty title in your current position at Incirlik?

11A: My duty title is Joint Operations Center Chief.

12Q: Would you describe for me the chain of command under which you fall?

12A: Well, my chain of command is the C-3 who is Colonel O'Brien. Above that would have to be the Chief of Staff, then Commanding General.

13Q: And do you have personnel working for you?

13A: Yes sir. While on duty, while on shift, I have a reports NCO or person, I have a administration specialist and a communications specialist.

14Q: Could you briefly describe the function of the Joint Operations Center?

14A: Sir, the function of the Joint Operations Center is to provide a twenty-four hour operation for coordinating, receiving, transmitting information that involves Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

**WITCHER**

15Q: Do you have written or published guidance which you use to conduct that operation?

15A: Yes sir.

16Q: Could you describe that written guidance please?

16A: Well, in my duty position, the guidance that I follow is a JOC Chief checklist. We also operate -- every -- every person in the section operates off a set of checklist type instructions that are either time or event driven, that detail specifically what you do, when you do it, etcetera, plus a number of continuity books which give historical information and background information on all aspects of our -- our job.

17Q: What are your responsibilities with respect to the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT or OPC daily flying mission?

17A: As JOC Chief, my responsibility is to coordinate -- specifically to coordinate changes with the flying schedule on a daily -- on a daily basis between CFAC and the Turkish C-3 representatives.

18Q: Could you describe an example of a change that you might coordinate and show me the process that you use to make that coordination?

18A: Yes sir. An example would be on a given day we may receive a call from the -- well, they go by Mad Dog. That's the CFAC control cell -- mission director cell. They would ask for a slip, for example, of an aircraft particular flight, let's say a slip of thirty minutes. We would then take that information, knowing the call sign of the aircraft, the mission number, time of takeoff. We would annotate our flying schedule which we operate off of for that given day. We would then take a change sheet, fill out the change indicating that a slip is going to occur and the new takeoff time. We would then take that sheet down to the Turkish C-3 representative, they would again annotate their schedule which is the same schedule that we operate off of, and they would sign it acknowledging approval. They would then contact tower who would then be aware of the slip. We would then put the change sheet in our change sheet booklet, our folder, and call Mad Dog back and tell them that the change was approved, or disapproved, depending on the situation.

19Q: In the performance of your duties in the JOC, do you have contact with Eagle flight, the UH-60s that belong to the MCC or Military Coordination Center?

19A: By contact, sir, do you mean contact with the helicopters?

20Q: Contact with the organization that schedules the helicopters or with the helicopters themselves.

20A: No contact with the helicopters, sir. Only contact with the Eagle Operations Center which is in Pirinlik.

21Q: What type of contact do you have with the Eagle Operations Center?

21A: We have both radio and telephone contact.

**WITCHER**

22Q: And what kind of communication would you receive from them?

22A: Typically a conversation would be a change to a takeoff time or a request for a gate time whether it is a gate in or gate out.

23Q: Would that request include activating a flight plan?

23A: It would involve, just like the fighter aircraft, executing a change sheet or it may include activating a line for a new mission.

24Q: Are you familiar with the daily Air Tasking Order, or ATO?

24A: Yes sir.

25Q: Are the Eagle flights represented on that Air Tasking Order?

25A: Yes sir.

26Q: Do the Eagle flights have fixed takeoff times and gate times on that Air Tasking Order?

26A: They have not in the past.

27Q: In cases in the past where they did not, and they were going through the process to activate that flight plan, what would be your involvement?

27A: Typically my involvement would be on the day prior, we would get a call at night or possibly in the afternoon to activate takeoff and gate in and possibly gate out time, or we would get the call on the morning of their intended mission.

28Q: I assume from your previous testimony you would obtain approval from the Turkish C-3 for that flight?

28A: Yes sir.

29Q: Would you pass that approval back to Eagle flight?

29A: Yes sir. We would usually do that by radio. Or by telephone.

30Q: Would you pass that information to any other agency?

30A: No sir.

31Q: Were you required by any directives or standard operating procedures to do that, to pass that information to any other agency?

31A: No sir.

32Q: In your duties with the JOC, are you aware of procedures for activating or notifying other agencies of unusual flight activity such as U.N. helicopter flights?

32A: Yes sir.

33Q: If you were to receive notification of such an activity, who would you notify?

**WITCHER**

33A: Well, if it was an example of a U.N. flight that was scheduled to be in the AOR, I would contact Mad Dog, I would contact the MCC and I would attempt to give them call sign, TAOR entry and exit times, frequencies, if available.

34Q: That procedure that you've described is different than those you described for the Eagle flight helicopters. Can you explain the difference to me please?

34A: The difference, I believe to be because the U.N. flights require special clearance. The Eagle flight is typically scheduled on the flying schedule and the ATO although it does not typically have times or the route. Therefore I -- I -- I would say the difference is simply because it is a unscheduled or untypical mission. It requires special handling and requires that AWACS knows what might be an unidentified track.

35Q: Are you, in your duties, involved in any long range -- by long range, I mean other than the day of flight scheduling activities? Do you participate in any long -- any long range planning for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT missions?

35A: As JOC Chief, no sir.

36Q: Are you aware of the process that produces the schedule from long range scheduling aspects?

36A: I'm aware of the process. I'm not involved in the process.

37Q: Does the JOC receive weekly schedules from Eagle flight?

37A: Yes sir.

38Q: And what's the disposition of those schedules when they're received?

38A: The Eagle flight weekly schedule in the past has been given to the command group downstairs because they prepare the daily TGS clearance for personnel going to Zakhu.

39Q: Could you provide me with the office symbol of the command group downstairs?

39A: Chief of Staff's office. And it also goes to the C-2 who would distribute it to SOC 2 because they always requested it.

40Q: Would you define SOC 2?

40A: The SOC 2 Intel cell is specifically who asked for it and I believe they are the F-16 and possibly the Jaguar elements. I'm not sure exactly.

41Q: Do you know if that weekly flight schedule is passed to any element of the CFACC or Combined Forces Air Component Commander?

41A: To my knowledge, it was not.

42Q: Are you aware of meetings at which that information would be presented?

42A: I'm not aware of any such meetings.

**WITCHER**

43Q: And in your position as the Chief of the JOC, you did not attend such meetings?

43A: No sir.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

44Q: Were you aware of the flight on the 11th of April in which General Pilkington went to Zakhu and from Zakhu flew on Eagle flight into the AOR?

44A: I don't -- I don't have a detailed recollection of it, sir. I -- I do remember that he made a flight during that time. Typically, though, if he goes to Zakhu, we know. I guess what I'm trying to say is I -- if I was on shift that day, then I certainly knew about it. If I was not on shift, I may not have been aware of it.

45Q: Do you know if anybody in the JOC would have been made aware in advance of that flight?

45A: Yes sir. The Chief of Staff's Office would probably have notified us. We would have also seen the list of people on the TGS clearance letter which is transmitted to Zakhu because our communications NCO does that.

46Q: And would that notification have included the takeoff times from Zakhu and the general route of flight that the Eagle helicopters would have taken?

46A: No sir.

47Q: Was that normal to not have that sort of information for flights outside of the security zone?

47A: Well, for -- for a flight outside the security zone, we would most likely have known the destination, not the route.

48Q: How about the time -- takeoff time?

48A: Only -- only if Zakhu had told us. They don't -- they did not routinely tell us of takeoff times from Zakhu.

49Q: If Zakhu had given you the takeoff times and the destination for that flight, would that information have been passed to the C-3, to the JOC?

49A: It would have been passed to the C-3.

50Q: And what would the C-3 have done with that information?

50A: I would -- I would have to say that it would be noted. I think I know what -- what question you may be asking next.

51Q: How would the information regarding that flight have been passed to the CFAC?

51A: It probably would not have, sir.

**WITCHER**

52Q: On the flight of the fourteenth, which was the flight outside of the security zone, are you aware of any information that was passed from the MCC to the CTF, or to anyone here at Incirlik regarding takeoff times or destination?

52A: If the information was available, it would have been in the weekly schedule.

53Q: If it was in the week -- how would it get in the weekly schedule?

53A: Zakhu publishes that, sir, and they send -- they send that schedule to us.

54Q: And having received that information from Zakhu, who would it go to? Who would receive it?

54A: Well, it would go to the -- as I said before, the weekly schedule information would go to the Chief of Staff's office and the C-2 would distribute it to SOC 2. It would not go to CFAC.

55Q: How would that information get into the ATO?

55A: We would have to give it to the frag shop at least a day in advance.

56Q: Do you know if that information was given to the frag shop?

56A: It was not.

57Q: Do you know if information of that type has ever been provided to the frag shop since you've been here?

57A: To my knowledge, that was not routinely -- that was not a requirement that we fulfilled.

58Q: It was not a requirement that you fulfilled . . .

58A: It was not a requirement, sir.

59Q: . . . was it -- was it ever done on any flights that you're aware of?

59A: To my knowledge, no sir.

60Q: How would the frag shop get that information if they did not get it from the C-3 and the JOC?

60A: They would not get it.

61Q: Are you aware of any provisions for getting that information to the frag shop or to any other agency so that the fighters and the AWACS would be aware of a flight outside of the security zone?

61A: Only from the people who receive it at SOC 2. Again, I -- I don't know where or who they would distribute that information to.

62Q: The people at SOC 2 you said would receive it from who?

62A: From our C-2 shop.

**WITCHER**

63Q: From the C-2 shop, but only if they requested it; is that correct?

63A: Well we -- we routinely send them the schedule but a description of a route for that particular mission probably would not have been sent to them because we may not have received it.

64Q: Had you received it, would it have been sent to them?

64A: Yes sir. If we had the information.

65Q: Are you aware as to whether or not the information on the flight on the fourteenth was in the C-3 or in the JOC at any time?

65A: As I -- as I remember, the weekly schedule indicated Irbil as one of their destinations for that day, as I remember, but I would have to look at the schedule to see for sure, and if that was on there, then it would have been sent out to the same people we always send it out to.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Okay, I think we need to take a break at this time.

(The interview was recessed at 1727 hours, 29 April 1994)

WITCHER

(The interview was reconvened at 1738 hours, 29 April 1994)

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 1738. The people who were here when we recessed are here once again.

COLONEL FAIN: We'll begin by clarifications on a couple of points, to include some definitions and terms and clarification on answers that you've given.

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

66Q: When you were referring -- all of us were referring to the C-3, you identified him as Colonel O'Brien. The office is the office that deals with operations aspects of the Combined Task Force?

66A: Yes sir.

67Q: You referred to the CFAC. Is it correct that that refers to the Combined Force Air Component?

67A: Yes sir.

68Q: Your comments could have been taken as either referring to the individual who is the Combined Force Air Component Commander or more broadly to individuals within the Air Component. Which way were you using the term in your testimony?

68A: Individuals within.

69Q: You were referring in your testimony to times in the past. Were you referring to times up to and including 14 April 1994, as opposed to events since the 14th of April 1994?

69A: Up to and including the fourteenth.

70Q: Up to, not including. I just couldn't hear you, I'm sorry.

70A: To clarify it, I would say up -- up to the 14th of April.

71Q: You used a term that I couldn't hear. You were talking about U.N. flights scheduled to be in the AOR. You said you'd contact the Mad Dog or the, and it sounded like EMC to me, but I didn't hear it clearly.

71A: MCC, sir. Military Coordination Center.

72Q: Thank you. You were asked whether you were involved in long range scheduling and you indicated that as the JOC Chief, or Joint Operations Center Chief, you were not. Are you involved in long range scheduling in any other capacity?

72A: Regarding what, sir?

73Q: First, generally, long range operational scheduling.

**WITCHER**

73A: No sir.

74Q: And specifically regarding Eagle flight?

74A: No sir.

75Q: Do you ever act as the C-3?

75A: No sir.

76Q: You referred to documents being sent to the Chief of Staff's office including information that came in regarding Eagle flights. Specifically to whom were they sent?

76A: They would typically be sent to the executive officer.

77Q: And who is that?

77A: Currently it's Captain Wiker.

78Q: W-I-C-K-E-R?

78A: No sir, W-I-K-E-R.

79Q: And do you know how long Captain Wiker has been in that position?

79A: I would say probably up to thirty days now, sir.

80Q: So he arrived around the first of April?

80A: Approximately, sir.

81Q: You referred to TGS clearance. What does that mean?

81A: Sir, that's Turkish General Staff.

82Q: You referred to SOC 2. Do you know what that means?

82A: Sir, that's the Squadron Operating Center.

83Q: Referring specifically to -- SOC 2 being one of two Squadron Operation Centers?

83A: One of three, sir.

84Q: One of three? Thank you. You referred to checklists in the Joint Operations Center that you and others make reference to. Is there any checklist which deals with how to handle flight information coming from Eagle flight?

84A: It is more of a narrative explanation with examples.

85Q: And what is that in?

85A: That's in our JOC Continuity book. It mainly talks about how to do the change sheets.

86Q: Is there any difference in the procedures for Eagle flights which are routine and Eagle

**WITCHER**

flights which go outside the security zone?

86A: Well, the primary difference, I would say, is that outside the security zone requires Commanding General approval.

87Q: Are you aware of any other differences in how those flights, or the information that people in the Joint Operations Center receive regarding those flights should be handled?

87A: There's no special handling difference between the two, that I'm aware of.

88Q: At one point, General Andrus asked you a question and you said, "I know what the next question is going to be." What did you believe the next question was going to be?

88A: I assumed the question was in regards to whether or not CFAC received that kind of information, which I think we've already answered.

89Q: Why did you believe that would be the next question?

89A: Just an assumption, sir.

90Q: Has anyone who has, to your knowledge, previously testified to this board discussed these events with you? The events of 14 April 1994?

90A: No sir.

91Q: Has anyone talked with you regarding your testimony, what it should be or should not be?

91A: No sir.

92Q: Do you have any personal knowledge of the events of the 14th of April 1994 as it relates to the shutdown of Eagle flight?

92A: The only knowledge I have, sir, is that -- the knowledge of 1330 hours that day, for the entire day and night, since I was on shift.

93Q: Your shift on the 14th began at 1330?

93A: Well, it officially began at 1400, sir. I arrived at 1330.

94Q: You made a distinction when I asked you a question between up to the 14th of April as to procedures which suggested to me that procedures may have changed on the 14th of April.

94A: Well, I was incorrect on that, sir. The procedures did not change on the fourteenth. They changed, I would say, within possibly three days. I don't perceive the exact day.

95Q: By procedures, you mean procedures pertaining to the handling of Eagle flight information?

95A: Yes sir.

96Q: Excuse me just a second. Were you on duty on the 13th of April?

96A: No sir.

**WITCHER**

97Q: Do you have any personal knowledge of the flight on the 11th of April that you previously commented on which General Pilkington was a passenger?

97A: I don't recall, sir.

98Q: Is it that you have no recollection, or something -- something less than that.

98A: I can only say that I don't remember -- if I was not on shift that day, I would not have been aware of it. I may have heard about it, given that it was a mission outside the security zone. If I was on shift, then I would have probably known about it.

99Q: But currently you do not recall.

99A: I just -- I just don't recall right off the top of my head, sir.

100Q: Did you have any personal -- do you have any personal knowledge of the events leading up to the Eagle flight on the 14th of April 1994?

100A: In what way, sir?

101Q: Did you have any personal participation and information received concerning that flight, clearance procedures for that flight, information passed on to any other agency regarding the flight?

101A: No sir.

102Q: Do you have any other personal knowledge pertaining to the events leading up to that flight, specifically relating to the flight itself as opposed to general procedures?

102A: No sir.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

103Q: In the past, information on Eagle flight plans, specifically Eagle flights that were going outside of the security zone, was passed to the C-3 and the C-3 passed that information to the CFAC frag shop. Do you know when that procedure stopped? You'd indicated that that did not happen now. Do you know when that procedure stopped?

103A: Maybe -- maybe I did not clarify what I had said. But that information had not gone to the frag shop in the past but it does now.

104Q: It had not gone to the frag shop in the time period that you have been assigned here; is that correct?

104A: To my knowledge, sir, no, it has not.

105Q: Are you aware if it went to the frag shop before you were assigned here?

105A: I'm not aware of it happening in the past, prior to my being assigned . . .

106Q: Okay.

**WITCHER**

106A: . . . because if it had, I'm -- I'm certain my predecessor would have told me about it, because we went through, in pretty excruciating detail, what my duty was.

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

107Q: Who was your predecessor?

107A: Sir, it was a Major Bo Hardrick.

108Q: B-O -- can you spell . . .

108A: I believe his first name was Harold, sir.

109Q: Harold? And can you spell the last name, please?

109A: It's H-A-R-D-R-I-C-K.

110Q: You say that it currently goes to the frag shop. Do you know why that change was made?

110A: Well, primarily to ensure that all CFAC knows the Eagle flight schedule and mission.

111Q: Were you party to any discussions prior to the 14th of April 1994 or coordinations pertaining to the adequacy or the procedures that were in place for handling Eagle flight?

111A: No sir.

112Q: Do you have any -- let me be specific. We've asked you a lot of -- a lot of questions going to specific points. Frankly, what we're interested in is whether you have any knowledge that is relevant to the matters which occurred on the 14th of April, either personally or information you've received from other people, that would help us understand what happened on that day and why it happened.

112A: No sir.

113Q: And that includes information that you may have heard from other people in C-3 or from any other source?

113A: No sir.

114Q: Your statement encompasses that. Or to put it another way, is it correct that you have not heard anything from other people?

114A: I have not heard things from other people, sir.

115Q: Are you familiar with the position of LNO or Liaison Officer for Eagle flight?

115A: Yes sir.

116Q: What's your understanding of that position?

116A: The 12th Aviation LNO is a lieutenant who works with us and also communicates with the Eagle flight crews and the Eagle Ops Center.

**WITCHER**

117Q: And what's his job? What's he supposed to do?

117A: Well, my understanding of his job is that he is a liaison for Eagle flight operations and provides us information on Eagle flight -- Eagle aircraft.

118Q: Is that person in the information loop concerning the flights of Eagle flight?

118A: Yes sir.

119Q: In what way?

119A: I assume he speaks to them on a daily basis and knows of their intended operations or their intended mission.

120Q: Does he pass information to you or other people in the Joint Operations Center?

120A: He may pass it to the C-3. He does not routinely pass that information to us -- to the JOC Chief. He does present information on a Monday, Wednesday and Friday update briefing that the C-3 receives.

121Q: Is that a briefing that the LNO gives to the C-3 or a briefing the C-3 gives to someone else?

121A: He doesn't actually brief, sir, he provides a -- information on a slide which depicts the Eagle -- the MCC travel -- or Eagle flight travel plans.

122Q: And for what period of time?

122A: Usually it covers the day of and a -- the next day. Correction, it usually covers a week period. The slide covers approximately a week period.

123Q: Do you have any participation in the preparation of that slide?

123A: No sir. The same information is transmitted by the MCC in the SITREP.

124Q: Is there a difference between this and the communications you were referring to earlier that are faxed from Eagle flight? Or is it the same thing?

124A: Could you be specific, sir?

125Q: Yeah. Earlier when you were testifying, you talked about information being faxed from Eagle Flight Operations to the Joint Operations Center. You also referred to information being passed by telephone. This is the first reference you made to a SITREP which I understand to be a situation report.

125A: Yes sir, the information in the weekly schedule that is faxed to us is more detailed than the SITREP.

126Q: Okay. And what is the SITREP?

126A: That's the Military Coordination Center's daily SITREP. It will have a week listing of the type of mission for a given day. It may say two-ship admin, two-ship TAOR, two-ship mission

**WITCHER**

support.

127Q: Now is that projecting the next day's activities?

127A: Well, it projects the next week.

128Q: Do I understand that each SITREP projects the next week?

128A: Yes sir.

129Q: Does it also give a report on the activities that occurred on that day?

129A: For the previous day.

130Q: And where are these maintained?

130A: We maintain a hard copy file in the C-3 in the JOC.

131Q: Who has access to these SITREPs?

131A: Personnel in the JOC, personnel in the C-3. Most anyone who is on -- on the distribution list.

132Q: What's done with the slide we're talking about that's prepared by the liaison officer from the SITREPs?

132A: Well that information is briefed and then it is erased, but the information is, again, on the -  
- on the SITREPs.

133Q: To whom is it briefed?

133A: That particular slide is briefed to the C-3. I believe the C-3 also briefs the Commanding General on it.

134Q: And who attends when it's briefed to the C-3?

134A: We have representatives from the C-3, our deputy -- deputy C-3 for plans, deputy C-3 for operations, the Air Force Operations Officer, the French Liaison Officer, the British Liaison Officer, a representative from JSOTF, representative from the frag shop, our mission planning cell, the aviation LNO, the C-2 watch officer and a couple of C-2 representatives that brief intelligence.

135Q: The representative from the frag shop, what frag shop are you referring to?

135A: That's that frag shop that works for the CFAC, sir, produces the schedule.

136Q: And is that a single person that regularly attends?

136A: It's usually the same person, sir.

137Q: Who is that?

137A: Captain John Foley.

**WITCHER**

138Q: Do you attend those meetings, those briefings to the C-3?

138A: Only when I'm on shift, sir. Or if it's a day where I'm there to observe the JOC Chiefs.

139Q: Did you attend the briefings that were conducted on Monday, Wednesday and Friday of the week of the -- the week that included the 14th of April?

139A: I would say no, sir, because I had the afternoon shift that week.

140Q: Briefings are conducted when?

140A: Zero eight-thirty. Correction, zero eight hundred.

141Q: Who is the Deputy C-3 for Operations?

141A: That would be Major Dave Mason.

**(Questions by Colonel Fain)**

142Q: The weekly schedule that's provided by the Eagle Ops, that's the basis for the slides, is received how often?

142A: The weekly information that comes from Zakhu was received on a weekly basis. However, the schedule that is depicted on the slide is received daily.

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

143Q: By means of the SITREP that you referred to?

143A: Yes sir.

**(Questions by Colonel Fain)**

144Q: The time of day at which that schedule is received is what?

144A: Typically the schedule would appear at night, sometime after 2000 hours. But again, the SITREP will cover a week period and with each day, of course, you lose a day and gain a day.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

145Q: Do you know if any of those SITREPs contained any information about the Eagle flight on the fourteenth?

145A: It would be depicted as it is always depicted as, it would say 14 April, two-ship, TAOR. There may or may not be some description. In the 13 April SITREP, that may have indicated that there was a special outside -- outside the security zone for that day.

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

146Q: Would the 13 April SITREP be received after the eight o'clock meeting on Wednesday --

**WITCHER**

Monday, Wednesday and Friday?

146A: No sir. That SITREP would have already been disseminated on the thirteenth.

147Q: You've testified that the basis for the slide presented at the staff call for the C-3 was the weekly schedule and was not the SITREP; is that correct?

147A: No sir, that's not correct. The basis of the information is actually the SITREP because it is almost a verbatim transfer of the information.

148Q: We're talking about the briefings that that slide figured into. You said there was another purpose that it was used by Colonel O'Brien to brief other people. Do you know who is briefed using that slide?

148A: To my knowledge, the Commander General.

149Q: Do you know who else would be in attendance?

149A: I -- I couldn't say, sir, because I don't -- I don't go to those briefings.

150Q: Have you ever attended them?

150A: No sir.

151Q: Just to clarify, you said the slide was erased. Why?

151A: We have no reason to keep the information since it's contained in the SITREP and we present it again in two days.

152Q: It's a reusable slide, fill in the blanks sort of . . .

152A: Yes sir. Actually it's a view graph slide and we simply use it, erase it and prepare for the next brief. But that information is available simply by looking up the SITREPs.

153Q: Are you aware of any annotation to the SITREPs that would distinguish between a flight in the security zone as opposed to a flight out of the security zone?

153A: I'm not aware of it, sir. I would have to look and read the SITREPs to see if there is such a distinction.

154Q: Are you aware of any discussion between representatives of C-3 and the CFAC organization regarding what the proper role of the two organizations were?

154A: I -- I know there's been a meeting between Colonel O'Brien and Colonel Richardson regarding that subject.

155Q: Did you take part in that meeting?

155A: No sir.

156Q: Do you know what the substance of the meeting was?

156A: Primarily a discussion of duties and responsibilities, probably functions and roles.

**WITCHER**

157Q: Do you know when that took place?

157A: I don't recall, sir.

158Q: Do you recall if it was before or after the 14th of April?

158A: I know that those kind of discussions, whether formal or informal, have occurred prior to the fourteenth.

159Q: Do you know what they -- the reason for those discussions is, what's precipitating?

159A: Well, to better define who has responsibility for what aspects of operations.

160Q: Were the areas that you've been discussing, scheduling, passing of information regarding flight operations part of those discussions?

160A: I'm not aware of whether or not scheduling was a part of that discussion. It may have been.

161Q: How about daily flight operations?

161A: I -- I couldn't say, sir, but I would only assume that that would have to be part of those discussions.

162Q: And what's your source of information regarding this?

162A: Well it would be Colonel O'Brien.

163Q: And in what context?

163A: Our eight o'clock briefings, the general discussions.

164Q: And what's been the nature of the discussion?

164A: Well, simply the importance of trying to arrive at a clearly defined set of operating rules for both the CFAC and the C-3. There has -- there are overlapping -- I would say there's overlapping coverage of things that we do which causes some friction.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Let's take a time out for a second.

(The interview was recessed at 1810 hours, 29 April 1994)

WITCHER

(The interview was reconvened at 1811 hours, 29 April 1994, with all parties present who were present when the interview was recessed)

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 1811. The individuals present when we recessed are once again present.

COLONEL BENNETT: I've got a couple of questions if I could.

**(Questions by Colonel Bennett)**

165Q: You mentioned you were on duty from 1400. What is the length of your duty period?

165A: It's normally an eight hour shift, sir.

166Q: On Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of that week, were you therefore on duty from 1400 to 2200 on those days? That would be the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth?

166A: Sir, I was on duty the eleventh and the twelfth. I was not on duty on the thirteenth, but I -- I couldn't say exactly how many hours I was on each day. I'd have to look at the log.

167Q: Okay. On the -- so you were on shift on the eleventh which was Monday; is that correct?

167A: Yes sir.

168Q: From fourteen to twenty-two hundred.

168A: Yes sir.

169Q: Do you remember when General Pilkington returned?

169A: I don't recall, sir. It would -- if the information was given to me, then it would be in the log book.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any further information, statements or evidence that may be helpful to this investigation?

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: You are reminded that this is an official investigation. You're ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately or report it to member of the board.

Do you have any questions?


**WITCHER**

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 1813. This interview is concluded.

### REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by Carl J. Witcher to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.



BRUCE H. PEGGS, DAFC

Court Reporter

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

WITCHER

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TAB V-111

V-103

CUMBEE, MARK K.

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**TESTIMONY OF  
LIEUTENANT MARK K. CUMBEE  
HQ CTF C2**

The interview was conducted by Colonel At Lee at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1244 on 28 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the Witness was sworn.

**EXAMINATION**

My name is First Lieutenant Mark A. Cumbee. I am assigned to CTF C2, which is the Intelligence Section of the Combined Task Force here at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

Upon entering the military, I attended the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas. Upon graduation, I was classified as a banked pilot. I then went through seven months of cross-training into Intelligence down at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. My follow on assignment from there was to Charleston Air Force Base at the 437th Air Wing. My total time in service is three years active duty. Incirlik is a TDY location for me. My permanent duty assignment is Intel Director of the 14th Airlift Squadron at Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina. Here at Incirlik I am the CTF C2 Air Analyst. I work directly for Colonel William Hall.

(There was a brief recess taken at 1248 and the interview was reconvened at 1250, 28 April 1994 with all those present prior to the recess once again present.)

My duties in my current TDY position are to track any type of air activity to include violations of the No-Fly-Zone, any type of technological advancements that they might be trying to develop and any type of special missions above that.

Upon my arrival at Incirlik, I did have approximately a one-month overlap with my predecessor because I operated as a watch officer. For approximately a month, I knew I'd be stepping into the Air Analyst position so I had about a month to train with the Air Analyst and learn her duties. Since that training, I have officially been performing my duties in C2 for about 29 days.

I am familiar with the Air Order of Battle of Iraq. I am familiar with the Helicopter Order of Battle as well. Essentially, we assess the Iraqi helicopter force as being mainly used in an air support-type role; specifically, fire support being CAS--Close Air Support. The capabilities that they have on their numerous helicopters are going to be limited to guns and unguided rockets.

**CUMBEE**

The location of the Iraqi Hind helicopters is north of Baghdad, probably about 15 to 30 nautical miles at al Taji Airfield. To the best of my knowledge, since the ceasefire with Operation DESERT STORM, there have been indications that these helicopters have operated north of that location. They were deployed for a short time about six months ago, last summer time frame, but they didn't deploy all of them and it was only about, less than 30 nautical miles to a northern air base and I don't have that specific name with me. As I was not here during that deployment, I do not know if that information was distributed to the aircrews or the Intel agencies involving those aircrews that are in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Currently, if that type of information were to recur--any type of deployment, it would be passed on if we felt it was significant, because that is a possible indicator of Iraqi intentions.

Our job, specifically, is to obtain information, analyze it and then distribute it. In that capacity, we're kind of like the wholesaler, kind of like a Numbered Air Force and then we've got the wing level Intel and then the squadron level, the WOC and SOCs. Once we obtain information like that, we would pass that information, kind of in a "shotgun" because we have a distribution system set up in CTF C2, I would go ahead and distribute that information to each of the SOCs, including the WOCs, all at the same time. We have in-boxes or trays and that's how we distribute hard copies of intelligence information that we feel is necessary or important to the squadrons and to the wing level.

When I need to discuss intel information with the CFAC, my point of contact within the CFAC is Captain Ken Dawson. He is the OIC for the Intelligence Office there and he has several people that we could deal with directly.

It is not really our function to give required briefings to each of the intel officers from each of the units. That's not to say it doesn't happen. We do give briefings, desktop-type briefings and all the squadron intel people are cleared and have the authorization to come and sit in on our morning briefings and also have access to any of the information I have, but on a normal basis, we do not have any requirement to have them come and listen to any of our presentations.

All visual recognition training regarding the air threat should really be accomplished before coming in theater. I mean the pilots are supposed to be MR, mission ready, when they come here so all that type of training should have been accomplished before they were ever deployed.

Our organization does not provide information, other than the Air Order of Battle for the Iraqis, to the units to include the disposition and location of friendly forces within the AOR, the aircraft that they might see that are friendly. If the squadron intel folks were to generate a question concerning how this information would get to the aircrews, it would be an RFI, Request for Information. That would go to the wing intelligence office and if they could not answer the question, it would be passed on to me, if it is specifically air related. If I could not

**CUMBEE**

answer it, I would pass it up the chain to either USAFE, EUCOM or the Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth, England.

The only pictures I have of the Iraqi Hind helicopters indicate they are in a desert cammo scheme, the grays or the brown. I cannot be assured that is the only color scheme they have. Prior to the 14th of April, the day of the incident, that information was available to me. I cannot be assured this information was disseminated to the aircrews because that is not a CTF function at the headquarters level. That would be a squadron level responsibility. I am not aware of medical markings on Iraqi aircraft and that information is not available within CTF. At this time, I cannot answer whether or not that information is available elsewhere, where we could access it. We've requested that information as a result of your request for it last week, but we have not yet received any information on that.

I am aware of the paint schemes or markings on the friendly UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters that operated down in MCC only because I had seen someone's personal photos that they had taken when they were either at Diyarbakir or Zakhu. It is not in my area of responsibility to pass this information to the individual units. I assumed my current position on about 31 March and prior to the 14th of April 1994, we had no requests from individual units for friendly aircraft configurations and markings or Iraqi helicopter configurations and markings.

Within my organization, we do not have a DOD or Air Force approved directive or publication that defines the responsibilities of CTF C2 or, more in particular, my duty description.

New intelligence officers reporting to Incirlik for TDY do have the opportunity to come up and listen to my desktop briefing in which I outline my specific job and how I can help them. This briefing includes the functions that I do and who my contacts are and things like that and I show them how, if they have questions that the WOC cannot answer, I can definitely help them. I cannot be assured all of them have attended this briefing.

WOC stands for Wing Operations Center. SOC stands for Squadron Operations Center.

(The standard witness caution was given and the Witness had no questions. The interview concluded at 1303, 28 April 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of LIEUTENANT MARK K. CUMBEE given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, Col, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**CUMBEE**

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TAB V-112

V-103

HALL, WILLIAM E., JR.

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**TESTIMONY OF  
COLONEL WILLIAM E. HALL, JR.  
COMBINED TASK FORCE INTELLIGENCE  
INCIRLIK, TURKEY**

COL AT LEE :       The time is 0823 on the 27th of April 1994. The persons present are the Witness, Major General Andrus, Colonel Fain, Mr. Brummell, and I am Colonel At Lee.

This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is an aircraft accident investigation conducted under AFR 110-14. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

WITNESS:   Yes.

COL AT LEE:Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS:   Yes.

COL AT LEE:Do you have any questions?

WITNESS:   No.

**HALL**

COL AT LEE: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed so that a written record can be made available to appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon. Please speak slowly, clearly and loudly. Remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others who do not have your technical background will be able to understand.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by this board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it is necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No.

COL AT LEE: If you will stand and raise your right hand, I will put you under oath.

(The witness was sworn.)

## EXAMINATION

### Questions by Colonel At Lee:

1Q: Would you state your name and grade?

1A: William E. Hall, Jr., Colonel.

2Q: Your organization and station?

2A: I am the Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT Director of Intelligence.

3Q: And your station.

3A: Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

COL AT LEE: Colonel Fain.

### Questions by Colonel Fain:

4Q: Would you give me a broad overview of your military experience please?

4A: I've been on active duty for about 24 years, all in the Intelligence business, from working mostly about 15 years overseas--base level, unit level type experience--squadron wings, also a

**HALL**

commander--Wing Commander for the Air Force Intelligence Command, Electronic Security Command, and squadron commander for Electronic Security Command.

5Q: Is Incirlik Air Base your permanent duty station?

5A: No, Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

6Q: What is your duty title at your permanent duty station?

6A: The Commander of the 26th Intelligence Wing.

7Q: How long have you been on this temporary duty assignment?

7A: Since the 4th of January 1994.

8Q: Is that the first time that you've been in this capacity at Incirlik?

8A: Yes.

9Q: Would you describe for me, at Incirlik Air Base, the chain of command under which you fall?

9A: I work for the--well, I'm one of the C-staff directors, C-2, the Intelligence Directorate, under the Chief of Staff for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, who, in turn, of course, works for the Commanding General.

10Q: What is the makeup of the organization underneath you?

10A: The C-2 has 33 people from four nations. We have Intelligence people from the United States, France, Britain and Turkey.

11Q: What is the C-2 mission, as you understand it?

11A: We analyze and report on the threat which exists in Northern Iraq, primary purpose. Also, secondarily, working with the Air Force OSI here at Incirlik, we are concerned with counter-terrorism to the people who are assigned here for PROVIDE COMFORT, which includes Turkey and Northern Iraq.

12Q: Do you have responsibility for providing intelligence updates to the aircrews flying in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

12A: Through, yes, not directly from the C-2 but through the CFAC, which is the Combined Forces Air Component and from there to the sector operations centers or the squadron operations centers which brief the aircrews.

13Q: Do you have written or published guidance that directs your activities as the C-2?

13A: Yes, we do.

**HALL**

14Q: Could you tell me what type of guidance that consists of?

14A: It would be difficult to say. We have, let me see where I would start, we have parts--we have intelligence parts to operations plans so you will find if you look in OPLANS for PROVIDE COMFORT, for example, you will find Intelligence Annexes which describe, in a general way, what our tasks are. We have letters from the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff directing us to do certain things. An example of that, for example, would be a letter that says the C-2 interviews people who travel to Northern Iraq for the purposes of gathering information on what goes on in Northern Iraq.

Let's see--what else would we have? That's all I can think of right now--the OPLANS, the letters from the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. There may be more, but that's all I can think of right now.

15Q: I would assume that the majority of the personnel working for you in C-2 are in temporary duty status. Is that correct?

15A: Yes, they all are.

16Q: Do you conduct training sessions or have standard introduction sessions for those individuals as they arrive?

16A: Yes.

17Q: Do you feel like their actions are fairly well standardized throughout the community or your organization?

17A: Yes.

18Q: In the generic sense, how do you collect intelligence information from the aircrews?

18A: The aircrews are debriefed when they return from their flying missions and those debriefings are conducted by the Intelligence people who are assigned to the detachments at the Squadron Operations Centers.

19Q: And those Intelligence personnel are not part of the 30 or so that you discussed that are part of C-2?

19A: No, no.

20Q: What type of information does your organization provide to the aircrews? Examples would be inbriefs, flight briefs, et cetera?

**HALL**

20A: Right. From the directorate itself, what we do is we prepare primarily written products and those written products include a daily intelligence report, a surface-to-air missile update which goes out everyday so if there are any changes in the surface-to-air missile threat over in Northern Iraq, that is in that document.

We produce something called the Highlights, which is another daily document which is really just the most significant developments of the past 24 hours; again, another written product going out from C-2.

We have another product which is called Banners and Banners are just, typically, a one or two line--almost like what you might call a tactical report--just a one or two line report which goes out over a system, a linked computer system called SENTINEL BYTE. If something significant happens that needs to be very quickly given to the aircrews, we put that out in a Banner. It goes from the C-2 into the CFAC, the Combined Forces Air Comport Intelligence staff there and--let's see--

We review also the SITREP which goes out, the Situation Report, which is put out by the Operations Directorate, the C-3, so we occasionally have an input to make to that.

I'm not sure I'm going to remember all the documents we do. Those are the most significant documents. Again, those are all a written product which go out from the C-2 every day.

21Q: Do you have a system in effect whereby you can ascertain that the data that you are putting out, for example, a change to the air picture that you would send out through one of these means, actually gets to the aircrew?

21A: A system?

22Q: First, let me ask--do you believe the information does get to the aircrew?

22A: Oh, yes--yes.

23Q: What makes you feel that it does get to them?

23A: We have a--there are a couple ways you can--well, to get to the aircrew, one is the--we have a distribution system so you know if the documents, first of all, are being picked up. There is a physical distribution system to each of the SOCs, to each of the squadron operation centers, there is a set distribution so just by the picking up of those documents everyday, you know that at least the information is getting to the sector operation centers. When I got here in January, I went down and visited each of the SOCs, the squadron operation centers, and asked for a briefing

**HALL**

of what they brief the aircrews. That was partly for my training but to understand what materials do aircrews get when they go out on a mission so from that standpoint, I learned what types of information are going out. That's kind of an informal feedback process that I had so I could understand exactly what the aircrews were being told.

A specific piece of information--I would have to assume that a specific piece of information is getting to the aircrews as opposed to actually knowing--unless I actually participate in the briefings themselves.

24Q: From your knowledge of the Iraqi air picture, has the air threat to OPC crews remained fairly constant for a period of time?

24A: Yes.

25Q: Do you feel like knowledge of that air threat among the aircrews is adequate?

25A: Yes.

26Q: Would you provide to them a change to that picture, if it were significant?

26A: Yes.

27Q: Are you aware, with respect to the Iraqi Air Order of Battle, what information regarding helicopters was provided to the aircrews at OPC?

27A: Yes.

28Q: Could you describe that information to me please?

28A: [Reference to classification deleted] The Iraqi--what we have is an Air Order of Battle; in other words, what the disposition of air forces is on the Iraqi side and in that case and in the helicopter case, the Hind helicopters, in particular, if I deal with those, we know we're based around Baghdad, just down to the south.

COL FAIN: Could we stop right here please?

COL AT LEE: Let's take a recess. The time is 0835.

(A very brief recess is taken at this point.)

COL AT LEE: The time is 0836. All individuals who were present when we recessed are once again present.

**Questions by Colonel Fain:**

**HALL**

29Q: When we stopped, we were discussing the Iraqi Air Order of Battle as it pertains to helicopters?

29A: Right.

30Q: You can continue.

30A: The information which we held on the Hinds were, in particular the Hinds, since that was the identification target on the 14th of April, was that there were 12 Hinds in the Iraqi inventory and they were based south of the Baghdad area.

31Q: Were you aware of that fact prior to the 14th of April?

31A: In a general sense, probably not specifically myself--the exact numbers, just that they were based to the south, the air bases around Baghdad.

32Q: Did you have any indication that those helicopters had moved forward?

32A: No, Sir.

33Q: If they were based around or south of Baghdad, would they have had sufficient range to have reached the area of the incident in site?

33A: Yes, Sir, they would. They would have sufficient--we calculated that a helicopter flying from one of the bases just to the north of the City of Baghdad could reach the point at Northern Iraq where the crash sites were. It would not make it back to that base again. It would have to refuel somewhere in the area in order to make it back, but one way, it could make it up there.

34Q: Would it have sufficient fuel to make it up there and make it back across the 36 parallel before it required refueling?

34A: If I remember right, I don't think so. I don't think it could go quite that far south, but I'd have to look at that again.

35Q: Another follow on question to that is--Could it take off from the vicinity of Baghdad, refuel at one of the northern Iraqi military installations south of the 36 degree line without us being aware of that?

35A: I think that's conceivable, yes.

36Q: In that case, they would have sufficient fuel?

36A: Yes.

37Q: To go to Northern Iraq and return to south of the 36?

37A: That's conceivable.

**HALL**

38Q: Can you tell me what you know about the physical appearance, markings, coloring, et cetera, of the Iraqi Hind helicopter?

38A: Not--I, specifically, probably couldn't tell you that much about the actual appearance of the Hind from the Iraqis, other than generally what a Hind looks like--a large 5-bladed helicopter with what appeared to be wings, pylons, bubble canopy.

39Q: Do you know if we have provided information such as photographs, to include markings and colors, to the aircrews?

39A: I don't know that, specifically.

**Questions by General Andrus:**

40Q: Do you know what color camouflage paint is on the Iraqi helicopters?

40A: No, Sir.

41Q: Does anybody in your organization have that information?

41A: I would guess--I have an Air Analyst, Lieutenant Mark Cumbee who would probably have that information.

42Q: Would he, being in possession of that information, would he be responsible for passing that information to the aircrews or how would that information get to the aircrews?

42A: We don't--at the C-2, we don't--at least in the four months I've been here, we haven't been requested or, as far as I know, passed any visual recognition information to the Wing Intel or to the Squadron Operation Centers, as far as I know.

**Questions by Colonel Fain:**

43Q: Would you expect the deployed Intelligence Officer to be providing that training to the individual units?

43A: Yes.

**Questions by General Andrus:**

44Q: How would he find that information out?

44A: Well, typically, again not being at the Wing level right now or the Squadron level, but going back in my memory from what I remember of the documents we had, we had visual recognition guides which were basically little books produced by different agencies which had the--depending on what book you were looking at, different information; for example, insignia markings on the aircraft, where the insignia markings might be, plus paint schemes, general silhouettes and appearance of the aircraft, dimensions, things like that.

**HALL**

45Q: Coming at it from a different direction, your Air Intelligence Officer, you indicated, would have that information. How would he have received that information, specifically, for Iraqi Hind helicopters?

45A: We've got some DIA books at the C-2 plus we have some recognition guides. I mean they are just part of the library. We have a library at C-2.

46Q: Would the squadrons have access to those DIA books?

46A: They would, yes, at C-2; whether they actually have them out at the squadrons, I don't know.

47Q: Would they be aware that you have them in the C-2?

47A: I believe so. In other words, we do--we bring all the squadron Intel folks--the NCOs and the officers up to the C-2 for briefings when they arrive in the theater. We have what we call "desktops" where they come in and they get briefed on what C-2 does and what the information is that we have.

48Q: Would you think that it would be a significant and important piece of information for the aircrews to know whether or not the Iraqi helicopters were painted with desert camouflage or were painted in the dark green-black camouflage?

48A: Yes, Sir, yes.

49Q: If that is an important piece of information, is there any way that that information would be passed down on one of these previous reports you mentioned, to the aircrews?

49A: I don't think so. I don't think so. We really didn't, at C-2, we really didn't deal with issues of visual recognition; at least not in the memory I have of my four months, almost four months, here.

COL AT LEE: Could I ask a couple of questions?

50Q: Would you describe the training or orientation that you received when you came in to C-2?

50A: It was a couple of things--one is before I came here, I went to the Joint Analysis Center at Molesworth which is the European Command Theater Intelligence Center.

51Q: Let me be more specific. I was referring to your orientation and training regarding the C-2 role in the CTF in the Combined Task Force.

51A: Well, that--I would say that would include the Joint Analysis Center because again they are the main intelligence input for us and then I went to European Command and visited the Intelligence Directorate there, the J2, and was briefed by the J2, plus the Deputy J2 and the others

**HALL**

in the J2 divisions and then I came here and was, in turn, briefed by the Commanding General of what he expected the role to be, the Chief of Staff and then by all my different analysts, the different experts in the areas they work in in the C-2. They gave me their briefings on what their jobs are, what intelligence they receive and what information they disseminate, plus they gave me the briefing on Order of Battle; in other words, what is out there.

52Q: Prior to the 14th of April, did you have any indication that Hinds were operating...

52A: No.

53Q: ... in Northern Iraq...

53A: No.

54Q: ...or any indication of hostile intent to do so?

54A: No.

**Questions by Colonel Fain:**

55Q: A follow on question regarding markings in more of a generic sense. Are you aware of the medical markings on Iraqi aircraft?

55A: No, I'm not myself, no.

COL FAJN: I'd like to take a break at this point.

(There was a recess taken at 0844.)

COL AT LEE: The time is 0845. The persons present at the time we recessed are once again present.

**Questions by Colonel Fain:**

56Q: You previously stated in your testimony that you did not, as the C-2, provide visual recognition training for the aircrews at OPC. You further stated that you expected that type of training to be conducted by the organizational deployed Intel officer?

56A: Right.

57Q: Do you have a system in effect to standardize or to be sure that the aircrews are provided the proper information and visual recognition required to accomplish their mission in OPC?

57A: No, I wouldn't say there's a system to do that, no.

**HALL**

58Q: Do you feel like there should be a system to do that?

58A: Yes.

59Q: What information is provided to the aircrews, to the best of your knowledge, regarding friendly aircraft in the AOR?

59A: Specifically, what information--

COL AT LEE: Could I ask for a recess please? The time is 0846.

(A recess is taken at this point.)

COL AT LEE: The time is 0902 on the 27th of April 1994. The individuals who were present when we recessed are once again present.

Colonel Hall, in response to a couple of questions, you gave us some information which requires us to advise you of your rights under the UCMJ before we proceed further. I'll proceed with that rights advisement.

I am Colonel At Lee. As previously stated, this Board is investigating the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the Northern No-Fly-Zone on 14 April 1994--the Northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994 and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft.

You are suspected of the following offense--dereliction in the performance of your duties in violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I advise you that under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, you have the right to remain silent; that is, to say nothing at all. Anything you say may be used as evidence against you in a trial by court-martial or in other judicial or administrative procedures.

I also advise you that you have the right to consult with a lawyer, if you desire; to have a lawyer present during this interview. You may obtain a civilian lawyer of your own choosing at no expense to the Government or, if you wish, the Air Force will appoint a military lawyer for you free of charge. You may request a lawyer at any time during the interview and if you decide to answer questions without a lawyer present, you may stop the questioning at any time. Do you understand your rights?

WITNESS: Yes.

COL AT LEE: Do you wish to remain silent or will you answer our questions?

**HALL**

WITNESS: I'll answer the questions.

COL AT LEE: Do you want a lawyer?

WITNESS: No.

60Q: The questions that I'm referring to, specifically, towards the end of the first segment of our discussion, you were asking whether there was a system in place which would provide--I'm not using the words exactly as they were presented to you but which would provide a uniform or consistent basis of information to aircrews for operation in the area. My understanding was that you said there was no such system in place. Is that correct?

60A: No. I mean there is, yes..

61Q: I'm sorry? There is a system in place?

61A: Yes, I'm not sure--maybe I didn't understand what the question was, but there is a system, yes.

62Q I also understood you to say that you felt there should be a system in place to provide standardized information to aircrew personnel.:

62A: If I remember right, the question was, specifically, recognition data. I think the answer was the C-2--at the C-2, we did not regularly disseminate recognition data. In other words, what we disseminated, primarily, was threat information--what was the Order of Battle, what were changes in the Order of Battle, our assessment of Iraqi intentions, information like that. I think the question dealt specifically with recognition data, and I don't remember in the four months I've been here turning out a product from C-2 that dealt specifically with recognition data.

COL AT LEE: We'll proceed with a number of questions which pertain to your function as the Chief Intelligence Officer and how those functions were accomplished.

**Questions by Colonel Fain:**

63Q: Are you familiar with OPLAN 91-7, the implementing instruction for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

63A: Only--yes, in the sense that I read it when I first arrived here. If you asked me what the 91-7 was, specifically, I probably wouldn't know if you hadn't given me the title.

64Q: In your readings of that directive, did you read the section entitled C-2?

64A: Yes.

65Q: For Intelligence.

65A: Yes.

**HALL**

66Q: Would you describe for me again what you consider the mission of CTF C-2 to be?

66A: Well, the primary mission is to collect, analyze and disseminate data on the enemy situation in Northern Iraq.

67Q: And dissemination of that data is to whom?

67A: The dissemination is to the squadron operations centers here at Incirlik, to the wing operations center which is the Combined Forces Air Component IN, intelligence staff, and also to the--by way of briefings and special products, to the Commanding General, Chief of Staff, the other "C" directors and to the commanders of the coalition forces here which include the French, the British and the Turks and then, finally, at a lower, I think, importance, would be information that we push upward and that would go primarily to the European Command.

68Q: With regard to the dissemination of intelligence information to the aircrews, would that include the Air Order of Battle?

68A: Yes.

69Q: Would it include changes to the Air Order of Battle?

69A: Yes.

70Q: Would it include visual recognition for aircrews of potential enemy and friendly aircraft?

70A: Not--again, not that I'm aware of in the last four months have we turned out a product I would describe as dealing with recognition.

71Q: How would you expect that information to reach the aircrews?

71A: Well, I would expect it to be--if we had a product, I would expect it to go from the C-2 to the squadron operation centers and be, in turn, used as briefing material for the aircrews or training material.

72Q: Would you expect other avenues of obtaining that information to be available to the aircrews?

72A: Yes.

73Q: What would those be?

73A: I expect that at the squadron operations centers there are libraries and documents related to Order of Battle. There are documents related to enemy weapons system capabilities and I expect would be recognition data as well.

74Q: In your capacity as the CTF C-2, is there any system in effect that will ensure you that the aircrews have received the proper information and are proficient in tasks such as aircraft recognition?

**HALL**

74A: A specific system, I don't think so. I would say a general system for making sure information is flowing, yes, but a specific system for checking, for example, to see that aircraft recognition data is available or briefed, I would say no.

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

75Q: I'd just like to ask for a point of clarification. You said that there was a "general system" to ensure that?

75A: Right.

76Q: What did you mean by that?

76A: Well, the system would include the preparation of products and then the dissemination of the products over--mostly, written products that go out in my distribution to the squadron operation centers.

77Q: Do you consider helicopters of Iraq, under the circumstances of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, to be part of the enemy Order of Battle?

77A: Yes.

78Q: Is there a way that you would expect the aircrew members to obtain information regarding that aspect of the Enemy Order of Battle if it didn't come through your organization?

78A: I don't know. They may hold, at the squadron operation centers, documents; for example, they might hold a DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, document related to Order of Battle, for example, that says this is the Order of Battle in a particular area at a particular time. Primarily, here, I relied on the products that we produced with the order of battle information in them, but yes, there are other sources of information.

79Q: Is it your understanding that the intelligence officers who brief at the squadron operation centers would also rely primarily on your organization for the source of that?

79A: Yes.

**Questions by Colonel Fain:**

80Q: Does your organization provide any training for the unit intelligence officers?

80A: Yes, we do.

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

81Q: What is the nature of that training?

**HALL**

81A: They come to the C-2 when they arrive and they are given an overview briefing, you might call it; in other words, I, typically, will brief them on kind of what PROVIDE COMFORT is all about, what we are here to do, what the nature of the problem is and then what they will do is they will spend time with each of the analysts so at the C-2 we have an air analyst, an air defense analyst, a ground analyst, an electronic intelligence analyst--let's see if I can remember them all--requirements person we call a requirements analyst and we have a reconnaissance specialist so what we do is we take the Intel people and they spend--they get desktop briefings from each of those and the desktop briefings is concerned with what's out there, what's the order of battle, what weapon systems are there, what changes have we seen recently and also what are the products that I, let's say I as an air analyst, will give to you--what products should you be looking for from me.

82Q: In their training sessions, would you expect the squadron intelligence officer to pick up enough information regarding the Air Order of Battle that he could translate that to the unit training program for things such as visual recognition?

82A: Yes.

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

83Q: Are you personally familiar with what is contained within those desktop briefings that they receive?

83A: In the sense that I was given the same briefings, yes, plus just by occasionally, I will listen in just to see what information they're passing on.

84Q: Do you know whether those briefings included the helicopter Order of Battle for Iraq?

84A: Yes, for Air Order of Battle, yes.

85Q: Did it include information pertaining to Hinds, specifically?

85A: As far as I know, yes--what was--yes, as far as the helicopter Order of Battle.

86Q: You related information regarding the location of Hinds. Was that part of the desktop briefings?

86A: Yes, as far as I know.

87Q: Are these a product that are used repeatedly? Can we gain access to those briefings--or materials used for those briefings?

87A: I'm not sure what you mean. Do you mean is there a written product?

88Q: That's used to brief or an outline that's used to brief?

**HALL**

88A: I don't know. I don't know if we have an outline. I don't know if the analysts use an outline or if they just brief from their knowledge. When I was briefed, it was just a standup. The analyst just stood up and briefed pretty much everything they knew and I think that's pretty much what I observed in C-2 when the Intel folks come in.

89Q: When you say a "stand up", you're referring, you know, standing at a board that depicts the Enemy Order of Battle?

89A: Right.

90Q: Prior to the 14th of April, had you received any requests for information from the operational community pertaining to the presence of Iraqi helicopters in the AOR?

90A: No.

91Q: Do you know whether there are any Soviet-built helicopters that are located in the vicinity [PAUSE]. There was a long pause there so let me restate the question so you are not trying to hang on to the first half of the question. Do you know if there are any Soviet-built helicopters that are located in the vicinity of the PROVIDE COMFORT AOR, other than Iraqi helicopters?

91A: Yes.

92Q: Can you give us a general understanding of the countries that may have them within the vicinity close enough to have access to the AOR?

92A: Specifically, the countries?

93Q: Yes.

93A: Are we going to go back to classified again?

94Q: We're operating within that mode.

94A: Okay, good. We know that there are Soviet helicopters, Soviet-made helicopters in Syria, Iraq, as we mentioned, also in Iran. The Turks have made a purchase offer for Soviet helicopters also, but not delivered as far as I know.

#### **Questions by Colonel Fain:**

95Q: Would you be more specific with regards to the Hind helicopter?

95A: My own personal knowledge--if I look at Turkey, the Turks were intending to purchase Hinds themselves, but again as far as we know, there's been no delivery.

**HALL**

**Questions by General Andrus:**

96Q: How about Syria?

96A: I don't know if Syria--I don't know myself if Syria has Hinds, or Iran. I don't remember. I know that--again, my Air Analyst would have that information. I do not remember, specifically. I don't believe Syria did, but I am not sure.

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

97Q: I want to make reference to a couple of areas within the Operations Plan 91-7 that pertain to the Intel area with specific focus on whether you have received any guidance from the Commanding General or anyone superior to you regarding the application of those sections. Under the "Execution" portion of the Operations Plan, under Intelligence in Electronic Warfare, it says--Priority of collection effort is on composition, disposition, strengths, locations and activities of Iraqi ground and air forces to include ADA and helicopters north of 36 degrees.

Have you received any guidance which would have reoriented the focus of your Intelligence section or that is contrary to that Execution guidance?

97A: No. Could you read that again?

98Q: Surely.

98A: I would say my first answer is, "No," but if you would read that again.

99Q: Under Intelligence and Electronic Warfare--Priority of collection effort is on composition, disposition, strengths, locations and activities of Iraqi ground and air forces (to include ADA and helicopters) north of 36 degrees.

99A: No, no guidance to change that.

100Q: And under the Intelligence Annex--Mission--General Section--To provide timely, usable, relevant intelligence to coalition forces in order to support prudent effective command decisions.

100A: Yes--I mean no, no guidance to change that--right. I would say that's current guidance.

101Q: Under the "Concept of Operations" portion of that Annex--CTF PC C-2 will be the focal point for all intelligence direction, collection, processing/analysis and dissemination for the operation.

101A: I'd say that's correct as well.

102Q: In terms of the time frame since you have been here and the absence, to your recollection, of any product going specifically to aircraft identification of Soviet helicopters or aircraft in

**HALL**

general from your organization down to the lower intelligence organizations, are there any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding the absence of that information moving down?

102A: It would be difficult to say. You know, again, we focus primarily on the numbers, types, disposition, capabilities, tactics of enemy systems and again the products I remember dealt with those issues. Usually, the squadrons themselves maintain recognition information. For example, when I was at a squadron Intel, I had recognition books, guides--I had posters, things we put up on the wall. I don't remember getting things from a higher headquarters, specifically, relating to recognition. I think we function along kind of the same lines here where we deal more with the kind of dynamics of the threat out there and maybe not so much with--well, specifically, not so much with what the threat looks like--at that, the C-2 level--the types of products we produce and I just--again, I don't remember--I can ask my analyst if they remember putting out a product relating to recognition, but I certainly don't remember one specifically.

103Q: Do you think it would be a significant area if--a significant area of importance to aircrew members to know what the threat in any particular area of operations did look like?

103A: You mean physical appearance?

104Q: Yes.

104A: Yes.

105Q: Related to that but not pertaining to Enemy Order of Battle, would your organization be responsible for disseminating information regarding the friendly Order of Battle so that aircrew members can distinguish between the friendly and the enemy?

105A: We did not. C-2 did not put out information on friendly Order of Battle--does not.

106Q: Do you feel that that is something which would be generally within the area of responsibility of the C-2?

106A: No.

107Q: Why is that?

107A: We deal really with the other side; in other words, the threat side of the equation.

108Q: Where would you expect the aircrews to obtain the friendly side for comparison with the threat side?

108A: I would expect it from the squadron operations centers, from the Ops side.

109Q: What would be their source of information for that?

**HALL**

109A: Well, let's see, sources would include, I guess, you have an Air Tasking Order which is produced everyday which tells the events that will take place that day, who will be flying, call signs, times, times over target, things like that, and then we have a daily--it's a graphic schedule, it's a flow diagram, which shows the aircraft--again, it gives their call signs and shows their takeoff times, times in the AOR, the Area Of Responsibility, refueling times and then you will see the return times on the flow as well so that visual information is available.

Again, I'm just going from my past experience but typically in the briefings, the Ops briefings I would attend, the package commander--again, depending on what type of mission this was going to be, the package commander or mission commander or a flight lead would brief friendly information; for example, frequencies, control agencies, other aircraft that might be in the flight, join-up procedures, things like that, which would give the crews a picture of the--kind of the flow of those involved and who else is out there--if it's a flying operation, who else is flying

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

110Q: Are you aware of any formal, regularized source of information to aircrew members of what the friendly forces looked like and how they would be expected to employ?

110A: Other than the ATO, the Air Tasking Order, the diagram, that's about all I can think of that would give you that information. There is also a weekly--if I remember right, there is a weekly mission--the Military Coordination Center produced a weekly--I think I have this right, a weekly flight schedule for the MCC helicopters--Eagle Flight, but other than that, I can't think of any other products that related to friendly Order of Battle, friendly presence, friendly dispositions.

111Q: Specifically regarding information that would assist in visual identification or electronic identification, are you aware of any source to them, other than that kind of information?

111A: No.

**Questions by General Andrus:**

112Q: Just to clarify, was anybody in your section or were you aware that Eagle Flight was going to be in the AOR on the 14th of April?

112A: Only in a general way, Sir. We know that Eagle Flight flies in the security zone, but specifically where they would be at any one time, no.

113Q: Do you know if any of your people were aware that they were going to be flying that specific day in the area?

113A: Again, I would say only in a general way. We know that they fly in the security zone.

**HALL**

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

114Q: Did you know they flew outside the security zone?

114A: No, I did not. Oh, you mean do they fly outside the security zone at times, yes.

115Q: Yes, within the AOR, but outside the security zone?

115A: Right, right, right.

**Questions by General Andrus:**

116Q: But you had no specific information that day as to where Eagle Flight intended to go. Is that correct?

116A: No, I did not.

117Q: And no one in your section had any information like that?

117A: I don't think so. I don't think so. I don't remember. When we first heard about the Hind shoot down, for example, the first question we asked to the JOIC, the Joint Operations Intelligence Center--the very first question we asked was--Do you know where the helicopters--our MCC helicopters are? That was the first question we asked which implied to me we did not have--in other words, I could not have looked around in my desk or my area and found--told you where the MCC helicopters were. We went to the JOIC to ask them do they know where the helicopters are.

118Q: Would you define the term you just used, the JOIC?

118A: Oh, the Joint Operations Intelligence Center is the operations center for PROVIDE COMFORT at the CTF level. It's run by the C-3, the director of operations.

119Q: You say that you asked the JOIC, "Do you know where the helicopters are?" That would imply that you were aware there were helicopters flying?

119A: Yes--yes, Sir.

120Q: Were you aware then that there were helicopters flying south of the Turkish border and north of the No-Fly--north of the 36 parallel?

120A: We knew MCC helicopters were flying in the area; again, that's about all I knew at the time; in other words, that they would be airborne somewhere in that area--where, specifically, they would be, at that time, I didn't know.

**HALL**

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

121Q: Can you be more specific on "that area"--what you mean by that?

121A: Normally, that area--I would say the security zone itself. We know that the helicopters are active--our helicopters are active within the security zone.

122Q: And to go back on the terminology--is what you referred to, the acronym I think would be JOIC?

122A: Right.

123Q: Is that also referred to as the JOC, Joint Operations Center?

123A: Yes. We added--in March--I think in March we added an Intel function to the JOC as it was then called, the Joint Operations Center, and it became the--officially now the Joint Operations Intelligence Center. Even though everyone, you still hear the term "JOC" or Joint Operations Center.

124Q: Can you describe what the source of the information was that the helicopters were within the security zone, how you generally knew they were flying there?

124A: The--we had a daily briefing down--there is a Monday, Wednesday, Friday briefing given by the C-3 to the CTF which shows what the air activity will be for the coming--it gives a summary of the previous day and it shows what the air activity will be for the next two days; and in fact, it actually shows--for the MCC it shows--projects about, typically, about a week. What you will get is just a general picture, a down day or a two-ship formation in the area--what they call the TAOR, Tactical Area of Responsibility.

125Q: And that briefing covered the Eagles in some manner?

125A: Yes.

126Q: Do you recall in what way it made reference to them?

126A: It's just a very general briefing. The C-3 gives it, again downstairs, to the CTF staff Monday, Wednesday, Friday, and it will show a day; for example if I take--I don't know if this is --if I specifically have this right but if I say 14 April, it will have a line after 14 April that will say something like, "Two-ship in the TAOR" or "Two-ship in TAOR" and what that tells you is there will be a two-ship formation flying in the security zone.

127Q: And the term "ship" in this case referring to helicopters?

127A: Right, two helicopters.

**Questions by Colonel Fain:**

**HALL**

128Q: Is there a time specified for those flights?

128A: In the briefing, no--no. It's just a general awareness that their helicopters are flying.

129Q: What time of the day is that briefing given?

129A: It's at 9:30 local.

130Q: Did you attend that briefing on the day prior to the 14th?

130A: I don't know what day of the week--I probably did attend the briefing preceding the 14th, yes--whether that was the day before or two days before, I don't know.

131Q: Do you recall specifics of the description of missions to be flown on the 14th from that briefing?

131A: No.

132Q: What time of the day is that briefing given?

132A: 9:30--Monday, Wednesday, Friday.

**Questions by Colonel At Lee:**

133Q: When you said it's given by the C-3, are you referring specifically to Colonel O'Brien?

133A: Yes--yes.

134Q: Do you have any further information, statements or evidence that you wish to present here, anything that you wish to add?

134A: No.

COL AT LEE: You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the Board President, Major General Andrus, CINC USAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No, I don't.

COL AT LEE: The time is 0936 and this interview is concluded.

**HALL**

**REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE**

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by COLONEL WILLIAM E. HALL, JR. to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.



MAUREEN A. NATION, DAFC

Court Reporter

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

**HALL**

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BETHEL, PAULETTE M.

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## SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

**MAJOR PAULETTE M. BETHEL  
37th SUPPLY SQUADRON  
LACKLAND AFB, TX**

The interview was conducted by Col Patrick J. Bennett, at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1446 hours, 27 April 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

### EXAMINATION

I am Major Paulette M. Bethel. My organization is 37th Supply Squadron, Lackland AFB, TX. My present duty assignment is Military Coordination Center, Rear Commander, Located at Pirinclik Air Base, in Diyarbakir, Turkey.

My duties primarily consist of ensuring that the logistical support requirements for the Military Coordination Center Forward take place. One of the primary tasks is forwarding the equipment or supplies that are required by the MCC Forward and to make sure all the customs requirements and paperwork is accomplished in order to move the property that comes in from Incirlik channeling through Diyarbakir on to Zakhu.

When I was first assigned to the job, I was told that Eagle flight came up under my command administratively. That all Military Coordination Center Commander Forward, in terms of administrative matters would come through me. In terms of administrative matters, I mean any of the personnel paperwork that needed be done, above what they would ordinarily do, we would process through our office. On a daily basis at the end of each day, I would be provided any information pertaining to the next day's schedule of operation, and then confirm any logistical actions that were going to take place in terms of equipment, in addition to going over what the next day's schedule would be.

I receive the operations schedule which is normally published 10 -14 days in advance. I would get that ahead of time. It would come in to me from the MCC Forward. MCC forward is located in Zakhu, Iraq. When I received that schedule, I would provide a copy to Eagle Flight Operations, because it would come in on the secure fax. Eagle flight didn't have a secure fax, it was located in my office. I would go over it to look at what the schedule looked like for the upcoming ten days to two weeks. Provide a copy to them and keep it in my safe, and then I would take out each day and review what the mission was going to be for the next day.

**BETHEL**

I do not get involved with forwarding that information down to Incirlik to the CTF. There is no message or mission information from me, from MCC Rear at Pirinlik to the CTF at Incirlik. Ordinarily, I would not get involved in any of the mission operation information that would pass from MCC Forward at Zahku to Incirlik. I have received phone calls from the JOC where discussions would be held about the mission as it related to something logistical that I needed to do with the following day, or during the week, or up-coming week. Normally the tasking, in terms of what would go on the aircraft would be, if there was supplies and equipment that need to go to Zakhu, I would know it was coming, because I would receive customs paperwork, for "beyaname" paperwork, ahead of the equipment coming. So that we could start the actions to ensure that the customs paperwork was taken care of in Diyarbakir to move the property forward.

I was aware that Eagle flight was going to Zakhu on the day of the 14th. I was aware the flight was also going into the TAOR. On the evening before the accident, I received my daily phone call from Major Sanders at MCC Forward to go over what the next day's mission was going to be. Capt McKenna was there at the time. He would normally come over approximately 1800 hours everyday. Normally about 1745 is about the time he would arrive. Major Sanders would call or I would initiate the call, which ever one of us got through first. At that point he would either confirm that the mission, that showed on the pre-printed schedule that I had, was going to remain the same or identify that there would be any changes to the schedule.

The schedule on the 14th was a changed mission. I believe that the original scheduled mission on the 14th of April had been an admin mission. When Capt McKenna received that mission information, we went over the information and the changes were provided to me. They had gone on the same or a similar mission a few days before. When he looked up what the changes were, I remember he made mention that he knew where they were going because they had been there previously.

I was not aware until after the accident occurred that Eagle flight needed to be in contact with AWACS before they went into the TAOR. I was not aware that U.S. Air Force fighters had to clear or be the first aircraft into the TAOR. I was not aware that any fighters had to go in first. Normally I didn't get involved in the operational aspects of the operation.

We would keep a copy of the operation schedule that was provided to me. When that one expired, we would destroy that one and then put the next one that had come in or any corrections to the schedule, if they published changes, then we would keep those until that time frame had passed. You have not received a copy of all that paperwork. I cannot provide a copy of that paperwork to LTC Black when he returns to Pirinlik because my admin troop had already destroyed it. So I don't have a copy from that week.

**BETHEL**

Returning back to the evening of the 13th at about 1800 and my conversation with Captain McKenna. Normally after we would have the conversation, he would go back to Eagle Flight operations. I never attended any of them, he would have a mission briefing with his people. I was never really aware of the exact time of his mission briefing with his folks to let them know what the mission would be the next day.

Captain McKenna never did file a flight plan with me. He would go in and file a flight plan and turn it in at Diyarbakir.

(At this point the interview was recessed. The interview resumed at 1508. The record should also reflect that prior to the recess Colonel Fain, Chief Investigator of the Accident Investigation Team joined us and that he has since departed.)

I am familiar with the MCC Operations schedule. It's the same schedule that I received from MCC Forward. I did not see the schedule dated 14 April with admin scratched out and the other mission information placed in. Since I am not knowledgeable about that change, I can't say when it happened. I don't remember the time of the mission being changed. I am not aware of any conversations by Colonel Thompson to get permission to go in early into TAOR on the day of the 14th. I am not privy to any conversations or knowledgeable of any desire by anybody to depart or go into the TAOR before the fighters or AWACS was up. If there was going to be a request to have the time changed, in my daily briefing with Major Sanders, he would either let me know that the time had changed and this was going to be the new departure time or he would tell me we're trying to get permission to move the time up, and if we did a change on the time, then we'll call and let you know. As far as I know the departure time was the same time as planned 10 days out.

(The record should reflect that the MCC operation schedule dated the week of 10-17 April 1994, that the witness referred to is evidence tag number 277 and is held in the accident team evidence room.)

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1512.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of MAJOR PAULETTE M. BETHEL, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

  
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SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA  
Legal Advisor

**BETHEL**

**TAB V-114**

**STEVENS, PHILIP R.**

## SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

**PHILIP R. STEVENS, CAPTAIN**  
**380 Air Refueling Squadron**  
**Plattsburgh AFB, NY**

The telephonic interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Mudge at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 0814 hours, 2 May 1994. Captain Patience Ruhe, judge advocate assigned to the 380 ARW/JA office at Plattsburgh AFB, NY, checked the ID card of the witness and verified the identification of the witness. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

### EXAMINATION

My name is Philip R. Stevens, Captain, 310th Air Refueling Squadron, Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York. My present duty assignment is as an aircraft commander.

My normal duties and responsibilities in the squadron are as an aircraft commander. I'm in charge of a four person crew on a KC-135 R model. Primary mission is air-to-air refueling.

When I was in Turkey on 14 April, my duties and responsibilities were to support the No-Fly-Zone over northern Iraq, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. That particular day we were up in the orbit, and we were refueling coalition fighters supporting that mission. I believe that was our fourth mission after arriving in the area. I had not been to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT before that.

Our mission on 14 April was to fly into the operating area. It spans approximately a four hour mission, three hours of which were in the anchor area, and I believe we were scheduled to refuel four F-15s and two F-16s.

If my time is right, we arrived at about 0630 Zulu. We were in the area approximately a half an hour of orbiting at which time the AWACS controller, which I believe was Duke, came

**STEVENS**

across and told us to work into the western part of the area. We started working into the western part of the area at which point the controller came across. He wasn't telling us, he was telling another fighter flight that two Iraqi Hind helicopters had been shot down. We continued to work in the western part of the area, avoid the eastern part of the area, and the only thing we heard on the radios was the AWACS controller continuing to advise other fighter flights that two Iraqi Hind helicopters had been shot down. That is all we heard on the radios. There were numerous fighter flights coming in and out of the area, and all we heard was he kept advising them that two Iraqi Hind helicopters had been shot down. That was basically all we heard.

The flight that was reported to have shot down the helicopters came up to us for air refueling. Everything was normal. It was a silent operation so we didn't talk to the pilots at all. They just came up, normal air refueling, and then they departed back into the area and that is all we saw of them. They were only with us for approximately ten or fifteen minutes at the most.

During this time frame, we had the air refueling primary frequency in one radio. The call signs of the two frequencies we were listening on were Duke and Cougar. We had a VHF radio, but I don't believe we had that dialed up to anything relevant. I don't remember what frequency it was on. I believe we were just monitoring the two UHF radios at that point. We had the Guard frequency on UHF and VHF on. To my knowledge, we didn't hear anything over those frequencies.

I did not hear any radio calls to or about Eagle Flight, the two helicopters. The only radio calls we heard was the AWACS advising other flights of fighters that Tiger had shot down two Iraqi Hind helicopters and, I believe, the way they were talking, they were just giving everybody a heads up, and they weren't expecting any retaliation from the Iraqis, but they wanted everybody to keep a good heads up. That was my impression of what was going on.

I have no knowledge of the engagement.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of Captain Philip R. Stevens, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation board.

  
CHARLES H. WILCOX, II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

STEVENS

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TAB V-115

FOLEY, JOHN M. II

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

OF

JOHN M. FOLEY, II, CAPTAIN  
86 FWS, 79 TEG EGLIN AFB, FL

The interview was conducted by Colonel Michael E. Fain at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey beginning at 1005 hours, 5 May 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I have been TDY here at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, since 24 January 1994. I work for Major Larry White who works in the operations building. Lieutenant Colonel Dougherty and Colonel Richardson would be next in the chain of command. I do not know if Lieutenant Colonel Pinter, the Ops Support Commander, is between Major White or Lieutenant Colonel Dougherty, but I know that he does work for Colonel Richardson

I am the CTF MP, the mission planning cell; scheduling. In my position here at Incirlik Air Base, we build the daily flow sheet and frag which gets published for the following day's missions, and coordinate all the details for that. We are not involved to create the long term, or three month scheduling plan, but we do receive it and use it as part of our tools for scheduling purposes.

I graduated from ROTC, and from pilot training in February of 1984. I went through F-16 RTU and I have flown F-16s since then. I am currently a weapons instructor stationed at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. I work in the Air-to-Ground Test Squadron, and I fly with the Air-to-Air Test Squadron.

The person who I replaced left the week prior to my arrival here at Incirlik Air Base, but when I arrived, there were two people in the shop who had overlapped; they trained me and gave me instructions. We went through our daily scheduling process, the collection of all the information that we use to build the ATO, and the flow sheets that we use to put out on the street everyday. I was briefed and given a copy of a continuity book which went over the procedures that we use in the shop. The continuity book has

FOLEY

been adequate, as far as getting the information out on the street and how to build a daily schedule. There have been some modifications made throughout the four months that I have been here where we have streamlined a couple of things; updating as the schedule processing evolved. However, the continuity book did not contain any information with regard to scheduling of the Eagle Flights flying through the AOR, nor was that published in any of our documents.

Since I have been here, the sequence of events for the daily processing of the ATO was: the day prior, we would build a flow sheet for flying, putting in all the aircraft that we have scheduled. Then we will type up an ATO, a local schedule and a Provide Comfort schedule. When we arrive at 7:30 in the morning, we will take those documents, and quality control line-by-line the take-off, landings, time on station, refueling. We check the flow sheet and the Provide Comfort schedule and check it against the ATO to make sure it is all accurate. Then we quality control the local schedule against local training flight schedules that we receive on a weekly and monthly basis, for accuracy. Once we have gone through it and made all our hand corrections, the enlisted personnel type it and we would quality control again. The ATO, the flow sheet, the local schedule, the Provide Comfort schedule and a cover sheet, which will list any meetings or notes for the next day, are then packaged to go to reproduction at about 11:00 o'clock to 11:30 daily. Then, it is distributed around 3:00 p.m. to the various units, command post and the different buildings that receive the ATO. If there are any changes that come down or fall out that everyone should be made aware of, we will then put that information into a BSD -- Battle Staff Directive. If we do have a BSD, it will be taken to the command post, where it will be put into a folder for each unit that needs to receive it. We will then begin work on the next two days scheduling. We do accept changes to the schedule until about 9:00 o'clock a.m., but after 9:00 o'clock a.m. we try to flow them into the next day. If there is a change which will require a BSD between 9:00 and 11:00 o'clock p.m., Major White will usually "beep" one of us. We will then go into the shop, get the details, make a BSD which will have a sheet that is then brought to the command post. Occasionally Major White goes in and completes a late night BSD. Although we only have maybe one late change where we would have to make a late night BSD every three weeks, it would be because we had a tanker that fell out or we needed a couple of people to move to a different tanker. I believe it is three to four hours prior to takeoff that we would publish a late BSD. But, if people were showing up for work we would put the change out on a BSD; it would be floated to the next day or it would be transmitted by the Mad Dog -- any scheduling changes.

We receive the information for scheduling from Intel, which goes into targeting and where people are going to go on different taskings is provided by the British or the French liaison for C-2 everyday between 9 and 10:00 a.m. We will then quality control it to make sure it is following the guidelines. We will then add it to the back of the ATO

**FOLEY**

and make sure that the appropriate units get the proper tasking. If any of the other units have an input, for instance flying three two-ships, they can only fly two-ships, or the next day they want to be on an early go, we tell them to forward that to Major White. However, we will annotate it on our calendar because when go to our schedule, we look for information that we need to put into our flow, which will then be quality controlled with Major White's office.

Lieutenant John Geis was the representative from Eagle Flight who gives us a calendar which would list their flights for a three to four week period. Those flights were either from Diyarbakir to here or local training; there were no specific AOR sorties. The only thing that we published was local training for the helicopters. This calendar is one of the tools that I quality control against the local to make sure their training gets put on the local schedule. Approximately every week to two weeks we would receive a change to their schedule. On the schedule itself we would put the call sign, what type of aircraft, takeoff and land time, the area they were going and any other remarks. At the time, I was not aware of any information that was available for any scheduled AOR sorties. There are lines on the PC schedule which show flights from LTCC to TAOR back to LTCC which are actually people who have hops back to Diyarbakir. It is totally transparent to our shop. There are lines on the schedule, I believe, they are used to show that they fly their helicopters around the AOR, which are standard lines in the ATO and on the PC schedule. The word in our shop was, "These are the lines that they always have." "They just always go on the schedule." I was not provided with late specifics of activation of those lines, or take-off times or gate times. We put the schedule out, and unless someone has an input, we are, basically, out of the loop as to whether they canceled, who flew or when they fly.

Colonel O'Brien ran the meetings on Monday, Wednesday and Friday, and they would put up a slide that shows how many sorties were scheduled and flown, a slide from maintenance showing how many helicopters were broken and fixed. My portion of the meeting is putting up the flow sheet that we were flying the present day and the next day, in case there was anything that Colonel O'Brien wanted to brief the General on. As to Eagle Flight, if I had any questions they usually were for the Army Lieutenant who would talk about the local schedule, because that was what we needed to know to build the schedule. But, the actual sorties that were hopping around the AOR by Eagle Flight we never dealt with that in our shop. There are lines on the PC schedule nomenclature to the right that are normally LTCC to TAOR back to LTCC, which are hops back and forth to Diyarbakir. I never picked up any individual information of what Eagle Flight does in the AOR or even if they have flown. I know there was a slide put up that talked about scheduled sorties, flown sorties and effective sorties, and there may be Eagle Flight sorties in there, but that was nothing that we ever had to deal with as schedulers. So, I

**FOLEY**

really never paid much attention. I never heard Colonel O'Brien make comments regarding the fact that Eagle Flight was not on the flow sheet, nor a discussion regarding getting Eagle Flight information on the flow sheet.

The flow sheets are provided to the individual units as well as the ATO. However, the Eagle Flights were not listed on the flow sheets because we do not know when, where or whether they fly.. The sorties on the flow sheet are sorties that we have scheduled take-off and landing times. The only people that are represented on the flow sheet are people that we schedule when they go out, what they do, and when they come home.

I did attend the Wednesday morning meeting prior to the 14th of April, however, I do not recall anything out of the ordinary being presented at the meeting. The standard slides were presented. I don't recall any discussion of any AOR sorties with the helicopters. Occasionally, we discussed restrictions, altitudes, guidance from the General coming down and, on occasion, the helicopters were mentioned. But, the actual, who is flying out in the AOR; I don't recall anything about the helicopters being brought up.

I do not recall any discussions before or after the meeting concerning a similar sortie that was flown on 11 April.

To the best of my recollection, Colonel O'Brien chaired the meeting on the 13th of April. However, if Colonel O'Brien was absent, Wing Commander Alan Thompson was in charge of the meetings.

I do not consider flying from Diyarbakir to Zakhu as training flights for Eagle Flight. If Eagle Flight is going to fly a training flight, they activate one of the required lines, which is the only one that we schedule. So, it is only the local training flights for the helicopters that we put on our local schedule. There are usually a couple of helicopters here doing local training, and if they show up on the schedule that Lieutenant Malborough provides us, they are flown out of this base. I would have to look at the schedule to be able to say MH-60s are part of their detachment. We do have MH-60s and UH-60s that are on the local schedule on a daily basis.

I do not know what the correct terminology is for MDS, but it is a type of aircraft.

Major White gave us guidance on training if there was something that we had not already been working or if it was something that we did not have a handle on.

I thought that most of the time that the scheduling process, with the guidance we received, was adequate -- up until the 14th of April.

**FOLEY**

Late in the day, when we hand carried the BSDs over the command post, they were given to a command post officer, who would sign for them and then get them ready for distribution. Each unit has a distribution point at the command post where they would pick up their BSD every morning before they went to work.

The Mad Dog's duty location is at the command post.

"Hops" in the AOR, refer to flights within the Area Of Responsibility.

"Lines" referred to Eagle Flight, that we put on the schedule; we have always put them on so that they can activate and fly their sorties that they do. But, that was kind of removed from what we did because they flew their schedule. I believe it was Captain Bellinger or one of the Sergeants within the Frag Shop who told me it was routine to put those "lines" on the schedule.

When I attended the meeting for the sortie that was going to be flown on the 11th which was similar to the sortie on the 14th, I do not recall any discussion about who was going to be on that flight. I also do not recall any discussion about who was going to be on the flight on the 14th of April during my attendance at the meeting on the day preceding.

The local area of training is here at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

I do not have any further personal knowledge of the scheduling of Eagle Flight on the 14th of April.

The C-3 meetings that I attended were part of my ordinary duties. I have attended those meetings every Monday, Wednesday and Friday, with the exception of three or four meetings around the third week in March, since I have been here. There had been a discussion that lasted about a week concerning the fact that I, as a representative from the Frag Shop who attended these meetings that some of the inputs by the personnel were coming to me instead of going to Major White. Also, there was a concern that C-3 would be removed from our operation, that we should be able to operate without having to have someone go to these meetings and use the proper communication instead of us being there. Our product to them was a weekly schedule where they put up the days and we had many inputs which changed that. So I felt that by attending these meetings, it was productive in giving them updates as we got them, rather than weekly. The C-3 would give us a heads up to things, but any information that would really affect the schedule was put through Major White.


(The Accident Investigation Board recessed at 1040 hours, on 5 May 1994, and was resumed at 1043 hours on 5 May 1994.)

**FOLEY**

I do not have any further evidence, information or statements that I would like to present.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of JOHN M. FOLEY, II, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

  
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WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR., Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**FOLEY**

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TAB V-116

V-116

THOMPSON, ALAN

7-144

## SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

OF

ALAN THOMPSON, WG CDR  
CTF C-3 - PLANS  
INCIRLIK AIR BASE, TURKEY

The interview was conducted by Colonel Michael E. Fain at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey beginning at 1108 hours, 5 May 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

### EXAMINATION

I am Alan Thompson. I am a Wing Commander in the Royal Air Force. Presently, I work at CTF Headquarters in the C-3 Plans area, at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

My duty title is CTF C-3 Deputy Director (Plans). My military background was in the operational area until 1990. I spent a year at our Staff College. Then, I was appointed to our Operational Research Organization in MOD where I was responsible for procuring and modifying new aircraft and equipment. I arrived here on 27 January 1994, and I had no experience in any planning job. Upon my arrival here, there was a four day overlap with my predecessor. My predecessor gave me an introduction to what Operation Provide Comfort was about and who I would be dealing with -- the personalities and various roles -- and that was about it. I was not provided with continuity folders, books, or written directions regarding my duties. I did have a job description which was provided. The continuity brief was conducted orally.

My primary responsibilities are to update, coordinate and produce any operation plans regarding coalition air and ground forces. The operation plans would include CTF plans. The CTF is operating under plans which go back to the beginning of the organization. They have subsequently been amended, as the mission of CTF has changed. I was led to believe that CTF OPLAN 92-1 was the governing document for the CTF daily operations with respect to plans. The CTF OPLAN 92-1 is not widely disseminated. I have subsequently found that the CTF OPLAN 92-1 has not been approved. I have found, by going back through the records, that the last OPLAN that was approved was OPLAN 91-7. I am very roughly aware of the contents of OPLAN 91-7. When I arrived here at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, I was not briefed that OPLAN

THOMPSON

91-7 was the governing document. In my experience since I have arrived here, I would have to say that OPLAN 91-7 is not widely disseminated because it was very rarely discussed. I can't remember ever hearing anyone refer to OPLAN 91-7 or discuss parts of it. I was not briefed on the status of OPLAN 92-1. I was aware of OPLAN 92-1 prior to 14 April, but as I have stated, I thought that it was in existence and had been approved.

CTF guidance is disseminated to the subordinate organizations by the CTF Commanding General through the various directors, through to the staff; I can only answer on behalf of the C-3 area. We hold regular meetings on Monday, Wednesdays and Fridays in which the majority of the C-3 staff are there. The Director then explains what guidance has been given by the General. If there is anything that comes up which is important and cannot wait for those meetings, then he will assemble the appropriate personnel and brief them accordingly.

The C-3 acted as a coordination unit to MCC in ensuring that the various messages were passed between MCC and C-3; I do not believe there was any other form of relationship. I'm not aware of any scheduling responsibilities with respect to C-3 as regards to Eagle Flight, the helicopter operations at MCC; we only monitored.

The C-3's relationship to CFAC was as a coordinating authority and monitoring the daily activity on the ATO. The C-3 tried to provide guidance to MCC and CFAC. Colonel O'Brien was very concerned and tried on numerous times to formalize an agreement. Colonel O'Brien had various meetings with the General and the CFAC DO to try and come to some agreement as to where the responsibilities of each should lie. The responsibilities of CFAC and MCC were not delineated in great detail in any of the plans.

OPLAN 92-1 should be reviewed, revised and put forward as the OPLAN under which CTF Provide Comfort should operate. I am not of aware of when or how progress and the publication of OPLAN 92-1 stopped, because it occurred before I arrived here; I was not briefed on it and therefore did not pursue that matter.

I do not know at what level OPLAN 92-1 had been approved at because there is no record of that in our files. The reason that I thought it was approved was that we have a short resume of the current plans and those that have been previously in place within Operation Provide Comfort; OPLAN 92-1 was the last on the list. It was described as EUCOM 005 and then underneath it had been written OPLAN 92-1, which is why I assumed that EUCOM 005 had been accepted as OPLAN 92-1. I do not know if OPLAN 92-1 had been submitted to EUCOM by the CTF.

I do not know why OPLAN 92-1 has not been approved. I do not think that any components of the CTF are operating under the guidance contained in OPLAN 92-1

**THOMPSON**

under the impression that it has been approved. The negotiations and discussions on OPLAN 92-1 started in 1991, and I presume that because it's a 92 number that they went into 1992; as to when they finally stopped and to what level they got, I have no information on that. We have not started the action to get the OPLAN 92-1 updated or approved.

My director, Colonel O'Brien, indicated what my responsibilities were when I first arrived here. He then stated that he wanted me to concentrate on two areas. One, was producing an OPLAN for the future runway closure at Incirlik and the redeployment of the tanker and AWACS aircraft. Second, was to review the contingency plans that we had, which were for reinforcement of MCC, evacuation of MCC, evacuation of NGOs -- Non Governmental Organizations -- and the redeployment of OPC. Colonel O'Brien never discussed with me OPLAN 92-1, nor OPLAN 91-7. I have spent all of my time trying to update the contingency plans and also to produce an OPLAN for the runway closure. Neither Colonel O'Brien nor anyone else has tried to redirect my energies toward a comprehensive plan for CTF.

When guidance came down from the Commanding General, it was conveyed to us by meetings with the Director of C-3 which were given orally, but they were occasionally written. The written guidance would come down as a memo, which we keep on file.

We have a draft of OPLAN 92-1 in our office; it is not a complete document. This draft OPLAN 92-1 is the only document designated as OPLAN 92-1 in existence, that I know of. I became aware that OPLAN 92-1 was a draft about a week to 10 days after the 14 April accident, because I had a general concern that perhaps we had not gotten everything in line and that there was no clear delineation of responsibilities in the area between CFAC and C-3. No one requested that I research the OPLAN 92-1; I did it on my own initiative.

There have been misunderstandings between the CFAC and the C-3. I think they both had different ideas of who had responsibilities for what areas and that was a topic that they continually discussed to try and resolve. A major topic of misunderstandings was over the tasking of the reconnaissance assets. There were also discussions over who should have control over various personnel in the Headquarters, in particular the French and UK liaison officers and also the SARLO, the search and rescue liaison officer. To the best of my knowledge, there were no discussions concerning the MCC operations or Eagle Flight. I believe the underlying cause of the misunderstandings between the CFAC and the C-3 would go to the fact that CFAC was a permanent party organization, although it was augmented with people that were TDY. The Headquarters staff are all


**THOMPSON**

TDY personnel and the Wing has assumed responsibility over a matter of time; they have the continuity, whereas the Headquarters staff on TDY do not have the continuity. I think, over a period of time, the CFAC has assumed a dominant role. I also think there is a personality clash between the Director of C-3 and the CFAC DO.

I have no further evidence, information or statements that I believe would be helpful to the Accident Investigation Board.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of ALAN THOMPSON, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

THOMPSON

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TAB V-117

V-116

MASON, WILLIAM D.

V-117

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**WILLIAM D. MASON, MAJOR  
22nd Fighter Squadron  
Spangdahlem AB, Germany**

**COLONEL AT LEE:** The time is 1306 on the 5th of May 1994. The persons present are the witness, also Major General Andrus, Colonel Bennett, Mister Brummell, Colonel Fain. I'm Colonel At Lee.

This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is an aircraft accident investigation conducted under AFR 110-14. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that their testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

**WITNESS:** Yes sir.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

**WITNESS:** Yes sir.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** Do you have any questions?

**WITNESS:** No sir.

**MASON**

COLONEL AT LEE: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon, speak slowly, clearly and loudly. Remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others who do not have your technical background can understand it.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by this board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it is necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Do you have any questions concerning these matters?

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: Please stand and I'll put you under oath.

(The witness was sworn)

## EXAMINATION

### (Questions by Colonel At Lee)

1Q: Would you state your name and grade?

1A: Major William D. Mason.

2Q: And your organization?

2A: I'm assigned to the 22nd Fighter Squadron at Spangdahlem. I am TDY to CTF C-3.

3Q: And that's at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey?

3A: Yes sir.

### (Questions by Colonel Fain)

4Q: Would you briefly describe for the board your military background, please?

4A: I started out flying OV-10s, forward air controller, at Sembach. From there I went to Homestead, transitioned into the F-4D, went up to Moody, did PAVE SPIKE for a few years up there, flying E model F-4s. Out to George, was a Weasel. After that, went to Langley. I worked in DR for three years on JOINT STARS. Went to war on JOINT STARS. Then got picked up on the return to fly board and -- and now at Spangdahlem flying F-16s.

**MASON**

5Q: And what's your duty title at Spangdahlem?

5A: Assistant operations officer.

6Q: And how long have you been at Incirlik?

6A: Since September.

7Q: September of '93?

7A: Yes sir.

8Q: And what's your duty title here at Incirlik?

8A: The Deputy C-3.

9Q: When you arrived at Incirlik, did you receive any overlap or training from your predecessor before assuming your duties?

9A: Yes sir, about three days worth.

10Q: Could you describe that training and the type of information that was passed to you at that time?

10A: We set down and went through all the duties that the deputy C-3 has and then I basically followed him through two days of -- of work.

11Q: Were you comfortable with your knowledge of the position when you assumed the position from him?

11A: Yes sir.

12Q: And would you describe for me what you believe to be your primary duties in your current position?

12A: I do quite a different number of things. I'm the -- basically the personnel guy for C-3 and I handle all the people that are coming in and going out, in terms of making sure that everyone who's departing has got a replacement. I handle awards and decs for people that are leaving.

In addition to that, there are a number of little things that I do. For example, people that are going to get orientation rides, I make sure the paperwork gets filled out properly. Probably the biggest duty I have is fairly nebulous, in that, whatever comes up that Colonel O'Brien wants me to handle, anything that -- hot comes up during the day, I jump on that. There's a lot of crisis management involved in the job.

13Q: Do you have any responsibilities with regards to scheduling of the daily OPC missions?

13A: No sir.

14Q: Do you have any written or published guidance available to you, higher headquarters directives, CTF directives, etcetera, for the conduct of your job?

**MASON**

14A: Yes sir. There is a continuity folder that I've got. Outside of that I -- I'm not aware of any.

15Q: Are you aware of the mission of the military coordination center, or MCC?

15A: Yes sir. I visited the MCC three different times and one time I was there for a week. So I'm very familiar with their mission.

16Q: Have you been to MCC Forward and to the Eagle Flight operation?

16A: Yes sir.

17Q: Have you flown missions with Eagle Flight?

17A: Yes sir.

18Q: Are you aware of Eagle Flight's scheduling practices with regard to providing Incirlik with information regarding their flights and getting that on the ATO?

18A: Because I was not directly involved in that, I did not have a real -- I was generally aware of what the -- what the scheduling procedures were, but not exactly.

19Q: Do you have a feel for how their missions were coordinated and/or integrated into a standard OPC package?

19A: Their missions really were not integrated with the O -- with the rest of OPC flying. Because of the nature of what they were doing, supporting the MCC, there were times where they were integrated into it. If they were traveling outside the security zone, they had to have AWACS on station, so they were integrated into it then. However, on a day to day basis, they weren't integrated into the -- into the OPC schedule.

20Q: Has that practice changed since your arrival back in September at all?

20A: No sir.

21Q: Did you consider, in your position, that to be a problem, with regard to OPC daily operations?

21A: No sir.

22Q: Do you perform your duties in the JOC or C-3 shop, or do you have an office separate from them?

22A: I have a separate office, but I'm quite often in the JOC.

23Q: Are you aware of the information passed from Eagle Flight to the JOC regarding their day to day operations?

23A: I know that we monitor the radio calls they make back and forth, but outside of that, no sir.

**MASON**

24Q: Are you aware of the functions of the liaison officer, the Army liaison officer?

24A: Yes sir.

25Q: Could you describe for me what his responsibilities are?

25A: He is the 12th Aviation Brigade's representative in the headquarters. He does a great deal of coordinating work, supporting people and parts coming through Incirlik on their way to Diyarbakir. And I would say that occupies the majority of his time.

In addition to that, he also -- if someone has a question about capabilities, limitations of -- of their helicopter operation, he's the person that we turn to.

26Q: Does he have a function with regard to their daily flight operations in coordinating with the C-37?

26A: No sir.

27Q: And who does he work for within the organization?

27A: Right now, he answers to the 12th Aviation Brigade. We're in the process of getting that changed so he is actually assigned a ULN number in the headquarters.

28Q: In your work with personnel, would you consider the fact that he isn't assigned to be an issue of authorizations, manpower authorizations?

28A: There are a number of, what I call "dogs and cats" people, that we're in the process of cleaning up. The Navy MULTS people, the Mobile Universal Link Translator System, which takes the JTIDS picture off of -- off of AWACS and puts that in the command post for us. They've got a detachment of three Navy enlisted here and they were in the same boat as the 12th Aviation Brigade LNO until recently.

29Q: And whose initiative was it to clean that up?

29A: C-1 started doing that at the beginning of April, the end of March.

30Q: Are you familiar with OPLAN 91-77?

30A: Not by that number, sir.

31Q: It's the implementing instruction for -- implementing plan, I guess I should say, for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

31A: Yes sir, I've seen it. It's been a while, but I've seen it.

32Q: Is there any direction or guidance that would affect you in your duties in that OPLAN, as far as you're aware?

32A: Sir, I -- I don't remember. But I don't believe so.

**MASON**

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

33Q: Reference the mission on the fourteenth with the Black Hawks. Do you have any information regarding that particular flight that may have been available prior to the fourteenth?

33A: No sir. I was not in the country that week. I was on leave, back in the States. But no.

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

34Q: So far as your awareness of how Eagle Flights are handled, are you aware of any difference in the coordination process for flights inside the security zone and outside the security zone?

34A: Yes sir. All flights outside the security zone have to be approved by the Commanding General, and they also get coordinated, as I said earlier, with the CFAC to ensure that there's AWACS on -- on station during the time that they'll be outside of the security zone.

35Q: Now, when you say they're coordinated with the CFAC, what happens? How is that accomplished?

35A: Because I was not a part of that process, I'm not exactly sure. I know that it gets coordinated with the frag shop, but I'm not exactly sure of how that process takes place.

36Q: Do you have any knowledge of whether that is a process focused on modifying the AWACS schedule to accommodate Eagle Flight, or whether it's a process of comparing Eagle Flight's plans to the AWACS schedule?

36A: It depends on how much lead time was given. I've seen instances where we've -- we've tried to move, because of a late notice need to fly outside of the security zone, we've tried to move the AWACS schedule around.

For the most part, because that involves not only AWACS, but fighters, tankers, and all the other aircraft, Weasels, they try to move the Eagle Flight schedule around rather than moving the AWACS schedule around.

37Q: When was the last time that you were aware of actual coordination effort to move the AWACS schedule or anything else that was truly integrating the two schedules, as opposed to comparing one to the other?

37A: Before I left on the -- the week before I left on leave, there was a need to fly to Irbil, and I can't remember the exact date, sir, but Colonel Thompson called up and, I believe, Colonel O'Brien called -- I'm not quite sure. Someone called Colonel Dougherty, and right now I don't remember who that was. But I was -- I took the call from Colonel Thompson, so I was involved in that one.

I couldn't give you an exact date on when that happened.

**MASON**

**(Questions by Colonel Fain)**

38Q: What date did you go on leave?

38A: If I could refer to a calendar.

(The witness looked at a calendar)

38A: Sir, I left here on the eleventh of April.

39Q: To the best of your recollection, was that process that you described, just prior to your departure?

39A: Yes sir, it was. It was sometime the week -- week prior to my departure, but I'm not sure.

40Q: And the call to Colonel Dougherty was for what purpose?

40A: Trying to push up the AWACS schedule in order to -- I'll take that back. It wasn't Irbil. General Pilkington was going to fly down and meet with some people at a little town outside of Irbil. And Colonel Thompson thought that the time that they were going to have -- they were required to be there was such that, in order to have AWACS coverage for the time they were outside the security zone, AWACS was going to have to take off early.

We called Colonel Dougherty, and for the reasons that I mentioned before, having to move so many airplanes, he did not want to move the AWACS schedule. General Pilkington then happened to walk into the JOC while all this was going on, and he said he didn't need to be at the destination, I don't remember where it was now, as early as Colonel Thompson thought he had to be, and so they went ahead and left the AWACS schedule as it was, and the Eagle Flight schedule got shifted back. And we're only talking about a matter of a half hour, I believe.

41Q: What type of information was passed to Colonel Dougherty with regards to that flight on that day?

41A: The reason it needed to be moved up, the time the AWACS coverage needed to start; basically a synopsis of what I've just given you, you know. Why we wanted -- what we were asking for.

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

42Q: Including the destination?

42A: Sir, my memory is not that good. I -- I don't know if that specific piece of information was passed to him or not.

**(Questions by Colonel Fain)**

43Q: Was Colonel O'Brien involved in these conversations?

43A: Yes sir.

**MASON**

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

44Q: Do you know who did the talking to Colonel Dougherty?

44A: No sir, I don't remember.

45Q: It was not you?

45A: It could have been. There were several phone conversations with Colonel Dougherty and I simply do not remember if I talked -- I talk to Colonel Dougherty quite frequently, and I don't remember if this is one of the times I talked to him or not.

46Q: Other than that, do you recall other instances where there's been similar discussions actually attempting to integrate the two missions . . .

46A: Yes.

47Q: . . . the security zone flights?

47A: Yes sir. I've been involved in those before, but I couldn't -- I couldn't tell you when. I just remember in similar situations, MCC would call up, say, "Hey, we need coverage during this period of time."

48Q: Was it a good while before . . .

48A: Yes sir.

49Q: . . . the 11th of April?

49A: Yes sir. I would say probably back in February, but that's just . . .

**(Questions by Colonel Fain)**

50Q: Going back to this sortie prior to the eleventh, prior to your departure, and the discussions, was any information at that time, or during that sequence of events, passed to the frag shop so that sortie could be integrated on the -- on the daily Air Tasking Order?

50A: I don't know, sir.

51Q: How would that process take place, if it were?

51A: There were several ways it could happen. Colonel Dougherty could call them up; the JOC could -- could call them up and pass the information to them. Our JOC Chiefs frequently call down there, so that wouldn't be unusual.

52Q: Are you aware of any formal process to pass that type of information to the CFAC or to the frag shop?

52A: Not so much to the frag shop, sir. That -- that's the type of information, especially a day prior like that, that would normally be passed to -- directly to Mad Dog, and again, that's something our JOC Chief would do.

**MASON**

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

53Q: If it were a situation where the AWACS coverage was already built in as needed, as opposed to having to change the AWACS schedule or the Eagle schedule, would there have been discussions regarding a flight in the security zone?

53A: You lost me.

54Q: If they were to call you up and say, "We need to fly in the security zone," . . .

54A: Inside the security zone?

55Q: Thank you. Outside the security zone. If they were to call you and say, "We need to fly outside the security zone," and comparison of the schedules would indicate that there would be AWACS coverage at that time, would there have been any discussions with the CFAC organization about that?

55A: I'm not sure, sir. I normally don't get involved in that process unless there's a problem.

56Q: Based on your understanding of the Commanding General's guidance, would you have perceived there to be any need to coordinate with the CFAC, if the schedule indicated the AWACS coverage would be up at that time?

56A: I believe that's information that would be passed to Mad Dog, but whether there was a policy in effect to -- to make that happen, I don't know.

57Q: Do you know of any time, from personal knowledge, that it actually was passed to Mad Dog?

57A: No sir.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

58Q: Do you know if there was ever a conscious decision made to not include information, route of flight, or times within the AOR, in order to preclude any other parties from knowing of that information?

58A: No sir.

Because of the nature of their work, the Eagle Flight schedule, once they departed Zakhu, was extremely flexible, and dynamic would probably be a good Air Force word. So even if somebody did have that information, as far as from the standpoint of trying to hide information from people, the information would not be a hundred percent accurate.

**(Questions by Colonel Bennett)**

59Q: Could you -- how could you tell that Eagle Flight was flying within the security zone?

59A: I don't have any way of -- of telling if Eagle Flight's flying inside the security zone, sir.

**MASON**

Without -- unless they informed us that they wanted to travel outside the security zone, as far as we knew, they understood -- they understood what the General's direction was, and they were following that direction.

But if they had chosen to fly outside of the security zone, chances are . . .

60Q: And how was the notification process of flying outside the security zone handled?

60A: The -- Colonel Thompson would call up either Colonel O'Brien or the Chief of Staff and ask them to pass to the General the request to fly outside the security zone, with the justification for it. The General would then make a decision and -- and it would get passed back to Colonel Thompson.

**(Questions by Colonel Fain)**

61Q: Did you ever see that request in written format?

61A: No sir. Well, I take that back. I have seen that in written format, but don't ask me for details. But I know I've seen a letter from Colonel Thompson, might have even been the previous Colonel Thompson, a letter I saw in a file someplace, but I know I've seen a letter going from -- and it was an instance where they had a meeting -- another one of these meetings down in Irbil, where they knew well in advance they needed to go down there, and to be honest, it was probably from the Colonel Thompson that's now the interim MCC commander that had been the previous MCC commander. It was probably during his watch, because that Colonel Thompson had a tendency to do things via paperwork, where the late Colonel Thompson was usually more direct and used the radio and used the IMARSAT.

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

62Q: Do you have any personal knowledge of the verbal coordination that you described for flights outside the security zone, other than the one that you told us about?

62A: As I said before, I was -- I have been present when that's taken place previously, but I don't have good enough recollection of it to provide you with any details.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

63Q: The ACO specifies that no PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft will enter the AOR prior to a fighter sweep, to ensure that no enemy forces are in the AOR. Do you understand that to apply to helicopter traffic as well?

63A: No sir.

64Q: Why not?

64A: It's simply my understanding that that particular -- that part of the ACO does not apply to -- in fact, I'm not sure that -- I won't say that. It's my understanding that that did not apply to

**MASON**

Eagle Flight. There's nothing written in the ACO that -- that said it didn't, but, I believe Eagle Flight's schedule took them into the -- well, I know for a fact that they flew on -- when the rest of OPC was having a down day, it was quite common for Eagle Flight to be flying, and so I know for a fact, they -- they entered the AOR when there were not fighters airborne.

65Q: Were you aware of a policy letter stipulating that they would take the same down days at Eagle Flight as OPC?

65A: That -- that policy has been instituted, yes sir.

66Q: And the references you made were prior to that policy taking effect?

66A: Yes sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any further information or evidence, statements, that you believe would be helpful to the Board that you'd like to make?

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: You're reminded . . .

GENERAL ANDRUS: Well, before you do, back to the previous question.

**(Questions by General Andrus)**

67Q: You indicated that you did not believe that the guidance in the ACO, regarding a fighter sweep, applied to OPC helicopter traffic. Have you ever been told that verbally by anyone or have you ever seen that in writing?

67A: No sir. Neither one of those things.

68Q: So what would you base your belief on that it would not apply to helicopter traffic?

68A: Simply my observation of how we conducted business.

69Q: By how you -- how business was conducted, do you mean by the fact that helicopters, in fact, flew in the area prior to fighter coverage?

69A: Yes sir.

70Q: Could that also be construed to mean that they were flying in violation of the ACO?

70A: I'm sure a lawyer could make that case, sir. From -- from my perspective, whether they were flying in violation of the ACO or not, is a matter of intent, and I do not believe that, from what I've seen of operations here, that there was that willful intent to violate a regulation, or guidance.

71Q: Do you know if the CTF leadership, such as the C-3, Chief of Staff, or the Commander,

**MASON**

was aware of the fact that the helicopters were flying in the area prior to fighter coverage?

71A: All three of those men were aware of that, sir.

72Q: Would you believe then, if they were aware of it, that they felt that the stipulation in the ACO did not apply to helicopters?

72A: Yes sir.

**(Questions by Colonel At Lee)**

73Q: Just to clarify a turn of phrase, to make sure we're not misunderstanding what you're saying, we've been referring to you fly -- to Eagle flying prior to fighter coverage. And the example you gave was them flying on a day when there was no fighter coverage. And the question we've been putting to you suggests flying on a day when there's fighter coverage, but prior to the coverage going into the AOR. Were the circumstances that you related focused on the helicopters flying on a day when there was fighter coverage, but prior to the fighters entering the AOR?

73A: I know of times where the helicopters have flown into the AOR when, because of the flying schedule, fighters were on station well after the helicopters entered the AOR.

74Q: On the same day.

74A: Yes sir.

75Q: And your answers regarding the leadership's awareness of that, related to those circumstances?

75A: Yes sir.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** You're reminded this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions that have been included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony, or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately. You may report it to a member of the Board.

Do you have any questions?

**WITNESS:** No sir.

**COLONEL AT LEE:** The time is 1336 and the interview is concluded.

**MASON**

**REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE**

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by William D. Mason to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bruce H. Peggs".

BRUCE H. PEGGS, DAFC  
Court Reporter  
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

TAB V-118

BERNARD, ANDREW T.

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## SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

### LIEUTENANT ANDREW T. BERNARD 53RD FIGHTERS SQUADRON

The interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Mudge, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1239 hours, 5 May 1994. A standard advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

#### EXAMINATION

My name is First Lieutenant Andrew Thomas Bernard. I'm with the 53rd Fighter Squadron, and I'm an Intelligence Officer. I'm assigned to Spangdahlem and I'm TDY to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

My normal duties and responsibilities in the Squadron at Spangdahlem, are to train the pilots on threats and to help the pilots in mission planning considerations. Using those two aspects of it, it's my job to focus on all the weapons systems that are in the world and apply them to the operation of the F15.

My duties and responsibilities that I have here at Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, are basically the same, just a little bit more focused on the theater. You worry about the threat of Iraq and what the Iraqi military could do to the F15; that's how to keep the pilots alive in that kind of environment.

This is my first trip to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. I arrived here around April the 16th. I took over the Intelligence Officer job in the 53rd around November 1, 1993.

Throughout 1993, every since I have been associated with the 53rd, for clarification, I was at Bitburg at the OSS. I deployed with the 53rd to Aviano for Operation DENY FLIGHT between April and July of 1993. So, I spent a lot of time with the Squadron.

In the course of my duties as the Intelligence Officer I conduct visual recognition training. My predecessor, Lieutenant Alex Burger, had a visual recognition training program where we trained everyday. In the five minutes allotted for Intelligence in the beginning of every pre-mission brief, two to three minutes were usually used for visual recognition. That's the training program that I took over in November when Lieutenant Burger left. I kept that up throughout 1993.

**BERNARD**

It was my decision around the beginning of the year to scale back on the visual recognition. My reasoning for doing that was that, one, the pilots were good. They knew the stuff after doing it everyday for a year. They were very good at it. Two, most of them knew all the slides I had. You can only have so many slides that are produced, and they had them pretty much memorized. Three, it gave me a chance to have longer Intelligence briefs, a little bit more in depth. Actually, it was more for my benefit. It gives me an opportunity to learn the weapons system more in detail and brief it as such. So, at the beginning of 94, I backed off on the visual recognition training.

Since the first of the year, I've conducted visual recognition four or five different times. I do not have the exact dates. The last time that I conducted training before the accident, was in February some time. It was right before we moved from Bitburg to Spangdahlem. I did not do any after we moved.

I do not know specifically if the individuals did or did not perform visual reconnaissance training from 35mm slides which is our standard method of doing visual recognition training. That's the primary method of doing it. I do include helicopters in my training. Approximately 10 percent of the threat slides I show are helicopters.

In my training I have included Hinds and Black Hawks. I cannot say specifically if I've shown Black Hawks with the wing tanks and aux tanks installed. I know that at Spangdahlem we own a slide of the Black Hawks with that thing, but I cannot say whether we have or haven't.

I didn't talk in depth about the camouflage or color schemes the helicopters had. Obviously, if we're talking about an American helicopter with spotted black and green schemes, it could be hard to pull out in a look-down environment. I mentioned stuff like that, but we don't talk about different shades. I don't go into a lot of detail about it. Our focus really isn't helicopters sometimes. There is really no information available to show the camouflage schemes and colors. But it's something that could be researched.

To the best of my knowledge I have not in the past discussed or shown the pilots specific camouflage schemes or colored schemes of helicopters.

I do not know of any materials that I have available now, that I brief with, that has that information.

**BERNARD**

I don't have any further information, statements or evidence that I wish to present.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1249 hours, 5 May 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of

ANDREW T. BERNARD, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Charles H. Wilcox II", written over a horizontal line. The signature is positioned above the printed name and title.

CHARLES H. WILCOX II, COLONEL, USAF  
Legal Advisor

**BERNARD**

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TAB V-118A

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BERNARD, ANDREW T.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

10 May 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR Accident Board (Lt Col Mudge)

FROM: 53 FS/DOI

SUBJECT: Affidavit

1. I am 1Lt Andrew T. Bernard and I am assigned to the 53rd Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem AB, Germany. As the 53 FS intelligence officer, it is my responsibility to oversee training given to the pilots on weapon system threats, as well as assist in mission planning. I am currently TDY to Incirlik AB, Turkey with my squadron in support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. I perform the same duties while TDY at Incirlik, albeit more focused, as I do at Spangdahlem.

2. As of 14 April 1994, there were about 15 helicopter visual recognition slides in our inventory at Incirlik. Of these, there were two sides of Hind helicopters and zero of Blackhawk helicopters. Both Hind slides were given to the investigation board.



ANDREW T. BERNARD, 1Lt, USAF  
Chief, Intelligence Division

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of May 1994.



CHARLES H. WILCOX II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

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TAB V-119

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BRONSON, MATTHEW F.

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
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## AFFIDAVIT

I am Matthew F. Bronson, SSgt, USAF, assigned to the 494th FS deployed to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. I am an Intelligence Operations Journeyman responsible for training 494th Aircrews on visual recognition features of aircraft and ground systems during normal training and deployments. On 14 Apr 94, my shop maintained DIA manuals used for visual recognition training for our flight crews. These visual recognition manuals contained pictures and diagrams of MI-24/25 Hinds and UH-60 Black Hawks. We did not have specific pictures of Iraqi Hinds or UH-60 Black Hawks with wing tanks. Aircrew members had access to helicopter recognition packets with pictures of helicopters used by Iraq. The packets were for use in the aircraft. On 14 Apr 94, we did not have 35mm slides of Hinds or Black Hawks but had access to them through the F-15C unit in my squadron operations center and 39 OSS Intelligence Flight who maintains an intelligence library. In our squadron intelligence library at RAF Lakenheath, we have 12 slides of Hinds and 5 slides of Black Hawks. Two of the Black Hawks slides show the helicopters with wings and wing tanks.

  
MATTHEW F. BRONSON, SSgt, USAF

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 12 day of May 1994

  
CHARLES H. WILCOX II, Colonel, USAF  
Legal Advisor

TAB V-120

MAHER, ROGER D.

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**THE MEMO FOR RECORD  
SUBMITTED BY  
COLONEL ROGER D. MAHER  
IS LOCATED AT TAB AC-6d**

**MAHER**

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TAB V-121

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ROGERS, JAMES R.

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**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY  
OF  
STAFF SERGEANT JAMES R. ROGERS  
722 AVN SC  
PIRINCLIK AIR BASE, TURKEY**

This telephone interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Black at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1300, 16 May 1994. The Witness was located at Pirinclik Air Base, Turkey. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the Witness was sworn.

**EXAMINATION**

I am Staff Sergeant James R. Rogers. My present duty assignment is Pirinclik Air Base, Turkey. I am the COMSEC account Alternate COMSEC Manager. My responsibilities include making sure that everybody has their Crypto for their circuits throughout the Base. That would be different organizations' secure voice, secure data, whatever their mission might be.

In the course of my responsibilities, I do maintain and issue the IFF codes. They are sent to me via DCS, Defense Courier Service, from Incirlik. They ultimately come from the AF CSC through the interim COMSEC theater package which would be at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. I get them throughout the month, always on a Thursday when the C-141 comes, which is usually about every other week. On hand, I keep about 150 days worth of COMSEC. Right now in my safe, I have anywhere from June, July and August. When I get the codes, they come in a key tape canister with paper tape keys and some come in publications. To describe the key tape canister, usually there's 31 segments that correspond with the day of the month--even the months that have 28 or 30 days, you will always have 31 days in the canister. You just tear one off for the day that it's effective for. It's a strip of paper about an inch wide and 8 inches long. It just has a paper tape code written on it. These codes are kept locked up in GSA-approved safes located within the COMSEC vault in Building 856 where I work. Only myself and the COMSEC manager have access to the codes. The COMSEC manager is Sergeant Sigmon.

The codes are issued to units on a month-to-month basis. I give it to them just for the current month. Usually what that relates to is on the last day of the month, I issue them for the next month. On the first day of the month, they do a turn-in for the previous month. It's just done in 30 or 31 day increments depending on the days of the month it's following. When someone comes in, they sign for it on a Standard Form 153, COMSEC receipt. Essentially, they check the canister to make sure that none have been pulled. They verify what they are signing for and then I usually don't see them for the rest of the

**ROGERS**

month. There are two copies of everything. They keep a copy and I keep a copy. There is a regulation that governs the sign-on procedure, but I can't think of it right offhand. It used to be that AFR 56-10 covered all COMSEC procedures. Since then, it has been replaced by an AFSSI, Air Force Special Security Instruction. Offhand, I can't give you that, but I could get back to you with that information. I conduct my signout procedures in accordance with that regulation.

At Pirinlik, I issue IFF codes to Eagle Flight. They are the only sub-account that gets the IFF codes. I have never issued IFF codes to anyone besides Eagle Flight. I have been performing these duties as Alternate COMSEC Manager since February of this year. To my knowledge, no one else has ever gotten an IFF code from our facility. At this point in time, Sergeant Elliott signs for the codes. At the time of the accident, it would have been Specialist McCarthy. No one else has picked up the codes since I have been on the account. For every primary, there are two alternates that could pick up the codes. They are on an appointment letter. At the end of the month, the codes aren't actually returned. They give me a disposition form showing that all the material has been destroyed. Based on that, I issue a destruction certificate. This is done for my records and it's kept for two years. It shows all the material for the edition have been destroyed and in accordance with regulation.

I maintain a KOI-18 and a KYK-13 for the COMM center operation.

I have never had an Eagle Flight NCOIC or the individual signing for the codes actually load a KYK-13 in my presence. They have their own cryptographic hardware, including the KYK-13 and KOI-18. I've never seen them load a KYK-13. To my knowledge and I am not familiar with their day-to-day operation, they load it at their office on the Base, and then it's transported to the flight line where they key it electronically.

On Thursday, 31 March 1994, I issued the IFF codes to Eagle for the month of April. They were received that day by Specialist McCarthy. There was nothing unusual about the sign-out process. He called because his office is on the other side of the Base so he called to let me know he was coming over. I printed up the hand receipt while he was on his way over. When he showed up, everything was ready. He verified the material he was signing for was in fact there. After that, he signed the receipt, kept a copy and I kept a copy. He left and I didn't see him again until the 15th and that was due to the accident; otherwise, I wouldn't have seen him until the end of the month.

Eagle Flight picks up the ATOs from me if it comes in on message traffic. They have their own account as far as the COMM center where they're one of our regular customers. Routinely, they pick up message traffic twice a day.

**ROGERS**

Eagle Flight did use the 14 April code for IFF. To my knowledge, they were correct at the time. The day after the accident I went to their office to verify that they hadn't pulled any keys that weren't eligible yet. At that time, they hadn't. I also verified that all the keys that were superseded had been destroyed. Based on that evidence, I affirmed the right key was loaded. When I went to Eagle Flight on 15 April 1994 and looked at the canister, I saw the key for the current day, Day 15. I also saw the destruction record for Day 13. Piecing that together, that tells me that absolutely, without a doubt, that Day 14 had been used on that day, that day being Thursday, the 14th.

Prior to 14 April 1994, I had issued codes twice. I started in February and that was my initial issue and then March--that would have been my second one. Since the 14th of April, I issued codes once more since then. I have never heard of any problems with the codes that have been issued. I've never heard of an experience, for example, where codes were found to be incompatible.

Concerning my 15 April visit to Eagle Flight, the 15 April tape was not out of the canister at the time that I went over.

I cannot think of anything significant or anything that I found wrong in that time period that may be of help to the Accident Board in resolving these issues.

(The standard witness caution was given and the Witness had no questions.)

(The interview concluded at 1315, 16 May 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of STAFF SERGEANT JAMES R. ROGERS as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



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SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA  
Legal Advisor

**ROGERS**