

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2003 1:54 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; McCreary, T. L., CAPT, JCS, PAO; Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO
Cc: Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Subject: conference call with military analysts

Importance: High

Attachments: Outreach Retired Military Advisors Group Teleconference Call with Chairman Myers 03-19-03.doc



Outreach Retired
Military Advi...

katie,

here's the list:

please confirm receipt. txs! (b)(6)

GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JCS

CONFERENCE CALL WITH RETIRED MILITARY ADVISORS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 2003

CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE, ROOM (b)(2) THE PENTAGON

Participants:

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)
Major Robert S. Bevelacqua (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman (USA, Retired)
General Wesley Clark (USA, Retired)
General Ronald Fogelman (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (USAF, Retired)
Brigadier General David Grange (USA, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah (USN, Retired)
Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak (USN, Retired)
General Barry McCaffrey (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
General William Nash (USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Valley (USA, Retired)
General Larry D. Welch (USAF, Retired)

T Major General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired)

Plane to New York

Declines:

General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC, Retired)

In Kuwait
Plane to California

Telephone Messages Left (Office and Cellular):

General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC, Retired)
General George Joulwan (USA, Retired)
General Hugh Shelton (USA, Retired)
General Glen K. Otis (USA, Retired)
General William F. "Buck" Kernan (USA, Retired)
General Charles A. Horner (USAF, Retired)
Admiral Dennis C. Blair (USN, Retired)
General Thomas S. Moorman (USAF, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Major General George Harrison (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCol, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2003 2:00 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: conference call with military analysts

you do great work!

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
>Sent: Wednesday, March 19, 2003 12:54 PM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; McCreary, T. L., CAPT, JCS, PAO;
Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO
>Cc: Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
>Subject: conference call with military analysts
>Importance: High

>
>katie,

>
>here's the list:

>
> << File: Outreach Retired Military Advisors Group Teleconference Call
> with Chairman Myers 03-19-03.doc >>

>
>please confirm receipt. txs!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2003 10:49 AM
To: Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: conference call with military analysts

Importance: High

tom,

per yesterday afternoon's conversation, i need to lock in a time with general mcchrystal and our military analysts asap. again, looking at approximately a 15-minute phone call for the general:

agenda would look like this:

note: if we could mimic yesterday's meeting with formers, would be great.

1:00 pm welcome and introduction
chris willcox, osd-public affairs

1:01 pm update on humanitarian planning for iraq
(b)(6) osd-policy

1:15 pm operations update
general stan mcchrystal, jcs

1:30 pm conference call concludes

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 01, 2003 1:29 PM
To: Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO; Haddock, Ellen (Katie) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LCDR, CE PO-PA
Cc: Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: final agenda + list of military analysts participating in this afternoons conference call

Importance: High

Attachments: Military Analysts Conference Call Agenda 04-01-03.doc; Map Press Iraq March 31, 2003.ppt; Fact Sheet OIF Special Ops 03-31-03.doc



Military Analysts Conference C...
Map Press Iraq March 31, 2003....
Fact Sheet OIF Special Ops 03-...

attached is the final agenda + list of participants in this afternoons call:

handouts that went out electronically yesterday include:

txs! (b)(6)



**Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Tuesday, April 1, 2003
Room (b)(2) The Pentagon
(As of March 28, 2003/4:30 pm)**

PROPOSED AGENDA

2:00 pm Welcome and Introduction (Guidelines)

Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs

2:01 pm Iraqi Paramilitary (Irregulars) Brief

(b)(6) Senior Intelligence Officer, Defense Intelligence
Agency

(b)(6) Middle East Desk Officer, Defense Intelligence
Agency

2:15 pm OIF Operational Update

Major General Stanley A. McChrystal, Vice Director for Operations
(J-3), Joint Chiefs of Staff

2:30 pm Call Concludes

Note:

Call-In Telephone Number:

(b)(2)



Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Tuesday, April 1, 2003
Room ^{(b)(2)} The Pentagon
(As of April 1, 2003/12:15 pm)

Participating

General Barry McCaffrey
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak
General Glen K. Otis
Lieutenant General Dan Christman
General William F. "Buck" Kernan
Major General Donald W. Shepperd
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney
General Thomas Moorman
Brigadier General David Grange
Major General Perry Smith
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
General Charles Wilhelm
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell
Colonel Carl Allard
Major General Paul E. Vallely
Admiral Thomas Lopez
Admiral David Jeremiah
Major General Tom Wilkerson

Tentative or Decline

General Ronald Fogelman
General Larry Welch
General Wayne Downing (T)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson
Colonel Jack Jacobs
General William Nash
General Wesley Clark (T)
General Hugh Shelton
Major General George Harrison
General Joseph Ralston (T)
General Merrill McPeak

Special Operation Achievements Thus Far

(As of March 31, 2003)

- U.S. Naval Special Operations forces precluded Saddam Hussein's apparent attempt to wage ecological warfare on his neighboring countries by seizing at the outset of the war oil terminals off the Al Faw Peninsula.
 - Navy SEALs were given the Al Faw mission, with commandos from the Royal Marines following close behind. After a preassault barrage from Marine and Air Force jets and AC-130 gun ships, SEAL teams flew close to the water on Air Force Special Operations MH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters to their objective: two oil platforms in the Persian Gulf off the coast of Al Faw.
 - By the morning of March 21, the SEALs, a small contingent of Polish Special Operations Forces, and the Royal Marine units had secured those platforms together with most of the peninsula--reducing by 90 percent Saddam's ability to soak the Persian Gulf with Iraqi crude. Coalition concern was justified.
 - The SEAL teams discovered that explosives had been placed at many of the wells, although they had not yet been wired to detonators. One of the open sea oil terminals were rigged with explosives for destruction.
 - This action precluded Hussein from potentially pouring millions of gallons of raw oil into the Arabian gulf as he did during Desert Storm, which caused an oil slick estimated as three times larger than the Exxon Valdes oil spill in Alaska.
 - It also ensured that the oil terminals were preserved for the resumption of oil production, which will enable a much more rapid economic recovery for the post-Saddam government.
- U.S. Army Special Forces have been conducting Unconventional Warfare with the Kurds of Northern Iraq.
 - They have helped, supply, and organize Kurdish formations that have successfully smashed the Ansar Al Islam redoubt that had been established in the vicinity of Khurma near the Iranian border. The remnants of this organization thought to be connected to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are now attempting to cross the border into Iran.
 - Additionally, Close Air Support strikes in the same vicinity have forced Iraqi Regular forces from the lines they have held for years back toward the city of Mosul. In addition, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces and Air Force Combat Controllers (Air Commandos) have been conducting long-range reconnaissance as well as SR missions throughout the Western Desert known as the "Scud Box."

- To date, no SCUDs have been launched either at Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Israel from this area.
- From the outset of the war, U.S. Air Force AC-130 gun ships have been continuously engaged in close air support missions of SOF ground forces against hundreds of targets.
 - They have been instrumental in attiring dug-in Iraqi formations in the North, West, and South. Additionally, U.S. Air Force Special Operations MC-130 Talons have flown hundreds of resupply missions dropping supplies to SOF teams on the ground.
- PSYOP missions developed by Army Special Operations personnel have worked with Air Force Special Operations and conventional Air Force units to drop more than 20 million leaflets in areas under the control of the Hussein regime.
 - The messages on the leaflets have ranged from providing instructions on where to get food, water and medical treatment, instructions aimed at enemy soldiers on for properly surrendering to the coalition, and warnings not to participate in WMD operations.
- U.S. Army Rangers and Army Special Operations gunship helicopters have been instrumental in attacking and seizing airfields in Northwestern Iraq, in addition to having conducted dozens of raids and interdiction missions against Iraqi LOCs.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, April 09, 2003 4:23 PM
To: Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO; Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: religious leaders outreach: rosa's power point

Importance: High

we will need to get a copy of general rosa's power point (disk) first thing in the morning so we can load computer for power point presentation. also, i need to know if there will be any handouts (aka, can i pass out the map that was distributed to military analysts tuesday)? txs. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2003 6:50 PM
To: Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO; Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: military analysts agenda + attendance list
Importance: High
Attachments: Military Analysts Conference Call Agenda 04-11-03.doc



Military Analysts
Conference C...

attached is fyi:

note: colonel rheinlander, i'll provide you with an updated list tomorrow AM. txs.

(b)(6)



**Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Friday, April 11, 2003
(As of April 10, 2003/6:45 pm)**

AGENDA

2:00 pm Welcome and Introduction (Guidelines)

Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs

2:01 pm Iraqi Reconstruction Efforts

William J. Luti, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International
Security Affairs (Tentative)

2:15 pm OIF Operational Update

Major General Stanley A. McChrystal, Vice Director for Operations
(J-3), Joint Chiefs of Staff

2:30 pm Call Concludes (Guidelines)

Note:

Call-In Telephone Number:

(b)(2)



Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Friday, April 11, 2003
(As of April 10, 2003/6:45 pm)

Participating

Brigadier General David Grange
General Montgomery Meigs
Lieutenant General Dan Christman
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
General William F. "Buck" Kernan
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak
General Thomas Moorman
Major General Perry Smith
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor
Major General Paul E. Vallely
Colonel Carl Allard
General Ronald Fogelman
General William Nash
General Joseph Ralston
Major General Donald W. Shepperd

Tentative or Decline

Admiral Thomas Lopez (D)
General Glen K. Otis (D)
General Wayne Downing (T)

Undecided

General Wesley Clark
General Charles Wilhelm
Colonel Jack Jacobs
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell
Admiral David Jeremiah
General Larry Welch
General Hugh Shelton
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson
Major General George Harrison
General Merrill McPeak

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, April 21, 2003 12:00 PM
To: Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCS/PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: conference call with retired military analysts

Importance: High

tom,

per our earlier conversation.

we'd like to scrub tomorrow's conference call in lieu of the one on friday at 2:00 pm.

note: (b)(6) is scheduling general garner for the call.

also, re: the two additional outreaches. we'd like to get the general out in front with embassy officials and ngo's beginning work on iraq. again, his remarks would focus on oif operations.

can you give me some dates and times that would work for the general and i'll go back and schedule others around him. txs. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO
Sent: Monday, April 21, 2003 2:37 PM
To: McCreary, T. L., CAPT, JCS, PAO
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: conference call with retired military analysts

Importance: High

Sir,

Given proposed briefer of the pending conference call on Friday and the four day delay until it happens in which operations will continue to wane, from the operational POV, think it is time for MG McChrystal to bow out and hand-off to HA gurus.

(b)(6) had talked about the two outreaches this morning after the 0815 meeting but not as to who was the audience. Given the listing below, would also use same argument as to MG McChrystal not being the right guy to brief.

v/r, Tom

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
>Sent: Monday, April 21, 2003 12:00 PM
>To: Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO
>Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCS/PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA
>Subject: conference call with retired military analysts
>Importance: High

> (b)(6)

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> and I'll go back and schedule others around him. txs. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6), MAJ, SJS
Sent: Monday, April 21, 2003 4:09 PM
To: (b)(6); Haddock, Ellen; (b)(6)
(b)(6) McCreary, T.; Rheinlander, Thomas; (b)(6)
Subject: FW: OASD/PA Question
Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged
Attachments: Fratricide PAG FINAL.doc



Fratricide PAG
FINAL.doc (47 K...

fyi -

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) MAJ OCPA [mailto:(b)(6)]
>Sent: Monday, April 21, 2003 4:02 PM
>To: McClellan, Kenneth LTC OASD-PA; (b)(6) Maj SAF/PAM
>Cc: (b)(6) LtCol SAF/PA; (b)(6) MAJ SJS; (b)(6) LT SECNAV;
(b)(6) SAF/PAM
>Subject: RE: OASD/PA Question

> Ladies and Gentlemen,
> Was on leave last week when discussion occurred on this.
> Please see the PAG on this issue, a recurring one - and, it is much better than my quote.
Must have been a very long day...

> -----Original Message-----

>From: McClellan, Kenneth LTC OASD-PA
>Sent: Friday, April 18, 2003 12:17 PM
>To: (b)(6) Maj SAF/PAM
>Cc: (b)(6) LtCol SAF/PA; (b)(6) MAJ OCPA; (b)(6) MAJ SJS;
(b)(6) LT SECNAV; (b)(6) SAF/PAM
>Subject: RE: OASD/PA Question

> Not at the moment. It is simply a recurring issue that will circle around after we
declare victory in Iraq.

> That's what I like about the American press. The dirt clods used to come before and
during the fight -- as they would tend to do internationally. Now they seem to come
principally afterward.

> VR
> VERITAS INVICTRIX

> Ken McClellan
> Lt Col (USAF)
> OASD(PA) Press Operations
> (b)(2) Fax: (b)(2)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) Maj, SAF/PA
>Sent: Friday, April 18, 2003 8:58 AM
>To: McClellan, Kenneth, LTC, OASD-PA
>Cc: (b)(6) LtCol, SAF/PA; (b)(6) MAJ OCPA; (b)(6) MAJ,

SJS; (b)(6), LT, SECNAV; (b)(6), SAF/PAM

>Subject: RE: OASD/PA Question

>

>Sir -- Do you have any queries on this right now? (b)(6)

>

-----Original Message-----

> From: McClellan, Kenneth, LTC, OASD-PA

> Sent: Friday, April 18, 2003 7:36 AM

> To: (b)(6) Maj, SAF/PA

> Cc: (b)(6) MAJ OCPA; (b)(6), MAJ, SJS; (b)(6) LT, SECNAV

> Subject: RE: OASD/PA Question

>

(b)(6)

> That was a wonderful answer right up to "AF, Army and Navy have all moved to different systems." That is precisely what I would think would make this the number-one Lessons Learned for this conflict.

> Where are we on a real-time coordination mechanism? Are we relying on some poor human at 40,000 feet trying to figure out which coordinates are friendlies and which ones targets? Is there an interoperability common denominator that automatically sorts them out by geographic sectors of targets and shooters? If it works so well, why did we kill our own in Afghanistan and Iraq? Are we IFFF frequency saturated? Was bandwidth the constraint? Call signs? What was fundamentally wrong with buying a system where tanks and F-16s or F-14s could autonomously recognize an American or Coalition unit? Have we set up JSTARS to be the center of gravity?

> Anyway, we might as well start figuring out why foil on plywood and glint tape on helmets is still the right answer after more than three White Sands studies on the friendly fire issue. And we need to share whatever visual presentation CIDAD J-8 is using to make the issue (and the latest solution) understandable.

> Many thanks. Happy Friday.

> VR

> VERITAS INVICTRIX

> Ken McClellan

> Lt Col (USAF)

> OASD(PA) Press Operations

> (b)(2) Fax: (b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6), Maj, SAF/PA

> Sent: Thursday, April 17, 2003 5:41 PM

> To: (b)(6), SAF/PAM; (b)(6) LtCol, SAF/PA;

McClellan, Kenneth, LTC, OASD-PA

> Subject: RE: OASD/PA Question

> All -- I asked around on this and the answer is this was an issue several years ago and something the Army found too expensive and now the AF, Army and Navy have all moved to different systems. Hope that helps. (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6), SAF/PAM

> Sent: Wednesday, April 16, 2003 7:05 AM

> To: (b)(6) LtCol, SAF/PA

> Cc: (b)(6), Maj, SAF/PA

> Subject: OASD/PA Question

> Ken McClellan has a question about blue force tracking upgrades to aircraft to prevent friendly fire. Can you help him?

-----Original Message-----

> From: McClellan, Kenneth, LTC, OASD-PA

> Sent: Wednesday, April 16, 2003 3:19 AM

> To: (b)(6) Maj., SAF/PAM; (b)(6) , SAF/PAM
> Subject: Is this true?
>

> Avoiding friendly fire. (ABC) - But for all the advantages of high-tech weaponry, modern military forces still face a tragic, age-old problem: "fratricide," otherwise known as "friendly fire" incidents. After Desert Storm, the Pentagon conducted extensive research into developing ways to distinguish friend from foe, but ended up ditching many of them due to cost. One such program - called the Battlefield Combat Identification System, or BCIS - would have been an ideal setup for helping to prevent fratricide. The system was similar to automatic identification systems developed and used by aircraft since the advent of radar. The Army spent some \$100 million to develop and test BCIS, analysts say. But to equip the Army with such automatic identification systems would have cost as much as \$40,000 per vehicle. The program was completely scrapped in 2001 because BCIS, designed for ground combat, couldn't be adopted for effective use with aircraft, said Maj. Amy Hannah, a public affairs officer for the Army. "It was difficult to integrate, and the system's limitations didn't answer the challenges that were added to the [project] requirement," says Hannah. "It just didn't provide what we want or needed." Instead, the Pentagon has focused its efforts to reduce fratricide through other means. Chief among them is to use the U.S. military's clear advantage in advanced sensors and information technologies to improve so-called situational awareness among friendly fighting forces. Under a program called Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below, or FBCB2, the military plans to create wireless local data communication networks that tie in various source of information. Computers and software would be able to collect video from unmanned drones, the position of friendly forces with GPS location systems, and data about the enemy from spy planes such as the JSTARS. By gathering such disparate information together into one "battle space picture" and distributing it to everyone on the field, it's hoped that even the common foot soldier will know where friends and foes are relative to their position and situation. One Army unit, the 4th Infantry Division, has already been equipped with such digital communications technology. But since the division was kept out of most of the fighting in Iraq, it remains to be seen if the system really could help in reducing fratricide.

<http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/FutureTech/iraq_friendlyfiretech030415.html>

>
>
>

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE – MESSAGES, Q'S AND A'S ON FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES/FRATRICIDE.

1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES MESSAGES AND Q'S AND A'S FOR USE IN HANDLING QUERIES REGARDING FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES. IT IS INTENDED FOR USE IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ONLY.

2. PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSTURE IS PASSIVE, RESPONSE TO QUERIES ONLY.

3. MESSAGES.

- A. DEFINITION OF FRATRICIDE/FRIENDLY FIRE PER AR 600-34. "A CIRCUMSTANCE IN WHICH MEMBERS OF THE U.S. OR FRIENDLY MILITARY FORCES ARE MISTAKINGLY, OR ACCIDENTALLY, KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTION BY THE U.S. OR FRIENDLY FORCES WHILE ENGAGED WITH AN ENEMY, OR WHILE FIRING AT A HOSTILE FORCE, OR WHAT IS THOUGHT TO BE A HOSTILE FORCE."
- B. FRATRICIDE IS AVOIDED OR LIMITED BY MULTIPLE ACTIONS, INCLUDING RIGOROUS TRAINING OF INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS IN VEHICLE RECOGNITION AND KNOWLEDGE OF FIRE CONTROL MEASURES, ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE FIRE CONTROL MEASURES DURING THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF AN OPERATION TO RESTRICT OR PERMIT FIRES ACROSS THE BATTLEFIELD, ADHERENCE TO FIRE CONTROL MEASURES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) DURING OPERATIONS, AND EMPHASIS ON SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. TECHNOLOGY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE AVOIDANCE OF FRATRICIDE, BUT WARFIGHTER TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP ARE THE PRINCIPAL DETERMINANTS.
- C. TECHNOLOGY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE WARFIGHTERS' SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND ASSIST IN THE PREVENTION OF FRATRICIDE. EXAMPLES ARE THE ARMY'S FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW (FBCB2) AND SECOND GENERATION FORWARD-LOOKING INFRARED (FLIR) (SGF). FBCB2 SUPPORTS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DOWN TO THE PLATFORM LEVEL ACROSS ALL BATTLEFIELD FUNCTIONAL AREAS (BFAS) AND ECHELONS. ACROSS THE BATTLEFIELD, LEADERS CAN USE THE DIGITAL DISPLAY TO REDUCE CHAOS AND CONFUSION, AND FOCUS COMBAT POWER AT THE DESIRED POINT.
- D. SECOND-GENERATION FLIR PROVIDES ARMOR, INFANTRY, AND RECONNAISSANCE FORCES WITH A LEAP-AHEAD CAPABILITY TO DETECT, ACQUIRE, AND IDENTIFY TARGETS IN ALL WEATHER AND VISIBILITY CONDITIONS, EVEN DURING NIGHT OPERATIONS AND IN CONDITIONS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY DUE TO SMOKE, DUST, SAND, AND FOG. SECOND GENERATION FLIR EFFECTIVELY DOUBLES THE IDENTIFICATION RANGE AND INCREASES THE DETECTION RANGE BY 55% COMPARED TO THE FIRST GENERATION FLIR USED DURING THE 1991 GULF WAR. AS A RESULT, SGF ALLOWS THE SHOOTERS TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY TARGETS BEYOND THE RANGE OF DIRECT-FIRE WEAPON SYSTEMS, CONTRIBUTING TO IMPROVEMENTS IN LETHALITY AND SURVIVABILITY OF OUR FORCES AND REDUCTION IN FRATRICIDE.
- E. NO MATTER HOW GOOD THE TRAINING, OPERATIONAL PLANNING, TECHNOLOGY, AND LEADERSHIP, WARFARE IS A HUMAN ENDEAVOR AND MISTAKES WILL BE MADE. SOME OF THOSE MISTAKES MAY CONTRIBUTE TO FRATRICIDE. THE INTENSITY AND SPEED OF COMBAT, FEAR, FATIGUE, DUST, SMOKE, AND MANY OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO WHAT HAS BEEN HISTORICALLY CALLED "THE FOG OF WAR." ONE GOAL OF TRANSFORMATION IS TO CUT THROUGH THE FOG OF WAR AND GIVE COMMANDERS, LEADERS AND SOLDIERS A NEAR-PERFECT SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE BATTLEFIELD.
- F. EFFORTS TO REDUCE FRIENDLY-FIRE INCIDENTS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE VERY HIGH EMPHASIS. AS WAYS AND MEANS TO DO SO ARE MATURED, THEY WILL BE

EMBEDDED IN THE ARMY'S DOCTRINE, ACQUISITION AND TRAINING. HOWEVER, BECAUSE CHAOS AND UNCERTAINTY REMAIN, THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF FRIENDLY-FIRE INCIDENTS CANNOT BE GUARANTEED. WE MUST NOT LET REASONABLE CAUTION EVOLVE INTO TIMIDITY, WHICH WOULD LIKELY MEAN GREATER CASUALTIES FROM ENEMY ACTION.

- G. THE PROGRAMS BEING DEVELOPED AND INSTITUTED TO REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR FRIENDLY-FIRE INCIDENTS NECESSITATE THE CONTINUING NEED FOR TOUGH, REALISTIC TRAINING. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR ARMY AND ITS ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION WITH MINIMUM CASUALTIES ARE A DIRECT RESULT OF TRAINING.

4. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

Q1. WHAT HAS THE ARMY DONE SINCE THE GULF WAR TO DECREASE THE CHANCE OF FRIENDLY FIRE ON THE BATTLEFIELD?

A1. IN TERMS OF TRAINING, ALL OF OUR COMBAT CENTERS, SPECIFICALLY THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER (NTC) AT FORT IRWIN, CALIFORNIA, AND THE COMBAT MANEUVER TRAINING CENTER (CMTC) AT HOHENFELS, GERMANY, HAVE TAKEN MEASURES TO EVALUATE IDENTIFICATION AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

Q2. THE BATTLEFIELD COMBAT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (BCIS) WAS DESIGNED TO HELP IDENTIFY FRIENDLY FORCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE PROGRAM WAS TERMINATED IN 2001. WHY?

A2. BCIS BACKGROUND - PROGRAM WAS INITIATED IN 1993 BUT IT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ONLY A GROUND-TO-GROUND IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITY FOR MOUNTED COMBAT VEHICLES. IT DID NOT ASSIST WITH ALL COMBAT ID REALMS [AIR-TO-GROUND OR MOUNTED-TO-DISMOUNTED / DISMOUNTED-TO-MOUNTED IDENTITY]. ADDITIONALLY, IT WAS NOT JOINT AND COALITION INTEROPERABLE. DUE TO THE SYSTEM'S LIMITATIONS TO MEET ALL OF THE ID REQUIREMENTS AND THE CHALLENGES OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION, AND ASSOCIATED COSTS, IT WAS TERMINATED IN 2001.

Q3. WHAT IS THE ARMY DOING TO DEVELOP COMBAT IDENTIFICATION (CID) SYSTEMS?

A3. ARMY'S CURRENT APPROACH TO CID - 3 PRONG APPROACH - 1ST IS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; 2ND IS BETTER TACTICS TECHNIQUES PROCEDURES (TTP) & TRAINING; 3RD IS ENHANCED OPTICS + INFRARED TECHNOLOGY. WITHOUT PROVIDING TOO MUCH DETAIL FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY REASONS, IT CAN BE NOTED THAT CID SYSTEMS ARE BEING DISTRIBUTED TO COALITION AND ALLIED FORCES TO ENHANCE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND IDENTIFICATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES. THESE SYSTEMS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, THERMAL IDENTIFICATION PANELS, THE PHOENIX INFRARED COMBAT BEACON SYSTEM AND GLOW TAPE. ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS ARE IN DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING PHASES AND WILL BE FIELDED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE TO PROVIDE:

- BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DERIVED FROM BLUE (FRIENDLY) FORCE TRACKING, FBCB2 & GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) ENSURING UNITS KNOW WHERE THEY ARE AND WHERE FRIENDLES ARE, THEREBY REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF FRATRICIDE.
- BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, COUPLED WITH IMPROVED TTP HAS RAISED THE SENSITIVITY LEVEL & ACUITY OF TODAY'S FORCES TO ENSURE THEY HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE OF THE TARGET'S IDENTITY PRIOR TO AN ENGAGEMENT. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS TRAINING INCLUDES THE RECOGNITION OF COMBAT VEHICLES (ROC-V), THERMAL SIGNATURE IDENTIFICATION TRAINING THAT HELP SOLDIERS LEARN TO IDENTIFY THE THERMAL SIGNATURES OF COMBAT VEHICLES. ROC-V IS AN INTERACTIVE, WINDOWS-BASED CURRICULUM THAT TEACHES THE UNIQUE PATTERNS AND SHAPES OF

VEHICLE "HOTSPOTS" AND OVERALL VEHICLE SHAPES. ROC-V ALSO PROVIDES SOLDIERS WITH PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN THE USE OF THEIR SENSOR IMAGE CONTROLS. WITH VIRTUAL SIGHT CONTROLS, SOLDIERS LEARN TO EFFECTIVELY ADJUST THEIR THERMAL IMAGES TO FIND TARGETS AND BRING OUT THEIR THERMAL ID CUES.

- IMPROVED OPTICS (2ND GEN FLIRS + NEWER NIGHT VISION DEVICE SYSTEMS) PLUS PASSIVE THERMAL TECHNOLOGY, ENABLE GUNNERS TO MAKE A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WITH GREATER CLARITY AND ACCURACY, AT GREATER RANGES.
- THE COMBINATION OF THESE APPROACHES REDUCES THE POTENTIAL FOR FRATRICIDE.

Q4. WHAT ARE FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES?

A4. DEFINITION OF FRATRICIDE/FRIENDLY FIRE PER AR 600-34. "A CIRCUMSTANCE IN WHICH MEMBERS OF THE U.S. OR FRIENDLY MILITARY FORCES ARE MISTAKINGLY, OR ACCIDENTALLY, KILLED OR INJURED IN ACTION BY THE U.S. OR FRIENDLY FORCES WHILE ENGAGED WITH AN ENEMY, OR WHILE FIRING AT A HOSTILE FORCE, OR WHAT IS THOUGHT TO BE A HOSTILE FORCE."

Q5. WHAT CAUSES FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES?

A5. COMBAT IS HIGHLY COMPLEX AND STRESSFUL. OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED 24 HOURS A DAY, IN ALL TYPES OF TERRAIN AND WEATHER. THEY INVOLVE RAPID MANEUVER AND INTENSE ENGAGEMENTS USING HIGHLY LETHAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS FIRED FROM A VARIETY OF AIR, GROUND AND SEA PLATFORMS. BATTLEFIELDS ARE OBSCURED BY DUST AND SMOKE, SOLDIERS BECOME FATIGUED, AND EQUIPMENT CAN MALFUNCTION. THESE AND OTHER OCCURRENCES PRODUCE WHAT IS CALLED THE "FOG OF WAR."

Q6. HOW MANY AMERICAN CASUALTIES RESULTED FROM FRATRICIDE DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR?

A6. OF THE TOTAL OF 613 MILITARY BATTLE CASUALTIES IN OPERATION DESERT STORM, 146 SERVICE PERSONNEL WERE KILLED IN ACTION, INCLUDING 35 KILLED BY FIRE FROM FRIENDLY FORCES, AND 467 WERE WOUNDED, INCLUDING 72 BY FIRE FROM FRIENDLY FORCES.

Q7. WHAT ARE THE LEADING CAUSES OF FRATRICIDE?

A7. THE FACTORS THAT CAN CAUSE FRATRICIDE ARE:

- CHAOS AND CONFUSION OF WARFARE
- INADEQUATE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
- INADEQUATE EMPLOYMENT OF, AND ADHERENCE TO, FIRE CONTROL MEASURES
- COMBAT IDENTIFICATION FAILURES

Q8. DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM, HOW DID THE FRATRICIDE INCIDENTS OCCUR?

A8. FRIENDLY-FIRE CASUALTIES ARE NOT UNIQUE TO OPERATION DESERT STORM. DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM, APPROXIMATELY 39 PERCENT OF THE FRIENDLY-FIRE INCIDENTS (11 OUT OF 28) APPEARED TO BE AS A RESULT OF TARGET MISIDENTIFICATION. MISIDENTIFICATION WAS A RESULT OF SEVERAL FACTORS—WEATHER AND BATTLEFIELD CONDITIONS BEING THE PRINCIPAL REASONS. COORDINATION PROBLEMS ACCOUNTED FOR APPROXIMATELY 29 PERCENT (8 OUT OF 28) FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENTS. OF THE REMAINING NINE INCIDENTS, SIX WERE DUE TO TECHNICAL AND/OR ORDNANCE MALFUNCTIONS; THREE INCIDENTS HAD INSUFFICIENT OR INCONCLUSIVE FINDINGS TO DETERMINE CAUSE.

Q9. THERE SEEMS TO BE A HIGHER PROPORTION OF CASUALTIES FROM FRIENDLY FIRE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM AS OPPOSED TO PREVIOUS CONFLICTS. IS THAT THE CASE?

A9. BASED ON THE REPORTS USED AND THE METHODS OF SURVEY REPORTED, THE PERCENTAGES OF CASUALTIES VARIED, TO INCLUDE: SIX PERCENT IN PANAMA/OPERATION JUST CAUSE, 13 PERCENT IN GRENADA/OPERATION URGENT FURY, STUDIES REFLECTING 10-14 PERCENT IN VIETNAM, AND 12-14 PERCENT IN WORLD WAR II AND 17 PERCENT IN OPERATION DESERT STORM.

ANOTHER DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OPERATION DESERT STORM AND PREVIOUS WARS WAS THE GREAT NUMBER OF LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENTS AND BATTLES IN LIMITED VISIBILITY. FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS—SIGHTS AND COMPUTERS—ARE FAR MORE CAPABLE THAN IN THE PAST. WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION ARE ABLE TO ACHIEVE HIGH PROBABILITIES OF HITS AND KILLS AT GREATER RANGES. THE NATURE OF THE DESERT PERMITTED ENGAGEMENT OF TARGETS AT RANGES EXCEEDING TWO AND ONE HALF KILOMETERS ON A REGULAR BASIS AND IN ALMOST ALL WEATHER CONDITIONS. EFFECTIVE LONG-RANGE FIRES DO MUCH TO WIN BATTLES WITH FEWER CASUALTIES, BUT THESE ENGAGEMENTS ALSO PLACE A PREMIUM ON POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION. IN ADDITION TO INCREASED RANGES, DESERT WARFARE IS CHARACTERIZED BY PERIODS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY. WEATHER CONDITIONS, SUCH AS SAND AND RAIN STORMS THAT OCCURRED DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM, THE DUST AND SMOKE OF BATTLE, AND DARKNESS OFTEN AID ATTACKING FORCES BY SHIELDING THEM FROM ENEMY OBSERVATION. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THESE CONDITIONS WERE, TO SOME EXTENT, RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIVELY LOW COALITION CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, THESE CONDITIONS ALSO DEGRADE SOMEWHAT THE SIGHTING SYSTEMS AIR AND GROUND FORCES USE. IN SUCH CONDITIONS, STATE-OF-THE-ART SIGHTS PROVIDE SUFFICIENT RESOLUTION TO IDENTIFY GENERAL TARGETS, BUT OFTEN LACK THE RESOLUTION TO PROVIDE CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLE TYPE. LONG-RANGE, LIMITED-VISIBILITY ENGAGEMENTS ARE PART OF THE ART OF MODERN WARFARE.

A FINAL FACTOR ON THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD IS THE PRESENCE OF COALITION FORCES EQUIPPED WITH DIFFERENT EQUIPMENT THAN EMPLOYED BY US FORCES. EXTRA CARE MUST BE TAKEN WHEN COALITION FORCES FROM DIFFERENT NATIONS ARE OPERATING IN THE SAME AREA. IN MANY CASES, THEY WILL NOT SHARE A COMMON PICTURE OF THE BATTLEFIELD OR EVEN EMPLOY SIMILAR ANTI-FRATRICIDE TACTICS AND CONTROL MEASURES. FURTHER COMPLICATING THE CHALLENGE, COALITION FORCES MAY BE EQUIPPED WITH COMBAT VEHICLES OF THE SAME TYPE AS ENEMY FORCES. COALITION WARFARE INTERJECTS A NEW DIFFICULTY INTO THE CHALLENGES SURROUNDING PREVENTION OF FIRE FROM FRIENDLY FORCES.

Q10. DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM, WHAT TYPE OF INCIDENTS RESULTED IN CASUALTIES FROM FRIENDLY FIRE?

A10. INVESTIGATIONS HAVE IDENTIFIED 28 INCIDENTS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM IN WHICH US FORCES INADVERTENTLY ENGAGED OTHER AMERICAN FORCES, RESULTING IN THE DEATHS OF 35 SERVICEMEN AND THE WOUNDING OF 72 OTHERS. OF THE 28 U.S. INCIDENTS, 16 WERE IN GROUND-TO-GROUND ENGAGEMENTS, WITH 24 KILLED AND 57 WOUNDED, WHILE NINE WERE IN AIR-TO-GROUND ENGAGEMENTS THAT RESULTED IN 11 KILLED AND 15 WOUNDED. OTHER INCIDENTS INCLUDED ONE SHIP-TO-SHIP, ONE SHORE-TO-SHIP, AND ONE GROUND-TO-AIR ENGAGEMENT. HOWEVER, NO CASUALTIES RESULTED FROM THESE INCIDENTS.

Q11. WHAT PROCEDURES WILL BE TAKEN ON THE BATTLEFIELD ONCE A FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OCCURRED?

A11. ONCE A FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OCCURRED, ARMY REGULATIONS REQUIRES BOTH A SAFETY AND COLLATERAL INVESTIGATION (SEE AR

385-40). IN THE EVENT OF FRIENDLY FIRE FATALITIES, AR 600-34 PRESCRIBES FURTHER REQUIREMENTS. AR 15-6 SETS FORTH PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF INFORMAL AND FORMAL INVESTIGATIONS AND GUIDES THE CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS REQUIRING THE DETAILED GATHERING AND ANALYZING OF FACTS, AND THE MAKING OF RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THOSE FACTS.

5. MEDIA QUESTIONS THAT GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THESE Q'S AND A'S SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO OCPA MEDIA RELATIONS BRANCH, OCPA-MR, ATTN: (b)(6) (b)(2), OR LTC (b)(6) OCPA STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, OCPA-SCD, (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, April 25, 2003 12:45 PM
To: Rheinlander, Thomas E., LTC, JCS, PAO; Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA
Subject: military analysts conference call with mcchystal/collins

Importance: High

Attachments: Military Analysts Conference Call Agenda 04-25-03.doc



Military Analysts
Conference C...

attached is the agenda + final list of participants for this afternoon's
conference call w/retired military analysts:



**Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Friday, April 25, 2003
(As of April 24, 2003/10:00 am)**

AGENDA

- 2:00 pm** **Welcome and Introduction (Guidelines)**
- Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs
- 2:01 pm** **Update on Coalition Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq**
- Dr. Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Stability
Operations
- 2:15 pm** **OIF Operational Update**
- Major General Stanley A. McChrystal, Vice Director for Operations
(J-3), Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 2:30 pm** **Call Concludes (Guidelines)**

Note:

Call-In Telephone Number:

(b)(2)



Conference Call
Military Analysts
2:00 pm, Friday, April 25, 2003
(As of April 25, 2003/12:45 pm)

Participating

Colonel Carl Allard
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
General William Nash
General Joseph Ralston
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor
Colonel John Warden
General Montgomery Meigs
Lieutenant General Dan Christman
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak
Major General Donald W. Shepperd
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Colonel Jack Jacobs
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney
General Glen K. Otis
Major General Paul E. Vallely

Tentative or Decline

Undecided

General William F. "Buck" Kernan (T)
Major General Perry Smith (T)
General Wayne Downing (T)
Brigadier General David Grange (D)
General Ronald Fogelman (D)
Admiral Thomas Lopez (D)
General Wesley Clark (D)
General Charles Wilhelm (D)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (D)
Admiral David Jeremiah (D)
General Larry Welch (D)
General Hugh Shelton (D)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (D)
Major General George Harrison (D)
General Merrill McPeak (D)
General Thomas Moorman (D)

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Wednesday, July 30, 2003 9:03 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS, PAO; (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) MAJ, SJS; (b)(6) LCDR, JCS SJS; (b)(6)
Subject: SMSgt, OCJCS
30 JULY END OF DAY REPORT

PLEASE PASS TO CAPT THORP

WINS:

--Gen McChrystal made time on his calendar for the OSD PA conference call with retired military analysts for tomorrow afternoon. His plan is to bring along an O6 from the JOD who will observe, then take this tasker on from here. I think it's a great plan. He indicated that had discussed this with Gen Swartz, and if, in the future, we felt there was need for more firepower on a particular call/subject, that we could re-engage. I told him that when these analysts were still on active duty, they relied on O6s to brief them, and that this should work well.

--Got a J5 SME to do a backgrounder with Bradley Graham this afternoon on Proliferation Security Initiative. Spoke with J5's EA, and sent an email to Gen Casey, (cc the J5, etc.) to "remind" all that this was already in the works, and so no one would be surprised when they read the Washington Post tomorrow -- or Friday, whenever it runs.

--WOODWARD interview: Gen Pace brought this subject up, as it came up at the NSC today. Condi Rice mentioned it, President chimed in, etc. Gen Pace indicated that we are to follow Condi's lead, get some input/guidance/outline, etc. I have a call in with Anna Perez, just to relay the conversation and see where we are. I think she had a long chat with Mr. Woodward today. Will follow up; at least the skids are greased, and this will be an expected event. Joan has prepared the memo for the Chairman on this.

--Got all the Chairman's transcripts you sent (New Delhi press conference; GEO-TV, Pakistan; and Bagram press conference) hung on the website. Also passed them to Col DeFrank for use on Defense Link. I noticed they used one of Jim Garamore's stories in the Pentagon Briefing (the weekly "blurb") with a hotlink to DefenseLink, so that's great (additional) coverage/audience.

LOSSES: (what are you looking here for??? I'm a Marine -- there will be NOTHING in the loss column!

QUESTION: Got an email from the Rendon Group folks. They originally sent it to you, then resent to me when they got your auto-response. John Rendon will be in the building Monday afternoon (4 Aug) for several meetings, and they were hoping to get him on your schedule (and they promised he will not go over the time limit.) Do you want me to schedule this? 30 minutes?

PREDICTION: Afraid LIBERTY for this weekend may be cancelled. Saturday schedule is building.

And while I was putting out fires with an ice pick, the rest of the office was really busy today:

Maj (b)(6)
* WA Post backgrounder with J5 on PIO. Publication expected tomorrow
* Attended Liberia IO VTC today - expect an interagency one-page talking point paper ready for chop by Saturday
* Staffing PAG for GTMO, coordinating across Joint Staff - waiting on J5, due tomorrow
* Chopping of PAG on Somalia complete
* Conducted BG Brooks backgrounder with FrontLine today
* Chopping Noble Malinda SMEB
* Alert order being worked -- PPAG being coordinated by Amy

LCDR (b)(6)

- * PPAG on upcoming event going through approval channels
- * Working a Terrorist Information Program/ JPENS - J6 Issue with OSD for Boston Globe - deadline tomorrow
- * Working a J5 Goldwater-Nichols Query

LTC (b)(6)

- * Computer Guru's loaded Calendar Creator 6.0 today -- LTC (b)(6) endeavoring to learn it and transfer it as Long Range Calendar.
- * Working Issues for Outreach Program.
- * Coordinated with J1 regarding IMA support proposal - not a simple process...will work it hard.
- * Town Hall meeting on track for SECDEF and CJCS on 14 Aug.

That's all the news that fits.
Stay safe, and hurry back to the barn.
V/R
Katie

Tracking:

Recipient

(b)(6)

Read

- Read: 7/30/2003 9:05 PM
- Read: 7/31/2003 7:04 AM
- Read: 7/31/2003 8:27 AM
- Read: 7/31/2003 7:46 AM
- Read: 7/31/2003 8:11 AM
- Read: 7/31/2003 5:57 AM
- Read: 7/31/2003 6:57 AM

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, August 04, 2003 2:40 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS
Subject: FW: Outreach Meeting with SECDEF and Military Analysts, 12 Aug, 10:30 am - 12:00 pm

Importance: Low

(b)(6)

Just as a head's up.
SecDef is scheduled to meet with the retired general officers/military analysts on Tues, 12 Aug, sometime between 1030-1200 here in the Pentagon. He may ask the Vice Chairman (Acting Chairman) to join him.
The briefer, etc. discussed below is ours for action -- NOT looking for Gen Pace to be the duty ops briefer.
Just wanted you to be aware that this might pop up on Gen Pace's calendar as a "drive by" with SecDef.
V/R
Katie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS
>Sent: Monday, August 04, 2003 2:01 PM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: Outreach Meeting with SECDEF and Military Analysts, 12 Aug, 10:30 am - 12:00 pm
>Importance: Low
>
>Ma'am,
> (b)(6) informed me about a neat opportunity to engage the Military Analysts and Civilian Defense Experts next week. He is hosting a Lessons Learned outreach for these analysts on 12 Aug here in the building, vice the weekly telephonic conference call.
> (b)(6) requested a 15-minute military operations briefing from someone on the Joint Staff.
> As you know we are working to identify an O-6 briefer to communicate weekly on the conf call.
> However, I thought that if the VCJCS wanted to engage this audience it would be a great opportunity to do so and get his message out.
> What do you think?
>
> v/r,
> LTC (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS
Sent: Tuesday, August 05, 2003 9:12 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: Outreach Meeting with SECDEF and Military Analysts, 12 Aug, 10:30 am - 12:00 pm

Importance: Low

Thank you...looking at SD's "two-weeker"...there is an "Outreach" noted for 1100-1145...I'll put on boss's schedule as an FYI and keep an eye on it.

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Monday, August 04, 2003 2:40 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS
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>Importance: Low

> (b)(6)

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>Katie

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> What do you think?

> v/r,
> LTC (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS
Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2003 10:19 AM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: Military Analysts Conference Call with CJCS

Importance: High

Attachments: Military Analysts Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call Agenda 08-07-03.doc



Military Analysts
Civilian Def...

Sir/Ma'am,
Latest info on the Conference Call.
v/r, LTC (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
>Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2003 9:46 AM
>To: Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC,
JCS SJS
>Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
>Subject: Military Analysts Conference Call with CJCS
>Importance: High
>
>Folks,
>
>Attached is an updated agenda and list of participants for this afternoon's conference
call with CJCS -- which reflects last night's change in time.
>A final revision will be forwarded by 1:00 pm. Thanks! (b)(6)
>
>



OIF Conference Call
Retired Military Analysts and Civilian Defense Experts
3:00 pm, Thursday, August 7, 2003, Room (b)(2)
(As of August 6, 2003/6:30 pm)

AGENDA

3:00 pm Welcome and Introduction (Guidelines)

Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs

3:01 pm Update on Joint Chiefs of Staff Trip to the Region

General Richard B. Myers (AF), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

3:15 pm Questions and Answers

3:30 pm Call Concludes (Guidelines)

Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs

Note:

Call-In Telephone Number:

(b)(2)



OIF Conference Call
Retired Military Analysts and Civilian Defense Experts
3:00 pm, Thursday, August 7, 2003
(As of August 7, 2003/9:15 am)

PARTICIPATING Retired Military Analysts

Colonel Carl Allard
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan
General Ronald Fogelman
General William F. "Buck" Kernan
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak
General Montgomery Meigs
Major General Donald W. Shepperd
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor
Major General Paul E. Vallely
Major General Thomas L. Wilkerson

PARTICIPATING Civilian Defense Experts

Mr. Anthony Cordesman, Fellow, Center for Strategies and International Studies
Mr. James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND
Lieutenant General Michael M. Dunn, President, National Defense University
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, President, The Center for Security Policy
Mr. Grover Norquist, President, Americans for Tax Reform
Ms. Danielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institute
Mr. Loren B. Thompson, Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute
Mr. John Wobensmith, Director of Development, Institute of World Politics

TENTATIVE or DECLINE Retired Military Analysts

Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (D)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (D)
Major General George Harrison (D)
Colonel Jack Jacobs (D)
General Merrill McPeak (D)
General Thomas Moorman (D)
General William Nash (D)
General Larry Welch (D)

TENTATIVE or DECLINE Civilian Defense Experts

Mr. Thomas Donnelly, Fellow, American Enterprise (T)
Ms. Nina Shea, Director, Center for Religious Freedom (T)
Ms. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (T)
Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution (D)
Mr. Chris Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, CATO Institute (D)

UNDECIDED Retired Military Analysts

Lieutenant General Dan Christman
General Wayne Downing
Brigadier General David Grange
Admiral David Jeremiah
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney
General Glen K. Otis
General Joseph Ralston
General Hugh Shelton
Major General Perry Smith
Colonel John Warden

UNDECIDED Civilian Defense Experts

Dr. Daniel Goure, Senior Fellow, Lexington Institute
Mr. Michael J. Horowitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Mr. Will Marshall, President, Progressive Policy Institute
Mr. Jack Spencer, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation
Dr. Michael Waller, Vice President, The Center for Security Policy

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS
Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2003 2:27 PM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: Military Analysts Conference Call with CJCS: Agenda/Participants

Importance: High

Attachments: Military Analysts Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call Agenda 08-07-03.doc



Military Analysts
Civilian Def...

latest update..

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
>Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2003 12:40 PM
>To: Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC,
JCS SJS
>Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL,
OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
>Subject: Military Analysts Conference Call with CJCS: Agenda/Participants
>Importance: High

>
>Attached is the agenda and final list of participants for this afternoon's conference
call with General Myers:

>

>

>Those that are "tentative/declined/undecided" are listed on page three.

>Txs! (b)(6)

>



OIF Conference Call
Retired Military Analysts and Civilian Defense Experts
3:00 pm, Thursday, August 7, 2003, Room (b)(2)
(As of August 6, 2003/6:30 pm)

AGENDA

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3:30 pm Call Concludes (Guidelines)

Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs

Note:

Call-In Telephone Number:

(b)(2)



OIF Conference Call
Retired Military Analysts and Civilian Defense Experts
3:00 pm, Thursday, August 7, 2003
(As of August 7, 2003/12:40 pm)

PARTICIPATING Retired Military Analysts

Colonel Carl Allard
Major Robert Bevelacqua
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan
General Ronald Fogelman
General William F. "Buck" Kernan
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak
General Montgomery Meigs
General Glen K. Otis
General Joseph Ralston
Major General Donald W. Shepperd
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor
Major General Paul E. Vallely
Colonel John Warden
Major General Thomas L. Wilkerson

PARTICIPATING Civilian Defense Experts

Mr. Anthony Cordesman, Fellow, Center for Strategies and International Studies
Mr. James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND
Lieutenant General Michael M. Dunn, President, National Defense University
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, President, The Center for Security Policy
Mr. Michael J. Horowitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Mr. Steven Nider, Director for Foreign and Security Studies, Progressive Policy Institute
Mr. Grover Norquist, President, Americans for Tax Reform
Ms. Danielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institute
Mr. Jack Spencer, Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage Foundation
Mr. Loren B. Thompson, Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute
Dr. Michael Waller, Vice President, The Center for Security Policy
Mr. John Wobensmith, Director of Development, Institute of World Politics

TENTATIVE or DECLINE Retired Military Analysts

Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (D)

Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (D)

Brigadier General David Grange (D)

Major General George Harrison (D)

Colonel Jack Jacobs (D)

Admiral David Jeremiah (D)

General Merrill McPeak (D)

General Thomas Moorman (D)

General William Nash (D)

General Larry Welch (D)

TENTATIVE or DECLINE Civilian Defense Experts

Mr. Thomas Donnelly, Fellow, American Enterprise (D)

Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution (D)

Mr. Chris Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, CATO Institute (D)

Ms. Nina Shea, Director, Center for Religious Freedom (D)

Ms. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (D)

UNDECIDED Retired Military Analysts

Lieutenant General Dan Christman

General Wayne Downing

Lieutenant General Thomas McNerney

General Hugh Shelton

Major General Perry Smith

UNDECIDED Civilian Defense Experts

Dr. Daniel Goure, Senior Fellow, Lexington Institute

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS
Sent: Friday, August 08, 2003 5:02 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: august 12 outreach meeting

fyi Ma'am

> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS
> Sent: Friday, August 08, 2003 5:01 PM
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> Subject: RE: august 12 outreach meeting

(b)(6)
> #1 - Our request is in to the J3 for general officer support. Standing by for their approval.
> #2 - VCJCS has it on his calendar to attend. I think we are fine - no need for SECDEF to do anything more.
> The only thing I could see that might prohibit his participation would be some unexpected requirement as Acting CJCS.
> My recommendation is that we do not reengage on the issue - it is on the schedule.
> And I did note the Press Conf on Tuesday, I believe that SECDEF and VCJCS will share the podium on Tuesday.
> Have a wonderful weekend. If I get more information tonight on the Operations Briefer for the 12th, I'll let you know ASAP.
> v/r, (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS
> Sent: Friday, August 08, 2003 1:18 PM
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> Subject: RE: august 12 outreach meeting

(b)(6)
> Asked CAPT Thorp to work through #1 this morning - expect he will tell me shortly.
> #2 Checked regarding the VCJCS and time is set aside on his schedule - think he is waiting to see if SECDEF asks him to join him.
> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> Sent: Friday, August 08, 2003 11:06 AM
> To: (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS
> Cc: Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
> Subject: august 12 outreach meeting
> Importance: High

(b)(6)
> we are still in need of closure on two things re: next tuesday's outreach:
> 1. i need a lock on lieutenant (b)(6) for the military ops briefing. with that obviously, we need to know what his briefing requirements will be, if any (unclass power point, hand outs etc...)
> 2. confirmation of vcjcs participation in this outreach meeting? note below/email transmission:
> (b)(6) Gen Pace is Acting Mon-Wed next week. I heard through our PA,
> Tuesday's Outreach is with retired GOs and Military Analysts...do you

>think my boss will be asked to attend? Also, your 2-weeker is showing
>CJCS doing the Press Avail...do you think it will still go with my boss
>instead? Thanks, (b)(6)

>
> It was our understanding that the vcjcs had already been asked.

>
> please advise soonest. txs! (b)(6)

>
>
>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, August 11, 2003 11:05 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS
Subject: outreach with military analysts

katie,

chris asked me to call you back which i've now left a message for you with deb.

a couple of quickies:

as an fyi -- osd pa still has not been told that vccjs is a lock by jcs pa. if he is -- great, however, please let us know so we can coordinate with protocol and other invited speakers. also, vccjs will not participate in prep meeting with secdef prior to the actual meeting. this concept has only been done once (the chair at the last outreach meeting) and it didn't work well. we've been instructed by secdef not to do this again.

give a call when you can so we can review info on attendance/agenda. note: our read ahead went up last wednesday already, however, i'm updating again today as is our routine. txs.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, September 22, 2003 6:55 PM
To: Myers, Richard B, Gen, JCS CJCS; GEN Peter Pace (E-mail)
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, OCJCS; (b)(6) LTC, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) COL, JCS VCJCS; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS SJS; Schwartz, Norton A., Lt Gen, JCS DJ-3; Peterson, Joe F, MG, JCS J3; Howard, Michelle J, CAPT, JCS J3; Casey, George W, LTG, JCS DJS; Hawkins, James A, Maj Gen, JCS VDJS/DOM; (b)(6) Col, JCS SJS
Subject: Retired Military Outreach Delegation - 22-25 Sep 03
Importance: Low
Attachments: Agenda Revised September 21, 2003.doc



Agenda Revised
September 21, 2...

General Myers and General Pace,

Retired Military TV-analysts arrived in Iraq today. OSD(PA) followed up on the CJCS invitation with good attendees and a great itinerary.

DoD selected key locations that will cause the analysts to get the "real picture." The key locations are highlighted on the attached itinerary and worth your perusal.

> The participants are some of the more influential and visible of the analysts that communicate with the media. As a matter of fact, several analysts conducted live interviews today from Iraq.

I think we're hitting a home run on this trip. I'll brief you on the results when they return. Next step is to see what other influentials we can get to Iraq for a similar itinerary. JCOC is one idea I intend to propose...

>
>v/r,
>Frank
>

Frank Thorp
Captain, USN
Special Assistant for Public Affairs
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(b)(2)

>

Itinerary for
Outreach Delegation
22-25 September 2003

Delegation:

Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
General Ronald Fogelman (USAF, Retired)
Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, President, The Center for Security Policy
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Ms. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
Major General William Nash (USA, Retired)
Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Ms. Danielle Pletka, Senior Defense Expert, American Enterprise Institute
Major General Paul E. Valley (USA, Retired)
Mr. Mitchell Ross Semel, Sr Vice President, Programming, East Coast, CBS Entertainment
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
Colonel John Warden (USAF, Retired)
Mr. John Wobensmith, Director for Development, Institute of World Politics Staff
Mr. Chris Willcox, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, OSD
Mr. Brent Thomas Krueger, Director for Community Relations and Public Liaison, OSD
Mr. Don Meyer, Special Assistant, OSD

Monday, 22 Sep

0800L Depart Kuwait via C-130

1030L Arrive Baghdad International Airport; Met by TBD

1045-1100 En route CPA helipad via rotary wing aircraft

1100-1115 En route CPA HQ via ground vehicles

1115-1230 CPA Overview with CPA Senior Staff, Ambassador's Conference Room
Attendees:
Ambassador Patrick Kennedy, Chief of Staff
LTG Ricardo Sanchez, CG, CJTF-7
Ambassador Clayton McManaway, Senior Counselor to Amb Bremer
Ambassador Chris Segar, Head of British Office, British Embassy
Mr. Gary Thatcher, Director, Strategic Communications

1230-1315 Lunch – CPA Dining Facility

1315-1430 CJTF-7 Operational Overview, Ambassador's Conference Room

Attendees:

LTG Sanchez

Others TBD on Ground

1430-1515 Meeting with Dr. Kay and MG Dayton, Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
(WMD Update)

1515-1615 CPA Ministries Discussions, Ambassador's Conference Room

Attendees:

Mr. Stephen Browning, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Electricity

Mr. Philip Carroll, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Oil

Ms. Leslye Arsht, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Education

Mr. Williamson Evers, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Education

1615-1800 Visit to 1st AD (location TBD by BG Dempsey)

1800-1815 En route Al Rashid Hotel

1815-1830 Personal time (refresh)

1830-2000 Reception with members of the Governing Council
Note: Invite UN Representative

2000-2015 En route CPA helipad

2015-2030 En route Baghdad International Airport

2045 Depart Baghdad via C-130 en route Kuwait

2115L Arrive Kuwait

Tuesday, 23 Sep

0800L Depart Kuwait en route BIAP via C-130

1030L Arrive BIAP; met by TBD

1040-1110 En route Al Hillah via rotary wing aircraft;
met by MajGen Tyszkiewicz, CG, MND (CS) and Mr. Mike Gfoeller, CPA-SC

1110-1120 En route MND-CS HQ

1120-1150 MND-CS Operational Overview by MajGen Tyszkiewicz

1150-1200 Meet with Coalition/Multinational leaders

1150-1201 1200-1245 Lunch with troops
1245-1305 En route Women's Rights Center (CPA funded reconstruction project)
1305-1400 Tour Women's Rights Center and Governance Center Building
with Mr. Dick Naab, CPA-SC Director
1400-1420 En route Mahawil Mass Grave site
1420-1450 Visit Mahawil – briefing by Ms. Sandy Hodgkinson, CPA Human Rights Officer
1450-1515 En route Babylon
1515-1600 Site visit of Babylon
1600-1610 En route helipad
1610-1645 En route Camp Victory helipad via rotary wing
1645-1830 CJTF7 Main visit and dinner troops
1830-1845 En route BIAP via motorcade
1900 Depart Baghdad en route Kuwait via C-130

Wednesday, 24 Sep

0730L Depart Kuwait via C-130
1030L Arrive Mosul; met by MG David Petraeus, CG, 101st Div
1030-1050 Aerial tour of Mosul; end at Div Main LZ
1050-1200 101st Area of Operation North Operational Overview/Video
1200-1245 Lunch w/Brigade Commanders and Command Sergeants Major
DivMain DFAC
1245-1315 En route City Hall via Police Station and Courthouse
(Reconstruction projects)
1315-1345 Meet Governor and Vice Governor and tour City Hall
Governor Ghanim al Basso and Vice Governor Khasro Goran
(Reconstruction project)
1345-1400 En route 101st helipad

1400-1500 En route Tikrit via rotary wing; met by MG Raymond Odierno, CG, 4th ID

1500-1900 4th ID Program – TBD

To include: Operational Overview
Meet with soldiers
Dinner with soldiers
Meet Tikrit local leaders
Meet one local NGO
View reconstruction project

19001945 Depart Tikrit en route Balad via rotary wing

2000 Depart Balad via C-130

2100L Arrive Kuwait

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS
Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2004 11:10 AM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: 3 Aug PA Events

Is this something that will involve the Chairman?

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
>Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2004 10:48 AM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) (b)(6), CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD(PA); (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
>Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) Maj, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) SSgt, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
>Subject: 3 Aug PA Events
>
>Looking to do Outreach w/Military Analysts:
>
>Tuesday 3 August
>9:25pm - Prep w/?
>9:45am-10:30 - Outreach
>10:45am-11:30 - Radio
>
>No Press Avail that week per Larry Di Rita.
>
>Let me know if this works - thanks,
(b)(6)
>
>
>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS
Sent: Friday, July 30, 2004 2:33 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: 3 Aug PA Events

It will be hard to do. He is officiating at a promotion ceremony at 1000, which I've already had to move once. Don't really want to jerk the two-star around any more. Do you know how long the analysts will be in the building?

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Thursday, July 29, 2004 7:00 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS
>Cc: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: RE: 3 Aug PA Events

> (b)(6)

>I've asked the question.
>Most of the time when OSD brings the military analysts in to the building to meet with the Secretary, he invites the Chairman to join him...still trying to get clarification on exactly what this is (who is coming, or if it is a conference call) ...if in fact it does include the Chairman, it would only be for the prep and outreach portion -- not the radio interviews.
>Should know more soon.
>V/R
>Katie

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS
> Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2004 11:10 AM
> To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
> Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
> Subject: FW: 3 Aug PA Events

> Is this something that will involve the Chairman?

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2004 10:48 AM
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Wheeler, (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) (b)(6), CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD (PA); (b)(6) Capt USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
> Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) Maj, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) SSgt, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD

> Subject: 3 Aug PA Events

> Looking to do Outreach w/Military Analysts:

> Tuesday 3 August
> 9:25pm - Prep w/?
> 9:45am-10:30 - Outreach
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> No Press Avail that week per Larry Di Rita.

> Let me know if this works - thanks,

(b)(6)

- >
- >
- >
- >

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2004 6:28 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: Eric Ruff (E-mail 3); Larry DiRita (E-mail 2); Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA, (b)(6) OASD-PA
Subject: POTUS VFW Speech Monday -- Global Posture
Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

(b)(6)

Just to follow-up our conversation. I attended a meeting this afternoon at the White House to discuss what the President was going to talk about in his speech to the VFW on Monday in Ohio. One component will be an announcement of his decision to return some 70,000 military forces from their overseas locations. OSD was represented by (b)(6) (b)(6) (Policy) and myself.

Major communication tactics will include:

Thursday night -- cable to embassies

Friday -- White House mention in the week ahead (of the speech not the specific contents)

Sunday -- (T) NSC backgrounder to a major news organization as a set-up piece

Monday -- POTUS speech at 11:30, followed by:

-- two background briefings: Pentagon and Foreign Press Center (DoD; DOS; NSC participants -- Usual suspects: (b)(6) and RDML Sullivan (DJ-5).)

-- Outreach call to military analyst

-- Pentagon Channel interview with Feith/ (b)(6)

Mid-Week - Possible SecDef op-ed in a major publication a couple of days after the speech (calibrate any of the reporting).

Working with OSD(Policy) to develop the fact sheet for DOS cable and background briefings (level of detail TBD).

I have conference call tomorrow with the same group to finalize the plan. Will keep you posted.

Thanks, Bryan

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, August 12, 2004 7:01 AM
To: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: POTUS VFW Speech Monday -- Global Posture

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Let me check into this, and discuss with Bryan at 0830....

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
>Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2004 6:28 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
>Cc: Eric Ruff (E-mail 3); Larry DiRita (E-mail 2); Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA
>Subject: POTUS VFW Speech Monday -- Global Posture

(b)(6)

>
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>Thanks, Bryan

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, August 16, 2004 10:50 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: News and Schedules from OASD-PA

(b)(6)

I think this went to the wrong Thorp -- might want to send again.
V/R
Col H

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Monday, August 16, 2004 10:47 AM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Ctr AF/XOS-HC; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: (b)(6), MAJ, JCS, SJS; (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
GOVT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) SMSgt, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: News and Schedules from OASD-PA
>Importance: High

> I spoke with Archie Davis late last week. He provided the following updates:

> 7 Sep - Outreach - Military Analysts

> (CJCS is TDY 8-13 Sep) to Norway, Luxembourg, Estonia, Latvia,
> Lithuania for Fall CHOD tour)

> 8 Sep - (T) SecDef speaks at Rand Annual Conference in DC

> 9 Sep - SecDef attends Congressional Breakfast with the legislators who
> met with DecDef on 9/11/;01

> 10 Sep - SecDef hosts a lunch for AMB Bremer

> PA - Dinner at Kalorma for Coalition Ambassadors and CPA Leaders
> (Don't know what happened to CJCS intent to recognize AMB Bremer, etc.)

> 11 Sep - SecDef participates in wreath laying at Arlington National Cemetery

> SecDef starts NASCAR event in Richmond
> (Don't know the plan about the Sunday Shows on 12 Sept)

> 21 Sep - Outreach - Corporate leaders

> 29 Sep - Outreach with Corporate supporters of ESGR

> Other Tidbits:

> NLF is evidently interested in opening a USO center in Afghanistan -
> probably in recognition of Pat Tillman

> AVA (our gold-laden "friends" in California) - they've moved their gala event from 22
October to TBD - perhaps next spring. Something about the manager of the Wiltshire hotel
in Beverly Hill having left, etc. (I'd guess he gave them a break on \$\$ for their event).

> V/R

> (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, August 16, 2004 10:52 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) MAJ, JCS, SJS; (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
Subject: GOVT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) SMSgt, OCJCS/PA
News and Schedules from OASD-PA
Importance: High

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V/R

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2004 1:50 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: News and Schedules from OASD-PA

(b)(6)

For the 7 Sep Outreach...will VCJCS speak or are you looking for a military operations update?

(b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Monday, August 16, 2004 10:52 AM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: (b)(6) MAJ, JCS, SJS; (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) GOVT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) SMSgt, OCJCS/PA
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>V/R

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS
Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:26 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

Wow -- enough advanced notice that we might be able to participate. Can you find out when they want the Chairman to talk to the group?

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
>Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:27 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
>Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) SSgt, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
>Subject: Military Outreach September 8th.

>
>Per Mr. Di Rita we would like to do the Outreach (Military Analysts) - Looking at Wednesday 8 September:

>
>11:00am - Prep
>11:15am-12:00 - Outreach

>
>Let me know if those times/date work - thanks, (b)(6)

>
>
>

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 5:06 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

(b)(6)

Can you check with Archie and get the timeline?
Thanks.
V/R
Col H

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) E, CIV, JCS OCJCS
>Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:26 PM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

>
> Now -- enough advanced notice that we might be able to participate. Can you find out when they want the Chairman to talk to the group?

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
>Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:27 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) (b)(6) CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
>Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) SSgt, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
>Subject: Military Outreach September 8th.

>
>Per Mr. Di Rita we would like to do the Outreach (Military Analysts) - Looking at Wednesday 8 September:

>
>11:00am - Prep
>11:15am-12:00 - Outreach

>
>Let me know if those times/date work - thanks, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, August 19, 2004 8:07 AM
To: Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

Archie, Do you have the times for CJCS participation? Please let me know soonest so we can block on his schedule.

Many thanks, (b)(6) OCJCS/PA (b)(2)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 5:06 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

> (b)(6)

>Can you check with Archie and get the timeline?
>Thanks.
>V/R
>Col H

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS
>Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:26 PM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

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>From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
>Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:27 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) (b)(6), CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
>Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) SSgt, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
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(b)(6)

From: Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 19, 2004 8:32 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: Military Outreach September 8th.

(b)(6)

I will bring the memo with the invited attendee list today requesting CJCS participation 10:45-11:15 a.m. I recall the CJCS is TDY that week. Should I make this request for VCJCS?

Archie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Thursday, August 19, 2004 8:07 AM
>To: Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
>Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

> Archie, Do you have the times for CJCS participation? Please let me know soonest so we can block on his schedule.

> Many thanks, (b)(6) OCJCS/PA (b)(2)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 5:06 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

(b)(6)

> Can you check with Archie and get the timeline?

> Thanks.

> V/R

> Col H

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS
>Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:26 PM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

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>Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:27 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) ., CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
>Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) SSgt, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
>Subject: Military Outreach September 8th.

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Wednesday 8 September:

>

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>11:15am-12:00 - Outreach

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>Let me know if those times/date work - thanks, (b)(6)

>

>

>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, August 19, 2004 10:46 AM
To: Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) MAJ. JCS. SJS; (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) TSgt, JCS, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) SMSgt, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) GOVT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Col, OCJCS
Subject: RE: Military Outreach September 8th.
Importance: High

Archie - CJCS will be here on the 8 September, he leaves on TDY on the 10th. Please bring the material addressed CJCS for the 1045-1115 timeslot. Thanks!

(b)(6) Do you know anything about 3 September SecDef's Town Hall with Joint Staff? We understand it is from 1100-1130, in (b)(2) and you have the action. We will need to bring this to DJS - VADM Keating's attention for input. Appreciate any details you can provide, so we can staff appropriately.

Many thanks for your helpfulness!

V/R
(b)(6) OCJCS/PA, (b)(2)

> -----Original Message-----
>From: Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
>Sent: Thursday, August 19, 2004 8:32 AM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: RE: Military Outreach September 8th.

(b)(6)
>
>I will bring the memo with the invited attendee list today requesting CJCS participation 10:45-11:15 a.m. I recall the CJCS is TDY that week. Should I make this request for VCJCS?

> Archie

> -----Original Message-----
> From: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
> Sent: Thursday, August 19, 2004 8:07 AM
> To: Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
> Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
> Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

> Archie, Do you have the times for CJCS participation? Please let me know soonest so we can block on his schedule.

> Many thanks, (b)(6) OCJCS/PA (b)(2)

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
> Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 5:06 PM
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
> Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

(b)(6)
> Can you check with Archie and get the timeline?
> Thanks.

> V/R
> Col H

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS
> Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:26 PM
> To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
> Subject: FW: Military Outreach September 8th.

> Wow -- enough advanced notice that we might be able to participate. Can you
find out when they want the Chairman to talk to the group?

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 4:27 PM
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance,
George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Whitman,
Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA;
(b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA (b)(6)
> Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD;
CIV, OSD; (b)(6) SSgt, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Subject: Military Outreach September 8th.

> Per Mr. Di Rita we would like to do the Outreach (Military Analysts) - Looking at
Wednesday 8 September:

> 11:00am - Prep
> 11:15am-12:00 - Outreach

> Let me know if those times/date work - thanks,

> (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 24, 2004 9:55 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: Military Analysts and Service Organizations

Importance: High

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Greetings Archie and (b)(6)

We are compiling Holiday lists for General Myers and will need names and addresses of military analysts in the area and also the updated list of commanders and executive officers of service organizations. Appreciate your assistance in providing me that information this week.

As always -- many thanks for all your support!

V/R (b)(6) OCJCS/PA, (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, September 10, 2004 4:24 PM
To: Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: Addresses

Archie,

Could you send us the electrons of your military analyst address list... We want to add them to our protocol list...

Thanks,
FT

Frank Thorp
Captain, USN
Special Assistant for Public Affairs
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, September 13, 2004 5:40 PM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6), CIV, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: Addresses

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Attachments: Retired Military Analysts.doc



Retired Military
Analysts.doc ...

Frank,

Of course, I can. Anything for my cell mate.

Archie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Friday, September 10, 2004 4:24 PM
>To: Davis, Archie, LTC, OASD-PA
>Cc: (b)(6), CIV, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: Addresses

>

>Archie,

>

>Could you send us the electrons of your military analyst address list... We want to add them to our protocol list...

>

>Thanks,

>FT

>

>Frank Thorp

>Captain, USN

>Special Assistant for Public Affairs

>to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(b)(2)

RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS

(As of September 13, 2004)

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG)

(b)(6)

Major Robert S. Bevelacqua (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Admiral Dennis C. Blair (USN, Retired)

President

Institute for Defense Analyses

4850 Mark Center Drive

Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882

Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)

Vice President for Advanced Concepts

Lockheed Martin

Flint Hill One, Suite 600

10530 Rosehaven Street

Fairfax, Virginia 22030

Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)

Senior Fellow

The Heritage Foundation

214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE

Washington, DC 20002

Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)

President

WVC3 Group, Incorporated

1800 Alexander Bell Drive

Reston, Virginia 20191

Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)

Heritage Foundation

214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE

Washington, DC 20002

General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Colonel (Tim) J. Eads (USA, Retired)
Blackbird Technologies, Incorporated
13900 Lincoln Park Drive, Suite 400
Herndon, Virginia 20171

General Ronald Fogelman (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)

Partner

Patton Boggs, LLP

2550 M Street, NW

Washington, DC 20037

Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (USAF, Retired)

Eagle Limited

4201 Congress Street, Suite 240

Charlotte, North Carolina 28209

Brigadier General David L. Grange (USA, Retired)

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer

McCormick Tribune Foundation

435 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 770

Chicago, Illinois 60611

Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)

The Steven J. Greer Foundation

(b)(6)

Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Admiral David E. Jeremiah (USN, Retired)

Partner and President

Technology Strategies & Alliances Corporation

5242 Lyngate Court

Burke, Virginia 22015

General George Joulwan (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

General William F. "Buck" Kernan (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Colonel Glenn Lackey (USA, Retired)
Operations Officer
Center for National Security Human Capital Management
U.S. Office of Personnel Management
1900 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20415

Colonel Walter P. Lang, Jr. (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN, Retired)
President
Information Manufacturing Corporation
7000 Infantry Ridge Road, Suite 200
Manassas, Virginia 20109

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

Colonel Jeff McCausland, (USA, Retired)
Director
Clarke Center, Dickinson College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013

Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Louis A. Bantle Professor of Government and Business Policy
Maxwell School of Syracuse University
Department of Public Administration
215 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, New York 13244

Major F. Andy Messing Jr. (USAR, Retired)

National Defense Council Foundation
1220 King Street, Suite 230
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. (USAF, Retired)

Booz Allen Hamilton, Incorporated
8283 Greensboro Drive
McLean, Virginia 22102

Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Patton Boggs, LLP
2550 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037-1350

Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired)

(b)(6)

General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Preventive Action
Council on Foreign Relations
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

General Glen K. Otis (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Retired)
Vice Chairman
The Cohen Group
1200 19th Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036

Lieutenant General Erv Rokke (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

General Hugh Shelton (USA, Retired)
President, International Operations
M.I.C. Industries, Incorporated
One Fountain Square, 11911 Freedom Drive
Reston, Virginia 20190

Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC, Retired)

(b)(6)

Major General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Retired)
Chief Executive Officer
Guardian Group International
1028 Jeanett Way
Bel Air, Maryland 21014

Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC, Retired)
Director of National Security Programs
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
80 Potter Pond
Lexington, Massachusetts 02421

Major General Paul E. Vallely (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)



Colonel John Warden (USAF, Retired)
President
Venturist, Incorporated
8233 Old Federal Road
Montgomery, Alabama 36117

General Larry D. Welch (USAF, Retired)
Senior Fellow
Institute for Defense Analyses
4850 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22311

General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC, Retired)
Battelle
1725 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 601
Arlington, Virginia 22202

General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired)
Chief Executive Officer and Publisher
U.S. Naval Institute
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, Maryland 21402

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, September 13, 2004 6:48 PM
To: (b)(6) GOVT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) SMSgt, OCJCS/PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV,
OCJCS/PA
Subject: RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS list -- to add to Holiday invite list
Attachments: Retired Military Analysts.doc



Retired Military
Analysts.doc ...

(b)(6)

Below list needs to be added to the Holiday Reception list you are working on. This list should be your number one priority. We are way overdue with Protocol... I want to see it before we turn it back in -- to include the copies that people have marked corrections/additions on. See me with any questions.
Thanks.
V/R
Col H

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The Steven J. Greer Foundation

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Burke, Virginia 22015

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General William F. "Buck" Kernan (USA, Retired)

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Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013

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(b)(6)

General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Louis A. Bantle Professor of Government and Business Policy
Maxwell School of Syracuse University
Department of Public Administration
215 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, New York 13244

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Major General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired)

(b)(6)

Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Retired)
Chief Executive Officer
Guardian Group International
1028 Jeanett Way
Bel Air, Maryland 21014

Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC, Retired)
Director of National Security Programs
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
80 Potter Pond
Lexington, Massachusetts 02421

Major General Paul E. Valley (USA, Retired)

(b)(6)

A large rectangular area of the document is redacted with a solid grey color, obscuring the contact information for Major General Paul E. Valley.

Colonel John Warden (USAF, Retired)
President
Venturist, Incorporated
8233 Old Federal Road
Montgomery, Alabama 36117

General Larry D. Welch (USAF, Retired)
Senior Fellow
Institute for Defense Analyses
4850 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22311

General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC, Retired)
Battelle
1725 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 601
Arlington, Virginia 22202

General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired)
Chief Executive Officer and Publisher
U.S. Naval Institute
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, Maryland 21402

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, November 05, 2004 6:44 PM
To: (b)(6) Lt Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING !!!!

FYI

(b)(6)

Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Defense Press Officer
Office of the Assistant Secretary Of Defense (Public Affairs)
Office: (b)(2) DSN: (b)(2)
Fax: (b)(2)

Things don't change much:

"A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes."
Mark Twain 1835 - 1910

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
>Sent: Friday, November 05, 2004 5:06 PM
>To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
>Subject: FW: CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING !!!!

>

>Here ya go.

> (b)(6)

> (b)(6)

>Program Support Specialist
>Office of the Secretary of Defense
>Public Affairs (Room (b)(2))
>Telephone: (b)(2)
>Fax:

>

>PLEASE SEE INVITE BELOW.

>

>

>MEMORANDUM

>

>To: Retired Military Analysts

>

>From: Colonel Archie Davis
> Director, Community Relations and Public Affairs
> Office of the Secretary of Defense

>

>Date: November 5, 2004

>

>Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Official

>

>We invite you to participate in a conference call, Saturday, November 6, 2004 from 8:00 AM to 9:00 AM.

>

>Topics to be discussed are: **Colonel Davis will follow this email tonight with a message explaining the topic of discussion.

>

>Participants in this conference call will be Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, III Corps. Your host for this call will be Colonel Archie Davis.

>

>To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Military Analysts conference call.

>

>Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) (b)(6)
<mailto:(b)(6)@ (b)(2) or call her at (b)(2)

>

>We hope you are able to participate.

>

>

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, November 05, 2004 7:15 PM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING !!!!

May want to dial in if you can.
Gen Metz on background with the Retired Military Analysts Sat 6Nov 0800-0900 Ph numbers below.
V/R
Katie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
>Sent: Friday, November 05, 2004 5:44 PM
>To: (b)(6), Lt Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING !!!!

>
>
>FYI
(b)(6)
>Lieutenant Colonel, USA
>Defense Press Officer
>Office of the Assistant Secretary Of Defense (Public Affairs)
>Office: (b)(2) DSN: (b)(2)
>Fax: (b)(2)

>
>Things don't change much:
>"A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting
>on its shoes."
>Mark Twain 1835 - 1910

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
>Sent: Friday, November 05, 2004 5:06 PM
>To: (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA
>Subject: FW: CONFERENCE CALL SATURDAY MORNING !!!!

>Here ya go.

(b)(6)
(b)(6)
>Program Support Specialist
>Office of the Secretary of Defense
>Public Affairs (Room (b)(2))
>Telephone: (b)(2)
>Fax:

>PLEASE SEE INVITE BELOW.

>MEMORANDUM

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>To: Retired Military Analysts
>
>From: Colonel Archie Davis
>Director, Community Relations and Public Affairs
>Office of the Secretary of Defense
>

>Date: November 5, 2004

>

>Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Official

>

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>

>Topics to be discussed are: **Colonel Davis will follow this email tonight with a message explaining the topic of discussion.

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>Participants in this conference call will be Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, III Corps. Your host for this call will be Colonel Archie Davis.

>

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>

>Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) (b)(6)
<mailto:(b)(6) (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

>

>We hope you are able to participate.

>

>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) TC OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 9:59 AM
To: (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen
(Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: Military Analysts Conference Call

Ma'am,
Note the time--I was thinking in Baghdad time.

v/r
(b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----
>From: Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA
>Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 8:41 AM
>To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col,
OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6), Lt Col,
OASD-PA
>Subject: Military Analysts Conference Call
>
>All:
>
>The call-in information for the military analysts conference call is:
>
>
>
>We invite you to participate in a conference call, Saturday, November 20, 2004 from 8:30
am to 9:30 a.m. est.
>
>Topics to be discussed are: Operational Update on Iraq.
>
>Participants in this conference call will be General Thomas Metz. Your host for this
call will be Colonel Archie Davis.
>
>To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and
ask the operator to connect you to the Military Analysts conference call.
>
>
>VR,
>
>Archie
>
>Colonel Archie Davis
>Director
>Community Relations & Public Liaison
(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 11:54 AM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: Military Analysts Conference Call

Capt Thorp,

There is a military analysts conference call tomorrow a.m. -- Sat, from 0830 to 0930 -- with Gen Metz.

Dial in info follows.

Thought you might be interested in listening in...

please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Military Analysts conference call.

V/R

Katie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA
>Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 9:59 AM
>To: (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: Military Analysts Conference Call

>Ma'am,

>Note the time--I was thinking in Baghdad time.

>v/r

(b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA
>Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 8:41 AM
>To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Lt Col, OASD-PA
>Subject: Military Analysts Conference Call

>All:

>The call-in information for the military analysts conference call is:

>We invite you to participate in a conference call, Saturday, November 20, 2004 from 8:30 am to 9:30 a.m. est.

>Topics to be discussed are: Operational Update on Iraq.

>Participants in this conference call will be General Thomas Metz. Your host for this call will be Colonel Archie Davis.

>To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Military Analysts conference call.

>VR,

>Archie

>Colonel Archie Davis

>Director

>Community Relations & Public Liaison

(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 6:00 PM
To: 'frank.thorp@'(b)(6)
Subject: FW: Military Analysts Conference Call

Capt Thorp,
Below info provided for tomorrow's conference call.
(b)(6) plans to call in too, just as a back-up.
V/R
Katie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 11:54 AM
>To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: Military Analysts Conference Call

>
>Capt Thorp,
>There is a military analysts conference call tomorrow a.m. -- Sat, from 0830 to 0930 -- with Gen Metz.
>Dial in info follows.
>Thought you might be interested in listening in...
>please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Military Analysts conference call.

>V/R
>Katie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA
>Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 9:59 AM
>To: (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: FW: Military Analysts Conference Call

>
>Ma'am,
>Note the time--I was thinking in Baghdad time.
>v/r
(b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA
>Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 8:41 AM
>To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Lt Col, OASD-PA
>Subject: Military Analysts Conference Call

>
>All:
>
>The call-in information for the military analysts conference call is:

>
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>We invite you to participate in a conference call, Saturday, November 20, 2004 from 8:30 am to 9:30 a.m. est.

>
>Topics to be discussed are: Operational Update on Iraq.

>
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>
>To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and

ask the operator to connect you to the Military Analysts conference call.

>

>

>VR,

>

>Archie

>

>Colonel Archie Davis

>Director

>Community Relations & Public Liaison

(b)(2),(b)(6)

A rectangular area of the document is redacted with a solid grey fill, obscuring the text underneath.

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 8:37 AM
To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Brooks, Vincent K BG OCPA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA

we ought to think about a roundtable with military analysts that vcjcs, secarmy, and ltgen blum can do today to put this whole armor/ng issue into better perspective.

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 8:41 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR,
OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: ROUND TABLE

(b)(6) - Heads up.

I'm on my way to a meeting at OSD PA...can't figure out if we're supposed to do the round table today, or think about it today.

I should know more when I return.

V/R

Katie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA

>Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 8:37 AM

>To: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Brooks, Vincent K BG OCPA

>Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA

>Subject:

>

>we ought to think about a roundtable with military analysts that vcjcs, secarmy, and ltgen blum can do today to put this whole armor/ng issue into better perspective.

>

>

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 10:16 AM
To: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Cc: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: One Pager Meeting - Tactics for Abizaid/Casey

George --

I'll be at the 1030 One-Pager mtg; others from this office (and J3) will cover the 1100 on rotation notification.

Also, I have TENTATIVELY marked Gen Pace's calendar for a military analysts' conf call this afternoon at 1645-1715. Included 1630-1645 prep; not sure if Gen Blum and/or Gen Schoomaker will be available, or if there would be interest in some "combined" prep time. Sorry it's late, but that's the best I could do with the general's schedule.

V/R
Katie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
>Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 9:41 AM
>To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; (b)(6) SFC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
>Subject: One Pager Meeting - Tactics for Abizaid/Casey

>
>Could we meet at 1030? Would like to use the Press Ops conference room since LD has an appointment at that time. Mr. Ruff has the lead for the meeting and will chair same. Suggest each of you come with some thoughts on the tactics we could employ for Abizaid and Casey next week.... If the press ops conf room is busy, might we be able to meet in Ms. Barber's office? Thanks, please let me know if you can come.

>
>Katie Haddock -- given your meeting schedule this morning, please feel free to send a sub....

>
>GR
>
>

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 1:05 PM
To: (b)(6) COL, JCS VCJCS
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj,
OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS
Subject: FW: CONF CALL TODAY 4:45 PM

(b)(6)

I'll bring this to the prep, but didn't know if Gen Pace would appreciate this seed earlier than that -- or if he would have time to read it. Gen Meigs is usually on these Military Analysts' conference calls, and he has some rather specific discussion items on Armored vehicles...his email follows.

V/R
Katie

-----Original Message-----

From: Montgomery Meigs [mailto:mcmeigs@(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 11:54 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA
Subject: RE: CONF CALL TODAY 4:45 PM

I'm still working my schedule.

The issue still not addressed by OSD remains the tradeoffs made by the Army on where it expended it's investments on new gear. As you all know, Gen Schoomaker has done a tremendous job of getting the newest, best gear out to the troops. But there's never enough money to go around. So I'm sure there were reasonable tradeoffs made as to what to buy on the margin. I'm also not sure the Army knew that the company involved had extra capacity. Remember, the people who do the contracting often don't communicate those kinds of things to the operators as a matter of procedure.

I'd also be interested in knowing whether young trooper Wilson, a scout, had an armored Hummer. As a scout he should have and I suspect his unit does have them, and if so, he was not digging in landfills and was put up to the question by the reporter who was observing - most likely - people from truck units looking for extra protection. I can't think of a time other than with "gun trucks" in Viet Nam that we armored 2 1/2 and 5 ton trucks. There may be a point of explanation there that can be helpful.

As you know there is an ethical issue here as well. As a matter of professional ethics, reporters are not supposed to insert themselves in the news. Clearly that happened in this case. Not something one can argue in the heat of the initial days of the story, but a consideration nonetheless.

MCM

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 11:38 AM
To: Montgomery Meigs
Subject: RE: CONF CALL TODAY 4:45 PM

Should I put you on the participants list?

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Program Support Specialist
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Public Affairs (Room (b)(2))
Telephone: (b)(2)

Fax: (b)(2)

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts
From: Colonel Archie Davis
Director, Community Relations and Public Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Date: 12-13-04
Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, TODAY, December 13th from 4:45 pm to 5:15 pm.

Topics to be discussed are: Armor issue in Iraq

Participants in this conference call will be General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Your host for this call will be Colonel Archie Davis.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and ask the operator to connect you to the Military Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) (b)(6)
<mailto:(b)(6)@ (b)(6)> or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 6:43 PM
To: (b)(6) COL OCPA'
Subject: RE: Military Analyst Teleconference (UNCLASSIFIED)

Thanks Joe -- your summary is much shorter (and more to the point) than the one I'm working on to forward to Capt Thorp/Gen Myers...

V/R
Katie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) COL OCPA [mailto:(b)(6)]
>Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 6:35 PM
>To: (b)(6) COL OCPA
>Cc: (b)(6) OCPA; Sorenson, Jeffrey A BG(P) ASA(ALT); Haddock, Ellen (Katie) Col OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA
>Subject: Military Analyst Teleconference (UNCLASSIFIED)

>
>Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
>Caveats: NONE

>
>Sir: GEN Pace and BG Sorenson participated in an OSD PA hosted teleconference today with 15 military analyst. Brief remarks made by each general officer followed by some excellent questions by the military analyst. All on the record. Bullet summary below:

>* GEN PACE KEY COMMENTS:

>
> * Challenge today is to balance equipment versus tactics for troops deployed throughout Iraq.
>
> * Requirement changed over time as a thinking enemy found innovative methods to attack our troops using IEDs
>
> * Provided definition for the three levels of protection provided on vehicles going into Iraq.
>
> * Provided a short summary of the two SECARMY directed task forces underway to look at both the manufacturing base and the IED threat.
>
> * Provided context on what the Army has done over time to armor vehicles
>
> * Made clear that armor is only part of protecting Marines and Soldiers: training, lessons learned, TTPs, and technology are also key elements

>*BG SORENSON

>
> * Summarized number of vehicles armored to date: unparalleled accomplishment versus any other coalition nation
>
> * Army is accelerating FMTV armored vehicles into theater
>
> * Emphasized funding is there and we are working closely with industry to meet demand
>
> * Pointed out the incredible testing effort on-going: tested over 1,000 "coupons" of materials
>
> * Added emphasis that armor is only part of the solution to protecting troops -- same points as above.

>OSD PA officials very pleased with the engagement. Believe this made a big difference to help counter media misperceptions.

>
>VR, COL (b)(6)

>
>
>Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
>Caveats: NONE
>

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2004 8:01 AM
To: Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA
Cc: Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA

Please share your ideas about generals casey and abizaid with Lessel and pittman and let them know this is what we are thinking about.

Don't distribute that full plan you developed that includes secdef and depsec ideas. Just share the thoughts about casey and abizaid and see how people feel about it.

I think it would be particularly important to ensure one or both of them speak with the military analysts, and does some kind of public event, too.

Tnx..

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) TSgt, JCS, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, December 16, 2004 1:24 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: Military analysts transcript for posting

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Attachments: 041213 - VCJCS Conference Call with Army Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Sorenson and.doc



041213 - VCJCS
Conference Call...

Col Haddock,
Attached is the Military analyst conference call you requested me format.

//SIGNED//

(b)(6) TSgt, USAF
Office of the Chairman, JCS
Office of Public Affairs

(b)(2)

Fax

GENERAL PETER PACE, USMC

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Conference Call with Army Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Sorenson and

Col. Lynn Callyer and Military Analysts

December 13, 2004

HOST COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: It is my privilege to introduce you to the group that will be speaking with us today. We've got General Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have General Sorenson, Deputy for Acquisition Systems Management, Army Secretary. And then we have Colonel Callyer from Army G8. Gentlemen, one change in the way we normally do these type things. Today the discussion is on the record. It's on the record gentlemen. With that I'll pass the mike to General Pace for opening statement and then after that we will take your questions. General Pace, please sir.

GENERAL PACE: Thanks very much and thanks everybody for taking time to be on the phone call. I just wanted to make myself available along the guys here from the Army to try to put some things in context and answer your questions. Basically we've got a challenge in Iraq with regard to force protection for our soldiers and our marines that balances both, I guess the equipment that we have available to them and the tactics that we employ with that equipment. You take the equipment side, going from most protected to least protected, you can put people in tanks or Bradley's or up-armored humvees or thin-skinned humvees or walking the streets in flack jacket and helmet or walking the street without flack jacket and helmet. And on the high end the more protected you are the more isolated you are from the civilian populace, and on the low end the less protected you are the less isolated you are. That's the science part, of course, as you all know the art is to try to figure out where you ought to be on that spectrum of protection so you can get both protection for your troops and the most influence with the population. But you sure don't want a heavy footprint or an oppressive footprint.

So about May-June of 2003, after the major combat operations, we went to about a 1/3 armored; 2/3rd wheeled vehicle mix and were out in the light-skinned humvees and ended up with a thinking enemy. Then around the October-November timeframe in 2003 started really employing IED's and VB-IED's in a heavy way. Which caused the commanders on the ground to reassess how they were employing their troops. Took the commanders desired armored vehicles from about 2,000 in the June-July timeframe up to about 15,000 required in around the November timeframe and since that time it has ramped up to about double that number. So as we've gone through the series of attacks on our troops and we've seen the usefulness, especially the up-armored humvee because it's about small enough not to be an oppressive type vehicle but it's substantial enough to protect the troops. You've seen that shift in emphasis. There are basically three levels of protection or three ways of getting to that level of protection. One is the factory installed.

You buy the up-armored humvee and it arrives in theater built and ready to go. The second is the humvees in theater and you buy the add-on kits from the manufacturers and apply those to the vehicles in theater. And the third is the folks in theater doing what good soldiers and Marines do which is putting on locally fabricated protection, to be able to fill in the gap while industry ramps up.

We have done a lot procurement wise, there is a lot more we need to do. Right now we've got a little bit over 15,000 armored vehicles in theater. By the end of January we will have probably about 22,000 and by the end of March probably have about 28,000. Which is a very healthy application of money and industry. We spent about \$1.2 billion so far on increases to armored protection and there is another \$2.4 billion to be spent to round out the protective requirements over there right now.

The Secretary of the Army has stood up two task forces. One, again on the equipment side, is looking at every part of the continuum with the manufacturers to see if we can't run a little bit faster, jump a little bit higher, to get the proper equipment to the troops faster. And the other one that was stood up around last October when the IED problem started to manifest itself and that is what is called the IED Task Force. It is a side of the equation that deals with the tactics, techniques and procedures that capture the data from the attacks on our forces with these weapons. Analyze the results of those attacks, share the information in theater immediately and then send it back here to the states where the Army Task Force can work on it and prepare new tactics, techniques and procedures and try them out, out in the desert in California to see what works best.

One more thing then I'll stop talking at you and start listening and that is on interceptive body armor part, I think you all know that that was a state of the art piece of equipment when we started the war, it worked exceptionally well. We were producing about 1,200 sets per month. We are now producing 25,000 sets per month. Everybody in the CENTCOM theater of operations, all U.S. military, all U.S. government employees, have a set of this protective gear and the Army will continue to buy these at the rate of 25,000 a month until we've got the Army and Marine Corp completely outfitted. Let me stop there and turn this back to our moderator.

COLONEL DAVIS: Sir, would you have comments that you'd like to make or would you like to go into questions?

GENERAL SORENSON: Just let me put a couple of other sound bites on there which I think, just to follow on to what General Pace said and that was I think it's noteworthy that over the last fourteen months as General Pace says we have begun to just the armoring capability there. This nation has armored over 20,000 vehicles, which is something I think if you look at the context of what other nations or other armies could have done. Probably unparalleled. The second thing is, as he relates to the Task Force, already we are beginning to work with acceleration of deliveries of capabilities for the FM TV, which is the family of medium tactical vehicles and some of our heavier fleets as well, to accelerate some of that capability into theater. But clearly as has been mentioned before, the focus initially from the theater was to make sure that we could up-armor the light

skinned vehicles, specifically the humvees, because those were more in harms way and we have now shifted that focus because of where we are with up-armorng the vehicles, both the vehicles in-country with armor as well as the delivery of up-armored humvees from the factory as well as from other major commands, as well as other services. We are now shifting that focus to the medium and heavy truck fleet and attempting to get those fleets up-armored here within the early springtime.

COLONEL DAVIS: Ok gentlemen, with that we will take your questions at this time.

KEN ALLARD: General Sorenson, this is Ken Allard. I am curious as to what roadblocks you are finding right now in the procurement process and where they exist. Is it in the procurement system, the funding system or in industry itself?

GENERAL SORENSON: Well when you say roadblocks I'm not sure specifically what...

KEN ALLARD: Constraints. Bad term was roadblocks. Constraints.

GENERAL SORENSON: Well I think at this point in time we have been able to work with not only the Army but the OSD staff, as well as with the Hill in getting the funding that we need. We have had some difficulties in some cases, I can go back into one particular design, whereby when the requirement came in we didn't have a design for one of these particular vehicles. We built the design, then we found we had some quality control problems, we had to go back and fix it. But the long poles in the tent have clearly been getting steel. We now have three steel manufacturers that are producing the steel. We have all the depots basically producing these kits, as well as manufacturers, so from the standpoint of constraints or roadblocks at this point in time I would say that if there was a roadblock we have certainly busted through it at this point in time.

PAUL VALLELY: Can you talk a little more in depth on some of the tactics, unclassified basis, that we're able to use over there now since October 2003?

COLONEL DAVIS: Vallely, who would you like to address your question?

PAUL VALLELY: Well anyone that can answer. You know cell phone triangulation, over head surveillance, convoy protection, anything that we could use that would give us a little more definitive on the force protection and tactics that we're using.

GENERAL PACE: Paul, this is Pete Pace. Let me try in an unclassified mode to answer that and then I'll ask the guys here from the Army too, if they've got anything they want to add. Clearly we have some tactical means available to determine where IED's may be and some technical means available to try to get those things to function or not function when they are not suppose to. A lot of time and effort put into understanding the changing tactics of the enemy employing them. First it was one IED and then they would put that in place and we would change our tactics so they put in more and then as we responded to that they have another one go off. So it's very much a

force vs. force thinking process. I would not want to get into the details of exactly how we are doing it right now because again, it will change what the other guys do and then we will have to change again.

GENERAL SORENSON: Sir, the only thing I would say from the Army standpoint, we've tried to take a holistic look at this. Clearly we've talked about the armoring but that's only one piece of it. We've also tried to use some other pieces of sophisticated equipment to preclude the detonation of those systems. As well as we within every particular incident have an after action report. As General Pace mentioned before, you have the IED Task Force over there and they clearly go back and look at specifically what happened and report back. And then we introduce that immediately into our training within less than 24 hours. So the TTP's in terms of the tactics, techniques and procedures are updated on a continuous basis.

DON SHEPPARD: I'm trying to follow General Pace's numbers here. 15,000 now, 22,000 end of January, 28,000 by the end of March. We heard in reports after the SecDef's town meeting of 450 vehicles a month. I assume that was probably just humvees being updated by another hundred or so. So my question is.... Can we really reach these numbers and how much of this was already in progress and a *fait accompli* before the stuff over this town hall meeting.

GENERAL PACE: I'll give you what I know and then I'll ask for backup from the Army guys. You are absolutely right, the 450 has to do specifically with the up-armored humvees. When we started this, they were producing at 35 a month. Over time it has ramped up to 450 a month. Every time we've gone forward to Congress with a request for money, they have provided it. So funding has not been an issue. There was a little bit of a surprise last week when the manufacturer said that they could produce another 100 per month than we thought they could. With inside of that same day that the manufacturer said that they could go from 450 to 550 the Army changed, modified the contract which, if you know procedures around this place, changing a contract inside of one day is kind of unusual. So the manufacturer now would be, with the funding to produce that extra 100 per month, is telling us now that they will be able to actually start providing those extra 100 a month in April of next year. So it's not like you can just turn a switch and have these things pour forth. In all the other vehicles there is something like, ohhh, give or take, 32,000 plus vehicles in Iraq right now. The numbers I told you about are things that are doable right now thanks to all the work that has been done for the last year plus and also in the last week or so going back one more time and scrubbing all the industry counterparts we had to see what might be brought forward faster. Again, remembering the continuum we are on, part of this challenge is to have the right equipment, the other part is to have the right tactics. So we shouldn't lay all this off on industry providing us X number of armored vehicles. It has to do with how the commanders in the field take the resources that we are able to provide to them and how we use it in a tactical world. So it's both sides of the equation.

DON SHEPPARD: And just a follow on to that, how would you characterize, when you say 28,000 out of 32,000 are armored vehicles and of course you still going to see them

blown up on TV for reasons we understand, how would you characterize that armor for public consumption.

GENERAL PACE: What do you mean by characterize. I'm sorry.

DON SHEPPARD: So the public thinks if we have 28,000 armored vehicles that there is going to be a heck of a lot less explosions and people killed and trucks blown up and that's really not necessarily the case. How should we characterize the levels of protection within 28,000 vehicles. Some level of protection, some level of armor, small arms, etc. not all like the up-armored humvees?

GENERAL PACE: I would say that this armor will certainly protect our soldiers and Marines from small arms. It will protect them from some of the IED's kind, for example use of artillery rounds, but clearly you can build a big enough bomb to blow up a tank, or anything else we have and that's why we have to be careful not to have the American public thinking that there is a tactical armor solution that we can put PFC Pace inside of some kind of cocoon that's going to protect him from everything. Clearly we cannot. Flack jackets and helmets protect us from some level of violence, tanks protect us from another level of violence but you gentlemen all know it is a continuum out there and a thinking enemy that can provide a pretty good sized blast in any particular place at one time. So we are doing what we should do to provide the level of protection that we know provides an added measure of security for our guys without going to the point where we have everybody riding around inside their own tank and we cannot do the job that we were sent over to do. Which is not only to defeat the enemy but also to help the populace get on to their next lives.

COLONEL DAVIS: Are there any other questions out there.

JED BABBIN: General, Jed Babbin. Some of the people I've been up against on the news lately have been basically saying that Mr. Rumsfeld has been ignoring this problem since last August. Can you give us a timeline as to really how this burbled up through the system and when it was identified as a major problem and what was done. Basically in relation to that.

GENERAL PACE: Sure, I mean this is totally inaccurate to say that about the Secretary. As I mentioned, the commanders in the field, and I agreed with them, believe that in the June-July 2003 timeframe that the amount of armor that we had over there and the numbers of vehicles we had were sufficient to be able to provide security but also to be able to interact with the populace. And then as I mentioned, the thinking enemy, in the October-November timeframe of 2003, started using IED's and VB-IED's very aggressively. When that happened, the commanders on the ground increased their request from the level that it was at, which was about 2,000 armored vehicles, jumping it up to 15,000 inside the space of about a month, once they realized that they needed to change our tactics, techniques and procedures. When we did that, it was at a time when the industry, for just one example, industry was producing about 35 to 40 up-armored humvees per month. We went to Congress, got the money to increase. I think it was the

first step went up to about 220 and over time we've gotten up to about 450, as the industry has been able to ramp up their capacity to build more for us. So for at least the last year the Army Task Force, the IED Task Force and the procurement process has been working on this to provide the right solutions. And every time we've gone to the Secretary with a new request for added armor, and shown him the bill for it, he has been very quick to insure that we have what we needed and has supported us very rapidly with Congress. And Congress has given us the money we've asked for, so outside those of us in uniform who has anything to do with leadership/providing resources to us has done it as quickly as we've asked for it. Within a capacity. Industry takes time to ramp up. As you all know.

KEN ALLARD: General Pace, Goldwater Nichols gave you as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs a lot of acquisition responsibilities and I know that you use those authorities quite aggressively. My question really is while I am a great fan of steel as opposed to anything else, are we limited simply to the existing technologies for protecting these vehicles or are you looking at anything else? Possibly the more aggressive use of Kevlar or some substitute for steel?

GENERAL PACE: Alright, the short answer is yes. You are right on the money, you know there are some Kevlar appliqué's out there that pound for pound are really very strong. We are looking at those. Let my Army counterpart, who is in that business, answer the specifics, but clearly we are out there searching for new applications of old technology like Kevlar and new substances materials that will allow us to do what Kevlar has allowed us to do so far.

GENERAL SORENSEN: Yes, again this is Jeff Sorensen. As we've talked about here, we've been really searching the entire industrial base. Up at Aberdeen proving ground, the people up there at the test community have tested over 1,000 different coupons which essentially represents everything from steel to composites to composites with aluminum to everything we could find, as a way to try to get the maximum protection capability for the vehicles. As an example, we have tested, once the coupon gets tested and is sufficient, then we have them put together a kit. As an example, for the humvee, we have tested 12 different kits up there at Aberdeen. Most of them have been steel but there have been some composites. But I will tell you in some cases with respect to the composites we've had some difficulty, if you will, adhering it to the door as well with the ballistic glass. We've had a much better success with the steel doors and the ballistic glass than we have here with the Kelvar solutions, though we have used the Kevlar solutions or composite solutions, if you will. On the back of the vehicles provide protection because in many cases here we have a lot of older vehicles out there in Iraq. You can only put so much armor on those particular vehicles after which point in time the suspension sort of gives way. Unlike the up-armored humvee, which was combined as a system design to accommodate a heavier transmission, a heavier suspension, heavier engine, etc. It was built from the ground up. Most of our vehicles over there in theater were the older humvees that we had to look at very carefully to design a package that would not only give the maximum force protection but also give the capability that the vehicle will

continue to operate properly. So we have looked at everything and we continue to look at everything as we try to determine solutions for this particular problem.

KEN ALLARD: General, one follow up to that and particularly in terms of commercial technologies that you may not have looked at before, if we run across any of that is there any way that we can get in touch with you. It may just be a wild screwy idea but if it can be something that's productive. It's one thing to complain about this on TV, it's quite another to offer solutions. So how do we get in touch if we have something like that.

GENERAL SORENSON: I can give you my email, I can give you my phone number. I'll leave that with Colonel Davis here.

KEN ALLARD: Super.

COLONEL DAVIS: I'll give it to you Ken.

KEN ALLARD: Great.

GENERAL PACE: The bottom line is we really shouldn't be collectively defensive about this, nor should we be collectively putting too big a smiley face on this thing. The fact is that this is combat. We had some good things when we went in, we're learning some lessons, we're trying to adjust to that. The enemy does the same thing. And I think we just need to make sure that the American public understands that their sons and daughters are important to us. We are going to do all we can to protect them, that has both a material solution and a tactic solution and we should just acknowledge where we are on the continuum and acknowledge the fact that we need to continue to press hard on this thing to get it right.

KEN ALLARD: General Pace, I was up at MSNBC when this story broke last week and I think that is precisely the right attitude to take on it. That it is the constant roar of abdication. Rather than saying it's the Army we want or the Army we don't want, that's really kind of beside the point. I think that what drives a lot of people crazy is when they have the impression that we have not done enough. Certainly the story that is there is an entirely different one.

QUESTIONER: Is the majority of these IED's come in detonated?

GENERAL PACE: I do not know the answer to that question. And I don't know that we want to put that out anyway. Just because of some of the techniques we are using against it. So if we could avoid going down that road, then it would probably be a good thing to do collectively.

CHUCK NASH: General, Chuck Nash, question about the over all lesson that were learning as we go beyond this with the armor on humvees and that is if you look at the continuum of the regular humvees, the up-armored humvees, Stryker, Bradley, Abrams, you know you've got a continuum there of protection you addressed earlier, how are the

lessons that we are learning now, as you look ahead and some of the things that we are planning on buying and planning on doing, how many degrees has the rudder changed, what have we learned from this?

GENERAL PACE: Don't know if I can answer it in degrees of rudder, I can tell you that last Friday and Saturday and again today sitting down with the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and various meetings about budgets and supplementals and the like, that very much a part of the discussion is as we lay out the FY2006 budget submission, have we in fact properly identified the changes that are needed in the budget to reflect the lessons learned without overcompensating and fixating on one piece of our armed forces, if I can say it like that, so find the right balance. Clearly inside of today's understood requirement, the funding is there. But as we look to, as the Army modularizes it's brigades, Pete Schoomaker and his folks, are looking at the right mix of vehicles and armored protection for those, partially based on what we are learning in Iraq and Afghanistan, and partially based on what we think the emerging threat will be in the future.

CHUCK NASH: If I could, a quick follow up. One of the criticisms that I've heard is that the Marines are taking higher casualties because they don't have the armor that the Army has. Is that a fair criticism?

GENERAL PACE: I don't think so. The numbers that I know about for the Marines and I refreshed myself on this last week, is that the Marines have 4,100 wheeled vehicles in Iraq right now and all of them have either level one, two or three protection right now as we speak. So to my knowledge, thanks to lessons learned by the Army, shared with the Marines before the Marines went back in theater this time, as the Marines came back into theater they were able to arrive either already with the new armor on the vehicles or to put in on in Kuwait before they went in. I know they do have a small number of vehicles that don't have armor and those are the ones they use inside the base camp.

COLONEL DAVIS: Sir, how we doing on time? One more question. Gentlemen, we have time for one more question.

COLONEL DAVIS: Any wrap up gentlemen?

GENERAL SORENSEN: One thing that I would just like to add up to what General Pace was talking about with the future. I will just tell you, again, this is Jeff Sorensen from the Science and Technology base, we are looking at other solutions such as active protection systems and so forth to defeat these type of capabilities. And clearly at this point in time there has been more of a focus on that as far as lessons learned as we begin to design the future combat system and see what we are going to do there as well as with Stryker. So that clearly in terms of lessons learned the Science and Technology base has had an additional focus for elements of how to make sure these vehicles can be protected in open combat.

GENERAL PACE: And again, let me just say thanks to all of you and your time. I know that your time is valuable and the opportunity to share some ideas with you so that when you go out and do what you do you have at least the best info we can give you, it's very beneficial to us and we appreciate it.

COLONEL DAVIS: General Pace, General Sorensen, gentlemen thank you very much for taking the time. Before we close we have one announcement.

COLONEL CURTIN: Hi I'm Colonel Joe Curtin, Army Public Affairs, on Wednesday morning at 0800 there will be a Press Briefing on wheeled vehicle strategy in which we are going to go into some detail with Major General Speakes and supported by General Sorensen to address the way ahead. I invite you to be there and if not, tell your primary media representatives for your networks to please attend.

COLONEL DAVIS: Thank you very much. Again, this entire discussion is on the record.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, December 17, 2004 12:04 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV
Subject: TPs from Casey for review
Attachments: TP 12-17-04 Gen. Casey Iraq update.doc; 12-16-04 Casey with mil analysts.doc; 12-16-04 Casey Pentagon presser.doc



TP 12-17-04 Gen. Casey Iraq up... 12-16-04 Casey with mil analys... 12-16-04 Casey Pentagon presse...

All:

Attached please find the first draft of talking points off Gen. Casey's briefings.

The sources are attached - (1) transcript of Casey's presser yesterday and (2) transcript from Bonnie Sciarretto in Archie's shop of Casey's briefing (phone) to the military analysts.

I'll stand by and wait for directions.

(b)(6)



US Department of Defense

Update: Dec. 17, 2004 - Gen. Casey Iraq Update

Gen. George Casey, commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, briefed the Pentagon press corps on Thursday about the situation in Iraq and the outlook for progress. Gen. Casey said the Coalition and the new Iraqi government are broadly on track to accomplish their objectives – a constitutionally elected government and security forces capable of maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as a safehaven for terror. Following are highlights.

Fighting the insurgents.

- It has been six months since the transition to sovereignty in Iraq. Commanders have reviewed the plan they shaped in August to help bring Iraq through its constitutional elections in December 2005. The assessment is the plan is broadly on track.
- One key element of the plan was to eliminate safehavens where the insurgents gather to plan and operate. With the liberation of Fallujah, the insurgents no longer have a safehaven in Iraq where they can plot and carry out their operations. They must look over their shoulders now.
- In 14 of the 18 provinces, there are fewer than four violent incidents a day.
- The insurgents are tough enemies – but they are not 10 feet tall. These same people have been oppressing the Iraqi people for 30 years. They offer no alternative positive vision for Iraq – so they are forced use intimidation to get their way. They cannot sustain this.

Iraqi security forces are growing stronger.

- Progressively more security forces were involved and actively working with Coalition forces in each of the recent major operations -- Najaf, Samarra and Fallujah.
- In Fallujah, there were two brigades fighting – and they performed well. Now there is an Iraqi Division Headquarters in Fallujah controlling the two brigades, which is the first time an Iraqi Division Headquarters has been in the field since the war.
- In Najaf, where the Mahdi militia were killing and terrorizing, the city is quiet. Najaf is an example of the positive change that can take place once Iraqis are liberated from the insurgents' tyranny. Now the governor and the Iraqi Security Forces are in charge.

Iraqi security forces are being trained and coming on line.

- By February there will be 70 battalions in the Iraqi army, including a mechanized infantry battalion.
- Iraqi division commanders have recently been appointed. Coalition forces are working with them to build their headquarters and forces capable of independent operations. These leaders will be critical to conducting independent counter-insurgency efforts because they will help garner the intelligence, shape the plans and direct the operations.
- Training the police is a longer-term project, but good progress is being made, especially with the special police battalions. By February there will be six public order battalions, a special police regiment, four police commando battalions and nine regional SWAT teams – each of which will help fight insurgents and terrorists on a day-to-day basis.

Reconstruction momentum is building.

- In June, the month Iraq transitioned to sovereignty, there were 230 projects from the Iraq Reconstruction Fund on the ground "turning dirt."

- By the end of November there were more than 1,000 projects – adding up to more than \$3 billion into the Iraqi economy.
- Reconstruction is moving forward despite the insurgents' attempts to disrupt this progress.

The Iraqi people broadly accept their government and their security forces.

- Some polls show an approval rating higher than 70 percent.
- Iraqis have a positive view of their army and their new police force.
- Sixty percent of Iraqis think their country is headed in the right election.

Elections are on track for January 30th.

- Insurgents are trying to create a security situation that makes people believe elections are not possible. The insurgents are desperate – they know they are going to be relegated to a very different position.
- The registration process has gone forward in most of the country, though there were some incidents up north and west in Al Anbar province. The election committee is working on alternatives for these two areas.
- Commanders expect insurgents to operate in a more classic insurgent mode, with attacks in small numbers. Insurgents may try to make some high profile attacks before the election. The Coalition and Iraqi forces are preparing for this.
- In general, the role of the Coalition forces during the elections will be to conduct broad-based security. The Iraqi security forces will work the specifics of the polling areas.
- There will be somewhere between 6,000 and 9,000 polling places. Guarding the sites won't always be done at the site – Coalition and Iraqi security forces have a range of options, such as controlling traffic around the site and restricting access. The goal is reduce the exposure of the sites rather than have 20-30 security forces huddle around each polling place.
- The insurgents don't want the Sunnis to participate in the elections, because they can then claim the election was invalid. Commanders are optimistic that there will be sufficient Sunni participation.

Success in Iraq is a tribute to the troops.

- The soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who have died in Iraq gave their lives to help 25 million Iraqis build better lives and to improve the security of the United States and the Coalition.
- We grieve with their families, and with the families of all the Coalition and Iraqi security forces who made the ultimate sacrifice.
- The nation is grateful for the troops who fight around the world to defeat terrorism and replace it with freedom.

CONFERENCE CALL OF 12-16-04

Retired Military Analysts

&

General George Casey

Host: COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Gentlemen, Colonel Davis here from OSD Public Affairs. Thank you for joining us this afternoon. It is my privilege to introduce to you General Casey, Commander of Multi-National Force Iraq. General Casey has agreed to speak with us this evening about operations in Iraq. General Casey, welcome back to the Pentagon Sir and thank you for your time. The briefing today will be on the record. We have approximately 30 minutes. General Casey will make an opening statement and after that he will take your questions. General Casey, the floor is yours.

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: OK I have no idea who is out there so nice to be with you here. Oh they are handing me a list, looks like some old friends. Let me just say a couple of things and then I'll take your questions and I will be fairly brief here. I have been out there almost six months now, six months since transition to sovereignty. We've just completed our first review of the campaign plan. I think most of you know we published the campaign plan there in August that shaped our way forward here through the constitutional elections (inaudible) in December of 05. Our assessment is that we are broadly on track in helping the Iraqi people get to those elections at the end of next year. And just a couple of points I'd like to leave with you.

First of all, the insurgency we are fighting isn't ten feet tall. They're tough guys. They are the same folks that have oppressed the Iraqi people for 30 years. But they are not, certainly not invincible. There is no single leader. They offer no alternative positive vision for Iraq. And as a result they are forced to violence to intimidate, particularly the Sunni part of the population to support them. We've seen time and again here where that has blown back on them. It is not sustainable for them. They also know that they can't defeat the coalition forces and they saw this in spades in Fallujah. And with the liberation of Fallujah there are no longer any terrorists or insurgent safe havens anywhere in Iraq. And so now they don't have a place where they can go to plan and operate and make weapons and car bombs with impunity. Everybody's got to be looking over their shoulder. We think that is a significant step forward. Getting to a point where there were no safe havens prior to the elections was one of the main elements of our plan. Anyway these guys aren't 10 feet tall.

Second, the Iraqi security forces are getting stronger every day. This has been a major effort. Dave Petraeus' folks have done a wonderful job. By February there will be 70 battalions in the Iraqi army including a mechanized battalion. On the police side we are making pretty good progress with the local police. That's a longer term project but we've also had good project on the special police battalions. Six public order battalions, a special police regiment, four commando battalions and nine regional swat teams, all of those guys are involved in the fight today or will be in the next month or so.

Third point I'll leave with you. Reconstruction momentum is building. When we got there in June there was about 230 projects from the Iraq Reconstruction Fund on the ground turning dirt. At the end of November there is over 1000. That's 3 billion dollars into the Iraqi economy. So that is moving forward and all against insurgent efforts to disrupt and deny the ability to get on with reconstruction.

Fourth point, the government, the Iraqi government is broadly accepted. They've got in some polls over a 70% approval rating. The Iraqi people have a favorable impression of their Army and their new police force. And by most polls about 60% of the Iraqi's think the country is headed in the right direction and they've got a positive view of the future.

Lastly, we're broadly on track for the elections. We said when I got there we were going to have to fight our way to the elections because the insurgents want to actively deny this because it will relegate them to a position that they are not accustomed to. Their accustomed to Sunni dominance of the political process in Iraq and it's not going to happen. Fourteen of the eighteen provinces, there are less than 4 violent incidents a day. The registration process has gone forward in most of the country. Had problems up in the north and out west in Al Anbar. The election committee is working on some alternatives to that. But the elections in January will go forward. The insurgents will do everything, I believe, in their power to create a security situation that they will try to make us believe that there not possible, but they will go forward and as a result we will take another step forward in the process of moving Iraq onto a democracy.

I know that most of you former military folks....boy you got a great armed forces out there and you can be really proud of them. What they did in Fallujah, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and corpmen even, is a feat of arms. Some of you know about the difficulties of urban fighting, they took down a well planned urban defense in seven days. Inflicted 3000 folks killed or captured on the enemy, with relatively insignificant losses to ourselves. So magnificent feat of arms there by a great armed forces. That's it, and I'll be happy to take your questions.

COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Gentlemen, are there any questions out there?

KEN ALLARD: Hey George, Ken Allard. Can you tell us what you are looking forward to in January in the run up to the election. Do you expect the insurgents to make a main effort, another Fallujah, and if so how do you intend to respond?

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Nice to hear from you Ken.

KEN ALLARD: Good to hear you back.

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: I don't believe that there is going to be another Fallujah nor do I think they will attempt to create another Fallujah. What we hear is that they recognize that they cannot defeat us. And we've proven that time and time again. So I don't think they will go to another Fallujah. I think they'll operate more as classic insurgents, small attacks, or attacks in small numbers. I do think they will try to make

some very high profile attacks before the elections. And that is what we and the Iraqi Security Forces will be preparing for.

PAUL VALLELY: General Casey, Paul Vallely. Can you tell us a little bit about the development of the intelligence capability for the Iraqi battalions and the Iraqi forces. Is that progressing or where are we at on that, because I think that's essential moving them towards some type of superior position over there when it comes to security.

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Paul, you are exactly right. Insurgency intelligence is the number one priority. I will tell you we have work to do in that area. Building an Iraqi intelligence capability is our number one priority for the next year. We have done some work already with the Minister of Interior and Minister of Defense on their services. More to do all the way down, as you suggest, down to the battalion level. We are working to give the Iraqi's the capability of conducting independent counter-insurgency operations. You can't do that without intelligence. So you will see that as a main priority over the next year.

PAUL VALLEY: Great, thank you.

CHUCK NASH: General, Chuck Nash. Story has been running in the paper started yesterday about six guardsmen from Ohio who stripped some vehicles that were off on the side of the road. Accomplished their mission and it looks like they got court martialled. Pretty much had the book thrown at them. There is an Ohio Senator trying to get clemency for them. Now it seems just, you know, on that side of the story, and what's being presented, that that's something that should have and could have been handled at a much lower level. Instead it didn't. What part of the story are we not getting about that?

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Chuck, I'm sorry, I have not heard that story. And I don't know anything about it.

CHUCK NASH: Okay, thank you.

COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Any other questions out there?

RICK FRANCONA: General Casey, Rick Francona. Can you give us an idea of your sense of what voter turnout might be?

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Yeah, it depends, kind of, where you are in the country. It could go as high, they think, as about 80%. The real question.... It will be high in the south and it will be high in the Kurdish areas. The real question is the Sunni participation. And right now my personal guess, it will be greater than 50% of the Sunni population that will participate. Hopefully it will be much higher. But there is just no way of knowing right now.

RICK FRANCONA: Thanks.

PAUL VALLELY: Any update on reconnaissance surveillance on the borders, any improvement that you see to stave off any of the cross-border operations that are being conducted from Syria or Iran?

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: We don't really see operations being conducted cross-border. We do see infiltration of foreign fighters across the borders. I think this is Paul Vallely again, I think...

PAUL VALLELY: Right it is George, Thanks.

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: The problem is not necessarily surveillance on the borders. I mean, right now we've got problems at the border crossings. With just honest border guards that are checking properly the people's documentation. And that is something that the Minister of Interior is working very hard with. We've actually had some of our own Department of Border Guard folks, our own Department of Borders over there working with the Iraqi's in the effort to help them. But what we felt is that a big ISR operation on the border doesn't necessarily service well when people are driving through the ports of entry. So I think that would be my answer to that. Intelligence, police and borders are my top three priorities for next year. So that is right up there.

COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Next question please.

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: You hit two out of three Paul.

PAUL VALLELY: Thank you.

KEN ALLARD: Yeah I've got another one. What is Dave Petraeus saying about, not just the equipping of these Iraqi units but the schooling of them and the operational art, how is their leadership looking and do you think that they are, in 2005, going to be a force you can increasingly turn to?

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: I will tell you that leadership has been a challenge. We are working to develop the brigade and division headquarters. That will be a major focus for the next year. They have just recently appointed the Iraqi division and brigade commanders. So we are working with them to build their headquarters. As I said that's our greatest challenge for the next year. Again, if you go back to the task, conduct independent counter-insurgency operations, you can't do that if you don't have brigade and division headquarters that can garner the intelligence, build the plans, direct the operations. So that part of it is still to be done. What Dave has done is a magnificent job of training and equipping Iraqi battalions. These battalions are on line and are actively working with coalition forces on operations. I will tell you that in each of the major operations that we've done, Najaf, Samarra and Fallujah, there has been progressively more Iraqi security force involvement in each of those operations. There were actually two brigades of Iraqi's in Fallujah. During the operation there they fought well. And there is now an Iraqi Division Headquarters in Fallujah controlling two brigades. It's the

first time an Iraqi division headquarters has been in the field since the war. So mechanics of the process going fairly well. As you suggest some of the leadership development and staff building processes still be done, to build forces capable of independent operations.

COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Other questions.

STEVE GREER: Hey Sir, Steve Greer here. I got a question about the Madhi militia and Sadr's influence and what you think is going to happen in terms of the elections. Has he reared his head lately or are things kind of quiet in that area.

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Knock on wood he is... the Madhi militia has been very quiet since Najaf. I will say that Najaf is a good example of what can happen once a city is liberated from the tyranny of insurgents. Madhi militia was running rampant in Najaf, killing and murdering people, intimidating and terrorizing the population. Since we've completed that operation the Governor and the Iraqi Security Forces have taken charge of Najaf. And really since then, it's not only Najaf but the south has gone almost quiet. I think a lot of that has to do with the influence of the Ayatollah Sistani. That's one thing. The second thing is we did some fairly significant damage to the Muqtada militia during the August time period. Now, I would say dormant. Okay. With a question mark. The other point I'd say is in Sadr City, Fauawah (??spelling). Pete Corelli in the 1st Cav and the Iraqi government have done a wonderful job there using economic development as a tool to keep the people on side and in support of the government.

COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Any more questions?

RICK FRANCONA: Yes, General Casey, Rick Francona again. Are you detecting a large influx of Iranians in the south?

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: I wouldn't say necessarily a large influx of Iranians but we and the Iraqi's both share a concern about Iranian influence in the south. And I do believe that there are Iranians coming into the south attempting to influence political outcomes. But it's not necessarily a large number of infiltrators, if you understand what I mean.

RICK FRANCONA: Right.

COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Any more questions gentlemen?

COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: Last call for questions?

COLONEL ARCHIE DAVIS: If there are no more questions, General Casey Sir, thank you for taking the time to discuss operations in Iraq with us. We really appreciate it and wish you all the best Sir.

GENERAL GEORGE CASEY: Hey thank you all very much. I appreciate your questions.

SPECIAL DEFENSE BRIEFING

■BRIEFER: GENERAL GEORGE CASEY, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ

THE PENTAGON, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

3:11 P.M. EST, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2004

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GEN. CASEY: Hello, everybody. I think I'm self-introducing. (Laughter.)

Nice to see you back in Washington here. For those of you I don't know, I'm George Casey, the commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq.

I'd like to just talk to you a little about the situation on the ground in Iraq. I've been there almost six months now, and we've just completed a review of the first five months. As I think some of you know, we developed a campaign plan in the July time period, John Negroponte and I, with both the embassy staff and my staff, and we've been working toward that ever since. And so we did our first major assessment here at the five-month point.

I can tell you that I feel that we're broadly on track in helping the Iraqi people complete their transition to a constitutionally elected government at the end of next year. We also believe that this objective is both realistic and achievable.

Now I recognize that that may not be an impression that we all share here, and I by no means want to give you the impression that this process is going to be uncontested or violence-free. That's not going to be the case.

But as we have seen in Najaf, in Tall Afar, in Samarra and in Sadr City, the Iraqi people are fighting to throw off the mantle of terror and intimidation, so that they can elect their own government and build a better life for the Iraqi people.

There is progress across Iraq every day, and every day we and our Iraqi partners are a step closer to accomplishing our objectives.

Now let me just make a couple of points with you. First of all, the insurgency that we're fighting is not 10 feet tall. They're a tough, aggressive enemy, but they're not 10 feet tall. They're the same people who have oppressed the Iraqi people for the last 30 years. They're the reason that over a million Iraqis are missing and why probably several hundred thousand of those missing Iraqis are likely in mass graves around Iraq. They're focused on their return to dominance, so that they can continue to plunder the great natural resources of Iraq. They offer no alternative vision. They offer only intimidation and subjugation.

With the win in Fallujah, with the liberation of Fallujah, they no longer have any safe havens anywhere in Iraq. And also, as a result of the success in Fallujah, it was driven home to them that they cannot defeat the coalition forces.

So they're attacking our will and the will of the Iraqi people, and I personally do not believe that they will defeat the indomitable spirit of 25 million free people who want to build a better life for themselves and for their families.

Second point: The Iraqi security forces are getting stronger every day. Our plan to build the Iraqi military and police forces is broadly on track. By February there will be 70 trained and equipped battalions in the Iraqi army; one of those will be a mechanized infantry battalion.

Progress has also been made in the police and special police forces. By February there will be six public order battalions, a special police regiment, four police commando battalions and some nine regional SWAT teams -- special weapons and tactics teams -- all of them contributing to the fight against the insurgents and the terrorists on a day-to-day basis. As most of you know, we still have a way to go in this area, but as I said, we're broadly on track and generally very pleased with the performance of the Iraqi security forces.

Third point: Reconstruction momentum is building. In June there were only around 230 projects actually what we call turning dirt, actually started, on the ground. By the end of November there were over 1,000, with a value of over \$3 billion. All of this in spite of insurgents' efforts to disrupt the reconstruction process. This is a great tribute to the folks that work on those projects, particularly in the embassy and the coalition businessmen and women who are over there working to build a better Iraq.

Fourth point: The interim government and their security forces are broadly accepted by the Iraqi people. Some poll ratings for the government are as high as 70 percent approval rating. The Iraqi people express a generally favorable opinion about their new army and about their police, and more than 60 percent of Iraqis believe that the country is headed in the right direction and they are optimistic about their future.

We're also broadly on track for the elections. Fourteen of the 18 provinces have less than -- four or less incidents of violence a day, and the registration process in most of the country was executed. The Iraqi election committee is working on some alternative solutions for the two areas of the country in which it was disrupted.

I want to be clear: The insurgents and the terrorists will continue to attack and attempt to disrupt the election process. And we see that daily. They won't succeed. And the elections in January will then be but another step forward in our relentless progress toward a new Iraq.

Now if I could just say a word to the home audience here in the United States. As a nation you can take great pride in the role that our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are playing in helping build a new, a better Iraq. Each and every one of them recognizes the importance that successfully accomplishing this mission holds for our own security, and each and every one of them makes a difference every day. Wherever I go I see their acts of bravery, compassion and selflessness, and I couldn't be prouder of these wonderful men and women.

Our success to date is also a tribute to the great men and women of the Iraqi security forces and the coalition who have given their lives to defeat terrorism and to help the Iraqis to help build a new Iraq. We grieve with the loved ones of all our service members and with those of Iraqi service members who have died.

We are humbled by their sacrifice and their contribution in bringing freedom to Iraq, and we are humbled by their sacrifice in enhancing the security of the United States and the coalition.

Lastly, we are, especially during the holiday season, also deeply thankful for the love and support of our families and loved ones, whose sacrifices and strength underpin everything that we do.

Progress towards a constitutionally elected government will not be easy. Nothing worthwhile ever is. But the challenge of helping the people of Iraq build a better future is one that the Iraqi people in the armed forces of 30 freedom-loving countries can take on.

So thank you very much, and I'll take your questions.

Q General, based at least partly on the candidates the Shi'a are offering, are you concerned on what influence Iran may have over the Iraqi government after the January election?

GEN. CASEY: I missed the very first part of your question.

Q Based at least in part on what candidates the Shi'a are offering, are you concerned about the possible influence that Iran might have on the Iraqi government after the election?

GEN. CASEY: My personal view -- and this is political, but I'm here every day and I'll give you just my personal view. I don't see substantial Iranian influence on this particular government that will be elected in January. I see Iran as more of a longer-term threat to Iraqi security. But that's just -- that's my view, and from -- I'm a military person who's just -- who's there.

Q You mean -- from a longer view, are you talking about a possible military attack as opposed to political?

GEN. CASEY: No, I don't -- I'm not talking about that. I'm just saying from a strategic perspective, Iraq is a long-term threat to stability -- I'm sorry, Iran is a long-term threat to stability in Iraq. If you look on the other side, I think Syria is a short-term threat because of the support they provide to the former Ba'athist leaders that we see operating in and out of Syria.

Q Thank you, General.

Q General, you talked about how the government is considering alternative solutions in some of those Sunni Triangle areas where registration is a problem. As I understand it, one of those is holding elections over a longer period of time; more than one day, in other words. What's your assessment of the security situation in doing them? Doesn't that just give a longer period of time for potential attacks by insurgents? And also could you tell us what the American role is in security of those election sites?

GEN. CASEY: I do not think the extended election period is still on the table. I know that was discussed, but I've discussed it with some of the leadership in the Iraqi government. I don't believe it's on the table anymore, at least it wasn't when I left.

We are working closely with the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi election committee (sic/commission) in building the security plan for the elections.

It's not finally formed yet. It will be probably by the end of this month. In general the role of the coalition forces will be one of broad-area security, and it will be the Iraqi security forces that will work the specifics of the polling areas and places like that.

Q General, how concerned are you that the Sunnis will not participate or not turn out in numbers sufficient in this election, not only because of the security situation, but simply because of disaffection? And if they do, what does that mean?

GEN. CASEY: Again, I wish -- my political consultant, John Negroponte, could probably do a better job on this one. My view is -- I'll give you my opinion. My opinion is that there will be Sunni participation in this in a reasonable amount. I believe that the insurgents are pursuing a strategy I call purposeful disenfranchisement by intimidating Sunnis away from the election process so they can say, "Well, the Sunnis didn't vote, so therefore the election is invalid." I don't think that's going to be a successful strategy, but it's one that they're trying to implement. So I think there will be sufficient Sunni participation in this for people to accept the fact that it is a reasonably free and fair election.

Q You talked about at the polling places it would largely be Iraqi security forces. There's what, 9,000 polling places?

GEN. CASEY: It's undetermined. Somewhere between 6,(000) and 9,(000); 9,(000) is the high end.

Q And when you look at the number of Iraqi security forces, it seems like there wouldn't be very many Iraqi security forces. If you could talk about that, the numbers at those polling places. And I know you don't want to be too specific on that, but if you'll give us more detail about what the Americans will do. Maybe sort of rapid reaction? What?

GEN. CASEY: Again, we're still working through the process, but it's like any type of security situation. If you want to guard, you don't guard every place just at the point. You guard it away from the point. You restrict access to it. You keep vehicles from moving in the direction of the polling places around it. I mean, there's a range of options that you do to reduce exposure of these particular sites, rather than just taking 20 to 30 people and huddling around the site itself. That's being worked out.

My experience with elections in the past, in Bosnia and Kosovo, again the forces of the coalition, the security forces normally operate away from the polling sites in an area security role and do provide reaction force if there's problems.

And the other thing we do and we will do and are doing is to continue to conduct operations prior to the elections to disrupt the insurgents and to keep them from disrupting the election process. So there's an offensive component to this as well.

Q General, you talk about the progress in security across Iraq. It seems that that airport road is a symbol of what many people say is a growing insurgency. What is the story with that road? And why can't U.S. and Iraqi forces patrol it effectively to stop the attacks that are happening on it?

GEN. CASEY: I wouldn't necessarily see it as a symbol of a growing insurgency. I would see it as a symbol of the growing use of car bombs in the insurgency. And that really is the question of the airport road. It's a tactic that's been adopted by the insurgents. They don't have to do much. A car bomb a day in Baghdad or on the airport road sends a symbol that the insurgency is very powerful, when in actuality I don't believe that they are. It's a classic technique of the urban insurgent. They are trying to provoke us to do something that will make us look like we're overreacting to them.

I mean, you could tie up traffic -- I mean, if you searched every car getting on the airport road, you'd put that part of Baghdad in knots. So it really is the issue of dealing with car bombs. We continually work on that. And we will get -- we will get to a point where the airport road is secure and our people and the people in the embassy are protected against car bombs. But as with any battle, it's an action-reaction-counteraction cycle that we go through with the enemy and the enemy does to us.

Q So is there a plan for that road or just a broader plan for attacking the terrorists and their ability to make car bombs?

GEN. CASEY: It's a little bit of each, but we're actively working with the minister of interior and his traffic forces on ways to reduce the threats to our forces on the airport road.

Q Sir?

GEN. CASEY: Behind you, and I'll come back.

Q Yes, General. This is Drew Brown with Knight Ridder. I know you addressed this in your opening remarks, but in your view, are we winning in Iraq? And how do you define winning? And as a follow-up, do you believe, given the current situation there, that credible national elections will be held or could be held or are possible to be held by January 30th?

GEN. CASEY: My view of winning is that we are broadly on track to accomplishing our objectives, which is a constitutionally elected government that is representative of all the Iraqi people and with Iraqi security forces that are capable of maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror. And I believe we will get there by the end of December '05, and I believe we are on track to get there by December of '05.

What was the second part?

Q About the elections, do you think that --

GEN. CASEY: I do.

Q -- given the situation, it's -- that credible elections will be held on January 30th?

GEN. CASEY: I do. I mean, it is going to be hard. They will fight us every step of the way. But I do believe elections are -- credible elections can be held. I mean, again, in the south and in the north, 14 of those 18 provinces, my -- what I believe is that they will be uneventful. They will be contested in the center area of the country, but I believe that we will succeed in that.

Q As a final -- final question, how do you -- how do you -- what do you tell the families of servicemen who have been killed and maimed over there? How do you define victory in Iraq, ultimate victory to these people who are losing their loved ones?

GEN. CASEY: I think I just did. But what I'd say to the families is what I said in my opening statement. These soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines that have died over there have given their lives to help 25 million Iraqis build a better life and to improve the security of the United States and the coalition.

And these young men and women went over there knowing that would be a possibility, and God bless them. That's what makes this country great.

Q I'm curious. Could you elaborate a little bit more on the situation up along that border? There was supposed to be a joint border committee that was meeting to work out the cross-border traffic. Has that fallen apart?

And would you also address down in the south, it's my understand you all are still holding some number of Mujahideen-e-khalq at a camp down near Kuwait. What's their status? How many are there? And what's going to finally happen to them? And when?

GEN. CASEY: Last part first. That's more up north. There are -- my last recollection is that there was about 3,000 MEK folks still there at a camp, that we are working their process with the Red Cross. I do not have a timeline of when that process will be completed.

Q So what will happen to them?

GEN. CASEY: Their ultimate disposition, where they --

Q Where are they going to go?

GEN. CASEY: Almost every one of them has a different story, so it's a variety of different places.

I'm sorry, what was your first?

Q And the first one is, what's going on at the Syrian border? You had a committee that was looking at that.

GEN. CASEY: Oh. There was a meeting. That process is continuing. I will tell you, my personal view is the Syrians are making some efforts on the border, but they're not going after the big fish, which is really the people that we're interested in. And we're really interested in them going after the senior Ba'athists that are providing the direction and financing for the insurgency inside Iraq. That's what we're really like to see them do.

Q Because you guys obviously can't cross the border to go after them.

GEN. CASEY: Right.

Q Yeah, your emphasis on the elections is making them shape into a fairly decisive element of the entire campaign. What would be the consequences if they are successfully disrupted by the insurgents? What's at stake here?

GEN. CASEY: It has been an important intermediate step in our campaign plan since we started this. But it is a step in the process. You're asking me a hypothetical. I don't really know the answer to that.

Q Well, you plan for failure.

GEN. CASEY: Well, you also -- you plan for success. I really don't have a good answer to that, and I'd rather not get into a hypothetical situation.

Q All right, you had said that with the fall of Fallujah for the insurgents, they don't have a safe house inside the country anymore. Mosul, since Fallujah has seen a lot of trouble up there, what is the status of Mosul now? And do you think that is becoming a safe haven for insurgents? And what are you doing to try to alleviate the ongoing problem up there?

GEN. CASEY: Let me talk about safe haven for a minute, what I mean when I say safe haven. For me, a safe haven is a place where insurgents and terrorists can go and plan, and build improvised explosive devices, and bring in recruits and receive them in, give them training, link them up with operations, stage for operations, rehearse operations, with impunity.

And that's what they had in Fallujah, and that's what they don't have anymore. That's what they had in Samarra for a while. They don't have that -- (inaudible). That's what the Muqtada militia had in Najaf. They don't have that anymore.

So they've lost the ability to operate any place with impunity. So what's going on in Mosul, in my view, is not a safe haven. It's an area where insurgents have gone and have had some success against the local security forces.

Now our folks, operating with additional Iraqi security forces, have restored the status quo. But I will tell you more work needs to be done there to improve the security situation prior to elections, and it will be done.

Q General Casey --

Q I'm sorry. Could I just follow up? Do you see at all that Mosul is becoming a safe haven? Is there an effort at all, any intelligence that shows that these folks have actually started moving into Mosul and they'll make that kind of their Fallujah?

GEN. CASEY: I see no evidence that the terrorists are trying to make Mosul a safe haven as I define "safe haven." It is certainly an area where they are operating and attempting to disrupt the election process and the coalition and Iraqi security force operations, but not a safe haven.

Q General Casey, if you -- if indeed, as you say, the terrorists and insurgents have lost the ability to operate with impunity, they've lost their safe havens, then how do you explain the fact that they continue to take such a toll, to be so effective against the Multinational Forces?

And what -- a second question -- what, if anything, will the Multinational Force be doing differently between now and January 30th to improve the situation and instill confidence in the Iraqi people that they can safely go to the polls and vote?

GEN. CASEY: To be clear, I said that they could operate with impunity inside the safe haven. They are clearly operating elsewhere around Iraq.

Now these levels of violence since Fallujah have dropped dramatically. And they are actually now down at the levels prior to Ramadan and really right where -- back where we were at transfer of sovereignty. So the levels of violence have come way down.

I do not -- they are not necessarily operating effectively against coalition forces. In fact, when we look back, the numbers of attacks don't necessarily produce a very high volume of casualties. In fact, a lot of the attacks are in fact ineffective against coalition forces. They are frankly more successful against civilians and in some cases against Iraqi security forces.

Q And the second part of the question. What, if anything, will you be doing differently between now and the end of January to do --

GEN. CASEY: Oh, yeah.

Q -- in spite of all this, instill the confidence to the Iraqi people that they can safely go to the polls and vote?

GEN. CASEY: That's a great question. We -- I think you know a few weeks ago I asked for some additional forces before the election period. We felt we needed to keep up the momentum, to keep the pressure on the insurgents that moved away from Fallujah after the Fallujah operation took place. And those forces are going to help us both keep the pressure on them and then get a more secure environment prior to the elections.

The other thing that's happening now is, as I mentioned, the Iraqi security forces are graduating. They're coming out of their training. And we're -- 18 of those 27 battalions are on line, and I think 12 of them have come on line in about the last 45 days.

And so they are now available to enhance security across Iraq.

Police continue to graduate. We continue to crank out the police commando battalion. So there will be a concerted effort across Iraq, particularly in the greater Baghdad area and the Mosul area and in the Al Anbar province, all the way up to January 30th.

Q You said in your opening statement you were generally pleased with their performance. That doesn't sound like a ringing endorsement.

GEN. CASEY: I said we are generally pleased with their performance. Everybody knows there have been instances -- Mosul is a good example -- where the police collapsed. But there are 12 provinces where the police are doing very well every day. So it's a mixed bag, but we're generally pleased.

The forces in Fallujah -- the Iraqi battalions that fought in Fallujah did very well. And they'll become the center, really, I think, of what the Iraqi Army becomes.

Eric?

Q General, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard have missed their recruiting goals the last two months. The National Guard is announcing new incentives for that. Given the fact that the Guard and Reserve represent about 40 percent of your forces over there and will continue to remain an important part -- a source of your troops in the immediate future, how concerned are you that many of these active duty forces who would normally flow into the Reserve and Guard are not doing so because they don't want to have to go back to places like Iraq and Afghanistan? How big a concern is that to you as the commander of forces on the ground there?

GEN. CASEY: Frankly, it's not something I've thought about deeply in about six months -- when I was the vice chief. But clearly a good flow of active forces into the Guard and Reserve is something that will benefit the Army, the Guard and Reserve over the long haul. And again, I haven't thought about it in a while there, but it's something I think we need to pay attention to and continue to encourage and maybe incentivize active forces to continue to move into the Guard and Reserve.

Q General Casey, could I ask you a question about the level of sectarian violence? Do you think it's on the rise? There have been several incidents recently -- the bombing yesterday against the Shi'a and bombing of a bus load of Kurdish militiamen up in Mosul. How do you assess that aspect of the insurgency?

GEN. CASEY: I would not assess that there is a high or seriously increasing level of sectarian violence at this time. There are clearly incidents. It is a troublesome trend, and it is one that we will continue to watch closely.

Q What do you think the source of it is? Is this -- I mean, Zarqawi in his famous letter talked about trying to foment just this sort of thing. Do you think that's where these things are --

GEN. CASEY: I wouldn't want to guess on that. But you've quoted a potential source.

Go ahead.

Q General, you said a few times that things are broadly on track. But now that you've been there six months, can you give us any specific areas where you had hoped to be further along than you are at this point?

GEN. CASEY: Fair question, because the analysis that we did look at that. I'll tell you, I would have hoped we had been further along on the Iraqi -- helping the Iraqi -- particularly the ministries I'm concerned with, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense -- in building their intelligence services up.

We're working counterinsurgency. Intelligence is key to that. And what we've said, and what we've seen to some degree but not the extent that I think we can if we build these effective intelligence services, is that we benefit from what the Iraqis know about themselves. So that's going to be one of our main priorities for the next year.

The second major thing that we'll be working on for next year is the local police. We are continuing to train folks. We've adapted their training program to make them more able to operate in a counterinsurgency environment. You know, the cop on the beat doesn't normally necessarily think he's going to get attacked by a carload of guys. They need to have some paramilitary-type skills so they can defend and protect themselves and operate in a counterinsurgency environment. So that's the second point.

Third point is I think we've got to do more work on the borders and on the border guards, and that will be another focus for the next year.

Q General, I want to go back to one thing you said about the insurgency, that they're not 10 feet tall. That's a statement that's been used in the past to describe the Soviet Union soldier, the Viet Cong, and yet we had trouble in Vietnam and it was strung out a long time. What is your best

intelligence about the resiliency of the insurgency, its ability to reconstitute? (Inaudible) -- you can cut off a lot of tails but you got to get at the head.

GEN. CASEY: Oh, absolutely.

Q Should the American public and the Iraqi public expect this insurgency just to go on in some form for quite a while no matter what happens January 30th?

GEN. CASEY: I think we ought to be clear that when they have the elections on the 30th of January, the insurgency's not going to go away. I mean, you mentioned some other cases, but if you look at the history of insurgencies, these are protracted events. They go on for a long time. Now, they won't necessarily go on at the same level and they won't necessarily go on at a level where it will require 150,000 American troops, especially when we're creating Iraqi security forces that we'll work with over the next year to help them build independent counterinsurgency capability, but insurgencies generally go on for a long period of time, and I think you'd expect to see the insurgency in Iraq go on at some level for a long time.

Q They seem to be more sophisticated. I heard that there was command and control sophistication or the attacks seemed to have picked up. It doesn't seem to be getting less sophisticated, but even more as you kill a lot of them.

GEN. CASEY: We are seeing military capabilities. I wouldn't say necessarily sophisticated, but we are seeing military capabilities in platoon-size attacks that we had not necessarily seen before. But for them to conduct an attack like that takes a lot of their time and their effort, and we're not seeing a lot of these.

Q General, could you just clarify your statement on Syria, what your concerns are about their role in the insurgency or perhaps the going and coming of foreign terrorists across that border?

GEN. CASEY: I have two concerns with Syria. One, as you suggest, is foreign fighters. And we see a facilitation mode through Syria, foreign fighters coming into Iraq. I do not see direct Syrian government involvement in that facilitation, but it is coming through Syria. And I do believe that they have the capability to stop it if they had the will to stop it.

The second point is we have fairly good information that there are senior former Ba'athists, members of that they call the New Regional Command, operating out of Syria with impunity and providing direction and financing for the insurgency in Iraq. And that needs to stop.

Q Is al-Douri one of them?

GEN. CASEY: He's back and -- he's a back and forther. He's not necessarily in there.

Q General, could you -- just a quick --

STAFF: Let's make this -- let's make this the last one, General.

Q Can I do a quick, you know, question on -- you said to Kathleen (sp) that the Iraqi security forces are performing well in 12 of the provinces in your own -- right? But one of the things you also say is that 14 of the provinces are in pretty good shape. So it would seem that in those 12 provinces they haven't really been tested. I presume before Mosul happened, before the most recent violence, you probably thought those Iraqi security forces were performing well. I mean, they're the retrained Iraqi security forces. So if they haven't been tested yet, aren't there still concerns about how they would do? I mean, I guess yesterday in Samarra a police station was attacked and not a shot was fired, and they also left the area.

GEN. CASEY: The 12 or 16 provinces, what I meant, those were police, not necessarily all Iraqi security forces. Just police. And whether or not they've been tested, some of them have. In

the south, during the Muqtada militia attacks, there were several police stations that were attacked fairly heavily, particularly the one in Kut for example, and they did fight very well. But there is something to what you're saying about untested.

Now in Mosul, we have seen problems with the police in Mosul over a period of time. And so the fact that all of them collapsed at the same time was a surprise. The fact that they had a chief of police who was not very effective and who many believe was corrupt -- that problem up there had been going on for a longer period of time, so it wasn't a complete shock.

Listen, thank you all very much. Come over here and see us.

STAFF: Thank you all for attending.

Q (Off mike) -- are they commanding, actually, the insurgency, this new regional command out of --

STAFF: No, that's their name.

Q That's what they call themselves.

GEN. CASEY: Thank you.

Q Thank you, General.

END.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, December 17, 2004 12:25 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV
OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: TPs from Casey for review

Col,
these TP are very thorough and extensive. I know we discussed possibly threading some of yesterday's PC seminar themes into them, but I have not received the "blessed" feedback yet from the J5 folks.
I think we should let these stand on their own and perhaps for next Tues press conference with SD/CJCS, they could use some of the PC seminar themes.

VR
(b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) OASD-PA
>Sent: Friday, December 17, 2004 12:04 PM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
CIV OASD-PA
>Subject: TPs from Casey for review

>
>All:
>
>Attached please find the first draft of talking points off Gen. Casey's briefings.
>
>The sources are attached - (1) transcript of Casey's presser yesterday and (2) transcript from Bonnie Sciarretto in Archie's shop of Casey's briefing (phone) to the military analysts.
>
>I'll stand by and wait for directions.

(b)(6)

> << File: TP 12-17-04 Gen. Casey Iraq update.doc >>
>
> << File: 12-16-04 Casey with mil analysts.doc >>
>
> << File: 12-16-04 Casey Pentagon presser.doc >>

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, December 17, 2004 12:36 PM
To: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV
OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: TPs from Casey for review

(b)(6) - thanks. Sounds like a plan to me.

(b)(6): These look great. Recommend you launch them, and we'll add into the press conf anything more we get early next week.
Thanks for your hard work.
V/R
Col H

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Friday, December 17, 2004 12:25 PM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Archie, Col, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV OASD-PA; (b)(6) OASD-PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA
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> To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
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> << File: 12-16-04 Casey with mil analysts.doc >>

> << File: 12-16-04 Casey Pentagon presser.doc >>

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2005 7:40 PM
To: (b)(6) LtCol, JCS SJS
Cc: (b)(6) COL, JCS VCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS; Thorp, Frank, CAPT,
OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
Subject: MOH Recipients to CENTCOM AOR

(b)(6)

Jack Jacobs, a retired Army colonel, military analyst -- and Medal of Honor recipient is organizing a group of a handful of Medal of Honor recipients who are interested in going to Iraq and Afghanistan to visit with the troops, to offer encouragement and motivation. He is an acquaintance of Gen Pace's, and has asked him for his input on how to proceed.

Gen Pace asked me to get with Legal to see what, if any, support we might be able to provide. Could these guys travel via military aircraft, would the Chairman and/or Vice have to accompany them, could they be worked into a "USO" type show, or ????

At your convenience, I would like to discuss this with you, and get your input on how best to proceed.

Thanks for your help,

V/R

Col H

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, January 07, 2005 7:04 AM
To: (b)(6) LtCol, JCS SJS
Subject: RE: MOH Recipients to CENTCOM AOR

That's fine.

Just wanted to get it on your scope (before it fell out of my brain altogether.) V/R Col H

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) LtCol, JCS SJS
>Sent: Friday, January 07, 2005 6:06 AM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: RE: MOH Recipients to CENTCOM AOR

>Ma'am,

>I probably won't have a chance to get to this until next wek.

>V/r

(b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
> Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2005 7:40 PM
> To: (b)(6) LtCol, JCS SJS
> Cc: (b)(6) COL, JCS VCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
> Subject: MOH Recipients to CENTCOM AOR

> (b)(6)

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> Thanks for your help,

> V/R

> Col H

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) LtCol, JCS SJS
Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2005 10:21 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: MOH Recipients to CENTCOM AOR

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Ma'am,

(b)(5)

V/r

(b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2005 7:40 PM
>To: (b)(6) LtCol, JCS SJS
>Cc: (b)(6) COL, JCS VCJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS VCJCS; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: MOH Recipients to CENTCOM AOR

(b)(6)

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> Thanks for your help,

> V/R

> Col H

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, February 01, 2005 5:31 PM
To: larry.dirita@ (b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA

Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Haddock, Colonel Ellen; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Merritt, Roxie T.
CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Rhynedance, George, COL,
(b)(6)
(b)(6) Thorpe, Captain Frank; (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Subject: How former military members serving as media analysts viewed the Iraqi election

Attachments: Military Analyst Coverage - Iraq 020105.doc



Military Analyst
Coverage - Ir...

TV Broadcast Summary:

Analysts Tommy Franks, Jed Babbin, Don Shepperd, Montgomery Meigs and Jack Jacobs were all featured on national news stations (Fox News, CNN and MSNBC). Generally speaking, all agreed that the election was not as violent as expected and that the Iraqi security forces and American troops did a very good job. Several analysts alluded to the fact that there will be more danger ahead. The analyst mood was positive as Iraqi events unfolded.

Print/Online/Radio Summary:

Military analysts' discussion of Sunday's election in print, online and radio outlets was minimal, limited to accounts quoting William Nash and Bob Scales. General Nash was featured on NPR before and during the election process (January 30th) while Bob Scales was quoted in The Baltimore Sun (reprinted by The South Florida Sun Sentinel) on keeping troops safe in Iraq. In addition, a Washington Times reader wrote a letter to the paper commenting on Scales' Op-Ed piece from earlier in the week on the need to raise troop levels.

The attached memo provides information on what each analyst said and how often they appeared on television.

MILITARY ANALYST COVERAGE IRAQI ELECTIONS

Print/Online/Radio Summary:

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William Nash (NPR)

- Iraqi troops "doing their duty" and enforcing security well
- Statements made about U.S. troops pulling out within 18 months "may be ambitious, but it's a good start."
- Nash emphasized the importance of the U.S. supporting, not leading efforts for the new Iraq, and avoiding being asked to leave Iraq.

Bob Scales (Baltimore Sun – print/online)

- The Sun piece described the Pentagon's plans to take U.S. soldiers from their own units and add them to Iraqi units.
- Scales: "It (embedding with Iraqi units) would put our troops' safety at risk, as they'd be more vulnerable to insurgent attacks."
- The key here is to quickly solidify the Iraqi troops as a standalone force from U.S. troops.

TV Broadcast Summary:

Analysts Tommy Franks, Jed Babbin, Don Shepperd, Montgomery Meigs and Jack Jacobs were all featured on national news stations (Fox News, CNN and MSNBC). Generally speaking, all agreed that the election was not as violent as expected and that the Iraqi security forces and American troops did a very good job. Several analysts alluded to the fact that there will be more danger ahead. The analyst mood was positive as Iraqi events unfolded.

Representative remarks per analyst are as follows:

Tommy Franks (Fox News – Hannity & Colmes / Fox & Friends)

- Troops feel great about what they've done in relation to the elections
- Any election in the Arab world is a "big deal"
- This is the first practical example of democracy in the Arab world
- Does not agree with comments made by Senator Kerry and Senator Kennedy
- He is proud of the work troops have done
- Last thing you want to do is announce your "timetable" for withdrawal

Jed Babbin (MSNBC Live Coverage – Iraqi Elections)

- Withdrawal from Iraq is “Simply the worst thing we could do”
- Withdrawal would strengthen the terrorists and weaken the Iraq people
- We have to look at the bigger picture, we have to deal with all the Jihadist nations that are influencing Iraq

Don Shepperd (CNN Live From....)

- What we did in the run up to the election made a big difference (i.e. controlling traffic flow around polling areas)
- There were extensive offensive operations to stop terrorist before voting took place especially in relation to foreign insurgents
- This weekend was very stressful for coalition forces
- It was very important for the Iraqis to pull this off


Montgomery Meigs (MSNBC Live Coverage – Iraqi Elections)

- Events in Iraq have gone surprisingly well
- It is a very tough process in inventing a new government
- We will see more Iraqi forces come on board with fewer American troops
- We will have to watch how Sunnis are brought into the process
- Doesn’t think the coalition will change after the vote
- Need to continue to watch insurgents from Syria and Iran

Jack Jacobs (MSNBC Live Coverage – Iraqi Elections)

- Highlighted “hot spots” in Iraq in real-time during the polling process
- Jacobs, during the polling, predicted high voter turnout
- Security expectations were “managed well”
- Provided an overview of how insurgents might inflict violence during the vote
- Said the training of Iraqi forces by the U.S. military was key
- Questioned whether “two Iraqs” would arise until the next election in October (religious and cultural divides a potential after Sunday’s election)

WHERE THE ANALYSTS APPEARED



(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2005 1:11 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS J8
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: NDS Rollout

(b)(6)

Below is schedule for tomorrow's press event.
Line-up right now is Mr. Feith and Admiral Sullivan to discuss the strategic documents (NDS/NMS) OSD has expressed interest in having someone from J8 "in the wings" during the press briefing in the event that the line of questioning takes a PROGRAMMATIC turn. NOT someone senior to Admiral Sullivan (made very clear to all) but if someone is available, I would recommend they be on hand from prep at 1115 through the press briefing at least (1215) but through the conference call with military analysts (1300) would be preferred.

Any possibilities?
V/R
Katie

- >1115: - Prep Feith/Sullivan in Whitman's office
- >1130: - Feith/Sullivan Pentagon Press Corps Briefing/Release
- >1215: - Feith/Sullivan Analysts Briefing
- >
- >- FYI only --
- >1300-: : Feith Targeted Media and Internal Interviews (Radio/Print, Pentagon Channel, AFIS)
- > - Pentagon Channel from 1300-1345
- > - (b)(6) at 1345; Needs to be firmed up. Have talked to
- >her once
- >
- >
- >

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2005 1:55 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS J8
Subject: RE: NDS Rollout

I say we go with the knowledgeable 06...if you've got a name, I'll run with it, just like we think we're smart.

Is MG Hunzeker out of pocket? Someone asked, and I said I thought he was TDY...
V/R
Katie

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS J8
>Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2005 12:44 PM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; (b)(6) LCDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
CAPT, JCS J8
>Subject: RE: NDS Rollout

>
>Katie, RDML Blake is the French CHOD Escort this week. As such, he is
>out of pocket for this event. Offer an O-6 with current Budget
>Knowledge. VR (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

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> Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2005 12:11 PM
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> Katie

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(b)(6)

From:
Sent:
To:

(b)(6) AFIS-HQ/PIA (b)(6)

Friday, May 13, 2005 4:57 PM

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Haddock, Colonel Ellen (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Thorpe, Captain Frank (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject:

Initial Media Reaction to BRAC announcement

Attachments:

BRAC Post Briefing- Media Reaction - 051305.doc



BRAC Post Briefing-
Media Reac...

The attachment includes an examination of media coverage from the top 10 news outlets by circulation and national television broadcast stations following the BRAC announcement. Early online coverage consisted primarily of a reprinted AP story announcing the number of closures and cost savings. Later updates included more original commentary and reaction from state officials and legislators. National television had similar coverage and included commentary by military analysts.

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure 2005

BRAC – POST PRESS CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT

MEDIA REACTION

FRIDAY 13, 2005

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ONLINE HIGHLIGHTS

Immediate coverage of the announcement:

- The NYT, WP, USA Today, NY Daily News and WSJ reprinted an AP story, without adding original reporting.
- Denver Post, Houston Chronicle tailored the AP piece for a local slant
- The L.A. Times, Chicago Tribune and Atlanta Journal-Constitution ran original stories.

Updated stories included:

- A WP piece on the proposal to shut down Walter Reed
- A NYT piece by Eric Schmitt and David Stout on “intense reaction” across the country to the announcement.

Commentary included:

- Reprinted AP stories highlighted overall cost savings, a “massive shift of US forces,” employment numbers in affected communities, and part of a written statement by the Secretary: “Our current arrangements, designed for the Cold War, must give way to the new demands of the war against extremism and other evolving 21st Century challenges.”
 - Also included several quotes from state legislators who were disappointed in their state’s closings. For example, New Jersey's Fort Monmouth was on the list, to which Democratic Rep. Rush Holt vowed to: “Fight like hell to change it” and “the Pentagon's error.”
- “Atlanta was a major loser...” but the rest of GA fared well and the state will gain jobs.
- The news that Illinois will lose jobs due to closures, but such major installations as Scott Air Force Base will stay open was greeted with “loud applause.”
- That CO has no closures and will gain jobs was called good news for the state by Wayne Allard, R-Colo.

- "California has done very well in this round" of closures, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Alpine), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said today

Messages and quotes:

- The aim to "promote jointness" – "The Pentagon also proposed eliminating scores of Reserve and National Guard bases, part of Rumsfeld's effort to promote "jointness" between the active-duty and reserve units." (NY Daily News, via an AP article).
- The updated NYT piece on immediate reaction to the closures:
 - Quoted Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute: "savings are generated more by reorganization than closures"
 - Quoted Gen. Richard Myers: "The degree with which the services coordinate, integrate and operate together will be increased, and it will include how we manage some of our bases and posts."
 - The Secretary "sought to ease fears" about unemployment caused by closed bases.

TELEVISION HIGHLIGHTS

- "Bottom Line – the DoD needs the money. They want to make better use of tax payers money" - (CNN)
- People in congress are saying "the battle starts today" – (Headline News)
- "There is life after closure but it is difficult" – Audience interview (Fox News Dayside with Linda Vester)
- We are going to fight this decision and we have plenty of ways to fight it – (MSNBC - Rep. Rob Simmons)
- Emphasis on which bases have had job gains (rather than losses) – (Fox News)
- BRAC sets-up a national competition between communities...that is what this process is about – (Fox News Dayside with Linda Vester)
- Historically, less than 10% of bases were able to get off the list - (Fox News Dayside with Linda Vester)
- Analyst: General Montgomery Meigs comments:
 - Efficiency is the core principle of this BRAC closure
 - Enhancement of "joint consolidation"
 - More open minded military culture
 - Biggest challenges: communities that lose jobs
 - BRAC is probably a combination of the transformation initiative and the wars overseas

ONLINE EXCERPTS

THE ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION

ORIGINAL: Four Georgia bases on closure list

Ron Martz, Bob Kemper

9:24 AM

After surviving four previous rounds of base closings unscathed, metro Atlanta took a major hit on Friday in the latest announcement of facilities the Pentagon wants to shut down.

The Pentagon announced it plans to close three bases in the Atlanta area — Fort McPherson in southwest Atlanta, Fort Gillem in Forest Park and the Naval Air Station in Marietta. That will mean a loss of nearly 6,500 military and civilian jobs and about \$560 million in annual payroll.

While Atlanta was a major loser, the rest of Georgia fared well and the state will actually gain about 7,500 military and civilian positions...

State officials had no immediate word on the list but Gov. Sonny Perdue was holding a news conference and will visit each of the targeted facilities later today.

"We're disappointed. We think the community action group did a great job. ... We're prepared to challenge the recommendation," said Fred Bryant, deputy director, Georgia Military Affairs Coordinating Committee. "We don't know yet what were the key factors in the decision."

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE

ORIGINAL: Illinois takes job hit but escapes major base closures

Rebecca Carroll, AP

8:56 AM CDT

Illinois would lose nearly 2,700 military and civilian jobs under base closures recommended Friday by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, but the state's major military installations would remain open.

Scott Air Force Base, located about 20 miles east of St. Louis, near Belleville, emerged as the big winner, gaining 797 military and civilian jobs. Great Lakes Naval Training Center in North Chicago is slated to lose 2,022 jobs...

The announcement that Scott would not close was greeted with loud applause and a standing ovation at MidAmerica Airport in Mascoutah, Ill., where Illinois U.S. Sen. Dick Durbin and Reps. Jerry Costello and John Shimkus held a news conference to announce its fate.

DENVER POST

ORIGINAL: Colorado a Winner in Base Closure Plans

Mike Soraghan, Denver Post Staff Writer and The Associated Press

09:31:52 AM, updated at 11:00 AM

...Not only was Colorado spared any base closures, the state stands to gain nearly 5,000 military jobs...Members of Colorado's congressional delegation expressed pleasure over the plan's impact on the state.

"I think it's good news for Colorado and it's great news for the Colorado Springs area," said U.S. Sen. Wayne Allard, R-Colo., who served on the Senate Armed Services Committee until recently.

HOUSTON CHRONICLE

UPDATED: 180 U.S. military bases targeted for closure by Pentagon

AP - 10:08AM, updated at 10:39

...The 147th Fighter Wing of the Air National Guard will remain at Houston's Ellington Field under the plan. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison said the wing's mission will be shifting from national defense to homeland security.

LA TIMES

ORIGINAL: California Largely Spared in Latest Round of Base Closures

Tony Perry, Times Staff Writer

...The Los Angeles Air Force Base, the language facility at Monterey and major Navy and Marine Corps bases in San Diego were spared in the Pentagon's list of bases proposed for closure, which was unveiled this morning.

"California has done very well in this round" of closures, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Alpine), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said today...

California's biggest job loss appears to be the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Corona, which employs 900 workers and is listed for closure...

Although the Pentagon's list is meant to be only the beginning of the process, 85% of bases targeted by the Pentagon in the past have been closed

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

ORIGINAL: Pentagon Plans to Close 33 Major Bases - AP

Liz Sidoti

12:44 PM EDT

NEW YORK TIMES

ORIGINAL: Pentagon Proposal to Include Shutting 33 Major U.S. Bases - AP

11:01 AM

UPDATED: Pentagon Proposes Shutting 33 Major U.S. Bases and Other Cuts

Eric Schmitt and David Stout - 1:11 PM

The bases proposed for closing include some familiar names in military history: the Navy's submarine base in New London, Conn., Fort McPherson in Georgia, Fort

Monmouth in New Jersey and the Pascagoula Naval Station in Mississippi. Scores of smaller installations would also be closed, and others would be consolidated...

While the list of recommended closings was smaller than expected, the reaction from those affected was intense.

Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut, called the recommendation to close the New London base, which would cost several thousands jobs, "irrational and irresponsible."

"It insults our history and endangers our future," he told The Associated Press...

"The savings projected by this round seem to be generated more by reorganization than outright closures," said Loren Thompson, a military analyst with the Lexington Institute, a consulting firm. "At present, the military is very inefficiently located and organized.

Many facilities are sited in places that made sense a century ago but not now."

After more than two years of exhaustive study, this round of base closings is an integral part of Mr. Rumsfeld's strategy to revamp the military into a leaner, more agile force.

"The degree with which the services coordinate, integrate and operate together will be increased, and it will include how we manage some of our bases and posts," Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said.

Mr. Rumsfeld sought to ease fears in many communities that closings could leave thousands of local employees out of work. He cited examples of closed bases that had been converted into commercial airports and economic centers. And he pledged that the Defense Department would provide retraining for workers and economic aid to help offset the immediate economic impact in communities where bases close.

USA TODAY

UPDATED - Battle over Bases Begins: Pentagon proposes closing of 33 major bases - AP

Updated 12:30 PM

...One major closure Rumsfeld seeks is Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, home to 29 B-1B bombers, half the nation's fleet of the aircraft, and the state's second largest employer.

Republican freshman Sen. John Thune on Friday called the Pentagon "flat wrong" about Ellsworth, and he vowed to help lead the fight in the Senate to delay the entire round of closures. "We will continue to keep Ellsworth open," Thune said...

Rumsfeld also recommended closing the Naval Station in Pascagoula, Miss., which barely survived previous base closure rounds. The decision was a blow to Sen. Trent Lott, R-Miss., who had fought the 1995 round of closures. At stake are 844 military jobs and 112 civilian jobs...

New England took a major hit, and Connecticut suffered the biggest loss in terms of jobs with the proposed closure of the U.S. Naval Submarine Base in Groton, Conn. Shuttering the installation would result in the loss of 7,096 military jobs and 952 civilian jobs.

Calling the recommendation "irrational and irresponsible," Sen. Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.) said, "It insults our history and endangers our future."...

WALL STREET JOURNAL

ORIGINAL: Pentagon to Propose Closure - AP

UPDATED: Pentagon Proposes Closure Of About 180 Installations - AP

10:55 a.m.

Later updated with AP piece

WASHINGTON POST

ORIGINAL: Pentagon Proposing to Shut 33 Major Bases - AP

Liz Sidoti

11:01 AM

UPDATED: Pentagon Proposes Shutting Walter Reed

William Branigin and Ann Scott Tyson

12:54 PM

The Pentagon today proposed eliminating about 180 military installations across the country in a new round of base closures and realignments aimed at saving nearly \$49 billion over 20 years. One major proposal calls for essentially moving Walter Reed Army Medical Center from Washington, D.C., to a new state-of-the-art, jointly staffed facility in suburban Maryland...

Housing and some research facilities at the Walter Reed site in Washington would stay open, but the facility as it exists today would practically be shut down, and it would lose 5,630 military, civilian and contractor jobs...

Among the luckiest states on the list is Maryland, which gains 9,293 jobs -- more than any other state. The District loses 6,496 jobs under the proposal -- mainly from the loss of Walter Reed -- while Virginia loses 1,574.

The hardest-hit states include Connecticut, which loses 8,586 jobs; Maine, with a loss of 6,938 jobs; and Alaska, which stands to lose 4,619. Overseas, a total of 13,503 jobs would be cut in the closure or realignment of U.S. military installations in Germany, South Korea and elsewhere. Many of those jobs would move to the United States.

TELEVISION EXCERPTS

MSNBC

5/13/2005 2:19:22 PM

Newscaster: Joining us to talk a little bit more about the strategic implications of today's announcement is MSNBC analyst Montgomery Meigs. Thank you so much for taking the time today. **Meigs:** Good to be on the show. **Newscaster:** It's unusual when you think about closures and the loss of jobs as something that might be helpful and might make a unit or a situation better. But can you explain to us why this realignment will make the military stronger? **Meigs:** Sure. There are three things that I see. First of all as general efficiency, a lot of these face that's are being closed can be consolidated with other functions. And can you get more things done for the equivalent DoD dollar. Efficiency

that is the first principle. Secondly, there is some joint consolidation going on. So, for instance, the third Army headquarters, which is now in Atlanta, is being moved to Shaw Air Force Base where it will consolidate with the Air Force headquarters that also works for U.S. central command. So that will make planning easier, coordination, etc. and enhance jointness. Finally within the Army, Chief of the Staff of the Army is breaking down some of the tribal barriers. He's consolidating the infantry and armor schools, a number of the logistics schools. That way you'll get much more open minded culture in the office corps of the army. **Newscaster:** Knowing Secretary Rumsfeld's vision of a more compact Army, do you think this was something that, perhaps, was always in the planning or is it a result of fighting two wars? **Meigs:** Well, I think it's a combination. For instance, foreman was up for election last time. This time they're going to close it and move the headquarters a little further north in the state of Virginia. And there are some things that have changed as a result of what we've seen in the last 10 years. Now the army is going to have more brigades than it has in the past. You have to have a place to put them. Some of that is deflected in the BRAC numbers. **Newscaster:** We talk about all the positive things that will come out of this. What is the difficult thing? What is the challenging thing? The not so great news today? **Meigs:** Well, you got to have some communities that are going to lose jobs. That's a painful transition process.

Fox News Channel

5/13/2005 1:17:35 PM

Interviews with Tom Markham (Association of Defense Communities) and Jim Saxton (New Jersey, Congressmen)

Those that are losing will be trying to reverse the signatures of the Pentagon. That's what this process is about. **Linda Vester:** Tom, you have been through this. You know what the fight is like when you try to save your base. How often is it a winning fight? **Tom Markham:** Those hit during the first four rounds of closures said less than 10% of the communities were able to get off the list. We don't know about this round but that was the case in the last round. **Linda:** This is democracy in action, but, you know, communities who are supportive of the military are being forced to compete with each other to stay alive. **Rep. Saxton:** That's true. While, less than 10% of the bases may have gotten off before this is not a mission impossible task to get a base off the list. I would point out in 1989 and 1991 both those round of BRAC, Fort Dix was on the list and it got off. In 1993 McGuire Air Force base was on the list and it got off. So, we've got a good record of knowing how to do this in New Jersey, we'll spare no effort to try to make our case. **Linda:** I want to bring a member of the audience. Turn out this fellow is a retired Marine. I would have thought you would say not to close the base. But instead, you said no, close them down. **Audience Member:** I'm assuming all the work that's being done there can be done elsewhere. The reason they are closing them is they are obsolete or not need. If they are not needed they should close. **Linda:** How well do the communities get handled after the fact in terms of retraining and stuff like that? **Tom Markham:** There is some retraining that goes on. However, the main challenge after these bases do close is the economic recovery. As an example, in Denver we have been closed for 10 years. We lost 700 jobs and \$290 million a year spent on the local economy. Today we have 20,000 people living there, new houses, and a \$4 billion economic impact. The message is that there is life after closure but it's difficult.

Headline News

5/13/2005 11:31:50

Newscaster: Tens of thousands of military and civilian personnel could lose their jobs. Jamie McIntyre joins us live from the Pentagon with details. Hi, Jaime. **McIntyre:** Hi Kathleen. It started as a major military operation this morning lone capitol hill as several-inch-thick base closure recommendation report was delivered to capitol hill where lawmakers are very interested to hear whether their particular bases are being closed or scaled back or in some cases actually gaining, according to this Realignment plan released by the pentagon. Lets look at some of the major closures. Thirty-three major bases. Here are some of the top ones around the country. New England would lose the submarine base at New London and also the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard targeted there. The naval station in Mississippi is on the targeted list. Cannon air force base in Texas as well as Ellsworth air force base where they have the b-2 bombers. The Pentagon plans to keep the planes, just move them to other facilities. In some cases some of the bases are gaining in some personnel and responsibility. Again, twenty-nine of thirty-three major closures, twenty-nine bases where they are going to have major reductions. Then another forty-nine bases will be gaining either in personnel or missions under this Pentagon plan, which now goes to the base closure commission over the next couple of months. That begins its work on Monday when the Pentagon will formally present this plan and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld will testify favor of it. One of the arguments they are going to make is that this plan has been carefully worked out, the pieces are interdependent and to change one base could affect the whole plan. The commission is going to have to look at the whole thing in entirety whether it sends recommendation to the president and ultimately to Capitol Hill. **Newscaster:** Is there the possibility that the commission could change its mind about some of these closures or is this really a done deal? **McIntyre:** well, in the past, the base closure commission has made some changes, but the prospect for any particular base is going to be kind of tough. The pentagon has spent a long time working up the rationale for each one of these. They say it is based on military necessity. They say they need the savings that have come from the base closings. The whole reason, there is an independent commission to do this is that if it were left up to congress, no base would ever be closed because members of Congress would simply stall.

CNN

5/13/2005 1:05:03 PM

Newscaster: There's a lot of people crying foul already Jamie. We've received so many e-mails and viewers wanting to know, sort of asking the direct question, during a time of ""operation Iraqi freedom"" and other ongoing wars, why base closures? What's the strategy, militarily for safety here at home, homeland security and, of course, fighting wars overseas? **Jamie McIntyre:** it's a very simple answer is, they need the money. That savings that I talked about, the Pentagon needs that money for better weapons, better materials, to better use the forces. Right now they're spending a lot of money on facilities they don't really need. They haven't been able to close them since 1995 because of the politics and the very sensitive nature of these kinds of closings. Because in particular, in 1995, there were accusations of people playing politics with the list because of the

presidential election. It made it almost impossible for the Congress to agree to a round.
They want to get as much savings as they can to make better use of the taxpayers' money.
When it comes down to the base in your backyard people don't want to see that go.

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2005 5:15 PM
To: (b)(6), CAPT, JCS SJS
Cc: (b)(6), Lt Col, JCS SJS; (b)(6), Col, JCS J3; (b)(6)
 COL, JCS VCJCS; (b)(6), CIV, JCS SJS; (b)(6), CDR, OCJCS/PA;
 (b)(6), LTC, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS MTG - 16 June 05
Attachments: Draft Agenda - Military Analysts.doc



Draft Agenda -
 Military Analys... (b)(6)

I apologize up front for the short lead on this one. OSD PA occasionally hosts a group of retired military personnel who now serve as media analysts ("talking heads") -- they are scheduled to be in the Pentagon on Thursday, 16 June from 1130-1345. Agenda is attached. Last week, OSD asked for the Chairman to participate; he's on leave. Gen Pace has indicated his schedule is too busy on Thursday, so we are now looking for another general/flag officer to appropriately represent the Joint Staff with this group. Other speakers include Acting DepSecDef England, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Peter Flory, and a final wrap-up with Secretary Rumsfeld. Requirement is 30 minutes, from 1200-1230, and rather than provide them with a detailed brief, this group prefers the opportunity to have a discussion (Q&A.) Not sure if the Director or J3 would be interested/available, but I would appreciate your help with this one.

- As of this morning, the list of retired military analysts who are confirmed to attend:
- Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard (USA, Retired)
 - Lieutenant General Frank (Ted) B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
 - Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
 - Mr. Jed Babbin (USAF, JAG)
 - Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)
 - Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)
 - Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)
 - Admiral David E. Jeremiah (USN, Retired)
 - Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
 - Colonel Jeff McCausland (USA, Retired)
 - General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
 - Major F. Andy Messing, Jr. (USAR, Retired)
 - Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired)
 - General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)
 - Wayne Simmons (USN, Retired)

Thanks again for your help.
 V/R
 Katie

> -----Original Message-----
 >From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
 >Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2005 4:35 PM
 >To: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
 >Subject: draft agenda

>
 >thanks for your help on this.
 >(b)(6)
 >
 >
 >

>
>
>Respectfully,
(b)(6)
>OSD Public Affairs
>Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
>Washington, D.C. 20301-1400
(b)(2)
>
>
>
>www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil
>
>
>

Tracking:

Recipient

(b)(6)

Read

Read: 6/14/2005 5:26 PM
Read: 6/14/2005 7:32 PM
Read: 6/14/2005 6:04 PM
Read: 6/14/2005 5:27 PM
Read: 6/14/2005 5:47 PM
Read: 6/15/2005 8:55 AM
Read: 6/14/2005 5:17 PM



Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
Meeting with Military Defense Analysts
Thursday, June 16, 2005
Deputy Secretary of Defense Conference Room ^{(b)(6)} The Pentagon

AGENDA

11:30 a.m. Welcome and Introduction

- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Ms. Allison Barber

11:31 a.m. Update on Detainee Operations

- Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy Gordon England

12:00 p.m. Update on Global Operations

- Joint Staff - TBD

12:30 p.m. Update on GWOT/Iraq Operations

- Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Peter Flory

1:00 p.m. Break

1:15 p.m. Discussion and Questions with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

1:45 p.m. Meeting Concludes

- Ms. Allison Barber

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2005 1:09 PM
To: Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: newest agenda

Allison,
we're experiencing some scheduling issues -- is it at all possible to swap the Joint Staff block of time (1200-1230) with Mr. Flory's block of time? (1230-1300)?
This would allow time for Gen Conway to do the press briefing with Mr. Di Rita beginning at 1130, and still get over to the Mil Analysts on time.
Thoughts???

V/R
Katie

(b)(2)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
>Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2005 12:37 PM
>To: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Subject: RE: newest agenda

>
>he's more than welcome to sit at the head of the table if that feels more natural. secdef prefers to stand.
>as mentioned, the analysts have asked about recruitment and retention issues, so the general will most likely be asked those questions.
>also, i just heard from the deputy's office that he (sec england) is going to be speaking about QDR, BRAC, NSPS and Acquisition, fyi.

>thanks

(b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
> Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2005 12:26 PM
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> Cc: (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
> Subject: FW: newest agenda

> (b)(6)

> he stands at the head of the table??? seems odd.
> Anyway, because DiRita wants to also do a press brief tomorrow at 1130, we're juggling generals. LtGen Conway may do the press brief and BG Ham may do the analysts. I'll let you know as soon as we have a decision.

> Thanks,
> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
> Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2005 12:22 PM
> To: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
> Subject: newest agenda

> hi there.
> thanks for the phone call. attached is the most recent agenda.
> please let me know what a/v needs the general will have. also, if there is anything he would like handed out, i will need it nlt 1600 so that i can prepare the briefing books for the analysts.
> generally, we do not have a podium. secdef stands at the head of the table so that it feels like more of a discussion, so that's the format we're assuming all of our

speakers will have. let me know if this is not doable.

> thanks!

> (b)(6)

> << File: Draft Agenda - Military Analysts.doc >>

> Respectfully,

> (b)(6)

> OSD Public Affairs
> Community Relations and Public Liaison

> (b)(2) The Pentagon

> Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

> (b)(2)

> << OLE Object: Picture (Metafile) >>

> www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2005 2:21 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) MAJ, JCS SJS; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, JCS OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) MAJ, JCS SJS
Subject: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

(b)(6)

Perhaps you can help direct me on how to best support this action:

SecDef, J3, and others met with several retired military analysts yesterday. They discussed a number of issues, with great emphasis on GTMO and Detainee Operations. SecDef encouraged them all to go to GTMO and see for themselves. OSD PA is currently working with SOUTHCOM to arrange a visit to GTMO by these military analysts soon -- could be as soon as first week or two in July. I'll get the date from SOUTHCOM once they have firmed up a plan.

OSD PA has taken members of this group on similar trips -- just not to GTMO.

Question/role for Joint Staff involves the air transportation. I believe the intent is to fly them in early and out later on the same day.

What can we do to ensure dedicated airlift is available to support this visit?

Thanks for your help.

V/R

Katie

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 12:46 PM
To: (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS
Cc: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

(b)(6) - Below is a sample; these are the folks who attended the roundtable with SecDef (and DJ3) last week.

The group is made up of retired military who serve as "talking heads" for various media. OSD PA has coordinated other visits in the past to help educate them on what's really going on in Iraq, etc.

They also do a conference call with them on a recurring basis.

We (Joint Staff) usually provide a J3 ops briefer for the call. Occasionally the Chairman or the Vice do the call -- depending on the topic/issue at hand. CJCS/VCJCS try to meet with the retired military analysts each time they actually have a group of them in the Pentagon, but last week's schedule was too hard, with the Chairman out of town, so the DJ3 filled in.

Hope that helps.

V/R
Katie

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Frank (Ted) B. Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan	(USMC, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah	(USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland,	(USA, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs	(USA, Retired)
Major F. Andy Messing, Jr.	(USAR, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
Wayne Simmons	(USN, Retired)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 6:18 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Katie, do you have any details of this group?

(b)(6)

Captain, JAGC, US Navy
Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

-----Original Message-----

From: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4
Sent: Sunday, June 19, 2005 10:11 PM
To: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc: Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, JCS, J4;
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS;
(b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; J-4 JLOC Personnel; Harnitchek, Mark

D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, J4
Subject: Re: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Norty,

Our folks have been running the traps. We can provide dedicated airlift for public affairs activities such as this per DOD 4515.13-R, Chapter 3.

We coordinated this with our policy experts and OCJCS/LC.

Per OSD Exec Sec yesterday, once OSD/PA and OSD Transportation Policy coordinate and DEPSECDEF approves the travel, exec sec will transmit to JS (J4) for validation and tasking USTRANSCOM. We have already given TRANSCOM a heads up.

We'll finish working it with the OSD folks on Monday and keep you informed on progress.

VR
Duncan

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS <norton.schwartz@(b)(6)>
To: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4 <duncan.mcnabb@(b)(6)>
CC: Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4 <mark.harnitchek@(b)(6)> (b)(6)
COL, JCS, J4 (b)(6); Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
<ellen.haddock@(b)(6)> (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS
(b)(6) (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS
(b)(6) J-4 JLOC Personnel (b)(6)

Sent: Sat Jun 18 10:07:51 2005
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Duncan, please take for action. Could we get this approved for SAAM? Thanks. V/r,
Norty.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 8:58 AM
To: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4; Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6)
COL, JCS, J4; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Sir:

During Thursday's SecDef session with military analysts, he apparently encouraged them to go to Gitmo and see things for themselves. OSD PA is working this with SOUTHCOM but question has arisen as to what we can do with dedicated DoD lift to support getting them in and out of Gitmo. Recommend passing this to the J4 team and letting them work it.

v/r,
(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6) USN
Executive Assistant
Director, Joint Staff

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA

Sent: Friday, June 17, 2005 2:21 PM

To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) MAJ,
JCS SJS; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, JCS OCJCS\PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) MAJ, JCS SJS
Subject: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

(b)(6)

Perhaps you can help direct me on how to best support this action:

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OSD PA has taken members of this group on similar trips -- just not to GTMO.

Question/role for Joint Staff involves the air transportation. I believe the intent is to fly them in early and out later on the same day.

What can we do to ensure dedicated airlift is available to support this visit?

Thanks for your help.

V/R

Katie

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 12:48 PM
To: (b)(6) Col, JCS J4
Cc: (b)(6) COL, JCS, J4; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

COL (b)(6)

I was given your name as a point of contact for this Airlift Request -- is that accurate? If so, please give me a call. I understand that this group is schedule to visit GTMO Saturday, 25 June...

V/R
Col Katie Haddock, USMC

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 5:57 AM
To: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS SJS; Harnitckek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, JCS, J4; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; J-4 JLOC Personnel; Maples, Michael D, MG, JCS VDJS; (b)(6) COL, J4
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Thanks, Duncan. V/r, Norty.

-----Original Message-----

From: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4
Sent: Sunday, June 19, 2005 10:11 PM
To: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc: Harnitckek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, JCS, J4; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; J-4 JLOC Personnel; Harnitckek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, J4
Subject: Re: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Norty,

Our folks have been running the traps. We can provide dedicated airlift for public affairs activities such as this per DOD 4515.13-R, Chapter 3.

We coordinated this with our policy experts and OCJCS/LC.

Per OSD Exec Sec yesterday, once OSD/PA and OSD Transportation Policy coordinate and DEPSECDEF approves the travel, exec sec will transmit to JS (J4) for validation and tasking USTRANSCOM. We have already given TRANSCOM a heads up.

We'll finish working it with the OSD folks on Monday and keep you informed on progress.

VR
Duncan

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS <norton.schwartz@(b)(6)>

To: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4 <duncan.mcnabb@(b)(6)>
CC: Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4 <mark.harnitchek@(b)(6)>
COL, JCS, J4 <(b)(6)> Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
<ellen.haddock@(b)(6)> <(b)(6)> Capt, JCS SJS
<(b)(6)> CAPT, JCS SJS
<(b)(6)> J-4 JLOC Personnel <(b)(6)>

Sent: Sat Jun 18 10:07:51 2005
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Duncan, please take for action. Could we get this approved for SAAM? Thanks. V/r,
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From: <(b)(6)> CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 8:58 AM
To: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4; Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; <(b)(6)>
COL, JCS, J4; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; <(b)(6)> Capt, JCS SJS
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Sir:

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v/r,
<(b)(6)>

CAPT <(b)(6)> USN
Executive Assistant
Director, Joint Staff

<(b)(2)>

<(b)(6)>

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2005 2:21 PM
To: <(b)(6)> CAPT, JCS SJS
Cc: <(b)(6)> CDR, OCJCS/PA; <(b)(6)> LTC, OCJCS/PA; <(b)(6)> MAJ,
JCS SJS; <(b)(6)> Maj, OCJCS/PA; <(b)(6)> LCDR, JCS OCJCS\PA; <(b)(6)>
<(b)(6)> MAJ, JCS SJS
Subject: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

<(b)(6)>

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Question/role for Joint Staff involves the air transportation. I believe the intent is to fly them in early and out later on the same day.

What can we do to ensure dedicated airlift is available to support this visit?

Thanks for your help.

V/R
Katie

Tracking:

Recipient

(b)(6)



Read

Read: 6/21/2005 1:42 PM

Read: 6/21/2005 1:07 PM

Read: 6/21/2005 1:15 PM

Read: 6/21/2005 12:52 PM

(b)(6)

From: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 1:19 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS
Subject: Re: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

This is perfectly legal... Or the US military has been breaking the law for 24+ years....

Pls proceed aggressively with planning this while we work this issue...

Frank Thorp
Captain, USN

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA <ellen.haddock@(b)(6)>
To: (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS (b)(6)
CC: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA <frank.thorp@(b)(6)>
Sent: Tue Jun 21 12:45:46 2005
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

(b)(6) -- Below is a sample; these are the folks who attended the roundtable with SecDef (and DJ3) last week.

The group is made up of retired military who serve as "talking heads" for various media. OSD PA has coordinated other visits in the past to help educate them on what's really going on in Iraq, etc.

They also do a conference call with them on a recurring basis.

We (Joint Staff) usually provide a J3 ops briefer for the call. Occasionally the Chairman or the Vice do the call -- depending on the topic/issue at hand. CJCS/VCJCS try to meet with the retired military analysts each time they actually have a group of them in the Pentagon, but last week's schedule was too hard, with the Chairman out of town, so the DJ3 filled in.

Hope that helps.

V/R
Katie

Confirmed Retired Military Analysts:

Colonel Carl Kenneth Allard	(USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Frank (Ted) B. Campbell	(USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan	(USMC, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin	(USAF, JAG)
Major Dana R. Dillon	(USA, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett	(USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer	(USA, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah	(USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis	(USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland,	(USA, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs	(USA, Retired)
Major F. Andy Messing, Jr.	(USAR, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash	(USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash	(USA, Retired)
Wayne Simmons	(USN, Retired)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 6:18 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Katie, do you have any details of this group?

(b)(6)

Captain, JAGC, US Navy
Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

-----Original Message-----

From: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4
Sent: Sunday, June 19, 2005 10:11 PM
To: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc: Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, JCS, J4;
Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS;
(b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; J-4 JLOC Personnel; Harnitchek, Mark
D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, J4
Subject: Re: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

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Duncan

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

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CC: Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4 <mark.harnitchek@(b)(6)> (b)(6)
COL, JCS, J4 (b)(6) Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
<ellen.haddock@(b)(6)> (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS
(b)(6) (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS
(b)(6) J-4 JLOC Personnel (b)(6)
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COL, JCS, J4; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS
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v/r,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
CAPT USN
Executive Assistant
Director, Joint Staff

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA

Sent: Friday, June 17, 2005 2:21 PM

To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS

Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) MAJ,

JCS SJS; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, JCS OCJCS\PA; (b)(6)

(b)(6) MAJ, JCS SJS

Subject: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

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V/R

Katie

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Col, JCS J4
Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 1:46 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: J-4 JLOC Personnel
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Katie,

This is the right place...I'll have the Battle Capt call you. We'll need to connect the dots with DoD Exec Sec.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 12:48 PM
To: (b)(6) Col, JCS J4
Cc: (b)(6) COL, JCS, J4; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

COL (b)(6)

I was given your name as a point of contact for this Airlift Request -- is that accurate? If so, please give me a call. I understand that this group is schedule to visit GTMO Saturday, 25 June...

V/R
Col Katie Haddock, USMC

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 5:57 AM
To: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS SJS; Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, JCS, J4; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS; (b)(6) (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; J-4 JLOC Personnel; Maples, Michael D, MG, JCS VDJS; (b)(6) COL, J4
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

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COL, JCS, J4 ^{(b)(6)} Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
<ellen.haddock@^{(b)(6)} Capt, JCS SJS
^{(b)(6)} ^{(b)(6)} CAPT, JCS SJS
J-4 JLOC Personnel ^{(b)(6)}

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^{(b)(6)}

CAPT ^{(b)(6)} USN
Executive Assistant
Director, Joint Staff

^{(b)(2)}

^{(b)(6)}

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From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2005 2:21 PM
To: ^{(b)(6)} CAPT, JCS SJS ^{(b)(6)}
Cc: ^{(b)(6)} CDR, OCJCS/PA; ^{(b)(6)} LTC, OCJCS/PA; ^{(b)(6)} MAJ,
JCS SJS; ^{(b)(6)} Maj, OCJCS/PA; ^{(b)(6)} LCDR, JCS OCJCS\PA; ^{(b)(6)}
^{(b)(6)} MAJ, JCS SJS
Subject: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

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V/R

Katie

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 3:43 PM
To: (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA
Cc: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, JCS J4; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) J, Col, JCS J4; (b)(6) LtCdr, OASD-PA
Subject: GTMO AIRLIFT REQUEST

(b)(6)

I understand you are the OSD PA POC for the flight request for retired military analysts to go to GTMO. I've talked with the POC at our J4, and understand this to be the process.

- 1) OSD PA submits request through SecDef's ExecSec
- 2) ExecSec approves request, and forwards to J4 (memo, via email)
- 3) J4 gets the approved request and tasks TRANSCOM to execute

Watch Officer in J4 (LTC (b)(2),(b)(6)) would like to provide TRANSCOM a heads up to expect the request, but needs more details, such as:
-- number of PAX
-- flight from where to where
-- departure/return dates & times

Other POCs and phone numbers that may be useful:
J4, Col (b)(2),(b)(6)
OSD PA Outreach: Dallas Lawrence: (b)(2) OSD PA Press Desk: (b)(6)
(b)(2) SouthCom PA: Col (b)(2),(b)(6)

When I spoke with others on this list earlier, I understood Saturday as the possible date; now understand that might change to Sunday. Also understand that this group may or may not be combined with a CODEL on Fri/Sat...

I will be leaving in about an hour to go to my son's graduation, but I'll be back first thing in the morning if you need anything else from me on this.

V/R
Col H

(b)(2)

Tracking:

Recipient	Read
(b)(6)	Read: 6/21/2005 4:06 PM
Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA	Read: 6/21/2005 5:50 PM
(b)(6)	Read: 6/21/2005 4:31 PM
(b)(6)	Read: 6/21/2005 3:57 PM
Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA	Read: 6/21/2005 3:43 PM
(b)(6)	Read: 6/21/2005 6:28 PM
(b)(6)	Read: 6/21/2005 3:53 PM

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, July 08, 2005 2:59 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS
Cc: (b)(6) Col, JCS J4; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6)
CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

(b)(6)

Just got a call from OSD PA action officer, working a return trip to GTMO for the Retired Military Analysts.

Between weather, CODELs, etc., the date jumped around a bit, but they are scheduled to go Tuesday, 12 July.

Unfortunately, the airlift support has not materialized. I understand they've discussed with each of the services, but nothing yet.

The call I got was in hopes of Joint Staff assisting with airlift -- I know Col (b)(6) helped out the last time, and our JLOC team made this happen. Want to make sure the Director is aware of a similar request for support (again).

I'm off to a meeting, and will try to stop by afterwards to discuss in more detail.

V/R

Katie

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To: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4

Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS SJS; Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, JCS, J4; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)

(b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; J-4 JLOC Personnel; Maples, Michael D, MG, JCS VDJS; (b)(6) COL, J4

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COL, JCS, J4 <(b)(6)> Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
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(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6) USN
Executive Assistant
Director, Joint Staff

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

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V/R
Katie

Tracking:

Recipient
(b)(6)

Read

Read: 7/8/2005 3:30 PM
Read: 7/8/2005 3:10 PM
Read: 7/8/2005 3:10 PM
Deleted: 7/11/2005 6:17 PM

Read: 7/8/2005 2:59 PM

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Sunday, July 10, 2005 5:08 PM
To: Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Captain Thorp --
Our JLOC is working this second lift request for Mil Analysts to go to GTMO.
The date bounced around a bit -- as of Friday, the intent was for them to go on Tues, 12 July.
V/R
Katie

-----Original Message-----

From: Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4
Sent: Friday, July 08, 2005 4:35 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; J-4 JLOC Personnel
Cc: (b)(6) Col, JCS J4; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Lt Gen, JCS DJS; (b)(6) Col, JCS J4
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

(b)(6) of course.

JLOC, Pls take turn on this...some prior history below.

thanks, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent: Friday, July 08, 2005 3:36 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4
Cc: (b)(6) Col, JCS J4; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Admiral:

Could the good JLOC team please work this MILAIR lift issue.

v/r,
(b)(6)

CAPT (b)(6) USN
Executive Assistant
Director, Joint Staff

(b)(2)
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, July 08, 2005 2:59 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS

Cc: (b)(6) Col, JCS J4; (b)(6) Capt. USMC,
OASD-PA: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA;
(b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

(b)(6)

Just got a call from OSD PA action officer, working a return trip to GTMO for the Retired Military Analysts.

Between weather, CODELs, etc., the date jumped around a bit, but they are scheduled to go Tuesday, 12 July.

Unfortunately, the airlift support has not materialized. I understand they've discussed with each of the services, but nothing yet.

The call I got was in hopes of Joint Staff assisting with airlift -- I know Col (b)(6) helped out the last time, and our JLOC team made this happen. Want to make sure the Director is aware of a similar request for support (again).

I'm off to a meeting, and will try to stop by afterwards to discuss in more detail.

V/R

Katie

-----Original Message-----

From: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS

Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 5:57 AM

To: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4

Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS SJS; Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4;

(b)(6) COL, JCS, J4; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA; Haddock,

Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS; (b)(6)

(b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; J-4 JLOC Personnel; Maples, Michael D, MG, JCS

VDJS; (b)(6) COL, J4

Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Thanks, Duncan. V/r, Norty.

-----Original Message-----

From: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4

Sent: Sunday, June 19, 2005 10:11 PM

To: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS

Cc: Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, JCS, J4;

Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt, JCS SJS;

(b)(6) CAPT, JCS SJS; J-4 JLOC Personnel; Harnitchek, Mark

D, RDML, JCS J4; (b)(6) COL, J4

Subject: Re: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Norty,

Our folks have been running the traps. We can provide dedicated airlift for public affairs activities such as this per DOD 4515.13-R, Chapter 3.

We coordinated this with our policy experts and OCJCS/LC.

Per OSD Exec Sec yesterday, once OSD/PA and OSD Transportation Policy coordinate and DEPSECDEF approves the travel, exec sec will transmit to JS (J4) for validation and tasking USTRANSCOM. We have already given TRANSCOM a heads up.

We'll finish working it with the OSD folks on Monday and keep you informed on progress.

VR

Duncan

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS <norton.schwartz@^{(b)(6)}>
To: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4 <duncan.mcnabb@^{(b)(6)}>
CC: Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4 <mark.harnitchek@^{(b)(6)}>
COL, JCS, J4 ^{(b)(6)} Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
<ellen.haddock@^{(b)(6)}> Capt, JCS SJS
^{(b)(6)} CAPT, JCS SJS
^{(b)(6)} J-4 JLOC Personnel ^{(b)(6)}
Sent: Sat Jun 18 10:07:51 2005
Subject: RE: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Duncan, please take for action. Could we get this approved for SAAM? Thanks. V/r,
Norty.

-----Original Message-----

From: Rogers, Michael S, CAPT, JCS SJS
Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 8:58 AM
To: Schwartz, Norton A, Lt Gen, JCS DJS
Cc: McNabb, Duncan J, Lt Gen, JCS J4; Harnitchek, Mark D, RDML, JCS J4; ^{(b)(6)}
COL, JCS, J4; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; ^{(b)(6)} Capt, JCS SJS
Subject: FW: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

Sir:

During Thursday's SecDef session with military analysts, he apparently encouraged them to go to Gitmo and see things for themselves. OSD PA is working this with SOUTHCOM but question has arisen as to what we can do with dedicated DoD lift to support getting them in and out of Gitmo. Recommend passing this to the J4 team and letting them work it.

v/r,
^{(b)(6)}

CAPT ^{(b)(6)} USN
Executive Assistant
Director, Joint Staff

^{(b)(2)}

^{(b)(6)}

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2005 2:21 PM
To: Rogers, Michael S, CAPT, JCS SJS
Cc: ^{(b)(6)} CDR, OCJCS/PA; ^{(b)(6)} LTC, OCJCS/PA; ^{(b)(6)} MAJ,
JCS SJS; ^{(b)(6)} Maj, OCJCS/PA; ^{(b)(6)} LCDR, JCS OCJCS\PA; ^{(b)(6)}
^{(b)(6)} MAJ, JCS SJS
Subject: MIL ANALYSTS TO GTMO: AIRLIFT REQUEST

^{(b)(6)}

Perhaps you can help direct me on how to best support this action:

SecDef, J3, and others met with several retired military analysts yesterday. They discussed a number of issues, with great emphasis on GTMO and Detainee Operations. SecDef encouraged them all to go to GTMO and see for themselves. OSD PA is currently working with SOUTHCOM to arrange a visit to GTMO by these military analysts soon -- could be as soon as first week or two in July. I'll get the date from SOUTHCOM once they have firmed up a plan.

OSD PA has taken members of this group on similar trips -- just not to GTMO.

Question/role for Joint Staff involves the air transportation. I believe the intent is to fly them in early and out later on the same day.

What can we do to ensure dedicated airlift is available to support this visit?

Thanks for your help.

V/R

Katie

MEMORANDUM

To: CAPT Frank Thorp
From: Allison Barber
Date: September 26, 2005
Subject: Outreach Meeting with Retired Military Analysts

OSD Public Affairs requests the Joint Staff's participation in an outreach briefing for Retired Military Analysts assembled by the OASD-PA Office of Community Relations and Public Liaison.

The purpose of this meeting is to provide the group with an operational update on Operations in Iraq, DoD's hurricane recovery and relief efforts, and the military commissions process.

We request General Casey address the analysts on Operations in Iraq. The General's participation, consisting of brief remarks and Q&A, is requested for 30 minutes, 9:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., on Wednesday, September 28, 2005, in room 3E928.

Hon. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense will be invited to provide an update on recovery and relief efforts from 10:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. We request someone from the Joint Staff address the analysts on the military's role in coordinating with Homeland Defense alongside Mr. McHale.

Brigadier General Thomas Hemingway, Legal Advisor to the Appointing Authority, Office of Military Commissions, will be invited to address the analysts with an update on the military commission process from 10:30 to 11:00. Deputy Assistant Secretary Allison Barber will conduct the meeting.

The list of invited Military Analysts is attached.

Should you or your staff have any questions, please contact (b)(6) Community Relations and Public Liaison at (b)(2)

Attachment:
As stated

RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS

(As of July 20, 2005)

Colonel Ken Allard (USA, Retired)
Mr. Jed Babbin (AF, Former JAG)
Admiral Dennis C. Blair (USN, Retired)
Commander Peter Brookes (USN, Reserve)
Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Cowan (USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Cucullu (USA, Retired)
Major Dana R. Dillon (USA, Retired)
General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Tim J. Eads (USA, Retired)
Dr. David M. Finkelstein (LTC, USA, Retired)
General Ronald Fogleman (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona (USAF, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant General Buster Glosson (USAF, Retired)
Brigadier General David L. Grange (USA, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)
Colonel Jack Jacobs (USA, Retired)
Admiral David E. Jeremiah (USN, Retired)
General George Joulwan (USA, Retired)
General William F. "Buck" Kernan (USA, Retired)
Colonel Glenn Lackey (USA, Retired)
Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez (USN, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Dr. Jeff McCausland (Colonel, USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Major Andy Messing Jr. (USAR, Retired)
General Thomas S. Moorman, Jr. (USAF, Retired)
Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired)

General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)
General Glenn K. Otis (USA, Retired)
General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant General Erv Rokke (USAF, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
General H. Hugh Shelton (USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Carlton Sherwood (USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steve Short (USA, Retired)
Mr. Wayne Simmons (USN, Retired)
Major General Perry Smith (USAF, Retired)
Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Retired)
Captain Robert R. Timberg (USMC, Retired)
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor (USMC, Retired)
Major General Paul E. Vallely (USA, Retired)
Colonel John Warden (USAF, Retired)
General Larry D. Welch (USAF, Retired)
General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2005 10:25 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: WHAT THEY'RE SAYING: Military Analysts Back From Iraq

What They're Saying ...

Military Analysts Back From Iraq

Recently, a group of military analysts for various media outlets traveled to Iraq to gain a first-hand assessment of ongoing operations. Below is a synopsis of their reports from the past week:

Major General Don Shepperd: "And I Think You Are - I'm Encouraged And Optimistic For The First Time In A Long, Long Time That The Iraqis Are Going To Pull Off - They're Going To Pull Off The Election. They Are Going To Get Their Forces Trained, And That Is Going Very Well." (CNN's "Daybreak," 10/11/05)

Major General Robert Scales: "But I Think The Greatest Hope Is Iraq, Iraq Units, The Regular Army, Building Them Up Very Quickly So That They Can Take Over The Fighting And Increase The Probability Of Coming Out Of This OK." Hume: "And You Think It's Happening?" Scales: "It's Happening." (Fox News' "Special Report With Brit Hume," 10/11/05)

Captain Chuck Nash: "Because There Are So Many Iraqi Troops, There Are About 140,000 Iraqi Troops And Those Aren't Guys Just Wearing Uniforms; They Are Fully Combat Trained, Ready To Go Troops And That's The Other Thing That's Changed Since January. It's Not A U.S. Face On This. It's An Iraqi Face And They Are Competent Troops." (FOX News' "Fox & Friends," 10/11/05)

Lt. Colonel Robert Maginnis Talks To Soldiers In The Middle East Who Are Optimistic And Support The Mission. "After a dinner last night with Army soldiers, Mr. Maginnis reports to us: 'The soldiers expressed frustration with the fact that most of the U.S. news coverage about Iraq is bad, which contradicts their firsthand view.'" (Bill Gertz And Rowan Scarborough, "Inside The Ring," The Washington Times, 10/11/05)

Iraq's Referendum:

Nash Says The Iraqis Are Running The Constitutional Referendum, Intend To Vote, And Are Providing Security. nash: "As a matter of fact, the Iraqis are out front on this. This has been the long - there's so much difference between now and the vote, the election back in

January. The biggest difference in this is number one, the Iraqi population is leaning very far forward to vote. Over 88 percent of the people in Iraq are registered to vote and intend to. There are some areas where as many as 98 percent of the people are registered to vote and the security, the plan itself for the security is an Iraqi plan. The U.S. folks when they got it, were ready to make whatever changes were necessary and they looked at it and they went wow, this is a great plan, so the Iraqis are providing the forces. The Iraqis are providing all of the security planning and our forces are there strictly as response units to help out should the Iraqis get in trouble, but the Iraqis are running this thing." (FOX News' "Fox & Friends," 10/11/05)

Shepperd Says That Iraqis See The Referendum As "A Victory Either Way" Because The Sunnis Are Participating. SHEPPERD: "Now, a couple of things about the election. Again, the people I've talked to say they believe the Sunnis are going to turn out despite the violence. ... They think that even if the referendum is voted down that it will be a positive, because the Sunnis have joined the process for the first time. And they get can them a modified constitution. So, they see it as perhaps a victory either way, although it certainly will be something less than what we hoped for." (CNN's "Daybreak," 10/11/05)

Iraqi Security Forces:

Scales: "From My Visit I Concluded That The Greatest Change In The Military Balance ... Since Last Summer Has Been Achieved By The Iraqis Security Forces." (Robert H. Scales, Op-Ed, "The Emerging Iraqi Army," The Washington Times, 10/14/05)

Shepperd On Iraqi Security Forces: "These Guys Are Good." SHEPPERD: "But I think this is what's going to happen: We've got impressions that the Iraqi forces are not good. The training is not going well. From everyone that we talked to, nothing could be further from the truth. These guys are good. They're coming up to speed very, very quickly." (CNN's "Daybreak," 10/11/05)

Shepperd "Impressed" By Iraqi Troops. SHEPPERD: "But they can do the key things. They can do intelligence. They can do raids. And they can do presence. And they are being - areas are being turned over to them. For instance, about 20 percent of the city of Baghdad has now been turned over to the Iraqi forces. I was very, very impressed with what I saw, and I think things will get better as they get better and as they start taking over some of our duties, and we gradually begin to withdraw." (CNN's "Daybreak," 10/11/05)

Shepperd Says Iraqi Forces Are Beginning To Take Charge Of Securing Parts Of Iraq. SHEPPERD: "The Iraqi forces are ready to protect the polling places. They're ready. They're starting to get ready in various areas. For instance, 20 percent of the territory of Baghdad has already been turned over to Iraqi forces. You're starting to see that spread slowly as they come up to speed. When they come up to speed, they are matched with U.S. forces, and then they are given their own territory. All of that appears to me to be working. It's slow, tough work, and we'll be there for a while helping them." (CNN's "Live From," 10/11/05)

After Visiting Ninth Iraqi Mechanized Division, Scales Concludes "And, Frankly, What I Saw Was Very Encouraging." (Fox News' "Special Report With Brit Hume," 10/11/05)

* Scales Praises The Iraqi Commanders Of Iraqi Security Forces. "We visited the Iraqi 9th Mechanized Division located in Taji a few miles north of Baghdad in one of the hottest and most contested regions of Iraq. The unit was activated last October and has yet to form completely. It is commanded by Gen. Bashar, a thirty-year veteran and, like many patriotic, innovative and self-reliant officers, a victim of Saddam Hussein's brutality. The general created the division by calling up many of his old regular-army comrades. Three quarters are veterans who have been recruited from every province and ethnicity in Iraq. The division's motto is, appropriately, 'Iraq first.' Gen. Bashar built his division from a junkyard. In less than a year his soldiers picked through acres of destroyed Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers to patch together a fleet of over 200 operational fighting vehicles." (Robert H. Scales, Op-Ed, "The Emerging Iraqi Army," The Washington Times, 10/14/05)

* Scales Recounts Division's Success In Taking The Fight To The Terrorists. "I met Colonel Mohammed, division operations officer, an intensely proud and nationalistic officer. He made clear to me that the division's eventual goal was to defend Iraq against the insurgents without American help. But he attributed the division's rapid progress to a remarkably small cadre of American soldiers who provided training, logistical and communications support. This is a unit that fights as it forms. They have killed or captured over fifty terrorists and removed over sixty roadside bombs from the major highway that travels through its area of operations." (Robert H. Scales, Op-Ed, "The Emerging Iraqi Army," The Washington Times, 10/14/05)

Shepperd: "These Are No Amateurs Here. They're Very Tough." (CNN's "Live From," 10/11/05)

Nash Says Iraqi Troops Are Supported By The Iraqi People. nash: "They're out there and the Iraqi people are turning to them - responses to surveys, 89 percent of the Iraqi population has support and trust the Iraqi troops and they're telling them where the bad guys are and we are rolling up that network. That's a real take away. The real take away is that terrorist thing is crumbling over there." (FOX News' "Fox & Friends," 10/11/05)

Scales Notes That Iraqis Are Providing Security And Have The Capabilities To Take On The Insurgents. SCALES: "I'll give you one example. Remember about eight months ago, Bill Cowan was in here talking about the BIAP road, you know, the airport road?" HUME: "Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, the alley of death." SCALES: "Right. I drove the BIAP road, five miles along that road. And it's clear of the enemy. It's full of commerce. And who's protecting it? The Iraqi sixth infantry division. And in many ways, they're better than we are, in the sense that they're better able to gather intelligence. I mean, they can spot insurgents by their body language and by how they act and the language they use. They can spot foreigners far better than our soldiers can. And they're better able to engage these terrorists when they find them oftentimes than our own soldiers are. You know, being part of the culture really means a lot when you're fighting an insurgency." (Fox News' "Special Report With Brit Hume," 10/11/05)

* Scales: "[Iraqi Security Forces] Are Often Very Successful At Finding Terrorists And Roadside Bombs Because Of Their Intimate Familiarity With The Countryside And Local Tribal Leaders." (Robert H. Scales, Op-Ed, "The Emerging Iraqi Army," The Washington Times, 10/14/05)

Shepperd: "But Remember, We Have Built Over Time These Insurgents As 10 Feet Tall. They Are Not 10 Feet Tall. They're Able To Do Small Attacks With IEDs, But You Notice They Have Not Taken Over Police Stations Or Done Any Large Movements Actions In The Last Several Months." (CNN's "Live From," 10/11/05)

Scales: "I Only Hope The American People Will Give Our Soldiers The Time They Need To Mature This Army. Give Them Time, Trust Them, And This War Will Turn Out OK." (Robert H.

Scales, Op-Ed, "The Emerging Iraqi Army," The Washington Times, 10/14/05)

Shepperd: "I Think You'll Start Seeing The Insurrection Or The Insurgency Take Some Hits Next Year And Start To Peter Out. But It Won't Be Until Next Year - Carol." (CNN's "Daybreak," 10/11/05)

U.S. Troops In The Middle East:

Scales Says The Capabilities Of American Forces In Iraq Are Only Increasing. SCALES: "That's a great question. The American commitment is steady. We're not going to see an increase in American forces. And their capability is increasing, thanks to infusions of technology and the combat experience..." HUME: "American forces?" SCALES: "American forces. And the infusion of new units coming over, combat-experienced units. The insurgency is on a steady downward trend, mainly because U.S. forces and Iraqi forces have been successful in cleaning out the ratlines..." (Fox News' "Special Report With Brit Hume," 10/11/05)

Shepperd: "The U.S. Forces, They're Under Attack By IEDs. But There's Very Little Direct Action Against U.S. Forces Anymore. Every Time Insurgents Attack The U.S. Forces, They Really Get Hammered. And So The Level Of Violence Against U.S. Forces Has Gone Down, Except For The IEDs." (CNN's "Live From," 10/11/05)

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(b)(6)

From:
Sent:
To:

(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Tuesday, October 18, 2005 6:14 PM

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col. OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(6) Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-
(b)(6)

(b)(6) Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT,
(b)(6)

(b)(6) Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA;
(b)(6)


Subject: Military Analysts in Iraq

Attachments: Final Military Analyst wrap-up - Iraq Referendum 10.18.05.doc



Final Military Analyst wrap-up...

This report takes a look at overall coverage numbers and weekend commentary (October 15-16) by military analysts who recently visited Iraq. As a control group, we have also provided some insight into commentary (or lack there of) of those military analysts who did not travel to Iraq right before the referendum.



Military Analyst Media Coverage Wrap-Up

Weekend Commentary-Iraq Referendum

October 18, 2005

This report takes a look at overall coverage numbers and weekend commentary (October 15-16) by military analysts who recently visited Iraq. As a control group, we have also provided some insight into commentary (or lack there of) of those military analysts who did not travel to Iraq right before the referendum.

Total Coverage (Oct. 11-16)				
<i>Analyst</i>	<i>Television</i>	<i>Radio</i>	<i>Print</i>	<i>Online</i>
Montgomery Meigs	1	0	0	0
Robert Scales	3	0	0	0
Don Shepperd	8	2	0	0
Chuck Nash	1	0	0	0
John Garrett	0	0	0	0
Robert Maginnis	1	0	1	0
Weekend Coverage (Oct. 15-16)				
Montgomery Meigs	1	0	0	0
Robert Scales	1	0	0	0
Don Shepperd	6	0	0	0
Chuck Nash	0	0	0	0
John Garrett	0	0	0	0
Robert Maginnis	0	0	0	0

HIGHLIGHTS

Bob Scales:

- The insurgency is on “a slow downward decline,” because the Americans and the Iraqis are working together.
- Feels optimistic that the Iraqi troops are up to speed “in terms of the intangibles” - willingness to fight for a cause, courage, cohesion, and “the bottom line is yes - these guys want to fight.”

Montgomery Meigs:

- Things were better than he thought they'd be in Iraq.
- They have secured "roughly 100 people connected to Zarqawi's networks...in the last 10 months...that's amazing."
- U.S. troops will be in Iraq through the first government term, through the next four years, but with significantly less troops. As Iraqi forces get better and stronger, U.S. troops will be drawing down.
- A positive sign is that lots of Iraqi troops, instead of U.S. forces, are leading battles in certain areas, including recently in the successful Tal Afar situation.

Donald Shepperd:

- Very difficult (for the Iraqi people) to elect a competent government that is not corrupt and gaining confidence of the people will take time
- Iraqi forces just need to be better than the insurgents; not as good as U.S. soldiers (in response to "readiness numbers").
- The Iraqi security forces, both the police and the military are getting better and more capable and this is their second election. They learned from the last one.
- I see a rapid acceleration of the training and the capabilities of Iraqi forces over there. The ones I visited were really good and very motivated.
- We must not set a date on troop withdrawal.

Other Military Analyst Coverage

As a means of comparing the analysis provided by the six persons who recently traveled to Iraq, we also looked for commentary by six other retired military personnel who regularly appear on television, in print, or on line. We chose Ken Allard, Jed Babbin, Bill Cowan, Gordon Cucullu, Barry McCaffrey, and Wayne Simmons. We found a combined total of one item among the six. This was a short excerpt in a piece Jed Babbin wrote on Sunday about Washington, DC, politics (see below).

Excerpt from *The American Spectator* online (posted today but written 10/15)

The unrestrained glee among the Sunday morning liberal talking heads at the Miers-driven internecine war among conservatives was equaled only by their celebration of the possible (and possibly imminent) indictments of White House staffers in the Plame leak investigation. Those political currents swept away the topic of the Iraqi constitutional referendum, which seems to have been an unqualified success. **At this writing -- Sunday afternoon** -- we don't know the result. Regardless of whether the constitution was ratified, about 60 percent of Iraq's eligible voters -- roughly 9 million people -- braved the insurgents' threats and voted. Even in the Sunni provinces, the turnout was reportedly that high or higher. No matter how the vote turns out, this is an overwhelming victory over the terrorists, whose murder campaign failed to keep the Sunnis out of the political process. This vote doesn't preclude failure of democracy in Iraq, but it makes it much less likely. The Sunnis -- and the other Iraqi ethnic groups -- will long remember this vote as a

milestone on their path to freedom and self-government. Their memory is bound to last longer than that of Judith Miller.

Note: General Tommy Franks appeared on Fox News on Sunday morning, in part to talk about the newly issued paperback edition of his book. In response to questions about the elections, he provided supportive answers, such as; it shows “the strategy is working.” Additionally, Rick Francona was later discovered to have multiple television clips on MSNBC. Generally, his commentary was about the referendum process and the insurgency. Unlike the traveling military analysts, he had much less focus on troop levels and Iraqi troop readiness.

Weekend Television Coverage

(Link to Actual Coverage on Fox, CNN and MSNBC)

Robert Scales:

Fox News -- On the Record With Greta Van Susteren

10/15/05 03:57:05

Donald Shepperd:

CNN -- Live Saturday

10/15/05 16:20:53

CNN -- Live Saturday

10/15/05 12:08:31

CNN -- Saturday Morning

10/15/05 07:48:53

CNN -- Dolans Unscripted

10/15/05 10:18:43

CNN -- Live Saturday

10/15/05 18:37:57

CNN -- Dolans Unscripted

10/15/05 10:07:59

Montgomery Meigs:

MSNBC -- Hardball

10/15/05 03:57:04

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2005 12:06 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA; Thorp, Frank, CAPT, OCJCS/PA
Cc: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) TSgt, JCS, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: Fact Sheet - 1268 Report to Congress on Measuring the Security & Stability in Iraq
Attachments: Fact Sheet October Report.doc



Fact Sheet October
Report.doc ...

Sirs... here's the fact sheet for the 1268 Report to Congress on Measuring the Security & Stability in Iraq from the DRSO office.

If you read this fact sheet, as well as the draft TPs that were generated earlier in the process, it quickly becomes apparent that the information is just too old to continue talking about it. It was old data the day it was published... and that will continue to be the problem for future reports if the 'process' doesn't allow for it to be published more quickly.

I propose we make the deliberate decision to discontinue executing the remaining proposed pieces of a PA plan (which are civic groups, J-SCOPE, and all-hands calls). This will probably be discussed at the next Steering Group Meeting next week.

While execution on this report was poor, I believe we have enough lead time and lessons learned from the last two that I can prepare a more aggressive plan for the next report that will be issued in January. This will be published every 90 days.

I also believe in the midst of all the activities going on right now (referendum, elections, Saddam trial, NMSP-WOT, NSSI, etc.) that this information will get lost in the fray, especially since we're already well out of the cycle for when it was released and the data, even when published on 12 Oct, was already old compared to what's being written about and discussed today.

With your approval, I will incorporate the following elements into the draft plan for the next report (Jan '06):

- J-SCOPE article (written by J-5 or use the AFIS article that's usually written from the press conference)
- All-hands calls (CONCERN: unless the CJCS does it AND it's mandatory, who will really be interested? We can't force-feed the Joint Staff, but I would hate to have Lt Gen Renuart (or other designated rep) stand up in front of an empty conf room/auditorium.)
- Talking Points/fact sheet (produced by DRSO) for a senior leader 'module' of information for speeches/public engagements/civic groups, etc.
- Press Conference
- Military analyst call
- Select military interviews
- Post report to Defense Link (Current report is posted)

Please let me know what you think.

vr, (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) LtCol, JCS J5
>Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2005 3:55 PM
>To: (b)(6) MAJ, JCS J5; (b)(6) MAJ, JCS J2; (b)(6) LtCol, JCS J5; (b)(6) MAJ, JCS J5; (b)(6) LTC, JCS NMCC; (b)(6) (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, JCS, NMCC

>Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, JS J5
>Subject: FW: Fact Sheet

>
>L&G
>HR 1268 fact sheet as promised
>VR

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Lt Col, USAF

>Joint Staff, J-5 Policy Division

>Information Operations Policy Branch Chief Pentagon Rm (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

>
>-----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) MAJ, WSO-DRSO
>Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2005 2:19 PM
>To: (b)(6) LtCol, JCS J5
>Subject: Fact Sheet

>
>Sir,

>
>Here is the fact sheet as formatted per guidance from OSD PA and/or LA. The facts are updated but the rest of the information (e.g. "Announcements or activities...") I'm not sure about (Jonathan was working with PA/LA on this).

>
>
>
>Respectfully,

>
>MAJ (b)(6)

>Metrics Coordinator

>Defense Reconstruction Support Office, OSD Pentagon, Room (b)(2)

(b)(2),(b)(6)

>
>"You can't manage what you can't measure."
>

Fact Sheet
OSD – Defense Reconstruction Support Office
Washington, DC
October 13, 2005

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq – 1268 Report to Congress

This is the second in a series of reports to Congress measuring stability and security in Iraq. The first report was delivered on July 22, 2005. The report provides baseline measurements and indicators of Iraq's political climate, security environment activity and security force training and performance.

Following is a listing of initiatives and activities that have occurred since the last report in July:

Political Stability

- The national referendum will be held on October 15th; reports indicated one million new voters registered
- Iraqis overwhelming intend to vote on October 15th, representing another major democratic and political milestone
- A private media is thriving and growing in Iraq; 44 commercial television stations, 72 commercial radio stations and more than 100 private newspapers are operating in Iraq
- Other countries have committed an additional \$235 million to rebuild Iraq
- NATO has partnered with Iraq and is training and developing a new staff college for Iraq's military

Economic Stability

- Iraq has normalized relations with the International Monetary Fund received \$436 million in emergency loans
- World Bank projects 3.7% growth for 2005
- Despite terrorist attacks, Iraq continues to produce 2.16 million barrels per day (bbl/d) and export 1.4 million bbl/d; key oil infrastructure repairs are underway
- The U.S. Government is training new infrastructure security battalions and creating a "train-the-trainer" program
- Thirty years of neglect and corruption in the electricity sector have severely limited Iraq's ability to improve electricity output
- Communications sector expansion fueled by broad-based and strong cell phone sales and use

Security Environment

- The Iraqi Army is in the lead for planning and executing counterinsurgency operations in one Iraqi province that is roughly the size of New Jersey. The ISF also have the lead for 87 square miles in Baghdad and over 450 square miles of battle space in the other Iraqi provinces

- Intimidation and brutal violence remains the terrorists and insurgency's weapons of choice, and will remain so for the foreseeable future
- Coalition commanders and local leaders continue to disrupt insurgent cells
- Significant numbers of Sunnis remain concerned about security, but intend to vote in the upcoming referendum
- Insurgents want sectarian violence and are promoting violence against innocent Iraq civilians
- Four provinces account for 85% of all attacks
- Fifty percent of the population is exposed to only 6% of the attacks

Security Forces Training and Performance

- We have 36 battalions taking the lead – capable of planning and executing missions with little or no support from Coalition forces. And this includes one battalion completely capable of operating independently of Coalition backstopping. This is a 50% increase in the number of ISF capable of taking the lead in combat operations.
- 116 ground combat battalions conducting operations – 22 additional battalions since July
- Over 192,000 Iraqi Security Forces trained and equipped – a 12% increase since July
- The total force structure projection has increased by 28,000, and is expected to be completed by August 2007
- Since January 2004 the Ministry of Defense has fielded 88 Iraqi Army battalions including 2 special operations battalions
- Iraq units being fully integrated into all major Coalition operations
- Since July the Ministry of Defense forces received approximately 10,000 AK-47s, 1,800 pistols, 2,700 machine guns and 750 vehicles
- Eleven Iraqi combat battalions were independently employed in Tal Afar; this is twice the number during Fallujah operations
- The new logistics system is now being built
- Special Operations units are undertaking reconnaissance and direct action missions
- Since July, Strategic Infrastructure Battalions have been integrated into Ministry of Defense plans and will complete Multi-National Security Training Corp - Iraq (MNSTC-I) training in October
- NATO has trained 24 Iraqi senior officers – colonels and lieutenant colonels; two additional course curricula have been planned
- Since July, Ministry of Interior forces received approximately 21,000 AK-47s, 15,000 pistols, 1,700 machine guns and 1,900 vehicles
- 5,500 additional Iraqi Police Service personnel have been trained and equipped since July

- 2,000 additional Special Police Commandos have been trained and equipped since July; this program is well ahead of schedule
- The Mechanized Police reached its target force level during this reporting period
- 1,200 additional Public Order Police have been trained and equipped since July; full force levels are expected by the October referendum
- Since July, the Emergency Response Unit has conducted nightly operations in Mosul and Baghdad; its forces have increased by 50% since July

Announcements or activities by President Bush and Department of Defense Officials related to this report

President Bush:

- Rose Garden press conference
- Oval Office briefing from LTG David Petraeus

Secretary Rumsfeld:

- Congressional appearance with Gen. Casey, Gen. Myers, and Gen. Abizaid
- Press conference with Gen. Casey
- Press briefing by LTG David Petraeus
- Briefing to AEI by LTG David Petraeus

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, December 20, 2005 6:03 PM
To: 'Tobias, Ed'
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV JCS SJS
Subject: RE: Travel with CJCS

(b)(6)

Thanks for the email -- I'll answer what I can, and look into the rest. The focus of the trip is troop visits, so I believe you will have plenty of access to the troops for interviews. We will help facilitate whatever you need. I'll need to get some clarification from the entertainers to see what their guidelines are with regard to granting interviews and or recording their performances. The entertainers who are confirmed for the trip are:
--Reggie McFadden -- Comedian
--Diana DeGarmo -- pop vocalist (runner up in American Idol) --Michael Peterson -- country-western singer --(Retired Colonel) Jack Jacobs -- Vietnam-era Medal of Honor recipient (and more recently, military analyst for MSNBC)

We might have a NASCAR driver, but won't know for certain until tomorrow. Hope that is useful; I'll try to get more details to you soon.
Best Wishes,
Katie

-----Original Message-----

From: Tobias, Ed [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, December 20, 2005 4:58 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: Travel with CJCS

Col. Haddock -

Thanks for the seat offer. I have a couple of questions which I'm e-mailing, in case I don't reach you on the phone this evening.

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Thanks for the help. I'll be back in touch tomorrow with a travel decision.

Ed

Ed Tobias
Associated Press
Asst. Managing Editor, Broadcast
1825 K St. N.W., Suite 800
Washington DC 20006
(b)(6) - Office
(b)(6) - Fax
<http://www.ap.org> <BLOCKED:<http://www.ap.org/>>

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA [mailto:ellen.haddock@
Sent: Tuesday, December 20, 2005 1:10 PM
To: Tobias, Ed
Cc: (b)(6), LTC, OCJCS/PA
Subject: Travel with CJCS

Mr. Tobias,

Tried to reach you via phone, but unsuccessful.
Please give me a call at your convenience to discuss possible travel with the
Chairman during next week's troop visit.
Thanks in advance,
Katie

Colonel Katie Haddock, USMC
Special Assistant for Public Affairs to the Chairman
(b)(2)

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If you have received this communication in error, please notify The Associated Press
immediately by telephone at +1-212-621-1898 and delete this email. Thank you.

(b)(6)

From: Tobias, Ed (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:22 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV JCS SJS; Meyer, Lisa
Subject: RE: Travel with CJCS

Katie -

We'd like to take you up on your offer and have Lisa Meyer accompany the CJCS on this trip. We won't be able to spring a videographer, though, so only one seat is necessary.

You should feel free to work logistics directly with Lisa, but would appreciate being kept in the info loop.

Thanks,

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From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:31 AM
To: 'Tobias, Ed'
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV JCS SJS
Subject: RE: Travel with CJCS

Great news!
Looking forward to working with Lisa, and with you.
All the best for the holidays,
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Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:22 AM
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[mailto:ellen.haddock@^{(b)(6)}]
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From: (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2005 10:43 AM
To: 'Tobias, Ed'
Cc: (b)(6) CIV JCS SJS; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: Travel with CJCS

Ed,
We will need the below information on Lisa to ensure we can add her to the trip.

Passport # /date issued/location
Social Security #
DOB/location

Thanks.

(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, December 23, 2005 1:48 PM
To: (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA
Subject: Fw: your mail

-----Original Message-----

From: Merritt, Roxie T. (b)(6) [Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA]
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Fri Dec 23 13:08:05 2005
Subject: FW: your mail

Katie,

I can't find Diane on the global. Could you forward this email to her. Follow-up to the Conway analyst call this am.

Roxie T. Merritt
Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, DoD Press Operations
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pentagon, Room 23565
Washington, DC 20301-1400

(b)(2)

cell (b)(2)

(b)(6)

"Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of All Who Threaten It"

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, December 23, 2005 12:27 PM
To: Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: Fw: your mail

hi roxie, could you pass this along to someone in jcs who can get it to conway??
thanks!

(b)(6)

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: robertmag73 (b)(6)
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Fri Dec 23 11:39:12 2005
Subject: Re: your mail

(b)(6)

I'm on notice for the Newshour for this evening. I'd like metrics that indicate downsizing at this time makes sense. Specifically, numbers of attacks, turn over battlespace to ISF etc.

Can you help?

Bob

--
Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

http://home.comcast.net/(b)(6)

----- Original message -----
From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA" (b)(6)

<<...OLE_Obj...>>

MEMORANDUM

To: Retired Military Analysts

From: Dallas Lawrence
Director, Community Relations and Public Liaison
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Date: December 21, 2005

Re: Conference Call with Senior DoD Officials

We invite you to participate in a conference call, Friday, December 23, 2005 from 9:30-10:00 a.m.

Lieutenant General James T. Conway would like to brief you regarding troop adjustments in Iraq. In order to participate in this call, you must agree to EMBARGO the information you receive on the call until NOON, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23, 2005. The call will be on background, so you are free to quote a senior DoD official once the embargo is lifted.

To participate in this conference call, please dial (b)(2) or (b)(2) and to be connected to the Analysts conference call.

Please R.S.V.P. to (b)(6) at (b)(6) or call her at (b)(2)

We hope you are able to participate.

(b)(6)

OSD Public Affairs
Community Relations and Public Liaison
(b)(2) The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
(b)(2)

www.AmericaSupportsYou.mil

(b)(6)

From:
Sent:
To:

(b)(6)

Wednesday, January 11, 2006 5:02 PM

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Haddock, Ellen (Katie),
Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Lawrence, Dallas (b)(6) [Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PAI]; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) OASD-PAI: Merrit,
Roxie T. (b)(6) [Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PAI]; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

To:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Rhynedance, George, Colonel; (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject:

Media Coverage of the Body Armor Issue

Attachments:

Body Armor 1.9.06.doc




Body Armor
.9.06.doc (213 KB).

<<Body Armor 1.9.06.doc>>

Note: For those of you interested in what retired military personnel now serving as TV analysts have to say, several have commented on the issue.

P A R A



Public Affairs Research and Analysis

MEDIA COVERAGE: BODY ARMOR STUDY

January 11, 2006

SUMMARY POINTS

- “Secret” Pentagon study call deaths preventable—“Either a larger plate or superior protection around the plate would have had the potential to alter the final outcome,” the study concluded.
- Vulnerability of the military's body armor has been known since the start of the war—data collected since 2003
- Pentagon continues to have armor problems ranging from shortfalls in bulletproof vests to heavily armored Humvees and trucks
- Pentagon working to adapt and improve solidier protection but need to consider safety from extra armor against the loss of combat effectiveness from too much armor
- Soldiers question the use of more armor—complain that it is already difficult for them to move
- Politicians criticize the Pentagon—Senator Clinton requests an inquiry into the issue.

Print/Online Summary

Media coverage of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner's body armor study has followed the lead of New York Times reporter, Michael Moss, who first broke the news on January 7. The coverage centered on the studies finding that additional armor would have prevented close to 80% of the deaths caused by wounds to the upper body.

The media provided a relatively descriptive explanation of the study's findings, but shifted to a more critical perspective in its presentation of the Pentagon's efforts to provide armor to its troops. After the initial reporting, coverage expanded to include skepticism voiced by soldiers regarding the benefit of added armor to combat effectiveness and criticism of the Pentagon from politicians.

Widely quoted Pentagon comments:

- “As the information became more prevalent and aware to everybody that in fact these were casualty sites that they needed to be worried about, then people were much more willing to accept that weight on their body”—Maj. Wendell Leimbach, Marine Corps Systems Command
- “In response to the changing battlefield conditions and as new technologies emerge, the Army continues to develop improvements to soldier protection

equipment to enhance survivability and mobility. We take operational security very seriously and will not discuss in public sensitive issues that may render any insight to the enemy about our capabilities, fielding plans, or tactics, techniques and procedures”—Army spokesman Paul Boyce

Television Summary

Television broadcasts also referenced the New York Times as the media outlet to “break the body armor” story, however, it is Good Morning America’s daily segments keeping the issue alive. It has included interviews with Senator Clinton, the manufactures of body armor and official U.S. Army statements about the distribution of armor overseas. Additionally, many military analysts such as Wesley Clark, Bill Cowan and Bob McGinnis have also provided their perspectives. Coverage was on all major national networks and local markets (ABC, NBC and CBS).

Military Analyst Quotes:

- The reality is we're fighting a real war. Unfortunately, if you burden soldiers down with every piece of protective Armor that we would like to, they wouldn't be able to move. (McGinnis)
- We've been worried about this for a long time this, is historic under investment in the protection of individual soldiers and marines. It's been going on 25 years, since Vietnam. (Clark)
- On this particular issue, I believe the military continues to do the absolute best that they can for the troops out there... (Cowan)

PRINT/ONLINE EXCERPTS

Clinton: Vests not protecting troops in Iraq – January 10

(Newsday) by Glenn Thrush

Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton claims that hundreds of U.S. soldiers may have died "needlessly" in Iraq because of inadequate body armor and wants the Senate Armed Services Committee to hold hearings into the safety of the standard armored vests issued to troops.

Sen. Clinton seeks inquiry into body armor study – January 9

(Newsday/AP)

Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton urged Congress Monday to re-examine the Pentagon's standards for soldiers' body armor in Iraq, after a new study found most fatal torso wounds to Marines would have been prevented or minimized with more protection. "With U.S. troops risking their lives daily in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, we owe it to them to make sure they have the best equipment possible," Clinton wrote to committee chairman John Warner.

Body-Armor Gaps Are Shown to Endanger Troops – January 7

(Washington Post) Ann Scott Tyson

The Marine Corps and Army are working to upgrade body armor to prevent fatalities caused by torso wounds from gunshots and explosions, after classified Pentagon forensic studies highlighted how gaps in current armor are leaving troops vulnerable.

U.S. troops in Iraq often complain that insurgents -- especially snipers -- have demonstrated they know how to exploit the gaps in the current armor. For example, enemy snipers have killed U.S. forces with single shots to the neck or upper torso.

Pentagon Study Links Fatalities To Body Armor – January 7 (widely reprinted)

(New York Times) by Michael Moss

A secret Pentagon study has found that as many as 80 percent of the marines who have been killed in Iraq from wounds to the upper body could have survived if they had had extra body armor. Such armor has been available since 2003, but until recently the Pentagon has largely declined to supply it to troops despite calls from the field for additional protection, according to military officials.

Military officials and contractors said the Pentagon's procurement troubles had stemmed in part from miscalculations that underestimated the strength of the insurgency, and from years of cost-cutting that left some armoring companies on the brink of collapse as they waited for new orders.

Armor Faulted in Some U.S. Deaths – January 7

(Los Angeles Times/AP)

An unreleased Pentagon study of fatal torso wounds to Marines in Iraq found that most might have been prevented or minimized if the troops had been wearing improved body armor.

The findings underscore the difficulty facing the Army and Marine Corps in providing the optimum level of body armor protection. The Army and the Marine Corps have weighed the benefits of additional safety from extra armor against the loss of combat effectiveness from too much armor.

U.S. Soldiers Question Use of More Armor - January 7

(Houston Chronicle/AP) by Ryan Lenz

BEIJ, Iraq — U.S. soldiers in the field were not all supportive of a Pentagon study that found improved body armor saves lives, with some troops arguing Saturday that more armor would hinder combat effectiveness.

But many soldiers say they feel encumbered by the weight and restricted by fabric that does not move as they do. They frequently joke as they strap on their equipment before a patrol and express relief when they return and peel it off.

Both the Army and the Marines have weighed the expected payoff in additional safety from extra armor against the measurable loss of combat effectiveness from too much armor...Others questioned the effectiveness of additional body armor.

Mass. pols blast Bush for skimpy GI armor – January 8

(Boston Globe) by Laura Crimaldi

Bay State congressional leaders yesterday blasted the Bush administration over a new Pentagon study that revealed as many as 80 percent of Marines killed in Iraq from torso wounds could have survived if they had better body armor.

“That fatalities that have occurred could have been prevented is unforgivable. The first basic responsibility that we have to those people that put on that uniform is to give them the tools that they need to do the job and come home safely,” said U.S. Rep. Stephen F. Lynch (D-9th), who is leaving for a fourth trip to Iraq in a few weeks.

“It is outrageous that this mistake was identified at the outset of the war, but armored vests were not ordered until this September. Our troops deserve more than speeches about ‘staying the course.’ They deserve a plan for victory in Iraq and the latest military technology. President Bush has denied them both,” U.S. Rep. Edward Markey (D-7th) said in a statement.

Pentagon study faults US body armor in Iraq deaths – January 7

(Reuters) by Will Dunham

Better body armor could have prevented or limited about 80 percent of fatal torso wounds suffered by Marines killed in Iraq, a report by U.S. military medical experts obtained on Friday said.

Christopher Kelly, spokesman for the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, said the office that conducted the study performs full autopsies on all troops killed in Iraq and Afghanistan and that the evaluation of body armor “is one of many issues we address with these investigations.”

“Information regarding the effectiveness of body armor has been shared with those who design and field personal protective gear,” Kelly said.

Senator Bayh visits Indiana troops – January 7

(WTHR, IN) Roger Harvey/Eyewitness News

A Pentagon study shows the US needs to do more work to protect troops fighting in Iraq. Senator Bayh and other lawmakers say the report is disturbing and better body armor is a must for Americans fighting for freedom.

For the families of these soldiers who lost their lives, they would like to see some quick action. Senator Evan Bayh responded, “Frankly, heads ought to roll if there are people who are responsible for not getting our troops the body armor they need to protect themselves. That is just not acceptable.”

TELEVISION EXCERPTS

WSB – Good Morning America

1/11/2006 7:14:19 AM

Continuing on issues of security. Good Morning America is still on the case of body armor and protection of American troops. ABC news has now received new information from the army (they had been reluctant to give a statement). They now say:

“Every soldier in harms way has a complete set of body armor, the best body armor in the world---nearly 700,000 full sets of interceptor body armor have been provided to soldiers.” – U.S. Army

They add now updated side armor will enter production shortly. Our question is what does “shortly” mean? This afternoon there will be a hearing of the senate armed services committee looking into the whole issue. We will have more on all of this for you tomorrow.

WSB (ABC) – Good Morning America

*Interview with Hilary Clinton. Some commentary by Howard Dean (*partial transcript*)
1/10/2006 7:12:32 AM

Diane Sawyer: Still on Body Armor watch this morning. We told you yesterday about the secret Pentagon study that found the lives of more than 80% of troops in Iraq with fatal wounds may have been saved if they had additional pieces of body armor. After our report later, "good morning America" received so many phone calls from so many military parents anxious to buy body armor for their children being sent to Iraq and this morning New York Senator Hilary Clinton joins us. She called for an investigation and she's at her home in Chappaqua, New York. Thank you for being with us. I want to get right to it. You have called on the Pentagon to make the additional armor available. Have you gotten any reaction from the Pentagon?

Senator Clinton: Well, Diane, this is the last of many requests that not only I but a number of my colleagues in the congress, parents soldiers and marines and others have made on their own behalf over the last now nearly three years. and it just is heartbreaking to me that once again we have a study that looked at the wounds that marines suffered and concluded as you rightly said that we perhaps could have avoided so many of these fatalities with the right body armor. The problem is that we have not provided that body armor in a timely way. We have not given many of our soldiers and marines the protection that they need. It's just unforgivable and unacceptable. We're looking for answers and I hope finally we will get them.

Sawyer: The army has issued a statement; the Department of Defense has issued a statement. They both said the same things. They continue to develop improvements to soldier protection equipment but they also add they won't discuss these issues in public because it might render insight to the enemy and aid the enemy in some way. Does this aid the enemy in some does this aid the enemy in some way to discuss this publicly?

Clinton: Of course not. In fact, this has been discussed publicly for nearly three years.

WLS (ABC) - Good Morning America

1/9/2006 7:14:02 AM

Diane Sawyer: Now someone who knows all about this, Jason Beck, president and CEO of Diamondback Tactical Defense, which makes body armor. He's also a former Marine and an instructor in hand-to-hand fighting. The vulnerabilities are here and on the shoulder?

Jason Beck: The shoulder region as well as the sides. There are no ballistic plates in either of those regions. We have ballistic plates in the front and back.

Sawyer: But it is available to provide for the side?

Beck: Correct. And the Marine Corps has purchased 27,000 sets. They have approximately 2,500 sets in the field currently.

Sawyer: But the army?

Beck: The study just came out about a month and a half ago or right around that time, the army has been moving as fast as they can. They're a big machine.

Sawyer: Well, you say that. But these are lives at stake. As fast as they can?

Beck: They should be able to provide these within the next six months to a year to where they actually have every single troop covered.

Sawyer: Should be able to. We're going to keep the pressure on, if we can.

Headline News

1/8/2006 5:16:37 PM:

A Pentagon study suggests that not all U.S. troops are happy about improved body armor. Many soldiers say the armor is restrictive, weighs too much and increases the chances of getting killed.

MSNBC -- Scarborough Country

*Interview with military analyst Lieutenant Colonel Robert McGinnis

1/9/2006 10:00:25 PM

Joe Scarborough: Did a Pentagon cover-up kill hundreds of marines in Iraq? A shocking secret report from the Pentagon says as many as 80% of the marines killed in Iraq from wounds to the upper body could have been saved if they had been wearing extra Body Armor. Why was the secret Pentagon study focused on saving lives buried for two years? *(Gap in Transcript)*

Joe Scarborough: Let me bring in Lieutenant Colonel McGinnis, saying that 80% of the marines may have been saved from upper torso wounds if he had had the right type of plates. What do you make this Pentagon report? Why don't you think that those types of plates should be used?

McGinnis: Well, the types of plates that are used are ceramic plates, ballistic plates. They have different characteristics that we can't describe here. But I looked at the study on the website. 93 cases, of course, you gave the statistics and the breakdown and interestingly recommended that they use larger plates, ceramic pads for the shoulders and sides. And you put a lot more weight on the soldiers. And you ask the soldier on the ground, I was there in 2003, I was there twice, I was not issued protective gear in the fall. This past fall, I had the Kevlar as well as the body armor and every soldier now over there obviously has it. We've learned a lot, clearly in three years. But the study is not; it's not been done in a laboratory. The reality is we're fighting a real war. Unfortunately, if you burden soldiers down with every piece of protective Armor that we would like to, they wouldn't be able to move. And the irregular warfare that we're fighting, they would endanger themselves based on what the soldiers are telling us.

CNN -- Late Edition With Wolf Blitzer

*Interview with Howard Dean

1/8/2006 12:47:23 PM

Howard Dean: I was disgusted when I read in the *New York Times* yesterday that 80% of the injuries in the Marine Corps could have been prevented if the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense and the President supplied them with the armor they had. They requested that from the field, the Pentagon refused. Secretary Rumsfeld ought to resign.

Fox News -- Fox News Live

*Interview with General Clark

1/8/2006 11:26:24 AM:

News caster: I'm going to ask you about a *New York Times* article saying that 80% of the U.S. forces who have suffered who died, actually from chest wounds didn't have to, had only they had the right body armor. Do you agree?

General Clark: Yeah, I do. We've been worried about this for a long time this, is historic under investment in the protection of individual soldiers and marines. It's been going on 25 years, since Vietnam. We knew when we came out of Vietnam the key thick was the body count. How many people we have lost. Yet, we invested in armored vehicles, high tech weaponry, missiles, and radars. But we didn't put enough money into the protection of the lives of the individual soldiers and marines on the battlefield.

Fox News -- Fox and Friends Sunday

*Interview with Bill Cowan

1/8/2006 8:25:38 AM

On this particular issue (body armor), I believe the military continues to do the absolute best that they can for the troops out there and here are the big issues, one, procurement is very difficult. Even if we had the absolute solution today getting it bought through the procurement manufacturing and distribution process could take a long time. Secondly for troops on the ground, I know from experience wearing body armor in Vietnam it's restrictive and the study says if we had more parts of the body covered we would have lost less people, but the issue for the trop on the ground is he's got to have mobility, these kids are carrying heavy equipment and gear and packs already and they've got to be able to move so sometimes you're willing to give up some of that body armor because you need that mobility and that flexibility on the ground

I think if you talk to the marines or soldiers operating against the enemy out there conducting, engaging, fighting, maneuvering, yeah, they'd like to be more prepared, a little bit more protected but I certainly want to maintain my mobility, my flexibility, my ability to jump, move, run, shoot, communicate, all the things that somebody down there on the ground has to do, that's what their mission is and you don't hear a lot of complaints from the troops right now.

We hate to lose any of our men or women over there, but you can't protect them 100 percent of the time with 100 percent perfect solutions.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 1:01 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]
Cc: Smith, Dorrance (b)(6) [Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PA]; Richard, Joseph (b)(6) [Richard, Joseph, Col OASD-PA]; Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA]; Thorp, Frank (b)(6) [Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA]; Barber, Allison (b)(6) [Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA]; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA]; Vician, Todd M (b)(6) [Vician, Todd, Maj, OASD-PA]; Carpenter, Joseph (b)(6) [Carpenter, Joe, LCDR OASD-PA]; Merritt, Roxie T. (b)(6) [Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA] (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; Lawrence, Dallas (b)(6) [Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OSD-LA]; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/NEWSI (b)(6) Maj, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; Di Rita, Larry (b)(6) [Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA]
Subject: Transcript - Military analysts body armor

Attachments: 01-11-06 Lehrer NewsHour body armor.doc; 01-12-06 Speakes, Sorenson body armor final.doc



01-11-06 Lehrer 01-12-06 Speakes, NewsHour body ... Sorenson bod...

Attached is the transcript for the military analyst call on Thursday, Jan. 12 at 1430.

Topic was body armor.

Guests were MG Stephen Speakes of the Army G-8 and MG Jeff Sorenson from Assistant Secretary of the Army Claude Bolton's office (Army acquisitions).

Briefing was ON THE RECORD.

Please note:

1. Mr. Ruff has asked that CAPT Merritt get the transcript to our reporters and also posted on our Defenselink web site in the transcript bin.
2. The transcript references an appearance by Lt. Col. Bob Maginnis (ret), one of our military analysts, on the Lehrer NewsHour on Wednesday, Jan. 11. I've attached a transcript of that discussion in case anyone would like to read it. He appears with retired Marine Corps Lt. Col. Roger Charles, president of Soldiers for the Truth, the advocacy group that obtained and published the Pentagon study of Marine deaths from torso wounds.

Any questions see or call me (b)(2)

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The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer

January 11, 2006, Wednesday Transcript #8439

HEADLINE: The Aalto Hearings;
Blueprint for Rebirth;
Protecting the Troops

BYLINE: ANCHOR: JIM LEHRER; GUESTS: TED OLSON; DAWN JOHNSEN; LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.); LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.); CORRESPONDENTS: KWAME HOLMAN; RAY SUAREZ; SPENCER MICHELS; MARGARET WARNER; GWEN IFILL; TERENCE SMITH; KWAME HOLMAN

BODY:

JIM LEHRER: Good evening, I'm Jim Lehrer. On the NewsHour tonight, the news of this Wednesday, then: Highlights from day three of the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee Samuel Alito, plus analysis by Ted Olson, former solicitor general for President Bush, and Dawn Johnsen, deputy assistant attorney general in the Clinton administration; a report from New Orleans on a blueprint for rebuilding the city; and a debate between two retired military officers on the effectiveness of body armor for U.S. troops in Iraq.

FOCUS - PROTECTING THE TROOPS

JIM LEHRER: Finally tonight, the debate over body armor for U.S. troops in Iraq. Margaret Warner has our story.

MARGARET WARNER: As U.S. casualties have mounted in Iraq so too has criticism of the body armor supplied to soldiers and Marines. It's called interceptor body armor and its design has been modified five times since the war began.

But insurgents appear to have figured out how to exploit gaps and weak points in the troops' protective vests.

Some members of Congress have jumped on the issue, including Democratic Congressman John Murtha when he called for a rapid timetable for withdraw.

But the Pentagon has defended the level of protection for American troops. The latest turn in the controversy came from a veterans group called Soldiers for the Truth published preliminary findings of a secret Pentagon study of 93 Marine deaths from torso wounds over two years.

According to the New York Times, the study found as many as 80 percent of those Marines could have survived if they had had extra body armor. For example, the study said as many as 42 percent of the Marine casualties who died from isolated torso injuries

could have been prevented with improved protection in the area surrounding the plated areas of the vest.

The Pentagon responded last week by stating it will continue seeking improvements to body armor, but, quote, will not discuss in public sensitive issues that may render any insight to the enemy.

Today Senate Armed Services Committee chairman John Warner called Pentagon officials, including a soldier and a Marine wearing body armor, to a closed-door hearing on the issue.

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM CATTO, U.S. Marine Corps: We're fielding the best body armor and protective equipment available we think in the world today. And as we have the opportunities to upgrade the equipment, we do that.

MARGARET WARNER: Last September the Marine Corps ordered 28,000 sets of side plates to offer additional protection for its troops in Iraq.

MARGARET WARNER: Do U.S. troops in Iraq have adequate body armor? For that, we turn to two former military officers who are wearing alternative varieties of protected vests: Retired Army Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis served in Vietnam. He's currently a consultant to the Pentagon and receives regular briefings there. He's wearing the body armor commonly worn by American troops in Iraq. Retired Marine Corps Lt. Col. Roger Charles is president of Soldiers for the Truth, the advocacy group that obtained and published the Pentagon study of Marine deaths from torso wounds. He's wearing one more expensive alternative advocated by some Pentagon critics.

We invited the Army and Marine Corps to participate in this discussion, but they declined.

Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for coming in.

And Col. Charles, let's start with you. Why did your group publish this, expose this on your web site?

LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): We had quite a bit of communication from groups in theater -- Afghanistan and Iraq expressing strong dissatisfaction with the current body armor for various reasons.

It began to appear like there might be a story. We decided to pursue it beginning in September, and along the way picked this part of the study up. We did not get the complete study.

MARGARET WARNER: Now the study only looked at a certain kind of death: That is, torso wounds. Were you able to extrapolate from that to say how many of the overall American deaths in Iraq might have been prevented with different body armor?

LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): We did not do that but the New York Times in their piece which aired -- which was published last Saturday in their newspaper did extrapolate.

I know the reporter, Michael Moss, that did this work and very confident in his meticulous research, and he said that over 300 deaths, if you included the Army, killed in action were probably -- possibly prevented had we had the better body armor.

MARGARET WARNER: So 300 of the more than 2200 deaths.

LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): Yes.

MARGARET WARNER: What was your reaction to the study, Col. Maginnis?

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Well, you know, Margaret, the battlefield is not a controlled environment. It's not an experimental lab.

Yes, there's no doubt that soldiers were killed and they were killed because there were gaps in body armor. But it's hard to tell from the study whether or not all of them were wearing the same body armor and a lot of the other details that you'd want to have in trying to make this decision.

MARGARET WARNER: And they did say they were preliminary results.

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): They did.

MARGARET WARNER: Well, now, Col. Maginnis, you are wearing what American troops wear in the field. Could you stand for us and just tell us what this is and how it protects the soldier wearing it.

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Okay. This is the outer protective vest, about eight pounds.

MARGARET WARNER: This is called the --

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): The interceptor body armor but it's the vest.

And then you have inside both the front and the back 11-pound ballistic ceramic, you know, protector -- small arms protection inserts.

Now we have a deltoid shoulder protector here. They weigh about five pounds. Now the Army soon will come out with side panels that weigh about three-and-a-half pounds that are ballistic plates just like the front. And then of course you have things on the neck and in the groin.

MARGARET WARNER: All right. Col. Charles, so what is wrong with this? What did the study show? Where were the vulnerabilities in this vest according to this study?

LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): Well, the major vulnerabilities were in this area here. And I'd like to point out this is not a ballistic defense piece of gear. This is protection against shrapnel but it's not the same as this hard plate that's in the front and the rear.

So there is no ballistic plate protection here, so this is an area of concern -- this whole area here and then around the throat and neck.

MARGARET WARNER: Stay standing both of you, please. Col. Charles, you're wearing one more expensive alternative advocated by some. What is it and why is it better? It actually looks skimpier, if I may use that word, than what Col. Maginnis is wearing.

LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): Well, first of all, we did not bring the shoulder attachments which are available.

But this is an outfit called Pinnacle Armor, produces -- the trade name is Dragon Skin. And these are small titanium ceramic plates that are positioned in kind of a fish scale approach.

And it gives you protection from there to here, and then from the rear there back. There's about an inch-and-a-half on each side where there is no protection as compared to, you know, about a foot on the side on here.

There also obviously is vulnerability here and around the throat and so on. But, overall it's about 140 percent more area of protection with this system than the interceptor.

MARGARET WARNER: Why wouldn't 140 percent more area be better?

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Well, it would be if it was all proven through science. You know, certainly the shoulders and the neck, major difference with this -- no groin protection.

And, you know, the contracting people as well as the Army scientists say, look, be careful with Dragon Skin because it's good for a knife fight but we don't want to take it to Iraq because of the ballistic issues. And they're not comfortable with it yet, but perhaps in the future.

MARGARET WARNER: Please be seated. What do you mean the ballistic issues? Is this a question of mobility or is there a difference in these two between, let's say you took a direct hit -- let's forget about the gaps or set that aside -- is there a difference in the level of protection between this ceramic one and this one with these disks?

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Well, I can't tell you the exact because it's

classified but this will take a fairly sizable small arm direct hit. And he'll have to speak for his own.

LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): This will not only will take that hit but will take multiple hits and the ceramic plate used in interceptor, one of the complaints from the troops in the field was that too often after one round impact, then you had a bunch of gravel basically inside the pouch.

It basically just kind of disintegrated and lost his rigidity and crumbled upon impact.

MARGARET WARNER: Is there also -- I had read today, Col. Maginnis, an issue of mobility or at least some commanders were saying though you look a little more mobilized than Col. Charles at the moment, that this actually was a little more flexible than this.

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Well, you know, you can modify this. You can take these shoulder pads off. You can take this neck guard off. You can even take other aspects. You know, it really depends upon what the mission says.

Now, we've upgraded a lot, at least five times over the last couple of years to include this ballistic plate, and it really addresses the issue that he just brought out.

MARGARET WARNER: Col. Charles, the insurgents are tremendously adaptable, and as been pointed, out they've kind of adapted; they know what this vest looks like. Why wouldn't they just adjust to this vest?

LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): Well, they had the chance. There was an unsolicited letter from an American contractor over there who was shot eight times in the back wearing one of these that he purchased for his own use.

And he did not know he had been shot until he got back and took it off and saw the bullet perforations in the canvas cover. There was no soft tissue damage so it's proven in the field that it can take multiple hits and still provide protection.

MARGARET WARNER: What do the people you've talked to tell you about why the military has not adopted this? Is it the cost? Is that they really have doubts about its effectiveness?

LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): The basic reason, as hard as this may be for your audience to understand, is not invented here: Bureaucratic turf protection because the Army people that were charged with providing this ten, fifteen years ago had a program - it produced something beginning in 1998 I believe, 1999. But it wasn't this - and t. They didn't want to use this because they did not claim invention of it.

MARGARET WARNER: Is there a little bureaucratic problem here or --

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): There's bureaucracy everywhere Margaret. In 1999, the interceptor came on line. There have been a lot of modifications since. We're still making those modifications. It's not perfect.

There's no protection system that's 100 percent perfect but it is a lot better than it was and it's getting better all the time. The scientists tell us that it's the best that the world has today.

MARGARET WARNER: Better than this?

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): They said bar none. You know, I've already made my statement with regard to Dragon Skin.

You know, they're looking at this. Anything that comes across their table they will examine. They have research going on at MIT even now on a variety of technologies.

We want to find the best technology to save our soldiers without jeopardizing mobility.

MARGARET WARNER: How much more would it cost to buy these?

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Well, you know, that's a contractual issue. I don't know what his firm would sell the Army his particular product for. But first it has to go through all the extensive ballistic tests which it hasn't but this material has.

MARGARET WARNER: And, finally, to you, Col. Charles, as Col. Maginnis has said, the Marines have ordered now side panels for these vests. How much of the problem will that solve?

LT. COL. ROGER CHARLES (Ret.): Well, it won't solve the proportion to the additional area that's being covered but let me just say I am not a representative for Pinnacle Armor.

We were told by several independent consultants who work for the Pentagon that cannot be named because of fear of losing their jobs that this was probably the best available body armor. It's what they would take to Baghdad. They do not have any financial ties with Pinnacle Armor. We're not saying it's the best. We're saying it ought to get a fair test.

MARGARET WARNER: And what's your very brief explanation of why 80 percent of these soldiers did suffer wounds that went into the gaps?

LT. COL. ROBERT MAGINNIS (Ret.): Well, some of the soldiers weren't wearing body armor because the study just isn't clear. You know, those that were, you know, yes, there are places that you can shoot them. And it depends upon their position and so forth. So it's a tough, tough finding. We're doing our best I think.

MARGARET WARNER: All right. Col. Maginnis and Col. Charles, thank you both.

RECAP

JIM LEHRER: And, again, the major development of the day: Supreme Court nominee Samuel Alito again declined to say the right to abortion is settled law.

JIM LEHRER: And to our honor roll of American service personnel killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. We add them as their deaths are made official and photographs become available. Here, in silence, are eight more.

JIM LEHRER: We'll see you online, tomorrow at 9:30 A.M. Eastern Time with our Alito hearing coverage, and again here tomorrow evening. I'm Jim Lehrer. Thank you, and good night.

LOAD-DATE: January 12, 2006

Jan. 12, 2006

Military Analysts Call

Briefers:

MG Stephen Speakes, Director, Force Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army

MG Jeffrey Sorenson, Deputy for Acquisition and Systems Management, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)

Host: Allison Barber, DASD OSD-Public Affairs

Ms. Barber: This is Allison Barber. We have with us General Speakes and General Sorenson. Today's call and information is on the record and we'll open it up. General Speakes, if you'd like to go ahead, and then we'll take some questions and move forward. Thank you both for your time today.

Speakes: Sure. This is Major General Steve Speakes. My job on the Army staff is the director of force development. As the director of force development, we're responsible for Army investment accounts for equipment; we're also responsible for overseeing the distribution of all of that equipment. And so we get in the business of insuring that soldiers across the Army have the equipment they need in accordance with the missions they are given.

What we would like to do is -- General Sorenson and I -- is talk our way through this. What we'll do is quickly highlight what we think some of the key issues are, and then we'll talk through what we believe is the appropriate -- or frankly, the truth in terms of some of the issues from our perspective.

The first issue is we saw in the weekend coverage the perception that essentially, once again, we in the military are reactionary to the developments that are happening over on the battlefield. And so what we'll talk a little bit is our longstanding commitment to go ahead and field the right stuff, and to anticipate trends on the battlefield.

The other thing that you saw is some discussion that said we continue to have a problem with various armored vehicles. And what we can quickly summarize for you is the success story that we have had in armored vehicles, and what we continue to do to improve our overall armored vehicle posture.

So what we'd like to do first of all is to begin by talking a little bit about body armor. I think that -- and for example, I saw Colonel Maginnis the work that you did on MacNeil Lehrer (referencing 11 January broadcast), and obviously, you have not only worn it, but you can talk it, and so what I will do for everybody else is just summarize some of the key points from our perspective.

Integrated body armor, interceptor body armor is something that has been in the Army inventory essentially since the start of this war. We have gone from about 75,000 sets that were available and distributed in the Army at the time we crossed the line of departure in Kuwait, to now over 700,000 sets. This amount is enough for all the forces operating in the Area of Operations plus the majority of the operating force of the Army.

But, more importantly, it has gone through a continuous series of improvements, and the improvements have been a twin pull of the dynamic of what we see on the battlefield and then what our various research, development and testing activities tell us back here in the United States. And so those two imperatives are then constantly giving the Army the chance to see where we ought to go to improve, and then to make those improvements.

The most important feedback we get always is what we call operational need statements, which are statements from the commander in the combat zone of what he needs to improve the capability. And they are short, specific requirements that communicate here is the need that we see, and then here is the quantity that we want fielded. They are then brought in to the Army; they

are worked within the Army, both as a matter of strategy in terms of how fast we can do it, what the technology is, and then to make sure that we have a distribution program once we get the actual capability put together. So, those are the dynamics that drive us.

Now, let's talk specifically about what we have been able to field. I mentioned 700,000 sets of interceptor body armor has been provided to soldiers. The next major improvement that we saw in terms of the quality of armor was what we call the deltoid axillary protector (DAP). And as many of you have seen on TV, what that involves is an ability to protect both the shoulder and also the side of the body.

Now, the issue there was that that came in (inaudible) in 2004, and essentially by January [sic, September] in 2005, we had completed fielding about 170,000 sets of what we call DAP. Now DAP was our best effort to insure that soldiers had mobility in their shoulders and upper body. And so what it did is it gave you a protection against fragments, because what we were seeing was soldiers in the combat zone – particularly who were up in turrets – had a problem in that they were being exposed to fragmentation and had no protection over their shoulders and side. And so this material, which has the same basic ballistic protection as the outer tactical vest – which is worn across the rest of the body – gave us the ability to protect shoulders on this – soldiers that were exposed, and also the side of their body.

And so that was the initial effort that we undertook to try to fix something that we saw was a result of combat – which is the need to protect soldiers against fragmentation.

The next thing we wanted to do was to continue to improve the quality of the armor that we actually issue to soldiers. And so what we've been able to do is work on an increase to the quality of the actual armor plate that we have provided to soldiers. And at this point now, we've got essentially the second generation of armor plating that has been issued – actually, I'm sorry -- the third generation of armor plating that we have issued this war to enable soldiers to better be protected against the ballistic threat that they face.

And so, that is something that we have undertaken to do over the course of the last year, and it's another success story, and one that we don't want to publicize. The rationale for that is obvious: the more we talk about it, the more information we provide the enemy. And one of the things that's been very, very concerning to Army leaders is the open discussion of specific targeting weaknesses or vulnerabilities that we see on soldiers when we see it in the media. And so in this case, what we have done is quietly fielded an enhanced capability to the basic SAPI (small arms protective inserts) plate that many of you have worn in theater when you have been in there.

So that is another important aspect of our overall program, which is as we improve, not to publicize what we're improving and why. And you can obviously anticipate with your respective backgrounds why that's so important.

The next issue then was something that the Army and the Marines both took on in their own way and that was the actual addition of SAPI plates to the side of the body. To give you a perspective, you're talking about essentially about nine inches of the side of a body that is right now not protected by the side of a SAPI plate. In other words, what you've got is the DAP protecting a large measure of the side of a body, but you don't have the actual ballistic protection that is afforded by a SAPI plate.

And so, the requirement came in essentially in September to the Army in a final form that identified our requirements then to provide what we are now calling side SAPI protection. And side SAPI protection was the final element in all of this. It was designed to give us essentially protection that augmented the Deltoid Axillary Protector or DAP, which already had progressed to the shoulder and side of the body. So this was our latest effort in terms of continuing to improve this overall design and our capabilities.

What we are seeing obviously is continuing evolutions in the nature of threat that we face. As you know, the rise of the IED has been something we've noted and we are reflecting in our body armor protection, and the increasing lethality of the weapons systems being used against us.

And so those dynamics will make this a continual process. And so when headlines that we see right now describe that we are now belatedly issuing or rushing out to correct a deficiency, those headlines entirely miss the point.

This has been a programmatic effort in the case of the Army that has gone on with great intensity for the last five months; was underway in December in terms of final decisions were being made and capabilities that we will see fielded here in the spring. And so all of this is something that the Army is very committed to, which is a continuous evolution in our ability to better protect soldiers, and yet at the same time, to master the dynamics of not overburdening them.

The soldiers who appeared yesterday in front of Senators Warner, Levin and Reed captured very, very well the fact that we are at about the point where a soldier has to make serious decisions about how much this armor he or she can afford to wear consistent with mission, and with the operating environment in terms of temperature or other environmental factors.

And the Marine that appeared in front of the public yesterday specifically addressed why he doesn't use DAP. And his view of DAP is that it is unduly restrictive to his ability to operate with his soldiers and upper body, and he doesn't prefer to wear it. We certainly understand that, and that has been a part of all of this, is the design of all this body armor, and General Sorenson will talk to that in detail because that is critical. None of this stuff is rushed out to the point that soldiers look at and don't feel it's been integrated or properly tailored to the rest of the equipment they are wearing. And that involves soldiers who are operating in a prone position, or soldiers for example who are in combat assaults, or soldiers who are truck drivers. And this capability has got to be universal in the sense that it fits all those operating environments and enables the soldier to do his or her job.

The other thing, when we say his or her, it's an important factor to consider. We can be outfitting a 245 pound man, as we demonstrated yesterday, or you can be outfitting a 115 pound female military policeman. Both of them require the same amount of protection. Both of them obviously have very different carrying capabilities in terms of how much they can hold in the way of body armor and then all the rest of the weapons ammunition that they carry with them as a part of their basic load.

So those are the factors that then cause implementation decisions to not be snap decisions. It's not a matter of simply snapping your finger. And then the other final part is that all of this is rigorously tested as part of the design process that General Sorenson will talk about, and is also then a part of continuous surveillance as we continue to buy and test as we go through this program.

So all of this I would summarize is designed to give you the belief that the protection of soldiers is our number one mission. Continuous evolution of this protection is absolutely essential, and that we can't get by by ever saying that a solution that we have today is the optimum. It represents our best at the moment, and will continuously be improved as we see the need to do it or we develop the capability to do it.

So what I would like to do now is pause, and I will give over to General Sorenson, who is our military deputy for acquisition.

MG Sorenson: OK, my name is Jeff Sorenson. I am the deputy for acquisition and systems management. Let me just kind of cover a couple points that I think Steve – General Speakes – has already mentioned, but let me just emphasize it.

As he pointed out, we have gone through a continual evolution here of improvement in terms of capability. I mentioned yesterday we've gone through seven improvements. He mentioned the fact that we are on our third generation of plates. The other particular improvements are essentially to the vest itself, as well as to other outer parts, specifically the DAP and as well now the side plates.

In all cases we have taken a very rigorous approach to making sure that as we produce this capability and develop it that we are taking into account much of the human factors which the soldiers have to operate within. And I know in some cases people think that's a very bureaucratic process, but as we certainly take a look at this the last thing we want is to protect these soldiers from getting killed by a bullet, and yet have them suffer with this additional weight of – you know, a 130 pound female or a 140 pound male, 30 extra pounds of body armor in 130 degree heat and suffer a death from heat stroke. So these are the types of things that have made this very complex, as well as their ability to even move, and in some cases, get up and get down and get out of the way.

I'd like to take this moment just to cover a couple other points which I think probably would be of some value, because I think they are important, especially in the last 24 hours with people in different companies making accusations and allegations in what their capabilities are.

I have seen, to some distress, particular members of the Hill talking about how we need to talk in very high degrees of specificity what types of coverage and capabilities we are doing. As General Speakes says, we don't want to give any of this information out. This is very sensitive to our chief; in fact, even continuing to have these discussions is something that I don't think he is really appreciative of because of the fact that it talks to something that is very sensitive to him with respect to force protection.

But recognize as we've done this, this is just one piece of the overall force protection capability. This is the personal piece. We've done the armoring of the vehicles; we've also done and added electronic and counter measures, and we have also changed a lot of the techniques, tactics and procedures with which they operate. And all these are generated to trying to improve the soldier's ability to be better protected with respect to force protection.

Now one particular instance here, we had a company come up yesterday and basically allege that they had a capability that quite frankly the Army has ignored and has really not taken seriously, and so I just want to put out some facts with respect to that.

The company's name I believe was Pinnacle. Facts are that we did test this particular capability back in 2004, and it failed. They have subsequently worked to improve their particular system, but with respect to our ability to validate with their improvements, we have not been able to do so as yet.

The PEO and the PM have discussed this with the CEO as of the end of December, and offered to procure some systems to verify manufacturer's performance claims, but at this point in time the company said that they don't really have a production system available and will not have it ready for testing or even prototypes until February of 2006. However, with respect to the system, they have provided some plates, which we have done some initially testing of up at Aberdeen test center. And though the tests are not maybe at this point in time representative of the entire Pinnacle armor system, the preliminary test data says at this point that this will not meet the Army's requirements. Again I say this will not meet the Army's requirements. It will not meet it with respect to performance; with respect to weight it is estimated at this point in time that it will add 10 more pounds to just a medium size, so as opposed to a 30-pound weight, we now have 40 pounds. In addition, the initial understanding of the costs, it's about 50 percent greater.

So we are welcome at this point in time to have them provide this capability and have us analyze it, but to date, it has not been anything that has passed our particular test, nor is it something that they are able to produce at this time for our evaluation in a complete system.

And with that, I think I will stop and let anybody ask any questions that they might have.

Q: It may be for General Sorenson, or whichever of you gentlemen. Two questions keep coming up. Number one, is the cost an issue? How much extra are we spending? Is there a default in the budget? And number two, I would like to know if you guys are using any special fast-track procurement methods to get this stuff bought and in the field?

MG Sorenson: Let me try to address that. With respect to cost, we do have funding to pay for this particular added capability.

Q: What is it costing per set?

MG Sorenson: The costing per set, at this point in time, all I can tell you is right now the entire contract is going to be – are you talking about the extra side plates now, or are you talking about the entire ensemble?

Q: Well, let's take each. I mean, you know, can you give me an idea what each costs per soldier, what are spending on armor for the basic vest? Jeff and I and a bunch of others were over in Iraq in December and we wore the basic vest which has the front and back plates, and some sort of a collar arrangement, and I don't know what that costs, and what do the enhanced systems cost?

MG Sorenson: OK, if I add up all the different pieces and parts that go to what you now know to be your IBA, which is essentially your vest, with your side plates, it's roughly at this point in time about \$2,100 for that particular piece. If you add the DAP, it's another \$300, and you add the side plates we are probably talking about another \$1,000. So add it all together, you're probably \$3,400 or something of that –

Q: Right. So basically everyone who's saying we're not willing to spend another \$260 a soldier is full of something other than Swiss cheese.

MG Sorenson: That's correct, that's correct.

Q: Last question, I'm sorry. Can you tell us if you're using any of the fast-track procurement procedures to get this stuff out and in the field?

MG Sorenson: I think at this point in time we are. In fact, the way they basically work this particular contract is we're going to put on contract initially, if you will – and I don't know if you got to see yesterday what the particular soldier wearing it looked like, I mean, he had – the side plates go into a pouch, the pouch is attached to the molle – if you will – vest there. And what we're doing right now is accelerating the delivery of the pouches themselves. And clearly we've structured in the contract a very aggressive capability. In fact, in some cases we will be able to produce and outstrip what the Marines are producing in the time frames they are looking at because of access to additional contractors.

Q: A couple questions. The weight of the average soldier, the weight of the average combat load. I have a picture of a Marine with all the accoutrements and it came out to 95 pounds. That's helpful in this argument. So if there are some official numbers we can have that would be well received.

Yesterday the representative I was debating was arguing that the SAPI front plate, you know, shattered inside with one round became useless. I didn't accept that. But I need – and I am sensitive to what the chief is saying, so, you know, help me as to what we can say. And then the

last question, on this dragon skin stuff. This guy was saying you had (Navy) SEALs using it, a number of federal agencies, a whole bunch of people over there, and the last thing I didn't accept is one of them took eight shots in the front or the back, I forget, and none of them penetrated. Can you help me on any of these?

MG Sorenson: Bob, the only thing I can help you with is the following. All I can tell you is the PM and the PEO have engaged that company with respect to dragon skin. That's the name of the company, it's called Pinnacle Armor. We have offered to buy some of their systems to verify their claims. The answer that we got is that they do not have a production system available for us to test. So all the claims with respect to, you know, they took eight shots and everybody's wearing it and all that kind of stuff is interesting and nice; however, comma, they have not come through and not been validated by the Army with respect to testing to our requirements.

As I said before, to date, they failed in 2004, we brought them back right now, we've tested their plates. Their plates at this point in time do not satisfy the ballistic protection required. They do not satisfy the ballistic protection required. As well, their plates are heavier, they would add about 10 more pounds to what we think we are currently weighing, and that's about 31 pounds, and as well, the cost of it is such is that it adds – I mean, their cost right now, I've seen cost figures that just to get their plates is at like \$5,000, so already, you're not even talking about the system, you're just talking about the plates.

Q: Wow.

MG Sorenson: So, all their stuff, in terms of their discussion, is interesting and probably noteworthy and newsworthy, but the fact of the matter is it's all – you know, we haven't seen the beef here. It's all, as someone would say, all Hooah, no do-ah. You can quote me on that one. I mean the fact of the matter is they haven't brought anything to bear. I mean, they just have not. And we continue to ask for it, and it has not been available.

MG Speakes: There's one other point that I would like to add without going into too much specifics, and that is when General Sorenson's guys do the testing. Obviously, we are not satisfied with just one impact.

MG Sorenson: Correct.

MG Speakes: And so that idea that because their system has the ability to repel multiple-round impacts, that it's better than ours, is just wrong. That's fundamental to the testing that the Army does. And obviously, we don't want to go any more specific than that. But there is an issue there of basic credibility. You're not going to give a soldier something that is good for only one round before the plate shatters, and that was the impact that you were left from listening to the McNeil-Lehrer stuff last night. That guy made that claim.

MG Sorenson: I would second that, and I forgot to make that statement before, but I completely agree with General Speakes. I mean, the fact of the matter the performance of this capability is obviously exceeding one round. And we won't go into what either type of round or what exceeding that means. But the fact of the matter is it does not shatter with one round.

MG Speakes: And then there is one other issue that we probably ought to take on, which is the fundamental question of have we provided protection in a timely way? We just addressed both the cost that is being invested by the American government, by the American taxpayer in protecting every soldier. It's extraordinary. The other thing we need to address is the fact that we are not operating on a timely basis.

Let's put it in terms of comparison. Once we adapted to the operating environment in Iraq, it became clear that the original concept that said that body armor was something that was prioritized to essentially dismounted soldier -- the combat infantryman, the combat engineer, and

instead became a full-force requirement, what we had was in the summer of 2003 the realization that we had additional need for essentially the rest of the force. Now the enormity of that requirement was staggering at the time. I think the important thing then was that within the period of then to April of 2004, we were able to equip the entire operating force in the CENTCOM AOR with body armor. And that was a figure approaching 200,000 soldiers. And so the enormity of both the Department of Defense's response, but also the American manufacturers who did what they were asked to do to produce this to a standard. And one of the other things General Sorenson hasn't highlighted, I guess but is the normal product that he does, is in addition to the testing he's highlighted is he certifies, the other thing is the continuous testing of every lot that's produced. And so what you are talking about now is the ability to properly equip every soldier in the AOR, and to do it to a standard where we could guarantee to American taxpayers and family members that what we were giving them met standards.

And so this idea that we're simply not interested, and we're not timely, and we're reactive and we only wait for press reports is just frankly offensive. And I think that's the other thing we've got to refute is somehow we are passive and uninterested in this business. It is a matter of passion, and every one of this who is a part of this thing feels the moral imperative to do the best we can.

Ms. Barber: Any other questions?

Q: Allison, is there someone who can give us the weight of the average soldier, and the weight of the combat load, if there's a difference between the Marine Corps and the Army in the field in Iraq?

MG Speakes: This is Steve Speakes. I would suggest that we not go that way. Here's why. When we are talking combat load, I was fascinated because what you had was two different dismounted professionals appear in front of Congress yesterday. Both of them acquitted themselves very well. They both explained that the whole issue of how much a soldier is wearing, or a Marine, is dependent upon mission and the operating environment and not upon the Service. In other words, both of them discussed the same basic terms – outer tactical vests, SAPI plates, it's a given. After that, then, do you wear the DAP or not? An important question. I think when we get the side armor out in sizable quantities, it is going to be something where soldiers are once again going to interact with their chain of command and decide whether they need it and want it, because it's more poundage once again. And the other thing is it seals your body in in a way that is going to become very, very heat producing. Because right now your body breathes essentially in the sides, in the top where you have some level of ventilation.

The other thing that you then have is your weapons, and most soldiers are carrying two weapons now, they are carrying an M4, they are probably also carrying a nine millimeter. You're carrying the magazines for both. You're carrying the ammunition that's in the magazines. You're carrying water, and then you're carrying at least probably one day's worth of some kind of combat ration. When you put all that together, the figures really become staggering. Do they wear it on a sustained basis, or do they take it on and off? All of those subjects that become something that as we talked poundage yesterday, it became very confusing for the civilians who were listening. And so I'd simply say, if you take a look at it right now what we're showing is the basic armor that we are issuing a soldier, for a medium-size soldier, went from about 60 pounds to about 31 pounds. That's only the start of what a soldier or Marine is wearing. And after that, it's all mission dependent, not Service dependent. Does a 16 to 31 pound increase help a little bit?

Q: So the other take away is this. You have gone through three basically continuous evolutions in the fielding of these sets. Is that correct?

MG Sorenson: No, not exactly. Partially correct. What was said was we have gone through three generations of the protective plates. We have gone through another four evolutions of the entire ensemble, so in all pieces here we have continued to improve everything, OK? So, total is seven. So we have made improvements to the vest, we've made improvements to the external elements

of the vest, we've made internal improvements to the type of composites, if you will, that are used in these plates. And those have gone through three generations.

Q: OK, and the total is you now have enough to, you know, to equip on average about 700,000 or more than (enough ?) to equip the entire operating force?

MG Sorenson: Oh, absolutely. No question.

COL Thomas Spoehr (Director of Materiel, Army G-8) : More than enough to equip the soldiers in Iraq, not quite the operating force. (The operating force is defined as every soldier in the Army that could potentially deploy.)

Ms. Barber: Great, well with that, thank you folks for calling in and for your time. General Sorenson, General Speakes, thank you for your time.

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Thursday, January 26, 2006 12:37 PM
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Smith, Dorrance (b)(6) [Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PA]; Di Rita, Larry (b)(6) [Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA]; Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA]; Barber, Allison (b)(6) [Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; Merritt, Roxie T. (b)(6) [Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA]; Thorp, Frank (b)(6) [Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/NEWS]; Lawrence, Dallas (b)(6)

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[Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA]; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Transcript: military analysts QDR

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Attachments:

01-25-06 QDR Ryan Henry, VADM Chanik.doc



01-25-06 QDR
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Attached is the transcript from yesterday's briefing with Mr. Ryan, VADM Chanik and the military analysts.

The briefing was on background.

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Transcript

Military Analyst Briefing

Topic: QDR

Jan. 25, 2006, 2E556 The Pentagon

Mr. Ryan Henry, PDUSD Policy; VADM Evan M. "Marty" Chanik

Host: Eric Ruff OASDPA

ON BACKGROUND

Transcriber: Murphy

Mr. Ruff: Hello? Folks, this is Eric Ruff and with me is, among others, are Ryan Henry and Admiral Marty Chanik, and they'll be talking to you for a second – in a second or two.

I just wanted to open up by talking a little bit about sort of what we are doing here. Obviously, as we are getting closer and closer to releasing the QDR, in about – what is it now, probably about 12 days or something like that – a week from this Monday, information is already starting to come out more and more.

You probably saw Mark Mazzetti's piece in the LA Times (Jan. 24), so we kind of made a decision to start talking about this a little bit. So we are talking on background now about the QDR. And I think the framework we are working in – and we have a document that's called a preface. It's a preface that's going to go in the front of the QDR when we send it up. And we can make this available to you guys. I don't know if we have the electrons on it yet – but we have a – it's about a three-page document, and Tara (Jones) or somebody will get it out to you either by fax or email, if we can email it OK? So, I think we've got all that information for everybody who's on the call.

Important to remember here is that this QDR is not a new beginning. In essence, we've been working lessons learned since we came in in 2001. And it's been a process by which over the last year or so a number of assumptions have been looked at and tested and tested and the thinking has been throughout this what have we learned from Iraq? What have learned from Afghanistan? And what do we know going into the future about what our force structure is going to be?

This thing has been a very high collaboration with civilian – I haven't been here more than two years, but the civilian and military collaboration in terms of this document, and Ryan and the admiral can certainly speak to this – has been really something to watch over the last year-plus.

So with that in mind, I'll just – we'll turn it over to Ryan and then Ryan, you and Marty can just take it from here.

Mr. Ryan: Yeah, hi, this is Ryan Henry. First of all I want to say hi to Ken and Tim from a former life. I am going to walk you through some high points on the QDR. My role was as I guess basically the traffic cop, the manager, and then I was supported by Marty who

is the J-8 here, and also the folks in PA&E, and the three of us pretty much represented the management cell.

One thing unique about this QDR as Eric was alluding to is that it was not a staff product. It is the work of the four stars, and their Senate-confirmed civilian equivalents in the building. They drove it; they made all the decisions; they directed the work on it; and they're the guys that put thousands and thousands of hours into it.

It is a wartime QDR. That's one thing that's different from in the past. We think that we're in the fourth year of a very long war. It's a war with a different sort of enemy than we faced in the past, and different sort of needed capabilities that we have to develop.

The QDR itself is supposed to be a 20-year look into the future of what the department needs. We're supposed to develop a strategy and then resource that strategy. Another thing that we did different this time is before starting the QDR we did the strategy. That was published in March of '05. It's available on DefenseLink. It's an unclass document. That strategy took about six months of the senior leadership's time. And when we refer to the senior leadership, we're talking the secretary and the deputy, the chairman and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, three Service secretaries, five – four service chiefs, and five undersecretaries. And that comprises the headquarter's senior leadership, and then on a periodic basis we bring in the nine combatant commanders to get their inputs. That group was supported by the vice chiefs of the Services and some of the other direct reports to the secretary who, at their four-star level, ended up doing an awful lot of the staff work to push it forward to the senior leadership.

What we came out with were two twin imperatives. And the bottom line of the QDR report itself says that we need to shift our balance and the capabilities we had, that the Sept. 11, 2001 represented a change and an off-balancing of what the strategic context that we thought we had up until that point. And so we are shifting our balance and we are shifting our capabilities. And I'll talk to some of the areas we are doing that in.

We see four sets of challenges that we have in the future to be able to address. And historically we've looked at a traditional set of challenges which basically involved major combat ops, and state-versus-state conflicts. And we looked at everything else as a lesser-included case to be able to meet that.

As we look to the future we see a set of irregular challenges which are represented by both Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the operations that we saw in Haiti and Liberia, and this is where usually the enemy is within a state, but not part of a state. We are not fighting another nation-state, but some sort of movement, and it requires a different set of capabilities, sometimes thought as lower level but still an area where we need to develop more expertise.

The second set is a catastrophic set of challenges. And those are one time of events that could occur to the U.S. They are just unacceptable for us to accept that blow. Pearl Harbor would be an example of that; 9-11 is an example of that; getting hit by a nuclear

IED in one of our cities would be an example of that. And so defense has a role in protecting the nation against that in the future.

And then the final set of the four is disruptive. And that is a challenge or a threat which might come against us that would basically neutralize the American military as a key instrument of national power.

And you kind of think of if another country would have gotten stealth rather than us, what would have that meant? If somebody comes up with a bio-warfare agent that can genetically target our soldiers or something, than those are the type of challenges that we want to be able to meet.

So we look at the future; we look at about getting capabilities across all four of those sets of challenges.

The second big part of the QDR was a recognition that as we change the capability of the forces in the field we have to change the headquarters. That the headquarters and the way that we're currently and operated is not sufficiently agile to be able to support the fighting forces that we have over there. So we have to do things to better support them and to be able to accelerate our ability to reorient the force. So there is an internal look here, too.

There's a recognition that this QDR, as Eric was saying, is a point in time across a continuum of transformation. Show it represents a snapshot in time. It is something that started working on basically two years ago started the initial effort, and we'll still be working on it two years from now.

There is a point in time on the 6th of February where we send up a report to the Hill, but it is an evolving process.

Eric talked a little bit about the lessons learned and what went in here. It was more than just Iraq and Afghanistan. It is the – the other areas in the global war on terror – the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, Georgia and the Pan-Sahel (in Africa). These are areas where we are trying to fight the global war on terrorism. We are working with partner nations; sometimes they lack the capability, sometimes they lack the will to be able to effectively prosecute this, and we need to do things to build up their capabilities.

Another big area is humanitarian. Our biggest victories to date in the global war on terrorism which involves impacting the hearts and minds of the moderate Muslims have been in our responses to humanitarian disasters. Specifically, the earthquake around Christmas of '04 and then the tsunami from the earthquake, and then Pakistani earthquake (October '05). And the polling that the agency does and the shift of opinions because of those toward the United States and away from radical Islam has been very, very significant.

So that speaks to another problem that we face in the future and that's one of unpredictability and uncertainty. We cannot predict with any certainty whatsoever how our forces might be able to be used in the future. We can say with a very high probability that within the next 10 years U.S. forces will be employed somewhere in the world where they are not today. But as far as when that will be, where that will be, or how that will be, there is just no way to determine that. So we have to have an agility of forces and we have to build capabilities, rather than focusing on a specific threat.

And then the final area that has informed the work is our response in support of civil authorities, specifically, the military's response to 9-11, and now more recently Hurricane Katrina and Rita. And that in providing the American people security, we have a role to play on the domestic front, too.

So the QDR then will speak to – the document will speak to four key focus areas that we are concerned with building more capabilities at the beginning of the 21st century.

How do we provide defense in-depth to the homeland? How do we hasten the demise of terrorist networks? How do we preclude hostile powers or rogue elements from acquiring or using WMD? And then finally, how do we influence and impact countries that are at strategic crossroads?

And they're we are thinking of three countries specifically. We are thinking of Russia and to temper its move toward authoritarianism. We are thinking of China and successfully managing its rise in the community of nations as a constructive force, and if that didn't prove successful, how do we dissuade them from hostile ambitions? How do we deter them from (inaudible – cursor? cursory?) actions and if called on, how would we be able to defeat them? And then finally then India, the world's democracy, second-largest Muslim nation, we think a key partner in the future, and how do we build a strategic alliance with them?

So those are four problem areas that the QDR addressed, and in doing that, they tried to come up with for our external customer, who we personify in the president, how are we going to be able to provide him, and his successor more importantly, options to be able to deal with these key problem areas of the beginning of the 21st century?

And then for our internal customer, who we view as the joint warfighter, how do we get them the capabilities set that they'll be more effective in dealing with these? And so the QDR then goes through and takes 12 different areas where we are interested in developing and enhancing capabilities. And then it goes on to look at the headquarter's function – how do we do governance at the headquarter's level? How do we improve on some of our processes? What do we do as far as the human capital strategy? And then finally, and probably most importantly, what can we do in the area of building partnership capability and capacity?

Now that partnership and capability capacity happens domestically, as far as working with state and local governments, Department of Homeland Security; it happens

interagency on the national security front, working with State Department, the NSC, CIA in an interagency process; and then internationally, how do we build the capability of the partner nations that we work with? Because this is very clear to the Department of Defense that we have to have lots of humility as we approach the problem set before us.

We are not going to be able to predict what is going to be able to happen, and we are not going to be able to solve it on our own, either as a department or a nation. We are going to be dependent on partners. Most times for sure they are going to be able to for sure address the problem cheaper than we can, and many times they are going to be able to do it more effectively because they are familiar with the local cultural terrain, they know the language, and they can operate more effectively in the environment we are in.

Along those 12 areas that we talked about being able to make changes, we talk about leading-edge investments that we can make and decisions that we can make in the fiscal year '07 budget, that arrives on the Hill the same time that the QDR does. But those are only leading-edge investments. The major shifts the department needs to make will be made as we do the program – future-year defense program in the coming year, which will look at the years '08 through '13. So that's where a lot of the significant vectors that the QDR has set will find their way into programmatic change, although there are some that are handled in the QDR itself.

And with that, at a top level – I guess one of the things – two other points real quick. One is we did do a force-planning construct. We have refined the force-planning construct from 2001. We maintain that we will still be able to do two major conflicts nearly simultaneously, take one of them to the level of what we call a win-decisive, sometimes categorized as something that might result in a regime change. We'll be able to do those. In the past, we had thought of both of those as conventional campaigns. Going forward, we want to have the capability to have one of them be a prolonged, irregular campaign.

The analysis that we did in the QDR clearly proved that the most stressing thing on the force is not the high-intensity major combat operations, but it is the prolonged, irregular campaign that goes on for a number of years and requires a rotational base to support it. And the multiplier effect there is what puts the stress on the force.

Some of the other things we learned is that we talk about the force some people think of an active-reserve component. We also need to think about an operational and an institutional component. And the usability and the force that we employ forward is only the operational component. And so as we look at what the size of the force is, rather than looking at total end strength, where there is many things on the institutional force we can do to transfer to civilian jobs or contractor jobs, we really - what the number we're really interested in is what do we have in the operational force, and what are the capabilities of those forces versus the problem set we are confronted with?

And so the QDR does a lot to move more capability and more numbers into the operational force. It also does a lot to move more capability into the irregular special

operations arena, making some sizable increases there, and taking the general purpose forces and start to give them (soft-light?) capabilities.

Also in the force-planning construct, we recognize the need to have a deterrence, but not a one-size-fits-all deterrence, which we've had in the past of massive retaliation, but one that will also work against rogue powers who might be in a state of collapse or would seemingly appear to be undeterrable and also terrorists and their networks.

And so there was the addition of a broader deterrent capability. So the force-planning construct maintains the two-war strategy; maintains the forward presence; talks to a steady state versus surge. In the area of surge there's going to be two – we will be able to handle two major conflicts, one of them which might be a prolonged irregular and take one of them to a win-decisive level.

It also recognizes that the force sizing, versus the force planning, is going to tend to be a function of policy choices being made. What are you going to have in the way of a mobilization as you face different conflicts? What are you going to do as a rotational base? What are you going to do for timelines (inaudible – at?) the operational criteria that you set for yourself? Are you going to stay engaged at the same level around the world? Are you going to do anything different institutionally to be able to move forces from the institutional to the operational? And then what will you do with emergency authorities you might have like we currently have on end strength?

The QDR went in with the assumption that the force size, while it was about right, but the force capability distribution needed a lot of rebalancing. After a year of work and analysis, we feel comfortable with that initial assumption and have kept it.

So with that, if Marty Chanik has anything to add I'll let him do that, and then we can start taking your questions.

VADM: Chanik: Good afternoon. I think probably the best use of your time that goes is to go to your questions, because quite frankly, Ryan really captured the essence of the report and I think he highlighted it pretty well. So I think we're ready for questions.

Q: Yeah, this is Jeff MacCausland, sir, with CBS. Can you talk a bit more detail, particularly about the Army. I mean the secretary, frankly, got beat up a little bit beat up today in the press conference I watched. There's been some leaks about reduction in National Guard brigades and shifting force structure to the active, which could make some sense, but it gets people down in communities all exercised (inaudible) interviewed the other day.

So can you talk a little bit specifically about Army, what you're thinking about there force-structure wise, change the National Guard-active mix, those kind of things?

Mr. Henry: OK, well the Army is going away, obviously, from the differentiated division concept to modular brigades, 77 of those of the combat brigades. Of those 77, in the

reserve component, there will be 28 that will be fully capable and on the par with the active.

In the past, there was – we had 16 enhanced brigades, and not all of those were actually whole brigades. We're moving it up to 28. The brigade structure on the reserve component will stay at 106, but the remaining brigades will be in the combat support, combat service support.

So, from our way of thinking, we are bringing up the reserve component and making them part of the varsity. As we start to develop how we will use these brigades and develop rotational models, then the reserve component will be part of that force generation model for the Army.

So, to be perfectly honest with you, we are a little bit perplexed on the type of responses that we are seeing. Now, in a planning process and as one starts to look at alternatives, all sorts of numbers are thrown around. And I think the reaction you are seeing is it's not that we are decreasing the Guard or taking them down. There is a mentality that says that the highest number that a Guard guy ever saw that what they might be at is not the number we settled at as we worked everything out. So at one point in time there were numbers that were under consideration that were above 28 on the combat brigades, but at no time had anything been finalized, as we balanced everything out, keep them at the same level, 106 total brigades, 28 which are the combat ones, which is up from the 16 quasi-full brigades that they have now.

Q: One quick follow up. Will there be any on the Guard side divisional flags go away? Because that gets them upset even if, you know, the number of brigades stay constant.

Mr. Ryan: Right, right. And as you are probably aware, there's a lot of flags around right now to which there aren't necessarily whole units to go with. The number of flags will remain the same. The percentage of flags that have real, viable forces associated with them will go up. But that is not to say that there might not be a handful around that are in the current status that they are now that there's not necessarily a fully associated unit with them. But no flags – to my knowledge – to my knowledge no flags will go away.

So they'll still have the same bragging rights.

Q: Exactly.

Q: Hello. Jed Babbin, American Spectator. Have you guys gotten a sign off from Negroponte and Goss (Porter Goss?) on this? Because what I am hearing is you guys are going to be putting an awful lot more into establishing defense-related intelligence capability and there could be a little bit of a turf war brewing, no?

Mr. Ryan: The QDR has been staffed through the NSC, up to the highest levels, in (and?) components that comprise the NSC – the intelligence community, the State

Department, the Department of Homeland Security, Justice Department, it has also been staffed through those organizations also.

I – we have not solved the problem of the iron major and the titanium colonel, either in our organization or other ones. You will be able to find somebody buried in an organization who somehow feels that his particular parochial interest was not served as fully as he thought. You will not find anybody at the senior levels of the defense establishment – and that's the four stars – that don't believe in this document. That's -- I mean, some of us that have participated in it think that the document itself is just an artifact of the QDR. But really what the QDR was it was a process that brought the department in, looked at a common set of problems, and came up with a cohesive approach to it that everyone buys in.

There – one of the things we get hit for is that there were no major weapon cuts. We didn't kill any major weapon systems in the QDR. Because we had such a collaborative effort, we were able to make large investments in the areas we need to do, without having to do that. And it couldn't have been done if it weren't the Services that were coming forward and saying this is how I can do my part to contribute to be able to shift the balance and where we need to go.

So, I've only been in the Pentagon for three years, but guys that have been through here and sat through all the QDRs say that this was fundamentally different in kind as far as not just the approach at the senior leadership, but as it developed, the collaborative effort, the fact that – and the vices – and maybe Marty's got a better count than I do – but I would say the vices put in 500 hours of their time over the last 15, 16 months, in sitting down and collaboratively working with the under secretaries and the deputy and the vice chairman in trying to come up and work through these solutions.

And we couldn't get to where we did if this wouldn't have represented – the spirit wouldn't have been one of that we are all in this together and we have to come up with common solutions.

We also, as far as inclusivity, brought in on many of our meetings members of the Department of Homeland Security, the CIA; we actually had some of our key allies participate in our internal discussions. And so this was much more inclusive than it's been in the past, too.

So, you know, there might be some people who feel that they were injured but we are not aware of anybody at a leadership level anywhere in the government that feels uncomfortable with this report.

VADM Chanik: And just to put an asterisk to the question on Ambassador Negroponte, Office of the Secretary of Defense folks that are the intel side of the house is working very closely continuous process working with the director of national intelligence and the CIA. So there's been an awful lot of crosstalk during the development of this QDR and

continuing onward with balancing the capabilities that are represented in all those three organizations.

Mr. Ruff: More questions?

Q: If nobody else is going to jump in, it's Jed Babbin for one more. You've mentioned a term and you just scared the liver out of me, guys. Nuclear IED?

Mr. Ryan: Yeah, I mean if – let's face it, we've got some bad guys out there that are trying to develop a full nuclear full cycle, and have the ability to produce fissile material. This is all about what the (? Response) to the global war on terrorism. It is weapons of mass destruction. It is a globalization mechanism which allows the movement of materials and ideas in a network world, and it is the emergence of terrorist organizations that have no limit to the amount of terror that they are willing to put on any nation or any group of people to get to their political ends.

And the nexus of those three things is what keeps us up at night.

Q: Forgive me for interrupting but I think one of things that I am hearing is that if it is a new term, it's got to be an identifiable threat. Is this near or longer term?

Mr. Henry: We have countries that are producing nuclear materials that are not under the non-proliferation treaty right now. So it is a possibility of which we cannot ignore. And I mean it is the high end, worse case. It doesn't necessarily – a nuclear IED is not necessarily something that would have to go critical, and it could just have a radiological dispersion aspect of it -- known as an RDD – radiological dispersion device.

And the other thing is is the QDR is given a responsibility to look out in the next 20 years. When we go to the intelligence community and ask them to look into the future, and to give us an assessment of where we are going to be, they can do it with a certain degree of accuracy out to five years.

The world we live in right now though, going out 10 years is an extremely iffy exercise, one that they feel uncomfortable with. And they will not venture out to the 20-year mark because the world's just too uncertain; we cannot predict which way things are going to go. The enemy is evolving too fast to be able to do any sort of linear extrapolation.

And so we have a responsibility in looking out at that 20 years to be able to address all feasible threats and to try to anchor what the high-end one is. And a terrorist with a – with a – with fissile material, and with a little bit of know-how, is the worst-case scenario.

That coupled though – I would say that's on a par with a terrorist with bio-warfare knowledge, too, or access to bio-warfare materials. Both of those are the high end one.

Q: Thank you.

Q: This is Jeff MacCausland again. There's been a lot of leaks, and I emphasize the words leaks, so you can say that's not necessarily true, that one of the things this report is going to say to the shifting of a particular number of forces – particularly air and naval – from, frankly, the Atlantic to the Pacific. Can you talk about that for a second?

And also, how do you see balancing the effort to, if you will, find a good relationship with the Chinese as opposed to creating a force structure that they find threatening and then we end up, you know, fulfilling our own prophecies?

Mr. Ryan: Right. I mean that's a – let me deal with the latter one, the Pacific and stuff like that. I mean, stability is the coin of the realm in the Pacific. It's not subject to an alliance structure like the Atlantic is. The U.S. is a force for stability in the region. I think it's recognized by all. We don't use our forces out there in an aggressive nature.

By the same token, for operational responsiveness, the timelines due to the distance involved are significantly different in the Pacific, so we need to have things forward. Our ability to respond with 17,000 troops within one week of the Banda Aceh tsunami, to be able to be delivering relief, we could not have done if we didn't have our forward basing and forward presence structure that we have there.

In order to do that, there will be a shift of maritime toward the Pacific. We talked about that in QDR '01; we continue to talk about that in QDR '06. And you'll probably see some specific metrics in the report that will very discretely deal with that.

In the Atlantic – the Atlantic is a -- to maintain our traditional relationship with NATO, to encourage the transformation of NATO from a Cold War structure to one that can make a difference to the world we live in. Obviously you're aware that we're doing ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) out-of-area ops there in Afghanistan, and we're working with them on the NATO response force, and we're having discussions on other areas as we'll go to Werkunde (Germany) and the ministerial is coming up here in couple of months on areas that NATO can continue to grow there. But it probably doesn't require the same force structure that it did during the Cold War.

Q: Thank you.

Mr. Ruff: OK, we'll just recap here. We'll get this material out to you, and I know one or two folks asked if they could get a transcript of this just for your own personal use and the answer is yes, we'll give you that. It's on background.

And I would just add one last thing and that is, you know, there's been a lot of discussion is building and QDR is certainly part of this umbrella in the long war. And just for your assay, you're going to be seeing in the days and weeks ahead the secretary and leadership in this building talking more about this long war and what the components are. And I would just give you that as something to be watching out for as we go forward with speeches and things like that.

OK? Thanks everybody.

(end of call).

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2006 11:23 AM
To: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: Iraq Progress Report

Your thoughts?
This is the "9010" brief...appropriate briefer? Mil Analysts seems tame enough...
V/R
Col H

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>From: (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA]
>Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2006 10:02 AM
>To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
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>VR/ CDR (b)(6)
>OASD (PA) Defense Press Office Policy Team Defense Intelligence
>(b)(2)
>

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2006 11:30 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: Iraq Progress Report

Yes ma'am... Lt Gen Renuart and Mr Rodman briefed the mil analysts on the report in October. He would be good again... or BG Jones or COL (b)(6) if you want a different level. Either way, I would recommend an OSD-JS joint briefing -- with the OSD briefer speaking first since they brief on the first two sections of the report (political, economic) and we can match the appropriate level J-5 speaker to who they get for OSD. Does that make sense? vr, (b)(6)

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To: (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: Iraq Progress Report

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(b)(6)

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Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2006 4:03 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, JCS SJS
Subject: RE: Iraq Progress Report

Ma'am... I just spoke with CDR (b)(6) in OSD/PA... The report is due to be delivered to Congress on the 10th of February, so it won't be included in the roll out of all the other strategic documents.

Here are the things OSD/PA is considering:

- 9 Feb -- Mil Analyst Call with two briefers (they haven't decided who from OSD yet and then appropriate level from J-5)
- 9 Feb -- Select one or two media members and provide an embargoed interview with same two briefers
- 10 Feb -- Report delivered to Congress
- 10 Feb -- Media Advisory for interested media to attend interview with same two briefers

I've cc'd LTC (b)(6) on this e-mail to bring him into the fold and get his thoughts on the LA piece so we can coordinate appropriately.

I will let everyone know as things progress and when a final action plan is approved and agreed to by everyone.

vr, (b)(6)

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> Is there value to bringing in some of the military analysts (similiar to what
we're doing with the QDR) and briefing them on the 9th about our release of the progress
report on the 10th? We can also set up a phoner too if you wish. Who would be the
appropriate person to brief them?

> VR/ CDR (b)(6)
> OASD (PA) Defense Press Office Policy Team
> Defense Intelligence
> (b)(2)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA]
Sent: Monday, February 20, 2006 5:32 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: "Fighting the Long War" - copy?

hi. can someone on your staff help with this request for one of the military analysts?
thanks!

(b)(6)

From: robertmag73@ (b)(6) [mailto:robertmag73@ (b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, February 20, 2006 5:30 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: "Fighting the Long War" - copy?

(b)(6)

Today's Washington Times includes an article by Rowan Scarborough that mentions an unclassified 27-page Joint staff briefing for Read Admiral Bill Sullivan. I believe, according to the article, the first section is "Why America wants a short war."

I'd like a copy and I suspect others would like one as well.

Can you help?

Thanks.

Bob

--
Robert L. Maginnis

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS
Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:43 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

FYI

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD]
>Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:40 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS
>Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

> Correct - no CJCS/V

> -----Original Message-----

>From: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS [<mailto:(b)(6)>]
>Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:39 PM
>To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD]
>Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

> My guy is not involved....right?

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2006 1:32 PM
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD]; (b)(6) YN1, OSD]; (b)(6) CIV, OSD];

(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OSD]; (b)(6) CTR, OSD-P&R]; Barber, Allison (b)(6) [Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA]; Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA]; Merritt, Roxie T. (b)(6) [Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA]; Lawrence, Dallas (b)(6) [Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; Bucci, Steven (b)(6) [Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; Richard, Joseph (b)(6) [Richard, Joseph, Col OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OSD]; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD]; (b)(6) CIV, OSD]; (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV JCS OVCJCS
> Subject: RE: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

> Confirming that we are still on for tomorrow as shown below - room? Is it (b)(2)

> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2006 11:59 AM (b)(6)
> To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) YN1, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) LtCol,

(b)(6)
OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, O CJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OVCJCS
> Subject: 22 Feb Outreach - time.

>
> For the outreach on 22 Feb, is it possible to adjust the time to start 15
minutes later - new time would be:

> 1:30pm-1:45 - PA Prep
> 1:45pm-2:30 - Outreach

> Let me know - thanks,
> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
> Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 9:19 AM
> To: (b)(6) YN1, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6)
> (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA;
> Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD;
> (b)(6) CTR, OSD-P&R; Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OASD-
> PA; Merritt, Roxie T. CAPT, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Capt. USMC, OASD-PA; Lawrence, Dallas,
> OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, Dr., OSD; (b)(6)
> CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) Col OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6)
> (b)(6) LtCol, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; (b)(6) CIV, OSD

> Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, O CJCS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS,
OVCJCS

> Subject: RE: PA - Schedule Items from 12 Jan Meeting

>
> Friday 3 February:
> 10:45am-10:55 - PA Prep
> 1100-1120 - Tri-West Healthcare Alliance - SD participate in cermeony
presenting portraits of MoH recipients - location TBD.

>
> Wednesday 22 February:
> 1:15am-1:30 - PA Prep
> 1:30pm-2:15 - Outreach w/Retired Military Analysts & Civilian
> Defense Experts - location TBD

>
> Tuesday 28 February:
> 8:45am-9:00- PA Prep
> 9:00am-9:20 - Meet w/National Guard Youth Challenge Group - location
> TBD

>
> Friday 10 March:
> 11:10am-11:20 - PA Prep
> 11:25 - Walk to POAC
> 11:30am-11:50 - Meet w/USA Basketball Leadership (ASY event) @ POAC

>
> Thursday 16 March:
> 1:15pm-1:30 - PA Prep
> 1:30pm-2:15 - Outreach w/Strategaic Communicators

>
> Let me know if this works - thanks,
>
> Cathy.

> -----Original Message-----

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]
Sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 2:33 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]
Cc: Smith, Dorrance (b)(6) [Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PA]; Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD]; Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; Thorp, Frank (b)(6) [Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA]; Barber, Allison (b)(6) [Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA]; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Lt Col, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA]; Ballesteros, Mark j. (b)(6) [Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA]; Vician, Todd M (b)(6) [Vician, Todd, Maj, OASD-PA]; Carpenter, Joseph (b)(6) [Carpenter, Joe, LCDR OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV - OASD(PA)]

Subject: Dempsey military analyst transcript

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Attachments: 03-16-06 Dempsey ISF training.doc



03-16-06 Dempsey ISF training....

Attached is the edited transcript from yesterday's military analyst call with LTG Dempsey.

The entire call was on background.

Military Analysts Call

Thursday, March 16, 2006

Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I)

On Background

Hosts: Mr. Dallas Lawrence, OASDPA, (b)(6) OASDPA

Room (b)(2); LTG Dempsey in Iraq

Transcriber: Murphy

Lawrence: (in progress) **the entire call will be on background. You are free to quote the source as a senior military leader, but other than that, it's on background,** and General Dempsey should be calling in shortly.

(break to wait)

The show is yours, sir. We have gone over the ground rules. Our folks know this call is on background, and we appreciate you joining us this evening from Iraq.

Dempsey: My pleasure.

Lawrence: General, if you'd like to kind of give an opening overview of the current status of forces, what the successes your folks are seeing there, anything you'd like to discuss, then we can open it up for questions.

Dempsey: Yeah, I think I would. But I will keep it brief, because I would rather just field the questions that they are interested in.

First of all, hello to all of you. Most of you have been over here at one time or another. I am just crossing my 21st month in Baghdad, 14 the first time and seven now. So I've got a bit of a, it seems to me, a historical perspective on this whole thing.

And what I would say in general terms in that regard is that although the generation of the combat forces, the more than 100 battalions of Army and police battalions that are out there get most of the notoriety, the – it seems to me that the – an equally important story is the institutions that are being built above it, that is to say the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, as well as the – kind of the foundation of the whole thing which is an education system, an Iraqi training and doctrine command that includes 18 institutes, academies, colleges and training centers so that this force we are building will be two things principally – three really. One is capable, clearly. But the other two are one that is an institution from top to bottom, from foot soldier to minister, and even more important than that an institution of national unity, that is, a cohesive force inside the country at a time when they clearly need some cohesive forces working on their behalf. And I think there's been some reasons to believe that that endeavor and that entire enterprise is moving in that direction.

And with that, I will say only one other thing, and that is I know nothing, literally, about Operation Swarmer, so if you will stay clear of that, I would be happy to answer your questions.

Q: General, this is Jeff McCausland. Good to talk to you again. Could you talk a little bit about that national unity function? Of course, there's been various reports after the bombing of the Golden Mosque (22 February in Samarra). And in general, the ones I have read seem to be summarized by saying the Iraqi security forces, the army, performed quite well; in fact, they deployed rapidly and were a settling influence, however, that the police forces were somewhat mixed results in terms of that whole being cohesive, being identified as a unifying force, et cetera.

Could you talk a little about those events, and those two different parts of the security force?

Dempsey: Sure. In general terms, I would say that the army and the national police – and the national police, by the way, used to be called when you were here last time the special police – and consist of the commando division and the public order division, those national forces, we have more visibility on them than we do the local police, but – performed very well. They were very deliberate; they were poised. I would describe their activities as a settling – clearly a settling influence on what was essentially a very emotionally charged atmosphere.

There were reports of certain units that chose not to confront armed militia, and there were some armed militia activities that cropped up, notably the (Muqtada Sadr's) Jaysh al Mahdi in and around Sadr City. But frankly, they didn't have much political top cover to do so. In other words, there was a conscious decision taken at the national level not to exacerbate the problem by handling two problems at once, you know, you've got the emotionally charged atmosphere of the mosque and the religious undertones of that and the decision was made not to confront militias, but rather ensure that they were not acting in criminal ways. So, for example, there were a couple of mosques that were taken over by militias – the militia of course claimed – and it may be true -- that they took them over in order to protect them – but when the legitimate forces went and said, okay, we got it now, they -- in every case -- they dispersed.

There were other reports about armed groups moving through the streets, you know, shooting their rifles in the air and things that over here are somewhat common place, I don't want to diminish that, but in every case, again, the legitimate security forces had a leveling effect on all that and kind of channeled all this excess energy.

Now we're still in the – this is all very recent, so we're still in the process at some level of accumulating our lessons learned. And there were a couple of instances where local police in particular, I am not talking about the national police or the national army, but the local police may have, you know, turned a blind eye to some things. But frankly, I saw this as a watershed moment for the Iraqi Security Forces, and they not only passed the challenge but did so very well.

Q: General, Jed Babbin. Thanks again for hosting us when we were over there in December. What can you tell us about the militias infiltrating the legitimate forces and we hear all sorts of goofy reports about people coming in and sectarian violence coming out of some of these forces.

Dempsey: First of all, let me go from the latter part of your question to the former. Make no mistake about it, there are intelligence reports on a frequent basis that cause us to be concerned about the activities of pieces of the legitimate security forces, never an entire unit, but rather an individual or two or three or 10, maybe, inside of a legitimate unit. And we've got a system in place with our Iraqi counterparts to investigate those. And we have on, I don't know, in the last six months or so, we've had the occasion to change commanders of battalions in both the army and the national police – again, the commandos and public order.

We've also changed a number of brigade commanders because there was enough evidence they were not exerting the kind of control and discipline over their force they needed.

But again, this is probably two or three battalions out of 100 or so in the army, and one brigade out of eight in the national police and two battalions out of 24 in the national police.

So, I mean, you know, it's significant, but not anything that would me to describe this as an endemic problem.

Now, back to the issue of infiltration. This is one of my favorite words, naturally. And it's hard for me to sign up for infiltration when we talk about the legitimate, that is to say, the governmental recognized militias – you know, the peshmerga, the Badr and seven others are identified in CPA order No. 91 as legitimate militias that must be over time disarmed and/or assimilated into Iraqi society and even the Iraqi Security Forces.

So we clearly have had former Badr Corps, former peshmerga come in to the security forces as individuals, intentionally. In fact, in some cases we've taken inputs and allowed them to be recruited intentionally that way as part of an assimilation process. The key is not to have them all in one place, and the second key is to have the leaders of units be diverse, and have the MiTT (Military Transition Team) teams that overwatch them be sensitive to these kind of things and also the special police transition teams as well.

Now there are other militias, let's even be less specific, and call them armed groups out there that are more problematic. And I mentioned the Jaysh al Mahdi as one of them, because it's not a recognized militia by the CPA order No. 91.

Secondly, many of the young men that tend to drift toward Jaysh al Mahdi are uneducated, almost universally unemployed, and as a result they can't even get into the

legitimate security forces because the legitimate security forces have a recruiting standard and generally they can't pass it. So they pose a little bit different kind of problem.

But infiltration is probably less precise than it ought to be, given that in some cases these men are actually invited in.

Q: Hey Marty, Bob Scales, how are you doing?

Dempsey: Hi, Bob, good to hear from you.

Q: Listen, I am intrigued by your description of a building of an institutional part of the army, a sort of TRADOC if you will. Are you actually building things like academies, staff colleges, war colleges, NCO academies, things of that sort? And if so, is that your mission or does that belong to somebody else? And I guess the last part is how is that going?

Dempsey: It is my mission. It was actually – it all started on Dave's (Petraeus) watch, actually. The concept has kind of matured and in fact, in my other hat, which is the NATO commander in Iraq, that's really in terms of officer education, that's their niche.

But, yeah, we've graduated our first class from the Iraqi military academy at Rustamiyah 78 new second lieutenants, none of whom had previous military experience. And that's significant, because you know we've also brought in, as you know, former officers to fill the ranks, and this was the first class – it graduated in January, that is young men who never had any previous military experience. So that's the beginning, it seems to me, of an officer development system, officer education system that will over time, you know, essentially replenish the ranks from start to finish.

And we're going to – we actually, it's another one of these national unity initiatives. There's three military academies in Iraq. One in Zakho, one in Qualachulon (?), they're both in Kurdistan, and one at Rustamiyah. And we've got them linked together with a common curriculum, a common program of instruction, common course length, they share instructors. And now they are each producing about 100 every nine months. Where we want to get them is to each produce about 300 because our analysis of the life-cycle needs of the army is that they'll need about 900 new lieutenants every year.

But that's all in place. There's a joint staff college equivalent to our Command and General Staff College in place. It will graduate 50 junior level they call it – that'd be majors and lieutenant colonels and then this year, this is the pilot year, 37 of the seniors, which are essentially full colonels and civilians, by the way, and that course will double in size next year as well.

There's a war college – actually they are going to call it a national defense university, that will open in September. And by the way, that's not unique on the army side. On the police side we've recently converted Baghdad police college to the production of officers, and they've got a nine-month course – I'm sorry, they've got a six-month, a one-

year course, and they've got a three-year course. And all those are up and running and if you all come over here and want to visit them -- I think that this is what will essentially create this enterprise that will endure over time.

Q: I am trying to get over there specifically just to bother you for a couple days so I can come back and report all that. I really think the larger message needs to be made. It's not just about producing battalions or producing soldiers and policemen, but it's also about producing infrastructure, and I think that's a story that the American people need to hear.

Dempsey: Absolutely right. And, just to highlight -- or reinforce that point, it's really what we focus on now. I mean the generation of units is really (in train?) and requires very little -- and by the way, handed over in great measure. The platform instructors for all of these institutes, academies, training centers, used to be exclusively Coalition and now it's 70 percent Iraqi. And by the end of this year, we will have transitioned most instructor positions over to Iraqis and then we'll be in a mentoring and advising role there.

We've also sent 500 mid-grade officers out of country as part of a NATO initiative to, you know, to the Marshall Center. And we had a kid graduate from Sandhurst who graduated with an award for the best foreign cadet. So, I mean, that's the institution side of it. It's not sexy, but it's the most important thing we're doing.

Q: And a story that needs to be told.

Q: Hey, sir, Ken Allard. Actually I think we adopted the class at Rustamiyah on our last trip over there ourselves. And we sure remember them very fondly.

Dempsey: Yeah, that's right, I do.

Q: The thing that I am getting a lot of questions about from our correspondents -- by the way, they talk about the present level of violence is making it even tougher on them to cover the story than it otherwise would have been.

One of the things that is interesting to me, based on my own experience in Bosnia, is whether or not you are seeing any signs of what amounts to a de facto ethnic cleansing? Because what happened over there was not so much that you had the death squads moving around, they were certainly present, probably in the same way that they are in Iraq, but what was happening is that a lot of what was going on was simply people getting out of harm's way. Are you seeing any signs that that is going on, and if so, what are the institutions you're building doing about that?

Dempsey: Yeah, one of the -- well, a couple of ways to answer that, or a couple of aspects to the answer. And that is most of the problems, this is no surprise, it's a flash to the obvious, you know, it's where the fault lines exist. And the principal fault line exists in Baghdad, pure and simple. It's also the center of gravity politically and so forth.

So we haven't seen the kind of problems that you are talking about any place else than Iraq with the exception of Baghdad. One of General Casey's CCIR (commanders' critical information requirements) is displacement of civilians, for exactly the reason you talk about. Are they being forced out, are they leaving?

By the way, the analysis of that is very complicated right now because we are right in the middle of Arba'een. Ashura is, you know, their Good Friday essentially, and then 40 days later is the Arba'een holiday and they – and many of them troop south, many of the Shi'a pilgrims, I should be more specific – troop south. And that's going on at precisely the time we are trying to figure out, you know, what's truth and what's fiction about the movement of people.

There have been two – since the Samarra mosque incident – there's been two reports of families on the move. One was I think – and again this is all on background, so please don't use the exact number – one involved 200 families and another one about the same number moving from Baghdad south. And the first report was absolutely determined to be pilgrims. The second one we don't have the answer yet; it could very well be that there were people that had moved out of southeast Baghdad to the south, to get away from what they perceived to be an unsecure situation.

As to what we're doing about it, this is really an operational answer to that question, but we are really focused like a laser beam on Baghdad, because again, for all the reasons I mentioned. And General Casey as you know has brought up the – a piece of his operational reserve to thicken the ranks. It's also been, by the way, a pretty good test of their ability to move and determine what timelines they would need to have to move.

We've brought three battalions of public order back from – they were forward deployed elsewhere, we brought them back into Baghdad. The Iraqi army has moved another couple battalions into Baghdad.

So we've probably increased the force levels in Baghdad by about anywhere from 3,500 to 4,000. Increased a number of patrols by between 150 and 200 a day. Kind of the issue now is restoring public confidence, frankly, and that takes place by increased presence. And so all that's happening. And we're monitoring the kind of things you just talked about as part of our CCIR.

But to this point, we haven't seen those kind of displacements. What we have seen is kind of a bit of a back and forth, you know, there will be a Sunni atrocity and then there will be a Shi'a atrocity and a Sunni atrocity. So the real trick here is to break the cycle, and we are working on that.

Q: General, Bob Maginnis. Question regarding the defense ministry and the interior ministry and whether or not you are seeing indications that they are maturing enough to be able to oversee countrywide the types of functions that you just described.

Dempsey: Yeah, maturing -- the present participle applies. They are clearly, they are clearly maturing. And we monitor -- just like the tactical units have a -- we call it a transitional readiness assessment. It's a monthly report card, if you will. We've got one that we, that we - where we evaluate ourselves, because we are not advisors over there, we're partners with them. And so on a monthly basis we determine what progress we have made or have failed to make on 18 key functions in any ministry, and it's everything from personal management with, you know, subtext of pay and promotion and retirement, all the way down to the inspector general function.

And we have - you know that I've got developmental responsibility for both ministries. And I've got right now about 70 soldiers and civilians in each ministry, and that number is going to go up a bit here in the next month because we have made some analysis of additional needs. And we really want them to get off to a promising start in this first 100 days of the new government. We are really focused on having them achieve some successes in the first 100 days or so in the new government. And so we're really, we've got some programs we've worked out with them to give them a few early wins if you want to call it that.

So, now there are some processes though where we have made enormous strides, pay for example. Promotion we're close, very close. And some that are just going to take longer. And the two that come immediately to mind are procurement and contracting. You know, they come from a command-directed economy where pretty much if you needed it you asked for the money, if you got it, you spent it. There was no competitive bidding and no competing in the free market economy against other sectors of the economy.

But they are very much in a free market economy now. They have to make their case to a council, and they've to do competitive bidding. This is their law, by the way, not ours -- their new law I should say. So that's been a real eye opener for them, and that probably is going to take, you know, a couple of years, I think, to mature.

Q: General, just one follow-up. The pay you mentioned, you know, what have you done to fix that?

Dempsey: Great question. Well, first of all, we've identified the problem. The problem wasn't pay; it was easy to lump it in to the category of pay. The problem was really personal accountability, frankly. So, for example, if a commander up in Mosul didn't have proper accountability of his people and either numbers or in rank structure and he placed a demand on the system -- and it's still a manual system -- and here came the payroll (north?) and he got there and he didn't have enough money to pay, then it was sort of lumped in in precisely as a pay problem. Well, it wasn't a pay problem, it was a personal accountability problem. So that's where we put our effort.

And we've got a couple of initiatives in place to build for them what we might call a little personnel administration center in each battalion where as these soldiers go on leave, you know, they're basically on a 21-day on, seven-day off cycle, they process in and out each time. And it's beginning to give us a heck of a lot more clarity on what's out there. And

as a result, I would venture to say – now this, our last month may have been an anomaly, I hope not, but the last month we had fewer than 1,000 pay problems in an army of, you know, that's just now at about at 106,000. And those were corrected very quickly upon identification.

The police is a little different. You know, they draw their pay and their support for local police from the provinces and then the national police are supported from the center. So, you know, we're learning as we go with that, but we've made some pretty significant strides with that as well.

Q: General, this is Jeff McCausland again. On the (inaudible) side, there's been a lot of focus frankly on the actual ministers, a Mr. (inaudible – sounds like he might mean Bayan Jaber, interior minister) the minister of interior is one that (inaudible – is talked about?) an awful lot. I'll fully understand if you don't want to want to comment at all. But I am curious about your thoughts at all, because obviously the guys at the top are going to be key and essential on answering a lot of these questions, whether it's infiltration, whether it's pay, (inaudible) et cetera.

Dempsey: You know ministers – in general terms – I don't want to comment about them personally because, you know, I mean, I have such a close relationship to them it wouldn't take too long to figure out where it came from.

But I will tell you in tell you in general terms, what this country needs in my view is ministers who -- you know, we tend to say we need a government of national unity, and that's a fact. No doubt about it. But you do need ministers in the key positions who have a strong political backing. In other words, they've got to have a constituency so that as they are buffeted by other influencers they've got some political backing. I mean, this is a democracy now.

(break in transcript)

Q: Sir, Ken Allard again. I was really impressed with some of the (inaudible – sounds like BUDS) that we saw, particularly with the overlapping surveillance systems. Have those things been any real assistance to you guys in dealing with the problem of the civil violence? Have those systems helped you guys at all react?

Dempsey: Yeah, I think so. Frankly, Pete Chiarelli would be better positioned to answer that because he really has access to that all the time. But I do know that --

Q: Well tell him that I said hi and also that --

Dempsey: I will.

Q: And I'll ask him those embarrassing questions myself.

Dempsey: Yeah, yeah. No problem. But I will say that he has reported that some of those things have allowed – you know the whole issue in this part of the world, I am not just talking about Baghdad or Iraq, but this part of the world is rumor generally trumps fact. And what these overlapping systems have allowed us to do in many cases is confirm or deny and tamp down things that otherwise could really spin out of control.

Lawrence: Any additional questions for the general?

Q: Well, thanks for what you've done, buddy. This is Bob Scales. You know, you've done a terrific job and all of us over here are really proud of you.

Dempsey: Well, thanks. That means a lot. And by the way though, it hasn't escaped me. I know you're trying to get over here, but I notice you didn't try to get over here before St. Patrick's Day (laughter).

Q: Hey, I am on a (six - inaudible) train tomorrow morning; I am going to O'Houlihan's on 57th Street, and I'll drink a beer (inaudible) I am going to march in the parade, Marty (laughter).

Dempsey: Are you really? That's great.

Q: Take care, my friend.

Dempsey: All right, you all take care.

Q: Take care, sir.

Q: Thanks to you, general.

Q: Hey Dallas?

Lawrence: Yes, sir. Folks, just a quick reminder that was on background. Go ahead, colonel.

(sidebar conversation continues).

End of transcript

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2006 3:45 PM
To: 'peter.pace@'(b)(6)
Cc: Giambastiani, EP, ADM, VCJCS; Odierno, Raymond T, LTG, JCS ACJCS; Sharp, Walter L., LTG, JCS DJS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS, ACJCS; (b)(6) Col, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Col JCS SJS; (b)(6) COL, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) MSgt, OCJCS/PA; Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) COL, JCS J5; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, JCS SJS
Subject: INTERVIEWS IN SUPPORT OF SECDEF

General Pace, Sir:

I have the following information regarding upcoming media interviews on the topic of retired generals calling for Secretary Rumsfeld's resignation. Also pasted below is the text of the President's statement of support for SecDef.

Very Respectfully,
Katie

TONIGHT

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1700-1800 GEN Franks on "Hardball" (MSNBC) 1800 -- Gen Myers on Fox News 2200 -- Gen Jumper on "Anderson Cooper 360" (CNN)

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Subject: STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

April 14, 2006

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GEORGE W. BUSH

#

Tracking:

Recipient	Read
'peter.pace@ (b)(6)	
Giambastiani, EP, ADM, VCJCS	Read: 4/15/2006 8:12 AM
Odierno, Raymond T, LTG, JCS ACJCS	
Sharp, Walter L., LTG, JCS DJS	Read: 4/14/2006 3:53 PM
(b)(6)	Read: 4/14/2006 3:55 PM
	Read: 4/14/2006 4:59 PM
	Read: 4/17/2006 12:35 PM
	Read: 4/14/2006 5:36 PM
	Read: 4/14/2006 4:22 PM
	Read: 4/14/2006 3:46 PM
	Read: 4/14/2006 3:54 PM
Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD]	Read: 4/14/2006 3:45 PM
(b)(6)	
	Read: 4/14/2006 3:46 PM
	Deleted: 4/17/2006 5:14 PM
	Read: 4/19/2006 3:53 PM
Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]	Read: 4/14/2006 5:32 PM

Recipient

(b)(6)



Pace, Peter, Gen, JCS, CJCS

Read

Read: 4/14/2006 3:45 PM

Read: 4/14/2006 4:38 PM

Read: 4/14/2006 3:47 PM

Read: 4/14/2006 4:18 PM

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2006 3:57 PM
To: (b)(6) MAJ, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LCDR, JCS OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
Subject: A CIV JCS SJS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV JCS SJS
FW: INTERVIEWS IN SUPPORT OF SECDEF

(b)(6)

Might want to capture these transcripts for Monday...

Thanks.

V/R

Col H

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA

Sent: Friday, April 14, 2006 3:45 PM

To: 'peter.pace' (b)(6)

Cc: Giambastiani, EP, ADM, VCJCS; Odierno, Raymond T, LTG, JCS ACJCS; Sharp, Walter L.,

LTG, JCS DJS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS ACJCS; (b)(6) Col, JCS SJS; (b)(6)

(b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Col JCS SJS; (b)(6) COL, JCS,

OCJCS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)

(b)(6) MSgt, OCJCS/PA; Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD]; (b)(6)

(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) COL, JCS J5; (b)(6)

(b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj,

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GEORGE W. BUSH

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(b)(6)

From: Giambastiani, EP, ADM, VCJCS
Sent: Saturday, April 15, 2006 8:14 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; Pace, Peter, Gen, JCS, CJCS
Cc: (b)(6), Col, JCS SJS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
A, COL, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS, OCJCS; Sharp, Walter L., LTG, JCS
DJS; (b)(6) COL, JCS J5; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV,
JCS SJS
Subject: RE: INTERVIEWS IN SUPPORT OF SECDEF

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From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2006 3:45 PM
To: Pace, Peter, Gen, JCS, CJCS
Cc: Giambastiani, EP, ADM, VCJCS; Odierno, Raymond T. LTG, JCS ACJCS; Sharp, Walter L.,
LTG, JCS DJS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS, ACJCS; (b)(6) Col, JCS SJS; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CAPT, JCS OVCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Col JCS SJS; (b)(6) COL, JCS,
OCJCS; (b)(6) CAPT, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) MSgt, OCJCS/PA; Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD]; (b)(6)
(b)(6) [Turner, James, CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) COL, JCS J5; (b)(6)
(b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Maj,
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#

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, April 17, 2006 7:11 PM
To: (b)(6) COL, JCS, OCJCS
Cc: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) LCDR, JCS, OCJCS
Subject: FW: Read Ahead Retired Military Analysts 04-18-06.doc

Attachments: image001.gif; oledata.mso

(b)(6)

OSD PA is coordinating a RoundTable tomorrow with SecDef, CJCS, and 17 retired military analysts. (List of attendees is at the bottom of this email.) They will be here from 1340 to 1600, local.

Itinerary includes:
1345-1430, briefing from Iraq via conference call (briefer still not yet identified)
1445-1515 with Gen Pace and
1515-1600 with SecDef

I'll provide Gen Pace a copy of this read-ahead in the a.m.
Just wanted to give you a head's up.

V/R
Katie

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]
Sent: Monday, April 17, 2006 5:20 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; Barber, Allison (b)(6) [Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA]
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas (b)(6) [Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA]; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD]
Subject: Read Ahead Retired Military Analysts 04-18-06.doc

hi. please note additional analysts for tomorrow's roundtable. we now have 17.
thanks

(b)(6)

Updated April 17, 2006

READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD

OUTREACH MEETING WITH RETIRED MILITARY ANALYSTS

Date/Time: Tuesday, April 18, 2006
to 4:00 p.m.

3:15 p.m.

Location: SecDef Dining Room, (b)(2)

Background:

* Approximately sixteen retired military analysts who serve as military/defense experts for major media outlets.

* Last outreach meeting with this group was September 2005.

* Comments should be considered on background.

Timeline:

1:40 p.m. Welcome and Introduction

* Allison Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

1:45 p.m. Update on Iraqi Security Forces (via video teleconference)

* Briefers TBD

2:30 p.m. Break

2:45 p.m. Update on Global Operations

* General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

3:15 p.m. Discussion and Questions with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

4:00 p.m. Meeting Concludes

Attachments:

* List of Participants

Tab A

Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld

Meeting with Retired Military Analysts

Room (b)(2) The Pentagon

Tuesday, April 18, 2006

Participants

CONFIRMED:

Mr. Jed Babbin

(USAF, JAG)

Lieutenant General Frank B. Campbell (USAF, Retired)
Dr. James Jay Carafano (LTC, USA, Retired)
Colonel (Tim) J. Eads (USA, Retired)
General Ronald Fogelman (USAF, Retired)
Colonel John Garrett (USMC, Retired)
Command Sergeant Major Steven Greer (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Maginnis (USA, Retired)
Colonel Jeff McCausland (USA, Retired)
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney (USAF, Retired)
Captain Chuck Nash (USN, Retired)
General William L. Nash (USA, Retired)
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (USA, Retired)
Major General Donald W. Shepperd (USAF, Retired)
Mr. Wayne Simmons (USN, CIA, Retired)
Captain Martin L. Strong (USN, Retired)
General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Retired)

(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2006 9:28 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, JCS, OCJCS
Cc: (b)(6) COL, JCS, OCJCS; (b)(6) MSgt, JCS, OCJCS
Subject: FW: Read Ahead Retired Military Analysts 04-18-06.doc

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Attachments: image001.gif; oledata.mso

(b)(6)

During prebrief with SecDef, he mentioned Gen Pace should have 45 minutes with these guys too...not sure if that works, or if SecDef mentioned it to Gen Pace this a.m., or what, but wanted to give you a head's up.

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From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]
Sent: Monday, April 17, 2006 5:20 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; Barber, Allison (b)(6) [Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA]
Cc: Lawrence, Dallas (b)(6) [Lawrence, Dallas, OASD-PA]; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) LtCol, OSD]
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(b)(6)

Updated April 17, 2006

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Tuesday, April 18, 2006

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(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2006 5:16 PM
To: (b)(6) COL, JCS NMCC
Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Lt Col, JCS J3
Subject: RE: 191100 APR O/C with DJ3

Thanks, (b)(6)

First off, I appreciate you coming to the rescue today, and helping us get BG Ham to brief the retired military analysts...he was very well received. The analysts spoke very highly of him (to the SecDef). Thank you for your part in making that happen!

I'll be there tomorrow at 1100 to discuss Ops Only press availabilities, or anything else the general wants to talk about!

V/R
Katie

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>From: (b)(6) COL, JCS NMCC
>Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2006 5:00 PM
>To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Cc: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Lt Col, JCS J3
>Subject: 191100 APR O/C with DJ3

>Katie,
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>vr
(b)(6)

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> From: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
> Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2006 4:53 PM
> To: Conway, James T, LtGen, JCS J3; Winns, Anthony L, RADM, JCS, J-3; Ham, Carter F, BG, JCS NMCC; Dorsett, David J (b)(6) [Dorsett, David J, RDML, J2]
> Cc: (b)(6) COL, JCS NMCC; (b)(6) LtCol, JCS J3; (b)(6)
(b)(6) CAPT, JCS NMCC; (b)(6) LCDR JCS J3; (b)(6) LTC, JCS J2
> Subject: transcript of SecDef & CJCS press conference

> << File: 060418 SD & CJCS presser.doc >> Generals, Admirals, Attached is the transcript from today's press availability with SecDef and Gen Pace. It is 13 pages - the first 11 of which discuss the criticism of the Secretary by retired general officers. General Pace discusses (again) the process of how senior officers and civilian leadership discuss decision making - page 8.

> At page 11, there is a question about Afghanistan and the concern about the poppy crops. Other topics (not that there was much time for such) included "ethnic cleansing" in Iraq, dealing with the militias and the formation of the Iraqi government.

> Vr
(b)(6)

> CDR (b)(6)
> Public Affairs Office
> Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
> The Pentagon, (b)(2)
> (b)(2)

>
>
>

niprnet:
siprnet:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2006 5:27 PM
To: Ham, Carter F, BG, JCS NMCC
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT, JCs NMCC; (b)(6) LCDR JCS J3; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: 191100 APR O/C with DJ3

Sir -
Echo Col H's note - truly - they really appreciated the perspective you provided.
Thank you SOOO VERY MUCH for coming to the rescue today. Name your flavor!

VR

(b)(6)

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> (b)(6)
>
> CDR (b)(6)
> Public Affairs Office
> Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
> The Pentagon, (b)(2)
> (b)(2)
> noprnet: (b)(6)
> siprnet:
>

(b)(6)

From:

(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]

Sent:

Monday, May 22, 2006 3:46 PM

To:

(b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]

Cc:

(b)(6) [Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PA]; Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD]; Thorp, Frank (b)(6) [Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA]; Barber, Allison (b)(6) Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA]; Maka, Brian (b)(6) [Maka, Brian, LTC, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) AFIS-HQ/Web Operations]; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) (b)(6), CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6), LtCol, OCJCS/PA

Subject:

transcript (b)(6) China report

Attachments:

05-22-06 China Rodman.doc



05-22-06 China Rodman.doc (58 ...

Attached is the transcript from this morning's conference call with Mr. Peter Rodman and the military analysts regarding the 2006 China Military Report.

As you announced, the call was on background and the information is embargoed until 1500 Tuesday.

Transcript:

Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Monday, May 22, 2006

Host: (b)(6) OSD-Public Affairs

OSD-Public Affairs staff: LTC Brian Maka

Trancriber: Murphy (digital)

Room (b)(2)

Topic: 2006 China Military Report

On Background

(b)(6) We are going to go ahead and get started. I will just remind you quickly we are on background so you are free to quote a senior DoD official. All of the information that you get here today we ask that you embargo until 1500 tomorrow. So with that I am going to go ahead and turn it over to the assistant secretary of defense, Peter Rodman.

Mr. Rodman: Good morning. Good morning and thank you for coming in, or tuning in, or whatever the phrase is. I think you are familiar with the origins of this report. I'll just say a brief word about that and then secondly, what we think some of the highlights are. And I think we should try to get – well we don't post, I guess we won't post the full text.

LTC Maka: Sir, it will be an active link on it tomorrow morning, or tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. Rodman: Okay. But anyway, you know, this is a congressional mandate. We have done this every year for a number of years. And the Congress asks us a number of questions about China's not only China's military programs but its long-term strategy. So the report, as in past years, has a lot of discussion about the underlying factors in China's military policy and so it ranges – you know, it isn't just nuts and bolts. It's about strategy, it's about economic factors, a little bit about political context, and so forth.

The – I would mention before I get into this report a couple of important quotes in some other reports. The president's National Security Strategy Report in March had a very important sentence in it about hedging. You may remember that sentence. ("Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people while we hedge against other possibilities.") That's from the president's National Security Strategy Report, and that pretty well encapsulates what our strategy toward China is. We try to put a constructive – we try to shape developments in a constructive direction but obviously, particularly in this department, our job is to watch closely what China is doing, and to be the one to be prepared to do what's necessary to carry out our commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. And part of that task is to watch closely what China is doing.

The QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) also had an important discussion about China, and it talked about China having the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U.S., and to field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages. That's the QDR in February. You may have copies of that.

So that gets us into the subject here, which is what China is doing. That's – I can now get into some of the specific highlights. A lot of what's in the report is not new, because a lot of what we're talking about has been a trend that we have spotted in previous reports. But some of the things that we highlighted in this report are China's strategic forces modernization.

We've mentioned this before, it's not brand new; but it's something that we are really commenting on that I think we should call your attention to. There are at least 10 varieties of ballistic missiles deployed or in development – at least 10 varieties of ballistic missiles either deployed or being developed. We see qualitative improvements as well as quantitative improvements. So, you know, the qualitative improvements include improved range, mobility and accuracy. You know,

ICBMs, for example, are the most advanced, they're solid fuel road mobile ICBMs that can reach the United States.

Again, this is not new, but we're struck by the strength of these programs. Shorter range missiles opposite of Taiwan – they have continued to build about 100 new ones a year, and so the total is up, you know, close to 800. That again is not new, but it's just inexorably growing, that missile force opposite Taiwan, about 100 a year.

We see very capable cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles and anti-ship weapons. Again, it's not new, but we are, you know, calling attention to some of these developments and these are giving the Chinese new options. Five submarine programs, five different submarine acquisition programs.

Now what does this mean strategically? Well, we see a number of things. We see, as we mentioned last year, a lot of these things are – they go beyond Taiwan in their significance. It's obvious that much of China's military development is focused on a Taiwan contingency. But we see both in their statements by some of their strategists and in some of their procurement that China is beginning to develop – again, I emphasize beginning – to think in terms of it to develop the capability to project power. They're only at the beginning of it, but I think this seems to be part of their long-range intention. And this could relate to contingencies – for example related to resources or territorial disputes, of which there are many in the region.

So, again, this is worth noting. We have noted it before but it continues to be worth noting.

Another issue – well, another issue we've called attention to before is about their use of nuclear weapons. There seems to be a debate going on about the no first-use doctrine. The Chinese say that they're committed to a doctrine of no first-use weapons, but we've seen a few stray comments by more than one strategic thinker calling this in to question. Now, they have reassured us, I repeat – when Secretary Rumsfeld was there, he was reassured by the Chinese that they adhere to the no first-use doctrine, and we take them at their word. But they say there is – we see these occasional comments as an indication of a possible debate that is going on among Chinese strategists and we think it is worth of note that there may be this debate going on.

But the issue gets to another big issue about transparency, which is how we often state our concern. China is a sovereign country, it has a right to build up its defense capability as it chooses, but the lack of transparency is clearly a concern for not only us, but China's neighbors.

This lack of transparency is reflected in a number of things; we talk in this report as in the past about the defense budget. We think their defense budget understates their real defense spending by a factor of two or three. In other words, their real defense programs are we think two or three times what their declared defense budget is because of --probably because of different accounting methods, probably because a lot of things -- they just do not include a lot of their research and development, a lot of their foreign purchases, they just don't include in their defense budget. But in any case the lack of transparency adds to the concern of China's neighbors.

Another aspect of this is a surprise factor. We mention in this report, as in the past, that every once in a while we encounter a new program of theirs that we didn't know about. You know, a new submarine or some program that, you know, has reached a mature stage that we just didn't know about. And that's a concern, obviously. And that is a continuing concern, and that is mentioned in this report.

Another problem is we worry about the dangers of miscalculation. I mean it's – we don't want to overestimate Chinese capability, we don't want to underestimate Chinese capability. And we don't want them to make a misjudgment, you know, to overestimate their capability. And so, you know, one of our objectives of our military exchanges with China is to try to illuminate a little more what they're up to, get them to disclose more of what they are thinking. They publish a white

paper every couple of years, which is a step forward, but it's not anything like what we do. I mean, we have our QDR for example, as well as, you know, every year, SecDef goes and testifies. We are incredibly transparent about our assumptions, our planning, our strategies, you know, as well as the procurement that supports those.

And Taiwan, by the way, came up with a recent with a recent statement that their national security strategy which – again, reflects the fact that it's a government accountable to a legislature and – but the Chinese have -- are only at the beginning of, you know, disclosing what their real thinking is, and that, as I say, is the problem.

We are concerned about the specifics of their build up, but as I said, the lack of transparency gives a whole new dimension to the problem.

I would mention just a couple – well, a couple of other nuggets in the report. There's a famous quotation from Deng Xiao Ping -- this is in previous reports -- it's called the 24-character strategy. And it's a maxim of his that goes back about 15 years but – it has been often quoted by senior Chinese strategists. And it's about – you may have seen it before, but I'll read it again. (")Observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time. Be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership(").

The phrase that strikes me of course is hide our capacities and bide our time. I think this encapsulates what China's strategy is – they're very patient, they know their weaknesses. And our report, by the way, is very clear about China's weaknesses; we're not trying to portray them as 10 feet tall.

But the Chinese are – seem to be aware of their limitations, but they are patiently and systematically building up their options so that five years from now, 10 years from now, they will have significant options that they don't have now. And that the balance of forces may be shifting if we are not careful to be, you know, to respond in our own planning.

So I think the Chinese have a strategy. They talk about comprehensive national power. You know, there's a debate in the west – oh, are they focusing on economic development versus military. Well, in a way they are doing all of the above. Clearly their economic growth is the foundation of everything else and their defense budget – their declared defense budget is rising faster than their GDP. They recently announced 14.7 increase in their defense budget. And that's a lot more than their economic growth rate, and that also reflects a recent trend. So they are modernizing their military rapidly, systematically. It certainly lacks – there are a lot of things they can't do. Their power projection capability is very, very limited right now. And again, we are very aware of China's weaknesses and China's vulnerabilities. But they have a patient long-term strategy and I think we have to recognize that.

Anyway, let me stop there, and I am happy to answer some questions.

Q: Mr. Rodman, Jed Babbin, American Spectator.

Mr. Rodman: Jed, how are you?

Q: Well, not bad for a grumpy old guy. Hope you're well. The issue that pops into my head is the question of Taiwan's investment in their own defense. The last I heard the legislative yuan (juan? Taiwanese legislature?) had turned down the appropriations for the 2001 arms package 50-some odd times. Is there any change in that or any change or modification or spending?

Rodman: Well, you're absolutely right to raise that. We discuss that in this report, at least to some degree it's clear that if it doesn't get serious about national defense and the balance of forces it's going to tilt even more radically. We had a – well, first of all the Chinese issued their – I mean the

Taiwanese issued their – the government issued its own national security report, which is a good thing. And we hope that there's a serious national debate beginning in Taiwan.

The government has committed itself to a three percent – a three percent of GDP by 2008. In other words, whatever happens to the special budget – you know, whether it's done by special budget or just the regular defense budget, (Taiwanese) President Chen has said that they ought to be spending three percent of GDP on defense. The mayor of Taiwan was in this country a few weeks back and Mayor Ma, he's the mayor of Taipei. And we had a chance to talk to him about this – you know the KMT (Kuomintang), the opposition party has to be serious about defense, I mean, we just indicated, you know, without taking any sides in their politics that the United States as a friend, you know, expects them to be carrying a significant load for their own self defense, and he said he agrees with that, and he said it's, you know, at some point as his party or his campaign, you know – as his campaign develops that he'll come out with his own defense program. And we certainly emphasize what the American view is and as I say he may -- he gave us some reassurance, and we just hope that will be reflected. You know they, you know, there ought to be a national consensus in Taiwan about facing up to the threat that they face. And we'll see, we'll see how it unfolds, but at least we delivered the message – we deliver the message to both sides, you know, to both parties or both the major parties whenever we get a chance.

(b)(6)

Gentlemen, any other questions for Mr. Rodman?

Q: Well, if nobody else is going to jump in, let me jump back in.

Mr. Rodman: Please.

Q: A couple of things that struck me in last year's report. Again, their dedication to asymmetric weapons such as anti-satellite weapons, cyberwarfare and so forth.

Mr. Rodman: Yes.

Q: Is there any change in your assessment from last year or, and if so, what is it?

Mr. Rodman: No – well, they're highlighted again, both of those things. So you're right, we don't have a concrete development to point to except they're among the developments that we highlight. They're still working on those things.

I mean a lot of things – I mean the report is – every year a lot of it is not new, a lot of it is cumulative information, but as I say, there's a section that highlights what some of the new developments are, at least the highlights that we think are worth pointing to, and those things – cyberwarfare, anti-satellite, R&D, they're still in there.

Q: Don't mean to just dominate the whole conversation, but in terms of Adm. Fallon's (PACOM commander) visit a week or so ago, he was, I think doing what you suggest needs to be done, trying to leverage them into being a little bit more open. Is that having an effect, do you notice an effect on the openness question?

Mr. Rodman: Well we – it's incremental. When Secretary Rumsfeld was there in October, we visited the 2nd artillery headquarters. And that was a bit of a breakthrough. And we had their command brief and they didn't disclose a whole lot, but it was an interesting contact. And we have now, we have invited – you know, that's their missile forces -- and we invited the commander to visit STATCOM, to come to the U.S. as a guest of STRATCOM, and they have accepted that invitation. When Hu Jintao was here they let us know.

So that's an interesting contact. We want to continue -- develop a dialogue with them about strategic contact and so forth; you know, the no first use issue, or any other issue. So that's

useful. You know, we're always pressing to see new places, we're always making that point we're – you know, we're trying to invite interesting Chinese here.

Another focus is junior officers – educational exchanges. It's something that President Bush is particularly interested in. And we think we're making some headway in some of these areas. Secretary Rumsfeld talks about, you know, demystifying each other. You know, we don't want to exaggerate this because, you know, there are some laws of geopolitics that aren't going to be repealed here, but it certainly helps if more Chinese younger officers get some exposure to us and vice versa. So we think we're making some headway in doing that since Secretary Rumsfeld's trip there.

Q: Last question for me then I'll shut up. There's – one of the things that I think came up in a previous conversation we had was your statement, or words to the effect, that one of the principal lessons of Mr. Rumsfeld's visit was that we could have, I think you said, very candid discussions with the Chinese and it wouldn't blunt the relationship. Is that still true? And who is having very frank talks with these guys?

Mr. Rodman: Well, the president raised a lot of these issues when he saw Hu Jintao. I am going over there in early June for our defense consultative talks and we – these are high-level strategic discussions and we talk about everything. And, you know, I am not going to be inhibited about raising questions about things they do that are disturbing.

But I think you are absolutely right, when Secretary Rumsfeld was there in both his public remarks and private remarks, you know, he listed things they are doing that are disturbing, and you know, not in a lecturing way but in a very calm way, and, you know, they are perfectly able to debate. But I think that is the right tone for a discussion.

Q: Thank you very much.

(b)(6)

Gentlemen, any other questions for the secretary?

Mr. Rodman: Let me mention one other small thing. It's not in the news right now. This is the EU arms embargo and we discuss this and this report as before. The Europeans have backed away from, you know, the attempt to lift their arms embargo. Now, they haven't killed this, but it hasn't -- has not been a live issue for them, and we hope it won't be. We have not changed our position that we would strongly oppose it.

Similarly with Israel. We've had more successful discussions with the Israelis to shut down their arms trade with China. We think we've reached a good understanding with them. And then finally we've put this on the agenda of our discussions with the Russians, who are the – of course, the biggest source of weapons.

But the importance of the European embargo is that the Chinese, we expect, would seek technology, dual-use technology in Europe, things they could not they could not get from the Russians. And we are convinced that the Chinese would exploit any opening very effectively and, you know, their technological development is their focus, and we would, you know, not want the Europeans to be contributing to that.

But anyway, the good news there is the Europeans have – yeah, it's software -- I think what they would get from the Europeans is not, you know, jet fighters but dual-use technologies of different kinds that would help them qualitatively upgrade. But anyway, the good news is that the Europeans have backed off. I mean, our president made a very strong – began a strong campaign last year, and the Europeans seem to have backed away. But, anyway, we reiterate in this report our strong feelings on that matter.

Anything else?

(b)(6) Okay. Gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us. We appreciate your time.

Q: Thank you very much.

(b)(6) If you have follow-up questions, please don't hesitate to email me as always and we'll get some documents out to you over email.

Q: Let's have another one of these when Mr. Rodman gets back from his June trip.

Mr. Rodman: Okay.

(b)(6) Okay, great. All right gentlemen, have a good day.

Q: Good bye.

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Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2006 7:07 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]
Cc: Smith, Dorrance (b)(6) [Smith, Dorrance, HON, OASD-PA]; Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD]; Thorp, Frank (b)(6) [Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA]; Barber, Allison (b)(6) [Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA]; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) CDR, OASD-PA; (b)(6) LTC, OASD-PA; Vician, Todd M (b)(6) [Vician, Todd, Maj, OASD-PA]; Ballesteros, Mark J. (b)(6) [Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) LtCol, OCJCS/PA
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Attachments: 06-01-06 Haditha.doc



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Attached please find the transcript from this afternoon's military analyst call on Haditha.

Briefers were BGen Sandkuhler and Col Dave Lapan.

The call was ON BACKGROUND.

(b)(6)

Transcript

Conference call with military analysts

Thursday, June 1, 2006

Subject: Haditha

Host: (b)(6) OSD-Public Affairs

Briefers: Marine Brig. Gen. Kevin Sandkuhler, staff judge advocate to the Commandant;
Marine Col. Dave Lapan, deputy director of Marine Corps Public Affairs

Transcriber: Murphy

ON BACKGROUND

Jones: Again, thanks for joining us this afternoon. This is obviously a hot topic and an important one and we appreciate you taking time out.

I have with me Brigadier General Kevin Sandkuhler. He is the staff judge advocate to the commandant of the Marine Corps. And I also have Colonel Dave Lapan with me who is Brigadier General (Mary) Krusa-Dossin's PAO. So he'll be also able to speak to you on the subject.

This call is on background, so as always, we ask that you only quote senior DoD officials with the information that you receive on this call. So with that, I am going to go ahead and hand it over to the general and the colonel, so they will make brief opening remarks and then we're, you know, free to take questions.

Lapan: Gents, thank you again. Dave Lapan here. Again, I am the deputy director of public affairs for the Marine Corps. We do appreciate you taking the time. Hopefully we can give you some information that will be of use to you, as I am sure you are being pressed – maybe not as much as we have – but certainly enough to comment on this situation.

As you all recognize, we are in a pretty tenuous situation here, with an ongoing investigation which constrains us from what we are able to say. We are certainly helped by those of you who have an understanding of the system and aren't on active duty. You have a little bit more freedom to talk about things, so we're hoping that we can give you information that's useful in allowing you to do those things when you are asked to comment.

I guess, just as a - I'll do a quick background on the situation just in case anybody isn't completely up to speed. Incidents of 19 November 2005 in Haditha in western Iraq. At the time it was Two Marine Expeditionary Force, which had command of that area of operations in Anbar Province. The third battalion, 1st Marines, which is normally part of the First Marine Division, was attached to 2 MEF for those operations. Three-one, I'll use the shorthand – is back in the U.S. now, has redeployed to their home base at Camp Pendleton. If there is from the investigations that are ongoing any type of follow-up legal action it is likely to be handled at Camp Pendleton because again that's where the unit that is involved is based currently.

As you may all may know already, Time Magazine is the ones who kind of brought this to the military that started at first an initial inquiry by Multi-National Corps – Iraq. They found enough there to convene a second AR15-6 investigation, which is headed by Major General (Eldon) Bargewell, which is ongoing at this point. And Major General (Richard C.) Zilmer, who is the current commander of Multi-National Force – West convened a -- Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigation. So those are the two ongoing investigations -- the AR15-6 and the NCIS investigation.

I am sure you have been asked, as we have, about when those are going to wrap up. We don't know. It is certainly not expected to be imminent, despite reports that you see. Again, can't put a time frame on it, and General Sandkuhler can probably talk more about why it's so difficult to kind of nail down how long investigations take and he'll talk process stuff.

So hopefully that brings you all up to speed. If I have repeated or said anything that you are already aware of I apologize, but I just wanted to make sure we are starting on a level playing field. I'll let General Sandkuhler now talk about some of the legal issues associated with where we are today.

Sandkuhler: Good afternoon, Kevin Sandkuhler here. I am the staff judge advocate to the commandant of the Marine Corps, the senior military lawyer to the Marine Corps.

One of the reasons we took this opportunity to talk with you gentlemen is to reiterate some things which I think you all probably know, but to make the points concerning what it is we can and cannot say at this time as these investigations are being completed.

First of all, with the pending investigation – the old statement that you don't know what you don't know. The investigators are out there gleaning facts each and every day, and you don't know what they have uncovered each and every day, so whatever you say could probably be wrong about the investigation or the status of the investigation, and you don't want to interfere with their processes.

But the other thing that really constrains us that I was asked to discuss is, you know, the topic of unlawful command influence. Most of you are aware of it. Most of you – especially General Scales and General Shepperd – have probably had SJAs tell you about this in the past. But it becomes critical now for us to make sure that we do not do anything or say anything that will prejudice our ability to bring whatever charges or whatever wrongdoing is uncovered in the investigations to the proper level or the proper forum for accountability.

We have to – and that puts us in the bad position, if you will, with the media of not being able to tell them all that they want to know or confirm items that they find from other sources that they wanted to talk about that perhaps in other settings local district attorneys would be more than happy to talk about -- but their system doesn't have the same features that ours does.

So I wanted to stress the topic of unlawful command influence and why there is frustration – there is frustration on our part as to what we can and cannot talk about.

So I will leave it at that and let's see if you gentlemen have questions and items that we could address for you.

Q: Yeah, this is Bob Scales real quick. I – this is a little short-fused but I am supposed to – I have written an essay, if you will, on the subject, which I am supposed to talk about and record this afternoon. I wonder if I might just send it to you just for a truth check, if that's okay.

Lapan: Yes, sir. Dave Lapan here. My email address – and all of you feel free to email me if you need to – is David dot Lapan. That's l, a, p as in papa, a, n as in November, at USMC dot mil.

Q: Well thank you very much. I appreciate it.

Q: Don Shepperd. Process question here. The AR15-6 and the naval criminal investigation are two separate investigations. What happens to the AR15-6 report if it goes to -- when the facts are found, who does it go to? And who decides whether or not to prefer charges? And is that – is that decision to prefer charges or not independent of the NCIS? In other words, if they decided not to, could NCIS also go ahead and prefer charges?

Sandkuhler: Kevin Sandkuhler here. NCIS does not prefer charges. A convening authority would have to prefer charges. The AR15-6 is an administrative investigation that is looking the two topics that you have heard about before – the training and the reporting (report?). Those are the two items they are looking at. That is an administrative investigation, and they will produce their findings and that is going to General Chiarelli in Iraq and Casey-- General Casey had him do that. And I think the flow will be Chiarelli to Casey to us – to the Marine component, and perhaps, back through Abizaid as well. Up and down the chain of command.

NCIS investigation was convened by General Zilmer, the Multi-National Force-West commander, but he is in the operational chain of command as well. We expect that investigation to flow up the same chain of command. We expect those cases, those findings, to come back to the Marine Corps, to the Marine Component at least, which is Marine Forces Central Command, for us to take action.

That's how the processing of those investigations should follow. There will be – there could be the preferal (sp) of charges by the Marine Corps based upon the 15-6, but if they find some other criminal conduct we could go back to NCIS and say investigate further on another avenue of inquiry.

Q: So Marine Corps Central Command will be the one to decide after it goes through the chain of command and the recommendations decide whether to prefer charges is what I hear you saying?

Sandkuhler: I think that's what the process worked out by the commanders has been. It's an operational chain of command issue and that's how I believe it's going to work out.

Q: What's the name that goes with that?

Sandkuhler: Sattler. You all know John (LtGen John Sattler), right?

Q: Yes. Absolutely.

Sandkuhler: I think John is the one on this situation who has been tagged, with the concurrence of General Abizaid and others, that that's how it's going to work.

Q: This is Jeff McCausland. I understand that – if I have got this – that the 15-6 with the training and (inaudible) reporting. Can you comment at all on – apparently there have been reports that the battalion commander was relieved. Can you comment on that? And can you also comment as far as the Navy criminal investigation just in terms of how many Marines are at least subject to the investigation, or does that go too far?

Sandkuhler: Well, on the commander of the battalion – 3rd battalion, 1st Marines, was relieved by the commanding general of 1st Marine Division. And it was done for the traditional stated reason of loss of confidence. I cannot tell you, and the commander does not have to explain to us, if there was something more – (were they involved?) the event that's the subject of all the media attention now, or whether there are other actions? You know, there could have been failures of inspections. There could have been a higher disciplinary rate than other commands. I don't know other than the commander of the 1st Marine Division lost confidence in the ability of that lieutenant colonel to command that battalion. And I think that's what we have reported before.

Now the second question about –

Q: How many Marines, at least in raw numbers, are the subject of the Navy criminal investigation?

Sandkuhler: Now, I don't – I don't think I know an exact number so I hesitate to give you a number.

Q: Okay.

Sandkuhler: They are talking to a number of people. They have been interviewing any number of individuals, and some of those individuals they may interview you for one purpose, but then find out that perhaps there is some other reason they had to talk with them further, or they might have done something else wrong that may have nothing to do

with this. So I would be very hesitant to throw out a number, because I am pretty confident I would be wrong.

Lapan: And just to jump on again, on the first part of the question, the battalion commander of 3-1 was relieved, as were two of the company commanders within that organization as well. And as the general said, the relief was done by the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division because the unit was back at Camp Pendleton at that time and so 3-1 fell under the 1st Marine Division because they were back in the States, and they weren't forward when these reliefs took place.

Sandkuhler: And to reinforce that, the general did that, General Natonski and that's been reported before, he could have figured out stuff or seen stuff upon their return from Iraq that was enough for him to decide to relieve him, and I have – you know, I would not tell you and I do not know his mental calculations he went through before he did that.

It could have been any number of events that led him to that conclusion, and I don't think it is centered on this investigation because this investigation – or the investigations relating to (Haditha?) have not been completed yet.

Q: Ok.

Q: Gents, Jed Babbin. Two questions. Number one, can you tell us if K31 (sp) was brought back early because of the suspicion of these events and number two, can you also tell us going back to the command influence point, how strongly you guys have been counseling both the military and civilian leadership to basically clam up so we don't screw up the prosecution?

Lapan: Dave Lapan here. On the first part, no, 3-1 rotated back on their normal schedule; they were not brought back early. An aside to that, the other incident that has been recently discussed involves 3rd battalion, 5th Marines. That unit still is in country, and members of that unit have been returned to the United States pending the investigation into those allegations.

So in the case of 3-1, the Haditha incident, they were not brought back to the States early. But 3rd battalion, 5th Marine, separate incident – Hamandiyah – that just happened more recently, some of those individuals have been returned to the States early pending the investigation.

Sandkuhler: On the unlawful command influence issue, what we have done is you have probably all seen the press release done by the commandant. That includes - you know, that was carefully crafted by us, if you read those words, and I know General (inaudible, sounds like Reid?) has read those words carefully, to take it above, and keep it above any claim where we are trying to influence the course of the investigation, or influence the discretion that subordinate commanders will have to exercise in the course of any investigation, any court martial that may or may not result, or any administrative action.

As you all know, there are a variety of people who will now have roles to play, from members of court martials, judges, lawyers who make decisions as to what the charges should or should not be, and the convening authorities.

We could have people who get charged for some not obvious offense by some other subordinate commander that we can't predict today. So we are trying to put out the word to the Marine Corps, through the commandant's words, and other things I do through the SJA channels, to make sure everybody keeps it at the right level so we retain our ability to use the military justice system for the purpose for which it was intended – to provide good order and discipline for the force, and to hold people accountable when necessary. So that's what we're working on, Jed.

Q: That's great. Hey, appreciate that. One quick follow up. Have the Iraqis squawked at all about bringing any of these guys back, early or late?

Sandkuhler: This is Kevin Sandkuhler. I have no idea. I haven't heard.

Q: On that, two quick follow-ups. One is, for those who have not – at least I haven't seen this press release by the commandant, (b)(6) could you possibly have that sent out to us? That'd be great.

(b)(6) Yeah, absolutely.

Lapan: I can get it to you. And I will also – well, I will get it to Tara and let her pass it to you. The other thing, too, is those of you who read Tom Ricks's story this morning probably saw reference to some other guidance we put out on this very subject, again, to make sure that anybody who – anybody out there who was being approached on the issue of Haditha knew where the out-of-bounds lines were and why. I can get you some of that guidance, as well.

Q: That'd be great. (inaudible) couple of TV spots. Second question is, what Jed just said. The Iraqis have announced that they are going to do their own investigation, and maybe it's too soon to comment on that. But will there be any coordination between what we're doing, NCIS in particular, with the Iraqis, or do you guys see that as being totally out of bounds?

Lapan: Don't know at this point. We have not heard anything along those lines. Obviously we have seen the comments coming out of the Iraqi government, but it hasn't translated into any action at our point at this juncture.

Q: This is Bob Maginnis. Question on press release that came out earlier today, I think out of Iraq, out of the Corps. Is this being typified as a training stand down? Or, I saw the commandant's message a couple days ago. What exactly is he doing in country? What are the messages he's sending? Can you go over that again, just for clarification?

Lapan: Sure. Two separate things, obviously. The commandant had a trip previously scheduled in which he was going to be visiting Iraq. It was not a trip that was put together for this purpose, but since he was going, he wanted to talk to his Marines.

The things that he talked to the Marines about were the importance of our core (Corps?) values – honor, courage and commitment, talking about doing the right thing. Also, making the point that the vast majority of Marines are doing the right thing – day in, day out, under very challenging circumstances both in combat and out of combat.

Wanted to get the message to them that even though there has been a lot of attention paid to this incident and these allegations that he believes that most Marines – that this is an aberration, that most Marines are doing the right thing. He wanted to reinforce that. But he also wanted to talk about the importance of doing the right thing, of having moral courage, of adhering to our core (Corps?) values again. Those are some of the things that he wanted to talk about. It was not intended to be a training in the way that this MNC-I announcement came out, done separately by General Chiarelli for whatever reasons.

I don't have any indications here that there would be any kind of training stand down. Obviously those guys across the battlefield are busy, and they can't afford to have everybody stop what they are doing but I think – and again I am talking a little bit out of school because it's an MNC-I issue, but I don't get the sense it's a stand down as much as making sure that commanders are reinforcing those training aspects on some type of schedule.

Q: As a follow up, perhaps (b)(6) or someone in OSD can clarify whether the Corps has put out something that is in fact – I am hearing through other people is being interpreted as a training stand down, and that's why I wanted some clarification.

A follow up question about this particular battalion, 3-1. Wasn't this their third tour, and were the people we are talking about that are being investigated, were they on their third tour with this battalion?

Lapan: The battalion itself, it was their third time back, but remember, the people in the battalion change out all the time, so it's not as if the entirety of the battalion was there for the third time, you would have variations throughout the ranks. In fact, I am sure they had people that were on their first tour at this time.

The second part of the question was – oh, whether the individuals that were involved – don't know to that level of detail in terms of if it was this person's first time or third time. Again, as General Sandkuhler said, it's a pretty wide net. It'd be tough to decide who it was that is considered, you know, part of the investigation.

Q: Thank you.

Q: Don Sheppard. I got hit with a question on radio the other day about – it had been reported that \$2,500 payments were made by the Marine Corps to some of the families involved, and it was not the normal policy to pay reparations in the field.

I am not sure this is your area, but do you know anything about that?

Sandkuhler: Well I think, one thing is that we call it salatia payments and they're done a lot in Iraq. They are done in other parts of the world, as well. And what they are is – and they range from things like when we have automobile accidents, when we damage property through either operational damage or through other damage; you know, our big trucks run into buildings on a regular basis, or run into Iraqi cars, and we offer them compensation for the damage that they suffered. And in this case, there was some salatia payments done to the families – or paid to the families, and I would not classify it as being unusual.

Lapan: The other important aspect is that salatia payments are not an admission of guilt, either. Again, they are a way to recompense individuals, families, whatever, for damages of one type or another. Again I know – in fact, to take it to the lowest level, when I was in Haiti two and a half years ago, we were paying people for breaking locks off their doors when we doing searches. I mean, it goes from the very small level to the very large level.

Q: This is Jeff McCausland again. Can you guys comment at all about this one young Marine, I think he is still on active duty out in California, apparently he has released a bunch of photographs. His mother has been on TV. He claims he was part of the quote unquote clean-up crew, but also has gone on to make allegations about the fact that – or his mother has at least – that the Marine Corps has not addressed this kid's PTSD and all the problems associated with this Haditha thing. Have you got any comment on that as well?

Lapan: The Marine in question did do an interview with the Los Angeles Times. He has since stopped doing interviews, from what I understand, of his own volition – nobody told him – again, as far as I understand nobody told him not to. But his mother is carrying the case. She has done a number of interviews. Again, her focus has been more on the PTSD issue and she has talked somewhat about what her son told her he saw and experienced.

Sandkuhler: He's also been accused of a variety of crimes in the local community there, which is reported in that article from the LA Times. I don't think we've seen anything official or unofficial about his claims of PTSD and whether he's being treated and stuff in (and?) that. We have not explored that yet.

Q: Bob Maginnis again. The LA Times today, a town awoke to slaughter. Very detailed. Were these two reporters on the ground, or are they basing what they are saying in here on second and tertiary sources?

Lapan: Well the – and I am just going off memory from reading the story this morning because I think that it mentioned that they wouldn't reveal the name of the reporter for security reasons, one who may have gone into Haditha to conduct the interviews, but also believe that they conducted interviews with individuals, so various levels of sourcing in terms of people who may have seen what happened, may have been involved, or may have heard from others - so it could have been second- or third-hand information. I didn't get the indication that the reporters were there when any of this happened, but then went back afterwards to talk to the townspeople. Does that – does that help at all?

Q: Yeah, it is littered with quotes that are very incendiary, so I am just curious as to the sourcing, so if that's what you have, that's what you have.

Q: Jed Babbin again, guys. In terms of the Congress, we're hearing that Senator Warner might want to have hearings or something, I mean, what requirements or what requests are these helpful folks levying on you these days?

Sandkuhler: Kevin Sandkuhler. We have – I am not aware of having received any official request for information or documents or people to testify, et cetera, yet. They have all said that, you know, we are going to have hearings on this some time. We have not gotten, as you characterize it, the helpful requests so that they can help clarify the issues for us.

It does raise Jed, as you know, a significant number of legal issues. Are they going to subpoena witnesses? Are these witnesses going to be people that will have to get some level of immunization to testify at the Congress? How does it impact cases in the future if there are cases? Evidence, other information. It does not make life simpler.

Q: It's precisely the kind of help you really don't need.

Sandkuhler: From the legal standpoint, I would love for everybody to keep their mouths shut so we can get the investigations done so people will keep talking to us, so we can get all the evidence gathered without having any taints and people running and hiding with information when they find out, you know, their name is going to be plastered all over the media, and get that all concluded so we could proceed in an orderly fashion without the helpful people from other sources.

So the Congress – that will be problematic, as you can imagine. And just go back to the prior history – you know, the last, I don't – go back 30 years, 25 years, 20 years – think of all the problems when they wanted to have Ollie North before the criminal investigation was done, and how that impacted the ability to prosecute and defend, et cetera.

Q: Thanks.

Lapan: One other note on the congressional piece, too. As I am sure you are aware, the commandant did go over to the Hill, again not on specific request, but in order to keep

the leadership apprised of what was going on in these cases and his legislative director followed him and did some briefing as well.

Q: The nature of the enemy that was being fought on November the 19th in Haditha, were they characterized in the immediate after action as just Sunni insurgents, or were there evidence of foreign jihadists that were embedded and perhaps were even using children, women as shields?

Lapan: Don't know the answer to that one. That may be something that comes out in the course of the investigation, but I do not know. I was there at the time in terms of – in Iraq – we felt, in our intelligence, you know, verified that the foreign fighter influence – influence, I should – the numbers of foreign fighters in western Iraq was pretty small. Obviously they had a big influence. But most of the guys we were fighting in western Iraq were local Sunni insurgents.

Q: Okay.

(b)(6) All right gentlemen, any other questions?

Q: Yeah, I just sent that email to you David. Could you just read that over and make sure it's okay?

Lapan: Will do, sir.

Q: (b)(6) are you going to follow up with the Corps to find out if they sent out something on a training stand down, because I am confused by what is on the web page.

(b)(6) Yeah, no, we'll get that to you.

Sandkuhler(?) : I don't think they have used the term stand down. I am looking at the press release, and they just talked about a training, commander direct training.

Q: They even said one report I got (inaudible – that it?) would be conducted over the next 30 days.

Voice (?): Right, that's what it says in here.

Q: (b)(6), anything you can get on that, I've got to go on two TV programs here, that would be great, as well as that press release by the commandant of the Marine Corps.

(b)(6) Sure.

Lapan: And, Dave Lapan again. Just one last point I'd like to make, and I think General Sandkuhler will probably jump on. As you can imagine, we have received a lot of requests from media to get the commandant out there to talk, to do interviews, to have media tag along as he goes and talks to Marines. Obviously, lots of concerns with that on

a number of levels, not the least of which is, again, perceptions of unlawful command influence. So we are getting a lot of pressure, but the commandant's talks to his Marines are intended to be that, for him to talk to his Marines.

Again, we do not want to put the commandant in a position based on, you know, the media's desire to get him to talk that's going to pollute the system. So, while he is obviously concerned, he has serious concerns with these allegations, he is not in a position to address them while there are ongoing investigations. Sir?

Sandkuhler: I would just reinforce, you know, the statement that he has made on Marine virtue is the kind of statement that you would expect the senior Marine, our leader, to talk about with Marines when there's investigations pending, to talk about how we expect each of us to behave, and at what level to behave, and how we can comport ourselves to comply with our honor, courage and commitment. And that's the kind of things he needs to go out and reinforce.

Talking to specifics to all of the Marines in the Marine Corps doesn't do any good. That's not what he needs to reinforce. He needs to reinforce the basic virtue. So that's what he is going when he goes out; he is talking to his Marines about how we expect Marines to behave, whether it is on liberty, on duty, on the battlefield or off the battlefield.

Q: Could you say again the exact title of AR15-6 investigation, what do you call it in the Marine Corps?

Sandkuhler: Well, in the Marine Corps terms we'd call it like a JAG manual investigation. And that the 15-6 again is – the Army guys can tell you this – is AR15-6 that refers to the regulation that guides it. It's an administrative investigation that commanders can use for a variety of reasons – to find out why their supply system is losing gear, to find out why people are getting in trouble in town – they can use it for any number of reasons. In this case it's to look at why the reporting was not accurate, and also was the level of training of the Marines involved prior to the event sufficient? And those are characterized as administrative investigations. And then if they find the criminal investigation – criminal matters that they think exists, then they can turn it over to NCIS, or the commander can take some administrative and disciplinary action based up on that investigation.

Q: This is Jeff McCausland again. Sadly, I don't think this is going to go away any time soon -- I sure hope to God it does -- but it might be useful Dave, and General Sandkuhler, if you can have (b)(6) send us some contact info in addition to Dave's email address and you all's offices in case we need to make a quick check on the legal side or on the public affairs side as this thing goes on for however long it goes on.

(b)(6) Yeah, I am happy to do that. All right gentlemen, thanks again for joining us, and I will send – and I will be sending out stuff this afternoon. Keep us posted for media that you do on this.

Q: Yeah, I'll be on O'Reilly tonight Tara.

Q: CNN in the morning, (b)(6)

(b)(6) Okay, great.

Q: Thanks very much guys.

(b)(6) Let us know if we can do anything else for you.

Q: Bye.

(b)(6)

From: Lapan Col David [david.lapan@usmc.mil] (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, June 02, 2006 7:11 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: Re: Hope you're not working today

Thanks Katie. As it turned out, a pre-planned backgrounder for some mil analysts happened yesterday afternoon. Jed Babbin was one of the participants.

v/r,

(b)(6)

Col Dave Lapan, USMC
Deputy Director of Marine Corps Public Affairs

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
To: JedBabbin@usmc.mil (b)(6)
CC: (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Fri Jun 02 05:23:52 2006
Subject: Re: Hope you're not working today

Jed,
Can't be certain you will receive this in time, since we are airborne, and will be for the next 16 plus hours. Recommend you talk to Col Dave Lapan in USMC PAO office. I know they are not interested in talking about the case -- but for the very same reason you are hoping to highlight.
The number to USMC PAO is (b)(2)
Hope that is useful...
Take care,
Katie

-----Original Message-----

From: JedBabbin@usmc.mil (b)(6)
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Wed May 31 07:10:56 2006
Subject: Re: Hope you're not working today

Katie: I got what I needed from another source. No worries. And would very much like to talk to you or one of the bosses on background before 1700 today. Any chance? I'm doing a column about why we need to let the military justice system run its course and not let the media spin this into another My Lai. Best, Jed.

Jed Babbin

(b)(2) (home office)
(home fax)
(mobile)

(b)(6)

From: Thorp, Frank (b)(6) [Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA]
Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2006 7:35 AM
To: (b)(6) (USAF); (b)(6) (DoD); (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA;
(b)(6) RDML CHINFO Washington DC; (b)(6) CAPT CHINFO EA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(6) CAPT CHINFO]; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; Haddock,
Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: FW: Transcript - BG Barbero Lebanon military analysts
Attachments: 07-19-06 Barbero Lebanon.doc



07-19-06 Barbero Lebanon.doc (...)

Wanted to make sure you saw this

Frank Thorp
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Joint Communication)

(b)(2)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2006 6:17 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Smith, Dorrance HON OSD PA; Whitman, Bryan SES OSD PA; Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD; Thorp, Frank RDML OSD PA; Barber, Allison SES OSD PA; (b)(6) Col OSD PA; (b)(6)
CIV, OASD-PA; Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA; Carpenter, Joseph LCDR OSD PA; (b)(6)
(b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA; (b)(6) OSD PA; (b)(6)
CDR, OCJCS/PA
Subject: Transcript - BG Barbero Lebanon military analysts

Attached is the transcript from the 1630 phone call with BG Mike Barbero and the military analysts on Lebanon.

The call was on background.

Military Analyst Call

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

Briefer: U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Michael Barbero, Deputy Director for Regional Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3

Topic: Evacuation of U.S. citizens from Lebanon

Location: (b)(2) The Pentagon

ON BACKGROUND – quote as senior DoD official

Host: (b)(6) OSDPA

Transcriber: Murphy

(b)(6) (introduction of the general). Again this call is on background, so you may quote a senior DoD official. So with that, General Barbero.

Barbero: This is Mike Barbero, and I know a few of you, so those of you who know me please don't hold that against me.

Let me just tell you where we are as far as contracted shipping. Navy ships are going to be in the area; I can discuss the command and control arrangements and then some of the messages that – I just came from a press conference at the State Department to try to shoot back at this why are we so slow, the delay, et cetera.

Let me talk about contract shipping. A contracted ship, the Orient Queen – I think you saw it on the news, departed Beirut approximately nine o'clock eastern daylight time this morning. In our count, over 1,000 American citizens.

We think it will take 24 hours for that ship to make a round trip – download in Cyprus, back – to arrive back dockside in Beirut. And this is the maiden voyage, so we'll see how that works.

Hopefully we can make one trip every 24 hours of a thousand passengers.

We have – Transportation Command has been active since the start, and they are the ones doing the chartering in support of State Department, and they have chartered two other commercial ships – the motor ferry Rahmah – spelled R-A-H-M-A-H, a Panamanian flag ship, capacity of about 1,000 passengers, and it should commence operations out of Beirut on the 21st.

Right now it's being – it's reached – and the question is why is it taking so long? Well, we're conducting safety and readiness for sea inspections, then it must transit the Suez Canal.

And the third ship we have under contract is a high speed vessel – the Vittoria – V-I-T-T-O-R-I-A, an Italian flag ship, capacity of 330 passengers, and it again is also being inspected and we think it will commence operations on the 22nd.

And what some may view and describe as delays I describe as making sure we are putting our American citizens – evacuating them safely on ships that we have inspected and are confident that can evacuate them safely.

And as you know, we have been using CH-53 helicopters since Sunday to continuously move U.S. citizens from the embassy compound.

We have six CH-53 helicopters that have been doing that today. Three of them are CH's, CH-53 cargo helicopters from the 24th MEU, and three are MH-53s from forces -- U.S. forces based in the United Kingdom.

Navy ships that we have either on site or on the way. USS Nashville will begin operations tomorrow and we think we can handle 1,000 American citizens per day and they'll either -- it's an amphib -- and they'll either transport the citizens from Beirut using their landing craft -- I think that's the most likely way they'll do that -- although I don't know, I've answered that by saying the local commander on the scene will make that assessment. But they can handle 1,000 a citizens a day starting tomorrow.

We also have two DDGs -- guided missile destroyers -- USS Gonzalez and the USS Barry, Arleigh-Burke class. And they are there for escort, primarily, and search and rescue. And they will be escorting these commercial carriers back and forth.

And then the fourth ship that's on the way -- or on station is the USS Mount Whitney, which is a command-and-control ship, and Brigadier General Jensen could move his command post to this ship; it is set up with a full suite of command and control systems.

And we have five more ships that we are heading towards and will enter the joint operational area within the upcoming days.

We've established a joint operational area, basically encompassing Cyprus to Lebanon, and as you know, Lebanon is the responsibility of Central Command, that's why they were given this mission. They have further -- the chain of command goes to NAVCENT, and he has delegated Brigadier General Jensen, United States Marine Corps, as the on-the-scene commander.

Israel is in -- under the UCP the responsibility of the European Command, so European Command is conducting coordination with Israel to facilitate our passage through the blockade.

Let's see. The themes I've been telling -- I've been passing to people as they ask the questions of timeliness is -- we have -- we are in support of Department of State, and as soon as we had a draft request from Department of State, we started to plan it and coordinate with CENTCOM or EUCOM to start moving assets.

And we have assets from European Command that we have chopped to Central Command; for example the -- I think the USS Barry is an example. The helicopters out of the UK are from European Command, and we have assets from United States Special Operations Command and Transportation Command is deeply involved in this.

But as soon as we heard -- got a draft request from the Department of State, we immediately started acting on that late last week and all throughout the weekend.

But the thing I have been telling people who have asked about timeliness is we have to balance the requirements for a safe, secure and rapid operation, and we're doing it with a sense of urgency. But I also tell them it's a time – as Admiral Walsh said the other day it's physics, it's time-distance.

The MEU was ashore in Jordan, conducting an exercise, so they had to disengage from that exercise, regroup, reload and then get underway.

We had a ship involved with – in an exercise I think in (and?) assets in Ukraine or Romania – a EUCOM exercise which they had to disengage from and move that way.

We had ships move from the Red Sea – ships that had already transited the Med were to the west, had to reenter the Mediterranean and head this way. And they are moving as fast as they can.

So with that – I've told people that, you know, it's a war zone, with an active blockade and our job is to get it right the first time and not rush to failure. And that's why we're balancing those three main concerns and operational imperatives I've mentioned.

So with that, I can answer any questions – let me just give you some numbers, projections, of American citizens we can handle. Yesterday we handled about 400 – I am sorry – yesterday we – and I am going to talk in terms of capacity, because we have assets on site and then the ambassador and the embassy has to get these citizens to either the landing pad at the embassy or dockside, and frankly, we have not filled every seat.

But let me talk in terms of capacity. Yesterday we had the capacity to evacuate about 440 Americans; today it's 1,340. Tomorrow it will be a capacity of 2,400; Friday we will have the capacity to evacuate about 3,800, and then Saturday with all the assets we'll have on station we could evacuate 6,500.

So as you see, we're rapidly forming this task force and building our capability. And with that, I'll answer any questions you might have.

Q: This is Jeff McCausland from CBS. Great summary. Quick question, long question. Quick question – then I assume 6,500 is what you see as steady-state capacity unless things become dramatically worse - example, having to move folks out of Israel.

And second question is, with the two DDGs for escort duty, can you talk at all about security concerns, for example it seems that a large ship like this with U.S. passengers moving in that area could be a prime Hezbollah, al Qaeda, pick your favorite nightmare target. Could you talk a little bit about those concerns?

Barbero: Well the first thing – as far as our capacity, the embassy has requested that we meet a rate of 2,000 per day, so that is our baseline, and that is the number we have been operating and building to. So anything above that is additional capacity that we have pushed to the area. So that is our planning figure. Now that could change if things go south; but 2,000 per day is what we got from the embassy and the Department of State and that's what we've been operating with.

As far as missile threat, we have no indications of threat to our task force or American citizens, but the point I make is we are building a capability for this local commander to be able to respond to any threat that may arise.

Q: Thank you.

Barbero: Okay.

(short cross talk)

Q: Am I correct that the ambassador – his responsibility are ashore; in other words, you all pick up responsibilities when the people get to the point of embarkation, but you're not planning on any trips ashore since the ambassador and the movement of people from locations in Lebanon to ports of embarkation?

Barbero: We have not been asked for that, and I am sure down at the tactical level they may be looking at some options, but we – it has not been discussed with us either at the Department of Defense or in our planning.

Q: This is John Garrett. With regard to the ambassador or the embassy, the country team's responsibility to get the folks to the collection point, have they or do you anticipate that they will be asking for any transportation type support for that once you get within range or whatever the parameter is that has to be met?

Barbero: We have not received and there has been no discussion with us about requirement to move American citizens to these points of embarkation, either the American embassy for air or dockside for the ships, so that has not been discussed with us or we have not been given a warning order for that.

Q: Okay, sir, thanks, and one follow-on. Have they asked for any kind of security support for those collection points, et cetera?

Barbero: No they have not, not at this time, but we will have the capability if that changes.

Q: Sure.

Q: Hey sir, it's Steve Greer. How are you doing?

Barbero: Hey, sergeant major, how are you?

Q: Hey, I am doing great sir, I'm glad you're still in the fight.

Barbero: Cool.

Q: Say, I've got a quick one. How are we getting the word out to citizens out there - is it loud speakers or radio, or is it TV? Are those capacities still available there? Or how are we notifying them of where these embarkation points are at?

Barbero: The embassy and State Department are doing that, and the State Department has done it through various means. We are not responsible for that, although we are flowing some PSYOPS forces there that can help the ambassador as far as crowd control and announcements and things like that. But that is strictly the embassy's job and I am not sure how effective they have been in doing that or exactly what means they have been doing that by; I don't know.

Q: Sure. Sir, and one more for you. At these two sites, is it U.S. Marines that are there providing the security and the kind of the patting down so some sort of suicide bomber guy doesn't jump on a 53 or happen to get on one of these ships? Is that our forces doing that, is that the Lebanese military, who is that involved in that?

Barbero: Sergeant major, I don't know for sure.

Q: Okay.

Barbero: I couldn't answer that. I know that there is security in place and they are checking credentials and paperwork and registrations and things like that, but as far as who is physically securing each one of these guys or checking them, I don't know for sure, I couldn't give you a straight answer.

Q: Okay, thanks though, I appreciate it.

Barbero: Okay, hooah.

Q: This is Jeff McCausland again. Can you talk at all about any future contingency planning. I mean, obviously we hope that this will be contained to south Lebanon, but have you considered any additional – of course you get those interesting boundary issues between CENTCOM, EUCOM – if you should be, for example, asked to evacuate U.S. citizens from northern portions of Israel, or does anyone have an estimate of how many U.S. citizens right now are in Syria, if we should have to expand the area of evacuation?

Barbero: Umm, we are, you know, we've got this plan pretty well in motion, and all I better say is Central Command is, you know, looking at all the possible threats and contingencies and we are assessing that now as part of any kind of planning.

Q: Okay.

Barbero: So, that's normal for us to –

Q: Do you know offhand, or does anybody there know offhand, I mean I know right now they say there are about 25,000 U.S. in Lebanon, how many U.S. there might be in Syria right now? I mean, God knows how many there are in Israel, but what the number might be for Syria?

Barbero: I don't know. The State Department hopefully could answer that.

(b)(6) Gentlemen, any more questions for the general?

Q: Just our -- (b)(6) I came on late. This is Jeff. What's our rules of engagement here? Are we on background?

(b)(6) We're on background.

Q: Where are we?

(b)(6) Yes, sir, we're on background.

Q: Background, okay.

(b)(6) Any one else have questions for the general? All right, well thanks gentlemen for joining us. General, thanks so much for your time.

Q: Great, thanks a lot, sir.

Barbero: Thanks. Sergeant major, good hearing you again.

Q: Hooah, sir, cool.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OCPA]
Sent: Tuesday, July 25, 2006 8:58 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) Capt
(b)(6) JIEDDO/Contractor
Cc: (b)(6) JIEDDO
Subject: FW: Military Media Analysts Update -- Update from the Chief of Army Public Affairs: July 22, 2006 (UNCLASSIFIED)

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

All three of you have requested this information, so the below E-mail note addresses issues of interest to you:

>Very respectfully,

>-- (b)(6)
(b)(6)

>Army Public Affairs, Media Relations Division
>phone: (b)(2) E-mail: (b)(6) fax: (b)(2)
(b)(2)

>
>Update from the Chief of Army Public Affairs

>
>More than 235,000 U.S. Army Soldiers are serving overseas in 120 countries. More than 91,000 U.S. Army Soldiers make up the backbone of the American and coalition team in Iraq, as of July 18, 2006. There are 17,000 Army Soldiers serving in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

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>Adaptability and learning
>-- The Army remains a learning organization. We are examining Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom operations for counterinsurgency insights ("lessons learned") to be applied to the current force and the implications for future force doctrine, organization, training, and materiel developments.

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>-- The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, in coordination with the U.S. Marine Corps, is formalizing many counterinsurgency lessons learned over the past three years into a new Army field manual on counterinsurgency operations -- expected to be released later this year. The Army has the Center for Army Lessons Learned, war colleges and hosts of schools also teaching boots-on-the-ground insights from the Iraq war to deploying Soldiers and, in some cases, our coalition partners. For over two years, the Center for Army Lessons Learned also has had a sustained presence in Iraq gathering real-time lessons learned and helping form an Iraqi Lessons Learned Center.

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>-- Recognizing the extreme importance of the military-training mission in Iraq, the Army has charged the 1st Infantry Division with organizing, equipping, training and deploying advisory teams. In addition to the "Big Red One's" mission, the Army also is adapting how it assigns officers and NCOs to these critical jobs. This ensures the teams are filled continually with our best trained and led people. In theater, senior leaders established a training academy exclusively for U.S. commanders to reinforce their understanding of counterinsurgency, and to underscore their critical partnership with Iraqis.

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>-- On the equipping effort, during the past two years the Army added over 25,000 armored HMMWVs in Iraq -- about half of which are the M1114 factory-armored variety. The Army fielded over 500,000 sets of state-of-the-art body armor. In addition to personal armor and vehicle armor, the Army expanded training venues and developed suites of countermeasure systems to provide a more holistic approach to defeating Improvised Explosive Devices. The Army also made major steps in decreasing the response time for

fielding materiel solutions and training improvements, and the Army continues to procure readily-available commercial and government equipment to provide new technologies to Soldiers faster. Agile robots, model-size planes and miniature cameras now often go into harm's way, rather than Soldiers.

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>Recruiting and retention of quality people

>-- In the first nine months of Fiscal Year 2006 (through June 2006), almost 100,000 Soldiers reenlisted in the Army. Two out of three Soldiers eligible to reenlist, continue to reenlist.

>a. As of end of month June, active Army reenlisted 56,531 Soldiers this fiscal year: 109% of the year-to-date straight-line glide path of 52,002. Overall Fiscal Year 2006 retention mission is 64,200—almost identical to the FY05 mission.

>b. As of end of month June, US Army Reserve reenlisted 12,329 Soldiers this fiscal year: 95% of the year-to-date straight-line glide path of 12,932. Overall FY06 retention mission is 17,712—1,464 more than FY05.

>c. As of end of month June, Army National Guard reenlisted 30,803 Soldiers this fiscal year: 122% of the year-to-date straight-line glide path of 25,239. Overall FY06 retention mission is 34,875—2,305 more than FY05.

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>-- So far this fiscal year, more than 125,000 Americans have answered the Call to Duty and joined the U.S. Army. In June alone, more than 20,000 patriots joined the Army team.

>a. In the June reporting period, the Active Army met its goal for the thirteenth consecutive month, recruiting 8,756 Soldiers into the Active Army: 102% of the monthly goal of 8,600. So far this fiscal year, we are at 104% of the year-to-date mission, recruiting 51,612 Soldiers towards a goal of 49,700. The fiscal year recruiting mission is 80,000—identical to last year's mission.

>b. In the June reporting period we accessed 5,640 Soldiers into the Army Reserve: 121% of the monthly accession goal of 4,661. So far this fiscal year, the Army Reserve is at 101% of the year-to-date accession mission, accessing 25,004 Soldiers towards a goal of 24,836. The fiscal year mission of 36,032 is 7,547 more than last year's mission.

>c. In the June reporting period we accessed 5,823 Soldiers into the Army National Guard: 101% of the monthly goal of 5,743. So far this fiscal year, the Army National Guard is at 103% of the year-to-date mission, accessing 51,477 Soldiers towards a goal of 49,988. The fiscal year mission of 70,000 is 7,000 more than last year's mission.

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>-- Regarding waivers: The Army has a sound process for conducting waivers that allows those who have overcome mistakes, made earlier in their lives, to serve their country. Only 3 of 10 men and women between 17 and 24 years old fully qualify for service in the Army due to medical, moral, physical, education and aptitude challenges, and standards in our society have changed over the years. As an example, today's young men and women are being charged for offenses that in earlier years wouldn't have been considered a serious offense, and might not have resulted in charges in the first place. We are a reflection of those changes. The Army does not rehabilitate enlistees who receive waivers; they have already overcome their mistakes.

>-- It should also be noted that we do not allow enlistment of anyone who is pending a criminal charge, serving any type of probationary period, parole, confinement or who in lieu of or a result of being prosecuted was ordered by a court to serve in the military. The military services are not an alternative to the criminal justice system and should never be viewed as an alternative source of rehabilitation for those that have not subscribed to the legal and moral standards within our society. For those that had past involvement with the law, the waiver process recognizes that some people have made mistakes and have overcome their past behavior and have the potential for being a productive and law abiding citizen.

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>-- The underlying purpose of a moral character waiver and standards that are applied in that regard is to minimize the risk of enlisting persons who may become disciplinary problems or a security risk to the military. When an applicant applies for enlistment and has had a past history of criminal misconduct a thorough review is made to evaluate the persons current character and potential for military service. In most cases we see, the charges were from a period of time when the applicant was young and immature. We look at the recent history such as employment, schooling, references and signs of remorse and changed behavior since the incident occurred as part of the waiver process.

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>Misconduct Allegations

>-- Almost 650,000 troops have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and more than 100,000

troops have been deployed to the Balkans --- and served honorably. The widespread media coverage of the detainee abuse and the rape and murder of an Iraqi female teenager and her family gives the perception that Soldier misconduct in Iraq is running rampant. Actually incidents of serious Soldier misconduct are few.

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>-- The Army has a long history of policing itself and continues to live the Army Values. In the cases of Abu Ghraib and Mahmudiyah, it was Soldiers who reported the allegations of misconduct. Soldiers report, leaders act, and the system takes action if warranted. By aggressively investigating and prosecuting all allegations of crimes committed by Soldiers we may be able to refute misinformation and reduce Iraqi anger and hate concerning such allegations.

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>-- The U.S. Army is a values-based organization. We are disappointed - heartbroken -- that some of our own are charged with breaking the faith and trust bestowed upon them. We do not like what may have happened; unfortunately we can not change it, but we can do everything in our power to bring to justice those who are guilty. When allegations of Soldier misconduct are reported they are fully investigated in an open and transparent system. We take allegations of wrong doing by Soldiers very seriously, and are committed to thoroughly investigate such allegations.

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>-- Thus far, allegations against 267 Soldiers have been addressed in courts-martial, non-judicial punishments, and other adverse administrative punishments. These include, as of June 16, 2006:

>-----Courts-martial: 85
>-----Non-judicial punishments: 95
>-----Other administrative actions: 87

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>-- The U.S. military has gone to great lengths in our training, education, and pre-deployment exercises to ensure that our soldiers know what constitutes violations of the law of war. The Army ensures each Soldier is physically and mentally tough, and trained in Warrior tasks and drills. Before any Soldier is deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, the Army employs a training approach that includes instruction and exercises in the Rules of Engagement, Rules for the Use of Force, Escalation of Force Principles, Law of War, Soldier's Rules, Uniform Code of Military Justice, Code of Conduct, Army Values, Ethics and Cultural Awareness.

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>Bottom Line

>We're in a long war. Never before, since the inception of the all-volunteer force in 1973, has our Army faced such myriad complex challenges in an ever-changing and uncertain global environment.

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>Leaders at all levels are working harder than ever to sustain the institution and simultaneously transform while ensuring the Army is fully staffed, trained and equipped to achieve victory in the war on terrorism.

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>The American people can be proud of the conduct and accomplishments of the American Soldiers who are fighting for the freedom of others, our own freedom, and our way of life.

>
>Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

>Caveats: NONE

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>Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

>Caveats: NONE

(b)(6)

From: Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]
Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2006 1:01 PM
To: Smith, Dorrance (b)(6) [Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA]
Cc: Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD]; (b)(6)
Mr, OSD-COMPT]; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; Rangel, Robert S (b)(6)
[Rangel, Robert S, CIV, OSD]
Subject: Oh, by the way.....

Did I mention that LTG Steve Blum was doing a Defense Writers Group breakfast this morning:

WASHINGTON (AP) More than two-thirds of the Army National Guard's 34 brigades are not combat ready due largely to vast equipment shortfalls that will take as much as \$21 billion to correct, the top National Guard general said Tuesday. The comments by Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum came in the wake of disclosures by Army officials, analysts and members of Congress that two-thirds of the active Army's brigades are not rated ready for war. The problem, they say, is driven by budget constraints that won't allow the military to complete the personnel training and equipment repairs and replacement that must be done when units return home after deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. ``I am further behind or in an even more dire situation than the active Army, but we both have the same symptoms, I just have a higher fever,'' Blum said. One Army official acknowledged Tuesday that while all of the active Army units serving in the war zone are ``100 percent'' ready, the situation is not the same for those at home.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]
Sent: Monday, August 07, 2006 7:10 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]
Cc: Smith, Dorrance (b)(6) [Smith, Dorrance, HON, OSD-PA]; Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; Ruff, Eric (b)(6) [Ruff, Eric, SES, OSD]; Thorp, Frank (b)(6) [Thorp, Frank, RDML, OASD-PA]; Barber, Allison (b)(6) [Barber, Allison, CIV, OASD-PA]; Keck, Gary L (b)(6) [Keck, Gary L COL OSD PA]; Turner, James (b)(6) [Turner, James, CIV, OASD-PA]; Ballesteros, Mark j. (b)(6) [Ballesteros, Mark J, LTC, OASD-PA]; Vician, Todd M (b)(6) [Vician, Todd, Maj, OASD-PA]; Carpenter, Joseph (b)(6) [Carpenter, Joe, LCDR OASD-PA]; (b)(6) Capt OSD PA; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) CIV, OASD-PA]; Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LtCol, OCJCS/PA
Subject: military analyst transcript 07 August
Attachments: 08-07-06 military analyst call.doc



08-07-06 military analyst call...

Attached is the military analyst transcript from today's phone call.

Per instructions, the speakers on these transcripts will now be identified as "briefer" rather than by their name.

This call was on background, with the speaker to be identified as a senior military official.

Questions please see me or (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Transcript

OSD-PA military analyst call

Briefer: Senior Military Official

Monday, August 07, 2006

Transcriber: (b)(6)

ON BACKGROUND – quote as senior military official

Host: (b)(6) OSD-PA

(b)(6): (in progress) per SOP, I am just going to let everyone on the call know this call is on background, so you may quote a senior DoD official with anything you hear on this call. General, unless you want to go on the record, you can state that at the time, otherwise we'll keep it on background. And with that, I am just going to hand it over to you for any opening remarks you have and then you can feel free to take their questions if you would.

Briefer: Okay, well thanks very much. Hello everybody, glad to have the opportunity to say a few things as we look at the Middle East here in this particularly interesting time for us.

A few points I want to make up front and then I will be happy to answer any questions. I know that's probably what everybody wants to do.

First of all, the three major movements that we see playing themselves out in the region. Number one, we see Iranian-sponsored activity going on with -- through the Syrians and into Hezbollah and throughout the other Shi'ite communities in the region. That plays itself out in a way that is designed to gain time for the Iranian nuclear program and also designed to increase Iranian regional power in a way that I think is definitely increased in the past year or so.

Secondly we have the Sunni extremists al Qaeda and their associated movements that are operating throughout most of the Sunni regions. I wouldn't say that they've necessarily increased their levels of activity but they are certainly looking for mergers and a way to increase their value on the global stage. I don't think that they probably think that they've done enough here lately, and we should look for them to try to make a statement here in the foreseeable future, probably outside of the region, but it could also be delivered against the oil infrastructure, as you know that they've tried to do before.

And of course the third big issue that constantly plays itself out is the context of the Arab-Israel context – or conflict. You see it manifesting itself in the Hezbollah, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine activity that's going on. When the process is moving forward it seems to make the region in general a bit easier to deal with. When the process breaks down and it moves towards conflict, it makes the region very difficult to deal with, not only from the United States' perspective, but from the perspective of all the powers in the region.

I think, you know, currently we've got to stabilize Iraq, stabilize Afghanistan, we've got to keep the flow of resources going in the region; we've got to deter Iran; we have to help

out where we can with regard to helping the Lebanese army at the right time, and also with regard to maintaining some readiness of our forces off the coast of Lebanon. It may come as a surprise to you but the 15,000 – nearly 15,000 Americans that were evacuated off the coast of Lebanon were evacuated under a CENTCOM operation, not a EUCOM operation.

I think the key point that's going on in Iraq where all of these interesting major problems come to bear in one form or another is that we see a shift from insurgency over the past seven or eight months – and it probably started sooner than that – more to sectarian violence and sectarian activity.

I think that this type of problem that we are seeing in Baghdad, which has really reached very serious levels of concern for us, has got to be dealt with, and I want to make sure that everybody knows it's just not a matter of dealing with it militarily; it's a matter of dealing with it militarily, to a certain extent economically, but certainly politically. And in particular on the political arena is a requirement to get the Jaysh al Mahdi rogue elements under control, and where they can't be brought under control politically, they have to be dealt with.

We also have a pretty robust program that's starting to show some good effects against hitting the what I would call the death squad cells. We certainly know the Sunni death squad cells because they primarily tend to be al Qaeda related or Ba'athist related that we have a fairly good view of. On the Shi'a side it's been harder for us, but last night we conducted some operations against some of the Shi'a death squads that had some good effect, and we continue to want to do more of that, and we'll have to do that in conjunction with the Iraqi armed forces.

The – it's clear from operations that are going on in Baghdad, at least I think it's clear in my mind, it may not be in the public's mind, our forces are there primarily to participate in the outer cordon operations that are going on to isolate the Sunni, and Iraqi security forces are doing a lot of the main work except for some of the precise hits that need to be done against the various death squad elements that we're finding in that battle space.

Certainly we thought that the situation was serious enough so that on its way out of the country we decided to divert the 172nd (Stryker Brigade) for anywhere from 90 to 120 days into the Baghdad area. We did it for a couple of different reasons. One, they are very experienced; they did a great job up in Mosul. And two, they are a very well-integrated unit with regard to both operational and intelligence capability, and experienced in a way that we think will start to help us see some better results in the Baghdad space relatively soon.

The situation in Afghanistan probably deserves a mention or two. As you know, about a week and a half ago we transitioned the regional command south region over to NATO command. We think that that area will continue to be contested by the Taliban; we also expect some increase in Taliban activity in the eastern sector, which is primarily a U.S. sector, and while there is certainly a lot of activity, particularly in Helmand province, it's

not all Taliban; part of it is Taliban, part of it is certainly drug-lord related activity that's going on there. But we don't see anything militarily that would unhinge our efforts right now as we go through the remainder of the summer and into the winter period in Afghanistan.

So, that having been said I guess there's probably other places we could talk about in the region. Certainly we've got activity going on down in Somalia, where the United Islamic Courts or the Council of Islamic Courts – they tend to change their names frequently – are showing a degree of capacity down there that we haven't seen any one particular party have before. What's worrisome to us about that is that they definitely have contacts with al Qaeda and they have been known to harbor al Qaeda militants in the region, although not in great numbers. We certainly should expect a pickup of activity there.

Throughout the rest of the region, the dynamic as you can imagine with all of these various things going on really presents a very pressurized and dynamic military period, but also the diplomatic and political activity that's going on is probably as intense as I've ever seen. So that having been said, nobody has yet ordered North Korea into our AOR and so we're happy with that.

Q: Hey, general, it's (name); how are you?

Briefer: Hey, how are you (name)?

Q: Terrific. Listen, take you back to your first three points. Do you see any convergence or divergence or parallels tracks between, you know, the Iranian Hezbollah largely Shi'a effort and of course the al Qaeda Sunni extremists? (For these guys? Are these guys?) on parallel tracks, do they hate each other, are they tacit cooperative? Can you make any comment on that at all?

Briefer: Yeah, my view on that is that they are not cooperating officially. I certainly don't see it. I regard what's going on in Hezbollah Hamas battle space as being manipulated by Iran, directed by Syria and executed by Hamas and Palestine and Hezbollah in the Lebanese border area.

The convergence – I think it's our worst nightmare if there were to be some convergence but the way people are behaving towards one another throughout the region – Sunni and Shi'a – I think would be a very tactical and a very transitory sort of convergence, and, you know, I can't imagine them coming together in a big way against us, although I can certainly imagine and I think it's not out of the realm of the possible that in Iraq, you could see the Iranians dialing up the pressure in southern Iraq, while at the same time al Qaeda in al Anbar Province and around Baghdad are trying dial up the pressure. They would not be coordinated moves; they would be moves that are trying to be complementary of one another, but not necessarily cooperate with one another. Over.

Q: Thank you.

Q: You mention that we have to deter Iran? How the heck do you do that?

Briefer: One thing that we certainly do with the Iranians is that we continue to know where their IRGC Kuds force people are acting, where they are operating. Certainly in the Persian Gulf area it's been very interesting to me – or in the Arabian Gulf if you want to use the term that our Arab buddies use – it's very, very clear to me that the Iranian military activity that was fairly aggressive that we saw from their naval and air units – at least aggressive in terms of their defense posture – has gone down actually below what we've seen, so it's interesting to me that as the pressure gets turned up militarily on the Hezbollah front that they are showing really no levels of big activity on the – within their own territory or in the territory that they normally patrol and operate in in the Arabian Gulf area.

This doesn't mean that we won't see them try to operate in southern Iraq and in Sadr City through their surrogates, but it's very difficult for us to really know how that surrogate activity cause and effect is working. We have, as you know, captured equipment that has been smuggled across the border, but every time we capture it it's never in an Iranian's hand, it's always in an Iraqi-Shi'a hand of some sort.

So, the best way for us to deter the Iranians as a nation-state is to make sure that our air and naval presence in the region remains robust enough to be able to deal with them if things get more – more difficult with them, and for them to understand that while they think we may be tapped out, that we are definitely not tapped out, and that, you know, they can be dealt with militarily in a defensive manner if necessary.

Q: But that doesn't reach to the (inaudible) of their nuclear program.

Briefer: Well, their nuclear program – you've got to make sure that over time you're doing what you can to not allow that nuclear program to go forward. If there's a requirement for military activity against that, we'll cross that road when we come to it. I think that it's a while before they have the capacity to field a nuclear weapon, although I understand that there's a lot of people in the intelligence community that's got different views on it. My view is still pretty much like I think the view of most people in the community, somewhere after 2010.

Q: (name).

Briefer: Hey (name).

Q: Sir, how are you?

Briefer: Great.

Q: 172nd into Baghdad. Is that enough – realizing you have a force constraint. Some folks around town and other places are talking the numbers ought to go up considerably over the next six months or so. How would you respond to that?

Q: Well (name), I think if you take into account the Iraqi army units that are around Baghdad, and the local Iraqi police and you take into account that at this stage in the campaign we want them to take the lead in dealing with the sectarian violence to the extent possible, that we are relying heavily on Iraqi military to do the job for which they're capable of doing. And so U.S. forces on the outer cordon and doing the precision work and also providing the enablers is what we are trying to accomplish there. And of course you know that we've got U.S. transition teams with most of the Iraqi units.

There's two divisions worth of what I would call national police that haven't really achieved the level of discipline or really done what I think the Iraqi government needs them to do. They are somewhere between the local police and the army, and that force we are in the process of standing it down at various locations, retraining it and trying to get it back on line with reliable connections to the new Ministry of the Interior. So my answer is there's a helluva lot more troops available in Iraq than there's ever been. The military in particular is pretty responsible and pretty active. I think more American troops over and beyond what we currently have we certainly wouldn't want to do but we don't rule it out if necessary.

Q: (name). You mentioned possible helping the Lebanese Army. How do you see we could enter in and help there? Are we just anathema because of our relationship with Israel?

Briefer: Well I think in the short term it's probably not a good idea for us to be around, although that's a political decision. In the long term, they want us to be around. The Lebanese army's got very good connections with the United States and France and other western countries. They want to be reformed along western lines. Hezbollah doesn't want to have western trainers or western contractors or western connections with it, and of course they don't want to be disarmed in the long run for reasons that I think are obvious to us.

I think that you don't achieve anything until over time the Lebanese government has attained its sovereignty down to the border with Israel, and that will be a long slow process. But as we move toward that process, I think it's essential that you bring the Lebanese army up to the standard that has to be done immediately -- which is fixed some of their spare parts problems and some of their combat systems problems and then you begin some training not only inside Lebanon but (abroad?).

Now, nobody's told me to begin training. We have conducted an assessment before the problem with Hezbollah started a while back. And that assessment tells us there's probably a two- to five-year program that's necessary to get the Lebanese army up to the point where they can really be what we would consider to be effective. And that's got to be accompanied by a program to disarm the Hezbollah militia which of course is a difficult point in its own right.

Q: Thank you.

Q: Another question on al Sadr's Mahdi army. What kind – what kind of a strategy can you go about using to handle this guy? You say it's a political problem for al Maliki. Is there anything that will work other than just the normal police work, and then at some point going after the part of his militia that won't cooperate?

Briefer: Well, there's two different ways that you have to look at it. Number one, there's – when it gets to the point where there will be large-scale direct confrontation, do we have the forces in the field necessary to take care of it, and I think the answer is yes. I think they have no intention of trying to provoke a major confrontation. They've done that twice in the past and it and it never worked out for them and I don't think that they are trying to do that right now.

No doubt however that there are rogue elements – rogue may be a term that's subject to some debate – but there are certainly elements that don't appear to be necessarily connected to Sadr himself that are participating in these various death squad activities. It's really clear to me that we've got to target them, and one of the real marks of whether we are going to be successful in Baghdad or not will be the willingness of the Iraqi government – national government – to underwrite those military operations necessary to take those cells out, not only on the Shi'a side, but on the Sunni side.

Q: Thank you.

Briefer: And so I think it's the leadership, go after the known cells that are going the bad work, and like I said last night we had some pretty good effect and we are going to continue that process.

Q: Thank you.

Q: General (Name.)

Briefer: Hey (name).

Q: Iran is of course as we all know leading the Lebanese problem. They are also I believe you would agree a major problem with you in Iraq right now, not only within the government – you have elements within the government that are I think are cooperating with the Iranians (Akeem? Sp?) and others I am told. If we don't take out and change the regime or leadership in Iran we are going continue to have major problems over there.

Has anyone proposed, and I know you can't really give me the answer, but the fact is regime change with Europe and everyone has got to be an eventual decision or we'll never get any stability in the region.

Briefer: Well, I tell you (name) the Iraqi – or the Iranian government is very unpopular with its own people.

Q: Concur.

Briefer: And in my mind if you can contain and protect and deter and do those things that bring into account an awful lot of the sentiment in the Arab Sunni population that they want to contain and protect and deter the Iranians in conjunction with the United States, then I think you can start setting the conditions that isolate the Iranians.

If you can solve the problem in Lebanon in a way that diminishes Hezbollah, which again at this particular point is probably more diplomatic than it is military, and if you can start moving both Iraq and Syria toward the Arab center, then I think there's a very good chance that Iran's power is both deterred and contained.

But it's a long-term strategy, it'd take an awful lot of effort, it's very hard to do when there's an Arab-Israeli conflict going on, but I think the Iranians are masters at taking advantage of unsettled situations, and as you know, they play all sides against the middle; they not only are working with the Iraqi government to try to get the Iraqi government to stabilize, but their IRGC Kuds force people are working with the various Shi'a rogue militias specifically to undermine the security situation down in Basra and up in Sadr City.

So it's a very complicated problem for us but I'm of the opinion that we've got enough power, there's enough regional sentiment and there's enough opportunity that over time you set the conditions where the Iranian current government of (amed) neged - sp) and the various other extreme factions that have come together really can't make it in the 21st century. That may be wishful thinking, but that's what I think.

Q: Well, when I said regime change I am not talking U.S., but I am talking covert and letting the Iranian people take their country back, and doing the same things that you are talking about getting alliances over there that would encourage this activity. I mean, lord knows they've got enough demonstrations and instability there and we know the population doesn't like them, but how would we get that coalition over there, plus covert operations to set up so that the Iranian people would ensure that that regime cannot keep a stable country over there? That's all I am saying.

Briefer: It's again probably the work of somebody else than CENTCOM, but I can tell you that there is a tremendous amount of concern in the Arab countries about Iranian hegemony right now. And it's actually just not in the Arab Sunni states, but you also see a lot of it reflected from the Iraqi Shi'a politicians as well. It's not true that they are completely dominated by the Iranians. I think ultimately they are trying to build themselves a state that will be part of the Arab world.

So the number one story last year was Iraq stability. As I go around the Arab world this year, the number one story is Iranian expansionism, hegemony and nuclear program. Now, in this period of unsettled activity, a lot of people have a lot of desire to sort this thing out rather quickly so that a unified front can emerge against the Iranians, but that will take a lot of (scaling?) - covertly how things emerge, (name), I just can't say.

Q: Okay, thank you sir.

Q: (Name) again. In view of your last statements there, do you view the turn in statements by the surrounding Arab countries toward Hezbollah from their original statements as simply rhetoric that will soon pass, or do you see any way that these governments can have any long-term interest in supporting Hezbollah, you know, considering they are an Iranian based factor?

Briefer: Well, it depends upon the state. For example, the other day there were Shi'a demonstrations, in (Damahn? Sp?) the oil-producing area of Saudi Arabia. And this is precisely what the Saudis thought would happen as a result of Iranian ambitions in the region. And so I think you'll always see Saudi Arabia very much squared off against Shi'a interests, whether they are in the form of Hezbollah, various parties in Iraq such as Muqtada Sadr's folks, or, you know, within the various Gulf States.

Jordan, on the other hand, which – you know, the king has been speaking out a lot against the Iranians, that having been said, his people – or the Jordanian people -- are looking at Hezbollah as one of the few Arab resistant movements that's ever been able to do anything the Israelis, and so he's got a problem in managing street expectations with his own geo-political outlook, and so, you know – again, it's complicated, but I think it's transitory. I think over time most of the Arab countries with the exception of Syria understand that they've got to diminish Hezbollah power because it's a conduit for Iranian power, and I think ultimately the other Arab countries will work hard on the Syrians to get the Syrians out of that orbit as well. But it's pretty interesting and dynamic.

Q: It's (name) again. On the Syrians, I mean do you see any (inaudible) to suggest that there would actually be an opportunity to just (peel?) the Syrians away and of course Syrian-Iranian (?) cooperation also may be marriage of convenience, and there may be a possibility to provide a series of incentives to make them do something like Qadaffi, and sort of find religion, to use a very bad metaphor. Do you think that's at all possible or just wishful thinking?

Briefer: No, I think it's possible and I think it's a road that ought to be pursued. I think a cornerstone of our strategic thought how do you get the Syrians away from the Iranian orbit? And again, it's over time. You know, we're kind of stuck in contact in this current crisis, and I don't believe that we necessarily need to think that what's going to happen in the next two or three weeks or next two or three months is going to be the way it's going to emerge.

I think in the longer term the strategic framework looks to me that it can move in a positive direction if we can get not only our own internal capabilities synchronized, but also that of our friends in the region probably most importantly, and also the Europeans.

I think when people look at how the Iranians have been playing this game and it's not real clear to people right now but it will be a couple weeks after things settle down,

people will be even less interested in Iran emerging as a nuclear weapon state, and so I think the impetus will change, will be pretty major. Again, I am not trying to be overly optimistic, but I am not pessimistic that we necessarily move towards escalation in more difficult times although that's possible, too.

Voice: Gentlemen, we have time for one last question.

Q: Hey general, (name). Question is about how we are getting our story out about information operations. From the beginning many of us on this phone call have talked with senior officials who said they've never really been happy with the IO campaign. And it just seems that the bad guys are popping up groups all over the Middle East, all over the world, as these things – maybe they're not organized together but for some reason, you know, it's like a bunch of ants -- when one finds food, they all know it.

And these things are popping up, and it just seems like the Iranians are sitting there, nobody's putting any pressure on them, at least that's visible, at least in the media, at least that you can see here. My question comes down to: What are we doing for the people who are not picking up arms, who are not throwing bombs, who want to have a stable society, what are we doing to inoculate them against these groups as part of our IO campaign that shows that we're the good guys?

Briefer: Yeah, well, first of all, it's a great question. It's one that we could talk on for another hour. But I would tell you that we are not going to ever convince the people in the region that we are the good guys, at least not in the next 10 or 15 years. What we need to do is convince people in the region that it is not in their interest to side with either the Sunni extremists or the Shi'a extremists, and the Shi'a extremists is state supported, the Sunni extremists much less clearly so, and we need to empower the moderates to the extent that we can.

But the first thing that we need to do better – and I don't think that we've done it at all – I mean, it's interesting, when I testify in Washington, it's as if I – you know, this is a one player game, that we happen to be playing a major tournament of some sort against ourselves in the Middle East, and the only thing that matters are the mistakes that we make in unhinging our theoretically unstoppable plan.

The truth of the matter is there's an awful lot of actors in the region that either are our enemies directly, or our enemies indirectly, and we don't talk enough about who they are, what they represent, what they (mean? Made? Main?) and what happens if their vision becomes mainstream in the region. If the extremist vision, either revolutionary Iranian or al Qaeda ideology becomes mainstream in the region, the region will either move to a major war against itself – Sunni versus Shi'a, or one of those two groups will move to a major action against us in the west, at a helluva lot more cost and problem than we currently have.

So, why doesn't this work it out? Why can't we seem to talk about the enemy? Your guess is as good as mine. We talk about it as much as we can; I guess we're not doing a

very good job of it, but I think we've got to expose this enemy for what this enemy is, and at the same time admit that we make plenty of mistakes, but on the other hand, we need to understand that there's an enemy that's got a plan, got an ideology and there are actually two very directions that are designed to throw the United States out of the region and it's fortunate for us that they haven't come together. I don't think they will come together, at least not in the short term, but, you know, we've got to be talking about what revolutionary Iran means and thinks, because they are in my mind clearly doing everything they can to be at war with us.

I read somewhere today somebody said, well the Iranians have been at war with us for a long time, we've just never been at war with them. But the question is, you know, how do we articulate what the Iranians have done, are doing and will do against our interests in the region and against the interests of the moderates in the region? To me it's easier to deal with that because it's tied to a state sponsor. Al Qaeda is a tougher thing to deal with, because it's an ideology. Yet, if you get on their web sites and you just use their own words and show their pictures of what they think they're all about, you would think it would disgust thinking people the same way that fascism and Japanese militarism disgusted people in the Second World War, but unfortunately, it really hasn't got to the danger point yet.

Now, the other final thing I'd say to you is I have been reading a lot of intelligence here lately about what these various groups are saying to one another, and interestingly enough they seem to think that they are getting chewed up by the media as well. And I was reading some conversation points here of some senior al Qaeda information where some of the senior leaders exchanged information and I won't reveal how we know this, you can imagine, but they're essentially saying we just can't seem to get the media to understand what we're doing and why we're doing it. And certainly within Iraq as we capture al Qaeda people that operate for AQIZ that they seem to think that all the media outlets are against them, and if people only knew their story, they would be on their side. But of course, people know what they're doing, and they're not on their side.

So, look, I hope this is useful for you. I appreciate what everybody is doing. It's an interesting time, but not one in which we ought to wring our hands and be pessimistic. I think there's ways to maneuver through this successfully.

(b)(6) General, thanks so much for joining us again today, we really appreciate your time.

Briefer: Okay.

(b)(6) Gentlemen, again, just as a reminder you are free to quote a senior military official from today's call, and thanks for joining us.

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2006 1:23 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
M, LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV JCS SJS; (b)(6) LtCol, OCJCS/PA;
(b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV JCS SJS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS
OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV JCS OVCJCS; (b)(6) CPT JCS SJS
Subject: Gen McCaffery GWOT brief - 6 NOV 06
Attachments: McCaffrey,NDUConf,GWOT-110606.ppt



McCaffrey,NDUConf,
f,GWOT-110606....

Katie and Team --

Received the attached GEN McCaffrey ppt brief from CENTCOM; it is a GWOT presentation made recently at NDU.

While there is nothing particularly new here, he does provide unfettered observations on Iraq, including dysfunctional/broken governance, lack of Congressional support for long-term funding solutions, dangers of diplomatically confronting Iran, and "grossly" inadequate interagency support. This is relevant because GEN McCaffrey speaks in various venues, is an adjunct professor at West Point, and is a military analyst for NBC and MSNBC. His audience reach is significant, and his observations will continue to shape popular opinion as we transition to a new SECDEF and continue to look hard at the GWOT way ahead.

For your SA.

vr (b)(6)



Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
United States Military Academy at West Point

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Presentation to:
National Defense University
Defense Worldwide Counter Terrorism Conference

Monday, 6 November 2006

BARRY R. McCAFFREY
GENERAL, USA (RETIRED)

2900 South Quincy Street, Suite 300A
Arlington, VA 22206
brm@mccaffreyassociates.com
703-824-5160



SIX INSIGHTS ON THE WAR ON TERROR

- The threat terrorist organizations have been intimidated and badly damaged.
- The threat has morphed and remains a huge danger to the US and our allies.
- Global animosity toward US foreign policy and the Administration is universal, intense, and growing.
- Homeland security has improved immeasurably since 9/11 (not withstanding Katrina).
- Homeland security is grossly under-resourced, lacks congressional support, and remains incoherent.
- The proliferation of WMD nation states and technology remains the principal threat to the American people and our allies.



ELEVEN OBSERVATIONS ON IRAQ -- 2006

- 1st - The morale, fighting effectiveness, and confidence of U.S. combat forces continue to be simply awe-inspiring. Our allies are leaving.
- 2nd - The Iraqi Army is real, growing, and much more willing to fight. However, they are very badly equipped. The Iraqi Police are a disaster.
- 3rd - The Maliki Administration is dysfunctional. Governance is broken. The nation is gripped with fear and distrust.
- 4th - Coalition and Iraqi forces have largely succeeded in neutralizing the foreign jihadist threat at a strategic and operational level.
- 5th - Inter-Agency Support for our U.S.- Iraq strategy is grossly inadequate. Only the Armed Forces and the CIA are at war.
- 6th - We face a serious strategic dilemma - Are U.S. combat troops conducting a police action governed by the rule of Iraqi law -- or -- are they a Coalition Military Force supporting a counter-insurgency campaign in a nation with almost no functioning institutions?
- 7th - U.S. Detainee policy and conditions have improved dramatically. We may have over-corrected.
- 8th - U.S. combat forces need to reduce their footprint to get down to ten combat brigades by Christmas. We are going to break the US Army.
- 9th - Iraq cannot sustain economic recovery without enhanced and long-term U.S. budgetary support. Congressional support is lacking.
- 10th - Tough U.S. diplomatic rhetoric about confronting Iranian nuclear weapons is ill-advised.
- 11th - There is growing animosity by the US Armed Forces towards the Media.

GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey



NINE OBSERVATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN -- 2006

- 1st - Afghanistan has in five years moved from a situation of: mindless violence, cruelty, poverty, massive production of drugs, the absence of government, and isolation -- to a nation with a struggling democratic government; an exploding economy; a rapidly growing, disciplined Army; a vibrant free press, and active diplomatic and economic ties with its neighbors and the world.
- 2nd - There is little question that the level of fighting has intensified rapidly in the past year. Three years ago the Taliban operated in squad sized units. Last year they operated in company sized units (100+ men). This year the Taliban are operating in battalion sized units (400+ men).
- 3rd - The early assumption by NATO of a lead role in supporting the Afghan government is a triumph. NATO is dramatically under-resourced for the task at hand.
- 4th - Afghanistan also produces more than 90% of the world's opium poppy (4,475 metric tons 2005) and is also the world's largest heroin producing and trafficking country.
- 5th - The creation of 44 battalions of ANA Forces (30,000 troops) in 36 months is an enormous success story. They are the most disciplined, and effective military force in Afghanistan's history. In general, these troops are very courageous, and aggressive in field operations. The Afghan Army is miserably under-resourced.
- 6th - The Afghan National Police are vital to establishing order in the urban and rural areas. (33,000 Afghan National Police ANP nominally exist and 5,200 Afghan Border Police) They are in a disastrous condition: badly equipped, corrupt, incompetent, poorly led and trained, riddled by drug use and lacking any semblance of a national police infrastructure.
- 7th - We must eradicate the opium crops without fail each growing season -- and massively resource alternative economic development.
- 8th - The country remains devastated by the peril of 450,000 landmines which kill and maim hundreds of people a year; foreign missionaries are harassed; there is widespread public perception of government corruption, including ministerial involvement in illegal narcotics; intimidation and violence directed at NGO workers increased during the past year.
- 9th - We must re-think the relative importance we place on Afghanistan. This was the source country of international terrorism. If we fail and it slips back into anarchy -- it will again be a sanctuary for international terror.

GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey



PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS FROM GUANTANAMO -- 2006

- 1st – There is now zero physical or mental abuse of prisoners in this facility by either guard personnel or military intelligence interrogators.
- 2nd – Military interrogations are clearly in compliance with previously published U.S. military training standards.
- 3rd – Procedures to review the status of Detainees exist. 179 have been released. More than four hundred and fifty Detainees are now being held. At least one-third are extremely dangerous terrorists.
- 4th – Environmental conditions clearly exceed those provided to U.S. Military personnel on garrison active duty.
- 5th – Opportunity to worship is respected. There is uninterrupted prayer time.
- 6th – Medical care, dental care, mental health care, nutrition, and cultural sensitivity exceed the standards of U.S. first-line institutions.
- 7th – Detainees receive 4200 calories a day with 53 individually prepared special diet meals. Four different menus and three meals a day are offered. Halal and cultural dietary requirements are supported.
- 8th – All Detainees have significant opportunities for recreation (2-12 hours daily).
- 9th – Detainees are provided two full sets of clothing, have privacy in cell toilet facilities, and are permitted regular showers.
- 10th – Books and magazines are offered to all compliant Detainees. (All Detainees regardless of status have a Koran in their cell).

GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey



WHAT IS IN OUR FUTURE?

- 1st – The US economy continues to dominate the global marketplace.
- 2nd – US – Japanese economic and political cooperation grows even more intense.
- 3rd – Saudi Arabia continues to modernize and maintains stability.
- 4th – Relations with Europe dramatically improve with the next Administration.
- 5th – Relations with Russia, China, India, and Pakistan -- now immeasurably better than pre-9/11 -- will continue to strengthen.
- 6th – North Korea comes apart.
- 7th – Terrorists strike America.
- 8th – Crisis in Iraq -- uncertain outcome.
- 9th – Showdown in Afghanistan -- uncertain outcome.
- 10th – The death of Castro -- meltdown of repression.
- 11th – Confrontation with Chavez -- instability and oil.

GEN (R) Barry R. McCaffrey

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6), CAPT, JCS, OCJCS
Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2006 2:28 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Subject: RE: Gen McCaffery GWOT brief - 6 NOV 06

Thanks Katie!

CAPT (b)(6) USN
Special Assistant to CJCS
Director, Chairman's Action Group
Pentagon Room (b)(2)
(b)(2),(b)(6)

From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2006 2:27 PM
To: (b)(6) CAPT, JCS, OCJCS
Subject: FW: Gen McCaffery GWOT brief - 6 NOV 06

(b)(6)

Not that you need one more thing to read -- and maybe you've heard directly from Gen McCaffrey, but thought these 6 brief slides were worth sharing...
V/R
Katie

From: (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA
Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2006 1:23 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) M, LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV JCS SJS; (b)(6) LtCol, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) (b)(6) Maj, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CIV JCS SJS; (b)(6) CIV, JCS OCJCS; (b)(6) CIV JCS OVCJCS; (b)(6) CPT JCS SJS
Subject: Gen McCaffery GWOT brief - 6 NOV 06

Katie and Team --

Received the attached GEN McCaffrey ppt brief from CENTCOM; it is a GWOT presentation made recently at NDU.

While there is nothing particularly new here, he does provide unfettered observations on Iraq, including dysfunctional/broken governance, lack of Congressional support for long-term funding solutions, dangers of diplomatically confronting Iran, and "grossly" inadequate interagency support. This is relevant because GEN McCaffrey speaks in various venues, is an adjunct professor at West Point, and is a military analyst for NBC and MSNBC. His audience reach is significant, and his observations will continue to shape popular opinion as we transition to a new SECDEF and continue to look hard at the GWOT way ahead.

For your SA.

vr, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Lt Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2006 10:54 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
Subject: LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
UPDATE: MEDIA INTERVIEW REQUESTS
Importance: High

Ma'am... revised request below, to include briefing to mil analysts tomorrow, for DJS approval.
vr, (b)(6)

to: sharp:

cc: (b)(6) haddock; (b)(6) whitman;
(b)(6); barbero; (b)(6) richardson, john; sattler; (b)(6)
(b)(6)

DJS, Sir; a couple of requests please,

1) Secretary Rumsfeld will hold a lunch meeting with the military analysts tomorrow at noon. This morning, SecDef requested the analysts receive an Iraq Update Briefing prior to his lunch meeting with them.

Lt Col (b)(6) from office as reached out to J-5 (ME) and J-3 to request a briefer be identified to present a combined UNCLASS strategy/current ops briefing (20 min ea) for the group tomorrow at 1115 in the DepSecDef (T) conference room. BG Jones has tentatively agreed, pending a formal tasking, to brief Iraq strategy. Read-ahead packages are forthcoming from OSD/PA for the briefer(s) identified.

With your concurrence, I request you please forward to J-3 and J-5 requesting their assistance in identifying a briefer for tomorrow's event.

2) Thom Shanker, New York Times, has requested a background interview with LTG Lute.

He just returned from Iraq and one of the stories he's working on is a profile of GEN Abizaid. One of GEN Abizaid's senior aides encouraged Thom to talk with LTG Lute as he is someone who knows GEN Abizaid well and can talk about his career.

LTG Lute has agreed to the interview and, pending approval, we've tentatively scheduled the interview for tomorrow, at 1230.

Lt Col (b)(6) from my office will be present to monitor the interview.

Recommend we support. Thom is one of the best and will write a meaningful and thoughtful personal profile.

Very Respectfully,
Katie

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Lt Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2006 11:25 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
Subject: LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) CDR, OCJCS/PA
UPDATE 2: MEDIA INTERVIEW REQUESTS

Ma'am... just got a call from BG Jones (J-5, ME)... he honestly doesn't think we should be offering a strategy brief for Iraq because there isn't anything new to say and we could only get ourselves in a jam by potentially conflicting with what SecDef will say 45 minutes later when he meets with them. He suggests a J-3 current ops update and leave strategy/policy questions to the SecDef. I actually agree with him... this time. Based on your thoughts, I've adjusted the request below as such.

vr, (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) Lt Col, OCJCS/PA
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2006 10:54 AM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA; (b)(6) LTC OCJCS/PA; (b)(6)
LTC, OCJCS/PA; (b)(6) J CDR, OCJCS/PA
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Importance: High

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vr, (b)(6)

to: sharp:

cc: (b)(6) haddock; (b)(6) whitman;
(b)(6) barbero; (b)(6)

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Very Respectfully,
Katie

(b)(6)

From: Sharp, Walter L, LTG, JCS DJS
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2006 1:31 PM
To: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
Cc: (b)(6) Col JCS SJS; (b)(6) Lt Col, JCS, ODJS; (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA; Lute, Douglas E LTG JCS J3; (b)(6) Col, JCS J3; (b)(6) MAJ, JCS, J3; (b)(6) W, LtCol, JCS J3; (b)(6) Lt Col, OCJCS/PA; Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) (b)(6) COL OSD PA; Barbero, Michael D BG JCS NMCC; (b)(6) LCDR, JCS J3; (b)(6) CAPT JCS NMCC; (b)(6) COL JCS J3; (b)(6) Col, JCS, J-3
Subject: RE: MEDIA REQUESTS

Both approved

>
>From: Haddock, Ellen (Katie), Col, OCJCS/PA
>Sent: Monday, December 11, 2006 12:56 PM
>To: Sharp, Walter L, LTG, JCS DJS
>Cc: (b)(6) Col JCS SJS; (b)(6) Lt Col, JCS, ODJS; (b)(6) CAPT OVCJCS/PA; Lute, Douglas E LTG JCS J3; (b)(6) Col, JCS J3; (b)(6) G, MAJ, JCS, J3; (b)(6) LtCol, JCS J3; (b)(6) Lt Col, OCJCS/PA; Whitman, Bryan (b)(6) [Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA]; (b)(6) L COL OSD PA; Barbero, Michael D BG JCS NMCC; (b)(6) LCDR, JCS J3; (b)(6) CAPT JCS NMCC; (b)(6) COL JCS J3; (b)(6) Col, JCS, J-3
>Subject: MEDIA REQUESTS

>
>General Sharp, Sir;
>We have the following media requests for Joint Staff personnel:
>1) Secretary Rumsfeld will hold a lunch meeting with the military analysts tomorrow at noon. This morning, SecDef requested the analysts receive an Iraq Update Briefing prior to his lunch meeting with them.
>Lt Col (b)(6) from my office as reached out to J-3 to request a briefer be identified to present an UNCLASS current ops update briefing for the group tomorrow at 1115 in the DepSecDef (T) conference room. Read-ahead packages are forthcoming from OSD/PA for the briefer identified.
>J-3 staff has been informed of the request; with your concurrence, we will continue coordination with J3 to identify a briefer for tomorrow's event.
>
>Important one to support -- these analysts will use this information to inform their frequent reporting/analysis in the national media.
>
>2) Thom Shanker, New York Times, has requested a background interview with LTG Lute.
>Thom Shanker just returned from Iraq and one of the stories he's working on is a profile of GEN Abizaid. One of GEN Abizaid's senior aides encouraged Thom to talk with LTG Lute as he is someone who knows GEN Abizaid well and can talk about his career.
>LTG Lute has agreed to the interview and, pending approval, we've tentatively scheduled the interview for tomorrow, at 1230.
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>