




**Headquarters, US Army
Reserve Command
Office of the Inspector General**



**Special Assessment of Training for
Army Reserve Units on the Law of
Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment
Requirements, Ethics, and
Leadership**

March - December 2004

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DAIG

**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND
1401 DESHLER STREET SW
FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330-2000**

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FOREWARD

1. This Assessment report addresses the US Army Reserve Command (USARC) Commanding General's (CG's), 11 March 2004, directive to conduct a Special Assessment of Training for Army Reserve Units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics and Leadership.
2. Based on this Assessment:
 - a. Shortcomings in training on Law of Land Warfare and detainee treatment were identified; however, Soldiers and leaders expressed knowledge of requirements.
 - b. Nearly all Soldiers expressed an understanding of the Army Values and a strong perception of personal ethics, to include adherence to the Law of Land Warfare.
 - c. Weaknesses were identified in the training to mission link, and training and operating procedures, to include Military Police (MP) and Military Intelligence (MI) interoperability.
3. The USARC Inspector General (IG) Team observed and assessed training and questioned Soldiers and leaders on the conduct of training on the Law of Land Warfare, detainee treatment requirements, ethics, and leadership. The USARC and Regional Readiness Command (RRC) IGs used Sensing Sessions and surveys to check Soldiers' perceptions of the training specified in the directive. The Team concentrated on training on the Law of Land Warfare, detainee treatment, ethics, and leadership and reviewed training management procedures with respect to this training. The USARC IG Team did not investigate cases of wrong doing as part of this special assessment. Command and Unit Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) and tactics, techniques and procedures in the context of training, ethics, and leadership were reviewed. Most of the units assessed were under the command and control of the USARC. The USARC IG Team also observed training and talked with mobilized Soldiers at Power Projection Platforms preparing to deploy or returning from deployment.
4. Specific training on the Law of Land Warfare and detainee treatment directed by the CG, USARC after this Assessment was under way addresses some of the shortcomings identified in this report. A steady improvement in observed training during the course of this Assessment was noted by the IGs assessing the training. Current Command Training Guidance and planned training should improve current procedures and strengthen the training to mission link also identified as a weakness in this assessment.
5. This assessment showed that Soldiers have moderate confidence in their unit leadership and their chain of command. Independent of this Assessment, the Army IG is conducting an extensive review of leader development in Reserve Components. It should be noted that the Chief, Army Reserve and the Chief, National Guard Bureau requested the review. Winning Soldier confidence is vital to training and mission accomplishment.

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


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6. The "way ahead" for the Army Reserve is to nurture and preserve the strong ethical and mission-oriented focus of its Soldiers. Clear training guidance; realistic, hands-on training at home station; and effective leadership are key to the success of the "**train-alert-deploy**" model. Leaders must continually strive to improve unit and Soldier readiness by identifying training shortcomings and implementing procedures to provide challenging, mission-relevant training for Soldiers.

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Executive Summary

1. Background:

a. Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Commanding General, US Army Reserve Command (USARC), signed a formal directive on 11 March 2004 to the USARC Inspector General (IG) to conduct a Special Assessment of Training for Army Reserve Units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership with priority given to Military Police (MP) and Military Intelligence (MI) units. In order to satisfy this directive, the USARC IG observed specified training, reviewed documents, talked to Soldiers and leaders to gain their opinions in interviews and Sensing Sessions, and collected data on opinions and perceptions by survey.

b. This Assessment was not an investigation.

c. The USARC IGs did not assess, review, or observe training outside of the Continental United States.

2. **Purpose:** The purpose of this Assessment was to evaluate the training of Army Reserve Units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership at various training locations. Further, any training weaknesses or impediments to training in these specified areas were to be reported along with appropriate recommendations or changes.

3. Concept:

a. The USARC IG Team used a three-phased approach during the course of the Assessment that provided an opportunity for a crosswalk of findings with subject matter experts and a written report at the end of each phase for the directing authority. During the course of the Assessment, IGs noted improvement in observed training quality and planning, particularly in MP units. An example of Command emphasis and action taken to improve training is the 2005 Desert Warrior Exercise, which will offer Army Reserve MPs "hands on" training on the Law of Land Warfare and detainee handling.

b. The USARC IGs worked in teams of two and gathered information and data for seven months during this Assessment using five primary methods: training observations, document reviews, individual interviews, surveys, and Sensing Sessions. The IG teams observed Army Reserve Soldiers in a variety of training environments that included: Inactive Duty Training (IDT), Annual Training (AT), MP reclassification training, and pre-deployment training at mobilization stations. They evaluated training based on its adequacy, quality, and whether it was conducted to standard. Adequacy, as it applies to this Assessment relates to sufficiency for mission requirements and execution. Quality equates to "Train as You Fight," i.e., realistic training. The determination for adequacy and quality was a subjective call from the IG observer

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or the Soldier receiving the training. Standard refers to the applicable Army Regulation, or Soldier Training Publication (STP), etc., for the specified task. The USARC IGs reviewed unit training documents to determine compliance with Army and USARC policies and guidance. They interviewed personnel at the MP and MI proponent schools and the USARC staff subject matter experts. Finally, the USARC IG Team assisted by Army Reserve Regional Readiness Command (RRC) IGs conducted surveys in 119 units and Sensing Sessions in 45 units; as well as, individual interviews with Soldiers at unit level to obtain perceptions and feelings about the specified training.

4. Objectives: The USARC IG Team had five objectives for this Assessment:

- a. Objective 1. Determine the frequency and standards for training Army Reserve Soldiers on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership.
- b. Objective 2. Assess the adequacy of specified training for Army Reserve units.
- c. Objective 3. Assess the quality of specified training in Army Reserve units.
- d. Objective 4. Observe specified training to determine if training is conducted to standard.
- e. Objective 5. Identify and recommend any changes to training, guidance, and procedures related to the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership.

5. Synopsis:

a. In the areas assessed, shortcomings were found in training on the Law of Land Warfare and detainee operations; however, Soldiers and leaders expressed knowledge of the requirements. IGs observed briefings on "The Soldier's Rules" used as the training vehicle on the Law of Land Warfare. These briefings provided Soldiers a good overview of the Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva and Hague Convention requirements, but they were not conducted to standard for the specified Soldier task. IGs also noted that during detainee operations training, trainers did not always include all Soldier task performance steps and test performance measures. Nearly all Soldiers indicated an understanding of the Army Values and had a strong belief in their own personal ethics, to include adherence to the Law of Land Warfare. Soldiers also had a positive belief that their peers and leaders would adhere to the Army Values and would ethically treat detainees in accordance with the Law of War. This is encouraging in spite of a lack of systematic training on the Army Values and values-based ethics in Army Reserve units.

b. The significant findings regarding Law of Land Warfare training were:

(1) Frequency for training Army Reserve Soldiers on the Law of Land Warfare was at the commander's discretion prior to 10 June 2004.

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(2) Training on the Law of Land Warfare was insufficient to adequately prepare Soldiers for the realities of a combat environment.

(3) Trainers failed to properly train Soldiers on prescribed performance steps and test Soldiers on prescribed performance measures during Law of Land Warfare training.

c. The significant findings regarding Detainee Treatment Requirements Training were:

(1) The recommended frequency for training Army Reserve Soldiers on detainee treatment requirements was derived from unit leaders' assessment of Mission Essential Task List (METL).

(2) Specified detainee treatment training in MP/MI units was not performed to the Army standards.

c. The significant findings regarding Ethics Training were:

(1) The majority of Army Reserve Soldiers and civilians did not receive face to face ethics training in 2004, as directed by the Acting Secretary of the Army.

(2) There is no prescribed frequency for values-based ethics training for Army Reserve Soldiers.

d. The significant findings regarding Leadership Training were that observed leadership training was adequate within the context in which it was presented.

e. The USARC IG Team also noted [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During visits to the MP and MI proponent schools, it was determined that Army Reserve courseware was not updated as often as the Active Component courseware. All units, including non-MP and non-MI units, indicated a weakness in knowledge of their own Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). Most Soldiers and units indicated that when mobilized and deployed they did perform missions for which they were trained. The noted exception was a significant portion of MP units sensed stated their units were regularly given missions for which they had not been trained. However, Soldiers and leaders did indicate they understood the need to adapt to the mission once in theater. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Finally, shortcomings in general training management were found during document reviews.


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
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f. Significant findings regarding Other Observations were:



(3) Army Reserve MP and MI Total Army School System courseware was not identical to Active Component courseware.



6. The findings and observations from this Assessment are separated into the following five chapters: Chapter 3 – **Law of Land Warfare Training**; Chapter 4 – **Detainee Treatment Requirements Training**; Chapter 5 – **Ethics Training**; Chapter 6 – **Leadership Training**; and Chapter 7 – **Other Observations**. A summary of chapters 3-6 is provided below:

a. Chapter 3 - Law of Land Warfare Training. The USARC IG Team determined that 65% of units visited from June through December 2004 had either conducted or scheduled Annual Law of Land Warfare Training. However, most of the training observed was inadequate to prepare Soldiers for the realities of a combat environment and was not conducted in accordance with (IAW) the prescribed standard. Prior to June 2004, there was no requirement for individual training for Army Reserve Soldiers on the Law of Land Warfare prior to their departure to the mobilization station. This changed with the issuance of Memorandum, Headquarters, US Army Reserve Command, AFRC-TR, June 10 2004, subject: Individual Training Focus Areas – Common Tasks, Military Police, and Military Intelligence, which required all Soldiers to receive Law of Land Warfare training prior to their departure to mobilization station. The Law of War training observed during IDT provided Soldiers an overview of the concepts of “The Soldier’s Rules” previously taught during Level A training.

(b)(2) Comply with the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions. USARC IGs observed training, conducted Sensing Sessions, and administered surveys; (b)(2)

(b)(2)

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b. Chapter 4 - Detainee Treatment Requirements Training:


(1) Army Reserve commanders determined frequency for training on detainee treatment requirements (detainee operations) based on an assessment of the unit's METL. A unit's METL includes the training tasks critical for wartime mission accomplishment. There are recommended frequencies published in mission training plans and STPs to maintain individual and collective proficiency. However, the Commanding General (CG), USARC, directed key training in the memorandum, Headquarters, US Army Reserve Command, AFRC-TR, June 10 2004, subject: Individual Training Focus Areas – Common Tasks, Military Police, and Military Intelligence. The memorandum directed that "soldiers specifically charged with responsibility for handling prisoners or other detainees – Military Police and Military Intelligence troops – receive focused refresher training prior to deployment." The CG stated "we cannot defer training on the critical individual tasks until after mobilization."

(2) The USARC IG Team made 45 observations of detainee operations training during IDT, AT, MP reclassification training, and at Power Projection Platforms (mobilization stations). The observations included training on 21 different specified MP and MI tasks. 52% (23 of 45) of observed detainee operations training was determined to have been conducted to standard. Of the training conducted to standard, 57% (13 of 23) was observed during IDT; 50% (2 of 4) during AT; 50% (4 of 8) during Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) reclassification training; and 40% (4 of 10) at the mobilization station. Some training observed was web-based. Training determined not to have been conducted to standard, 48% (22 of 45), resulted when instructors/trainers did not conduct all performance steps and performance measures as required by the STP. In assessing the training observed, the USARC IGs found training, though not always adequate, better prepared Soldiers for mission requirements than if they had received no training at all. Additionally, some instructors/trainers provided quality training by including "train as you fight" realism to training events.

c. Chapter 5 - Ethics Training:

(2) The standards and frequency for ethics training in the Army Reserve was reviewed and the conduct of ethics training was observed to determine its adequacy and quality. Prior to April 2004, there was no Army Regulation (AR) or policy specifying frequency requirements for ethics training for Army Reserve Soldiers. Currently, Soldiers are required to receive annual face-to-face ethics training conducted by an Army Ethics Counselor. USARC IGs found that approximately 46% of reported Army Reserve Soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians received ethics training in 2004, but not all of the training was face-to-face as required. High

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


Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) due to ongoing mobilizations likely affected the numbers of Soldiers trained as did the fact that unit trainers and Ethics Counselors may not have had sufficient lead time to develop appropriate training plans and schedule training for everyone. The IG Team observed ethics training conducted by Judge Advocates from one Garrison and three RRCs. All of the observed training dealt with business relationships and fiscal matters and did not specifically relate to the unit's mission.

b. The USARC IGs determined that another type of ethics training was more closely linked to the Army Values, under the "umbrella" of the Army Consideration of Others (CO2) Program. "Ethical Development – Individual and Organizational," was one of eight key areas under this program. AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, states that Equal Opportunity Advisors assist the commander in implementing a CO2 Program. Headquarters, USARC provided CO2 Program implementing guidance and training requirements in 1998. USARC Pamphlet 600-4, *Consideration of Others Participant Manual*, states, "Commanders, at all levels, will initiate Consideration of Others by presenting a comprehensive briefing to the entire unit/organization..." and this "training will be conducted annually at a minimum..." It further states that Troop Program Unit (TPU) Soldiers will attend a minimum of two hours of small group discussion per year. Full-Time Support personnel, which include Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Soldiers, are required to attend eight hours of similar training. However, the USARC Command Training Guidance (CTG) for Training Years 2004-2006 has since allowed commanders to defer the annual CO2 briefing to pre-mobilization or post-mobilization training. As a result, some Army Reserve Soldiers have not received periodic training to ensure continual awareness of caring as an organizational imperative. The USARC IG Team found documentation reflecting a decreasing amount of CO2 small group training for TPU and AGR Soldiers. It was noteworthy though that surveys and sensing showed widespread knowledge of the Army Values among Soldiers. A total of 94% of all survey participants indicated knowledge of the Army Values and 89% indicated they lived the Army Values.

d. Chapter 6 - Leadership Training

(1) Army Regulation 600-100, *Army Leadership*, defines leader development as a progressive and sequential system of institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. AR 350-1, *Army Training and Education*, states that leadership is a common military training requirement in military units but defines it as integrated training, i.e., it is not intended as stand-alone training but is integrated into other training events. Field Manual 7-0, *Training the Force*, further explains that an effective training program includes growing and maturing leaders. Senior commanders recognize that leader training is more than periodic officer and Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Professional Development classes. Instead, it is a continuous process where senior commanders establish a positive training environment that encourages subordinates to become adaptive leaders. During this Assessment, the USARC IG Team observed three classes on Army Leadership: two conducted during IDT and the third at a meeting for senior field grade officers. The training was deemed adequate in each case but was not conducted to any specified task, condition(s), or standard(s).



(2) Since leader development is key to unit readiness, the Chief, Army Reserve, and the Chief, National Guard Bureau asked The Inspector General to conduct a Special Inspection of the Leader Development Process in the Reserve Component. Additionally, current USARC CTG directs: Officer and Noncommissioned Officer Development Programs during IDT; specific training for new commanders; and mandates that Colonels and General Officers participate in the Senior Leader Training Program, a key element of the Army Reserve Leadership Campaign Plan. Finally, leader development was a prominent topic for briefings and panel discussions during the Fall 2004 Army Reserve Senior Leader War Council.

7. Survey and Sensing Session Conclusions:

a. Correlations were identified between the Sensing Sessions and the surveys. Taken together, a strong picture of what Soldiers perceived can be drawn. The survey participation enabled IGs to exceed our goal of a 95% confidence level with a + or - 5% confidence interval. A 99% confidence level with + or - 2% confidence interval overall was achieved for MP units. The exception to these correlations was for Soldiers in MI units wherein a slightly lower confidence interval of + or - 4% was achieved, but still maintained our goal. Soldiers from 19 non-MP and MI units also returned valid surveys. A 95% confidence level was achieved with a + or - 5% confidence interval for this group. Units often did not reach a consensus on a focus question in Sensing Sessions; the survey question results, therefore, contributed to solidifying the overall picture.

b. The general perception of training on Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment, Ethics, and Leadership was moderate to low. The USARC IG Team found variances between units according to the leadership climate and type of unit. Although overall confidence in leaders was good, there was not a strong consensus. Some units had command climate problems. More Soldiers (67% vs. 55%) expressed a higher degree of confidence in their NCO leaders than in their commanders. Ethics was rated particularly high. Most Soldiers (66%) indicated they, their peers, and their leaders adhere to the Army Values, stand up for what is right, and will follow the Law of Land Warfare. A good majority, 73%, of the respondents indicated they believed their leaders would follow the Law of Land Warfare in the treatment of detainees and only 3% did not. Soldiers in MP units expressed overall confidence in detainee handling. Conversely

[REDACTED] the Law of Land Warfare, the Geneva Convention, and on cultural awareness training. Both MI and MP units expressed low confidence in operating procedures, particularly in the effectiveness of unit SOPs. Soldiers had very few comments on the interoperability between MP and MI personnel in reference to detainee handling. USARC IGs noted some disparity between MP and MI personnel interviewed and sensed on who (MP or MI) was "in charge" of detainees.

c. Soldiers in MP units perceived the adequacy and quality of training as good overall, although some Soldiers expressed weakness in the relative adequacy of the training during MP MOS and MOS-reclassification training. The consensus of all Soldiers sensed and/or surveyed was that there was not enough time to do adequate METL training during IDT. Soldiers in MP


units indicated they performed many missions outside of their METL training. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (b)(7)(C)
They indicated they did not receive enough training from Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISC), although what ARISC training they did receive was of very good quality. However, they indicated they were generally able to perform their missions. Results from the non-MP/MI group closely approximated the results from the main group of MP and MI Soldiers. Both groups produced consistent results in all areas except in Law of Land Warfare training, where the main MP/MI group consistently scored higher perceptual ratings.


8. **Conclusion.** The Army Reserve is aggressively moving to correct faults in Law of Land Warfare and detainee handling training. Training initiatives were developed and implemented to better teach Soldiers, particularly MPs, how unit mission relates to the principles of the Law of Land Warfare. The same model must be applied to other Combat Support and Combat Service Support units to ensure that all Soldiers understand the application of Law of Land Warfare training. Training should be integrated with different units, particularly, but not limited to, MP and MI units. The training of future Army Reserve Force Packages in annual "Warrior Exercises" can be critical to accomplishing integration. Army Reserve Soldiers expressed strong feelings of individual ethics and the Army Values. Capitalizing on this with relevant training and dedicated leadership can only make the Army Reserve a better, stronger national asset.

9. **IG Recommendation To The Commander, USARC:** Recommend that the Commander, USARC sign this Executive Summary, approving the enclosed USARC Special Assessment Report of Training for Army Reserve Units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership.

Encl



APPROVED:


JAMES R. HELMLY 314
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding General
US Army Reserve Command



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
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Chapter 1
Background and Assessment Concept

1. **Background:** Lieutenant-General (LTG) James R. Helmly, Commanding General, US Army Reserve Command (USARC), signed a formal Directive on 11 March 2004 to the USARC Inspector General (IG) to conduct a Special Assessment of Training for Army Reserve Units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership. The Directive instructs the IG to give priority to Military Police (MP) and Military Intelligence (MI) units.

a. The USARC's Command Training Guidance (CTG) for 2004-2006 (dated 12 December 2003) directed the restructuring of training to meet the "Train-Alert-Deploy" model in order to reduce post-mobilization training time to 3-5 days. The CTG also emphasized that Army Reserve Soldiers must be prepared to deploy as individuals, in sections, or in units. LTG Helmly's June 10 2004 memorandum, subject: Individual Training Focus Areas - Common Tasks, Military Police, and Military Intelligence, modified the CTG to emphasize pre-mobilization training on the Law of Land Warfare and the handling of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) and civilian detainees. Specifically, all units and Soldiers were to train on the Law of Land Warfare prior to mobilization instead of deferring it to post-mobilization; all MP Soldiers were to train on processing and escorting EPWs and civilian detainees; and Counter Intelligence and Human Intelligence MI Soldiers were to train on basic questioning techniques and approach strategies. The CTG for 2005-2007 (dated 2 October 2004) gave specific guidance on refresher training on the Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva and Hague Conventions.

b. A series of reported cases of alleged or substantiated detainee abuse involving deployed Army Reserve Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan began surfacing about December 2002. While not inclusive of all reported cases of wrong doing, some of the findings from investigations of these cases that have a bearing on this assessment include:



c. The Army IG's Report on Detainee Operations, approved by the Acting Secretary of the Army, concluded among other things that:

(1) The overwhelming majority of our leaders and Soldiers understand the requirement to treat detainees humanely and are doing so.

(2) We failed to identify system failures that resulted in incidents of abuse. These incidents of abuse resulted from the failure of individuals to follow known standards of discipline and the Army Values and, in some cases, the failure of a few leaders to enforce those standards of discipline.

(3) The current operational environment demands we adapt; our Soldiers are adapting; so we must also adapt our doctrine, organization, and training.

d. Army Reserve units typically perform four, four-hour Unit Training Assemblies per month, usually scheduled over one weekend. The USARC IG Team concentrated its efforts on visiting MP and MI units, brigade level and below. Commanders are required by regulation to "lock in" their unit training schedules 90 days in advance. Therefore, by necessity, the Team had to review unit training schedules over several months to identify specified training that met the assessment objectives. As a result, the USARC IG Team and RRC IGs visited Army Reserve units from June through December 2004.

2. **Assessment Concept:** The detailed concept of this assessment follows:

a. The purpose of this Assessment was to evaluate the training of Army Reserve Units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics and Leadership at various training locations. Further, any training weaknesses or impediments to training in these specified areas were to be reported along with appropriate recommendations or changes.

b. Objectives: The USARC IG Team had five objectives for this assessment:

(1) Objective 1. Determine the frequency and standards for training Army Reserve Soldiers on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership.

(2) Objective 2. Assess the adequacy of specified training for Army Reserve units.

(3) Objective 3. Assess the quality of specified training in Army Reserve units.

(4) Objective 4. Observe specified training to determine if training is conducted to standard.

(5) Objective 5. Identify and recommend any changes to training, guidance, and procedures related to the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership.

c. Scope: USARC IGs traveled to various training locations and commands throughout the Continental United States in teams of two. Select Regional Readiness Command (RRC) IGs augmented the USARC IG teams to assist with the conduct of Sensing Sessions and the administration of surveys within their RRC. The USARC IG Team was augmented with a member of the USARC Provost Marshall's Office, a former MP company commander, as well as, various Judge Advocates. Additionally, the USARC IG Team was augmented on two occasions by a MI officer. The scope of this Special Assessment included specified training for Army Reserve units with priority given to MP and MI units from brigade to detachment level. Observed training included: Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Reclassification Training; Pre-deployment Training at Power Projection Platforms (PPP); Annual Training; and Inactive Duty Training. The Assessment also captured Soldiers' perceptions and opinions on the specified training. The population base was primarily Soldiers assigned to Army Reserve MP and MI units. The USARC IG Team also observed training in 3 non-MP/MI units and surveyed an additional 19 non-MP/MI units.

5. Assessment Approach.

a. The Assessment's approach included training observations, document reviews, individual interviews, surveys, and Sensing Sessions. Unit visits were coordinated with the assistance of the RRC IGs. Selected RRC IGs assisted in administering the survey and conducting Sensing Sessions. They forwarded their Sensing Session reports and completed surveys to the USARC IG for analysis. Training observations provided the IG Team a snapshot of selected training. The surveys and Sensing Sessions added Soldiers' and leaders' perceptions of training and thoughts on unit leadership and ethics. The USARC IG Team conducted interviews with personnel involved in Army Reserve courseware development and management at the US Army MP School and at the US Army Intelligence Center. The Team also interviewed commanders, executive officers, and key training support personnel at the Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers. The interviews supplemented the Sensing Sessions and provided additional perceptions on specific training areas.

b. The assessment followed a three-phased approach which is explained in Chapter 2 with written reports completed at the end of each phase. The directing authority requested a Pre-Assessment Report and an Interim Report prior to this Final Report.

6. **Other Reports, Plans, and Initiatives.** Appendix E, *The Correlation Matrix*, correlates findings and recommendations from this Assessment to the findings in The Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) Detainee Operations Inspection Report, the Army Detainee-Interrogation Operations Plan, Annex B, *Synchronization Matrix*, and to USARC initiatives already implemented.

7. **Definitions.** The following definitions are key to this report:

a. Adequacy: Adequacy as it applies to this Assessment relates to preparedness for mission requirements and execution. Adequacy was a subjective call from the perspective of the IG Team observer or by the Soldier participating in a Sensing Session or survey.

b. Quality: Quality as it pertains to this Assessment equates to "Train as You Fight," i.e., realistic training. Again, quality in this Special Assessment was a subjective call from the IG Team observer or by the Soldier participating in a Sensing Session or survey. When observing training, the Inspectors asked themselves, e.g., whether the training environment was appropriate for the training, and whether the training provided a degree of combat realism.


c. Sensing Session: Sensing Sessions are group interviews conducted by a facilitator team. For this Assessment, all Sensing Sessions were conducted by a two-person IG Team. All participating IGs, to include some assigned to RRC IG offices, were DAIG School trained to facilitate Sensing Sessions. The RRC IGs observed USARC IGs conducting Sensing Sessions for this Special Assessment prior to conducting Sensing Sessions in their own commands.

d. Survey: A survey is an individual questionnaire. For this assessment, Soldiers were asked to complete a survey in support of the Army Reserve Special Assessment of Training. It included questions on "You and Your Unit," "Training," "Your Unit Leadership," and "Your Background." MP and MI Soldiers also completed three to four questions specific to their MOS.

e. Law of Land Warfare: The Law of War, the Law of Land Warfare, and the Law of War and Geneva and Hague Conventions training are used interchangeably in this Report. All refer to the Law of War training Soldiers receive throughout their military careers commensurate with their duties and responsibilities.

f. Detainee handling, detainee operations, and detainee treatment requirements: These terms are used interchangeably in this report. They refer to the training for Soldiers charged with responsibility for handling prisoners or other detainees.

g. Inactive Duty Training, Unit Training Assembly, and Multiple Unit Training Assembly: The terms Inactive Duty Training and Unit Training Assembly relate to Army Reserve training periods while the unit is not in an active duty status. These training periods are usually held on weekends, last four hours, and are usually performed in multiples of four. Inactive Duty Training is the term used to describe the pay or legal duty status; Unit Training Assembly is the assembly period. Both terms are used in this report to describe non-active duty training by Army Reserve units and Soldiers. The acronym MUTA is used to describe Multiple Unit Training Assemblies.



h. Power Projection Platform: The Power Projection Platform is the current terminology used to describe a mobilization station where Army Reserve units prepare for deployment. It is typically an active Army installation.

i. Specified training: As it refers to this assessment, specified training is training on the Law of Land Warfare, detainee treatment requirements, ethics, or leadership.



Chapter 2 Assessment Methodology

1. The US Army Reserve Command (USARC) Inspector General (IG) Team gathered information and data for seven months during this Assessment using five primary methods: training observations, document reviews, individual interviews, surveys and Sensing Sessions. We observed Army Reserve Soldiers training in a variety of training environments that included: monthly Inactive Duty Training (IDT); annual training; Military Police (MP) Reclassification Training; and Pre-deployment Training at mobilization stations. The USARC IG Team reviewed unit training documents to determine compliance with Army and USARC policies and guidance. They interviewed personnel at the MP and Military Intelligence (MI) proponent schools and members of the USARC staff. And finally, the Team conducted numerous surveys, Sensing Sessions, and individual interviews with Soldiers at unit level to obtain beliefs and feelings about specified training, overall training, ethics, and leadership. The Team used a three phased approach during the course of the Assessment that provided a written report for the directing authority at the completion of each phase.

2. Phased Approach:

a. Phase I included identification of the Assessment objectives, development of the inspection plan, review of applicable regulations and policies, in-house training, and selection of initial unit visits. During this phase the survey and sensing tools were developed and refined. Regional Readiness Command (RRC) IG offices identified specified training for observation and assisted in administering surveys. The USARC IG appointed a MP and MI officer as Temporary IGs to assist in the Assessment as subject matter experts. Initial analysis from the surveys and the Sensing Sessions as well as preliminary findings were developed and reported to the directing authority in the first Interim Report 30 June 2004.

b. Phase II included refining the inspection plan, development of the document review "calls," and the bulk of the unit visits for training observations, surveys and sensing. The USARC IG Teams visited the MP and MI proponent schools, observed several iterations of MP reclassification training, pre-deployment training at a mobilization station, and train-the-trainer training on detainee operations. The Team completed the second Interim Report for the directing authority on 15 October 2004 and furnished a copy to the Inspector General of the Army for comment.

c. Phase III included the final IDT training observations and document reviews, an annual training observation of an alerted unit, training observations at two mobilization stations, and final analysis of all surveys, Sensing Session, and training data. The Team finalized trip reports, developed findings and recommendations, and cross-walked them with the USARC staff and school proponents. The USARC Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) provided a legal review of the Final Report for accuracy and completeness.

3. Training Observations (Objectives 2-4):


a. The USARC IG Team identified specified training on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment, Ethics and Leadership in accordance with the Assessment objectives. The Team visited 19 MP and 3 MI units, and made 61 training observations. Observations were primarily conducted during IDT, but two units were observed at Power Projection Platforms (PPP) (formerly mobilization station), and four MP Total Army School System Battalions were observed instructing Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31B10 reclassification training. The USARC IG Team was assisted by RRC IGs and subject matter experts from the USARC staff to include MP and SJA officers. The Military Intelligence Readiness Command also assisted with MI subject matter experts. The RRC IG offices assisted in the coordination of the unit visits to include identifying units for visits through published training schedules. The USARC IG Teams observed the conduct of training and evaluated it according to applicable published standards to determine adequacy and quality.

b. Table 2-1 illustrates the number of units, their status, and the number of training observations conducted. Each training observation represents a class on a specific task or subject. The "Others" category includes training observed at non-MP units and other sites. These observations included: two classes conducted for three non-MP/MI units during IDT; one class in a Garrison setting; one during an organizational meeting; and, two as part of a Soldier Readiness Processing at a RRC headquarters. Students in the MOS reclassification classes were on active duty for training status and the instructors were in a variety of active duty statuses. They are placed under Annual Training (AT) in Table 2-1 for illustration purposes.

Unit Type	Units in IDT	Units in AT	Units at PPP	Other Sites	Observations
MP Internment/ Resettlement	7	1	2		31
MP EAC	1				5
MP Guard	2				3
MP IRIC	1				1
MP Law & Order	1				4
MP MOS reclassification		4			8
MI	3				3
Others	3			3	6
Total	18	5	2	3	61

TABLE 2- 1

4. Document Reviews (Objectives 1-3, and 5): Document reviews of Command Training Guidance, Training Calendars and Training Schedules, Mission Essential Task Lists, Post-Mobilization Support Training Requirements, Pre-deployment Training Schedules, and Programs of Instruction were also conducted to assess scheduled and planned training. Written unit After Action Reports (AARs), as well as, some individual AARs and other reports were also reviewed. Support for training document reviews was provided by the USARC G-7 and the RRC IGs.




5. Surveys, Sensing Sessions and Interviews (Objectives 1-3, and 5): Sensing Sessions, surveys and individual interviews were conducted to capture current and pre-deployment perceptions and opinions of Soldiers and leaders on the specified training, overall training, ethics, and leadership.

a. A special survey was developed to capture Soldiers' feelings, beliefs, and attitudes related to the specified training, as well as, ethics and leadership in their units. The surveys were administered with the assistance of the RRC IGs and centrally collected at the USARC IG Office for analysis. Surveys were administered to as many Soldiers assigned to MP and MI unit as possible, regardless of their MOS or unit's mission and to a cross section of other units. A total of 4602 Soldiers were surveyed for this Assessment from 119 units USARC-wide. Of these, the main survey group consisted of 4171 Soldiers from 100 MP and MI units. A smaller control group of 431 Soldiers from a cross-section of Army Reserve units was also surveyed to compare their results with the main group of surveyed MP/MI unit Soldiers.

b. Units were identified for Sensing Sessions based on their availability during the Assessment. Many MP and MI units were either mobilized, or had recently demobilized and were still within the 60-day "cooling off" period where Soldiers had the option to not attend drill. The USARC IG Team and specially trained RRC IGs conducted Sensing Sessions in 35 MP and 10 MI units. A total of 2010 Soldiers from all ranks participated in the Sensing Sessions or individual interviews. All units that were sensed, were surveyed first. The IGs read verbatim the same Facilitator Guide to Soldiers before participants completed the survey. The Soldiers offered their feelings and beliefs on the specified training, as well as, ethics and leadership in their units. Soldiers included comments on these areas, as well as, comments on unit climate prior to deployment. The surveys and Sensing Sessions also gave Soldiers an opportunity to voice their opinions and offer recommendations on how to improve training, operational procedures and leadership in their units. Individual interviews targeted trainers and key unit leaders. More details on Sensing Sessions and interviews are included in Chapters 3-7 of this report.

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Chapter 3 Law of Land Warfare Training

1. **Introduction:** Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, *Army Training and Education*, April 2003. Paragraph 4-14a, states that "Soldiers and leaders require Law of War training throughout their military careers commensurate with their duties and responsibilities." The proponent for Law of War training is The Judge Advocate General. Enlisted personnel receive Level A training, the minimum knowledge required for all members of the Army, during their Initial Entry Training; warrant officers and officers receive it during their basic courses. In units, the commander is responsible for planning and executing Level B training commensurate with the mission of the unit. The unit commander ensures training relates to the current mission and contingency plans and is integrated into unit training activities, field training exercises and unit external evaluations. Level C training is conducted in The Army School System (TASS) and is tailored to the tasks taught in those schools.

2. Findings:

a. **Finding 1: Frequency for training Army Reserve Soldiers on the Law of Land Warfare was at the commander's discretion prior to 10 June 2004.**


(1) Standard:

(a) Memorandum, Headquarters, US Army Reserve Command, AFRC-TR, 10 June 2004, subject: Individual Training Focus Areas – Common Tasks, Military Police, and Military Intelligence. Paragraph 4a states that Law of Land Warfare training "deferral to post mobilization, as permitted in our Command Training Guidance-2004-2006, is hereby rescinded. All Soldiers will receive this training prior to departure to their mobilization stations."

(b) Memorandum, Headquarters, US Army Reserve Command, AFRC-TR, 12 December 2003, subject: Command Training Guidance (CTG) for Training Years 2004-2006. Appendix B, paragraph 5, states that commanders have the option to move certain pre-mobilization training requirements to post-mobilization. Law of Land Warfare training is listed as a briefing that commanders could defer to post-mobilization.

(2) Assessment Results: The US Army Reserve Command (USARC) Inspector General (IG) Team determined that 44% (8 of 18) of units visited from June through September 2004 had either conducted or scheduled Law of Land Warfare training. By 31 December 2004, 65% of units (24 of 37) visited had either conducted or scheduled the training. IG Assessment Teams observed scheduled training on the Law of Land Warfare at seven of these units. Judge Advocates conducted training at five of the units and a senior Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) conducted training at two units. During a document review at another unit, a unit trainer stated they had conducted the training but could not provide supporting Soldier Sign-In sheets.

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(a) Soldier Training Publication (STP) 21-1, *Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT)*, August 2003, Chapter 2-1, , states 'frequency' relates to how often Soldiers should train on a task to ensure they maintain proficiency, but it is not a requirement. Rather, 'frequency' is a guide the commander can use to develop a comprehensive unit-training plan. STP 21-1-SMCT and STP 21-24 SMCT list the training location (unit) and frequency recommendation (annually) for Task 181-105-1001, *Comply with the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions*; Tasks 181-105-2001, *Enforce the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions*; and 181-105-2002, *Conduct Combat Operations According to the Law of War*. The USARC training guidance for Training Years (TY) 2004-2006 gave commanders the option to move some pre-mobilization training requirements, e.g., Law of Land Warfare, to post-mobilization.

(b) On 10 June 2004, following reports of mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison, the USARC Commanding General signed a memorandum (hereinafter, the 10 June 2004 Memorandum) rescinding the option to defer Law of Land Warfare training to post-mobilization. All Soldiers, regardless of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), will now receive training conducted to the standards of Task 181-105-1001, *Comply with the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions*, prior to departure to their mobilization stations. The USARC IG Team observed Law of War training conducted at one unit prior to the issuance of the 10 June 2004 Memorandum and at six units following the publication of the Memorandum. Furthermore, the USARC CTG for TY 2005-2007, dated 2 October 2004, now requires annual testing of Warrior Task Training (WTT) (formerly Common Task Training (CTT)) for all Army Reserve Soldiers. It also states, "commanders and first line leaders will plan, coordinate, execute, and evaluate WTT annually." Warrior tasks are the foundation and focal point for individual training and unit readiness. One of the "four tasks that all Soldiers will train on from the CTT 05 approved list is task 181-105-1001, *Comply with the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions*." Additionally, all NCOs will receive refresher training on Tasks 181-105-2001, *Enforce the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions*, and 181-105-2002, *Conduct Combat Operations According to the Law of War*.

(c) Surveys showed that 81% of MP/MI respondents recalled receiving Law of Land Warfare training. Of these, 48% stated they received the training within the last year. Among the 431 non-MP/MI Soldiers surveyed, 70% recalled receiving this training and, of those, just 40% stated they received it during the last year. During Sensing Sessions with Soldiers from 35 MP and 10 MI units, most groups expressed a consensus that they had received Law of Land Warfare training. Much of this training was accomplished since the sensed units were released from active duty. Units that did not reach a consensus had several sensing groups or participants that did not recall the training. This indicates the training was not effective for all Soldiers.

b. Finding 2: Training on the Law of Land Warfare was insufficient to adequately prepare Soldiers for the realities of a combat environment.

(1) Standard: AR 350-1, Army Training and Education, 9 April 2003, paragraph 4-14 covers Law of War training. Paragraph 4-14b, states that "Level A training provides the minimum knowledge required for all members of the Army" and the "basic law of war rules (referred to as 'The Soldier's Rules,' which stress the importance of compliance with the law of war) will be taught during Level A training." Paragraph 4-14a(2) states that Level B training is conducted in units for officers, warrant officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel commensurate with the missions of the unit. Paragraph 4-14c states that unit commanders will plan and execute Level B Law of War training around current missions and integrate it into unit training activities.

(2) Assessment Results: Zero percent (0 of 7) of Law of Land Warfare training events observed by the USARC IG Team were adequate to support the units' wartime mission and related Mission Essential Task List (METL). Observed training in MP and MI units did not adequately incorporate the MP custody mission or the MI interrogation and intelligence-gathering mission, respectively. Adequacy, as applied to this assessment, equates to Soldier and unit preparedness for mission requirements and execution. Furthermore, the observed training, while professionally conducted, was not determined to be quality training because it did not include sufficient elements of combat realism. Quality, as applied to this assessment, equates to "Train as You Fight," i.e., realistic training. The trainers presented classroom briefings that stressed the importance of compliance with the Law of War and identified key points on the treatment of detainees. The briefing format affected the overall quality of the training because the primary emphasis was a reinforcement of the principles set forth in "The Soldier's Rules" and was not "designed around current missions and contingency plans" and "integrated into unit training activities, field training exercises, and unit external evaluations" IAW AR 350-1, paragraph 4-14c.

(a) The 10 June 2004 Memorandum required Army Reserve Soldiers to perform Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Levels 1 and 2-4: Task 181-105-1001, *Comply with the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions*; Task 181-105-2001, *Enforce the Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva Hague Conventions*; and, Task 181-105-2002, *Conduct Combat Operations According to the Law of War*. These tasks necessitate an interaction between each Soldier and the instructor to ensure that all Soldiers understand the performance steps to complete the task. As previously mentioned, AR 350-1, states that unit level Law of War training should be "integrated into unit training activities, field training exercises, and unit external evaluations." It further states "maximum combat realism should be applied to tactical exercises consistent with good safety practices." The 10 June 2004 Memorandum requiring individual and refresher training on the Law of Land Warfare directed commanders to provide training on all of the performance steps IAW the specified SMCT tasks. Task 181-105-1001, *Comply with the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions*, for example, includes seven performance steps with over 100 sub steps. However, the Judge Advocate and NCO trainers observed merely presented an overview of "The Soldier's Rules" more consistent with

Level A training. Some instructors and individual Soldiers shared personal experiences from recent deployments that related to the Law of War presentations. Although all but one training observation was conducted as a classroom briefing (one was web-based), none covered all the prescribed performance steps for the task. The training was adequate for Soldiers to understand the concept of "The Soldier's Rules" per AR 350-1 but inadequate to prepare them for adherence to the Law of Land Warfare when exposed to the realities of a combat environment.

(b) Sensing Sessions, surveys, and written comments supported that even if Law of Land Warfare training was conducted or integrated into unit training, many Soldiers did not recognize it as such. During surveys, 41% of MP/MI Soldiers indicated the training was "excellent" or "good" versus 30% from the non-MP/MI Soldiers. The consensus during Sensing Sessions was that Law of Land Warfare training was a classroom briefing and not incorporated into a field environment. Also mentioned was that much of this training had been accomplished since the sensed units were released from active duty. Seventy-three percent of the MP/MI Soldiers surveyed stated their leaders would adhere to the Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva and Hague Conventions; 3% stated they would not and the remaining Soldiers answered somewhere in between. Responses were 61% and 4%, respectively, for non-MP/MI Soldiers.

(3) Root Cause: Trainers conducted a briefing that provided an overview of The Law of War (The Soldier's Rules) rather than training to the requirements of the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Levels 1, 2-4.

(4) Recommendations:

(a) USARC G-7 emphasize to USARC Major Subordinate Commanders the requirements for the conduct of adequate Level B Law of Land Warfare training.

(b) Commanders at All Levels include Law of Land Warfare training in mission specific scenarios to enhance training realism.

c. Finding 3: Trainers failed to properly train Soldiers on prescribed performance steps and test Soldiers on prescribed performance measures during Law of Land Warfare training.

(1) Standard:

(a) Field Manual (FM) 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*, September 2003, paragraph 6-11, states, "All training must be evaluated to measure performance levels against the established Army standard. Evaluation is conducted specifically to enable the unit or individual undergoing the training to know whether the training standard has been achieved."



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(b) STP 21-1-SMCT, paragraph 1-7d-e, states to "Advise each soldier of any special guidance that appears in the Evaluation Preparation section of the task summary before evaluating. Score each soldier based on the information in the Performance Measures and Evaluation Guidance sections."

(2) Assessment Results: The USARC IG Team reported in the second report that two of three observed Law of War/Geneva Hague Convention training events were conducted to standard. The standard initially used to determine our preliminary finding was AR 350-1, paragraph 4-14b, "The Soldier's Rules." After coordination with OSJA and G-7 staff subject matter experts within the USARC headquarters, it was determined that the actual standard for Law of War/Geneva Hague Conventions training was the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Levels 1, 2-4. The USARC IG Team observed four additional Law of War/Geneva Hague Convention training events after completing our second report for a total of seven observations. Analysis of the seven Law of War/Geneva Hague Conventions training observations indicated that 0% (0 of 7) was conducted to standard.

(a) The Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Levels 1, 2-4, Task 181-105-1001, *Comply with the Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva and Hague Conventions*, and Task 181-105-2001, *Enforce the Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva and Hague Conventions*, require Soldiers to identify, understand, and comply with the Law of War. Soldiers are required to identify problems or situations that violate the policies and take appropriate action, including notifying appropriate authorities, so expedient action can be taken to correct the problem or situation. Task 181-105-2002, *Conduct Combat Operations According to the Law of War*, requires Soldiers to conduct operations in accordance with the Law of War and employ actions to prevent violations of the Law of War. Six of the observed training events were presented in a slide presentation and one was web-based. There was limited interaction between the trainers and Soldiers. The trainers failed to follow the prescribed task, condition(s), and standard(s) for the training event. They did not cover all performance steps, nor did they tell the Soldiers what performance measures they would be expected to perform.

(b) FM 7-1, paragraph 6-11, states, "All training must be evaluated to measure performance levels against the established Army standard. Evaluation is conducted specifically to enable the unit or individual undergoing the training to know whether the training standard has been achieved." None of the performance measures that were required for the performance steps were conducted during observed Law of Land Warfare training. Trainers did not inform Soldiers of their requirement to pass multiple performance measures at the end of the Law of Land Warfare training. It should be noted that the average Law of War/Geneva Hague Conventions briefing observed lasted approximately one hour. According to USARC staff subject matter experts from G-7 and OSJA offices, it would take approximately four hours to train and evaluate the performance measures for Task 181-105-1001, *Comply with the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions*, IAW the standard.


(3) Root Cause: Unit trainers did not follow the specified task, condition(s), and standard(s) when conducting Law of Land Warfare training.

(4) Recommendations:


(a) **USARC G-7**, in coordination with **USARC SJA**, determine whether any web-based training is for familiarization only, or, if it satisfies the performance steps and measures in the three Law of Land Warfare tasks, 181-105-1001, 181-105-2001, and 181-105-2002.

(b) **Commanders at All Levels** ensure that Law of Land Warfare training is conducted to standard as outlined in STP-21-1-SMCT, Skill Level 1 and STP-21-24-SMCT, Skill Levels 2-

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Chapter 4

Detainee Treatment Requirements Training

1. **Introduction.** This chapter addresses the frequency, standard, adequacy, and quality of detainee treatment training. A 'detainee,' as defined in Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, is any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force. 'Other detainee' is defined in Field Manual (FM) 3-19.40 as a person in the custody of US armed forces who has not been classified as an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW), a Retained Person (RP), or a Civilian Internee (CI), who is nevertheless treated as an EPW until a legal status is ascertained by competent authority. Detainee handling training for Military Police (MP) and Military Intelligence (MI) units is determined from the Mission Essential Task List (METL) and the Yearly Training Guidance (YTG), and is derived from the organization's war plans and related tasks in external guidance. The commander must identify those tasks that are essential to accomplishing the organization's wartime operational mission. These identified tasks provide the foundation for the unit's training program. In assessing the training, the USARC IG Team recognized that some of the training not completed to standard still demonstrated a degree of adequacy and quality. Instructors/trainers, while not always accomplishing all individual or collective task requirements, were often able to conduct training that was adequate, i.e., preparedness for mission requirements and execution. Instructor/trainers also were able to provide realistic, beneficial training even if the training was not always completed to the Army standards.

2. Findings:

a. **Finding 4: The recommended frequency for training Army Reserve Soldiers on detainee treatment requirements was derived from unit leaders' assessment of METL.**

(1) Standard:

(a) AR 350-1, *Army Training and Education*, 9 April 2003. Paragraph G-4a(5) states "R: Refresher training (assumes trained to standard in schools, but requires occasional review to sustain training level for all soldiers) is used to reinforce previous training and/or to sustain/regain previously acquired skills, knowledge, and experiences. Training may be used in units to prepare soldiers for institutional training. Individuals and units must achieve the required performance standards while performing the task(s) under prescribed conditions. Commanders determine the need for refresher training based on assessment of individual and unit proficiency."

(b) STP 19-95B1-SM, 2-1 states, "Training location where the task is first trained to Soldier training publications standards. If the task is first trained to standard in the unit, the word 'Unit' will be in this column. If the task is first trained to standard in the training base, it will identify, by brevity code (ANCOC, BNCOC, etc.). Sustainment training frequency indicates the recommended frequency at which the tasks should be trained to ensure Soldiers maintain task proficiency."

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(c) Memorandum, Headquarters, US Army Reserve Command, AFRC-TR, 2 October 2004, subject: Command Training Guidance (CTG) for Training Years 2005-2007 states, "Appendix K provides a list of specific tasks-some common tasks, some Career Management Field specific- that have been identified as being inadequately trained. Commanders will ensure that all Soldiers matching MOS receive refresher training on these tasks."

(d) Memorandum, Headquarters, US Army Reserve Command, AFRC-TR, 10 June 2004, subject: Individual Training Focus Areas – Common Tasks, Military Police, and Military Intelligence. In this memorandum, LTG Helmly, Commanding General, USARC, directed that Soldiers specifically charged with responsibility for handling prisoners or other detainees – MP and MI troops – undergo focused refresher (R) training prior to deployment.

(2) Assessment Results:

(a) Army Reserve commanders are required to conduct a periodic METL assessment of individual and unit task proficiency. Document analysis identified 18 MP and MI units scheduling METL training events during the observation phases of this assessment. The USARC IG Team found that Soldier Training Publication (STP) 19-95B1-Soldier Manual (SM), STP 19-95B24-SM-TG, STP 34-97B15-SM-TG, and STP 34-97E14-SM-TG prescribed a recommended frequency for MP/MI Soldiers to perform these tasks to proficiency. Unit leaders assess proficiency level and schedule remedial or refresher training to maintain proficiency using applicable training publications.

(b) Lieutenant General Helmly directed that Soldiers specifically charged with responsibility for handling prisoners or other detainees – MP and MI troops – undergo focused Refresher (R) training prior to deployment. This was directed in Memorandum, Headquarters, US Army Reserve Command, AFRC-TR, 10 June 2004, subject: Individual Training Focus Areas – Common Tasks, Military Police, and Military Intelligence. This memorandum mandated that all MP Soldiers, regardless of current unit of assignment, be trained in several key individual tasks: Task 191-376-4100, *Perform Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee (EPW/CI) Security and Control Activities at an EPW/CI Camp*, Task 191-376-4101, *Process EPWs/CIs at a Collecting Point or Holding Area*, Task 191-376-4102, *Escort EPWs/CIs to Rear Areas*, Task 191-376-4103, *Process EPWs/CIs for Internment*. The United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS) MP Internment /Resettlement (I/R) Training for Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31B10 (MP) includes these tasks in One Station Unit Training (OSUT).

(c) The MP Leader Tasks directed by the 10 June 2004 Memorandum are: Task 191-377-4205, *Supervise Processing of EPWs/CIs at a Collection Point or Holding Area*; Task 191-378-6079, *Supervise the Escort of EPWs/CIs to a Collecting Point, a Holding Area, or an Enclosure*; Task 191-379-4410, *Supervise Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Camp Security and Control Procedures*; and Task 191-379-4413, *Supervise the Processing of Captives for Internment*. The STPs recommended quarterly frequency for sustainment during Basic

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Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC)/Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCO) for these MP leader tasks. Two of these key leader tasks: Task 191-377-4205 and Task 191-378-6079, are not currently taught in the BNCOC for MOS 31E30 courseware.

(d) In addition, current MP doctrine outlined by USAMPS' Program of Instruction (POI), lists the following tasks: Use of Force and Army Values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, Personal Courage). While these tasks are not MP I/R specific, they are critically important to the accomplishment of the MP I/R and/or Detainee Operations mission and are trained at all levels of MP education. The USAMPS is currently implementing the following tasks: Introduction to Detainee Operations; Communicate with Detainees; Use of Force and Detainees; Detainee Frisk, Undress, Cell and Area Search Operations; Restraint Procedures and Detainees; and The Geneva Convention and Detainee Operations, in MP training POIs as a result of lessons learned and changes in the contemporary operational environment:

(e) The MI key tasks, as listed in the 10 June 2004 Memorandum for 97B MOS, Counterintelligence Agent, are: Task 301-97B-1250, *Assist in Counterintelligence (CI) Screening Operations*, and Task 301-S97-6004, *Conduct Basic Questioning*. The 97E MOS, Human Intelligence Collector, key tasks listed in the Memorandum are: Task 301-97E-1152, *Develop Approach Strategies*; Task 301-97E-1200, *Implement Approach Strategies*; Task 301-97E-1251, *Question Source for Intelligence Information*; and Task 301-97E-6004, *Conduct Basic Questioning*. The United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) Human Intelligence Collector, 97E10 MOS classification, includes these key tasks as part of the Advanced Individual Training (AIT) with a recommended semiannual/annual sustainment frequency.

(f) The CTG for Training Years (TY) 2005-2007, Appendix K identifies some common tasks and Career Management Field (CMF) specific tasks for refresher training for Soldiers with matching MOSs and skill levels. This Appendix identifies key tasks for MI CMF 97B and 97E, and MP CMF 31 as well.

(3) Root Cause: Prior to the CTG, TY 2005-2007, MP I/R and MI unit training frequency on detainee tasks was based on the commander's assessment of the METL.

(4) Recommendations:

(a) **Commanders at All Levels** must ensure all Soldiers with CMFs 97 and 31 receive refresher training and identify shortcomings on the key tasks identified in CTG TY 2005-2007, Appendix K.

(b) **Commanders at All Levels** ensure that Soldiers specifically charged with responsibility for handling prisoners or other detainees – all MP MOSs and MI MOSs 97B/97E- receive effective sustainment training to maintain proficiency at all skills levels.



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b. Finding 5: Specified detainee treatment training in MP/MI units was not performed to the Army standards.

(1) Standard:

(a) FM 7-1, states, "performance oriented training is hands-on and conducts the task under the conditions and to the standard specified." "Soldiers train better, faster, and to a higher degree of proficiency when they know the task, condition, and standard."

(b) STP 19-95B1-SM, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill Level 1, Soldier's Manual, 14 January 2003. Paragraph 1-3 states, "The evaluation guide identifies the specific actions, known as performance measures, that the soldier must do to successfully complete the task. These actions are listed in a pass/fail format for easy evaluation."

(c) STP 34-97B15-SM-TG, Soldier's Manual and Training Guide for MOS 97B, 2 February 2004, Counterintelligence Agent, Skill Levels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Chapter 1-2a(5), Performance Steps, states that "This section identifies a summary of specific actions the soldier must do to complete the task successfully."

(2) Assessment Results:

(a) Only 51% (23 of 45) of specified training observed was conducted to standard. All training is evaluated to measure the performance against the Army standard. FM 7-1 states, "performance-oriented training is hands-on and conducts the task under the conditions and to the standard specified." "Soldiers train better, faster, and to a higher degree of proficiency when they know the task, condition, and standard. Likewise, training is more effective when it is performance-oriented and standards-based." Detainee treatment observations trained to Army standards included: 13 during Inactive Duty Training (IDT), 2 during unit Annual Training (AT); 4 at MP Total Army School System (TASS) Battalion (Bn) Reclassification Training, and 4 at the Power Projection Platforms (PPPs, mobilization stations).

(b) Training at IDT. During Sensing Sessions, all units expressed a weakness in the planning and execution of training during IDT. The USARC IG Team determined that 57% (13 of 23) of observed IDT training was conducted to standard. The Team found that trainers did not perform all required performance steps according to STPs 19-95B1-SM, 19-95B24-SM-TG, 34-97B15-SM-TG and 34-97E14-SM-TG, and administer performance measures as prescribed in FM 7-1. Performance measures are listed in pass/fail format for evaluation. Specifically, all trainers failed to administer prescribed performance steps and measures for MP Task 191-376-4101, *Process EPW/CI at a Collecting Point or Holding Area*; MP Task 191-1-3512, *Conduct Transfer Operations, observed at a MP I/R BN*; and MI Task 301-97B-1250, *Assist in Counterintelligence (CI) Screening Operations*.

(1) Fifty percent of all Soldiers surveyed indicated their unit had a detainee handling mission of some kind; 17% indicated their unit had some sort of detainee interrogation mission. The consensus was that there was not enough time to do adequate METL training during IDT. Both MP and MI Soldiers completing surveys rated the adequacy of detainee handling training and interrogation techniques training as moderately low- to-low. For MP unit members, regardless of MOS, this included confidence in training on overall detainee handling (45% agreed or strongly agreed) and prison or internment camp operations (38% agreed or strongly agreed). MI unit members, regardless of MOS, had a very low confidence in training on interrogation techniques (29% neutral and 49% expressing low confidence). Soldiers in MI units indicated they did not receive enough training from Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISC), although the ARISC training they did receive was very good quality. Soldiers in MI units indicated they were generally able to perform their missions. It should be noted that non-MP/MI unit members rated adequacy of training only slightly higher than the main MP/MI group.

(2) The USARC IG Team determined that 48% (11 of 23) of the tasks observed during IDT were adequate in that they prepared Soldiers for mission requirements and execution. The difference between those deemed adequate and those conducted to standard was two tasks in which trainers accomplished all performance steps, but not under the conditions prescribed in the unit's Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) to restrain the detainee in movement. In the other tasks deemed not adequate and not trained to the Army standard, trainers did not follow the scenarios as prescribed by STP 19-95B1 and STP 19-95B24. The presentation of training was primarily a lecture type rather than demonstration and hands-on. For instance, Task 191-376-4101, *Process EPW/CI at a Collecting Point or Holding Area*, requires a mock collection point or holding area using engineering tape, concertina wire, or similar markings to mark the areas. In addition, two Soldiers are required for role-players: one captive and the other to act as the captive escort. These specified requirements for the training did not occur. Another example of inadequate training occurred during an interrogation training exercise in a MI unit. The exercise was a demonstration given by three unit personnel for the rest of the unit. The subject of the interrogation was an experienced interrogator, but the two role playing interrogators were not experienced. The principal trainer failed to demonstrate the proper approach and questioning techniques for the exercise.

(3) Sixty-one percent (14 of 23) of IDT tasks observed by the assessment team were determined to be quality training. In making this call, the IG Team looked to training realism in the "train as you fight" concept. Although some of the performance measures were not followed by the trainers in one task, the trainers did provide a degree of realism for a portion of the task presented to make it quality training. In all the training considered quality training, the trainers followed the training plan, identified the key points, interacted with Soldiers, and provided informative and valuable training. Training was not considered quality when the trainers did not apply the "train as you fight" concept. For example, Task 191-376-4103, *Process EPW/CI for*



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Internment, requires a mock receiving and processing center, collection point or holding area, and an EPW/CI enclosure. Soldiers are required to role-play as guards and as EPW/CI. The trainers stated the condition and standard for the task and identified all performance steps, but failed to ensure that the class was scenario-driven with role-playing. In other observations, the task could have been performed with some realism in a drill hall, motor pool, or parking lot using a little creativity. As the assessment progressed, the quality of observed training improved significantly. In surveys, MP/MI unit members rated overall quality of IDT/home station training as moderate, with 41% indicating good or excellent quality and 30% expressing neutrality. Thirty-nine percent of non-MP/MI unit members stated home station training was good or excellent.

(c) Training during AT. Fifty percent (2 of 4) of the detainee treatment tasks observed during AT were conducted to standard. During Task 191-381-1321, *Take Action in the Event of Disorder at an Internment Facility*, a realistic scenario was created to require a reaction to a disorderly internee. During the conduct of this task, MP Guards responded appropriately, removed, and isolated the internee. One of the training observations not conducted to standard, Task 191-376-4101, *Process EPW/CI at a Collecting Point or Holding Area*, occurred because trainers failed to ensure that each captive had a capture tag, DD Form 2746, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag.

(1) Seventy-five percent (3 of 4) tasks observed during AT were deemed adequate and quality training by the USARC IG Team. Although not all the performance measures were tested in one task, the performance steps covered were adequate for the Soldiers being trained. The trainers also provided a degree of realism that produced quality training. The facilities and the availability of training resources (e.g., outside prisoner role players, towers, concertina wire, riot gear) contributed to the realism of the training. The AT training schedule was very intensive and demanding. For example, Task 191-376-4101, *Process EPW/CI at a Collecting Point or Holding Area*; Task 191-381-1321, *Take Action in the Event of Disorder at an Internment Facility*; and Task 191-376-4103, *Process EPW/CI for Internment*, were conducted using a mock internment camp for the exercise. During Task 191-376-4101, *Process EPW/CI at a Collecting Point or Holding Area*, the trainers followed the performance steps with accounting, segregating, and searching captives, but failed to ensure that each captive had a capture tag. The lack of the capture tag resulted in training not conducted to standard. In another observation, Task 191-381-1321, *Take Action in the Event of Disorder at an Internment Facility*, was executed following all the performance steps and performance measures in accordance with (LAW) STP 19-95B1-SM. A scenario was created requiring Soldiers to react to an internee disorder; Soldiers reacted appropriately during the role-play and maintained control of detainees.

(2) In Sensing Sessions, Soldiers in MP/MI units had a mixed consensus on training during AT. Surveys showed these Soldiers rated the quality of AT comparable to IDT/home station training, i.e., moderate, with 41% indicating good quality or better. Similarly, 39% of non-MP/MI unit members rated AT quality as good or better.

(d) MP MOS (31B) Reclassification Training:

(1) Fifty percent (4 of 8) of the TASS Battalion training observed was conducted to standard. The eight observations included four on Task 191-376-4101, *Process EPW/CI at a Collection Point or Holding Area* and four on Task 191-376-4100, *Perform EPW/CI Security and Control Activities at an EPW/CI Camp*. During the Field Training Exercise (FTX), Soldiers rotated roles in a round robin as MPs, prisoners, and civilians. The STP 19-95B1-SM required that each individual test and receive a "Go" in processing EPW/CI. At the end of the instruction, trainers failed to evaluate correctly, using collective testing rather than the required individual testing. They evaluated one group going through the process and gave the entire class a "Go" for the exercise, even to those not directly involved. The instructors and the Training and Doctrine Command representatives in attendance stated that this was an acceptable practice because of the time constraints of the course. The USARC IG Team considered these tasks to be adequate, and the training realistic, however it was not executed to standard IAW STP 19-95B1-SM. Of the two tasks not conducted to standard, the TASS instructors failed to follow the POI and did not test or role-play most of the Soldiers being trained. Overall, therefore, 75% (6 of 8) of the observed tasks conducted by the MP TASS Battalion during 31B10 Reclassification Training was considered adequate and quality training.

(2) The consensus in 19 of 35 (54%) MP units sensed was that MOS or MOS Reclassification Training was not adequate or valuable on the Law of Land Warfare or Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) and detainee handling. Most participants stated that the training revolved around the enemy being an organized, uniformed military force, as opposed to insurgents or battlefield detainees.

(e) Training at the PPP. Forty percent (4 of 10) of observed training events at PPPs were conducted to standard. The four training observations conducted to standard were deemed adequate and quality training by the USARC IG Team. This training was executed by a Garrison Support Unit (GSU) assisted by a MP Mobile Training Team. The 14-day training cycle encompassed 28 tasks consisting of MP detainee treatment, cultural awareness, and medical-specific training for the Joint Task Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) Detention Facility. The mobilized GSU and MP TASS Battalion were responsible for training Active Component, Army Reserve and Army National Guard units and sister services' personnel with a detainee guard mission at JTF-GTMO. The training is routinely updated based on After Action Reviews and Lessons Learned from JTF-GTMO. The training observed was structured to provide service members a technical and tactical foundation to perform high-risk detention operations. This training does not qualify service members for additional skill identifiers or a MOS. The six tasks that were not conducted to standard were executed by a mobilized MP Detachment. Originally, the Detachment had a camp inspection and liaison mission but this was changed to Command and Control of a prison facility. The training was conducted off-site from the PPP at a correctional facility. The superintendent of this prison facility opened an unoccupied cellblock to provide a

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training facility for the Detachment. The training was a realistic 4-day event with 2 ½-days of classroom instruction and 1½-days of excellent hands-on training. The unit and instructors role-played using the cellblock for cell extractions of prisoners. The instructor emphasized the potential for punitive punishment for not operating a military I/R facility using Army Doctrine and stressed key points on detainee treatment requirement IAW Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions. The USARC IG Team deemed these six tasks as adequate and quality training events, since they provided realistic training for mission requirements. However, the instructors failed to test Soldiers on all performance measures for these tasks; therefore, the IG Team determined the training was not conducted to the Army standard.

(1) In Sensing Sessions units had a mixed consensus on training at the PPP. Soldiers in seven of 35 MP units sensed expressed a definite consensus of shortcomings in training at the PPP. Fifty-four percent of surveyed MP/MI unit members indicated they agreed or strongly agreed that quality of training at the PPP was excellent or good. Non-MP/MI unit members indicated 53% of PPP training was excellent or good. MI units all expressed a need for more training from the ARISCs. The ARISCs have unit training support as one of their missions. As such, they perform the training and assistance for MI units that the Exercise Divisions perform for all other units. ARISC Mobile Training Teams travel to PPPs to provide instruction and training support for both Army Reserve and National Guard MI units. Often the MI trainers at the PPPs are from an ARISC, but this is transparent to the Soldier receiving the training. Training is provided according to the MI unit supported. ARISC personnel interviewed stated they have supported every training request within their ability, and if short personnel, they pool resources from each other (there are five ARISCs). Some interrogation training has been provided to MI teams, according to interviews. The perception was that, in two of the five ARISCs, this training support was not requested in earnest until after June 2004 in the wake of Abu Ghraib, and when other Army intelligence agencies provided guidance for training. The general perception among the ARISC personnel interviewed was that the Active Component Soldiers that are part of the ARISC Mobile Training Teams, are either not a priority for fill or won't be replaced upon their change of station, causing a shortage of personnel required for this critical training mission.

(f) Recapitulation. Overall, 51% (23 of 45) of observed detainee operations tasks were conducted to standard. Of these, 67% (30 of 45) were considered adequate training by the USARC IG Team, and 73% (33 of 45) were considered quality, i.e., training included a degree of realism. It is worthwhile to note that in a Special Assessment of Training Management and Risk Management conducted 19 August 2002 through 20 November 2002, the USARC IG Team concluded 60% of all training observed during IDT was conducted to standard (vs. 57% in this assessment). Commanders must train their units to be combat ready. Training is their number one priority IAW FM 7-0. Commanders achieve combat readiness through tough, realistic, and challenging training. At every echelon, commanders must train their units to the Army standard. Battle focus enables the commander to train units for success on the battlefield. In accordance with FM 7-1, "commanders and leaders ensure that trainers are prepared to conduct performance-oriented training to standard when they provide specific guidance and resources."

(3) Root Cause:

(a) Unit leaders failed to properly manage the planning and execution of detainee treatment training to the Army standard.

(b) TASS instructors did not follow the POI or test all Soldiers due to time constraints.


(4) Recommendations:

(a) **Commanders at All Levels** make IDT worthwhile by gaining training time and taking advantage of the flexibility encouraged and authorized in the Command Training Guidance (CTG) for TY 2005-2007. Commanders can accomplish a Multiple Unit Training Assembly (MUTA) 6 or MUTA 8 by company, platoon, teams or sections. Separate teams, platoons, etc., could train every weekend with the training protected and tailored to that unit. The MUTA 6 or 8 could be accomplished semiannually. Commanders could also consider instituting a "red, amber, green" with "green" being prime time training, using MUTAs 2, 4, and 6 for a quarterly cycle.

(b) **Commanders at All Levels** ensure tasks, conditions, and standards are identified for collective and individual tasks. Source for tasks, conditions and standards are found in the Mission Training Plans (MTPs), MOS Soldier's Manuals, and Common Task Testing (CTT) manuals. Commanders can derive tasks, conditions and standards from Army Regulations, Field Manuals, and training guidance if the above sources are not available.

(c) **The Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC)** request assistance through **USARC Full-Time Support Reserve Management Directorate** to US Army Forces Command for priority of fill of Active Component personnel for the five ARISCs to provide trainers for MI unit training, particularly in interrogation training.

(d) **The Full Time Support-Resource Management Directorate and USARC G-7** assist the MIRC in maintaining the ARISC training capability.



Chapter 5 Ethics Training

1. **Introduction:** The USARC IG Team reviewed the standards and frequency for Ethics training in the Army Reserve and observed the conduct of Ethics training to determine its adequacy and quality. The IG Team determined that prior to April 2004, there was no Army Regulation (AR) or policy requiring annual Ethics training for Army Reserve Soldiers. The Team also found that Ethics training conducted by Judge Advocates and civilian Ethics counselors was vastly different from Ethics training presented under the "umbrella" of the Army Consideration of Others (CO2) Program. Surveys and Sensing Sessions showed the majority of Soldiers had knowledge of and lived by the Army Values.

2. Findings.

a. **Finding 6: The majority of Army Reserve Soldiers and civilians did not receive face-to-face Ethics training in 2004 as directed by the Acting Secretary of the Army.**

(1) Standard: Memorandum, Department of the Army, Acting Secretary of the Army, SASA, 9 April 2004, subject: Face to Face Annual Training of the Standards of Ethical Conduct – ACTION MEMORANDUM. This memorandum directed the Army General Counsel and Army Ethics Counselors to provide annual Ethics training to every Soldier and civilian employee.

(2) Assessment Results: Until recently there was no AR or policy requiring periodic Ethics training for Army Reserve Soldiers. Annual Ethics training (though not required to be "face-to-face") was required by the Joint Ethics Regulation DOD 5500.7-R. Enlisted Soldiers received Ethics training during formal schooling, e.g., the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), on tasks such as "Resolve an Ethical Dilemma," and "Apply Leadership Fundamentals to Create a Climate that Fosters Ethical Behavior, the latter of which Soldiers also received at the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC). All Soldiers attending the Advanced Noncommissioned Course (ANCOC) received training entitled "Apply the Ethical Decision-Making Method at Small Unit Level." Enlisted Military Police (MP) attending the 31B10 course received training on "Police Deviance and Ethics." Officers attending the MP Officer Basic Course (OBC) received "Ethics and Military Leadership," and those attending the Captain's Career Course (CCC) received "Leadership Values and the Ethical Decision-Making Process." Ethical behavior was embedded in course material for Enlisted MI Soldiers, e.g., 97B10 (Counterintelligence Agent) included lectures and practical exercises for "Rights Advisement" and "MI Law." Soldiers attending the 97E10 (Human Intelligence Collector) course learned "HUMINT Collector Legal Principles. Military Intelligence (MI) OBC and MI CCC included "Ethical Decision-Making" and "Apply the Ethical Decision-Making Process as a Commander, Leader, or Staff Member," respectively. MI Warrant Officers received training on "Ethical Decision Making" and "Battlefield Ethics." Once Army Reserve Soldiers returned to their Troop Program Units (TPU) for Inactive Duty Training (IDT), however, any Ethics training was "hit or miss" and totally depended upon local command emphasis.



(a) In January 2001, President Bush directed that all Executive Branch personnel become familiar with, and observe, applicable Ethics laws and regulations. As a result of the President's mandate, the Army leadership at the Pentagon began receiving periodic Ethics training. To ensure that all Army personnel were aware of and complied with the highest ethical standards, the Acting Secretary of the Army directed the Army General Counsel and Army Ethics Counselors, on 9 April 2004, to provide face-to-face Ethics training for the 2.1 million Active, National Guard, Army Reserve Soldiers, and Army civilians by the end of the calendar year. To achieve this goal, the General Counsel provided every Army command with a Program of Instruction. On 8 May 2004, the Commanding General (CG), US Army Reserve Command (USARC) directed Army Ethics Counselors from subordinate command Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) offices to conduct the face-to-face training. On 2 October 2004, the USARC Command Training Guidance (CTG) for Training Years (TY) 2005-2007, added a requirement that all Soldiers and Department of the Army (DA) Civilians receive at least one hour of face-to-face Ethics training annually. A designated Ethics Counselor (i.e., Judge Advocate or government civilian attorney) must conduct the training and be immediately available to answer questions in person or by telephone. As of 31 December 2004, the USARC SJA Office documented that 46% (84,901 of 183,603) of Army Reserve Soldiers and civilians were trained. The total number was not further broken down to show the numbers of Soldiers and civilians trained, nor did it include numbers of mobilized Soldiers. It should also be noted that not all personnel received the required training face-to-face. Documentation showed that 2% (1831) received training by Digital Video Device and at least 40 others did not receive training face-to-face.

(b) The USARC Inspector General (IG) Team observed four Ethics briefings scheduled during October through December 2004. The Team reviewed numerous MP and MI monthly training schedules for the June through December 2004 timeframe to identify Ethics training for observation but found few classes scheduled. The Team requested schedules for Ethics training from their SJA offices. As a result, the IG assessment team chose to observe Ethics training conducted by Judge Advocates from one Garrison and three Regional Readiness Commands. In each case, the training emphasis was on fiscally related matters, e.g., accepting gifts, gift limits, using a position for personal gain, and using government communications. According to the USARC OSJA Ethics Counselor, Department of the Army did not prescribe what had to be trained and Ethics counselors were free to develop their own Ethics presentations. The USARC Ethics Counselor indicated that most SJA personnel would use material obtained from the Office of Government Ethics. The only topic identified for training in 2005 was post government employment restrictions.

(c) The only standard mandated for Ethics training in 2004 was that it had to be face-to-face and presented by an Ethics Counselor. All four presentations observed by the USARC IG Team met that standard. During one document review, however, the Team noted that a Specialist, not an Ethics Counselor, from a regional Legal Support Office, conducted the unit's Ethics training. During training observations, the Team noted differences in the adequacy and quality of the training that may have affected the training's effectiveness. All training was

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conducted in a slide presentation format and lasted from just 20 minutes to one hour. One instructor simply read the briefing slides and did not interact with the Soldiers. In addition, instructors covered a wide range of topics with ethical implications but did not relate their briefings to the unit's mission or mobilization lessons learned. Again, this was not required, but could have added the additional "train as you fight" dimension of realistic training to the class. Class size, which ranged from 26 to 123 Soldiers, also affected the quality and adequacy of the training. In one class, there were not enough chairs available for attendees and approximately 15 Soldiers stood during the entire 55-minute presentation. In the class with 123 Soldiers, the presentation was projected on a wall and was not visible to everyone.

(3) Root Cause: Many Army Reserve Soldiers were mobilized during 2004. Since the requirement for Ethics training came down mid-year, unit trainers and Ethics Counselors may not have had sufficient time to develop appropriate training plans and schedule everyone for training.

(4) Recommendations:

(a) **USARC SJA** determine if the face-to-face training requirement directed by the former Acting Secretary of the Army is still a valid requirement.

(b) **USARC SJA** coordinate with Office, The Adjutant General to request approval for an alternate mode of instruction, if it is still a valid requirement.

(c) **Commanders at All Levels** ensure all Army Reserve Soldiers and Army Reserve civilians receive face-to-face counseling, if it is still a valid requirement,

(d) **Army Reserve Ethics Counselors** provide realistic training that relates Ethics to unit mission or mobilization lessons learned.

b. Finding 7: There is no prescribed frequency for values-based Ethics training for Army Reserve Soldiers.

(1) Standard:

(a) USARC Pamphlet 600-4, *Consideration of Others Participant Manual*, 1 August 2000. Appendix B states, "Commanders, at all levels, will initiate Consideration of Others by presenting a comprehensive briefing to the entire unit/organization...." and this "training will be conducted annually at a minimum..." It further states that "all Full-Time Support military and civilian personnel will attend 8 hours of small group discussion" and that "all Troop Program Unit members will attend a minimum of 2 hours of small group discussion per year." Appendix C covers "The Army Ethics" that "inspires the sense of purpose necessary to sustain the soldier in the brutal realities of combat and to tolerate the ambiguities of military operations where war has not been declared."

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(b) Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do*, 31 Aug 99. Chapter 2, Section I of the Field Manual describes what a leader must be and discusses the seven Army values that guide each Soldier and all the Army. These values form the acronym LDRSHIP: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage. Chapter 4 describes leader conceptual skills. One of these, ethical reasoning, is necessary to "do the right things for the right reasons all the time, even when no one is watching."

(2) Assessment Results: As mentioned previously, the material presented during observed Ethics training was related to principles of conduct dealing with business relationships and fiscal matters. None of the training observed addressed the moral or values-based Ethics that deal with the specific choices an individual makes in relating to others. During training observations, the USARC IG Team heard one Ethics Counselor preface his briefing by stating that the reason for the required training was the events that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison. However, he never tied those events or lessons learned to his Ethics presentation. The commander at another unit where Ethics training was observed commented afterwards that the presentation was not what he expected. He said he thought it was going to relate to what happened at the prison in Iraq. These two cases illustrate that Ethics is not one dimensional, but has several meanings and applications.

(a) When the former Acting Secretary of the Army directed the Army General Counsel and Ethics Counselors to ensure face to face Ethics training was "provided to every Soldier and civilian employee, regardless of grade, rank, or position," he was mandating training on the standards of ethical conduct, not training on the Army Ethics. Interpersonal, values-based Ethics training falls under the "umbrella" of the Army CO2 Program. USARC Pamphlet 600-4, *Consideration of Others Participant Manual*, describes CO2 in the Summary as a "program that increases every soldier's and Department of the Army Civilian's awareness of human relation issues and commitment to professionalism towards others." Appendix C of the Pamphlet defines the Army Ethics as the guiding beliefs, standards and ideals that characterize and motivate the Army.

(b) Department of the Army implemented the CO2 Program in February 1998. Their handbook lists "Ethical Development – Individual and Organizational," as one of eight key areas under Consideration of Others. In March 1998, the USARC published guidance that the CO2 Program was a mandatory program and training event for all USAR commanders. Equal Opportunity Advisors (EOA) at all levels of command were responsible for helping commanders implement the Program. Per USARC's program guidance and in accordance with AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, two training periods each year were to be devoted to training on Equal Opportunity (EO) Program subjects. Commanders were required to conduct formal CO2 Program instruction and training for one training period but had discretion in selecting the other EO subject. There was no requirement for specific Ethics training.

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(c) As recent as the USARC CTG for TYs 03-04, CO2 was still listed as an annual briefing requirement for pre-mobilization and IDT. However, CTGs for TYs 04-06 and 05-07 state that CO2 and other "Individual General Requirements" briefings, e.g., Equal Opportunity, Suicide Prevention, could be diverted to pre-mobilization or post-mobilization training. Therefore, unit commanders were no longer required to conduct CO2 training during IDT, but could defer this awareness training until after unit mobilization. Subordinate command CO2 reporting statistics for Fiscal Years (FY) 2002-2004 also show a downward trend in training conducted. In each of the three FYs, reporting numbers decreased throughout the year. For example, in FY 02, of 37 subordinate commands, those reporting training conducted, by quarter, were: 1st quarter - 29; 2d quarter - 24; 3d quarter- 21; and, 4th quarter - 17. By FY 04, the corresponding quarterly numbers of commands conducting CO2 training had dropped to 13, 12, 11, and 8.

(d) In addition to observing Ethics training, the USARC IG Team, assisted by subordinate IG offices, conducted surveys at 119 Army Reserve units, primarily MP and MI. Of these, the IGs facilitated Sensing Sessions at 35 MP and 10 MI units. Survey and Sensing Session data revealed Soldier perceptions of Ethics and Army Values in their units. Surveys showed that unit Ethics had the highest perceptual rating of any profiled area. Approximately two-thirds (66%) of MP/MI survey respondents stated they had received training on Ethics or the Army Values, and 94% indicated they were familiar with the Army Values. Most units (26 of 45) participating in Sensing Sessions reached a positive consensus on understanding and applying the Army Values. Only three units expressed a negative consensus on unit Ethics and Army Values with the remaining units expressing mixed results. Among non-MP/MI respondents, Ethics was also the highest rated profile area.

(e) When asked if they follow the Army Values and include them in their lives, 89% of MP/MI Soldiers stated they strongly agree or agree that they do versus 90% for the control group. Two-thirds of MP/MI Soldiers, 66%, and 53% of non-MP/MI, stated that others in their units follow the Army Values to include their leadership. Conversely, 16% of MP/MI and 15% of non-MP/MI Soldiers indicated they would consider violating the Army Values to complete the mission. This perception is a concern. Other responses included: leaders take responsibility for their action - 53% agreed or strongly agreed; and leaders stand up for what is right - 59% agreed or strongly agreed.

(3) Root Cause: The USARC CTG for 2005-2007 allows commanders to defer conducting the previously annual CO2 briefing to pre- or post-mobilization instead of conducting it during scheduled IDT.

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(4) Recommendations:

(a) **USARC G-7** include Human Relations Training in future Command Training Guidance as an annual mandatory requirement.

(b) **Commanding General, USARC** direct the **USARC G-1** to reenergize human relations training using the CO2 methodology to ensure continual awareness of caring as an organizational imperative in the Army Reserve.

(c) **Commanders at All Levels** include CO2 training events in accordance with USARC guidance in their Annual Training Guidance and training calendars.

(d) **USARC Surgeon** coordinate with the Department of the Army Surgeon General to formulate medical ethics training for all Army medical personnel to include Army Reserve medical personnel in regards to treatment of detainees according to the Law of Land Warfare. Although not mentioned in the Sensing Sessions or survey, medical ethics is a part of detainee operations.

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Chapter 6 Leadership Training

1. **Introduction.** Army Regulation (AR) 600-100, *Army Leadership*, defines leader development as a process. For military leaders, it is a progressive and sequential system of institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. AR 600-100 covers leadership training for Soldiers and lists the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, as the proponent for leader training. AR 350-1, *Army Training and Education*, paragraph 1-11 describes the Army's formal leader development process as "integrated, progressive, and sequential." It "promotes the growth of individual leaders through training and education, experience, assessment, counseling and feedback, remedial and reinforcement actions, evaluation, and selection." AR 350-1, Table G-1, lists Leadership as a common military training requirement in military units, but defines it as integrated training, i.e., it is not intended as stand-alone training but is integrated into other training events. During the period June-December 2004, the US Army Reserve Command (USARC) Inspector General (IG) Team observed three separate Leadership training events and noted that leader development was a prominent topic of discussion at the Fall 2004 Army Reserve Senior Leader War Council.

2. Findings:

a. **Finding 8: Observed leadership training was adequate within the context in which it was presented.**

(1) Standard:

(a) AR 350-1, *Army Training and Education*, 9 April 2003. Table G-1 lists Leadership as "I" for both Officers and Enlisted personnel. "I" is explained in paragraph G-4a(4) as "Integrated training (to be integrated with other unit training. Not intended as stand-alone training events)"

(b) AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*, 17 September 1993. Paragraphs 1-9 and 2-4 discuss Leadership training for Soldiers and list the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, as the proponent for leader training.

(c) FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, October 2002. Paragraph 5-12 discusses how leader training, i.e., growing and maturing leaders is a vital part of an effective training program.

(d) Memorandum, Headquarters, US Army Reserve Command, AFRC-TR, 2 October 2004, subject: Command Training Guidance (CTG) for Training Years 2005-2007. Paragraph 6 of the USARC CTG for Training Years (TY) 2005-2007 states that Officer Professional Development (OPD) and Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development (NCOPD) programs "will ideally provide equitable coverage of METL related topics and general knowledge updates including professional subjects." As stated in the CTG, METL stands for ~~026428~~ Mission Essential Task List.

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
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(2) Assessment Results: AR 350-1 lists "Leadership" in Table G-1 as a common military training requirement in units that is integrated into other unit training. Paragraph G-4a(4) further explains that "integrated training is used to retain/refine previously acquired skills, knowledge, and experience. Individuals must have received prior training before the subject is integrated into other training." Soldiers receive formal and informal leadership training throughout their military careers. A review of proponent school Programs of Instruction shows that, in the Primary Leadership Development Course, Specialists and Sergeants receive training on "Apply the Essential Elements of Army Leadership Doctrine to a Given Situation." Staff Sergeants attending the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course learn to "Develop Subordinate Leaders in a Squad" and "Troop Leading Procedures." In addition, Sergeants First Class attending the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course learn to "Develop Subordinate Leaders in a Platoon" and "Communicate Effectively as a Leader." Officers receive similar formal school training during their Officer Basic Course (OBC) and Captain's Career Course (CCC), although there may be differences in course material across the officer branches. For example, Military Police (MP) officers are trained on "The Army's Future and Leadership" and "Develop Subordinates" during OBC. "Leadership Development," "Leadership and Team Building," and "Leadership that Directs and Implements" are taught during the CCC.

(1) During this Assessment, the USARC IG Team observed three separate leadership training events during the period June-December 2004. Two leadership classes observed were conducted by MP units at scheduled Inactive Duty Training (IDT) as part of their OPD/NCOPD Programs. The Team also observed a presentation for Colonels (COL) and Lieutenant Colonels (LTC) (Promotable) in the National Capital Region. The training was adequate for the requirements of OPD/NCOPD and for a senior leader meeting. The IDT trainers provided quality instruction that included a slide presentation and discussion of real world scenarios. Trainers did not identify task, condition(s), and standard(s) but did cover key points on Army Values, Roles and Relationships, Leadership Responsibilities, and Troop Leading Procedures. Trainers also followed training plans and related leadership with real time missions in the Area of Responsibility during question-and-answer sessions. A General Officer spoke to COLs and LTCs on the three elements of leadership: character, competence, and the ability to encourage the heart. He stressed there was no excuse for lack of leadership, that leaders need to communicate with Soldiers to establish a positive command climate. He referenced recent incidents of detainee abuse to emphasize teaching points on leadership.

3. Other Matters:

a. Survey and Sensing Sessions revealed some units had command climate issues. 14 of 45 MP/MI units sensed reached a negative consensus on unit leadership and 9 a positive consensus. The rest, 22 units, could not reach consensus on effective unit leadership. The USARC IG Team did not sense any non-MP/MI units. MP/MI Soldiers completing surveys stated they have somewhat more confidence in their Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) leadership than in their officer leadership - (67% vs. 55%). This perception was consistently held by Soldiers rating



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their senior NCO leader (CSM/SGM or 1SG) at 65% as strong leaders vs. their commanders at 56%. Non-MP/MI Soldiers responded similarly, expressing more confidence in their NCOs (67%) than in their officers (50%); and in their senior NCO as a stronger leader than their commander - 68% versus 50%. Both groups rated command climate the same with 53% of survey respondents stating it was excellent or good; 27% of MP/MI units rated it as moderate and 12% rated it as poor or very poor. Just over half (52%) of the MP/MI survey respondents indicted their unit had excellent or good military discipline versus 45% of the non-MP/MI Soldiers.

b. Leader Training and the USARC CTG for TYs 05-07:

(1) FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, states that an effective training program includes growing and maturing leaders. Because leaders spend nearly all their time supervising the training of subordinates, it is vital that they increase their own understanding of fighting as combat or support leaders. Senior commanders recognize that leader training is more than periodic officer and NCO Professional Development classes. Instead, it is a continuous process where senior commanders establish a positive training environment that encourages subordinates to become adaptive leaders.

(2) The USARC CTG for TYs 05-07 states that the OPD and NCOPD programs "will ideally provide equitable coverage of METL related topics and general knowledge updates including professional subjects." Additionally, the CTG lists the Army Reserve Leadership Campaign Plan as a mandatory OPD/NCOPD topic for TY 05. Emphasis will focus on leader training to accomplish assigned missions.

(3) The USARC CTG for TYs 05-07 directs new company level and brigade and battalion level commanders to attend the USARC-funded Pre-Command Course (PCC) no earlier than six months prior to and no later than six months after assuming command. All company level Commanders/Officers in Charge, First Sergeants/Noncommissioned Officers in Charge, and Unit Administrators of unit status reporting units are also required to attend a Company Team Leader Development Course (CTLDC) conducted by the Regional Readiness Commands (RRC).

(4) The Senior Leader Training Program (SLTP) initiative is a key element of the Army Reserve Leadership Campaign Plan. The SLTP objective is to improve the quality of Army Reserve senior leadership by: exposing senior leaders to emerging doctrinal and operational concepts in the current environment of exponential change; and, providing senior leaders the opportunity to analyze the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative's imperatives. All COLs and General Officers will participate in the SLTP.

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c. On 2 July 2004, the Chiefs, Army Reserve and National Guard Bureau requested The Inspector General to inspect the Reserve Component (RC) Leader Development process. The then Acting Secretary of the Army signed the Inspection Directive on 19 August 2004 that formally directed the inspection. The purpose of the inspection is to assess the Leader Development System used to train, educate, and grow leaders in the RC, and to determine if it meets the Army's needs. The Inspection will include how the RC applies the three domains of the Leader Development Model: institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development. The Inspection will also address the processes for promotion, selection, appointments, and assignments for RC leaders. The assessment is currently ongoing.

d. During the Fall 2004 Army Reserve Senior Leader War Council, General Officers presented briefings and conducted panel discussions on leader development. The Chief, Army Reserve, gave a presentation on "Officer Leadership." The Command Sergeant Major, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, spoke on "NCO Leadership." The Acting The Inspector General presented an update on the Inspection of Leader Development in the Reserve Component. A panel discussion entitled "Leader Development and Growth," facilitated by a General Officer, discussed leadership development and the challenges of senior leaders in a deployed environment.

4. Recommendations:

a. **Commanders at Company, Battalion, and Brigade levels**, as part of the Army Reserve Leadership Campaign Plan, develop a leadership philosophy for their command tenure. This should be discussed during the commander's first counseling and at the initial command inspection. The purpose of the leadership philosophy would be to articulate where the commander intends to take the command over the course of the command tenure in terms of readiness; the commander's view of the Army Values; and the commander's view of discipline, to include the use of disciplinary measures in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The commander's leadership philosophy should not be more than two pages in length but should be more than a short statement to support the unit mission. A short one or two sentence version of the philosophy could be developed into a vision statement to be posted with the mission statement. Instruction in the development of this philosophy can be presented at the CTLDC and the PCC.

b. **USARC G-7** in conjunction the Commander, 84th US Army Reserve Readiness Training Command assist with the guidance to Commanders at company, battalion, and brigade levels, in developing a leadership philosophy. See recommendation to Commanders at company, battalion, and brigade levels.

c. **The USARC Full Time Support-Resource Management Directorate** develop a civilian leadership development plan for both Department of the Army civilians and Military Technicians to teach troop leading procedures. Satisfactory completion or leader certification should be accomplished before civilian leaders are placed in charge of Soldiers. Many civilian personnel are in leadership positions over Soldiers at all levels on a day-to-day basis.



d. **USARC CXO** should assist the Army Reserve **Full Time Support-Resource Management Directorate** develop a civilian leadership development plan for both Department of the Army civilians and Military Technicians to teach troop leading procedures.

e. **The USARC G-7** should ensure that the civilian force training plan (by grade) will be published in the next Command Training Guidance (CTG for TY 06-08).

f. **Commanders at All Levels** comply with the CTG 2005-2007 and complete a command climate survey assessment IAW AR 600-20. The USARC Equal Opportunity Office, in conjunction with Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, has developed a web-based survey to accomplish this. Commanders take appropriate action and set priorities based on survey results.

g. **Commanders at Brigade Level and Above** emphasize attendance at the CTLDC conducted by the RRCs and the PCC as directed in the CTG 2005-2007.

h. **Chief, Army Reserve** review and as the Commanding General of the Army Reserve, direct implementation of the recommendations that result from the Department of the Army Inspector General Inspection on the Leadership Development Process as it pertains to the Army Reserve.

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Chapter 7 Other Observations

1. **Introduction.** This chapter includes additional observations identified during the Assessment that are not directly related to the established objectives, but need attention and resolution. The six additional findings resulted from visits to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Schools, First US Army Detainee Operations Training, and survey and sensing analysis.

2. Findings:

a. **Finding 9: Military Police (MP) and Military Intelligence (MI) Soldiers were unaware of their unit's Standing Operating Procedures (SOP).**

(1) Standard: Field Manual (FM) 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operation*, 31 May 1997. Page H-8 states, "Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) detail how forces will execute unit-specific techniques and procedures that commanders standardize to enhance effectiveness and flexibility. Commanders use SOP to standardize routine or recurring actions not needing their personal involvement."

(2) Assessment Results:

(a) Less than half, 44%, of MP and MI Soldiers surveyed indicated their unit had SOPs. This correlates with Sensing Sessions where Soldiers agreed the unit had SOPs, but were not sure how well understood or how effective they were. Some units did not even have an SOP. Only 3 units (of 45 sensed) reached a positive consensus in confidence in or extensive knowledge of their unit's SOPs. Among non-MP/MI units, 43% of survey respondents stated their units had effective SOPs.

(b) An example of the lack of effective SOPs was derived from individual interviews and a review of After Action Reports (AARs) from Internment Resettlement Information Center (IRIC) personnel. These interviews and AARs revealed an inconsistency in detainee accountability reporting procedures and a lack of Detainee Personnel Data Management procedures, to include operations of a Theater Detainee reporting Center (TDRC).

(3) Root Cause: MP/MI SOPs are either non-existent, or the information is not disseminated or taught to unit members.

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(4) Recommendations:

(a) **MP and MI Unit Commanders** develop effective SOPs and train their Soldiers on their content.

(b) **USARAC G-7** develop exercise play wherein MP SOPs are tested with respect to detainee accountability and personnel data management procedures; and, insert IRIC Exercise play in future Warrior Exercises.

b. Finding 10: The Detainee Operations training did not identify the interdependent and independent roles of the MP custody mission and the MI interrogation mission.

(1) Standard:

(a) FM 3-19.40, *Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations*, 1 August 2001. Paragraph 3-66 states, "The MP assists MI screeners by identifying captives who may have answers that support priority intelligence requirements and information requirements. Because MPs are in constant contact with captives, they see how certain captives respond to orders and see the types of requests they make. The MP ensures that searches requested by MI are conducted out of sight of other captives and that guards conduct same-gender searches."

(b) FM 34-52, *Intelligence Interrogation*, 28 September 1992. Chapter 3, states, "Screeners coordinate with MP holding area guards on their role in the screening process. The guards are told where the screening will take place, how EPWs and detainees are to be brought there from the holding area, and what types of behavior on their part will facilitate the screenings." Chapter 4, states, "MI assumes control from the MP when interrogators determine a captured item or EPW is of intelligence value."

(2) Assessment Results: The US Army Reserve Command (USARC) IG Team conducted 23 observations of detainee operations training during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) from June through December 2004. Eighteen of the 3 MI and 20 MP detainee operation tasks observed had been directed by the Commanding General's 10 June 2004 Memorandum and were later included in the Command Training Guidance for Training Years 2005-2007. The other five tasks were Mission Essential Task List (METL)-related detainee operations tasks. None of the observed training incorporated MP/MI interdependent roles. Several of the detainee operations tasks from the MP and MI Soldier Training Publication (STP) and Mission Training Plans (MTP) introduce interaction between the MP detainee custody mission and the MI intelligence collection mission. The STP Task 191-379-4410, "*Supervise Internment /Resettlement Camp Security and Control Procedures*," requires MP leaders to supervise procedures for the interrogation of internees. This task requires enforcement according to applicable regulations and the local SOP. The USARC IG Team observed units instructing this task by merely reading the performance steps. Trainers did not reference unit SOPs or distinguish between roles and responsibilities, i.e., the MP detainee custody mission and the MI intelligence collection mission.

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(a) Individual interviews and document reviews identified some confusion over the interoperability between MP and MI personnel concerning detainee handling. During Sensing Sessions there was very little expressed on MP and MI interoperability other than the general MP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for prisoner accountability in situations where a detainee would be handed off to MI or Other Government Agency personnel. Soldiers (usually field grade officers) stated that they did develop SOPs and TTPs on the ground; often, after receiving US Central Command level guidance. Individual interviews also revealed some confusion over "who was in charge." One MI officer stated with certainty that he and the MI units were "in charge" of the detainees once the information gathering or interrogations started.

(3) Root Causes:

(a) (Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) Detainee Operations Inspection Report) Current doctrine does not adequately address or prepare MP or MI units for collaboratively conducting detainee operations and provides inconsistent guidance on terminology, structure and function of interrogation facilities.

(b) MP Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Facility SOPs are either non-existent or not properly developed to address MP/MI interoperability as it refers to the detainee handling mission.

(c) MP and MI Soldiers are not accustomed to training together. Although there are tasks in MTPs and STPs that mention or require the interaction and interdependent exercise of MP and MI procedures, the impression was that units simulated or ignored the interaction.

(4) Recommendations:

(a) **MP and MI Unit Commanders** develop SOPs that address MP and MI cooperative functions as relates to the MP custody mission and the MI intelligence-gathering mission consistent with the Law of Land Warfare. SOPs need to be easily understood and available for all unit members.

(b) **USARC G-7** incorporate MP and MI Detainee Handling Interoperability Training into Warrior Exercises and in combat training center exercises.

c. Finding 11: Army Reserve MP and MI Total Army School System (TASS) courseware was not identical to Active Component (AC) courseware.

(1) Standard: TRADOC Regulation 350-70, *Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products Training Requirement*, 9 March 1999. This regulation prescribes the Army's Training Development (TD) Process. The Systems Approach to Training

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(SAT) is a systematic approach to making these training/education decisions. The SAT process must be used by HQ TRADOC, TASS Training Battalions, and all subordinate organizations responsible for managing or performing training development, or TD-related functions, including evaluation/quality assurance of the training, personnel, products, and institutions that present the training/education.

(2) Assessment Results:

(a) The USARC IG Team visited the US Army Military Police School (USAMPS), and the US Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) at Fort Huachuca. The visits revealed that some TASS Battalion courseware tasks were not identical to the AC courseware or updated to be relevant to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Resource challenges and the lengthy process to update TASS Battalion courseware were concerns for the proponent schools. Often, AC courseware had a higher priority and was therefore updated and available for instruction sooner than Army Reserve courseware. The Courseware Training Development Process may take up to two years pending major resource requirements. Courseware changes requiring no additional resources or changes to the instruction were approved at the proponent school level.

(b) The AC TASS Resident Course was normally instructed at the proponent school for an established duration of time to meet course objectives. The AC and Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Soldiers were required to attend the AC Resident Courses and Troop Program Unit and Mobilization Day Soldiers had the option to attend either the Resident Course or the Army Reserve TASS Course. The Army Reserve TASS Courses were structured for durations of two weeks. Army Reserve TASS Courses were based on the course objectives and designed modularly for Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Active Duty for Training (ADT).

(c) TRADOC Regulation 350-70 requires coordination and staffing with the National Guard Bureau and USARC prior to proponent approval for Program of Instruction (POI) updates/changes. The courseware is validated for any changes to current resource levels and instructions. The proponent-approved courseware is forwarded to the TRADOC, Deputy Chief of Staff, Training, six months prior to the implementation of the revised course. The forwarding of the updated courseware must be submitted in-cycle to TRADOC. In-cycle submission allows appropriate time to access the resource system, permits the resources to "catch-up" and satisfies long-range needs. Revised training initiatives can be implemented out-of-cycle, but will be treated as an Unresourced Requirement or paid for with on-hand assets.

(d) The Army Reserve MP 31B Reclassification Courseware was four years old when the USARC IG Team observed this training. The USAMPS has since instituted an updated Army Reserve MP 31B Reclassification Course, approved 1 July 04. USAMPS has also generated Army Reserve MP 31E Reclassification Course instructions for future training. Army Reserve TASS Battalion 31E instructors were in the process of completing instructors' certifications due to the 31E restructure initiative. The courseware for the MP Army Reserve

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Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) and Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) was six years old. Neither reflected recent GWOT lessons learned and AARs. The Directorate of Training and Leader Development at USAMPS was in the process of designing the new courseware for ANCOC and BNCOC. The new courses will almost mirror what is taught to AC counterparts at the MP School. The only difference between the Army Reserve and AC for ANCOC and BNCOC courseware is the Army Reserve will not train on two pieces of equipment. This is due to lack of equipment for the Army Reserve and because systems use is a very perishable skill. The USAMPS training development priority and availability of training developers has contributed to the Army Reserve courseware delay. The USAMPS AC courseware is updated routinely as dictated by AARs and lessons learned from the theater of operations. Although the USAMPS Table of Distribution and Allowances required two AGR Major Training Developers and one Major Training Coordinator, there were no authorizations to fill these positions.

(e) The USAIC and Fort Huachuca visit revealed that a mobilized MI TASS Battalion was validating the updated Army Reserve courseware for 96B (Intelligence Analyst), and instructing AC 97B (Counter Intelligence Agent) and AC 97E (Human Intelligence Collector) courseware. The mobilized MI TASS Battalion mission was the Mobilization Train and Deploy (MTD) training to the Army Reserve and ARNG soldiers. The Army Reserve 97B and 97E courseware was not relevant to current GWOT, AARs, and lessons learned. The USAIC was scheduled to validate the Army Reserve 97B and 97E courseware this Training Year (TY). Although the USAIC required and was authorized an AGR Master Sergeant (97B) Training Developer, the position was being reviewed for modification to facilitate all Army Reserve MI training development.

(3) Root Causes:

- (a) Low priority for Army Reserve courseware updates
- (b) Lengthy Army Reserve courseware coordination approval process.
- (c) Lack of adequate training developer authorizations at proponent schools

(4) Recommendations:

(a) USARC G-7 coordinate with TRADOC to revise the courseware approval process to consider the MOS density of Soldiers in the Active Component versus the Army Reserve with priority given to the highest density for courseware updates.

(b) USARC G-7 coordinate with all School Proponents and determine if courseware is updated and current.

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(c) USARC G-7 coordinate with TRADOC to review expediting the courseware development process to facilitate on-going changes identified from GWOT, AARs, and lessons learned.

(d) USARC G-7 coordinate with TRADOC to ensure that Army Reserve and AC TASS courseware consists of the same tasks, conditions, and standards but with different delivery methods due to Army Reserve time constraints.

(e) USARC Force Programs in conjunction with Full Time Support-Resource Management Directorate coordinate with the Human Resource Command-St. Louis and Proponent Schools to review and determine personnel requirements and authorizations for AGR Training Developers.

d. Finding 12: MP units were assigned missions in the theater of operations [REDACTED]

(1) Standard:

(a) FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, October 2002. This FMI introduces the training cycle, the linkage of Army training and leader development, and the three domains where training occurs--the operational, institutional, and self-development domains.



(b) FM 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*, September 2003. This FMI is the Army's doctrinal foundation for "How to Train," and it is applicable to all units and organizations of the Army. It explains how the Army assesses, plans, prepares, and executes training and leader development; it is critical to all the Army does.

(c) FM 3-19.1, *Military Police Operations*, 31 January 2002. The Military Police (MP) Corps supports the commander across the full spectrum of military operations. This FM is the foundation for all MP doctrine as it relates to this support. It communicates to all levels of leadership and staffs how the MP provides a flexible and lethal force capable of operating across this full spectrum. As the keystone manual, it identifies what MPs train on and how their forces are organized and equipped in support of all Army echelons.

(2) Assessment Results: 13 of 35 MP units and 1 of 10 MI units sensed, stated they were regularly assigned missions [REDACTED] during their deployment. For example, an MP Combat Support (CS) unit was assigned an I/R mission and an MP Guard unit was assigned a customs mission. Another MP company was mobilized under a superceded Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). [REDACTED]

Reserve training planning process. Army Reserve MP units trained on METL tasks applicable to their war trace mission. Immediately following mobilization or upon arrival in theater their

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actual mission in theater changed to meet the combatant commander's needs or requirements

 The resource of training time and equipment is greatest challenge for all Army Reserve Soldiers. MP Soldiers in particular were additionally challenged to be proficient in all five MP functions (maneuver and mobility support; area security; internment and resettlement; law and order; and police intelligence operations) due to the specificity of unit mission training plans and limited training days. MP units are designed by MTOE to perform a specific MP function, but not all five interchangeably.

(3) Root Causes:

(a) The MP reserve units are classified in various types: Combat Support, Guard, Escort-Guard, I/R, and others; therefore, their training is derived from their METL in accordance with their Mission Training Plan (MTP). This training is comprised of individual Soldier tasks that culminate in extensive collective tasks to attain METL training proficiency. The time constraints of IDT may impact the adequacy of training due to the myriad of other training requirements Army Reserve Soldiers must perform.

(b) The requirements of the combatant commanders do not always match the reality of the Army Reserve METL training. As stated in a Memorandum, HQ, 300th MP Brigade, AFRC-CMN-MP-CG, 13 August 2004, subject: After Action Report (AAR): Assessment/Proposed Training Concept for Military Police - TY 05/06, "the recent experience in current theaters indicate that the [combatant] commander expects a multi-functional capable MP unit to multi-task units across the broad range of MP functions."



(4) Recommendations:

(a) USARC G-7 continue reclassification training, individual MOS "Pop-Up" courses, and training of Individual Ready Reserve Soldiers for cross-leveling.

(b) USARC Force Programs continue to restructure and re-designate low demand units.

(c) USARC G-3, Mobilization coordinate with FORSOM G3 to follow up on the recommendation from the Army Detainee and Interrogation Operations Plan to develop a policy proposal for the Chief of Staff of the Army on how to ensure units receive their mission upon alert to enhance battle-focused training.

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e. Finding 13: The majority of assessed units failed to perform Training Management procedures to standard.


(1) Standard:

(a) FM 7-1 *Battle Focused Training*, September 2003 states "the RC trains at lower echelons, and the number of tasks trained differs as a result of the organization and training time available."

(b) AR 350-1, *Army Training and Education*, 9 April 2003. Paragraph 1-14 states, "(the Army's training development) process ensures a systematic approach to making individual and unit training decisions. It determines: whether or not training is needed; the content and level of training; how, when, and where the training will be conducted; and the training resources required to produce, distribute, implement, and evaluate the training."

(2) Assessment Results:

(a) Document reviews indicated that 49% (18 of 37) of MP/MI units did not have an approved METL, YTC, YTG, or training plans. Fifty-seven percent (21 of 37) of unit Yearly Training Calendars (YTC) were available, but most did not address METL tasks. The specific training identified in units' METL was not scheduled or conducted. In one instance, there was no specified MP training scheduled for a given TY. Only 18 of these units provided approved training schedules for the next 3 months. Another observation was that training meetings were not always conducted. FM 7-1 states, "training meetings are non-negotiable." The USARC IG Team noted that actual training conducted/executed often had not been scheduled on the YTC. In addition, training schedules were generally not followed during drill and scheduled training sometimes did not occur. Thirty-two percent (12 of 37) of units reviewed could not provide AARs to document training deficiencies. FM 7-1 states, "a significant part of learning occurs as a result of After Action Review (AAR), which ensures that the training audience understands when they have not performed to standard and how they must perform to do so." Forty-six percent (17 of 37) of units provided documentation to support conducting or scheduling the required MP/MI specified training directed in the Memorandum, HQ, USARC, subject: Individual Training Focus Areas - Common Tasks, Military Police, and Military Intelligence, 10 June 2004. Several Training Management procedures were not followed and were vague. Only 32% (12 of 37) of observed units were able to provide date/type of last documented specified training. Some units that had been Released from Active Duty (REFRAD) and reconstituted failed to have training plans for the remainder of the TY. Sixty-eight percent (25 of 37) of external training directives reviewed were not specific to a unit's wartime mission or, as in one case, were unavailable and the unit was unaware of its wartime mission. Some of the METL tasks and the Yearly Training Guidance (YTG) were not related, and if related, did not emphasize Soldier, Leader, and Collective tasks. The lack of available approved training schedules and an awareness of scheduled training by the Major Subordinate Commands caused a considerable challenge during the conduct of this assessment for USARC IG Team members.



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(b) The training planning process in the Army Reserve MP/MI units observed was constrained by the lack of resources on hand. FM 7-1 states, "the RC trains at lower echelons, and the number of tasks trained differs as a result of the organization and training time available." The observed combination of lack of proper training development process, resources, and time contributed to the training deficiencies noted. Furthermore, the consensus of surveys and Sensing Sessions was that there was not enough time for adequate METL training during IDT. The majority of MP unit training observed did not meet the specified detainee operations performance objectives. The training lacked resources, as well as, proper planning and execution. These MP units were not following the "crawl-walk-run training" process as stated in FM 7-1. The units never completed the "crawl phase" in the majority of collective training observed due to the heavy reliance on lecture type classes.

(3) Root Cause: Unit leaders at all echelons failed to properly plan and manage training and enforce Training Management standards.

(4) Recommendations:

(a) **Commanders, Staffs, and Senior Noncommissioned Officers at All Levels** comply with the doctrinal guidance and procedures outlined in FM 7-0 and FM 7-1.

(b) **Commanders and Staffs at All Levels** comply with the guidance outlined in the USARC CTG for TYs 05-07.

(c) USARC G-3 and G-7 incorporate Training Management into unit Readiness Reviews.

(d) USARC G-7 revise their portion of the Automated Inspection Program to reflect Training Management validation as a tool of the Organizational Inspection Program.

f. **Finding 14:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (local purchase items and Common Table of Allowances items) essential to I/R mission and METL training.

(1) Standard: Common Table of Allowances (CTA) 50-900, *The Common Table of Allowances* is an authorization document under the provisions of AR 710-1, *Centralized Inventory Management of the Army Supply System*, 15 April 2003, and AR 700-84, *Issue and Sale of Personal Clothing*, 18 November 2004, providing flexible basis of issue which may be used to acquire clothing and individual equipment.

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(2) Assessment Results:

(a) Several observed MP units (Guard/IR) discussed [REDACTED] with which to train on detainee-operations tasks prior to mobilization, to include the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) computers. Units were found to have [REDACTED]

(b) The DAIG Report, *Detainee Operations Inspection*, 21 July 2004, page E-80 states that AC units qualified to conduct I/R operations are organized by Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and are not designed for deployment. These units are responsible for US Military Correctional Facilities. Army Reserve units conducting MP I/R operations are organized in Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) for deployment. The equipment authorized and required under MTOE and available at unit level differs from equipment under CTA authorization.

(c) [REDACTED] The new missions frequently required different sets of equipment [REDACTED] The USARC IG Team sensed an MP CS unit that was given a MP I/R mission that required I/R specific training and equipment to perform this mission while mobilized (see CTA listing above).

(d) In order for all Soldiers to proficiently train on METL related tasks, they must train as they fight. CTA 50-900 provides a flexible basis of issue, which "may" be used to acquire clothing and individual equipment, giving unit commanders flexibility for procurement of essential items that are required to perform real world mission. In addition, this equipment is essential to conducting the required performance measures as outlined by Soldier's Manuals, MTPs, and directed by the USARC headquarters.

(3) Root Causes:

(a) Equipment was not identified on MTOEs for Army Reserve MP units with an I/R mission.

(b) Unit commanders could not order CTA 50-900 equipment due to uncertainty of wartime mission and lack of resources (time and money).

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
(4) Recommendations:

(a) **USARC Force Programs and USARC G-3** ensure all MP units with an I/R mission include detainee restraint equipment as required equipment on their MTOE.

(b) **USARC G-7** coordinate with **USARC G-8** to ensure that training sets (detainee restraint CTA items) are available to support training guidance published for MP units without an I/R mission.

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Chapter 8 Summary of Recommendations

1. **Purpose:** The purpose of this chapter is to list all recommendations proffered in the report. Some recommendations may be similar to others; however, all recommendations are included here.

2. Chapter 3, Law of Land Warfare Training:

a. USARC G-7 emphasize to USARC Major Subordinate Commanders the requirements for the conduct of adequate Level B Law of Land Warfare training.

b. Commanders at All Levels include Law of Land Warfare training in mission specific scenarios to enhance training realism.

c. USARC G-7, in coordination with USARC SJA, determine whether any web-based training is for familiarization only, or, if it satisfies the performance steps and measures in the three Law of Land Warfare tasks, 181-105-1001, 181-105-2001, and 181-105-2002.


d. Commanders at All Levels ensure that Law of Land Warfare training is conducted to standard as outlined in STP-21-1-SMCT, Skill Level 1 and STP-21-24-SMCT, Skill Levels 2-4.

3. Chapter 4, Detainee Treatment Requirements Training:


a. Commanders at All Levels must ensure all Soldiers with CMFs 97 and 31 receive refresher training and identify shortcomings on the key tasks identified in CTG TY 2005-2007, Appendix K.

b. Commanders at All Levels ensure that Soldiers specifically charged with responsibility for handling prisoners or other detainees – all MP MOSs and MI MOSs 97B/97E- receive effective sustainment training to maintain proficiency at all skills levels.

c. Commanders at All Levels make IDT worthwhile by gaining training time and taking advantage of the flexibility encouraged and authorized in the Command Training Guidance (CTG) for TY 2005-2007. Commanders can accomplish a Multiple Unit Training Assembly (MUTA) 6 or MUTA 8 by company, platoon, teams or sections. Separate teams, platoons, etc., could train every weekend with the training protected and tailored to that unit. The MUTA 6 or 8 could be accomplished semiannually. Commanders could also consider instituting a "red, amber, green" with "green" being prime time training, using MUTAs 2, 4, and 6 for a quarterly cycle.



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d. Commanders at All Levels ensure tasks, conditions, and standards are identified for collective and individual tasks. Source for tasks, conditions and standards are found in the Mission Training Plans (MTPs), MOS Soldier's Manuals, and Common Task Testing (CTT) manuals. Commanders can derive tasks, conditions and standards from Army Regulations, Field Manuals, and training guidance if the above sources are not available.

e. The Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC) request assistance through USARC Full-Time Support Reserve Management Directorate to US Army Forces Command for priority of fill of Active Component personnel for the five ARISCs to provide trainers for MI unit training, particularly in interrogation training.

f. The Full Time Support-Resource Management Directorate and USARC G-7 assist the MIRC in maintaining the ARISC training capability.

4. Chapter 5, Ethics Training:

a. USARC SJA determine if the face-to-face training requirement directed by the former Acting Secretary of the Army is still a valid requirement.

b. USARC SJA coordinate with Office, The Adjutant General to request approval for an alternate mode of instruction, if it is still a valid requirement.

c. Commanders at All Levels ensure all Army Reserve Soldiers and Army Reserve civilians receive face-to-face counseling, if it is still a valid requirement,

d. Army Reserve Ethics Counselors provide realistic training that relates Ethics to unit mission or mobilization lessons learned.


e. USARC G-7 include Human Relations Training in future Command Training Guidance as an annual mandatory requirement.

f. Commanding General, USARC direct the USARC G-1 to reenergize human relations training using the CO2 methodology to ensure continual awareness of caring as an organizational imperative in the Army Reserve.

g. Commanders at All Levels include CO2 training events in accordance with USARC guidance in their Annual Training Guidance and training calendars.

h. USARC Surgeon coordinate with the Department of the Army Surgeon General to formulate medical ethics training for all Army medical personnel to include Army Reserve medical personnel in regards to treatment of detainees according to the Law of Land Warfare. Although not mentioned in the Sensing Sessions or survey, medical ethics is a part of detainee operations.

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5. Chapter 6, Leadership Training:

a. Commanders at Company, Battalion, and Brigade levels, as part of the Army Reserve Leadership Campaign Plan, develop a leadership philosophy for their command tenure. This should be discussed during the commander's first counseling and at the initial command inspection. The purpose of the leadership philosophy would be to articulate where the commander intends to take the command over the course of the command tenure in terms of readiness; the commander's view of the Army Values; and the commander's view of discipline, to include the use of disciplinary measures in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The commander's leadership philosophy should not be more than two pages in length but should be more than a short statement to support the unit mission. A short one or two sentence version of the philosophy could be developed into a vision statement to be posted with the mission statement. Instruction in the development of this philosophy can be presented at the CTLDC and the PCC.

b. USARC G-7 in conjunction the Commander, 84th US Army Reserve Readiness Training Command assist with the guidance to Commanders at company, battalion, and brigade levels, in developing a leadership philosophy. See recommendation to Commanders at company, battalion, and brigade levels.

c. The USARC Full Time Support-Resource Management Directorate develop a civilian leadership development plan for both Department of the Army civilians and Military Technicians to teach troop leading procedures. Satisfactory completion or leader certification should be accomplished before civilian leaders are placed in charge of Soldiers. Many civilian personnel are in leadership positions over Soldiers at all levels on a day-to-day basis.

d. USARC CXO should assist the Army Reserve Full Time Support-Resource Management Directorate develop a civilian leadership development plan for both Department of the Army civilians and Military Technicians to teach troop leading procedures.

e. The USARC G-7 should ensure that the civilian force training plan (by grade) will be published in the next Command Training Guidance (CTG for TY 06-08).

f. Commanders at All Levels comply with the CTG 2005-2007 and complete a command climate survey assessment IAW AR 600-20. The USARC Equal Opportunity Office, in conjunction with Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, has developed a web-based survey to accomplish this. Commanders take appropriate action and set priorities based on survey results.

g. Commanders at Brigade Level and Above emphasize attendance at the CTLDC conducted by the RRCs and the PCC as directed in the CTG 2005-2007.

h. Chief, Army Reserve review and as the Commanding General of the Army Reserve, direct implementation of the recommendations that result from the Department of the Army Inspector General Inspection on the Leadership Development Process as it pertains to the Army Reserve.

6. Chapter 7, Other Observations:

- a. MP and MI Unit Commanders develop effective SOPs and train their Soldiers on their content.
- b. USARC G-7 develop exercise play wherein MP SOPs are tested with respect to detainee accountability and personnel data management procedures; and, insert IRIC Exercise play in future Warrior Exercises.
- c. MP and MI Unit Commanders develop SOPs that address MP and MI cooperative functions as relates to the MP custody mission and the MI intelligence-gathering mission consistent with the Law of Land Warfare. SOPs need to be easily understood and available for all unit members.
- d. USARC G-7 incorporate MP and MI Detainee Handling Interoperability Training into Warrior Exercises and in combat training center exercises.
- e. USARC G-7 coordinate with TRADOC to revise the courseware approval process to consider the MOS density of Soldiers in the Active Component versus the Army Reserve with priority given to the highest density for courseware updates.
- f. USARC G-7 coordinate with all School Proponents and determine if courseware is updated and current.
- g. USARC G-7 coordinate with TRADOC to review expediting the courseware development process to facilitate on-going changes identified from GWOT, AARs, and lessons learned.
- h. USARC G-7 coordinate with TRADOC to ensure that Army Reserve and AC TASS courseware consists of the same tasks, conditions, and standards but with different delivery methods due to Army Reserve time constraints.
- i. USARC Force Programs in conjunction with Full Time Support-Resource Management Directorate coordinate with the Human Resource Command-St. Louis and Proponent Schools to review and determine personnel requirements and authorizations for AGR Training Developers.
- j. USARC G-7 continue reclassification training, individual MOS "Pop-Up" courses, and training of Individual Ready Reserve Soldiers for cross-leveling.
- k. USARC Force Programs continue to restructure and re-designate low demand units.
- l. USARC G-3, Mobilization coordinate with FORSOM G3 to follow up on the recommendation from the Army Detainee and Interrogation Operations Plan to develop a policy proposal for the Chief of Staff of the Army on how to ensure units receive their mission upon alert to enhance battle-focused training.



m. Commanders, Staffs, and Senior Noncommissioned Officers at All Levels comply with the doctrinal guidance and procedures outlined in FM 7-0 and FM 7-1.

n. Commanders and Staffs at All Levels comply with the guidance outlined in the USARC CTG for TYs 05-07.

o. USARC G-3 and G-7 incorporate Training Management into unit Readiness Reviews.

p. USARC G-7 revise their portion of the Automated Inspection Program to reflect Training Management validation as a tool of the Organizational Inspection Program.

q. USARC Force Programs and USARC G-3 ensure all MP units with an I/R mission include detainee restraint equipment as required equipment on their MTOE.

r. USARC G-7 coordinate with USARC G-8 to ensure that training sets (detainee restraint CTA items) are available to support training guidance published for MP units without an I/R mission.

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Appendix A REFERENCES

Reference	Date	Title
AR 190-8	1-Oct-1997	Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees
AR 350-1	9-Apr-2003	Army Training and Education
AR 600-20	13-May-2002	Army Command Policy
AR 600-100	17-Oct-1993	Army Leadership
ARTEP 19-472	2-Mar-2001	Mission Training Plan for the Military Police Combat Support and Internment and Resettlement Brigades and Criminal Investigation Division Groups.
ARTEP 19-546-MTP	10-Apr-1999	Mission Training Plan for the Headquarters and Headquarters Company Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement)
CTA 50-900	1-Aug-1990	The Common Table of Allowances
DOD Directive 2310.1	18-Aug-1994	DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Other Detainees
DOD Regulation 5500.7-R	Aug 1993	Joint Ethics Regulation
FM 22-100	31-Aug-1999	Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do
FM 3-19.1	31-Jan-2002	Military Police Operations
FM 3-19.40	1-Aug-2001	Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operation
FM 34-52	28-Sep-1992	Intelligence Interrogation
FM 34-60	3-Oct-1995	Counterintelligence
FM 6-0	11-Aug-2003	Mission, Command: Command and Control of Army Forces
FM 7-0	1-Oct-2002	Training the Force
FM 7-1	1-Sep-2003	Battle Focused Training
Memorandum, HQ USARC, AFRC-TR	12-Dec-2003	Command Training Guidance (CTG) for Training Years 2004-2006
Memorandum, HQ USARC, AFRC-TR	2-Oct-2004	Command Training Guidance (CTG) for Training Years 2005-2007
Memorandum, HQ USARC, AFRC-TR	10-Jun-2004	Individual Training Focus Areas - Common Tasks, Military Police, and Military Intelligence.
Memorandum, DA, SASA	9-Apr-2004	Face to Face Annual Training of the Standards of Ethical Conduct
Memorandum, HQ 300th MP Brigade, AFRC-CMN-MP-CG	13 Aug 2004	After Action Report (AAR): Assessment/Proposed Training Concept for Military Police - TY 05/06

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**Appendix A
REFERENCES
(Continued)**

Reference	Date	Title
STP 21-1-SMCT	31-Aug-2003	Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1
STP 21-24-SMCT	31-Aug-2003	Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Levels 2, 3, and 4,
STP 19-95B1-SM	14-Jan-2003	MOS 95B, Skill Level 1
Soldier Training Publication (STP) 19-95B24 -SM-TG	2-Dec-2002	MOS 95B, Skill Levels 2/3/4
Soldier Training Publication (STP) 34-97B15-SM-TG	2-Feb-2004	MOS 97B, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4 and 5
Soldier Training Publication (STP) 34-97E14-SM-TG	28-Nov-2003	MOS 97E, Skill Levels 1/2/3 and 4
TRADOC Regulation 350-70	9-Mar-1999	Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products Training Requirement
USARC Regulation 350-2	1-Nov-1996	Intelligence Training in the Army Reserve Command
USARC Pamphlet 600-4	1-Aug-2000	Consideration of Others Participant Manual
USARC IG Special Assessment of Training Management and Risk Management Report	1-Apr-2003	Assessment of Training Management and Risk Management

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Appendix B DIRECTIVE



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND
1401 DESHLER STREET SW
FORT MCPHERSON, GA 30330-2000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFRC-IGI (1-201a)

11 March 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Inspector General, US Army Reserve Command, 1401
Deshler Street SW, Fort McPherson, GA 30330-2000

SUBJECT: Directive for a Special Assessment of Training for United States Army Reserve
Units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and
Leadership

1. You are directed to conduct a review of training for Army Reserve Soldiers and units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics and Leadership. The assessment will focus on the following objectives:
 - a. Determine the frequency and standards for training Army Reserve Soldiers on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership training.
 - b. Assess the adequacy of specified training for Army Reserve units.
 - c. Assess the quality of specified training in Army Reserve units.
 - d. Observe specified training to determine if training is conducted to standard.
 - e. Identify and recommend any changes to training guidance and procedures related to the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics and Leadership.
2. You will conduct the assessment at selected Army Reserve units and locations. Military Police and Military Intelligence units are given a higher priority for this assessment, but a cross sample of the Army Reserve will be obtained. You will also observe specific training conducted by Army Reserve instructors to include: Advanced Individual Training; One Station Unit Training; Officer Basic Course; during unit training assemblies; at the Army Reserve Center and School; and at Power Projection Platforms. You will brief me on your findings upon completion of the assessment.

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Appendix B
DIRECTIVE

AFRC-IGI

SUBJECT: Directive for a Special Assessment of Training for United States Army Reserve Units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership

3. You are authorized to request support from the US Army Reserve Command staff and subordinate headquarters for those resources required, thus ensuring successful accomplishment of the Special Assessment. You are authorized a Judge Advocate General and a Military Police Officer detailed to assist with the assessment as subject matter experts. Further, you are authorized unlimited access to Army Reserve activities, organizations, and information sources necessary to prepare and conduct the Special Assessment.


JAMES R. HELMLY, 3/12
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

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Appendix C Training Observations

Task Number/Title	Number of Specified Task
Law of Land Warfare	7
19-1-3512, Conduct Transfer Operations (EPW/CI, US Prisoners and Dislocated Civilians)	1
19-6-3110, Process Information for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs), Civilian Internees (CI), and Dislocated Civilians (DCs)	1
191-376-4100, Perform Enemy Prisoners of War/Civilian Internee (EPW/CI) Security and Control Activities at an EPW/CI Camp	9
191-376-4101, Process Enemy Prisoners of War/Civilian Internees (EPWs/CIs) at a Collecting Point or Holding Area	9
191-376-4102, Escort Enemy Prisoners of Wars/Civilian Internees (EPWs/CIs) to Rear Areas	3
191-376-4103, Process Enemy Prisoners of War/Civilian Internees (EPWs/CIs) for Internment	2
191-377-4205, Supervise the Processing of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs)/Civilian Internees (CIs) at a Collecting Point or Holding Area	2
191-377-4410, Supervise Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Camp Security and Control Procedures	1
191-378-6079, Supervise the Escort of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs)/Civilian Internees (CIs) to a Collecting Point, a Holding Area, or an Enclosure	2
191-379-4405, Plan Movement of Enemy Prisoners of War/Civilian Internees (EPWs/CIs)	1
191-379-4413, Supervise the Processing of Captives for Internment	1
191-381-1287, Frisk Search A Detainee	1
191-381-1306, Control Personnel Entry To and Exit From an Internment Facility	1
191-381-1321, Take Action in the Event of Disorder at an Internment Facility	1
191-382-2347, Inspect the Physical Security of a Cellblock	1
301-97B-1250, Assist in Counterintelligence (CI) Screening Operations	1
CD 113, Geneva Convention (Humane Treatment of Detainees)	1
CD 226, Perform Security and Control Activities within Detainee Operations	1
CD 246, Escort Procedures within Detainee Operations	1
CD 408, Cell Block Operations within Detainee Operations	1
CD 412, Meal Procedures within Detainee Operations	1
CD 424, Forced Cell Move Procedures within Detainee Operations	1
Interrogation Exercise	1
Tactical Humint Training	1
Ethics	4
Army Leadership	3
Code of Conduct	2

Total 61

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Appendix D

Survey, Analysis, and Sensing Tool

1. **Purpose:** To provide perceptions and opinions from surveys, Sensing Sessions, individual interviews, and documents provided to the US Army Reserve Command (USARC) Inspector General (IG) by Army Reserve Soldiers for the Special Assessment of Training on The Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics, and Leadership. The analysis from this Appendix is incorporated in the Findings of Chapters 3-7.

2. **Methodology:**

a. A total of 4602 Soldiers from 119 units completed valid surveys (Annex A). Of the Soldiers surveyed 2010 participated in the Sensing Sessions. The main survey group consisted of 4171 Soldiers from Military Police (MP) and Military Intelligence (MI) units. This main group of MP and MI units participated in the Sensing Sessions. Of the units surveyed and sensed 81 were from MP units and 19 were from MI units for a total of 100 units. Thirty-five MP and ten MI units provided Soldiers for Sensing Sessions. The survey answer sheet also provided space for written comments. Several Soldiers offered additional information on their perceptions in writing or were interviewed separately. Sensing session and interview group size ranged from 1 to 21 Soldiers.

b. All Soldiers participating in the Sensing Sessions completed the same survey and were read the same Facilitator's Guide (Annex B) prior to the beginning of the Sensing Session.

c. The results of the non MP/MI survey group of 431 Soldiers used as a control group were used to compare with the main group of surveyed MP/MI unit Soldiers.

3. **Conclusions.** Correlations were identified between the Sensing Sessions and the surveys. Taken together, a strong picture of what Soldiers perceived can be drawn. The survey participation enabled IGs to exceed our goal of a 95% confidence level with a + or - 5% confidence interval. A 99% confidence level with + or - 2% confidence interval overall was achieved for MP units. The exception to these correlations was for Soldiers in MI units wherein a slightly lower confidence interval of + or - 4%, but still maintained our goal. Soldiers from 19 non-MI/MP units also returned valid surveys. A 95% confidence level was achieved with a + or - 5% confidence interval for this group. Units often did not reach a consensus on a focus question in Sensing Sessions; the survey question results therefore, contribute to solidifying the overall picture.

a. The general perception of Training on Law of Land Warfare Training, Detainee Treatment, Ethics and Leadership was moderate to low. The USARC IG Team found variances between units according to the leadership climate and type of unit. Although overall confidence in leaders was good, there was not a strong consensus. Some units had command climate problems. More Soldiers (67% vs. 55%) expressed a higher degree of confidence in their noncommissioned officer (NCO) leaders than in their commanders. Ethics was rated particularly

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high. Most Soldiers (66%) indicated they, their peers, and their leaders, adhere to the Army Values, stand up for what is right, and will follow the Law of Land Warfare. A good majority, 73%, of the respondents indicated they believed their leaders would follow the Law of Land Warfare in the treatment of detainees and only 3% did not. MP unit members expressed overall confidence in detainee handling.

the Law of Land Warfare, the Geneva Convention, and on cultural awareness training. Both MI and MP units expressed low confidence in operating procedures, particularly in the effectiveness of unit Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). Soldiers had very few comments on the interoperability between MP and MI personnel in reference to detainee handling. USARC IGs noted some disparity between MP and MI personnel interviewed and sensed on who (MP or MI) was "in charge" of detainees.

b. Soldiers in MP units perceived the adequacy and quality of training as good overall, although some Soldiers expressed weakness in the relative adequacy of the training during MP military occupational specialty (MOS) and MOS Reclassification Training. The consensus of all Soldiers sensed and/or surveyed was that there was not enough time to do adequate Mission Essential Task List (METL) training during Inactive Duty Training (IDT).

The MP units indicated they performed many missions outside of their METL training. MI Soldiers indicated they did not receive enough training from Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISC), although what ARISC training they did receive was of very good quality. MI Soldiers indicated they generally performed their missions. Results from the non-MP/MI group closely approximated the results from the main group of MP and MI Soldiers. Both groups produced consistent results in all areas except in Law of Land Warfare training, where the main MP/MI group consistently scored higher perceptual ratings.

4. **Sensing Sessions.** Thirty-five MP and ten MI units participated in the Sensing Sessions. Sensing session participants and individual interviews included:

Rank	Total	From MP Unit	From MI Unit
PVT-SPC	964	808	156
SGT-SSG	677	569	108
SFC-MSG	172	144	28
SGM/CSM	5	2	3
WO1-CW4	35	17	18
LTs-CPT	106	67	39
MAJs	38	23	15
LTCs	11	5	6
COLs	2	1	1
Total	2010	1636	371

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5. **Survey.** Of all the survey respondents 74% were from MP units, 16% were from MI units, and 10% were from other units. By Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) the breakdown was 47% MP, 11% MI, and 42% all others. By rank the breakdown was as follows: PVT-SPC, 48%; SGT-SFC, 39%; MSG-SGM, 4%; WO-CW5, 2%; LT-CPT, 5%; and MAJ-COL, 2%.

a. A total of 4171 valid MP/MI surveys were returned to the USARC IG office. The surveys attempted to gauge the respondent's opinions and perceptions. Percent scores indicate responses to a specific question. The survey for the main MP/MI group achieved a confidence level of 99% with at least a + or - confidence interval of 4%. Simply stated, there was reasonable assurance that responses to each survey question accurately represented the opinions of the MP and MI Army Reserve Soldier population.

b. **Non-MP and MI unit survey.** A total of 431 Soldiers from 19 non-MP and MI units returned valid surveys for this assessment. The same baseline survey was used, except that MP and MI questions were deleted. A 95% confidence level was achieved with a + or - 5% confidence interval. No Sensing Sessions were conducted from this cross section of units. The following units by types were surveyed:

Number of Units	Unit Type
1	Garrison Support
3	AG Replacement
2	AG Postal
6	Transportation
2	Engineer
3	Medical
2	Quartermaster

c. Specific survey results are referenced in Chapters 3-7:

Law of Land Warfare Training

Question 26	Responses		
	Yes, more than a year ago	Yes, less than a year ago	Never
I received Law of Land Warfare Training			
MP/MI	33%	48%	19%
Non-MP/MI	30%	40%	30%

Question 27	Responses			
	Excellent/Good	Moderate	Poor	No opinion
My unit's quality of Law of Land Warfare Training is				
MP/MI	41%	20%	10%	29%
Non-MP/MI	30%	24%	20%	25%

Army Values and Ethics

Question 74	Responses		
<i>I received training on Army Values and Ethics</i>	Yes	No	NA
MP/MI	66%	23%	8%
Non-MP/MI	67%	23%	7%

Question 39	Responses				
<i>Leaders in my unit would treat EPWs, and Detainee per the Geneva Convention and the Law of Land Warfare</i>	Very great or great extent	Moderate extent	Slight extent	Not at all	Don't Know
MP/MI	73%	11%	2%	1%	12%
Non-MP/MI	61%	11%	3%	1%	23%

Question 8	Responses			
<i>I know the Army Values</i>	Strongly Agree/ agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ strongly disagree	No opinion
MP/MI	60%	34%	4%	2%
Non-MP/MI	56%	40%	3%	1%

Question 9	Responses			
<i>I live by the Army Values and Ethics</i>	Strongly Agree/ agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ strongly disagree	No opinion
MP/MI	51%	38%	8%	2%
Non-MP/MI	45%	45%	8%	2%

Question 10	Responses			
<i>Soldiers in my unit demonstrate Army Values and Ethics</i>	Strongly Agree/ agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ strongly disagree	No opinion
MP/MI	68%	20%	9%	3%
Non-MP/MI	64%	25%	9%	2%

Question 13	Responses			
<i>I might violate one of the Army Value or Ethics in order to accomplish the mission</i>	Strongly Agree/ agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree/ strongly disagree	No opinion
MP/MI	16%	28%	50%	6%
Non-MP/MI	15%	33%	49%	3%

Army Values and Ethics (Continued)

Question 41	Response			
<i>Leaders in my unit follow the Army Values</i>	<i>Great or very great extent</i>	<i>Moderate extent</i>	<i>Slight extent or not at all</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	66%	21%	9%	4%
Non-MP/MI	53%	25%	18%	3%

Question 35	Response			
<i>Leaders in my unit take responsibility for their actions</i>	<i>Great or very great extent</i>	<i>Moderate extent</i>	<i>Slight extent or not at all</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	53%	26%	16%	5%
Non-MP/MI	50%	30%	16%	4%

Question 37	Response			
<i>Leaders in my unit stand up for what is right</i>	<i>Great or very great extent</i>	<i>Moderate extent</i>	<i>Slight extent or not at all</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	59%	23%	14%	5%
Non-MP/MI	57%	24%	15%	4%

Leadership

Question 43	Response			
<i>How would you describe the NCO leadership</i>	<i>Excellent or Good</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Poor or very poor</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	67%	20%	8%	5%
Non-MP/MI	67%	20%	11%	3%

Question 44	Response			
<i>How would you describe the officer leadership</i>	<i>Excellent or Good</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Poor or very poor</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	55%	23%	14%	8%
Non-MP/MI	50%	23%	18%	9%

Question 45	Response			
<i>How effective is your commander</i>	<i>Excellent or Good</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Poor or very poor</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	56%	18%	12%	13%
Non-MP/MI	50%	18%	18%	13%

Question 46	Response			
<i>How effective is your senior NCO</i>	<i>Excellent or Good</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Poor or very poor</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	65%	17%	9%	8%
Non-MP/MI	68%	15%	11%	6%

Leadership (Continued)

Question 47	Response			
<i>How would you describe the discipline in your unit</i>	<i>Excellent or Good</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Poor or very poor</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	52%	29%	14%	5%
Non MP/MI	45%	30%	21%	3%

Question 48	Response			
<i>How would you describe the command climate in your unit</i>	<i>Excellent or Good</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Poor or very poor</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	53%	27%	12%	7%
Non MP/MI	53%	27%	16%	4%

Training (Adequacy and Quality)



Question 27	Response			
<i>I perform missions that I have not been trained for</i>	<i>Never or Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often or all the time</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI				
Non MP/MI				

Question 28	Response			
<i>My unit performs missions it was not trained for</i>	<i>Never or Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often or all the time</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI				
Non MP/MI				

FOR MI UNIT SOLDIERS				
Question 50	Response			
<i>I received adequate training on MI interrogation techniques</i>	<i>Strongly agree or agree</i>	<i>Neither agree or disagree</i>	<i>Disagree or strongly disagree</i>	
MI unit members only				

Question 51	Response		
<i>I received adequate training on the Law of Land Warfare and on the proper treatment of EPWs, CIs, and Detainees.</i>	<i>Strongly agree or agree</i>	<i>Neither agree or disagree</i>	<i>Disagree or strongly disagree</i>
MI unit members only			

Question 52	Response			
<i>I received adequate MP training</i>	<i>Strongly agree or agree</i>	<i>Neither agree or disagree</i>	<i>Disagree or strongly disagree</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP unit members only				



Training (Adequacy and Quality) (Continued)

FOR MI UNIT SOLDIERS				
Question 53	Response			
<i>I received adequate MP training on detainee handling</i>	<i>Strongly agree or agree</i>	<i>Neither agree or disagree</i>	<i>Disagree or strongly disagree</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP unit members only				

FOR MI UNIT SOLDIERS				
Question 54	Response			
<i>I received adequate MP training on Prison Facility operations</i>	<i>Strongly agree or agree</i>	<i>Neither agree or disagree</i>	<i>Disagree or strongly disagree</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP unit members only				

Overall Quality of Training

Question 19	Response			
<i>My unit's quality of mission related training during AT is</i>	<i>Excellent or Good</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Poor or very poor</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	41%	20%	10%	29%
Non MP/MI	47%	21%	13%	19%

Question 20	Response			
<i>My unit's quality of mission related training at Home-station is</i>	<i>Excellent or Good</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Poor or very poor</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	41%	30%	18%	17%
Non MP/MI	39%	31%	23%	7%

Question 21	Response			
<i>My unit's quality of mission related training at Mob-station was</i>	<i>Excellent or Good</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Poor or very poor</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	54%	29%	16%	
Non MP/MI	53%	31%	16%	


Other Matters

Question 5	Response			
<i>My unit's SOP and policies help me to complete my work to standard</i>	<i>Strongly agree or agree</i>	<i>Neither agree or disagree</i>	<i>Disagree or strongly disagree</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	45%	28%	18%	8%
Non MP/MI	41%	33%	21%	5%

Question 30	Response			
<i>My unit's SOPs and procedures are well known and adhered to by unit members</i>	<i>Strongly agree or agree</i>	<i>Neither agree or disagree</i>	<i>Disagree or strongly disagree</i>	<i>No opinion</i>
MP/MI	44%	27%	20%	9%
Non MP/MI	43%	24%	27%	6%

Question 15	Response		
<i>My unit has a EPW or detainee handling mission</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Not Applicable</i>
MP/MI			

Question 16	Response		
<i>My unit has a EPW or detainee interrogation mission</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Not Applicable</i>
MP/MI			



ARMY RESERVE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

PURPOSE

LTG Helmly directed the Office of the Inspector General, United States Army Reserve Command, to conduct a Special Assessment of Training for the Army Reserve with priority to Military Police and Military Intelligence units. The assessment focuses on the standards, quality, quantity and adequacy of training. The assessment is designed to survey Army Reserve Soldiers and determine their perceptions and concerns about the training received. This survey will assist the Army Reserve to provide realistic training guidance and procedures to Army Reserve Soldiers.

INSTRUCTIONS

YOUR OPEN AND HONEST RESPONSES ARE NEEDED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR DECISIONS AFFECTING THIS COMMAND AND YOUR UNIT.

- All answers and comments will remain confidential and anonymous.
- Respondents will not receive retribution for their answers or comments.
- Only group statistics will be reported.
- Please do not write on this survey questionnaire, mark the appropriate response on the answer key.
- Please do not write your name on this survey questionnaire or on the answer key.
- Return the completed survey to the person who gave it to you.
- If you are uncertain of your answer to a particular question or if the question does not apply to you, then select **Not Applicable** as your response.
- Please mark the appropriate bubble in your response to each of the questions on the answer key.
- Completely fill in the bubbles on the answer key using a blue or black ink pen or number 2 pencil.
- Mark your response like this: ① ● ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ and not like this: ① ⊗ ③ ⊗ ⑤ ⊗

END ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

Survey number: _____ of _____

Unit being surveyed: _____

NOTE: Each survey questionnaire and answer key will be individually numbered to maintain accountability.
PLEASE BEGIN THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

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DA IG

You and Your Unit

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about you and your unit?

- | | | | | | | |
|--|----------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | No basis to judge | | | | | |
| | Strongly disagree | | | | | |
| | Disagree | | | | | |
| | Neither agree nor disagree | | | | | |
| | Agree | | | | | |
| | Strongly agree | | | | | |
1. I perform the type of work I should be doing, according to my Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or Officer Branch. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 2. I am MOS qualified. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 3. I receive the required training to perform my job satisfactorily. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 4. I receive the performance counseling and coaching needed to do my job satisfactorily. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 5. My unit's Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and policies help me to complete my work to standard and on time. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 6. The Mission Essential Task List (METL) and Individual/Collective Tasks that support the unit METL are well known and implemented in my unit 1 2 3 4 5 6
 7. My unit trains to the METL tasks and the supporting Individual and Collective Tasks. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 8. I know the Army Values and Ethics. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 9. I live by the Army Values and Ethics. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 10. Soldiers in my unit demonstrate Army Values and Ethics. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 11. I am proud to serve with the Soldiers in my unit. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 12. I am confident that appropriate action would be taken in my unit if I filed an IG complaint. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 13. I might violate one of the Army Values or Ethics in order to accomplish the mission. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 14. I treat other people the way I want others to treat me. 1 2 3 4 5 6

15. My unit has an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW), Civilian Internee (CI), or Detainee mission.
 1. Yes
 2. No
 3. Not applicable

16. My unit has an EPW/CI/Detainee Interrogation mission.
 1. Yes
 2. No
 3. Not applicable

Training

17. I know my unit's training schedule 90 days in advance.
 1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
 6. Not applicable
18. My unit follows the unit training schedule.
 1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
 6. Not applicable

Describe the quality of training in your unit.

- | | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | No basis to judge | | | | | |
| | Very Poor | | | | | |
| | Poor | | | | | |
| | Moderate | | | | | |
| | Good | | | | | |
| | Excellent | | | | | |
19. My unit's quality of mission related training at Annual Training is. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 20. My unit's quality of mission related training at Home Station is. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 21. My unit's quality of mission related training at Mobilization Station is. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 22. My unit's quality of training on the Law of War is. 1 2 3 4 5 6
 23. I receive post mobilization training.
 1. Yes
 2. No
 3. Not applicable or I am not currently mobilized
 24. I receive training on the Army Values and Ethics.
 1. Yes
 2. No
 3. Not applicable

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25. Training in my unit at Home Station is most often evaluated by:
1. First line supervisor
 2. First officer in the chain of command
 3. Commander
 4. Higher headquarters
 5. No one
 6. Not applicable
26. I receive training on the Law of Land Warfare.
1. Yes, more than a year ago
 2. Yes, within the last 12 months
 3. Yes, within the last 6 months
 4. Never
 5. Not applicable

Describe assigned missions in your unit.

No basis to judge					
All the time					
Often					
Sometimes					
Seldom					
Never					

27. I perform missions that I have not been trained for. 1 2 3 4 5 6
28. My unit performs missions that it was not trained for. 1 2 3 4 5 6

Your Unit Leadership

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

No basis to judge					
Strongly disagree					
Disagree					
Neither agree nor disagree					
Agree					
Strongly agree					

29. I feel free to go to my chain of command with questions or problems about my work. 1 2 3 4 5 6
30. My unit's SOPs and procedures are well known and adhered to by unit members. 1 2 3 4 5 6
31. I am confident that appropriate action would be taken if I notified my chain of command of a wrong doing. 1 2 3 4 5 6
32. I know my chain of command. 1 2 3 4 5 6
33. I know my chain of command's higher headquarters. 1 2 3 4 5 6
34. I know who gives my commander war time orders. 1 2 3 4 5 6

To what extent do leaders (officers, NCOs, and civilian leaders) in your unit demonstrate the following?

Not applicable					
Not at all					
Slight extent					
Moderate extent					
Great extent					
Very great extent					

- Leaders in my unit . . .
35. take responsibility for their actions and decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 6
36. are open and truthful. 1 2 3 4 5 6
37. stand up for what is right. 1 2 3 4 5 6
38. treat subordinates with respect. 1 2 3 4 5 6
39. would treat EPWs, CIs and Detainees per the Geneva Convention and the Law of Land Warfare. 1 2 3 4 5 6
40. demonstrate high standards. 1 2 3 4 5 6
41. follow the Army Values and Ethics. 1 2 3 4 5 6
42. effectively communicate the unit's mission, vision and values. 1 2 3 4 5 6

Describe the unit leadership in your unit.

No basis to judge					
Very Poor					
Poor					
Moderate					
Good					
Excellent					

43. How would you describe the NCO leadership? 1 2 3 4 5 6
44. How would you describe the officer leadership? 1 2 3 4 5 6
45. How effective is your commander? 1 2 3 4 5 6
46. How effective is your senior NCO? 1 2 3 4 5 6
47. How would you describe the military discipline in your unit? 1 2 3 4 5 6
- Given that a good command climate in a unit comes from effective and open leadership;*
48. How would you describe the command climate in your unit? 1 2 3 4 5 6

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Answer questions 49 to 51 if currently assigned to an MI unit, otherwise skip to question 51.

49. I receive adequate Military Intelligence (MI) Training from one of the Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISC).
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
 6. Not applicable or I do not have an MI Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)/Branch
50. I receive adequate training on MI Interrogation Techniques.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
 6. Not applicable or I do not have an MI Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)/Branch
51. I receive adequate training on the Law of Land Warfare (i.e. Geneva Convention), Army Regulations and the Department of Defense Directives on the proper treatment of EPWs, CIs and Detainees.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
 6. Not applicable or I do not have an MI Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)/Branch

Answer questions 52 to 55 if currently assigned to an MP unit, otherwise skip to question 56.

52. I receive adequate Military Police (MP) related training.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
 6. Not applicable or I do not have an MP Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)/Branch
53. I receive adequate MP training on Accountability and Proper Handling of EPWs, CIs and Detainees.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
 6. Not applicable or I do not have an MP Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)/Branch
54. I receive adequate MP training on Prison Facility Operations (i.e. Detainee/prison camps).
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
 6. Not applicable or I do not have an MP Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)/Branch
55. I receive adequate MP training on Internment Resettlement Camp Operations (i.e. refugee camps).
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neither agree nor disagree
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
 6. Not applicable or I do not have an MP Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)/Branch

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D-A5

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Your Background

56. Upon mobilization, I was cross-leveled into this unit.

1. Yes
2. No
3. Not applicable or I am not currently mobilized

57. Which ONE category best describes you?

1. I am currently mobilized
2. I am currently NOT mobilized
3. Not applicable

58. Which ONE category best describes you?

1. I have a Military Intelligence MOS or branch (i.e. 96B, 96D, 96R, 96U, 97B, 97E, 97K, 98C, 98G, 98K, 350B, 350D, 351B, 351E, 352C, 352G, 35A, 35B, 35C, 35D, 35E, 35F, 35G)
2. I have a Military Police MOS or branch (i.e. 31A, 31B, 31D, 31E)
3. I have an MOS that is not listed above
4. Not applicable

59. Which ONE category best describes you?

1. I am assigned to an MP unit
2. I am assigned to an MI unit
3. I am assigned to a unit other than an MP or MI
4. Not applicable

60. My military pay grade is.

1. E1 to E4
2. E5 to E7
3. E8 to E9
4. WO1 to CW3
5. CW4 to CW5
6. O1 to O3
7. O4 to O6

61. List one leadership or training function that your unit does well. Please write your response on the answer key.

62. List one leadership or training function that your unit does poorly. Please write your response on the answer key.

63. How would you improve your unit? Please write your response on the answer key.

**THIS CONCLUDES THE UNIT SURVEY
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION**

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
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ANNEX A

Survey and Responses



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DA IG

ANNEX B

Facilitator's Guide



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FACILITATOR'S GUIDE

(Facilitator Note: Facilitators will use this guide for conducting IG surveys and Sensing Sessions. The comments directed to the participating audience should be read verbatim to ensure standardization.)

1. **INTRODUCTION:** Good morning/afternoon. *(Introduce yourself and your partner(s))*
2. **PURPOSE** *(Read to Audience):* We are here today, at the direction of LTG Helmly, to conduct a survey with Sensing Sessions as part of an overall assessment of training for Army Reserve Soldiers and units on the Law of Land Warfare, Detainee Treatment Requirements, Ethics and Leadership. These surveys and sessions are designed to address perceptions and concerns about your MOS and mission related training, its quality, frequency and adequacy as well as, the leadership and ethics in your unit. If you have any questions, I ask that you hold them until the end of my introduction. At this time, we will distribute the questionnaires. We will collect the questionnaires and answer keys in approximately 20 minutes. *(Distribute the survey questionnaires and answer keys. Ensure the questionnaires and answer keys are sequentially numbered to maintain positive control and accountability. Provide approximately 20 to 30 minutes to answer the questionnaire.)*
3. **SENSING SESSION EXPLANATION:** *(Read to Audience)*
 - a. To ensure we are all on the "same sheet of music" let me explain what a Sensing Session is.
 - b. A Sensing Session is a group interview, designed to provide us with feedback on issues affecting you and your unit. To gain insight on the unit's training, ethics and leadership, we have scheduled several Sensing Sessions. Our attempt is to talk to as many people as possible. This group represents opinions of interest to us.
 - c. A Sensing Session is not designed to solve problems. It is designed to identify problems. The objective of this Sensing Session is to obtain a group consensus, where possible, on the perceptions of leadership, individual and mission training, and ethics within this command.
 - d. This is not a complaint session, if you have any individual complaints, we will be available later to address them.
 - e. The USARC IG Office will use the information gathered from the Sensing Session and questionnaire to prepare a report to LTG Helmly. This report will keep comments from all participants totally anonymous. This Sensing Session is a non-attribution session. We will make every effort to protect your anonymity.

4. RELEASE OF SUPERVISORS AND NON-VOLUNTEERS (*Read to Audience*)

a. At this time, is there anyone here that supervises another member of our group? We are sorry, but supervisors must leave. There will be other Sensing Sessions, where you will be able to participate.

b. Sensing Sessions are by their nature "voluntary." Anyone here that does not wish to participate in this session may leave. (*Allow non-participants to leave*). If you stay we expect you to participate.

c. This Sensing Session is scheduled to end at _____ We will begin to close the session 10 minutes before our scheduled completion time.

5. GROUND RULES: (Let me go over the ground rules for this session)

a. We expect, and require, each of you, in this room, to respect the privacy and rights of the other participants.

b. Anyone may speak, and everyone has an equally important say.

c. You may talk about facts, opinions, feelings, or anything that bears on the training, detainee treatment requirements, leadership and ethics of this organization. This is not a court of law where the only admissible evidence is facts. We are interested in your thoughts, feelings, and opinions.

d. Our primary rule in this Sensing Session is: what you see, what you say, and what you hear, remains in this room. We do take notes. At the end of this session, we will review these notes with you, to ensure that we capture the intent of your discussion.


e. However, I must note, that the only time we might attribute a name to a statement is if one of you indicates you have evidence of a crime, a violation of security, or a serious breach of integrity. If that happens, we will attempt to look into that issue, separately.

f. What you say in here is protected by federal law, Title 10 USC 1034, no unfavorable action can be taken against you based on what is said to an IG.

g. Again, if you want to discuss something, not related to this Sensing Session, we will be happy to meet with you separately.



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DA IG

BEFORE WE BEGIN, ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

6. SENSING SESSION QUESTIONS:

*(Facilitator Note Begin closing the session approximately 10 minutes before the completion time. Items with an * are must-hit items.)*

a. You and Your Unit:

- (1) Does everyone know the mission of this unit?*
- (2) Does everyone know his or her chain of command or supervisory chain?*
- (3) Does everyone know their peacetime chain of command's higher headquarters?

b. Leadership:

(1) How would you describe the overall leadership of your unit? (CDR, 1SG/CSM, officers and senior NCOs) *

(2) Do leaders in your unit communicate the unit's mission so that it is understood by everyone? *

(3) Do leaders in your unit treat everyone with respect?

(4) Do you trust and respect your leaders? (Would you go to war with them? Do they take responsibility for their actions)

(5) Do leaders in your unit enforce discipline (equitably enforce standards, hold Soldiers accountable)? *

(6) Do you feel the leaders in your unit will address complaints of wrongdoing involving unit members? *

c. Army Values:

(1) Do leaders in your unit stand up for what is right?

(2) Do they follow the Army Values (Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, Personal Courage)? *

(3) Has your unit trained on Army Values?

(4) Are the Army Values understood in your unit? *

D-B4



(5) Does your unit follow and live the Army Values? *

(6) Do the Army Values apply to civilian life?

d. Training and Operations:

(1) Does your unit train to tasks that support the unit mission? (METL and supporting individual and collective tasks) *

(2) Has your unit trained on the Law of Land Warfare? How long ago? *

(3) Was the Geneva Hague Convention part of your Law of Land Warfare? How long ago?

(4) Has your unit received training on the handling of EPWs and detainees? *

(5) Did your training on the handling of EPWs and detainees include the treatment of detainees?

(6) How would you assess the overall quality of training in your unit? How would you assess the quality of your training in the Law of Land Warfare and Detainee Treatment? *

(a) Pre-Mob or Home Station?

(b) Post-Mob or Annual Training?

(7) Is training in your unit adequately planned and predictable (e.g. training schedules are published in advance, instructors are assigned and prepared, and training aids and materials are available)

(8) Does your unit have Standing Operating Procedures for Garrison and Tactical Operations? Are they understood and are they effective? *

(9) Are new or cross leveled Soldiers well integrated and trained into your unit? *

(10) Was your MOS training adequate to prepare you for your job with respect to your unit's mission? *

(11) Has your unit, or part of your unit ever been tasked to perform tasks it was not trained for? (Frequency? Was extra training provided?) *

(12) What would you do or recommend to improve the leadership or quality of training in your unit?


7. CLOSING (Facilitator Notes):

- a. Review all notes taken during the course of the Sensing Session.
- b. The recorder and facilitator should check the accuracy of comments and notes taken during the Sensing Session with the participants. Make corrections as necessary.
- c. Restate the purpose of the session and the use of comments.
- d. Reiterate your availability to discuss any issue they feel has an impact on the training and leadership of the Command.
- e. Re-emphasize the need for everyone to protect the confidentiality of all participants.
- f. Thank each participant for their time, their contributions, and their effort.

8. CLOSING COMMENTS: (Read to Audience)

Again, on behalf of LTG Helmly, we greatly appreciate your participation in this assessment.

Sensing & Survey OIC: Ensure all questionnaires and answer keys are collected. Mail or deliver the answer keys back to USARC IG, ATTN: [REDACTED] If the questionnaires will not be used again, destroy them by burning or shredding them. Consolidate comments NLT COB the first working day after the return from the TDY or unit visit. Turn in consolidated comments to [REDACTED] be ready to clarify points. Format for consolidated comments per standard Sensing Session brief.



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DA IG

FACILITATOR INSTRUCTIONS/REQUIREMENTS:

1. Team: Facilitator: _____

Recorder: _____

2. DATE: _____

3. TIME: Start: _____ End: _____

4. LOCATION: _____

5. GROUP: (Circle all that apply)

- a. COL
- b. LTC
- c. MAJ
- d. CPT/LT

- e. CW5/4
- f. CW3/2
- g. SGM
- h. MSG

- i. SFC
- j. SSG/SGT
- k. PVT-SPC


6. **CLOSING CHECKLIST:**

- Review all notes taken during the course of the Sensing Session.
- The recorder and facilitator should check the accuracy of comments and notes taken during the Sensing Session with the participants. Make corrections as necessary.
- Restate the purpose of the session and the use of comments.
- Reiterate your availability to discuss any issue.
- Re-emphasize the need for everyone to protect the confidentiality of all participants.
- Thank each participant for their time, their contributions, and their effort.

7. Facilitators will provide Sensing Session notes to the sensing and survey team OIC. The facilitator/recorder team should organize their notes and comments according to the Facilitator Guidance, question sequence. Use this sheet as the cover sheet for your report.

8. **Facilitator Notes:**

- a. Rehearse and review Sensing Session materials with your partner.
- b. Arrive early to ensure the room is organized to support your session.
- c. Keep track of separate comments to improve future sessions.
- d. Capture the necessary information pertaining to command climate.
- e. Avoid making promises.
- f. Avoid getting defensive.
- g. Keep it professional, not personal.
- h. Stay on schedule.



D-B7



4287

DAIG

Appendix E

Correlation Matrix

Findings & Recommendations	USARC	DA IG Report on Detainee Ops	Army Detainee Ops Plan and Other Reports/Memos
<p>Finding 1: Frequency of training for LOLW was at the CDR's Discretion prior to 10 June 2004.</p>	<p>Compliance with 10 June 04 CG Directive. This directive set deadlines and guidelines for LOLW training</p>	<p>Finding 21 Leaders and Soldiers assigned to 69% of inspected units stated they desired additional home station training; and pre-and post mobilization training to assist them in performing detainee operations. Recommendation (REC): Army G3 integrate a prescribed detainee operations training program into unit training</p>	<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, App 4, (Training)</p>
<p>Finding 2:  Soldiers for the realities of a combat environment.</p>	<p>REC: G7 & SJA provide unit commanders guidance on Learning Objectives and evaluation guidance on level B, LOLW refresher training</p>	<p>Finding 23 LDRS and Soldiers indicated their Law of War refresher training was not detailed enough to sustain their knowledge obtained during initial and advanced training.</p>	<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, Appendix 4 (Training), Bin #1 (Training Guidance), Bin #5 (MP/Detention Operations), Bin #6 (Law of War/Geneva Convention).</p>
<p>Finding 3 Trainers failed to properly train Soldiers on prescribed performance steps and test Soldiers on performance measures during Law of Land Warfare training.</p>	<p>REC: Unit CDRs ensure that Law of Land Warfare training is conducted to standards.</p>	<p>Findings 21 & 23 REC: Army G3 & OTJAG provide unit commanders guidance on Learning Objectives and evaluation guidance on level B, LOLW refresher training</p>	<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, App 4, (Training), Bin #1 (Training Guidance), Bin #5 (MP/Detention Operations), Bin #6 (Law of War/Geneva Convention).</p>

Appendix E Correlation Matrix (Continued)

Findings & Recommendations	USARC	DA IG Report on Detainee Ops	Army Detainee Ops Plan and Other Reports/Memos
<p>Finding 5 Specified detainee treatment training in [REDACTED]</p>	<p>REC: Commanders verify training execution and ensure training is to standards.</p>	<p>Findings 21 (REC): Army G3 integrate a prescribed detainee operations training program into unit training</p>	<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, App 4, (Training)</p>
<p>Finding 6 The majority of Army Reserve Soldiers and civilians did not receive face to face ethics training.</p>	<p>REC: SJA. Army Reserve Ethics Counselors provide realistic training that relates ethics to unit mission or mobilization lessons learned,</p>		<p>Memo, DA, 9 Apr 2004, subject: Face to Face Annual Training of the Standards of Ethical Conduct - ACTION MEMORANDUM. Directs Army General Counsel and Army Ethics Counselors to provide annual Ethics training to every Army Soldier and civilian employee.</p>
<p>Finding 7 There is no prescribed frequency for values-based Ethics training for Army Reserve Soldiers.</p>	<p>REC: That the G-1, USARC, update previous guidance on the Consideration of Others Program to ensure continual awareness of caring as an organizational and the Army Values in the Army Reserve. Currently the USARC CTG for 2005-2007 allows commanders to defer conducting consideration of others briefings to pre- or post-mobilization instead of scheduled IDT.</p>	<p>Finding 2 In the cases the DAIG reviewed, all detainee abuse occurred when one or more individuals failed to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training, or Army Values; in some cases abuse was accompanied by leadership failure at the tactical level.</p>	<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, Appendix 4 (Training), Bin 11, Values, update Values training highlighted in AR 350-1, and DA Pam 350-58</p>

Appendix E Correlation Matrix (Continued)

Findings & Recommendations	USARC	DAIG Report on Detainee Ops	Army Detainee Ops Plan and Other Reports/Memos
<p>Finding 8 Observed leadership training was adequate within the context in which it was presented</p> <p>REC Full support to the Army Reserve Leadership Campaign Plan</p>	<p>CTG 2005-07</p> <p>Para 6b -Officer Training</p> <p>Para 6e - NCO Training & 6d NCOES</p> <p>Para 6e(1) - Leader Training (Pre-command course, CO Level, BN-level, and BDE Level Leader Training). - Command Climate survey completed within 180 days of assuming command.</p> <p>6e(3) - Senior Leader Training Program for COLs and GOs</p>	<p>Finding 2 In cases reviewed by DAIG detainee abuse occurred when one or more individuals failed to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training, or Army Values; in some cases abuse was accompanied by leadership failure at the tactical level.</p> <p>ROOT CAUSE Detainee abuse was an individual failure to uphold Army Values and in some cases involved a breakdown in the leadership supervision of Soldier behavior.</p>	
<p>Develop Civilian leadership especially for those that supervise Soldiers on a regular basis</p> <p>Pre-command course training, and commander development</p> <p>Company level command climate survey assessment</p> <p>Leadership Philosophy Statement</p>	<p>Civilian Force training Plan (by grade to be published in CTG 2006-08)</p>	<p>REC: - CDRs enforce the basic fundamental discipline standards, provide training, and immediately correct inappropriate behavior. - G3 require pre-deployment training include a strong emphasis on leaders' responsibilities to have adequate supervision and control processes in place to ensure proper treatment of, and prevent abuse of, detainees.</p> <p>DAIG Reserve Component Leadership Development Inspection</p>	<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, Appendix 4 (Training) Bin #2 Leader Training, also Bins 2.1-2.3)</p>

Appendix E Correlation Matrix (Continued)


Findings & Recommendations	USARC	DA IG Report on Detainee Ops	Army Detainee Ops Plan and Other Reports/Memos
<p>Finding 9</p> 	<p>REC:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. That MP and MI unit commanders develop effective SOPs and train their Soldiers on their content 2. That the Army Reserve G-7 develop exercise play wherein MP SOPs are tested with respect to detainee accountability and personnel data management procedures; and, insert IRIC exercise play in future Warrior Exercises. 	<p>Finding 12</p> <p>There was no Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC) acting as the central, theater-level agency responsible for detainee accountability, resulting in a lack of detainee personnel and data management.</p>	<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, Appendix 1 (Policy) Bin # 2 (Relationships) establish MP-MI policy; Bin #3 (Procedures) advise CDRs to publish a comprehensive SOP on treatment of detainees Appendix 3 (Organizations) Bin # 2 Review National Defense Reporting Center, TDRC and IRIC organizations</p>
<p>Finding 10</p> <p>Detainee Ops training did not identify the interdependent roles of MP custody mission and the MI interrogation mission.</p>	<p>REC:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. That MP and MI unit commanders develop SOPs that address MP and MI cooperative functions as relates to the MP custody mission and the MI intelligence gathering mission consistent with the Law of Land Warfare. SOPs need to be easily understood and available for all unit members. 2. That MP and MI detainee handling interoperability training be incorporated into Warrior Exercises and in combat training center exercises. 	<p>Finding 5</p> <p>Doctrine does not clearly specify the interdependent, and yet independent roles, missions, and responsibilities of MP and MI units in the establishment and operations of interrogation facilities.</p> <p>REC:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. TRADOC develop a single document for detainee operations that identifies the interdependent roles of MP and MI missions. 2. That TRADOC establish doctrine to clearly define the organizational structure, command relationships and roles and responsibility of personnel operating detainee facilities. 3. That the PMG and the G2 establish policy to clearly define the organizational structure, command relationships, and roles and responsibilities of personnel operating interrogation facilities. <p>Related finding: 11.</p>	<p>Appendix 2 (Doctrine) Bin # 3 (MP/MI Relationships); Appendix 4 (Training) Bin #3 (MP/MI Relationship).</p>

Appendix E Correlation Matrix (Continued)

Findings & Recommendations	USARC	DA IG Report on Detainee Ops	Army Detainee Ops Plan and Other Reports/Memos
<p>Finding 11: RC MP & MI TASS BN courseware are not identical to AC courseware</p>	<p>REC: USARC G7 coordinates with School proponent and TRADOC to ensure courseware is updated current, and expedite the courseware development to incorporate GWOT AARS and lessons learned.</p>		<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, Appendix 4 (Training), Bin #5 (MP/Detention Operations), Bin #5.2: Integrate standardize detainee operations training into appropriate Army proponent school common core POI.</p>
		<p>Finding 17: Units operating collecting points and I/R facilities were</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>	
<p>Finding 12</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>	<p>10 June 2004 USARC CG Directive. The directive directed MP units, irrespective of current unit of assignment to be trained in specific individual and leader tasks focused on detainee handling. The CTG for TY 2005-07 reemphasized these tasks for all MP Soldiers.</p>	<p>ROOT CAUSE:</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>Finding 21: Leaders and Soldiers assigned to 69% of inspected units desired additional home station training; pre and post mobilization training. Interviewed leaders and Soldiers in 64% of RC units stated they were assigned battlefield [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>Their consensus was that their units should have concentrated their training on all 5 of the MP functional areas.</p> <p>ROOT CAUSE:</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>Findings: 10, 11, 14</p>	<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, Appendix 1 (Policy) BIN # 11 (Theater Mission Assignment) Appendix 3 (Organizations), Bin # 1 (Military Police Force Structure), Update MP force structure design at the UA, UEy, and UEx levels to support the simultaneous execution of detainee operations.</p>

Appendix E Correlation Matrix (Continued)

Findings & Recommendations	USARC	DA IG Report on Detainee Ops	Army Detainee Ops Plan and Other Reports/Memos
<p>Finding 13: The majority of units assessed failed to perform training management procedures to standard. ROOT CAUSE: Unit leaders and higher headquarters failed to properly plan and enforce training management standards.</p>	<p>Higher headquarters commanders and staff comply with guidance outlined in the USARC CTG for TY 2005-07. Commanders and all leaders comply with doctrinal guidance outlined in FM 7-0 and FM 7-1.</p>		<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, Appendix 4 (Training)</p>
<p>Finding 14: Army Reserve MP units [REDACTED] (Local purchase items and Common Table of Allowances items). These items are essential to I/R mission and METL training.</p>	<p>REC: Ensure all MP units with I/R Mission [REDACTED] as a MTOE required equipment. G3, G7, Force Programs.</p>		<p>Army Detainee Ops Plan, Annex B, Appendix 5 (Material) Bin 2, Equipment Shortfalls. TRADOC review and adjust minimum equipment requirements for detainee operations for units responsible for detainee operations.</p>



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