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EFIT-130-014 MAJ[redacted]

1LT[redacted]: This is Lieutenant[redacted]CFLCC historian; I'm interviewing Major [redacted], with the C3 battle captain position. Today is January 10th. Sir if you could state your full name.

MAJ[redacted]: [redacted]

1LT[redacted]: Spell your last name sir.

MAJ[redacted]: [redacted].

1LT[redacted]: Your social security number.

MAJ[redacted]: [redacted]]

1LT[redacted]: Rank and position, sir.

MAJ[redacted]: Major, I'm a ground OPS, ground operations officer, current OPS for C3, CFLCC.

1LT[redacted]: Could you describe your current mission and role as far as CFLCC?

MAJ[redacted]: As far as CFLCC my mission is to maintain operational or situational awareness of certain locals within CFLCC and current missions. Specifically I cover all the operations in Pakistan, and specifically the detainee operations in Afghanistan as they flow through Turkey to Guantanamo Bay.

1LT[redacted]: Sir as far as a question I omitted to ask you, are you a reserve component or active duty.

MAJ[redacted]: I'm a reservist on active duty.

1LT[redacted]: Did you volunteer for this position, or were you tasked?

MAJ[redacted]: Volunteer.

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1LT [redacted]: Sir, with as far as the C3 position, can you describe you interaction from a joint theater, from the operations?

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MAJ [redacted]: Yes. From a joint theater, I coordinate the operations. Specifically lets talk about detainee operations first, cause that's really the most joint application I have. We have to coordinate with Air Force to get the lift airframes, to move detainees around the theater. Currently we're moving them from collecting points up north, Mazar Sharif (?) prison Bagram, down to the main collection point at Kandahar. From Kandahar they're then moved into the custody of SOUTHCOM. Who moves them to Guantanamo Bay. Now that's an evolving process. That began when the detainees started to be collected, and it's a process that will evolve as time goes along. Lessons learned from the initial movement phases, I suspect they'll pickup a production line or milk run flavor to where we're typically doing the same things, although we'll probably alter, alternate the time a little bit just for, to avoid operational predictability. So that we're not moving folks from one location to another, same time everyday, for a force protection measure. I coordinate with the Air Force for the airframes. I coordinate with the American embassy in host countries, specifically right now Pakistan, for diplomatic clearance to land military aircraft at different airfields, to pick up detainees. Then to move them into Afghanistan, to the central collection agency. We've had some high value detainees that have been kept offshore on US Navy ships, and there was a coordination between the Air Force, Navy, and US Embassy to get all three services, the Army MP, the Air Force air frames, and the Navy helicopter at the same place on the map at the same time to effect the transfer. We've done that relativity easily, everyone's been very corporative. We've had a standardization of language, standardization of time, using Zulu time, and we haven't had any major problems. We've had some hiccups, but those happen within operation of the scope.

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1LT [redacted]: What were some of the initial difficulties that you ran into when you first started the operation with detainee transfer, and eventually how was CFLCC able to work those out?

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MAJ [redacted]: Some of the initial problems were, availability of airframes. We've got a limited number of C-130, which are the airplanes that we use as inter-theater. C-130 offers us a wide adaptability to airfields situation that C17's, C-141's, and C-5's don't. They're a short field, multiple surface aircraft that we can use at some of these smaller places. (?) prison is an example. (?) prison we had an airstrip out there that we found that was about (b)(2)-3 [redacted] from the prison, and it gave us an opportunity to move the detainees only a short distance by ground and reduce the risk of ambush. Understanding that these detainees are somebody's buddy. Somebody doesn't want them being detained, either because of their intelligence value to us, or because of their position within the Al-Qaeda or Taliban. So by using the (?) airfield, which was nothing more than an asphalt strip, in the middle of Afghanistan. C-130's can get in there, C-17's, C-5's couldn't. That being said we've got a limited number of C-130's. A lot of our C-130's are being used for logistics support of Bagram, which is not asseeeiable by ground. That created some difficulties in the availability of airframes, and we've come to the point, after doing a number of runs we've got an idea of how much space on a C-130. A certain number of detainees, (b)(2)-3 [redacted], (b)(2)-3 [redacted] are going to take of the aircraft that gives us the same capability of using the same aircraft for both log lift and detainee movement. Some of the other issues that have come up is, I suspect probably the biggest was some of the more aggressive detainees that we've had to deal with. To be able to keep them under control. A group we took out of Pakistan, from (?) were responsible for taking over a Pakistani bus when they were moving by ground, caused the deaths of several Pakistani guards, as well as some of the detainees. Just by moving them in small

groups, getting the MP detainee staffs trained on what to expect, what to do. We haven't had any injuries to any of the MP's. We haven't had a loss of any aircraft. We haven't had any major instances with the detainees. So, the use of the aircraft, optimization of the aircraft. We put (b)(2)-3 [redacted] or (b)(2)-3 [redacted] from one location and may put (b)(2)-3 [redacted] or (b)(2)-3 [redacted] from another location. Generally we will not have a full aircraft, if we've got a good concept, a good grasp of many we're going to have, we know how many we can carry away on the log, on that plane as well. It's worked to the benefit of Bagram, which has been a struggle to keep supplied, logistically, because of the.[redacted] (b)(2)-3 [redacted] we're flying under BFR conditions, which means if we've got a snowstorm, Bagram is cut off. There is no alternative to supplying them. So optimization of the aircraft, and still getting the detainee mission done. We start today being the tenth of January with flowing detainees out of the country, into Guantanamo Bay. We've had to, from a CFLCC standpoint, not necessarily from a detainee movement operation, but from a CFLCC standpoint, we have had to build detainee facilities, man operate them, feed the detainees, maintain to their logistical requirements. By getting Guantanamo set up we can relieve some of the stress that Kandahar specifically has lived under.

1LT (b)(6)-2 [redacted]**:** What as far as you mentioned sir, as far as some of the change of weather in Bagram is so dependent on air lift logistic support, have you seem many cases of shift in priorities, and if you have how has that affected your mission?

MAJ (b)(6)-2 [redacted]**:** The detainee mission has maintained over the last two weeks or so. When we started collecting detainees, detainee's missions become one of the top priorities, and we have not shifted that priority. It maintains a high priority. Both from the standpoint of getting these folks in a controlled environment where we can debrief them, and get any strategic information we can from them. We're still looking for two things. One is Omar and the other is

UBL. We need to get the information as quickly as possible. We need to do so in a manner that meets Geneva Convention requirements, and I think for the most part we've done that. See, I think that Bagram, we had to find a way to blend the requirements of Bagram with the commander's priorities, and that is detainees. But Bagram has got to be supplied, bottom line. Fuel, water, and food are three things they can not generate on their own.

1LT [redacted]: Sir, with the multiple countries, multiple stops, and multiple locations of detainees, how do all of these issues play into count with your normal lift concerns of, fuel, time in the air, time on the ground?

MAJ [redacted]: Biggest one has probably been fuel, and crew day. We have worked these missions two day, where they take off from one location and end up at that location, meaning the airplane. That gives us about 16 hours to work with. We're crossing one, two, maybe three time zones. One-way and then back within the course of a day. We've spent a lot of time going north south, but you can't take into account with the time zones, and we've just had to be very, very judicious, in planning and timing. Initially we started the Air Force forces planning on [redacted] on the ground, to check and secure [redacted] detainees. Over time we in the Air Force have learned that is anywhere from a [redacted] to a [redacted] job. So we're cutting down the amount of ground time, which gives us a little bit more flexibility, in terms of how far we can get in a standard crew day. Fuel's been another problem. We've worked around that by determining where in the route, where's the last place in the route that we can fuel the plane, without taxing resources on the ground. Example would be our run from (?), (?), Pakistan, (?), Kandahar, Bagram, back to (?). Can't do that on one tank of plane, on one tank of fuel. What we we're able to do, is through our embassy contacts, get the Pakistanis to provide [redacted] pounds of fuel, roughly [redacted] gallons, at Qatar, which kept us from depleting those fuel resources at Kandahar and Bagram. Again, both

those locations[redacted]. The same fuel we us in the planes we're using for the heating for stoves, and we're using for heating of stoves, and running the generators. So, that's, it's liquid gold, and we don't dare spend (b)(2)-3 [redacted] pounds of fuel in Bagram on a C-130, if we can top off in Pakistan. That profile has allowed us to get the plane from sea to sea without touching Bagram or Kandahar fuel.

1LT (b)(6)-2 [redacted]: Sir, can you describe, are their any situations that have come up that it's been necessary to move detainees from different locations, and different, some of our different countries we're flying through are not excited about us coming through, or having an issue with that, and how we may have dealt with that to accomplish the mission?

MAJ (b)(6)-2 [redacted]: Well, yes and no. Pakistan is the main country that we've dealt with to date. They have captured several hundred of these guys coming across their border with Afghanistan. They've taken them into custody. They found out the hard way that just because they we're taken into custody they weren't sheep. As I said described they lost a bus that was taken over by a group of detainees, and several Pakistani military members lost their lives, in that process of losing the bus and recapturing the detainees. The Pakistanis refused to let us move the detainees from (?) where they were, by ground or by rotor aircraft. They told us specifically we had to come to (?), pick them up with fixed wing and fly them out of the country with no stops. That required the Air Force to get a air traffic control team on the ground to access the airfield as being C-130 capable, set-up temporary running, runway lights, land the planes, deal with the detainees, and fly out. That was at (?), that was a 3-day process. We also had an embassy team on the ground that did the initial medical screening, to determine which detainees were moveable, and which ones were not, and a intelligence officer to determine who were high value and who the Pakistanis could keep. But that was a situation where the Pakistanis were absolutely

not going to let those detainees move within their country. They wanted them picked up and moved out, and the Air Force was flexible enough to meet their requirements to not violate their regulations, and get the C-130 on the ground and get them out. One of the alternatives we looked at was using a Special Forces C-130, or AC-130. We didn't have to do that. Those assets are being used in the Tora Bora and (?) regions to look for additional Al-Qaeda and Taliban folks that are hiding in the caves. We didn't want to pull those airplanes off of that mission, to do detainee runs.

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1LT [redacted]: As far as the, you mentioned some of the medical assessment for some of the detainees, has that played a factor in the war, as far as determining who moves and how you segregate them, and evidently fly those individuals as well with the high priority intelligence individuals?

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MAJ [redacted]: It's become a factor in determining whether or not we took detainees. There were a number of detainees that the anti-Taliban forces and the Pakistanis wanted us to take, that we did not feel were going to survive the trip. The (?) instructions were, if we had one near death, don't take him. We create a potential media problem for our, for CFLCC if we take a detainee and he dies while in our custody. Regardless of rather if we had anything to do with it or not, it gives the perception that perhaps we're mistreating the detainees. With no exceptions have we had a intelligence source, a high valued intelligence source who was so ill that we couldn't move him, but that was taken into consideration in a number of detainees, who may have otherwise been debriefed were not taken. I think a couple of those have died at the prison. These guys are all coming out of war, they're all coming out of combat. A number of them we're just not going to make it. They were so severely wounded, and there was a real question about there, the value of the intelligence that could have been gotten before they died, and we didn't touch

that, but it was a prime consideration. The CFLCC forward which is 10th Mountain Division Detac, got a list of criteria from the (?), and used that to screen detainees, both able bodied, as well as some of the guys that were on litter. Litter patience created a problem obviously in movement, because of the space considerations. You can take an able-bodied guy and set him down on the floor on his knees, and fly him wherever you need to. Litter patience takes up more floor space. Therefore requires more consideration, and the detainee facilities had to consider whether they had the medical facilities on hand to deal with some of the medical conditions that these guys presented. Whether it was gun shot wounds or other medical conditions, that they may have gotten while in the middle of a very remote site. So those things were taken into consideration.

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1LT [redacted]: There's been some innovative work done to, by some of the aircraft crew, working with some of the detainees because of their lack of hygiene.

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MAJ [redacted]: Talibens, the talibens. talibens are plastic trays, innovation. Necessity is the mother of innovation. We found on the initial runs were that the Taliban, or these detainees, whether their Al-Qaeda of Taliban, I don't know, lost bodily function, whether intentionally or because of fear, I don't know. They were creating some real messes in the bottoms of the C-130's. The Air Force being very concerned about the hygienic state of their planes, found some plastic trays that are a kin to litter boxes, and they sat the detainees in these bins so that once they were removed from the plane, the excrement or urine could be quickly, easily disposed of, without having to clean out the entire airframe. So yes the taliben's were an interesting innovation.

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1LT [redacted]: As far as, can you describe any issues or just your opinion of working with coalition partners, in the C3 operation area?

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MAJ [redacted]: We've had some, the Navy has been very cooperative. The Navy's been, you tell us where you want them and we'll have them there. Using (?) as a base operations for them, from originally (?) and then the [redacted] (b)(2)-3. We were able to move the high valued detainees out to sea and then last night move them back inland, for the movement to Guantanamo. The Air Force, because of the regulation, and we've had some discussions about the very stringent limitations they have on where a C-130 or a C-17 is going to land, and I'm not an Air Force guy, I'm an infantryman. To me it seemed overly cautious. Their the Air Force, they've landed every place we've needed them to land, but there has been a lot of give and take and a lot of coordination involved to make that happen. Basically (?) is a good example. We have a commercial airport that is used by the American ambassador, among other people going in and out everyday. The Air Force had to have a group, a team to put on the ground called STS, that then looked at the runway, the condition of the runway, and the air control system, and make a call whether or not that was certified for C-130. It's used by commercial jets but the Air Force had to check that for themselves, and again the Air Force is responsible for their airplanes and their very, very cautious with them and I understand that. It was just, at times very frustrating, in that it seemed that some of the regulations were almost in the way of successful completion of what we've done so far. It worked, it just took a little time to make it work.

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1LT [redacted]: Sir as far as the coalition side have you worked with any other foreign country partners, with anyone in the planning process?

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MAJ [redacted]: Worked very limited, but I've worked some with the Australian Army, cause they've got some SAS team in, what is called Task Force 58, or in southern Afghanistan around (?), Tora Bora, and Kandahar. Very good guys, very straightforward, haven't had any real problems with them I've worked with the French in Mazar Sharif; they are right now securing

the airfield at Mazar. The French are a lot less flexible. They wanted, they politicized to get their mission at the airfield to be very stringent, very specific, and when that's accomplished, 6 weeks later, they go home. Have not worked with the Jordanians, but from a distance I've watched us wok as a coalition partner with the Jordanians, Jordanians have been real good about living in very aster conditions. Setting up a hospital in a region that's relatively hostile towards Arabs because of the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda influence on Afghanistan. Mazar for the most part is an Uzbek ethnic background, and their tolerance of Arabs is slim to none. Jordanians have gone into Mazar airfield. They've set up a hospital. First day of operation they treated 70 patientients, 3 they kept as in-patients. They are, to date have been very good coalition partners. Working with the British on the very (?) on the international security assistance force, the ISAF, out of Kabul. The Brits have taken the lead in that, as a coalition partner, we appreciate as the DCG for operations said today, we're not interested much in nation building. We are in Afghanistan for two reasons. One, to make Afghanistan no longer a safe harbor for terrorist organizations. Two, to find Osama bin Laden. The Brits, and they'll be followed by the Turks, are going to take the lead on the ISAF, and that's taken a huge burden off of the American military soldiers, and I can appreciate that.

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1LT [redacted]: Sir, can you describe the average workday, in general terms, as a battle captain what it comprises of and the hours you work?

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MAJ [redacted]: Well, the first month were 14-15 hours days. As time has gone by we have gotten some addition officers in, and we work, this is day 41. Current OPS by design, all the officers in current OPS work without breaks. We don't get days off. As the tactical situation changes, that may change, but right now COL (b)(6)-2 [redacted], who runs the current OPS section, the CHOPS, intentionally does not want, he has looked at sustainment scheduling and the possibility

of us getting days off, and his concern right now is that we not lose situational awareness. He feels that a day or two off could detract from that situational awareness. We worked initially 13-14 hour days, now that we've gotten more people in, we've cut back to 8, 8-10 hour days. Generally we come in at the morning and we get the battle update brief, I make contact with all of my various areas of responsibility, geographic areas. I get with the Air Force and make sure that we're set on the detainee movements for the day, which take place (b)(2)-3 [redacted]. I get with the C4 trans and make sure that we're square for the next 24 hours of operations, and get that set up. I put together a Power Point slide that has a map of the AOR of Afghanistan, and some of the other countries, and show the movement of airplanes, arrival times, departure times, how many picked up at this location, how many drooped off at this location. Then I get a hold of AMD, air mobility detachment out of (?), and validate the times I get from the (?) rep in the current OPS section. To make sure we're on with times, try to deconflict, if we've got more than one route going in to Kandahar, I try to deconflict the arrival times of the aircraft to make sure that we're not putting (b)(2)-3 [redacted] detainee planes on the ground at the same time. I'll get back, in the afternoon with my point of contacts at the various geographic locations and determine if there are any significant updates. I build a (?) rep page, that we use on word and everyday we create a new copy of that so that we've got a historical backtrack, a historical log of what takes place on certain days and what gets briefed. Then around 1600 I'll met the OPS officer whose one of the majors up with CHOPS, aware of all the changes so he can go into the 1815 (?) brief with the general officers, and he has a overall situational awareness of my part of the entire AOR, and all three of the ground operation stations do that with him. So that he's got everything he needs to bring the CG's, DCG's up to speed, for that particular meeting. Around between 1900 and 2100 we take that same (?) rep, with any additional late changes and we update the battle captain who

has a staff update brief at 2100, and we bring him up to speed on Mazar Sharif, Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar, Pakistan, and (?) Pakistan, and how those sites are fairing. One of the areas we haven't looked at yet and hopefully won't have to is the (?) out west. Generally northern Afghanistan, eastern Afghanistan and southern Afghanistan. We got forces on the ground.

1LT (b)(6)-2 [redacted]: Sir could you describe in your opinion the personality of COL (b)(6)-2 [redacted], the chief of operations and the way he's running the show, as far as operations.

MAJ (b)(6)-2 [redacted]: COL (b)(6)-2 [redacted] is a good man, is a good leader. I think I talked to you before, I've had supervisors in my life, I've had people at higher headquarters that have been very politically correct, and concerned with perceptions, and feelings, and all the things that go along with that. COL (b)(6)-2 [redacted] is none of those things, and given the war setting we're in, I think that's a good thing. COL (b)(6)-2 [redacted] is a driven man, whose responsibility it is to make sure that the current operations of 15,000 troops in theater are all coordinated, all visible to his boss whose a 3 star general, and that those of his on his staff that are not pulling their weight, will pull their weight or go somewhere else. Given that we're in a war his concern for feelings is minimal. But, when you do a good job, he will be the first one to tell you that. He has put together a team out of Third Army, forces command, Fourth Infantry Division, 18th Airborne Corps, basically snips and parts from here and there, of people who have not worked together, and he's turned them into a cohesive team. He's helped to build a certain level of pride in us that comes with being a leader. We even have 2 Marine officers that are onboard with us, and we work as though we've been doing this for years, and that is COL (b)(6)-2 [redacted] being the focal point, and keeping our minds on the facts, that what we do is not a simple exercise. It has to do with real living, breathing people on the ground, some of who are going into harms way on a daily basis. He can be rough. When you screw up, he tells you you screwed up. It you make the same mistake again, that's three marks against you. But

when you do a good job, he demands excellence, and when he gets excellence he tells you, he gives you good feedback, both negative as well as positive. But he's not a touchy, feely kind of guy. He's an infantry officer, probably 22-23 years, my guess, who knows how to move troops, who knows how to lead. I don't think the current OPS would be in the shape it is, had COL [redacted] b-6-2 not been as driven as he is. He comes in, I know I see him at 8:00 in the morning, and I know I come in there at 11:00 at night and he is still there. He's been doing that for just about 60 days now, without a break.

1LT [redacted]: Sir, do you have any further comments that you'd like to make sir, or anything else to add at this point?

MAJ [redacted]: Personal comments I don't know are important in a historical sense but I think that what I have seen from the CFLCC, and this is a reservist, coming on to active duty, after not being on active duty for about 10 years, 8 years. I had the belief at one point that the Army I left was not the Army that's here now. After the last 45 days, I've come to find that it is the same Army, it's just not been where I've been. That's all.

1LT [redacted]: Sir, I want to classify this tape as ~~secret~~ [unclassified] for the caveats and information we've talked about in there. If you have no further questions sir that will conclude our interview.

MAJ [redacted]: That'll do it.

EFIT-130-029 CPT [redacted]

MAJ [redacted]: This is Major [redacted] with the 130th Military History Detachment. Today's date is January 25th 2002, time is approximately 2:10 in the afternoon. Today with me I have Captain [redacted]. What is your full name?

CPT [redacted]: Captain [redacted].

MAJ [redacted]: Your social security number.

CPT [redacted]: DELETED PER PRIVACY ACT

MAJ [redacted]: Do you consent to this oral interview?

CPT [redacted]: Yes I do.

MAJ [redacted]: What is your current unit of assignment?

CPT [redacted]: 3rd US Army, which is also the CFLCC Provost Marshall's office.

MAJ [redacted]: What is your position?

CPT [redacted]: I am a planner for the CFLCC PMO.

MAJ [redacted]: How long have you been acting in this capacity?

CPT [redacted]: Since August of 2001.

MAJ [redacted]: Prior to coming onboard for Operation Enduring Freedom, where were you located?

CPT [redacted] We were located in Atlanta, where we did planning for this. In mid November we deployed out to Camp Doha Kuwait.

MAJ [redacted]: Can you take me a little bit through the process of your activation and deployment to Camp Doha?

CPT [redacted]: Well, we weren't really activated, obviously being a regular Army unit. Our deployment, we received orders in early November that we were deploying to Camp

Doha. We had an initial unit push out as an enabling package to get the COLC, which is where we're currently located at, up and operational. Upon receiving deployment orders, went through the normal deployment rigmarole. I believe on November 20th, we deployed here to Kuwait.

MAJ [redacted]: Just in general, give me a little bit of the concept of the operation, the PMO operation that's going on right now.

CPT [redacted]: The PMO is divided up into 3, I would say distinct functions. The first function is obviously the plans group, which works with the CFLCC operational plans group. Again, we do all of the detailed planning. We also in plans take care of future operations, which is 72 hours out, from current operations. Then we have a current operations section which handles the day-to-day operations of the provost marshal. Additionally we have the security coordination's cell, which does all of the security for the bases and forward deployed units, within the AOR.

MAJ [redacted]: A little bit about the deployment. Did you deploy with your full MTOE, or did you leave a lot of stuff behind, or are you a composite type of element?

CPT [redacted]: As far as the PMO goes, we deployed with all of our personnel, minus a couple of the TPU's soldiers, which were left behind, and as well as our sergeant major, to sustain operations in that we moved forward. We were also augmented with TPU, I believe as of 1 November, with I think 12 TPU soldiers. As far as our MTOE equipment, we deployed with everything that we had. Which was redeploying from Bright Star, which was diverted to this location.

MAJ [redacted]: Now you said you've been augmented with reserve and National Guard soldiers?

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CPT [redacted]: No, we've been augmented with reserve soldiers that are assigned to 3rd Army. They are drilling reservists, not individual augmentes. They do their 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks a year, which the 2 weeks normally consists of the exercises that we do here in Kuwait, Lucky Sentinel, or the war fighters that we do at the Army level headquarters.

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MAJ [redacted]: In your opinion how do the reserve component soldiers help or hurt this operation?

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CPT [redacted]: Well candidly they do bring a lot to the fight. Like any organization there are extremely good soldiers and then there are other soldiers who have lees than value added. Having worked my previous assignment before here as an ACRC, MP active duty advisor to all the MP units in the state of New York, I have a unique perspective on that. I think part of it comes down to training the individuals. Here at 3rd Army we definitely integrate them into our force flow as far as exercises and have them actually execute their wartime mission.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Just to start off again, can you discuss the commander's concept of the operation, as you received it, from the commander?

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CPT [redacted]: For which part, for OEF?

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MAJ [redacted]: Yes, then we'll get into more specific, Kandahar and the detainee mission.

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Ok. To the best of my recollection we started planning in early October for Operation Enduring Freedom, as far as the Afghan piece, and several other pieces subsequent to that, for follow on missions. CENTCOM did not publish their campaign plan until early December, which as a planner makes it difficult for us to plan, obviously our campaign plan. We indelibly we're going from crisis to crisis to crisis planning as on

operational plans group. Working that piece on a day to day or a week-to-week basis, which when we finally got the vision for the overall plan, it made our life much easier, so that we could actually synchronize our efforts instead of piece milling our efforts into the fight.

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MAJ [redacted]: Have you found that to be a large problem with this whole operation that sometimes planning that needs to happen at a higher level, CENTCOM, Joint Chief of Staff, is not happening, and then the lower levels having to push it back up, to have it come back down, in your opinion?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: In my opinion yes, I would think it's a re-occurring thing. There have been several occasions where we, the CFLCC staff have gotten a slide from CENTCOM to develop an overall campaign plan. We develop the plan and pushed it up to CENTCOM, they go ahead and manipulate it, put their fingerprint on it, and then send it back to us as their product. I don't necessarily know if it's their fault. I think with the rapid pace after September 11th, and to get something done and on the board, I can understand that. Again, from our perspective, from a planning perspective, we need to know what division is and most essentially the commander's intent, to be able to draft the correct plan, to fit the situation.

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MAJ [redacted]: Talk a little bit about the commander and the commander's intent, and the commander's personality. If you can walk we up through your chain of command, from the colonel up to GEN Mikolashek, and how you see their personalities.

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CPT [redacted]: Well first of all our provost marshal COL [redacted], (b)(6)-2 hard working guy. Demands graduate level work obviously from his staff here. Consistently pushing us forward to go to the next level. As far as GEN Mikolashek he is, he's not Patton in the sense of his very

boisterous, type attitude, but a very intelligent individual, who gives careful and thoughtful consideration to all the plans we've developed, and has been able to take a rather convoluted situation and give it at least some clarity to the plans group, to push forward, to develop our plans to support OEF, as a whole.

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MAJ [redacted]: One of the areas I want to kind of talk about is a little bit about the high-tech area that the Army is now entered in to. Mainly talking about computers, SIPR net, NIPR net, has this worked? What happens when the SIPR net goes down, or the power goes out and now you have a headquarters that cannot use computers, [redacted] b(2)-3 [redacted]?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: Well to answer the first part of your question, I think that the evolution of the technological age as far as the SIPR net obviously allows us to develop and transmit information faster than any other time in previously recorded history. It is just that, it is a valuable tool to be used, just one of many. It still doesn't replace someone actually being on the ground and sending up reports. As far as contingency for [redacted] b(2)-3 [redacted] Being unable to access that information at critical times, unless you have it backed up on your computer can be a stumbling block for planning, and most of all pushing the information forward to the guys who really need it down in Kandahar. With the information age and having been stationed in Kandahar, we did have phone service and we did have SIPR net. The phone communication was tenuous at best. [redacted] b(2)-3 [redacted] Again, baring any complications with the server pushing that information out.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Having been forward into Kandahar, was there any evidence of micro management through the computers now and with the information flow that, say CENTCOM making a call that maybe a on the ground commander should be making?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: I don't know as far as working with the guys on the ground, Task Force 58, and the 26th MEU, I didn't see micro management at all, or if it was it was very limited, and fairly transparent to me. As far as the information from CFLCC and CENTCOM, there were incidences of information being pushed down, that was either irrelevant or OBE. Again, as you pointed out from someone who wasn't necessarily there on the ground. I think that's the danger. Information overload is a bad thing. I think most of the issues that we had with the SIPR net was RFI's that would come in from several individuals asking the same question. Which would be the cross talk between either the CENTCOM headquarters or the CFLCC headquarters.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Now, how long were you in Kandahar?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: I was in Kandahar for 32 days.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Lets talk a little bit about Kandahar and the detainee operation. To start off I'd like a little bit to talk about the facilities. Can you describe the troop, our own troop facilities in Kandahar, when you were last there?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: What I'd like to do, start off initially and see the progression that we got to before I departed. Initially, conditions were open slit trench latrines. No showers, and MRE's, we were limited to 2 a day, and I believe 3 water bottles a day, before they got the (?) unit up. They were able to find several wells that they were able to tap into, which allowed the (?) units to at least purify water. The final state was that they did have one

shower that was open 3 times a day. Due to the limited water supply there we were upped to 3 MRE's a day and we had built several outhouses, with burm barrels.

MAJ [redacted]: Approximately how long ago was that?

CPT [redacted]: Let me see, that was approximately 8 days ago.

MAJ [redacted]: We're at approximately day 132 or, close enough. What were the troops living conditions?

CPT [redacted]: Most of the guys, the Marines that were there, and soldiers there were living in tents, mediums mainly for the Army and smalls. The Marines were mainly living in small hexagon backpacking tents. There were also staff members who lived in the airport, realizing that the airport terminal itself had to be improved due to various bomb, gunfire damage as well.

MAJ [redacted]: How about describe the perimeter, the fencing, wiring, sandbagging.

CPT [redacted]: Most of the positions had standard fighting positions, with sandbags and overhead cover. On the [redacted] side of the terminal, the [redacted] side of the perimeter was [redacted] along the road was the connector road to highway [redacted], which was a road that ran to Kandahar. On the [redacted] and [redacted] side it was pretty much the same as the [redacted]. On the [redacted] side, we had [redacted] In which the [redacted] Tha[redacted] was approximatel[redacted] off of the active runway to the [redacted], which limited the mobility and position of the fighting position to the [redacted]. The most fighting positions were about [redacted] off. Standard fighting position construction, but as far as (?) I don't think we can get much better than a [redacted] that was there. [redacted] that were in Kandahar were marked with [redacted] the [redacted] in the center, and [redacted] on the other

side. One of the things we did find though, was over the years through erosion and the climates, [redacted] So we usually gave them about a [redacted] (?).

MAJ [redacted]: Talking a little bit about [redacted], in you opinion are [redacted] effective obstacles?

CPT [redacted]: Absolutely they are. Depending on what the mix is, the [redacted] that were there were great deterrents as far as anti personnel, which they were originally designed for [redacted]

MAJ [redacted]: Talk a little bit more about the airfield. How critical is the airfield to our operations in Kandahar?

CPT [redacted]: Without the airfield it would be no operations in Kandahar.

MAJ [redacted]: Why do you say that? Take me into a little bit more detail of without an airfield, we wouldn't have an operation.

CPT [redacted]: [redacted] Initially the airfield, the way it had been bombed by the Air Force was C130 capable for part of it. The CB's were great Americans and probably the finest engineers in the world. They worked day and night to keep that airfield up, to repair it, to repair the taxiways, and of course the active runway. When I left they were able to get in C17 capable aircraft. It was a continuing process, obviously the patches they were putting on the craters were temporary. It was a significant amount and realizing we're only doing [redacted] operations due to the man pad threat that was located in the Kandahar region. Without the airfield we would be

unable to bring in the logistics to support Task Force (?) and the 26 MEU Marines. Realizing initially that the Marines expeditionary force, the battalion landing team, had driven up from AO Rhino, to the airfield to bring up additional assets to get it C130 capable.

MAJ (b)(6)-2: So it wasn't (?), but it was highly dangerous?

CPT (b)(6)-1: It was highly dangerous and took (b)(2)-3 hours to get from the only usable runway we has access to, which was at (b)(2)-3 at area of operation (b)(2)-3

MAJ (b)(6)-2: Do you know if the facility has come under attack?

CPT (b)(6)-1: Yes it has. I've been there during several sniping and probing actions, as well.

MAJ (b)(6)-2: Can you describe these in just a little bit of detail?

CPT (b)(6)-1: The sniping attacks mainly lone gunman located to the north, east, or west of the active runway. They were taking potshots at soldiers going about, either improving fighting positions or conducting reconnaissance in the area. Mainly they were out of range, it was enough to get you moving into cover. Unfortunately the terrain there didn't lend itself to being able to return fire, as least from out perspective. The probing actions, I think occurred on the first night that we pushed up the detainee flight. Several individuals at the northeast corner of the airfield came out of a canal system and in a tunnel system that was preexisting to that location, shot at the aircraft. The aircraft executed emergency takeoff procedures and the Marines responded in kind with overwhelming firepower, as well as moving in with (?) troops, who is a local warlord, to sweep the area as well. The primary defensive setup that we had, to you asked earlier, obviously the Marines and now the 101st have the exterior perimeter. In addition to that you have the local Afghan

military forces, AMF's, were out there working alongside our special operations individuals to develop a buffer zone between our parameter and any other forces that may want to do us harm.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Talk to me a little bit about the moral of the Marines and Army that are there.

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: The soldiers and Marines there have excellent moral. They have been out there especially the 26th MEU and the 15th MEU, soldiers that were there. They realized they actually had a purpose in life and what they were doing was contributing in the fight against global terrorism. Specifically in Afghanistan and hunting for UBL and Al Qaeda and Taliban members.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Walk me through a little bit about your change over from the Marines to the Army, and how that went, realizing you might have only been here for a small portion of it.

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: I think their relief in place went fairly well. Obviously when a new unit comes in they got policies they want to change. Some for the good, some that were doing it just to do it. Understanding that they want to set the tone for their soldiers as well. As far as at the task force level, I know that the Marines were ready to complete the relief in place. I think the only stumbling block with the relief in place was the Marines really couldn't understand this part of it, why it was taking the Army for so long to get there to do the relief in place. Obviously there was some airflow issues, getting enough aircraft to go up there. Realizing that the Marines have their own aviation assets to include MC130's and that they already had pre staging bases in Pakistan. It made it easier I believe for them to get into there, whereas the 101st was coming from CONUS.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Lets move into a slightly different area and talk a little bit about the detainees. Can you describe the detainee facilities in Kandahar?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Initially the detainee facility was enclosed in a mud wall perimeter with 2 buildings inside. One building had no roof or no sides. The other building was constructed or corrugated steel. We inside had sectioned it off into 7 different compartments. Each compartment capable of handling 10 individuals for 6 of them the last compartment was an isolation unit that we had. We had (b)(2)-3 [redacted] plus a (b)(2)-3 [redacted]. Also within this mud wall construction there was an office space for operations center and our QRF. There were (b)(2)-3 [redacted] entrances to the facility. One that we had blocked if initially, which would have been a (b)(2)-3 [redacted] gate, with limited access to one entrance, where we also brought it the detainees. The facility initially had (b)(2)-3 [redacted] (b)(2)-3 [redacted] of the wall. With (b)(2)-3 [redacted] processing tent that we had inside of the facility. On the outside we also had a holding area. Additionally we had a flight line holding area so that when the detainees would arrive, we would move them in groups of (b)(2)-3 [redacted] in which they were shackled by the hands and feet and we would run 5/50 cord through their left arms with a guard on either side of them. If a detainee was going to cause us problems, you could yank on the 50/5 cord and drop the whole lot of them. Additionally to the movement with those (b)(2)-3 [redacted] individuals, we had security (b)(2)-3 [redacted] and (b)(2)-3 [redacted] with M16 or M4's.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Now where were the detainees arriving from?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Detainees were arriving from several locations. There was (?) Pakistan, (?) Pakistan, Bagram, (?) prison in the north, and (?), located in northern Afghanistan.

Additionally due to do direct action operations with special operating forces, they were bringing ones and twos to us from those direct actions.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Can you walk me through the screening process, once the detainees have arrived into the facility and the location?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Well mainly the screening process was done forward. The original plan was is that military intelligence team, or MID teams, would go out to various locations in coordination with Special Forces who are working with the local Afghan resistance organizations. There was established screening criteria in which they had to meet. Were they Al Qaeda, if they were Al Qaeda they would come to our location at the short term holding facility at Kandahar. Direct actions from special operating forces that obviously they would have sealed orders to snatch and grab selected individuals that were either Al Qaeda or high level Taliban. Once the individuals were screened forward they would be brought to our location, in which we would conduct a follow up screening followed with follow up interrogation of these individuals to exploit for tactical operational and strategic level information.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Do you know if we are turning any detainees back into the streets?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: From our location, no. I believe your referring to repatriation. We do not do any repatriation. We did do 1 change of custody though. I believe approximately 60 detainees that had been brought from Pakistan, were deemed not meeting the criteria, and they were returned to (?) Pakistan, on [redacted] separate flights of [redacted]
(b)(2)-3 (b)(2)-3

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Were the detainees allowed visitors?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: No they were not. Well, let me caveat that by saying, if you classify the international committee of the Red Cross, they were allowed obviously to come in. They

were there from the first time that we received the first batch of detainees, and they would come when we got a new group in to register them and put them into ICRC system. Follow on once our population grew, they were there everyday.

b(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Do you know if you had any problems, and I don't want to use the word problems, but issues within the international Red Cross and some of the world organizations that have assumed the over watch position on the detainee operations?

b(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: Well the RCIC initially was fairly helpful. They were able due to our limited ability here, to stuff in. They did purchase socks, gloves, and hats for the detainees. There was one incidence of the night that the first detainee flight came under attack, there was a. You may want to stop it now.

b(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: I'll be stopping the tape for just one second. At this time I'm going to go ahead and up the classification due to the next subject that we discuss upon here, upon proper declassification. ~~The tape will now carry a TS clearance~~. [Unclassified]

b(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: In reference to the ICRC, the day after we had the attack on the first detainee flight out, information had been related to me through the commander of the

b(6)-2 b(2)-2

[redacted], from [redacted], which are the MI interrogation teams. That

b(2)-2

through (?) and [redacted] that the ICRC had either wittingly or unwittingly tipped off individuals that had lead to the ambush of the aircraft. b(3)-2 [redacted], which could have lead to the ambush of the aircraft. It is speculation on my part, [redacted]

b(3)-2

[redacted] But the chances of probability of them hitting the C17 that was flying out at the exact time. b(3)-2 [redacted]

[redacted] to insure that we were complying with all the accords of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. The information that I had found out later on from the Air Force liaison there was (b)(2)-2/3 [redacted] and this is where the human intelligence comes in, where they had talked to an individual that was observed and overheard by again (b)(2)-2 [redacted] and the (b)(2)-2 [redacted] individuals that were unknown to us at the time. They were more than likely Al Qaeda, and realizing that Kandahar is the heartland of Taliban/Al Qaeda country, and that there are still many bad guys out there. The probability of them getting this information and hitting a flight at the exact time that it was boosting off, in my opinion is more than coincidental.

MAJ (b)(6)-2 [redacted]: Lets get back a little bit on the detainees and them coming through. How are they fingerprinted and identified for future reference?

CPT (b)(6)-1 [redacted]: Well, to do that I will walk you through the process for in processing. Detainees are moved from a holding area, currently located on the outside wall of the facility, which is blocked by a visual screen of sheet metal and conex's, to a processing tent. They are moved one by one, by (b)(2)-3 [redacted] The detainees have blindfolds on, they are shackled at their feet, and they also have handcuffs with their hands behind them. From this point they are moved to a search pit, which we look for any explosive devices, anything that can harm themselves or the guards on the inside. From that point they are call forwarded to an initial processing station where the military intelligence and the MP's have laptops and they get the basic biographical data from the individual.

Name, what their associations are, Taliban, Al Qaeda, other. They are also, date of birth and any pertinent other personal information that we can put into this system to identify these guys. From that point they are de-robed of their clothes, and they are moved to a medical processing station where a doctor or certified physicians assistant conducts a full exam of them. They look for scars, looks into their eyes to make sure there's nothing wrong there, identifies any wounds or any other things that may need medical treatment. From that point they are moved to a station were they are given a bracelet, which has their identification number on it, which is the MP number that we use locally. Before they fly out they are given ISN number, which is the international way of identifying detainees. From that point they are moved to a processing station where several organizations to include the FBI, criminal investigation division for the military, and other government organizations take fingerprints, photographs, and DNA samples. DNA samples were done actually in 2 ways. One was through hair follicle and the other way was through blood. From that point they were moved and they are given a blue jumpsuit, they are robed at that point, they are also given their issue of clothing. Which includes a mat, 2 afghan blankets, which are extremely thick, a hat, gloves, sandals, and then they are escorted to our maximum security area to be held for that night. After they are placed in their cell and we in process anywhere from (b)(2)-3 [redacted] detainees which would come in a flight, the military intelligence individuals would go ahead and conduct their interrogations of them from that point.

MAJ (b)(6)-2 [redacted]: Can you tell me what type of condition the detainees are coming in? Have they been eating regularly? Are they starving to death? Are they well?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: Well, that's really a double-edged sword. We've had several detainees come in that have come in that were fit that actually had fat on them, and they were mainly leaders of the Al Qaeda or Taliban. They were well kept, they had showered, you could tell they have eaten, and they were in fairly good physical condition. Others that had come from various locations were in more rough shape. Individuals that were border lining on dehydration, malnourishment. They hadn't taken a shower in months, hiding out in the caves. Additionally we've had individuals that came in with gun shot wounds, amputations, lice, and various other health problems. We put them into the poor medical condition category.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: In you opinion do you feel they will get better care inside the detention facility than they were getting prior to detention?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: Absolutely. Now some of the detainees did come in with, they had received medial treatment prior to them getting to us. But the Navy, Marine, the Air Force and the Army medical system that we had established worked very well. We in the facility, we even had a medical hold area. We had a hardback GP medium tent, which is a GP medium with built up sides, a hard deck floor, which had a surgical, fully operational surgical room in it. The other side of that had a post operation area, and then we also had two other tents that we had established for our medical individuals as well, so they could receive care from the general population.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted] Do you know if we've had any detainees die while in US care?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: To the best of my knowledge, and at the short term holding facility, no detainees died.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Can you tell me why we're calling the detainees, detainees, not POW's or criminals, or any other term we might want to put on to them?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: That's a really good question. I know policy letter that came down from the secretary of defense on what the individuals captured or transferred to us from other custody would be called. I do know this though, that all people that came through the short term holding facility were treated as enemy prisoners of war, as according to the Geneva Prisoner of War convention, or the GPW. All though they did not receive the status of those individuals. So the treatment was according to the GPW. Their status according to the GPW, you have EPW's, you have civilian internees, and you have other detainees. Currently the individuals that we are holding are considered other detainees.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Approximately how many detainees have we detained?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: From which location?

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: As many as you can speak to me about.

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: I can speak to you about the short term holding facility. When I left I believe we had a population of 369 individuals that had been processed through. With several flights going out to Guantanamo Bay Cuba.

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MAJ [redacted]: Do you expect that number to increase or decrease?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: I would expect that the population, in my own opinion, and again that's a really good question. I think we've kind of hit the peak right now, for operations. I don't think out population will get more than what we currently have, which is 369.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: What are we feeding the detainees, MRE's or local type food or let them forage on their own?

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CPT [redacted]: It's kind of hard for them forage on their own, being incarcerated by us. The detainees are being fed 3 meals a day. For the morning and evening meal they have MRE's, minus the MRE heater, spoon, and accessory packs which could be used as weapons. For their mid meal they were given a loaf of pita bread which is probably about 6 inches in width and about 12-14 inches long and about an 1/8 of an inch thick.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: How do they like the MRE in your opinion, or do you see them scoff at it or do they woof it down and clean it up?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: I think they, they ate everything that they were given. I don't think that was an issue. In additional to the MRE's, they were given plenty of water, as well to go with that. So water was consistently replenished on an hourly basis, to make sure they were properly hydrated. Again, being one of the medical conditions that they come in with, to make sure they maintain their health.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: What other items are issued to the detainees? You know we brought up they were given a jump suit, the afghan blankets. To the best of your recollection did we provide them with, or were they provided with Bibles, Koran's?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Yes. Not everyone had a Koran. When we ran out of supply obviously they had to share the Koran, bit initially everyone did have a Koran, provided by the ICRC.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Reading materials?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: No reading materials. The only written material to my best recollection that they were allowed was the Red Cross message that they would send home. The Red Cross messages before they were sent out were actually went ahead and scrubbed my military intelligence, to make sure there were no coded messages or given away their location.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Were they allowed any visitors or any?
(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Outside of the ICRC, no visitors were allowed.
(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: What did the detainees do all day, during the long day?
(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Mainly the detainees outside of reading their Koran's and police calling their own cells for hygiene and any other objects that would be in there, pretty much laid around.
(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Do you know if we had any escapes or attempted escaped?
(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: No attempted escapes and no escapes, to the best of my knowledge.
(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: What about any detainees maybe getting suicidal?
(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: No suicidal detainees. The only thing we did find during shake down of the cells, which occur periodically.
(b)(6)-2 (b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: This is MAJ. [redacted] the time is now five to three. We've had to break, the captain had to go into a meeting. This is MAJ (b)(6)-2 [redacted] it is now 26 January, the time is approximately 1:55pm and we are going to continue with this interview. Captain (b)(6)-1 [redacted] the last time we were talking you were talking about the detainees and finding some contraband in their cell and problems you've been having with the detainees. If you could kind of pick up where we left off.
(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Ok, no problem. We were finding homemade weapons. A couple of different varieties. One was a stick that they were finding in their cells that they were sharpening. Others were to include MRE spoons that had been left in the MRE package, which they were breaking off and fashioning, into weapons. Additionally when we moved into the new part of the expanded part of the short term holding facility. On the dirt floor they were finding shell fragments, which they were sharpening and preparing to

use for weapons. Fortunately for us we had really observant [redacted] guards that were able to catch these items, find the individuals in most cases that were responsible for it, and be able to subsequently enact punishment on those individuals as setting an example for the rest of the detainees. Additionally the psychological conditions of the detainees kind of changed a whole perspective I guess of the camp. Initially when we only had 17 and then as our numbers grew, detainees were very compliant. As more numbers came in and as the longer they stayed there they became more deviant. In addition to again, thinking of ways to escape, though there was a little bit more active resistance among the individuals more individuals that we had to penalize, especially in the cases of talking in large groups. Which of course we didn't allow as a security concern.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Let me back up just a little bit, you talked about punishment, if a detainee was making a shank or a home made weapon, what would be their corrective punishment or discipline that would be in place.

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: The discipline that we enacted, a couple of things. Obviously if an individual is making a homemade weapon they would be put into solitary confinement for one or two days depending on his disposition. Additionally we would have follow up interrogations with the military intelligence folks to find out what their mindset is. For simple infractions in the facility, we mainly have three levels of punishment. The first one was we would put them in sort of a time out position for 30 minutes. We would put them in a stress position, which is having them on their knees facing away from the group, with their hands interlocked behind their head. If they committed another infraction, and these are cumulative, whether it be a 2 hours a day or whatever, they

would go into isolation for 24 hours. If they continued to resist our commands then they would be put into isolation the entire time, until they left.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: I would take it there are set procedures for how long they can be in isolation, policy SOP's procedures, written doctrine, guidance?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Roger. Really the rules of the camp, I guess I should start with that. When each detainee comes into the facility they are read the rules of the camp and they either signed the document in their language or the interpreter indicated that it had been read to them. Additionally all the rules for the camp were posted in each of the cells and throughout the camp in various languages. I think there were 6 or 7 different languages when I left, that were there so they understood what the rules were.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted] Just sideline but less I forget, do you think you can get me a copy of these rules, through your chain of command?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Yes I could do that. I could probably give you a copy of the SOP which has the rules and our basic Arabic commands as well in there.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted] Great, I'd be much impressed in collecting one of those for an artifact.

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Ok.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted] You were talking about they are now becoming a little bit more resistant, lets continue on that vein.

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Sure, again the whole psychological perspective of the detainees was changing, as the initial shock from being captured, or transferred to us from other agencies. Initially they were fairly compliant. The more time that they spent in the short term holding facility, the more openly belligerent they became, the more deviant they became, which of course makes it more dangerous for us and for them. Mainly looking,

different looks that we would get, more deviant in their eyes. They would become more accustom, they knew that we weren't going to treat them anyway other than according to the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. Which of course as know we don't beat them, we don't torture them. They were being fed 3 meals a day, they had their blankets, etc. So, again a part of their deviance and belligerence I believe too was, they were becoming more nourished, if you will. I've already talked about the conditions that they were coming in. So as their strength built up, their will to resist also I believe built up as well.

MAJ (b)(6)-2 In your opinion do you think that they were starting to realize that they were being given more care, better care and they could also be defiant and resistant where as if they came out or they were defiant or resistant with their previous captors, what do you call them the anti Taliban or Afghan forces they would be treated differently?

CPT (b)(6)-1: Yes, definitely. I do, that is a true statement as far as I know.

MAJ (b)(6)-2: How are our soldiers handling this? Are they grumbling amongst themselves, that we're giving the detainees to many rights? How are they handling that?

CPT (b)(6)-1 I think our soldiers are doing exceptionally well on handling this. It's a very difficult position to be in, especially considering the aster conditions up in Kandahar. With the codification of our SOP's and of course strong leadership there to insure those are being enforced. I do believe though if there was any conformation on any facet, not necessarily with the detainees, but with the ICRC, of course the ICRC has their mission that they have to do. b(3)(2) [redacted] Obviously the environment up there doesn't lend itself to that. The only grumbling that I heard about were about the ICRC.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Do you know if the detainees think they were ever going to be killed at any point, like put up against (?) and shot? Again this is your opinion with some of the acts or the way they're feeling all of the sudden they don't know their in this foreign environment.

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: I think the first couple of groups of detainees we got from various other organizations, they had been told prior coming into US custody that they were going to be killed and tortured by the US. They did cause a little problem to us, but after they got into the processing through us and our interrogators calming them down, I think they understood. It's like anything else, actions speak louder than words, and after a couple of days there they realized that they weren't going to be killed or tortured.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Again that's all here say, we don't have much substance.

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: Right. The only information we did get though was through interrogations and that's what these detainees were telling us that they were told before they got here. I haven't been able to confirm that though.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Now are we keeping the leaders separate? How are we, obviously some are communal areas. How are we keeping the figureheads away from the rest of the detainees?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: Basic segregation policies within the facility where leaders were segregated into there own cell. We also had the general population which was the bulk of the detainees and then there were also other detainees that were through interrogations and through the information we received on them prior to them showing up, that were considered extremely dangerous. They were segregated either in ones and twos or isolated entirely by themselves.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Going back to kind of the detainees, do you know if they're using any type of tapping, Morse code. Obviously in some of our own doctrine we have some POW codes and tap codes and communication codes.

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Well, one of the things that we try to do in segregation was get as many different languages together in one of the 20 man cells as possible, to limit their ability to communicate. Obviously most of them do speak various forms of Arabic. Arabic being the common one. We have a lot of guys patched in, but as far as Morse code or any other signs, we haven't been able to detect that up to this point, or that we witnessed.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Lets move on into a little bit different area, media and outside world opinion. In your opinion can you see how this is affecting our operation? Obviously we have the International Red Cross looking over our shoulders and various other humanitarian groups, civil groups, anything you want to name it. How do you think this is affecting out operation?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Well, not being prvied to a lot of the outside media sources I really can't.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: We're talking about the International Red Cross and outside influences and world opinion, if we can just kind of pick up right there.

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Again, the ICRC seem to be [redacted] which wasn't going to happen. Again I really can't comment on outside media impressions, from my perspective because I haven't really been involved with that, being isolated as I was.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Lets talk about transporting some of the detainees to Cuba. Kind of just walk me through that process real quick.

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: Ok. Out-processing usually the morning before they're transported, we would go ahead and call out the individuals who were going to be moved. Preferably the night before we grouped them all together, as part of our SOP in the facility we would (b)(2)-3 [redacted] on a consistent basis so we didn't give them any signals that they were being moved. We moved them one at a time from that cell, out to the out-processing area, which is also the in-processing tents. The first station they would go to is they would have their heads shaved and beards shaved, mainly for sanitary effect. A lot of these guys had different lice and fleas, and that type of stuff. They were also deloused at that point as well.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Let me talk about real quick before we move on, on shaving their beards. Are they protesting, are they doing this willingly?

(b)(6)-1

CPT [redacted]: I doubt they are doing it willingly, but we didn't have any physical or verbal altercations with any of the detainees when I was there, of shaving their beards. It was explained to them through an interpreter that we were doing it for sanitary. A lot of the detainee in their beards they have the eggs of larvae, for various different bugs and fleas. So they didn't protest to the best of my knowledge. Then from that point they move to another station where we did the out processing paperwork. They were given another medical exam, to see what their condition was prior to and of course leaving the facility. Again they were, pictures were taken of them, because obviously they look different. Any individual that needed to have re-DNA samples done was done at that time. Then the Air Force would go ahead and put them, we would take them out of the blue jumpsuit. The Air Force would put them into an orange jumpsuit with orange socks, orange sneakers, and they also had feet shackles, cause we got ours back, and the Air Force would put

theirs on. They also put handcuffs on them along with a bellyband, to secure them. Prior to the flight, they would go ahead and put on goggles with tape over them, and earmuffs, earmuffs again to protect them from the aircraft noise as they were flying.

MAJ (b)(6)-2: Let me ask you. Now are these normal just basic US or international off the shelf shackles?

CPT (b)(6)-1: Yes. Smith and Wesson I believe is the brand that they were using.

MAJ (b)(6)-2: Pretty much we're not inventing anything with 5/50 cord or.

CPT (b)(6)-1: No, No.

MAJ (b)(6)-2: Wire or anything like that. We're not doing anything.

CPT (b)(6)-1: No. All standard law enforcement hand shackles and feet shackles. At this point after they had been re-robed and had their new hand and iron shackles put on them. They were moved to the final station where all the property that came in with the detainees, money, personal effects, were signed over to the Air Force representative there and they would go into the holding area. While they were in the holding area they would be fed their mid meal which was bread and water. The pita bread again, like we discussed earlier. They would wait there until the aircraft arrived. Normally the aircraft, actually all the aircraft would be coming in (b)(2)-3 From that point detainees would be moved in groups of (b)(2)-3 out to the flight line where they would be transferred over to the Air Force escorts that were there, as well as their property as well. Property mainly consisted of personal effects, fingerprint cards, DNA samples, photographs of the individuals. Again that signing over process would be with the OIC of the Raven team which is the Air Force SP's that were escorting them, or the MP's from GTMO, the Army MP's from GTMO.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted] Again, I'm trying to get to view what the detainees are going through. How do you think they felt about, for most of them this was their first flight in an airplane.

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Actually it would have been their second flight. Most of the detainees came in by C130. The aircraft that they were using was a modified C17, with troop seats in the row and two comfort pallets on the bed, for sanitary reasons. We did note that during the medical exam they had evaluated blood pressure and heart rates. Obviously they knew something was up because, the shaving, new uniforms, and that type stuff. Really no problems from the detainees. I mean again they were under total positive control of us and then transfer to the Air Force. We didn't have any incidences while I was there, of resistance.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: I realize I'll probably have follow up interviews with the aircrews. I take it their locked into their seats?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Basically they would go into a regular troop seat, in the C17, which was in the middle of the aircraft, with guards on either side. They had their hands handcuffed with a chain around their belly, standard flight train that the US Marshall's use. Then their handcuffs and feet were shackled to a I believe a 45,000 pound chain, that ran down the center of the aircraft and they'd all be handcuffed to that.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: There's an innovation and I don't know if you know anything about it, something called like a kitty box or anything like that.

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: I have no knowledge of that sir.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted] Do you know if any of them had to be sedated?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: I know why they were at the short-term holding facility, we did not sedate anyone or medicate any of those individuals. If there was sedation done, it was done either in flight or once they got to GTMO.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: I think we covered a little bit about the equipment that was captured with the detainees, if you can just go back into a little bit.

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Sure, most of the detainees came in with civilian's clothes on initially and obviously we were able to get blue jumpsuits for forward units. The stuff that was retained property that would be given back to them was, money, we did find some significant amounts of money, watches, rings, personal artifacts to include photographs and pictures. While they were at the short term holding facility we allowed them to have none of that because that stuff could be used as weapons. As far as intelligence value and weapons they were mainly taken from the guys that were either the capturing unit and forwarded up through a different channel or retained by whichever other government organization or country that had captured them.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: It's pretty much one of our duties to collect historical artifacts, if I wanted to search for some of the both friendly artifacts we use the jumpsuits, like chains, handcuffs, and detainee type artifacts, what would be your suggestion?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: Currently right now the overall commander for the short term holding facility is LTC (b)(6)-1 [redacted], he is the 519th MP Battalion commander. I'm sure he would be able to get you a blue jumpsuit, handcuffs, leg irons, and the blankets that we issue them, the floor mats, and some of the civilian attire that we originally used before we had jumpsuits to the detainees. Additionally Captain (b)(6)-1 [redacted] is the Air Force special security

forces OIC on the ground and I'm sure he could hook you up with the Air Force orange apparatus that they use.

MAJ [redacted]: Moving along, photographs. I know that no civilian media are supposed to be taking photos of the detainee operations facilities. Obviously we've seen some on CNN where one of these guys are shooting with a [redacted] lenses from a [redacted] off. Do you know anybody who has taken a lot of photographs of the operation? We're interested in collecting them for historical purposes.

CPT [redacted]: I do have photographs of the short term holding facility that I was using to put together for the AAR and also for additional proposals that we had for the short term holding facility. I do have a collection of those. Of the facilities within the short term holding facility, the different segmented areas that we have, the maximum security holding area, and I do have pictures from the inception of it to what it looked like right before I left.

MAJ [redacted]: I'd be very interested, are those digitals or wet?

CPT [redacted]: Digital, and I do have some hard copies.

MAJ [redacted]: Great. We can talk off line on submittal of those for historical purposes. What questions have I not asked that you think should be answered during this interview?

CPT [redacted]: Well there are a couple of things. I don't know if I've covered this yet. There was the inception of the plan that we had initially forged for this operation for MP force structure was pretty much what the end state looks like right now. Due to force caps I think that has been, that there's been a constraint on this operation as far as detainee operations and MP operations overall. There has been the force cap that was either self imposed or imposed by other countries. Initially the force structure that we looked at

putting into the Afghan theater of operation was an MP battalion headquarters, with one company initially in Rhino to run the short term holding facility or collection point. Then of course moving to Kandahar when ALO rhino closed down. A company in K2, Uzbekistan, and a MP company up in Bagram. That force structure was cut to a company minus with a lot ordered yet in K2, and eventually we had to jump through many, many hoops to get the force structure that we have now in place, after the need was realized. What is the other thing? Oh, overall detainee operation, when we started planning for this operation in October, the mind set was we weren't going to take any detainees. The original plan had them flying out afloat to one of the carrier battle groups that was there and then eventually to the fleet that was there. We did have some high profile individual's fly directly out there. (b)(6)-4 [redacted] being one of them, and a couple other Al Qaeda members. Not the most effective and that was one of the constraints also that we had, that no country surrounding the perimeter of Afghanistan would allow us to put in a holding area, a temporary holding area for detainee operations. So eventually it was settled on to put it in Afghanistan. Then of course the debate on where of if we were going to put the long interment resettlement holding facility, which is now at GTMO. Several proposals were floated, GTMO was one of the choices, Midway Island was one, (?), and we also floated using regional confinement facility that had been closed down in that states at Ft. Carson, predominately to house the detainees.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Do you think the detainee facility in Cuba is the best choice?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: For what were doing yes. It is an excellent choice. It's isolated, easy to control, there was already a pre-existing info structure there, from the various boatlifts and refuge movements that we had in that region of the world.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: If somebody was going to listen to this in 50 years or 100 years, what else do you want them to know about this operation?

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: I think the first thing would be is that all the detainees that came into our care and custody control were treated in accordance with the Geneva Prisoner of War convention. There was no brutality going on. I think an understanding of how exactly this operation started the genesis of this operation started, with initially being with force caps, which I think, as I said before really limited our ability to conduct the operation in a doctrinal way. I guess that would be another thing, is the doctrinal aspect of this whole operation was a guide but we're writing doctrine here. Doctrinal EPWCI operations and the way you construct either a core holding area, which is really what the short term holding facility is, or a internment resettlement facility were pretty much thrown out the window based on the type of individuals that we were getting. The facility that we operate in Kandahar is more of a maximum security prison, with individuals who are probably a little bit more dangerous than maximum security individuals, because the have the intent, and they have the training as compared to most criminals, formal training. As terrorists and obviously demonstrated by September 11th, they have vivid imaginations on how to pull this stuff off.

(b)(6)-2
MAJ [redacted]: Have we run across any thing about the instate of what happens when eventually we can't hold them as detainees forever and ever and ever? Has there been any talk or discussion of any of these guys ever come home, how to do that? When I say come home, return back to Afghanistan.

(b)(6)-1
CPT [redacted]: As far as repatriation, that part I'm not very familiar with. I know there has been talk about that. I think there's really two veins. Once we have screened or vetted

these individuals as far forward, like in Afghanistan, or wherever the detainees were coming from, these were pretty much the bad seeds. I know there are two different tracks though, that they were going to prosecute these individuals that were going to GTMO either through DOD channels, which would be a military tribunal, for their crimes, or through the department of justice. Mainly with the FBI's elite, to prosecute them in civil criminal court.

MAJ (b)(6)-2 [redacted]: I think that solves all the questions. If I was going to interview several more individuals concerned with the detainee and detainee operations, who would they be? Who would be very knowledgeable such as yourself?

CPT (b)(6)-1 [redacted]: CPT (b)(6)-1 [redacted] he is the current commander of the short term holding facility, and also the commander of the 108th MP Company in Kandahar, Afghanistan. LT (b)(6)-1 [redacted], she was a platoon leader that was there when I arrived there. LTC (b)(6)-1 [redacted], he was the original OIC of the short term holding facility, he is a Marine assigned to 26 MEU. He is the MSSG commander, which is equivalent to an Army forward support battalion. The 26th MEU commander, COL (b)(6)-1 [redacted], obviously whose intimately involved. The Task Force 58 commander GEN Matis. Additionally from the 26th MEU, would be SGT (b)(6)-1 [redacted]. He was the initial 13 MP's on the ground, from the 26th MEU, who were there to do the initial in processing. Also LT (b)(6)-1 [redacted], he was the OIC of the reinforcing Marine MP's from the 15th MEU.

MAJ (b)(6)-2 [redacted]: Wow. You've just given me a month's worth of work. With that any further things to say?

CPT (b)(6)-1 [redacted]: No sir.

(b)(6)-2

MAJ [redacted]: Well I appreciate it, and with that I will be concluding this interview.

Thanks very much.