



Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
CONTINGENCY SUPPORT PLAN

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to LOGCAP CONTINGENCY SUPPORT PLAN

REFERENCES.

- a. AMC Statement of Work (SOW)
- b. Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Operations Other Than War
- c. FM 34-8, Combat Commanders Hand Book for Intelligence.
- d. FM 101-10-1/2, Staff Officers' Field Manual
- e. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Iraq Special Report, 30 August 2002
- f. CIA World Fact Book 2002, IRAQ
- g. Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government

TIME ZONE USED THROUGHOUT THE PLAN. Iraq.

TASK ORGANIZATION. See ANNEX A.

1. SITUATION. See Base PLAN.

- a. **General.** Iraq was once a major Mid-East oil producing nation and today remains second only to Saudi Arabia in proven oil reserves. But a decade of war with its neighbor Iran in the 1980s, the 1991 Gulf War and its accompanying destruction and subsequent United Nations (UN) economic sanctions, years of ill advised oil field practices and deferred maintenance to its infrastructure have severely crippled Iraq's oil production capacity. Simultaneously, Iraq became one of the Middle East's most belligerent nations as evidenced by its long running war with its neighbor Iran, genocidal attempts to eliminate the Kurdish culture in the north, armed attacks on the Shia Muslims in the south, the unrelenting government control exercised over the Sunni Muslim population, the invasion of Kuwait and its long standing support of worldwide Muslim fundamentalist terrorist organizations.

The 1991 War decimated Iraq's conventional military capability. Except for a few special units, all branches suffer from aging and increasingly inoperable Soviet Era equipment. Conscription of Sunnis continues, but their morale is low. Yet, for all the above, Iraq remains the world's most dangerous threat to regional stability and international peace through its policy to develop and demonstrated will to employ weapons on mass destruction (WMD; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-explosive contaminants (CBRNE). Irrefutable evidence reveals Iraq employed chemical weapons on at least two occasions: against Iran and again against the people of Kurdistan. It has continued to pursue this policy in the face of world condemnation and 10 years of United Nations (UN) sanctions enforced primarily by the U.S. and its Western European Allies. During the reign of Sadaam Hussein, France, Russia, and China, in contravention to UN sanctions, have curried favor with Saddam Hussein to gain oil drilling rights.

During the Gulf War, Russia supplied Iraq with advisors, supplies and equipment to wage war against the US led military coalition. Additionally, Western European countries such as Germany and France sold Iraq equipment and materials that can be used in the manufacture of WMD. Iraq's future is a large change mark at the current time. Following the 11 September, 2001, al



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Qaeda attacks, the Bush Administration has made Iraq a primary target for fundamental change through unilateral or coalition military intervention if necessary. A possible scenario of future events that will return Iraq to the peaceful family of nations follows: the overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime by external military intervention, UN-mandated intervention to prevent the rise of a similar Tikriti (Hussien's ruling clan) government during the period of a political power vacuum, and international economic support to factions friendly to the U.S. and its Allies and committed to establishing democracy and capitalism.

Whatever scenario actually plays out, key to future advancement economic, social and political progress is the ultimate restoration of Iraq's languishing crude oil and natural gas production infrastructure. Prior to the Gulf War oil exports accounted for 95 percent of Iraq's GNP. Once restored, controlling its exports until the nation's massive internal economic and social needs are addressed. To better plan for restoring Iraq's oil producing infrastructure, understanding the challenges associated with gaining control of these areas and the nation is necessary.

b. Specific. Since the Gulf War, Iraq oil production regained 75 percent of its pre-war capacity. Now, all indications point to falling annual production in the north and south oil fields. Below are but a few critical areas that must be addressed just to sustain the current production rate of 2.2 MM BPD.

- 1.) Exploration of the western desert and southern marsh land must receive it past level of priority and start at once.
- 2.) Non-producing fields must be reopened and recovery rates increased to 35 to 50 percent.
- 3.) Future production. Iraqi goals of producing of 6.0 MM BPD by 2010 are not attainable unless best oil field practices are re-instated. If not, continued use of current practices will permanently damage reserves.

4.) (b)(1), (b)(3) 50 USC §403(g) Section 6

5.)



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6.) **The politics of restoration.** An overarching goal of military intervention into Iraq is maintaining the nation's current borders and national integrity while preventing Iraq from being divided geographically along minority cultural, or religious lines. After years of political, cultural and religious oppression, armed intervention will create a climate ripe for various factions to attempt to gain control of areas with specific geographic, economic and religious importance. For example, two of the most holy of Shia temples are located inside the eastern border of Iraq. It is imperative coalition ground forces secure pumping stations, manifolds, separators, storage facilities and terminals as soon as possible to prevent them from coming under control of groups dedicated to holding them for political ransom or or destroying them out of a basic need for revenge. Within Iraq, are these organizations opposed to the current regime, dedicated to international recognition and some form of autonomy and driven to carve out new geo/political areas within Iraq. Kurdish: KDP, PUK, ICP and INC; Shia: Islamist al-Dawn (controlled from Tehran). In addition to the internal opposition threats, plus the sever economic and social challenges, a new government will also face the restructuring of \$90 billion of international debt and \$27 billion of UN recognized reparations.

c. **Unfriendly Situation.** Refer to the Iraqi War Source Book, UN Experts Report and Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment; Iraq Special Report.

(b)(1);(b)(3)-50 USC
§403(g) Section 6

1.) **Inside Iraq.** An incursion into Iraq will face threats from politically/fanatically motivated extremist groups such as the Fadayeen Saddam, the Al-Quds and remnants of Saddam Hussein's elite military units; Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard. The probability for limited military strikes and terrorist attacks and acts of sabotage against coalition forces and accompanying Contractor employees during and after the cessation of fighting is high.

a) **Iraqi Order of Battle.**

(1) **Conventional Forces.** Iraq's conventional forces face many problems that will weaken their effectiveness in battle. Its regular army of approximately 350,000 soldiers is less than one third its size prior the the Gulf War and morale is low. Up to 40 percent of its equipment may be unserviceable.

(a) **Army.** Iraq's Regular Army is organized into five CORPS with 19 divisions. The 1st and 5th CORPS combine to form the Northern Military Command The Republican Guard is organized into parallel and independently reporting Northern and a Southern CORPS consisting eight divisions (Armor x 2, Infantry x 3 and Mechanized x 3). The Special Republican Guard is consists of 14 battalions. The Special Forces consists of 10 Brigades. The Popular (Reserve) Army consists of 19 divisions with an approximate total of 650,000 soldiers.

(b) **Iraqi Air Force (IAF).** Iraq's Air Force is a shadow of its former self, estimated to have approximately 90 operational aircraft. In addition to its losses during the Gulf War, Iran has never returned the 100-plus Iraqi Air Force fighters flown into Iran seeking refuge. Additionally, another 120 fighter aircraft ordered by Iraq sit on Russian and French ramps as a result of the post-war embargo. It is generally accepted the IAF would not be a serious threat in any future war.

(2) **Air Defence Command (ADC).** Though the network was badly damaged during the Gulf War, the ADC still possesses a serious threat to coalition aircraft. Since the Gulf



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War, the ADC has received priority attention for rebuilding and refurbishment. The following countries have contributed to this effort: Russia, China, France, North Korea, Belarus, Former Yugoslav Republic and the Czech Republic. The main areas of improvement have been in long range acquisition radar and the installation of fiber optics.

(3) Weapons of Mass Destruction. Iraq's greatest threat comes from the possible use of WMD. Matched with appropriate delivery systems, these weapons could be used for preemptive strikes against Coalition marshalling and staging areas and air fields across the Persian Gulf and Turkey and against Naval/Marine Forces deployed at sea. They could also be employed against Coalition Forces once inside Iraq's borders against ports, airfields, beach heads or oil fields. At any time, these weapons could be used to attack Israel, Turkey or any of the countries along the Persian Gulf littoral. The object of such action would be the weakening of regional and international support or to distract the focus of senior coalition military leaders. Saddam Hussein's use of various WMDs could come early in a conflict, especially if his conventional forces proved ineffective and his personal survival came in doubt.

2) Outside Iraq. The predominate threat emanates from indigenous and transnational, anti-American (or anti-Western) terrorist groups and by State sponsored terrorism. Military forces and Contractor personnel must remain vigilant when traveling and working throughout the Middle East. The US led global response to the al Qaeda attack of September 11, 2001 and the continued US policy of alignment with Israel in its dispute with the Palestinians is generating growing anti-US sentiment throughout the Muslim world. Third Country Nationals (with Islamic sympathies), working in the mid-east, offer excellent passive/active support for al Qaeda and other terrorists groups. As security increases for US military Forces and US Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) facilities in the area, the threat will focus on less well-protected targets such as clubs, restaurants, schools, places of worship and recreation areas.

d. Friendly Situation. See ANNEX A. Friendly forces in Iraq and the surrounding area will include US and coalition forces, DOD/DOS civilians, Contractor employees and relief workers from a multitude of approved government organizations (GO) and non-government organizations (NGO). BRS employees and BRS sub-contractor employees will deploy as "members of the force". In addition to the Coalition/Joint Task Force (C/JTF) entering Iraq, US and allied forces will establish a presence in most mid-east countries. Additionally Halliburton Company, parent company of BRS, and its associated businesses and partners have numerous offices, resources and capabilities in the region.

1) BRS Management Support Team (MST). Refers to the entire BRS support effort and includes BRS personnel, primary subcontracting personnel and other subcontractors and vendors with whom BRS enters into business relationships to accomplish the mission.

2) Team LOGCAP. Includes, if deployed, the Army Material Command's Logistics Support Element (AMC-LSE), the Defense Contract Management District-International (DCMD-I) Contracting Team, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and other Government personnel providing oversight and management of the LOGCAP effort in the Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR.

2. MISSION. See Base PLAN.



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3. EXECUTION. See Base plan.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See ANNEX I.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. See Base PLAN and ANNEX H.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

(b)(6)

BRS PGM, LOGCAP

OFFICIAL:

(b)(6) BRS D/PGM

- APPENDIX 1. (Iraq Ground Order of Battle)
- APPENDIX 2. (Iraq Air Order of Battle)
- APPENDIX 3. (Iraq Air Defence Order of Battle)



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APPENDIX 1 (GROUND ORDER OF BATTLE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to LOGCAP CONTINGENCY SUPPORT PLAN

SENTINEL – GULF STATES IRAQ SPECIAL REPORT www.janes.com

3.11.9 Structure of the Republican Guard

Supervisor: Qusay Saddam Hussein
Chief of Staff: Staff General Ibraheem Abdul Sattar
Muhammad al Tikriti

A: Northern Corps (Allah Akbar Command Centre)
HQ: Al Rashedia (Baghdad region) and Tikrit
Commander: n/a (Until Summer 1997 the commander was Staff Major General Amal Mustafa Abdulla Sultan al Tikriti, who was then promoted to commander of the Special Republican Guard.)

Republican Guard Northern Corps Divisions

Division HQ Commander Brigades

1st Adnan Mechanized Division Mosul Staff Brigadier General 11, 12, 21
Majid Hussian al Ibraheem

al Tikriti

2nd Baghdad Infantry Division Maqloob Maontin – Mosul Staff Brigadier General 4, 5, 6
Khedaer Muhammad

Mejbel Hussian Nema

Al Madina al Munawara Armored Division Al Rashedia Camp – Al n/a 2, 10, 17, 14
Taji Camp

Al Abed Infantry Division Kirkuk – Khalid Camp Staff Brigadier General 38, 39, 40
Salih Hafudh Abass Ali

B: Southern Corps (Al Fateh al Mubin Command Centre)

HQ: Al Hafreia – Alsuwera Camp

Commander: Staff Major General Mahmoud Ali al Lihaiby

Republican Guard Southern Corps Divisions

Division HQ Commander Brigades

Nabu Khuth Nussar Infantry Division Al Husseinia – Al Kutt Staff Brigadier General 19, 22, 23
Sufian Je Eff al Tikriti

Hamurabi Mechanized Division Al Wahda area – Al n/a 8, 17, 14
Suwaira

Al Nedaa Armored Division Baaquba – Deyala Staff Major General 27, 28, 29
Shubatt Ali Muttar

Kheshiem al Azawi



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3.11.10 Special Republican Guard

The role of this super-elite well-equipped military force is to protect the president and the regime, and crush any attempt at a rebellion or coup. The elite SRG is essentially Saddam's praetorian guard, and is responsible for the security of Baghdad. Units are deployed in various roles – some to guard Saddam's palaces, others to escort Saddam on the move and yet others as 'emergency response' forces. In recent years its structure included four infantry brigades comprising 13 battalions, as well as armor, air defense and artillery units. Recently an extra battalion has been added, making a total of 14. In times of war, it is understood that the total strength is brought up to between 25,000 and 26,000; in peace time, the SRG has a lower strength. In the summer of 1998, it was estimated to have strength of 15,000 to 16,000. The SRG is quite separate from the elite Republican Guard (RG). Although elements of the latter are stationed on the outskirts of Baghdad, the SRG is the only significant military unit of divisional strength allowed to be based in central Baghdad, the location of many sensitive installations, including the Republican Palace, nerve centre of Saddam's power. Apart from the SRG, the only military units permitted to maintain a presence in central Baghdad are the brigades attached to the security/intelligence agencies such as the Special Security Organization (SSO), the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and the Secret Police (SP).

The SRG maintains tight control on central Baghdad, guarding key government and Baath Party installations and other facilities such as the international airport, and securing all the major roads in and out of the city. As well as protecting Saddam, the SRG also ensures that any dissident military elements attempting to move on the capital would meet with considerable resistance. Many SRG personnel, especially senior officers, are drawn from areas noted for loyalty to Saddam, such as the dictator's home area around Tikrit. Some senior officers have been related to Saddam, either by blood or marriage. The SRG appears to receive preferential treatment in terms of the allocation of equipment and facilities.



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**APPENDIX 2 (AIR ORDER OF BATTLE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to LOGCAP
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Base	Unit	Type Role
Al Rashid Air Base (North of Baghdad)	Military Aviation School Republican Guard Squadron PA-34 An-2 Special Squadron Bell 214 ST	Transport Helicopter Support
Al Habbaniyah Airfield Cmdr: Gen Dhahir (40 km west of Baghdad)	Air Wing Cmdr: Brig Gen Karim Yassin Sq 44 Su-22 Sq 109 Su-25 Sq 73 MiG-23 Sq 14 MiG-21 Sq 6 MiG-29	Fighter/Bomber Close Air Support Multirole Fighter Fighter Bomber Interceptor
Al Bakr Airfield (30 kms south of Tikrit) Air Wing Cmdr: Brig Gen Sayf	Cmdr: Gen Farouk Sq 93 MiG-23 Sq 63 MiG-23 Sq 8 Su-24 Sq 5 Su-22 Sq 49 MiG-23 Sq 3 An-24, An-26 Sq 33 Il-76, PA-34	Multrole Fighter Multirole Fighter Fighter Ground Attack Fighter Bomber Multirole Fighter Transport Transport
Al Qadisiya Airfield (250km southwest of Baghdad)	Cmdr: Gen Ismail Al Sheiks Air Wing Cmdr: Brig Gen Amer Shaheen Sq 47 MiG-21 Sq 96 MiG-25 Sq 57 MiG-21 Sq 17 MiG-21	Fighter/Bomber Long-Range Interceptor Fighter/Bomber Training
Al Qadisiya Airfield	Cmdr: Brig Mohamed Mansour Combat/Training Wing MiG-21	Combat Training
Al Huriya Airfield (Kirkuk, northern Iraq)	Cmdr: Brig Bayan Al Tikriti Sq 69 Su-22	Fighter/Bomber
Saddam Airfield, Quayara (25km south of Mosul)	Sq 79 Mirage F1 Sq 89 Mirage F1 Sq 9 MiG-21	Multirole Fighter Multirole Fighter Fighter Bomber
Base	Unit	Type Role
Air Force College (Abu Ghraib area of Baghdad)	Cmdr: Gen Saad Daham Al Nasiri Air Wing Cmdr: Col Nawfal Sq 1 EMB-312 Tucano	Training



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Sq 2 EMB-312 Tucano	Training
Sq 3 L-39	Training

Dhulouya Airfield (western outskirts of Baghdad) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are flown from here

Abu Ubaida (near Kut) Dispersal Airfield

Imam Ali Airfield (near Nasseriya) Dispersal Airfield

Al Shuaba Airfield (Basra) Dispersal Airfield

Al Walid Airfield, H3 (near Jordanian border) Dispersal Airfield

Note: The above details are based on information emanating from Iraq via dissident sources in 2001.



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APPENDIX 3 (AIR DEFENSE ORDER OF BATTLE) to ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) to LOGCAP CONTINGENCY SUPPORT PLAN

- 1. Background.** The ADC, which has an estimated strength of about 17,000, has been commanded in recent times by a very experienced officer, General Yassin Mohamed Shaheen, who was deputy Air Defense commander during the 1991 Gulf War. The ADC HQ, part of which is underground, is close to al-Muthanna Airfield in the Mansour area of Baghdad.
- a. Despite major damage caused by coalition air strikes on air defense sites in the 'Desert Fox' offensive of December 1998 and subsequently, the ADC has shown considerable resilience.
 - b. The air defense system has been developed from a C3 system called KARI installed by French technicians in the 1980s to co-ordinate a mix of Soviet and Western equipment.
 - c. The network was badly damaged during the Gulf War. In 2001 it was estimated that missile assets included 20-30 SA-2 batteries with 100 launch units; 25-50 SA-3 batteries with 140 launch units and 36-55 SA-6 batteries with more than 100 fire units, as well as Roland SAMs, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and a mix of Western and Soviet-designed radar.
 - d. In June 2001, a senior US military source stated that Iraq had fired more shells and missiles at US aircraft patrolling the northern no-fly zone since January than it did in all of the previous year. Washington also became very concerned about Iraq's increased air defense capabilities in the southern no-fly zone and the targeting of coalition aircraft. This prompted the coalition to carry out air strikes against five command and control nodes, four of them north of the 33rd parallel near Baghdad, in February 2001. The aim was to disrupt the operations of long-range surveillance radars and other sites that provide the command and control links to Iraqi SAM batteries. The nodes were being linked up through fibre-optic cables with SAM batteries in the south. In the greater Baghdad area, Iraq has been using the Thomson-CSF Volex III E/F band and the Soviet-designed P-14 'Tall King' VHF band long-range surveillance radars, which can 'see' into both the northern and southern no-fly zones, to target aircraft in an attempt to prevent the SAM batteries' own target acquisition radars from being struck by allied Highspeed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs).
 - e. U.S. officials have complained about the Chinese role in constructing the fibre-optic system. Iraq has sought help to upgrade its air defenses from other foreign sources as well. (b)(1);(b)(3); 50 USC §403(g) Section 6
(b)(1);(b)(3); 50 USC §403(g) Section 6
 - f. A newspaper in Belarus reported in October 2001 that Iraqi military officers had arrived in the country to learn how to operate the S-300 air defense missile system. According to the unconfirmed report in the newspaper Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, ten officers were undergoing a two-year course at the Belarussian Military Academy.
- 2. Role and Deployment** One of the key roles of the Air Defense Command (ADC) has been to use SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery in an attempt to bring down Coalition aircraft patrolling the northern and southern no-fly zones.



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- a. ADC HQ operates from a partly-subterranean complex close to al-Muthanna Airfield in the Mansour area of Baghdad. It controls four Sector Operations Centers (SOCs) as follows:
- 1) 1st Sector Operations Centre** The 1st SOC covers the central/east sector. HQ is at al-Taji Military Camp, northern Baghdad. This is one of the more important SOC's, covering the greater Baghdad area and central Iraq. The area covered extends to Balad and Samara to the north; al-Kut to the south, Iran borders to the east, and al-Habbaniyah to the west. The SOC controls surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) batteries, and early warning radars and control systems. Al-Taji Military Camp plays a key role in air defense and military communications. The centre here is at the core of an underground coaxial cable network, with a relay centre located inside the Ministry of Defense. Units under the control of 1st SOC include:
- (a) Missiles Brigade No. 145, located 20kms south of al-Dorah neighborhood, Baghdad. It comprises six SA-2 batteries; six SA-3 batteries.
 - (b) Missiles Brigade No. 146, located at al-Habbaniyah consists of four SA-2 batteries and SA-3 batteries.
 - (c) Other missile batteries. A wide range of missile batteries, including mobile batteries, protect sensitive installations in the greater Baghdad region. SAMs deployed include Roland, Hawk, SAM-2, and SAM-3.
 - (d) AAA Battalions.
 - (1) One Battalion at al-Taji Military Camp.
 - (2) One battalion at al-Rashid Military Camp/
 - (3) Two battalions at the Nuclear Power Station complex.
 - (4) Two battalions at al-Askandariyah.
 - (5) Weaponry deployed includes 57mm, 23mm, 14mm, and Shilka 23mm ZSU -23-4.
 - (e) Electronic Countermeasures Unit, located at al-Rashid Military Camp.
 - (f) Early Warning Radar and Control (EWRC) Battalion. Location unknown. This unit is responsible for detecting enemy aircraft threatening the greater Baghdad area. The unit also operates a SAM-11 battery and 57mm AAA.
 - (g) Other EWRC units:
 - (1) The 50th EWRC regiment, located at Baghdad, al-Nibayi. Linked to stations at Hamrin Mountain, Samarra, Thathar, al-Kut and Mansooriat al-Jabal.
 - (h) The 51st EWRC regiment, located close to al-Habbaniyah Air Base.
 - (i) The 52nd EWRC Regiment, located at Al-Nekhaib close to Saudi Arabia border.
- 2) 2nd Sector Operation Centre** The 2nd SOC covers western Iraq. HQ is located close to al-Waleed Air Base (H3) near the Jordanian border. It covers a region that includes the border with Syria, the region north to Mosul; the region to al-Semawah to the south, the Iranian border to the east and al-Habbaniyah base to the west. Units controlled by the 2nd SOC include:



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- (a) Missiles Brigade No. 147. Comprises six SA-3 Batteries, four Batteries of SA-2, and what is described as a 'mixed Technical Battery'.
 - (b) Roland Missile Battalion _ Anti aircraft artillery units, deploying weaponry with a range of different calibers, including 57mm, 23mm, 14.5mm, and Shilka 23mm ZSU -23-4.
 - (c) The 12th Early Warning Radar and Control (EWRC) Battalion.
- 3) 3rd Sector Operation Centre** The 3rd SOC covers southern Iraq. HQ is located close to Imam Ali Air Base, near Nasseria, and covers the region to al- Kut in the north, the borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the south, the borders of Iran to the east and the borders of Jordan and Saudi Arabia to the west. Units controlled by the 3rd SOC include:
- (a) Missiles Brigade No. 148; this unit is reported to have been re-established after its assets were destroyed.
 - (b) Anti aircraft artillery units spread through Basra, Nasseria and the Iranian border region near Amarah city.
 - (c) 3rd Early Warning Radar and Control (EWRC) Brigade, which consist of two Battalions.
 - (1) The 71st EWRC Battalion located close to the SOC HQ.
 - (2) The 72nd EWRC Battalion located near Amarah city.
 - (3) In addition, there is an EWRC Regiment located around Basra. All these EWRC units are said to be fully operational.
- 4) 4th Sector Operation Centre.** The 4th SOC covers northern Iraq. HQ is at al-Hurriya Air Base close to Kirkuk city. Areas of responsibility include Mosul to the north, Iranian frontier region to the east, and al- Jazirah to the west. All units are said to be fully operational. Units controlled by the 3rd SOC include:
- (a) Missile Brigade No. 195 in Kirkuk. Units include four SAM-2 batteries, and a number of new batteries installed at Beji and Mosul.
 - (b) Anti-aircraft artillery units.
 - (c) Two SAM-6 batteries.
 - (d) Two Early Warning Radar and Control (EWRC) Battalions.
 - (1) The 81st EWRC Battalion is located in Kirkuk vicinity.
 - (2) The 82nd EWRC Battalion located at Mosul. Both units said to be fully operational.
- 5) Independent SOC.** SAM batteries installed in this sector to protect Saddam Hussein's Presidential Palaces, and installations of the elite military formations, the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard, are controlled by a SOC independent from the ADC HQ. This independent SOC controls a number of missile brigades deploying a range of missiles, including