[redacted]

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NOTE: APPENDIX (ITEMS 1-13) OF JCSM-497-61 WERE DECLASSIFIED & RELEASED IN 1977.

[redacted]

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JCS 1731/473

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21 July 1961

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 7-400

DECISION ON JCS 1731/473

A Report by the J-5

on

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 8 JUN 1983

STUDIES PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL MEASURES (U)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 21 July 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 9 of JCS 1731/473.

2. Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised pages listed below and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations

3995	2	of the Appendix to Enclosure A
3997	3	" " "
4003	4	" " "
4008	8	" " "
	9	" " "
	11	" " "

3. The memorandum in Enclosure A, together with its Appendix, was forwarded as JCSM-497-61, dated 21 July 1961, to the Secretary of Defense.

4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c), applied and were followed.

5. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of JCS 1731/473.

[redacted]

F. J. BLOUIN

[redacted]

M. J. INGELIDO

[redacted]

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20 July 1961

Pages 3995 - 4009, incl.

REPORT BY THE J-5

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

STUDIES PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL MEASURES (U)

References: a. JCS 1731/242
b. JCS 1731/401
c. JCS 1731/414
d. JCS 1731/462
e. JCS 1731/469
f. JCS 1731/472
g. JCS 2319/9

The Commandant has expressed the direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter.

[redacted]

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DOD DIR 5200.10

(Page Revised by Decision on - 21 July 1961

[redacted]

[redacted]

STUDIES PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL MEASURES (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the impact on, and the remaining capabilities of, the United States and its military forces if these forces were reduced to 1.8 million men.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In a memorandum* to the Secretary of Defense dated 22 July 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a study on the effect on the US military posture of a reduction of the armed forces of the United States and USSR to 2.1 million men. This study was based on a proportional reduction in the strength of the various Services.

3. In a memorandum** to the Secretary of Defense dated 28 October 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded:

a. A recommended US policy on arms control.

b. A recommended US position for arms control negotiations.

c. Interpretative policy guidance with respect to the arms control plan of 27 June 1960, as revised.

4. In a memorandum*** to the Secretary of Defense dated 10 June 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed that the 27 June 1960 position provides a properly safeguarded disarmament program suitable for negotiation.

5. In a memorandum**** to the Secretary of Defense dated 28 June 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed their concern that the revised draft of the US Negotiating Proposal did not require that limitations and reduction of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles be related to each other and be conditional upon prior reductions in armed forces and other armaments.

---

* Enclosure A to JCS 1731/401 — 3050 (1 Jan 60) Sec 14 - JCSM-318-60

** Enclosure A to JCS 1731/414 — " (") Sec 17 JCSM-483-60

*** Enclosure to JCS 1731/462 — 3050 (6 June 61) JCSM-315-61

**** Enclosure to JCS 1731/469 — 3050 (6 June 61) JCSM-440-61

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

DISCUSSION

6. For discussion, see Enclosure B.

CONCLUSIONS

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously concluded that numerical limitations alone on the military manpower of the armed forces of the United States and USSR are not a realistic means for the regulation of arms and armed forces. These conclusions remain valid.

8. The appraisal of the impact of the postulated reduction of armed forces in the United States and the USSR to 1.8 million men in the period about 1966, contained in Enclosure A and its Appendix, is as adequate as can be made at this time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in Enclosure A, together with its Appendix which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. Copies of this paper be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Studies Pertaining to Arms Control Measures (U)

1. In accordance with an oral request from Mr. McCloy, the Adviser to the President on Disarmament, to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the impact on, and the remaining capabilities of, the United States and its military forces, if those forces were reduced to 1.8 [redacted] million men.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views as expressed in JCSM 440-61* dated 28 June 1961, JCSM 395-61** dated 10 June 1961, JCSM 783-60*** dated 28 October 1960 and JCSM 318-60**** dated 22 July 1960. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to emphasize their previous views that:

a. Numerical limitations on manpower alone do not constitute a sound and comprehensive approach to arms control. Any numerical limitations must, therefore, be considered only in the context of other arms control measures.

b. Any reduction in armaments, and in manpower levels, resulting from negotiations with the Bloc, must be in conjunction with sound inspection and control procedures.

c. Armed forces and armaments result from international political tensions; they are not the cause. A demonstrable reduction in international political tensions must precede any significant reductions in US armed forces if the security of the United States is to be maintained.

* Enclosure to JCS 1731/469
** Enclosure to JCS 1731/462
*** Enclosure A to JCS 1731/414
**** Enclosure A to JCS 1731/401

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[redacted]

3. It is recognized that for arms control planning purposes, a more definitive analysis of the impact of a reduction of force level below the 2.1 million level must be made. The analysis of a reduction to the 2.5 million and 2.1 million level is reviewed in the Appendix in order to establish a background against which a 1.8 million level could be considered. The [redacted] impact of a reduction to the 1.8 million [redacted] contained in paragraph 5 of the Appendix.

4. In view of the critical sequencing and the close relationship which exists between the reduction of force levels and other arms control measures, particularly nuclear measures, it is recommended that this study be considered along with the study* on Net Military Consequences of a Cessation of Production of Fissionable Material and that the two studies be considered in any related arms control measures.

* JCS 1731/472

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

STUDY RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL MEASURES

(16 pages)

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX

STUDY RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL MEASURES

1. Introduction

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their views that numerical limitations alone do not constitute a sound and comprehensive approach to arms control and that any numerical limitations must be considered only in the context of other arms control measures.

b. Further, there are certain basic conditions, political and military, throughout the world which must be achieved to reduce the threat to Free World security and to warrant reductions in armed forces by the United States and its Free World Allies.

c. It is vital to Free World security that the United States and its Allies recognize and never lose sight of the fact that we are negotiating with the representatives of a USSR controlled international communist system that is dedicated to the domination of the world through communism. It is an offensive system and not a defensive one; it is a closely controlled system, prepared to use any means to accomplish its end goals. The situations in or affecting Laos, Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan, Cuba, Guinea, Congo and Berlin are current examples of the varied nature and extent of the threat and methods employed.

d. The United States must also consider the commitments and obligations that are inherent in the system of mutual security that has been developed since World War II. A summary of these obligations is attached in Annex titled International Agreements.

e. It is therefore axiomatic that relaxation of international tensions must be achieved before a meaningful arms control agreement can be accomplished and implemented.

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20 May 1977
Authority SM-449-77 (Appendix only)

f. It is the purpose of this study to consider in general terms the impact on, and the remaining capabilities of, the United States and its military forces, if these forces were reduced to 1.8 million men. In order to accomplish the above, this study will review in general terms the impact of the 2.5 and 2.1 million man force limitation proposals, and set forth as briefly as possible specific political and military conditions which must ensue before any force levels are agreed to and implemented by the United States and its Allies. This results in a scenario of arms control progress based on the 27 June 1960 arms control proposal, to the point where reductions from 2.1 to 1.8 million men might begin

2. Phasing of force level reductions.

a. The 27 June 1960 arms control proposals provide in part that:

(1) Stage I;

(a) Force levels shall be limited initially to 2.5 million each for the United States and the USSR and agreed levels for certain other States.

(b) After these initial force level limitations for all participating States have been accepted and verified, the force levels of the United States and the USSR shall be limited to 2.1 million each and to agreed appropriate levels for other military significant States.

(2) In Stage II, force levels shall be progressively reduced to 1.7 million each for the United States and USSR and to agreed appropriate levels for other States.

b. Reduction to 1.8 million could be one force level in a progressive reduction to 1.7 million.

3. Impact of the 2.5 million level.

a. It is estimated that the USSR armed forces have been reduced to approximately 3.25 million as of 1 July 1961, including an estimated 0.25 million security forces. On 8 July 1961, Premier Khrushchev announced that he had ordered suspension of projected reductions in the Soviet armed forces and had called for an increase of more than 3.0 billion rubles in this year's defense budget. There is evidence that some functions previously performed by military personnel have been, in the course of reductions in recent years, increasingly filled by civilian employees, particularly in construction and logistical activity.

b. The US armed forces are currently at a level of approximately 2.5 million men. The 13,000 increase scheduled for distribution to all four US Armed Services, and the 12,000 additional increase proposed for the Marine Corps, both of which are now before the Congress, are indications of needed trend in the US Armed Services.

c. In assessing the impact of agreeing to a force level of 2.5 million, it is important to recognize that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have specified the armed forces which would be included and those which would be excluded in computing the level. Their definition is as follows:

"1. In calculating the limits of the 'armed forces' allowed the signators of a first phase disarmament agreement, the following will be included:

"All full-time, uniformed personnel maintained by the national government in the following categories:

"a. Career personnel of the active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.

"b. Conscripts performing their required period of fulltime active duty as fixed by national law.

"c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a combatant military mission.

"2. In calculating the limits of the "armed forces' allowed the signators of a first phase disarmament agreement, the following categories associated with the national military establishment will be excluded:

"a. Reserve personnel or volunteers undergoing active duty training in the national military establishment for periods totaling not more than six months per year.

"b. Reserve personnel, auxiliary personnel, and student trainees not performing fulltime duty with the national military estaolishment.

"c. Civilian employees of the national military establishment engaged on a voluntary basis and free to sever at will their connection with the national military establishment.

"d. Personnel serving in units maintained by the national government for primarily humanitarian missions, even though such personnel are fulltime and uniformed."

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff acceptance of a 2.5 million or any other force level was conditioned in part upon an agreed international definition which was in accord with the above.

e. Any conclusions concerning the relative military power of the United States and the USSR, with each adhering to a 2.5 million personnel level, must be conditioned by the fact that the USSR is maintaining and continuing to achieve a high order of modernization of its armed forces. In this regard, it is estimated that Soviet military manpower reductions to date will not reduce the over-all military capabilities of the Soviets; that the reduction in manpower, although it has resulted in fewer weapons systems and combat units, will be more than offset, capability-wise, by modernization of existing systems and equipment and the increased fire power obtained in new systems. These forces, estimated to total approximately 3,250,000 including 250,000 security forces as of 1 July 1961, are complemented by large mobilization reserves. Superiority in basic military resources devoted primarily to land campaigns, including support by missile, air, naval, and airborne forces, is expected to give the Soviets a capability to prevail over current indigenous military opposition in Europe and other areas contiguous to the Bloc.

f. Restriction of the United States and the USSR to a 2.5 million level within the over-all terms of the US proposal of 27 June 1960, may, on balance, be to the relative net security advantage of the United States. However, this statement is qualified and limited by:

(1) The high order of modernization of the Soviet forces, which will permit them to reduce their military manpower without an appreciable over-all reduction in military capabilities.

(2) The advantages the Sino-Soviet Bloc has in short lines of communication with respect to the most likely areas of involvement vis-a-vis the United States.

(3) The fact that the military strength of the United States, as the leader of the Free World, must be assessed in relation to the total USSR-Communist China capability.

(4) The fact that an international agreement limiting US military strength at essentially its present level will reduce our flexibility in the adoption of a more aggressive foreign policy.

(5) The fact that the United States and Sino-Soviet military establishments are not symetrical, e.g., the large number of security and quasi-military forces in the USSR for which there is no counterpart in the United States.

g. An agreement for a 2.5 million force level should therefore include:

(1) Agreement on the US definition of the term "armed forces,"

(2) Means of verifying compliance,

and should follow significant relaxation of international tension in certain areas that have become critical during the past year or which threaten to become so. Examples include Southeast Asia and Berlin.

h. Four additional aspects of an agreed 2.5 million force level warrant specific consideration:

(1) Adoption of a more aggressive foreign policy by the United States for combating communism in the underdeveloped areas of the world may well result in a military strategy which requires an increase in personnel over present strengths. An international agreement on a 2.5 million level will reduce the military flexibility of the United States by preventing any such increase.

(2) The United States must deploy and commit its forces over extended lines of communication from the CONUS. By contrast, the main arena for employment of the forces of the USSR is contiguous to the homeland. This extended deployment of US forces has a higher relative cost in military manpower. It requires numerically more, and technically superior, manpower to maintain or deploy a US military unit in Europe than for the USSR to maintain or deploy a comparable unit in the same area.

(3) Finally, the United States must never ignore the fact that even if the Communist Chinese and the USSR agree to a similar reduction to 2.5 million, the United States must consider its unilateral, political, and military commitments, not only in areas contiguous to both of these military powers, but in other parts of the world as well.

(4) Necessity for increased US progress in the political-psychological-economic areas of the cold war.

4. Impact of the 2.1 million level

a. The US proposal on levels of forces considers that a prerequisite for a 2.1 million level would be the accession to the treaty by Communist China and all other militarily significant states. This would include agreement on the initial force levels for these states; e.g., not more than 2.5 million for Communist China, as well as verification of such levels by an effective arms control organization.

b. A ceiling of 2.1 million men on the United States armed forces would place a definite restriction on our military capability and require, in essence, a new military strategy for the nation. Trade-offs and balance would be necessary between such factors as deployed forces vs CONUS based forces and CONUS air defense vs other combat forces.

c. The exact extent of these changes cannot be forecast specifically at this time as they must be based on the international political situation then confronting the United States as well as the Sino-Soviet military force structure and deployment at the time of implementation. The results of other measures within Stage I of the 27 June 1960 proposals will also be of considerable importance. Order of magnitude reductions which can be anticipated include:

(1) A significant reduction in US forces deployed to NATO, large enough to require a major revision of the commitments of all the nations.

(2) Significant reductions in the Pacific forces.

(3) Proportional reductions in the US CONUS ready forces and in required sea and air lift.

(4) Possible phasing out of certain obsolescent bombers before adequate weapon system replacements are available.

(5) Reduction of approximately [redacted] of the Navy's atomic and conventional strike capability in the Atlantic and Far East areas.

(6) Reduction of approximately one-third in CONUS air defense forces.

(7) Reduction of anti-submarine defense of seaward approaches by approximately one-third.

(8) A general reduced level of over-all readiness and a reduced training and production base to support mobilization.

d. With respect to Allied Forces, inasmuch as no levels have been as yet proposed for countries other than the United States, USSR, United Kingdom, France and Communist China, it is not feasible to make a definitive assessment of the impact of the reduction to 2.1 million men. However, under the assumption that reductions of Allied Forces would be roughly comparable to the 16% proposed for the United States under a reduction from 2.5 to 2.1 million men, the greatest impact would appear to be on the NATO Alliance. If heavy US redeployments from Europe were to be considered by our Allies as a lessening of US interest in the problems of Western Europe it would weaken the resolve of the NATO member nations to a point where the collapse of NATO as an effective defense alliance would be probable. It thus follows that for the reduction to be a viable proposal, our allies must agree to the details as well as the general idea.

e. The influence of geography, resulting in long lines of communication for the United States as opposed to the Sino-Soviet Bloc, becomes even more critical at this force level. Because of interior land lines of communication to areas continguous to the Sino-Soviet homeland, the USSR could maintain a relatively strong force structure against NATO, and, in connection with the Communist Chinese maintain an enhanced capability in Asia.

f. In summary:

(1) The reduction in manpower from 2.5 million to 2.1 million constitutes a particularly critical step in the total arms control operation.

(2) The withdrawal of US deployed forces required by this force level will advance the present Soviet objectives of reducing the US power position throughout the world, and of greatly weakening the political-military alliances of the Free World.

(3) The resolution of most of the major points of Free World-Sino-Soviet Bloc disagreement must occur before this reduction is initiated. Examples of such sources of political tension include, but are not limited to:

(a) Berlin

(b) South Korea

(c) Southeast Asia

(d) Taiwan and the Chinese Nationalist Government

5. Impact of the 1.8 million level

a. The implications of a reduction of force levels to 1.8 million include many unresolved problems. By assuming the successful completion of all of the measures now in Stage I of the US proposal, some narrowing of parameters can be obtained. For example, by using this assumption, we can envisage a world in which:

(1) Measures to prevent space vehicles carrying mass destruction weapons would be in effect.

(2) Certain measures to prevent surprise attack would be in effect.

(3) Production of fissionable material would have been stopped, with some level of agreed quantities transferred to peaceful purposes.

(4) Force levels of 2.1 million would exist for the United States, the USSR and the CHICOMS, with appropriate lesser forces for other significant powers.

b. However, the successful completion of Stage I still leaves a number of imponderables directly associated with Arms Control. For example:

(1) Nuclear weapons will still exist in the arsenals of a number of powers.

(2) These weapons could be launched, assuming that a nation or group of nations desire to circumvent the Stage I agreement.

(3) The Sino-Soviet Bloc can possess significant quantities of chemical, biological and radiological weapons which can be produced covertly and easily hidden while in stock.

(4) Because of strategic location and total forces, the Sino-Soviet Bloc will possess a superiority in military manpower and conventional weapons for peripheral application at times and places of their choosing.

c. In addition to the above, the following unknowns exist in our forecast of the world at the completion of Stage I:

(1) The alignment of nations by treaties or other mutual interest agreements.

(2) The continued existence of international communism, with an avowed determination to rule the world, or its replacement by some other political philosophy, which has as a goal political, economic and/or military aggression leading to world domination.

(3) The ability of the United Nations to organize, and politically control, an international police organization for the maintenance of world peace.

d. Because of factors such as those listed above, any assessment of the implication to the United States of a 1.8 million force level must be of a broad and general nature. These general areas are explored in the following paragraphs.

e. Within a 1.8 million force level, the military force of the United States can:

(1) Maintain reduced strategic offensive forces, which could be effective only in the deterrence of attack and for employment in defense of US territory and only if completely reliable inspection and control measures exist over all Phase I measures. (This would require radical revision of US Basic National Security Policies.)

(2) Maintain a small CONUS air defense force, which could be effective only under the conditions stated in paragraph (1) above.

(3) Maintain certain limited military forces outside the CONUS and contiguous waters to evidence continued US participation in our mutual assistance agreements, with an extremely limited capability to reinforce and support combat operations in forward areas.

f. The military force of the United States cannot:

(1) Maintain sufficient combat power to maintain our security if the Sino-Soviet Bloc is able to covertly evade the restrictions of Stage I.

(2) Contribute sufficient deployed forces in support of a forward strategy involving mutual security agreements.

(3) Maintain sufficient mobile forces to project any consequential degree of military power to more than one area of the world at any one time.

g. Before the 1.8 million force structure could be a viable force for national security, in addition to completion of Stage I, the following conditions should exist.

(1) The levels of reductions must be related to the degree of improvement in the international political environment and confidence in the international peace-keeping machinery.

(2) Such reductions must be approached on a military basis to insure that as one element of security is lost, another of equal military worth is provided.

6. Conclusion. It may therefore be concluded that Stage II of Arms Control to include a 1.8 million force ceiling can be a logical goal of United States policy only if:

a. Stage I, including reliable inspection and controls, is accomplished.

b. There is in the world no government strong enough to be a threat which seeks to expand its political philosophy and influence through economic and/or military aggression.

c. The interdependence of measures for force levels, armaments, nuclear weapons stockpiles and means for delivering nuclear weapons as specified in the 27 June 1960 proposal is preserved throughout each stage and level of disarmament.

ANNEX

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The United States is now party to a number of international agreements which would individually or in combination obligate us to employ military forces. The United Nations charter obligates signatories to make available to the Security Council armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Protracted negotiations during the early years of the United Nations disclosed apparently irreconcilable differences between the United States and the Soviet Union on this subject. The United States adopted a position that we would not discuss the problem further until agreement is reached on the control of atomic weapons and also on other aspects of the question of arms control.

a. The terms and charter of the various collective self defense and regional arrangements to which the United States is a party are all stated to be in accord with the purposes and principles of the UN charter. The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty agreed to improve their defenses and to consider an attack against one of them in Europe, North America, the northern Algerian departments of France and the Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer, as an attack against all of them. The United States is not a member of CENTO, but has joined three of its committees including the Military Committee. The United States has bilateral defense agreements with the three Middle East CENTO countries, i.e., Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, and has agreed that in the case of aggression

against these countries it will take action, including the use of armed forces to promote peace and security in the Middle East. As a member of SEATO the United States has agreed to act in accordance with its constitutional processes against armed aggression in the treaty area against any signatories or aggression taken against Cambodia, Laos or South Vietnam. In the Pacific Defense Pact (usually known as ANZUS), Australia, the United States and New Zealand promised to resist armed attack by means of continuous self help and mutual aid. By the Rio Treaty the American States agreed that aggression against one was considered to be against them all. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), which is included in the charter of the Organization of American States is the focal point of military activity and collaboration.

b. In addition to the foregoing multilateral agreements there are a number of bilateral treaties which could lead to the employment of US armed forces. The United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the Japanese islands would be dangerous to the peace and both parties agreed to act to meet the common danger. The United States-Korean Treaty is similar except the area specified is the Pacific area. The United States-Philippines Treaty is in the pattern of the Japanese and Korean Treaties. In the United States-Republic of China Treaty, each of the parties recognizes that an armed attack in the western Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and that each would act to meet the common danger. The United States has established bilateral defense commissions with Mexico and Brazil.

c. These agreements have certain things in common. They are defensive in nature. Their implementation depends upon some overt act from outside. Except for the UN charter, their implementation is related to a defined geographic area. They all retain for their signatories a wide degree of discretion as to means and degree of implementation.

d. It is noteworthy that although we have entered into defense agreements with a large number of countries, there are in addition many countries who are susceptible to international Communist aggression who would possibly ask for help if attacked or threatened. The United States has common defense interests with Spain and Liberia and the individual American states although the treaties with these related primarily to equipment and bases. India is an example of a country who might ask for help if attacked by her communist neighbor.

[redacted]

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE B

DISCUSSION

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously addressed* the implications of an Arms Control force level of 2.1 million. The Joint Staff has more recently investigated** the implications of a force level of 2.5 million and 2.1 million. In both of these studies, the inability to develop accurate implications of a further reduction below a 2.1 million level was reaffirmed. Valid forecasts concerning the international situation that would exist at the end of Stage I of the proposed Arms Control Plan are not available at this time.

2. The above factors relative to a 1.8 or 1.7 force level are still applicable. However, a requirement exists to increase the data available for long-range Arms Control Planning.

3. For the reasons stated above, specific statements concerning the impact of a 1.8 million force level cannot be made. It is possible, however, to assess, in general terms, certain missions that the armed forces of the United States can or cannot perform at this force level. Even so, the assessment is still necessarily qualified by the imponderables concerning the international political and military situation which would exist at the end of the successful completion of Stage I.

4. Service estimates of a possible force structure under a proportionate reduction to 1.8 million are at Appendices A, B, C, and D. It should be specifically noted that each of these

* See Enclosure to JCS 1731/401
** DJSM 625-61; on file in Joint Secretariat

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

structures represent but one possible course of action which might be adopted under the indicated ceilings. If a reduction of this magnitude were actually adopted, the resulting force structures would be in accordance with the military requirements of a specific time period and thus might vary widely from the structures shown.

5. The estimated strength of the Sino-Soviet Bloc active military personnel as of 1 July 1961 is at Appendix E.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE B

ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

MAJOR UNITS	TOTAL 30 Jun 61	ARMS CONTROL ESTIMATE 628,200 STRENGTH		
		TOTAL	CONUS	OVERSEAS
Divisions	14	9	4	5
Brigades & Regiments	23	10	3	7
Air Defense Bns	77¼	45¼	24	21¼
Separate Combat Bns	97	75	32	41
Special Forces Gp	3	4	2	2
COS Avn	34	20	7	13

[redacted]

[redacted]

SP[redacted]

APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE B

NAVY FORCE STRUCTURE

	TOTAL 30 Jun 61	ARMS CONTROL ESTIMATE 451,300 STRENGTH			
		LANTCOM	EUCOM	PACOM	TOTAL
Attack Carriers (CVA)	15	4	2	6	12
Support Carriers (CVS)	9	5	-	3	8
Cruisers/Command Ships (CAG/CLG/CC)	15	3	2	4	9
Destroyers and Escorts (DD/DDE/DDG/DDR/DL/DE/DEG)	225	74	16	78	168
Submarines (SS/SSN/SSG/SSGN/SSK)	112	34	2	26	62
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)	5	27	-	9	36
Amphib Warfare Ships	108	25*	-	25	50**
Air ASW Rons (VP)	30	4	-	4	8
Attack Carrier Air Group (CVG)	15	4	2	6	12
Support Carrier Air Group (CVSG)	9	5	-	3	8
Patrol ships (PCE/APD)	43	-	-	-	-
Mine Warfare ships	84	-	-	-	-
AEW Rons (VW Barrier)	2	-	-	-	-
AEW Rons (VW Fleet)	1	-	-	-	-

* Five amphibious ships to be available for occasional deployment to EUCOM

** Amphibious shipping adequate to provide austere assault lift for ½ Marine Division/Wing Team equivalent on each coast.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Page revised by 1st Corrigendum - 20 July 1961)

APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE B

AIR FORCE FORCE STRUCTURE

MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS	TOTAL 30 June 61	ARMS CONTROL ESTIMATE 594,100 STRENGTH
1. Not assigned		
Tactical Ftr Sqdns	28	24
Tactical Recon Sqdns	4	4
Troop Carrier Sqdns (H)	10	-
Troop Carrier Sqdns (M)	7	6
Troop Carrier Sqdns (A)	6	-
Tactical Tanker Sqdns	4	-
Air Transport Sqdns (MATS)	19	8
2. Assigned		
a. ALCOM		
Ftr Intcp Sqdns	1	1
b. LANTCOM		
Ftr Intcp Sqdns	1	-
c. CONAD		
Ftr Intcp Sqdn	39	19
Intcp Missile Sqdns	6	-
d. EUCOM		
Tactical Bomb Sqdns	3	-
Tactical Missile Sqdns	3	-
Tactical Ftr Sqdns	18	3
Tactical Recon Sqdns	8	0
Ftr Intcp Sqdn	6	3
Troop Carrier Sqdns (H)	1	-
Troop Carrier Sqdns (M)	3	3
Tactical Tanker Sqdn	1	0

[redacted]

[redacted]

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MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS	TOTAL 30 June 61	ARMS CONTROL ESTIMATE 594,100 STRENGTH
[redacted] PACOM		
Tactical Bomb Sqdns	3	-
Tactical Missile Sqdns	2	-
Tactical Ftr Sqdns	9	3
Tactical Recon Sqdns	2	-
Ftr Intcp Sqdns	5	3
Troop Carrier Sqdns (H)	2	-
Troop Carrier Sqdns (M)	3	3
Tactical Tanker Sqdn	1	0
[redacted] SAC		
Bomb Sqdns (H)	37	42
Bomb Sqdns (M)	83	-
Recon Sqdns (M)	6	-
Strategic Missile Sqdns	4	44
Strategic Tanker Sqdns	58	38

3. RECAPITULATION

Bomb Sqdns (H)	37	42
Bomb Sqdns (M)	83	-
Recon Sqdns (M)	6	-
Strategic Missile Sqdns	4	44
Strategic Tanker Sqdns	58	38
Tactical Bomb Sqdns	6	-
Tactical Ftr Sqdns	55	30
Tactical Recon Sqdns	14	4
Tactical Missile Sqdns	5	-
Tactical Tanker Sqdns	6	-
Ftr Intcp Sqdns	54	26
Intcp Missile Sqdns	6	-
Troop Carrier Sqdns (H)	11	-

MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS	TOTAL 30 June 61	ARMS CONTROL ESTIMATE 594,100 STRENGTH
Troop Carrier Sqdns (M)	13	12
Troop Carrier Sqdns (A)	6	-
Air Transport Sqdns (MATS)	21	12
Total Wings	88	44

[redacted]

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APPENDIX D TO ENCLOSURE B

MARINE CORPS FORCE STRUCTURE

	FMF STRUCTURE 30 June 1961	ARMS CONTROL ESTIMATE FMF STRUCTURE (148,000)*	ARMS CONTROL ESTIMATE FMF STRUCTURE (126,400)**
LANTCOM			
Fleet Marine Force	1	1	1
Marine Division/Wing Team@	8/9	6/9	8/9
EUCOM			
Marine Division/Wing Team@	1/9	1/9@@	1/9@@
PACOM			
Fleet Marine Force	1	1	1
Marine Division/Wing Team@	2	1-2/3	1
(Deployed)	(1)	(8/9)	(1/3)
(CONUS)	(1)	(7/9)	(2/3)
Recapitulation			
Fleet Marine Forces	2	2	2
Marine Division/Wing Teams@	3	2-4/9	2

* See USMC PM 27-60 of 21 June 1960; not on file in Joint Secretariat

** This strength will not allow the Marine Corps to maintain three combat divisions and three air wings as required by Title 10, US Code, Section 5013

@ Marine Division/Wing Teams are amphibious assault forces consisting of integrated air-ground elements with special task groupings as required

@@ Subject to availability of amphibious shipping

COMPARATIVE FORCE STRUCTURES OF USMC COMBATANT FORCES UNDER SELECTED MANPOWER CEILINGS

[redacted]

(Page Revised by Decision on - 21 July 1961

[redacted]

APPENDIX E TO ENCLOSURE B

ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH OF BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL, 1 July 1961 1/ *

	ARMED GROUND FORCES	AIR FORCE (Including Naval Aviation)	NAVAL FORCES	MILITARIZED SECURITY FORCES	TOTALS (Excluding Security)
USSR (Rounded Total)	2,150,000 2/	450,000	395,000 3/	250,000	2,995,000
EE Satellites (Rounded totals)	850,000	80,000	45,000	280,000	975,000
Albania	25,000	2,500	1,500	10,000	29,000
Bulgaria	110,000	11,500	6,200	35,000	127,700
Czechoslovakia	155,000	25,000	--	45,000	180,000
East Germany	75,000	7,500	11,000	50,000	93,500
Hungary	100,000	3,500	--	35,000	103,500
Poland	200,000	30,000	15,000	45,000	245,000
Rumania	200,000	10,500	11,000	60,000	221,500
Communist Asia (Rounded	3,275,000	100,000	75,000	50,000	3,450,000
Communist China Totals)	2,660,000	89,500	65,000	4/	2,814,500
North Korea	325,000	18,000	7,000	26,500	350,000
North Vietnam	275,500	450	1,800	35,000	277,750

1/ Figures in this Table are based on estimated order of battle
2/ Includes about 240,000 ground troops estimated to be assigned to Air Defense Forces and the Ministry of Defense
3/ Does not include naval personnel assigned to Ministry of Defense, Air Defense Forces, and pre-operational aviation training units
4/ Public security forces (totalling 200,000 men), which are subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense, are included in the ground force total

* JCS 2319/9

[redacted]

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

HOLDERS OF JCS 1731/473

A Report by the J-5

on

STUDIES PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL MEASURES (U)

The enclosed letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 27 July 1961, on the above subject is circulated for information.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

[redacted]

[redacted]

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
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[redacted]

(Page revised by 2nd Corrigendum - 4 August 1961)

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

27 July 1961

Honorable John J. McCloy
Adviser to the President on Disarmament
Department of State

Dear Jack:

In response to your oral request to General Lemnitzer, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the impact on, and the remaining capabilities of, the United States and its military forces if those forces were reduced to 1.8 million men. Their study,* with which I am in general agreement, is enclosed for your consideration and that of the Committee of Principals.

In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to emphasize their previous views that:

a. Numerical limitations on manpower alone do not constitute a sound and comprehensive approach to arms control. Any numerical limitations must, therefore, be considered only in the context of other arms control measures.

b. Any reduction in armaments, and in manpower levels, resulting from negotiations with the Bloc, must be in conjunction with sound inspection and control procedures.

c. Armed forces and armaments result from international political tensions; they are not the cause. A demonstrable reduction in international political tensions must precede any significant reductions in US armed forces if the security of the United States is to be maintained.

It is recognized that, for arms control planning purposes, a more definitive analysis of the impact of a reduction of a force level below the 2.1 million level must be made. The analysis of a reduction to the 2.5 million and 2.1 million level is reviewed in the enclosed study in order to establish a background against which a level of 1.8 million could be considered. The specific impact of a reduction to the 1.8 million level is contained in paragraph 5 of the study.

* See JCS 1731/473

[redacted]

[redacted]

In view of the critical sequencing and the close relationship which exists between the reduction of force levels and other arms control measures, it is recommended that this study be considered in conjunction with the study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff entitled "Net Military Consequences of a Cessation of Production of Fissionable Materials",* which has been forwarded separately to you. Further, it is recommended that these two studies be taken into account when any other related arms control measures are considered.

With respect to the unresolved question from the meeting of the Committee of Principals on July 5, 1961, as to whether or not the disarmament measures in the first stage of the US draft negotiating paper should be linked to prior accomplishment of force reductions to 2.1 million men each for the US and the USSR, you will recall that it was decided to defer a decision until the two studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were completed. On the basis of these studies, I believe that the link should be maintained.

Sincerely,

/s/ ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
Deputy Secretary of Defense

* See JCS 1731/472

[redacted]

[redacted]