


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ON 21 APRIL 1980



HISTORY
OF
THE JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF
BACKGROUND AND PREPARATION OF SIOF 62

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HISTORY OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF:

BACKGROUND AND PREPARATION OF SIOP-62

HISTORY & RESEARCH DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

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Preface

This document is the initial installment in the continued History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. It is concerned first with the development of problems in strategic target planning during the 1950s and the evolution of plans for the integration of the activities of the various commands into one plan; second with the organization of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Headquarters SAC; and third with the preparation of the first Single Integrated Operational Plan. In the preparation of this history the historian did research in JSTPS files at Headquarters SAC and in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Documents indicated as exhibits (Ex) are on file in the History & Research Division, Directorate of Information, Headquarters SAC.

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Background

establish a joint staff at Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC) under the direction of Commander in Chief, SAC, brought together for the first time all elements of the armed services with a strategic nuclear capability into one integrated operational plan. Secretary Gates considered the decision the most important he had made in seven years in the Pentagon. Perhaps the magnitude of this action can be better appreciated after a review of the history of planning and coordination activities for the strategic nuclear offensive between 1952 and 1960.

(U)

Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War, SAC had a virtual monopoly on the means of delivering atomic weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) drew SAC forces under its direct operational control in 1946 and strengthened these bonds in subsequent years by preventing usurpation of control of SAC forces by theater commanders. Therefore, during these years no coordination problems existed in planning and executing the atomic offensive, but by the early 1950s the situation was changing because of a proliferation of weapons and delivery vehicles. (U)

The United States Navy announced in 1952 that all of its new attack planes were capable of carrying tactical atomic bombs, and that it had on hand aircraft capable of delivering large bombs. Newly

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activated tactical units in Europe and the Far East also became able to deliver small weapons. Indeed, the Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter, announced that "nearly all" USAF combat aircraft were being modified to carry them. The time was also rapidly approaching when the Soviet Union would become a major atomic power. It exploded an atomic device in 1949, and a year later USAF credited Russia with already having a "formidable long range air force" which by 1952 could cover all of the United States.' (U)

To meet this increased Soviet threat the JCS acted to gain more direct control of the nation's expanding atomic force. In March 1952 an ad hoc committee of that group examined existing procedures for control and coordination of atomic operations and recommended centralizing them for maximum bombing effect and minimum interference between forces. The JCS agreed and established facilities for lateral coordination of planning called Joint Coordination Centers (JCC) in Europe and the Far East.* They were war room facilities for receipt, compilation, display, review, coordination, and relay of information concerning the plans and operations of atomic forces for the benefit of the unified and specified commanders concerned and the JCS.** This was operational coordination, that is, it took place after hostilities began. (U)

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Early exercises of the Joint Coordination Centers disclosed a requirement for pre-hostilities coordination of commanders' atomic plans. Accordingly, in 1954, the JCS asked each appropriate commander to submit an atomic annex, i.e., a target List, to his war plan and to coordinate it with theater commanders and CINCSAC. In 1955 SAC was directed to act as host for a conference of appropriate commanders to determine a methodology or "modus operandi" for defeat of communist air power. This conference failed to agree on anything except the requirement for periodic coordination of atomic war plans. With JCS approval these conferences became known as World-Wide Coordination Conferences (WWCC). They were held each subsequent year through 1958. Plans coordinated at these conferences and approved by the JCS were prepositioned with the Joint Coordination Centers for operational coordination required by an exercise or the initiation of hostilities. The total coordination activity pre- and post-hostility, was known as the atomic coordination machinery.


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How successful was this machinery? The magnitude of the problem probably can be appreciated best by recalling the complex problems of generation, launch, mutual support, and maximum bombing involved in preparing a single command's strike plan. These factors were manageable because the work went on within the framework of a common doctrine. When coordination between commands with different concepts, doctrines, traditions, and techniques was attempted, the problems became formidable. On the positive side, world-wide conferences did enable commanders

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to appreciate more fully each others capabilities, tasks, objectives, and plans. Target lists, forces, and strike timing were discussed and compared. Some conflicts were avoided. Yet the defects of the program were clearly more evident than its successes, at least to SAC. The conferences did not solve targeting conflicts; for example, in the 1957 and 1958 meetings duplications and triplications (two or more commands delivering weapons to the same target) were not significantly reduced. Neither did they achieve mutual support or unity of strategic effort among the JCS commanders. At the JCCs, operational coordination procedures depended upon a highly sophisticated communications system. During peacetime exercises the communications time lag between sending and receipt of messages tended to increase causing a backlog; under combat conditions the system's efficiency would be greatly reduced. In each of the exercises of the JCC machinery from 1958 through 1960 over 200 time over target (TOT) conflicts highlighted the degree of conflict in existing execution plans. In wartime, with disrupted communications, this could result in needless loss of aircraft and crews. A comparison of target lists and same conflict resolution were the net gains in four years of coordination effort.' General N. F. Twining, Chairman of the JCS, believed one fundamental principle had evolved from these coordination activities: " . . . atomic operations must be pre-planned for automatic execution to the maximum extent possible and with minimum reliance on post-H-Hour communications." ()



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The Search for More Effective Coordination

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (Public Law 85-599), passed by Congress on 23 July 1958, seemed to open new vistas for better coordination of the strategic offensive. President Eisenhower, in outlining his plan to the Congress, emphasized ". . . the vital necessity of complete unity in our strategic planning and basic operational direction." It was necessary that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs have the authority to take action in these matters. The Air Force, traditionally in favor of integration along functional lines, supported the President's program, as did the Army. The Navy was less enthusiastic. (U)

Armed with increased authority over the development and operation of new weapon system given him by the reorganization act, the Secretary of Defense, then Neil McElroy, examined plans for the new Fleet Ballistic Missile or Polaris, then in development. In December 1958 he asked the Joint Chiefs for their views on the future employment of the system. (U)

As spokesman for the Air Force, General Thomas D. White advocated creation of a unified US Strategic Command, to encompass subordinate units from the Air Force (heavy and medium bombers and intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles) and the Navy Polaris. With approval of the JCS, the CINCSAC would develop the organization so it could be functional by the time Polaris became operational. Strategic

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Air Command personnel would be integrated with those of the participating services and assigned to the new headquarters. General White believed a unified strategic command provided the organizational structure best suited for developing maximum effective atomic offensive plans. ()

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were in general opposition to the Air Force plan. Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, objected to integrating all strategic weapon systems into a single command and recommended rejection of the Air Force position.* The Navy had earlier asked that Polaris be assigned to Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) and eventually to United States Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEur) and Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPac). Admiral Burke saw little need for change: in his opinion coordination had been working well since the 1958 Reorganization Act and integration of Polaris into the fleet would pose no targeting problems. Assignment of all weapon systems to a single command, on the other hand, ". . ." would disrupt and alter the US. defense organization." Authority already existed in the JCS to prevent undesirable duplications in strategic targeting, planning, and weapons employment and the CNO believed it should remain there.* The Army generally agreed with the Navy, but it believed the entire investigation was premature. It would assign Polaris to the fleet and examine its command structure later when it had become a proven system. The Marine Corps favored making the JCS responsible for selection of targets, after which the unified commanders would

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assign them to attack forces. It feared assignment of targets to one commander would create a "monolithic" structure to control aircraft and land and fleet missiles which would have great coordination problems and be vulnerable if communications were destroyed. (S)

As a result of this disagreement, a split decision paper was presented to the SecDef. Although General White reported Mr. McElroy did not believe a decision on command arrangements was urgent because the system would not become operational until late in 1960, there was no doubt that the Secretary intended to press for improvement of target coordination procedures. In late July, following an EWO briefing at Headquarters SAC for the SecDef and members of the JCS, he requested the Chairman present his views on this problem. (M)

In his reply, General Twining reviewed the history of coordination to date and concludednot much more progress can be achieved under the present arrangements He rejected modifications to the existing machinery, advocating instead "fundamental changes" to the system. The problem divided into three categories: (1) targeting policy, (2) development of integrated operational plans, and (3) control of strike forces. Regarding the first, he inclined toward the Air Force counter force philosophy, believing the target system should include (in order of priority) long range nuclear delivery capability, government and military control centers, war making resources, and population centers. After adoption of a targeting policy, in the

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Chairman's opinion the commander responsible for the strategic mission should develop a national strategic targeting system or list subject to review by J-2 (Intelligence). On the second question, he believed an integrated operational plan was definitely needed. He would charge CINCSAC with its development. Naval carriers would not be assigned any pre-planned strategic targets, but when Polaris developed a significant operational capability it would be brought into the integrated plan. On the third issue, the Chairman reasoned that if the above actions were taken the question of operational control and problems of mutual interference would be "simplified." The promulgation of a national strategic target list (NSTL) and a single integrated operational plan (SIOP) would, in General Twining's words, ". . . provide a sound basis for necessary coordination of operational plans of local commanders with CINCSAC's plan." Only after decisions on these issues were made, in the form of a command decision, and enforced, would there be progress in the area of target coordination. ()

At the time he presented his views to the SecDef, the Chairman sought the positions of the services on the issues of targeting coordination by requesting answers to 18 questions. Initially* an inter-service ad hoc committee prepared a reply to the questions. Later, each service individually prepared their answers. As in the issue of command and control of Polaris, a wide divergence of opinion existed between the services. But no further action was taken on the matter

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during 1959, awaiting the completion of Study 2009, an optimum target system for general war being prepared for Presidential approval. (S)

Secretary McElroy also left office in December 1959; and the task of resolving the target coordination problem fell to his successor, Thomas S. Gates. The new SecDef gave early indications that he intended to take action. On 20 January he told the Joint Chiefs that he wished to discuss SM-171-59 (the split decision Polaris paper) at their convenience. Events during early spring provided fresh evidence that action was needed. Representatives to a coordination conference at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (—) agreed that targeting of a wide variety of weapons without a waste of resources was . . . far beyond the capability of coordination conferences. The senior representative of CINCEur and CINCSAC stated in their memo to the JCS: "With the increased number of weapons and their diversified utilization, it appears that an efficient application of the force can only be accomplished by a single authority. (S)

Meanwhile, the issue remained stalled at the roadblock of conflicting service positions. On 6 May General Twining advised the Secretary that the Chiefs could not agree on a response to the 18 questions; their individual views were forwarded.* After a two-day discussion in the middle of June in which the service positions were freely discussed with the new Secretary,* the Joint Staff prepared a paper expanding on differences in the areas of policy, target detection, and

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planning and coordination. The Joint Chiefs were in agreement that a basic targeting policy was needed to translate guidance contained in Study 2009 and the President's decision on the study into workable instructions for unified and specified commanders, and that guidance was needed for selection of targets in a national target list, but they differed on what that policy should be. General Twining felt the elements of this diversity arose, partially at least, from endemic conceptual differences. He urged that the JCS not wait for a "perfect solution." To fit action to the word, he proposed a national strategic targeting policy.* Service positions went to the SecDef as SM-696-60 on 20 July 1960. ()

On 16 August 1960, after over a year of consideration by the JCS and two Secretaries of Defense, the issues of command and control of strategic systems and strategic targeting became the subject of a SecDef decision. It was a clear compromise, indorsing neither the Air Force position favoring a unified command, nor the Navy position that existing JCS machinery could do the work. Recognized by Secretary Gates was CINCSAC's extensive experience in strategic planning. The individual designated as CINCSAC, acting as the agent of the JCS, would collect at Headquarters SAC a team of experts from all services to prepare a plan for all US forces committed to the initial strategic strike effort. CINCSAC's duties as Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) were an additional and separate responsibility. On 18 August Secretary Gates assigned as General Power's deputy Rear Admiral (subsequently

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promoted to Vice Admiral) Edward N. Parker, an expert in nuclear weapons and former head of the Defense Atomic Support Agency. (U)

Organization

General Power began immediately to gather **his** inter-service staff at Headquarters SAC. Actions to bring in **new** people and organize and train them in SAC methods proceeded at a brisk pace and they constituted the organization's **main** problems during the early formulative months. Time for preparation of the first plan was short; the SecDef wanted it done by early December. (U)


The organization was kept as small as possible, with **maximum** participation of the existing SAC staff, but all services participated in all aspects of planning. Commands involved (SACEUR, CINCLANT, CINCPac, CINCAL, and CINCNELM) were requested to send representatives to a 24 August meeting at Offutt AFB to **discuss** organization and manning. Three days later a proposed organizational structure *to perform* the main work assigned, i.e., preparation of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), was prepared and forwarded to the JCS. (U)

The organization was divided into two general categories (see Chart next page). The first was the Office of the Director. General Power, in **his** capacity as Director of Strategic Target Planning, had as **his** mission to: (U)

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JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF

OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA



- a. Organize a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff consisting of personnel from the various services possessing the required skills to perform the targeting and planning functions. (U)
- b. Develop and maintain the NSTL and the SIOP for attack of the targets on the NSTL. (U)
- c. Submit the NSTL and the SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval, highlighting points of difference which he resolved during the preparation of the NSTL and the SIOP. (U)

Also assigned to this office was a deputy, who assumed the responsibilities of the Director in his absence and acted as his principal assistant and advisor on JSTPS activities, and one representative each from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. These service representatives served as a personal staff for the director and his deputy, represented their services in policy matters, and performed a liaison function. They were not in the command channel. Representatives from unified and specified commands supplying forces to the SIOP and a JCS liaison group were also attached to the staff. The CINC representatives (the number assigned was at the discretion of their commander) participated in the preparation of the SIOP and NSTL. They were not integrated into the staff, but were directly responsible to their respective commanders. A JCS liaison group, an integral part of the Joint Staff, JCS, assisted the DSTP in interpreting JCS guidance and informed the JCS and the services of progress in the preparation of the NSTL and SIOP. The CINC and service representatives served as a Policy Committee under the chairmanship of the deputy director. This committee reviewed and

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approved policy; disagreements went to the director for final decision. Also part of the Office of the Director was the Secretariat, responsible for administration and personnel supervision. The second category consisted of the two production units of the Target Staff--the National Strategic Target List Division and the Single Integrated Operational Plan Division--which took their names from the work they performed. (U)

The initial Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) of 269 spaces requested for the above organization was divided as follows: SAC resources - 140 officers; 57 airmen, and 22 civilians; Army - 10 officers; Navy - 29 officers; Air Force - 8 officers; and Marine Corps - 3 officers.*

On 1 September 1960 the JCS approved the proposed organization, officially designating it the Joint Strategic Target Planning Agency (JSTPA),* and the initial Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) consisting of 50 military spaces to be added to the 197 SAC military personnel working in related areas. In one change, the JCS stipulated that the deputy chief of the SIOP Division be a Navy officer in the grade of rear admiral or captain.

Subsequently, as a result of the survey made of the NSTL Division's intelligence structure and the intelligence support agencies of SAC

* On 29 September 1960 the JCS redesignated the organization as the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. (SM-957-60; "Strategic Target Planning," 29 Sep 60.)

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Headquarters, at the Chief of Naval Operations's request, the Deputy Director of JSTPS requested 69 additional military spaces, which with the exception of 5 airmen from the Air Force were to be furnished by the Navy and Army. Forty of these were to be assigned to Headquarters SAC Intelligence functions and 29 to the JSTPS. After review, the JCS approved the interim augmentation of 29 military personnel and 3 civilian spaces, but disapproved the additional 40.

The organization to prepare the first NSTL and SIOP was assembled in haste because the SecDef had ordered the two documents completed by 14 December 1960. Emphasis had been placed on acquiring the best people from the services to do the job; not much analysis had been made of existing capability within the SAC staff. But with completion of the initial NSTL and SIOP* the organization could be adapted for the future, i.e., the work of keeping the documents current. General Power recommended a reduction; the non-SAC authorization would be reduced from 83 to 75 spaces and SAC personnel in a dual function status would be cut from 219 to 111. He also asked that the number of permanent representatives of the CINCs be held to a minimum.

The Army and Navy did not agree. The Chief of Naval Operations did not think it adequately represented all services at all levels, but favored the Air Force. Because the duties of the NSIL Division concerned primarily intelligence and target selection, in the Navy's opinion all

* The preparation of these documents will be treated later in this history.

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services should be **equally** represented. Neither did **Admiral** Burke favor the proposal to reduce the number of the CINC representatives, preferring instead to leave their appointment to the discretion of the commander concerned. Injecting a new feature, the CNO recommended creation of an intelligence panel, with representatives from the CINCs, the services, the Joint Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency, ". . . to provide the broadest and most expert intelligence base which can be achieved to support the SIOP." The Army did not think the proposed manning met the criteria of a joint staff, nor did it agree with maintaining SAC officers with two jobs in key positions, *except for* the DSTP. It recommended **equal** representation among services in the NSPL Division and proportional representation (based on committed forces) in the SIOP Division. (S)

The DSTP argued that existing JCS guidance for creation of joint staffs did not provide precedent for assignment of joint staff responsibilities to a specified command. He defended the JTD as representing his interpretation of JCS guidance: it was the most economical, made the most efficient use of space and technical equipment, and most adhered to the composition of forces and weapons assigned to the plan. He had not used forces submitted to the plan as a basis for representation; if he had the Navy and Marine Corps would have been reduced by one-half. In the document 14 key positions out of 34 were identified as Army, Navy, or Marine Corps (41 per cent). Although the DSTP had

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no requirement for an intelligence panel, he welcomed the addition of one intelligence officer from each of the CINCs to monitor SIOP intelligence, and he agreed to the addition of 10 personnel to provide "confidence" and coordination of intelligence by unified and specified commanders. (S)

After considering the new proposal and the above comments by the services, the new SecDef, Robert S. McNamara, notified General Parer that he had "complied fully" with directives issued by Secretary Gates, but that he should realign the JTD using the following guidance: (S)

- A. Persons occupying key positions in the NSPL Division of JSTPS will be assigned no other duties. (S)
- ✓ B. Key positions in the NSPL Division will be filled by the best qualified officers regardless of their service affiliation. (S)
- ✓ C. Key positions in the SIOP Division will be filled by service representatives essentially in proportion to the forces each service provides for the execution of the SIOP. (S)
- D. The JSTPS should be organized so as to receive, evaluate and utilize pertinent intelligence from all available resources. However, no "Joint Intelligence Review Panel" appears necessary. (S)

The revised JTD submitted 27 April 1961 was essentially the same basic organization as proposed in January: 34 key positions and a total of 186 military and civilian personnel. Sixteen positions in the NSPL Division, however, were identified as "no service specified";

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the best qualified would be chosen for these posts irrespective of service. In the DSTP's opinion, the guiding principle of the JSTPS organization was " . . . that of service representation proportional to the service forces involved." The organization as submitted was approved by the JCS on 14 June. ()