



UNCLASSIFIED




# Pakistan National Defense University Visit




## AFGHANISTAN UPDATE

23 April 2007

COL J. F. "Keen" Malavet, USMC  
Joint Staff, J-5, CASA




- **Environment and Strategic Threats**
- **What Has Changed?**
- **Afghanistan Security Situation**
- **Security Operations**
- **Force Contributors – ISAF & OEF**
- **ISAF PRT Locations**
- **NATO / ISAF**
- **Building Afghan Security Forces**
- **Counternarcotics**




## ***U.S. STRATEGIC GOALS FOR AFGHANISTAN***

- **US strategic goals remain the same: Afghanistan is -**
  - **A reliable, stable, geo-strategically placed ally in the War on Terror**
  - **Moderate, democratic, with a thriving private sector economy**
  - **Capable of effectively governing its territory and borders; and**
  - **Respectful of the rights of all citizens, including minorities and women**

# ENVIRONMENT AND STRATEGIC THREATS



## Security




- Insurgency / Terrorism
- Drug Networks
- Porous Borders

## Governance & Justice




- Corruption
- Immature Democracy
- Fledgling Judicial System




## Human Capital



- Literacy
- Bureaucratic Traditions
- Basic Services




## Economics & Infrastructure



- Broken Agricultural / Industrial Base
- Poor Communication Networks
- Difficult Revenue Collection

**CHALLENGES ARE COMPLEX & INTER-RELATED**


# STRATEGIC PROGRESS MUCH ACHIEVED, AND MUCH STILL AHEAD



## 2001

- Security
  - ➔ Haven for terrorists
- Government
  - ➔ Taliban controlled
  - ➔ Civil war
- Socio-Economics
  - ➔ Crumbling/non-existent infrastructure

A moderate, stable, and representative Afghanistan capable of controlling and governing its territory




## 2007

- Security
  - ➔ Target of terrorists
  - ➔ Developing quality and sustainable of Afghan National Security Forces
- Governance & Justice
  - ➔ Representative government
  - ➔ Extending the reach of national institutions
- Economic & Strategic Reconstruction
  - ➔ Investing in the future

**SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS; CHALLENGES REMAIN**

# U.S. ROLES AND MISSIONS




## Maintain Counter Terrorism Capabilities

- ↳ Defeat AQ and international terrorism throughout region; support ISAF as required




## US Embassy: Direct U.S. diplomatic & developmental efforts

- ↳ Shape regional environment; Build IRoA governance and infrastructure capacity
- ↳ Coordinate efforts w/ ISAF POLAD/CJ9 to assist ministries in programs, planning, and execution
- ↳ Afghan Engineer District support USAID and major construction planning and projects




## Maintain Unity of Effort – USEMB and Military

- ↳ Coordinate with U.S. Sector and ISAF-led security/stability efforts → mutual support
- ↳ Coordinate USG development in RC-E sector with USAID




## Serve within NATO-ISAF

- ↳ RC-East sector operations; continue tactical cooperation w/ PAKMil for border ops/security
- ↳ Provide ‘in extremis’ support as required to enable ISAF success



## Build Afghan National Security Forces capability

- ↳ CSTC-A: Ensure success of ANSF train, equip, and infrastructure development to build enduring security capacity
- ↳ Coordinate and synchronize efforts with ISAF and IRoA




## Enable Operations by NATO and ANSF

- ↳ Be prepared to provide shortfall capabilities to ISAF and combat enablers to ANSF operations
- ↳ CJSOTF Foreign Internal Defence operations support ANSF with C2 and combat enablers, and ISAF for counterinsurgency




## Support U.S. National Missions

- ↳ Provide required national support to all U.S. elements in Afghanistan



# IROA MUST DEMONSTRATE ITS VALUE TO THE PEOPLE





## Spring 07: Expected Enemy Actions

- "Psychologically isolate" Kandahar
- Erode Afghan people's confidence in Government, US, and NATO
- Weaken NATO resolve
- Undermine Afghan national and political unity
- Set conditions for political fragmentation of South

- 5 years since the West intervened, Afghans, particularly in the provinces, perceive expectations un-met
- Afghan population support for GOA must be maintained by delivering services and security.

# OPERATIONAL REALITY




- Reconstituted enemy is more lethal

- Sanctuary is enemy advantage


- Increased narco-trafficking/crime

- Limited transportation infrastructure impacts security effectiveness

- Positive side: ANSF leadership & capabilities have matured faster than expected





**TIPPING POINT: ANSF CAPABILITY CRITICAL TO ACHIEVING SUCCESS**




# AFGHANISTAN OVERVIEW

- ISAF has assumed stability and security assistance mission throughout Afghanistan
- US maintains responsibility for counter-terrorism mission
- US leads development of Security Forces; fielded forces continue to show improvement
- Persistent presence to deny Al Qaida/Taliban resurgence




**CONSOLIDATED SECURITY OPS UNDER NATO**


# AFGHANISTAN SECURITY SITUATION



## MONTHLY VIOLENCE LEVELS SINCE 2005



**ASSESSMENT:** Violence levels down significantly through winter following intense summer and fall, remains above seasonal norms. No anticipated drop in the immediate future.



# FORCE CONTRIBUTORS – ISAF & OEF

## ISAF

- 1 Albania
- 2 Austria
- 3 Azerbaijan
- 4 Belgium
- 5 Bulgaria
- 6 Croatia
- 7 Estonia
- 8 Finland
- 9 Greece
- 10 Hungary
- 11 Iceland
- 12 Ireland
- 13 Italy
- 14 Latvia
- 15 Latvia
- 16 Lithuania
- 17 Macedonia
- 18 Norway
- 19 Poland
- 20 Portugal
- 21 Slovakia
- 22 Slovenia
- 23 Spain
- 24 Sweden
- 25 Switzerland
- 26 Turkey

## ISAF/OEF

- 1 Australia
- 2 Canada
- 3 Czech Rep
- 4 Denmark
- 5 France
- 6 Germany
- 7 Netherlands
- 8 New Zealand
- 9 Romania
- 10 UK
- 11 US




## OEF

- 1 Egypt
- 2 Korea
- 3 Mongolia

## Percentages

Afghan Forces (65%)  
 OEF Forces (1%)  
 US Forces (16%)  
 ISAF Forces (17%)

# ISAF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS




- PRTs:**
- Extend the reach of the government
  - Provide a secure environment for reconstruction.
  - Provide link to region

- Way Ahead:**
- Develop common approach with NATO / ISAF
  - Reduce military profile
  - Promote greater civilian participation and leadership



★ **NATO (ISAF)  
PRT: 25**

# ***BUILDING AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES***



## **Goal:**

Strengthen the Afghan National Army to provide for internal security and to assume lead for Counter Insurgency and Internal Security Ops.



## **Afghan National Army**



- Internal security
- Lead Counter Insurgency Operations.

**Assigned: ~34,500**




### Gains

- Beginning to operate more independently
- The first war college equivalent began 28 Oct
- Capable of conducting operational planning
- UCMJ developed and functional
- Able to develop and defend MOD budget
- Conducting significant training at KMTC
- Reducing attrition and increasing retention
- Source of national pride

### Challenges



- Training and mentoring a credible and confident military force
- Developing chain of command capacity at Regional and Brigade levels
- Ability for self-sustainment into the long term
- Resourcing embedded trainers
- Maneuver unit partnership
- RED-AMBER-GREEN cycle for ANA

# ***BUILDING AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES***




## **Goal:**

Strengthen the Afghan National Police to uphold the rule of law and control movement across Afghan borders.



## **Afghan National Police**

- Uphold the rule of law
- Control Afghanistan's borders.




**Assigned: ~62,500**

### Gains

- ANP payroll concept implemented in 19 of 34 provinces; 100% accurate payroll
- Internal affairs policy and procedures complete
- Code of Conduct awaiting approval by Attorney General for release by Minister of the Interior
- Auxiliary Police being fielded
- Readiness reporting requirements fielded; Focusing on ANP personnel and equipment accountability

### Challenges

- Overcoming a culture of corruption
- Earning public trust and respect
- Capable and willing to uphold the rule of law
- Quantity and quality of embedded trainers
- Program structure
- Inter-agency coordination



**President Karzai: “*The question of drugs... is one that will determine Afghanistan’s future. If we fail (to fight drugs), we will fail as a state eventually and we will fall back into the hands of terrorism.*”**


**Key issues:**

- **Develop a coherent and well coordinated plan in support of the Afghan Government**
- **Military in support role**
- **Synchronization of resources**
- **Balance between short and long term planning and effect**
- **Complex interagency coordination**

**Way Ahead: Synchronize efforts and build Afghan capacity—police, prisons and justice system**



# *CRITICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES*



- **Short-Term**



- Reconstruction
- Security


- **Mid-Term**

- Building Afghan Security Forces
- Judicial Reform / Rule of Law
- Reducing Corruption

- **Long-Term**


- Sustained Government Capacity
- Revenue Generation
- Counter Narcotics







# RECONSTRUCTION AND ROADS

**(U) Ring Road Reconstruction Progress**  
**ICOD: Mar 2007**



- INFRASTRUCTURE**
- Kajaki Dam producing power; Once complete, will provide power to Kandahar, Lashkar Gah and surrounding areas. (1.7M new customers)
  - 80% Afghan workers gaining technical expertise
  - 147 Storage and market centers
  - 40 Courthouse & justice centers
  - 32 Independent radio stations
  - 4,500 KM of irrigation canals repaired for 290,000 hectares land
  - 589 Schools built or repaired
  - 649 Clinics built or refurbished





# QUESTIONS?