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Draft cable on letters

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Date: APR 09 2014

~~S.O. 11958~~: 05/30/12

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IZ

SUBJECT: SHARING UNSCR-RELATED LETTERS WITH THE NEW INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ

~~Classified~~ by IO A/S Kim R. Holmes, Reasons ~~1, 4 b, d,~~

1. ~~(S)~~ The current plan for incorporating the idea of the post-sovereignty security partnership between the Multinational Force (MNF) and the Iraqis in the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) is to do it through two parallel side letters. One would go from the new Iraqi Prime Minister-designate to the Security Council, and the other from the appropriate Coalition representative to the Council. Rather than having detailed language in the UNSCR itself, these two letters will be "noted" in the text.

2. ~~(S)~~ The letters incorporate both the principle of unity of command for actual military operations and Iraqi authority over their own forces. We believe this (a) in close coordination with Iraqi authorities at all levels, authorizes the MNF commander to take any actions necessary to implement the purposes of the UNSCR; and (b) Iraqi authorities retain authority over their own forces, which

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means that they retain the option of declining to participate in an operation; (c) however, where there are joint operations undertaken, then the principle of unity of command means that the MNF commander directs all forces including those Iraqi forces that are participating; and (d) Iraqi forces can conduct independent operations as long as they are deconflicted with operations of the MNF. These are essentially the same parameters under which we operate in Afghanistan.

3. (C) Action Request. Ambassador Bremer should share the draft texts of the letters related to the new draft Iraq UNSCR (transmitted to CPA by the NSC) with Prime Minister-designate Allawi on Monday (May 31). In doing so, Department requests CPA make clear to Allawi that the texts be treated as "confidential." Washington requests CPA seek an answer from Allawi as to whether he (1) agrees with the text of both letters and (2) is ready to sign the IIG letter now in his capacity as PM-designate. We are seeking a response to Washington no later than Wednesday (June 2). If asked, Ambassador Bremer may tell Allawi that the MNF letter will be signed by Secretary of State Powell, representing the lead nation of the MNF.

4. (C) Action Request Cont'd. Washington requests CPA work with Allawi to transmit a signed copy of the letter to the Security Council by Friday (June 4), if possible, and perhaps delivered in person by an authoritative IIG representative. One possibility would be for FM Zebari to travel to New York and present it to the Council, perhaps Friday morning. Council members will be looking to Ambassador Brahimi to provide a briefing on IIG formation this week. Perhaps Brahimi and an IIG representative (preferably delivering the signed Allawi letter) could meet with the Security Council on the same day.

5. (C) Action Request Cont'd. We plan to introduce a revised draft of the U.S.-UK Iraq resolution in New York this week and intend to provide Allawi with the revised text prior to, or simultaneously with, doing so in the Security Council. CPA should encourage Allawi and others in the IIG to support the text of the draft resolution. Revised text is still being finalized and will be provided to CPA later.

6. (C) Action Request Cont'd. Talking points are provided in paragraph 7 below for Ambassador Bremer to draw on, along with information in paragraphs one and two, as he deems appropriate. End Action Request.

7. (C) BEGIN TALKING POINTS.

-- We are seeking rapid action from the Security Council to endorse the Iraqi Interim Government. This is important to

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mobilize international support for Iraq's political transition and for the success of the interim government.

-- The Security Council expects to hear from you, as a representative of the sovereign Iraqi Interim Government, that you support this new resolution and specifically request continued assistance from the Multinational Force. This is important to ensure that Iraq has the security necessary to hold elections on schedule and to build a prosperous and democratic Iraq.

-- In order to ensure rapid Council action, we are proposing that you send a letter to the Security Council. We would send a separate letter on behalf of the Multinational Force, which we want to share with you in advance. It is important that we have a common understanding on the broad outlines of our security partnership.

-- Rather than having detailed language in the UNSCR itself, these two letters will be "noted" in the text.

-- The letters incorporate both the principle of unity of command for actual military operations and Iraqi authority over their own forces.

-- It is important that you speak directly and openly, on behalf of the interim government and the Iraqi people, about the need of Iraq for the continued assistance of the Multinational Force. We are shouldering a big responsibility on behalf of a stable and peaceful world, at considerable cost in American lives. We expect members of the international community to support us in this effort.

-- As we have heard from many different Iraqis, Iraq needs the assistance of the Multinational Force, at least until you have developed the capability to provide more substantially for your own security. This will take time.

-- We stand ready to help and intend to work with you in a genuine partnership on security.

END TALKING POINTS.

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