

#91

78-1809

~~SECRET~~

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS *545C552*
Date: *19 Jan 2014* Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: *X* Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: *545C552(b)(6)*
MDR: *13-M-4690*

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: *19 Jan 2014*

1 MAY 1973 *209 Space*

MEMORANDUM FOR GRAYDON I. LOSE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, ASD(C)

SUBJECT: Space Shuttle Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979 (SA 224/78)

(U) The attached galley proof copy on the subject document has been reviewed and appropriate corrections made.

(S) The proof copy as printed contains two security violations:

1. On page KW NITE MONO-44, fifth line from bottom, the term "SM I" must be deleted. See brackets.

2. On page KW NITE MONO-52, NASA has provided a table containing classified information. This classified information in brackets must be deleted. Note that the NASA table is identical to a DoD table immediately above and the entire NASA table can be deleted.

Since copies of these pages exist with the Committee, NASA, GAO and most importantly the printer, I request that your office take action to see that the deletions are made before printing. The Committee must also notify whoever else has copies of the proof pages.

(S) Further, the three galley proof copies which we have seen all have the deleted portions of the inserts-for-record reinserted (either in pencil or by typed attachments). These copies are classified. Request that your office assure that the Committee, GAO, and any others having copies understand this. (Assuming these organizations have similar marked-up copies in hand.)

(U) Due to the short time available to respond, Lt Col Forsythe, APRDS, has assisted my staff by reviewing portions of these proof pages. During our review of the document we observed that references to previous question had been done by referencing the question number; however the question numbers were deleted by the printer. This makes references to prior answers awkward. Will DoD review the galley proofs, so that accurate page references can be inserted? Will duplicate inserts be deleted?

(U) Classified portions are now properly noted and the proof pages are ready for you to send to Mr. Bodling for security review. Security review should note the following:

~~Classified by *USDRE*~~
~~Authority: EO 12958~~
~~Date: *06/28/81*~~
~~Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS~~
31 Dec 2008

Declassified - Authority: EO 12958
Date: *06/28/81*
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

~~SECRET~~

13-M-41690

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(U) Page KW NITE MONO-9. The classified material deleted on line 24 should probably be reinserted. Attached are copies of unclassified State Department and DoD letters providing essentially the same statements.


(S) Page CV NITE MONO-96. Some classified material deleted on last line should probably be reinserted. Specifically, the portion "...a). The ascent maneuver...into Canada and the USSR." See State and Defense letters. Note that NASA uses this material from State Department letters attached on CV NITE MONO-97. The last sentence should remain classified.

SIGNED

Robert A. Greenberg
Director
Space and Advanced Systems

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: 19 Jun 2014

 D(SAS)/

iw/1 May 78

OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS

Mr. Frank C. Conahan
Associate Director
United States General
Accounting Office
Washington, D. C: 20548

Nov 1977
Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: 19 Jun 2014

Dear Mr. Conahan:

Thank you for your letter of October 11, 1977 asking for comments on the possibility of conducting high inclination Space Transportation System (STS) launches from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida.

We have reviewed the mission profiles and trade-offs for high inclination launches from KSC and have examined the potential impact on our international relations and on US foreign policy. The Department is of the view that conducting high inclination launches from KSC is not acceptable for the following reasons among others:

- A. The ascent maneuvers required at KSC would result in substantial loss of payload capability. This would undercut the capability of STS to provide launch support for systems essential to national security, including National Technical Means.
- B. The loss of payload capability would hamper our important programs of international cooperation in space activities.
- C. Polar launches from KSC would require passage over the USSR on the initial portion of the first orbit. The 1971 Agreement on Measures to reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic anticipates the need for notification in situations where unidentified objects on early warning systems raise the risk of nuclear war; but we have no

knowledge of whether such notification, even if given in timely fashion, would avert Soviet reaction to the sudden appearance of the STS, including its separated external tank.

- D. Launching of STS in the direction of populated areas could be expected to bring shuttle more centrally into international debate, especially in the UN Outer Space Committee. This would abet arguments raised by countries opposed to our position on such issues as the delimitation or boundary of outer space.
- E. The Department is informed that while range safety calculations have not yet been made in detail for such launches, the likelihood of an accident leading to injuries is greater for the polar launch from KSC than was deemed acceptable for such launches from VAFB. If this is confirmed by detailed range safety calculations, it would, of course, be unacceptable to the Department of State.
- F. Many factors can make launch or insertion into orbit unsuccessful. A number of these would require bringing portions of the system to earth nearly underneath the planned flight trajectory. Both Canada and the Soviet Union could be thus affected by a mission abort.
- G. The United States, Canada and the USSR are signatories to the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. This Convention provides for "absolute liability" for damages on the earth's surface. The Department of State believes that all reasonable measures should be taken to avoid situations putting the US in such a position of liability, especially those involving populated areas under the ascent phase of a launch.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposal. We would be happy to discuss this matter in further detail. Please feel free to call upon us.

Sincerely,

Robert C. Brewster
Deputy Assistant Secretary


Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: 19 JUN 2014

OSD 5U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

Clearances:

OES/APT/SA [redacted] [redacted]
November 4, 1977: x [redacted]

- OES/APT
- S/P
- OES/APT/SA
- EUR/CAI
- ARA/PPC
- EUR/SOV
- IO/UNP
- PM/ISP
- L/UNA
- INR/STA



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAR 8 1978

Mr. Victor L. Lowe
Director
General Government Division
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548

~~Dear Mr. Lowe:~~

Thank you for providing the Office of Management and Budget the opportunity to comment on your January 1978 draft report, "Space Transportation System: An Analysis of Launch Site and Fleet Size Requirements." Although I would defer to the appropriate operating agencies for substantive comments on many of the specific points made in your report, I do have strong reservations about the policy implications of your recommendation to confine shuttle launches solely to an east coast site. This suggestion, if implemented, would, I feel, undermine the "national" character of this program, possibly resulting in dual Defense and civilian space transportation vehicles for many years to come.

With regard to the number of orbiters, funds to proceed with the production of a four-orbiter fleet are provided in the NASA budget for FY 1979. This number is considered sufficient to meet both civilian and military requirements. Funding for additional orbiters can be considered, however, if projected flight rates or the loss of an orbiter warrant future augmentation of this fleet.

In terms of your recommendation on launch sites, limiting the shuttle program to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) could have serious consequences for satisfying critical national defense requirements. First, range safety concerns as well as potential repercussions resulting from high inclination shuttle launches ascending over the Soviet Union would make any decision to use KSC for polar launches highly unlikely. Moreover, even if such a choice were made, reduced payloads and little capacity for growth would effectively preclude DOD from launching selected satellites from this site. Finally, the advantages offered civilian users through west coast launches would also be lost under your proposed arrangement.

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: 19 Jul 2014

In light of these considerations, we urge that you reconsider your recommendation for a single launch site for the shuttle program. As you note on page 37 of your report, "the STS must be a national program meeting civil and defense needs." Only with the two sites can this goal be effectively achieved.

Sincerely,

(Signed) J. T. McIntyre

James T. McIntyre
Acting Director

cc:
Honorable Robert A. Frosch, Administrator,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Honorable Harold Brown, Secretary,
Department of Defense
Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary,
Department of State

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: 19 Jun 2014

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

APR 26 1978

Honorable George H. Mahon
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5

Date: 19-JUN-2014

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On March 9, 1978, the Department of Defense testified along with NASA and GAO before your Subcommittees on Defense, Military Construction, and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies in a joint hearing devoted to the Space Shuttle. This joint hearing focused on the need for a Shuttle launch capability from Vandenberg Air Force Base. Since a large amount of information was provided in the various statements, briefings, and responses to questions, I want to be certain that the DoD position remains clear on the need for a Shuttle launch and landing capability at Vandenberg.

The GAO has taken the position that polar launches could be conducted safely on a routine basis from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) with adequate Shuttle payload delivery capability. The GAO feels that concerns about international overflight can be resolved. Thus, the GAO does not support the development of the Shuttle launch capability at Vandenberg.

Polar launches from KSC using the Shuttle would require overflight of the northeastern United States and Canada. The DoD considers the risks to life and property due to potential accidents during such launches to be unacceptable. We are not prepared to conduct such launches on a routine basis.

The GAO suggests that the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may provide an acceptable basis for routinely notifying the Soviets of our intention to launch over their territory. The spirit of this Agreement is to encourage both parties to avoid incidents which could be misinterpreted so as to raise the risk of nuclear war. The Agreement was not intended to encourage acts which either party might interpret as potentially hostile. An approach to the Soviets to use this Agreement to request permission for overflight could lead to many unacceptable situations for us. There could be requests for reciprocal overflights of the US by Soviet launch vehicles, or indeterminate delays while issues are discussed. We cannot put this country into a position where it must rely on prior Soviet approval of our highest priority launches.

NASA, the most qualified agency to determine Shuttle performance, has stated that northerly launches from KSC would result in severe degradation of the payload delivery capability of the Shuttle. This degraded performance is unacceptable to DoD.

Safety, international, and performance considerations lead us to conclude that KSC polar launches are not acceptable and that we must have Shuttle launch and landing facilities at Vandenberg. I ask your support of the full \$423.9 million which we are requesting in FY 1979 for our activities leading to DoD Shuttle use.

Sincerely,

Harold Brown

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Date: 19-JUN-2014