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BACKGROUND

SUBJECT: Possible Topics for Discussion between SECDEF and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat

Time and Place: (Tentative) Wednesday, April 9, 1600 hours at Blair House

Topics for Possible Discussion:

- Strategic Situation in the Region (Tour d'Horizon)
  - Current Soviet position in region.
  - Outline measures US is taking throughout region to counter Soviets.
    - Status (as of 9 April) of Access Negotiations with Oman, Kenya, and Somalia.
    - Status of US plans for Diego Garcia, e.g., RDF and expansion.
    - Status of and plans for carrier task groups in the Indian Ocean.
- Relate overall US plans in region to development of need for "Rear Area Staging Base."
  - Point out that US perceives Ras Banas/Berenice is ideal location for such a facility.
  - US actively considering such a facility. Advantages are:
    - distances from potential conflict areas.
    - optimum distance for staging from CONUS or Europe.
    - buffered from direct hostile air attack.
    - can use both sea and air LOC's to move men/materiel.
- Need to feel-out Sadat on his views of US presence in Egypt.
  - US wishes to be sensitive on this point (avoid mistakes made by USSR).
  - Profile of presence is also important, i.e., more presence for less visible at Wadi Qena than small TAFT at Cairo West.
  - If Sadat not too opposed to presence, there are steps we can take to speed up FMS programs, i.e., more trainers, language instruction, etc.
- F-4 Program behind schedule, too many sorties cancelled; US could deploy small number of US F-4s to Cairo West temporarily to assist in joint training.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
Authority: E.O. 12958 as amended  
Date: July 13 2003  
Chief, Doctrine Br. Div. & Ret. S&S

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- Such a move could be mutually beneficial;
  - would temporarily augment EAF maintenance, weapons training, and civil engineering;
  - 12 US aircraft could carry sufficient maintenance for 18 aircraft;
  - would assist EAF in bringing permanent equipment on line, e.g., simulator, instrument lab, etc.;
  - would provide US realistic theater training and joint exercising with EAF;
  - would give US access to open ranges for ordnance delivery while training Egyptians;
- Concept would involve approximately 400 US personnel at Cairo West near Cairo (30 KM away from city).
  - Bare Base kits would be used, so no drain on Egypt;
  - Billeting, feeding, housekeeping all included in Bare Base concept.
- If Sadat amenable, he runs risk of intensified attacks from rejectionist Arabs.
- Need to use opportunity to try to get Sadat to cool down anti-Saudi rhetoric
  - attacks are particularly acrimonious at present, need to return to arrangement struck by Ambassador Eilts between Sultan/Fahd and Sadat/Mubarak last April.
  - Present set of circumstances counter-productive.
    - We will see if Ambassador West can undertake similar effort with Saudis.
- Because of rapid growth in military relationship over past year, time might be right to reintroduce joint contingency planning discussions.
  - First raised by SECDEF (February 1979) with Gamasy in Cairo.
  - Sadat does not believe US doing sufficient planning for the region.
  - Could lay ground work for future joint exercises with Land Forces (some work being done now with Air Force and Navy).
  - Could, if handled carefully, reduce internal pressure on Sadat and keep Land Forces lined up behind Sadat.
- This topic could lead to review of overall FMS program status (info data and back-up will be provided).
  - Include F-16 program, M60A3, and summary of \$1.5B peace package.

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- Discuss difficulties of US making M48A5 tanks available to Egypt.

-- assets in US Army very limited;

--- M48A5 will not be available for Egypt till 1983 (Thailand order has priority);

--- Cost for rebuilt M48A5 is extremely high (\$900,000).

-- We recommend that Egypt buy more M60A3 tanks.

--- use money programmed for 130 M48s would buy 80 additional M60A3s.

--- Egyptians already have standardization program (T-54/55, T-62, T-34, M60A3).

- Final topic could be on problem DOD [s. having with Egyptian customs.

--- not normal at head of state level but no Egyptian ministry or military willing to attack problem, i.e., they will not take on customs people.

--- Classic case: US paying customs and duties on F-4 spare parts which are intended for EAF use which means that EAF is paying duties (through FMS);

--- Customs argue that it is not their concern because it is MOD money.

--- Attempts have been made to solve problem by all concerned to no avail.

--- Only by direct intervention on case-by-case basis by MOD Ali or General Badawi have things been cleared.

--- We need President/Vice President assistance to break through red tape.

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