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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

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I-05509/83



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Lewis, US Ambassador to Israel (U)

Date/Time: 11 January 1983, 1100 hours.

Place: Your office.

Participants:

Defense

State

Secretary Weinberger
MG Secord, DASD(NESA)
COL K. McKim, Israeli Country
Director
Mr. West, ASD/ISA

Ambassador Lewis
Mr. T. Miller, State NEA/IAI

(*) Setting. Ambassador Lewis has been on an extended stay in the US. He will be returning to Washington DC the morning of his visit with you and has tentative plans to depart for Israel later in the day.

(*) Ambassador Lewis has voiced his support for some sort of MOU on the Lebanon Lessons Learned effort. He believes that not following through on the initialed draft will have an undesired negative effect on the overall Israeli-US relationship and that MOD Sharon will try to turn this event to his political advantage. He also favors USG support for the Israeli LAVI fighter aircraft program. These and other current issues with Israel may very well be topics for discussions.

(*) Objectives: Ambassador Lewis will be looking for current DoD views on the above subjects and in some cases providing you with his rationale for the Embassy's positions.

(U) Attached are some brief subjects you may wish to address with him.

Attachment
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Francis J. West, Jr.
FRANCIS J. WEST, JR.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

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Issues For Discussion

Key Issues

Topics Ambassador Lewis May Raise

Israeli request for USG support for the LAVI fighter.

-- We have received a series of briefings from them on the aircraft and are now developing our views on the programs for the Arms Transfer Management Group meeting, 14 Jan 83.

-- There may be overriding negative aspects to the program including: (1) military viability of the day only-limited capability aircraft in the complex defenses and tactics of the 1990's. (2) economic aspects in that the Israelis will be expending large sums of their own money on the LAVI that could be better spent on developing an industrial base, (3) we believe they may intend to upgrade the LAVI to F-16/F-18 capability and then request third country transfer in direct competition with US firms.

-- We appreciate the political aspects of the LAVI program and will take those into account, however we may recommend deferring any decision until after the PM Begin visit in February.

-- As a general matter Defense sees no reason to be particularly forthcoming, considering the lack of GOI cooperation with us starting with the Golan annexation thru the current discussions on Lebanon.

MOU on Lessons Learned during the Lebanon war.

-- We have serious doubts over the need for an overall MOU.

-- The amount of information available does not warrant such an all inclusive document and certainly does not merit the open-ended restrictions on US sales of follow-on equipment, nor the detailed technological transfer quid the Israelis requested.

-- In the recent exchange with the British we did not need such an agreement and received considerably more information.

-- Additionally, we are now supplying detailed information on the SA-5 systems being installed in Syria, without requesting "a quid."

-- The current status of the Lessons Learned project has been given to the Israeli Defense Attache.

Issues You May Wish to Raise

Israeli requests for data on the SA-5 missile system. We have provided detailed information on the SA-5 to MG Sagi and the IDF, and have made demarches to the Soviet Union, and Syria warning them about the destabilizing effect of these weapons systems on the region. We regard the Soviet move more as a Soviet challenge to our bi-lateral relationship with them than a single effort in the Middle East.

-- We would appreciate Ambassador Lewis' views on the situation, particularly his evaluation of the possibility of Israeli strikes on the sites.

The current negotiations in Lebanon.

-- You could inquire as to the Ambassadors views of Israeli flexibility on the issues and what their real desires are in the country concerning security, possible withdrawal dates, and what Israel intends in regards to Lebanese forces in the South, such as Major Haddad.

Restrictions on sale of cluster munitions.

-- We are scheduled to review the Administrations restrictions on cluster munitions in late January.

-- You may wish to gain the Ambassadors views on the advantages/disadvantages of retaining the present restrictions.

The Israel Air Force continues to overfly Jordanian Territory.

-- On 30 December two A-4's overflew Jordanian towns, proceeding into the Golan Heights.

-- This has been a continued practice.

-- Defense remains very concerned about these overflights, particularly since Jordan may feel compelled to take an action, resulting in an incident.

-- Additionally, these events make it difficult for King Hussein to be forthcoming concerning the peace initiative.

-- What has been the Israeli reaction to the Ambassadors demarche concerning previous incidents.

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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

14 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LAVI Meeting at Staff Level - State, JCS, OMB, DoD
Assistant and Under Secretaries (Veliotes, Schneider,
Ligon, MG Trapp, West, etc.) on 14 January 1983

(S) 1. JCS, OSD, NSC and OMB pointed out that the LAVI was, on technical criteria, cost-ineffective. It would be cheaper and better for Israel to purchase F16s. Also, precedent was a problem. If Israel were allowed FMS spending offshore and access to US high technology data packages, other nations such as Egypt and Turkey would ask for equal treatment. Whether the US should subsidize a foreign aircraft manufacturer to compete with, say, Northrop's F-20 was another issue.

(S) 2. State (Schneider) planned to send a memo to SecState on the subject and promised DoD a copy.

(S) 3. All agreed the issue should be resolved only by SecDef, SecState, Judge Clark and the President. In the interim, no licenses for LAVI would be approved by State.

Francis J. West, Jr.

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