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IMMEDIATE
O 081020Z OCT 91
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7857
INFO USMISSION GENEVA 0342

ZYUW RUEHMOA8720 2811626

THAN ROGOV, BUT DIFFERENCES ABOUT CAPABILITIES ARE
LEGITIMATE AND MERIT DISCUSSION. OUR VIEW REMAINS
THAT THE PROGRAM IS LIMITED, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO
ILLUSTRATE THIS.

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5. WHETHER THE ABM TREATY? ROGOV ASKED WHETHER A
/----- TREATY OR AGREEMENT ON
GPALS WOULD SUPPLEMENT OR REPLACE THE ABM TREATY. HE
ASKED FOR U.S. VIEWS ON HOW THIS WOULD BE FRAMED.
BARTHOLOMEW SAID WHAT'S IMPORTANT NOW IS THE
SUBSTANCE, AND FORM SHOULD FOLLOW SUBSTANCE.
OBVIOUSLY, HE SAID, AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE
REACHED ON CERTAIN ELEMENTS TO SUPERCEDE THE ABM
/----- THE FORM COULD BE AGREED LATER. BARTHOLOMEW
OUTLINED THE IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR NOW:

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~~EXCLS~~ DECAPTIONED

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GENEVA FOR USDEL NST

~~EO 12958: DECLASS~~

TAGS: PARM, MNUK, PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW'S VISIT --
/----- OCTOBER 7 MEETING WITH SOVIET GROUP

-- WHY WE ATTACH SUCH IMPORTANCE TO GPALS.

-- WHAT DO WE MEAN BY GPALS?

-- WHY GPALS SHOULD NOT BE A CONTROVERSIAL FACTOR
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR.

1. (SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS, TOGETHER
WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND
KAZAKHSTAN, MET FOR 90 MINUTES OCTOBER 7 MAINLY TO
ANSWER SOVIET QUESTIONS ABOUT TECHNICAL LIMITS ON
GPALS, AS WELL AS COSTS, AND TO HEAR SOVIET "THINKING
ALONG" ABOUT A JOINTLY DEVELOPED AND OPERATED
SPACE-BASED EARLY WARNING SYSTEM WHICH WOULD
SUPPLEMENT EXISTING NATIONAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS.
END SUMMARY.

6. IS GPALS WORTH THE EXPENSE? ANOTHER SOVIET
/----- DELEGATION MEMBER
(RUSSIAN REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVE) NOTED THAT HE WOULD
RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE OF GPALS AS A GIFT, BUT GPALS
WOULD INVOLVE ADDITIONAL BUDGETARY OUTLAYS. HE ASKED
FOR ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST FOLLOWING THE
CHEAPER ROUTE OF MERELY STEPPING UP JOINT DIPLOMATIC
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EFFORTS AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY. BARTHOLOMEW RESPONDED WITH FOUR ELEMENTS:

-- BUDGET PHILOSOPHY. BOTH SIDES ARE GOING TO BE
SPENDING LESS OVERALL ON DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC
WEAPONS, BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN LESS SPENDING ON
EVERYTHING. THERE WILL BE SOME INCREASES, AND WE
VIEW LIMITED MISSILE DEFENSES AS AN AREA THAT
WARRANTS INCREASES.

3. ABM: WHAT LIMITS THE LIMITED SYSTEM? SOVIET
/----- DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV OPENED THE MEETING AT 1830,
SUGGESTING AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE U.S. IDEA OF A
LIMITED ABM DEFENSE AGAINST LIMITED NUCLEAR STRIKES.
OBUKHOV NOTED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS IN THE
GENEVA SPACE GROUP. FROM THE SOVIET SIDE, ROGOV
FOLLOWED WITH A QUESTION ON RESTRAINTS AND
GUARANTEES: WHAT WILL LIMIT THE LIMITED SYSTEM?
SPECIFICALLY, NOTING THAT GPALS PROVIDE FOR A FAIRLY
COMPLEX, THREE-LAYERED DEFENSE, ROGOV ASKED WHAT
WOULD GUARANTEE THAT THE SYSTEM REMAINS AT A GIVEN
LEVEL? WHAT WOULD GUARANTEE AGAINST UPGRADES TO TIP
THE SCALES OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE? WHERE IS THE
THRESHOLD?

-- EXISTING SOVIET PROGRAMS. THE SOVIET UNION IS
CURRENTLY SPENDING A LOT ON ABM'S, AND, WE BELIEVE,
ON THE WRONG KIND. WITH GPALS, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT
ORIENTING SPENDING DIFFERENTLY, AND MORE
INTELLIGENTLY.

-- NON-PROLIFERATION IS NOT ENOUGH. WE AGREE THAT WE
HAVE TO PUSH AS HARD AS WE CAN ON NON-PROLIFERATION
OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. WE ARE HAVING SOME SUCCESS.
BUT THE U.S. HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT A
SUCCESSFUL NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY WILL ALSO REQUIRE
DEFENSES. THE TWO ELEMENTS ARE NOT MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE ALTERNATIVES, BUT MATCHING PARTS OF A
COMPLEX STRATEGY. WE WORKED HARD ON MISSILE
NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH SOME
SUCCESS, BUT WE WERE ALSO GLAD TO HAVE THE PATRIOTS.

4. UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW RESPONDED THAT
RESTRAINT AND GUARANTEES WOULD BE FOUNDED ON A SOLEMN
BILATERAL AGREEMENT, THE FORM OF WHICH IS OPEN TO
DISCUSSION. BARTHOLOMEW SAID HE ENVISIONED A TREATY
BACKED UP BY CERTAIN INHERENT TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITS,
AND POSSIBLE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. ASD
HADLEY ADDED THAT THERE WOULD ALSO BE, PRACTICALLY
SPEAKING, LEGISLATIVE LIMITS, WITH THE ADMINISTRATION
HAVING GONE TO CONGRESS FOR A LIMITED PROGRAM. A
LARGER PROGRAM WOULD REQUIRE A FURTHER REQUEST TO
CONGRESS, AND ITS APPROVAL. ROGOV RESPONDED THAT,
EVEN WITH THE BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS NOTED, THE
LIMITED SYSTEM BEFORE THE CONGRESS WOULD BE CAPABLE
OF INTERCEPTING MORE THAN 200 INCOMING RV'S. HADLEY
ANSWERED THAT HE BELIEVED THE SYSTEM LESS CAPABLE

-- MISSILE ARCS. BARTHOLOMEW REPEATED THAT WE MEAN
WHAT WE SAY IN REFERRING TO A LIMITED ABM SYSTEM
WHICH WILL NOT THREATEN THE RETALIATORY CAPACITY OF
EITHER SIDE. HE SAID HE BELIEVES U.S.
DECISION-MAKERS CANNOT RESPONSIBLY LEAVE THE U.S.
VULNERABLE TO MISSILE ATTACKS BY IRRESPONSIBLE THIRD
COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD HAVE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES.
HE SAID HE FELT THAT ON REFLECTION, HAVING SEEN THE
MISSILE ARCS FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD, THE SOVIET
SIDE WOULD AGREE.

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7. GPALS: SOVIET EDITORIAL COMMENT. OBUKHOV WOUND
/----- UP THE
DISCUSSION ON MISSILE DEFENSES BY EXPRESSING HOPE

ACTION (R.M)
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USDA: SYNFAC(1) ASD: PA(2) USDP-CM(1) USDP: PD(1)
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UKRAINE'S VIEWS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS "WILL HAVE TO BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT." STRAUSS BT

THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD AGREE NOT TO TAKE STEPS
ENTAILING ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURES. "WE BELIEVE THERE
ARE GROUNDS FOR CONCERN." ALSO, HE SAID, THERE ARE
CONCERNS FOR THE ABM TREATY WHICH HAS BEEN A FACTOR
FOR STABILITY. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS
AND THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION, CERTAIN
CLARIFICATIONS WERE REQUIRED AND A DIALOGUE SHOULD
OCCUR.

8. SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR JOINT EARLY WARNING SYSTEM.

OBUKHOV INVITED DISCUSSION OF THIS COMPONENT OF
GORBACHEV'S OCTOBER 5 RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S
INITIATIVE. ROGOV FOLLOWED WITH A LENGTHY
DISQUISITION, WHICH HE LABELLED "THINKING ALOUD."
PLACING NUCLEAR THREATS BY THE U.S. AND USSR AGAINST
EACH OTHER UNDER THE RUBRIC OF "OLD THINKING," ROGOV
NOTED THAT DESPITE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, STRATEGIC
STANDOFF REMAINS TOGETHER WITH THE THREAT OF
ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED USE, OR BREAKDOWNS IN
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. ROGOV ADDRESSED TWO
TECHNICAL EARLY-WARNING ISSUES. REFERRING TO THE
KRASNOYARSK RADAR, HE SAID THAT SOVIET EARLY WARNING
CAPABILITY WILL NOT, SO FAR AS THE PACIFIC IS
CONCERNED, BE AT THE DESIRED LEVEL FOR SOME TIME.
(NOTE: ROGOV THEN INTERJECTED IN ENGLISH: "I'M NOT
COMMENTING ON THE REASON WHY -- JUST ON THE FACT THAT
IT HAPPENED.") HE SAID THAT IN THE NORTH ARCTIC,
NORAD OVERLAPS WITH THE SOVIET EARLY WARNING SYSTEM,
WITH POTENTIAL FOR PROBLEMS.

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9. IN THIS CONTEXT AND TO ENHANCE CRISIS STABILITY,
ROGOV SAID, HE COULD ENVISION A JOINT COOPERATIVE
EARLY WARNING EFFORT PROVIDING JOINT USE OF A
JOINTLY-DEVELOPED SYSTEM, WITH NATIONAL EARLY WARNING
SYSTEMS ALSO RETAINED. THE JOINT SYSTEM COULD BE
SPACE-BASED, WITH SATELLITES JOINTLY-DEVELOPED,
-LAUNCHED, AND -MAINTAINED OVER THE NORTHERN PACIFIC,
NORTH ARCTIC, THE INDIAN OCEAN WHERE THEY WOULD HAVE
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OTHER USES AS WELL, AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC. ROGOV
ALSO SUGGESTED MONITORING STATIONS ON LAND, MANNED BY
U.S. AND SOVIET PERSONNEL ON THE OTHER'S TERRITORY.
HE SUGGESTED ADOPTION OF FAIL-SAFE DEVICES ON
MISSILES WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR DESTRUCTION OR
SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE EVENT OF ACCIDENTAL OR
UNAUTHORIZED LAUNCH. REGARDING THIRD COUNTRY
THREATS, WHICH HE IDENTIFIED UNDER THE RUBRIC OF "NEW
THINKING," ROGOV SUGGESTED MONITORING OF LAUNCHES TO
HELP "ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVOCATION."

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10. CONCLUDING REMARKS. BARTHOLOMEW COMMENTED THAT
/----- THIS WAS A LEGITIMATE
MATTER TO DISCUSS, AS REFLECTED IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S
INITIATIVES, AND THAT HE WAS ENCOURAGED TO HEAR A
SOVIET TALK ABOUT SENSORS IN SPACE. IN CONCLUDING
THE SESSION, HE COMMENTED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS
PROVIDED FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE ERA OF THE THREAT
-- HIGH, IMMEDIATE, INTENSE THREAT -- IS OVER. THIS
HAS HAPPENED BECAUSE OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE
MILITARY BALANCE CAUSED IN PLBWCHMS ONTROL, AND
BECAUSE OF CHANGES IN THE MILITARY. THE ERA OF
THREAT IS OVER POLITICALLY, AS WELL. OUR AIM, HE
SAID, IS TO SHIFT TO DIFFERENT KINDS OF FORCES, WITH
DIFFERENT INTER-RELATIONSHIPS, WHICH FIT THE CURRENT
SITUATION. OBUKHOV RESPONDED WITH THANKS FOR THE
U.S. SIDE'S PATIENCE WITH THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN
THE SOVIET UNION, AND FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC
REFORM HERE. THE UKRAINIAN REP FOLLOWED WITH AN
EXPRESSION OF THANKS TO THE U.S. FOR HAVING TAKEN THE
INITIATIVE TO INCLUDE THE FOUR REPUBLICS IN THE
DISCUSSIONS. THE UKRAINIAN REP AFFIRMED THAT

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