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PRIORITY ZYUW RUEHMOA9793 2910057
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8663 SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

THE DRAFT; AND A DRAFT AGREEMENT IS CIRCULATING ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY AMONG THE REPUBLICS.

END SUMMARY.

NEUTRALIZING ALLEGED UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

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~~EXDIS~~

SECDEF ALSO FOR OSD/ISP - EDELMAN

E.O. 12958, DECLASS. AUTHORITY: EO 13526
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, UR
SUBJECT: ROGOV/VLADIMIROV DEMARCHE ON UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR ISSUES: "YOU ARE OUR LAST HOPE")

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date OCT 28 2014

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. ON OCTOBER 11 SERGEY ROGOV OF THE USA & CANADA INSTITUTE AND DEFENSE REFORM COMMITTEE MEMBER GENERAL ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROV APPEALED URGENTLY TO ARMATT AND POLOFF FOR THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, NATO AND THE UN TO TAKE A NUMBER OF STEPS DESIGNED TO FOIL WHAT THEY SAW AS THE UKRAINE'S AMBITION TO BECOME A NUCLEAR POWER. AMONG THE MOVES THEY SOUGHT WERE:

-- A PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL ULTIMATUM THAT NO U.S. RECOGNITION OR AID WOULD BE FORTHCOMING TO THE UKRAINE IF THE UKRAINE DID NOT PERMIT REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS TERRITORY;

-- A NATO DECLARATION THAT ANY CLAIM BY NON-RUSSIAN SOVIET REPUBLICS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE VIEWED AS A VIOLATION OF THE NPT;

-- U.S. CONCESSIONS (REDUCED B-2 PROCUREMENT, SRAM-II PROGRAM CANCELLATION, D-5 SCALEBACKS) TO INDUCE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE BUSH PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE MIRVED ICBMS, THUS OBLIGING UKRAINE TO GIVE UP ALL THE ICBMS ON ITS TERRITORY; AND

-- EXPLICIT U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT REGARDING CENTRAL STORAGE OF AIR-DELIVERED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SO AS TO HAVE A LEGAL BASIS ON WHICH TO FORCE REMOVAL OF SUCH WEAPONS FROM THE UKRAINE TO RUSSIA FOR "CENTRAL STORAGE."

3. VLADIMIROV AND ROGOV ALSO TOUCHED ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

-- THOUGH UKRAINE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACQUIRE PHYSICAL CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, LAUNCH IS MECHANICALLY IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THE CENTER'S AUTHORIZATION;

-- THERE ARE NUMEROUS AREAS FOR POTENTIAL FUTURE U.S.-SOVIET SECURITY COOPERATION, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WARHEAD STORAGE AND DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY, GENERAL STAFF LIAISON, EARLY WARNING COOPERATION, AND SOCIAL ADAPTATION OF DISCHARGED MILITARY;

-- A FUTURE GLOBAL SECURITY REGIME COULD INCORPORATE NATO AND OTHER BODIES. ONE ACTIVITY COULD BE A REGIME FOR CONTROL OVER PLUTONIUM STORES;

-- THE SOVIET DEFENSE REFORM COMMITTEE HEADED BY RSFR MOD KOBETS HAS NO STAFF AND HAS TAKEN NO ACTIONS THUS FAR; THE RECENT SHAPOSHNIKOV MEETINGS WITH REPUBLIC DEFENSE OFFICIALS WERE AIMED CHIEFLY AT IRONING OUT SERIOUS NEAR-TERM PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND

URGED THAT THE U.S. AND CANADA LET THE UKRAINIANS KNOW IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS (VIA DIRECT HIGH-LEVEL MESSAGES TO KRAVCHUK OR VIA THE PUBLIC MEDIA) THAT IF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE NOT REMOVED, THERE WOULD BE NO RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE AND NO FURTHER ASSISTANCE OF ANY KIND. "NO ONE NEEDS ANOTHER NUCLEAR COUNTRY," HE SAID, THOUGH ASSERTING THAT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD ONLY BE RELEASED BY CENTRAL AUTHORITIES, HE WAS CONCERNED THAT UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS MIGHT GAIN PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE WEAPONS.

5. POLOFF ASKED WHETHER THE CENTER HAD ALREADY ISSUED A FORMAL NOTIFICATION TO THE UKRAINIANS REGARDING REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO RUSSIAN TERRITORY. IN REPLY, VLADIMIROV MERELY REFERRED TO GORBACHEV'S OCTOBER 6 NUCLEAR ARMS DECLARATION. POLOFF ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY EXPLICIT INDICATIONS, FORMAL OR INFORMAL, THAT UKRAINE WOULD NOT COMPLY. VLADIMIROV SAID THAT, EVEN IF THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO COOPERATE, "BANDITS" COULD PHYSICALLY BLOCK EXIT OF THE WEAPONS FROM THE UKRAINE. ROGOV INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT TO SAY THE U.S. AND NATO MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ANY CLAIMS BY ANY SOVIET REPUBLIC TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE VIEWED AS A VIOLATION OF THE NPT AND OTHER ARMS AGREEMENTS. THE NPT MUST BE USED AS THE LEGAL BASIS OF AN OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC POSITION, SO THIS WOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.

6. ROGOV ADDED THAT THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT WAS NO LONGER SAYING THE UKRAINE WAS A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE. VLADIMIROV ADDED THAT UKRAINE'S ABSENCE FROM THE OCTOBER 9 SHAPOSHNIKOV MEETING WITH REPUBLIC DEFENSE OFFICIALS WAS A BAD SIGN; UKRAINE'S POSITION WAS UNPREDICTABLE. ROGOV CITED UKRAINE'S OCTOBER 10 COMPLAINT TO GORBACHEV OVER SHAPOSHNIKOV'S REQUEST THAT THE UKRAINIAN MOD NOT GIVE ORDERS TO TROOPS ON UKRAINIAN TERRITORY AS EVIDENCE THAT UKRAINE WAS CLAIMING AUTHORITY OVER ALL FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY, INCLUDING NUCLEAR FORCES.

7. IN RESPONSE TO POLOFF'S QUESTION ON PLANS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE UKRAINE, VLADIMIROV SAID THAT THE WEAPONS HAD BEEN REMOVED QUICKLY FROM THE BALTICS AND THAT THE HOPE WAS TO DO LIKEWISE FROM THE THREE DEPLOYMENT AREAS IN THE UKRAINE, BUT NO SCHEDULE HAD BEEN SET.

NEED FOR A LEGAL PRETEXT

8. ROGOV EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE RECENT BARTHOLOMEW CONSULTATIONS HAD NOT RESULTED IN A LEGALLY BINDING

ACTION (R,M)
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ASD:PA&E/DCL(1) USDP-CH(1) USDP-PO(1)

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MCN=91291/00210 TOR=91291/0100Z TAD=91291/0129Z CDSN=MAK044

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UNDERTAKING WHICH COULD BE USED TO PRESSURE THE UKRAINIANS TO ACQUIESCE IN THE PULL-OUT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THEIR TERRITORY. HE ALSO REGRETTED THAT THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF HAD REJECTED THE BUSH INITIATIVE TO ELIMINATE MIRVED ICBMS, SINCE ALL ICBMS IN THE UKRAINE WERE MIRVED. HE NOTED THAT ONLY 100 NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE UKRAINE AND KAZAKHSTAN WERE BEING TAKEN OFF ALERT STATUS, WHILE 180 WERE REMAINING ON ALERT. HERE, TOO, ROGOV REGRETTED THE SIDES HAD NOT ESTABLISHED A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO TAKE WEAPONS OFF ALERT STATUS.

GOING AFTER THE D-5: HAVE WE GOT A DEAL FOR YOU)
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9. ROGOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, THE UKRAINE COULD NOT BE SINGLED OUT, BUT THE DE-MIRVING IDEA WAS A GOOD WAY TO GET AROUND THIS PROBLEM. HE ASKED WHETHER DOWNLOADING WOULD BE PERMITTED. REFERRING TO SHAPOSHNIKOV'S REMARKS THAT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE BUSH PROPOSAL WOULD SHARPLY ALTER THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, ROGOV SAID THAT IN ORDER TO GAIN THE GENERAL STAFF'S AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE MIRVED ICBMS THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO ADD SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE PACKAGE. THESE COULD INVOLVE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN B-2 PROCUREMENT, ADHERENCE TO THE DECISION ON CANCELLATION OF THE SRAM-12 PROGRAM, AND AN ACTION INVOLVING THE D-5 SLBM (SEE BELOW).

10. ROGOV ASSERTED THAT IF ALL MIRVED ICBMS WERE ELIMINATED, THE ONLY REMAINING "FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON"
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WOULD BE THE D-5, THANKS TO ITS SUBSTANTIAL PROMPT HARD TARGET KILL CAPABILITY. IF ALL 18 U.S. TRIDENT SUBMARINES WERE ARMED WITH D-5S, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE OVER 3000 FIRST-STRIKE WEAPONS, ACCORDING TO ROGOV. A TECHNICAL SOLUTION COULD INVOLVE TWO PARTS: FIRST, STICKING TO THE U.S. DECISION TO DELAY UNTIL 1997 THE REFITTING OF THE FIRST TRIDENT-1S WITH D-5S (INSTEAD OF C-4S, WHICH ARE NOT A "FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON"). SECONDLY, THE U.S. COULD ADOPT THE PENTAGON SUGGESTION THAT, FOR THE FIVE TRIDENT-1I SUBMARINES FOR WHICH D-5S HAD NOT YET BEEN PROCURED, W-76 WARHEADS BE USED FOR THE C-4S (WHICH VROGOV ASSERTED WOULD KEEP THEM FROM BEING A "FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON"), RATHER THAN ACQUIRING W-88 WARHEADS. THUS, W-88 WARHEADS WOULD REMAIN ONLY ON FIVE OF THE TEN TRIDENT-1I SUBMARINES IN QUESTION. THESE CONCESSIONS, ROGOV SAID, WOULD ENABLE THE USSR TO AGREE TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ALL MIRVED ICBMS.

11. IN AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION, ROGOV THEN STATED THAT THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF AND MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT FAVOR THIS SOLUTION. IN THAT CASE, POLOFF ASKED, WHAT BASIS WOULD THE U.S. HAVE FOR MAKING THIS MOVE? ROGOV EXPLAINED THAT SUCH A U.S. OFFER WOULD ENABLE HIM AND VLADIMIROV TO GO TO GORBACHEV, WHO WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERRULE GENERAL STAFF OPPOSITION TO THE BUSH PROPOSAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE UNITED STATES ALSO WAS WILLING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. THIS WOULD HELP THE U.S. PRESIDENT WITH HIS FORTHCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN, ROGOV STATED, BECAUSE HE WOULD BE ABLE TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR ELIMINATING ALL MIRVED ICBMS. SUCH A SUCCESS COULD ALSO LEAD TO 2 SUMMIT

12. VLADIMIROV COMPLAINED THAT THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF WAS STILL TAKING A BEAN-COUNTING APPROACH TO ARMS REDUCTIONS, BASED ON THE OLD POSTURE OF CONFRONTATION. HE DEPLORED DECISIONS TO LEAVE SS-24 ICBMS IN THE UKRAINE, SAYING THAT IN HIS PROFESSIONAL VIEW THESE WEAPONS WERE NOT BEING OPTIMALLY USED. ROGOV ADDED THAT SOME VISIBLE U.S. CONCESSIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY IN THE STRATEGIC AREA SO THAT SOVIET CONSERVATIVES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCUSE GORBACHEV OF SELLING OUT. THE B-2 WOULD

BE A "VISIBLE" CONCESSION. THE ARRANGEMENT ON W-88 WARHEADS WOULD NOT BE SO VISIBLE, BUT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO PROFESSIONALS IN NEUTRALIZING CONSERVATIVE ARGUMENTS. VLADIMIROV ADDED THAT THESE COULD BE "NEXT STEPS" IN THE DIALOGUE ON UNILATERAL MOVES, WHICH PRESIDENT BUSH COULD PREVIEW TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES (TNF)
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13. ROGOV EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE "AIR-DELIVERED" LOOPHOLE IN TNF REDUCTIONS. WHILE HE CONSIDERED IT "STUPID" TO SEEK TOTAL ELIMINATION, HE URGED ESTABLISHMENT OF A LEGAL BASIS REQUIRING WITHDRAWAL OF TNF FROM THE UKRAINE AND OTHER REPUBLICS. HE RECOMMENDED A CENTRALIZED STORAGE FORMULA UNDER WHICH THE U.S. WOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP AIR-DELIVERED TNF WEAPONS IN EUROPE, BUT AT FEWER SITES; THE FORMULA WOULD ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW BOMBS AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES FROM THE UKRAINE TO RUSSIA FOR "CENTRAL STORAGE." VLADIMIROV STRESSED THE NEED TO BE LEFT WITH ONLY ONE NUCLEAR POWER -- RUSSIA. ROGOV ADDED THAT THE MAIN GOAL WAS CENTRALIZED CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ANY OTHER SITUATION MUST BE PREVENTED.

LAUNCH OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTROLLED BY CENTER
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14. VLADIMIROV ADDED THAT CENTRALIZED CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD REMAIN IN ANY CASE; EVEN IF NATIONALISTS COULD STEAL THE WEAPONS, IT WOULD BE TECHNICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO DETONATE THEM BECAUSE LAUNCH WAS MECHANICALLY CONTROLLED BY THE CENTER. NEVERTHELESS, HE CAUTIONED, GIVEN THE FACT OF UKRAINIAN PUBLIC OPINION, ANY UKRAINIAN ATTEMPTS TO PRESERVE CUSTODY OF THE WEAPONS COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES.

NEED FOR JOINT WORK ON ELIMINATION TECHNOLOGY
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15. VLADIMIROV CITED AN OCTOBER 9 DECLARATION BY KAZAKH PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV THAT KAZAKHSTAN HAD NO DESIRE TO KEEP NUCLEAR MUNITIONS AND SILOS UNDER ITS CONTROL, BUT NEITHER DID HE PLAN ANY ELIMINATIONS ON KAZAKH TERRITORY. IF SUCH WEAPONS WERE TO BE REMOVED TO RUSSIA, SITES WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED. VLADIMIROV ASSERTED THAT NEITHER THE SOVIET UNION NOR THE U.S. HAD RELIABLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ELIMINATION TECHNOLOGY OR STORAGE ARRANGEMENTS; HE SAW A NEED FOR A JOINT PROJECT TO WORK OUT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS.

THIRD COUNTRIES
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16. VLADIMIROV RAISED THE ISSUE OF THIRD COUNTRIES SUCH AS CHINA, PAKISTAN, INDONESIA, ISRAEL AND IRAQ, WHO POTENTIALLY ALREADY HAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT GIVEN EITHER NUCLEAR OR CRUISE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO THESE COUNTRIES, BUT WORRIED OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF PRIVATE FIRMS. HE SAW A NEED FOR UN INTERVENTION TO PROHIBIT THIS. ROGOV DISAGREED, SAYING THE UN WAS POWERLESS AND THAT ONLY U.S.-SOVIET ACTION WOULD BE EFFECTIVE. VLADIMIROV STILL SAW VALUE IN A UN INITIATIVE TO BEGIN A WORLDWIDE CAMPAIGN. HE ALSO PRESSED FOR A GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEM, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE NATO.

OTHER SECURITY COOPERATION
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17. ROGOV SUGGESTED THAT LIAISON MISSIONS BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET GENERAL STAFFS. HE SAID A

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FIRST STEP IN MOVING TOWARD A GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEM
COULD BE U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF EARLY
WARNING. VLADIMIROV ADDED THAT THIS WOULD BEGIN WITH
EXISTING FACILITIES; THE SIDES WOULD AGREE THEY HAD A
COMMON TASK. THEY COULD COOPERATE ON GLOBAL MONITORING.
ROGOV ADDED THAT JOINT WARNING SYSTEMS COULD BE DEPLOYED,
WHICH WOULD SUPPLEMENT EXISTING NATIONAL MEANS -- FOR
EXAMPLE, SATELLITE LAUNCHES. VLADIMIROV SUGGESTED A
SYSTEM WHEREBY BOTH SIDES COULD RECEIVE INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION FROM EARLY WARNING INSTALLATIONS. PERSONNEL
COULD BE TRAINED JOINTLY, AND STAND DUTY TOGETHER AT
EARLY WARNING FACILITIES. FURTHER, VLADIMIROV SUGGESTED,
QUICK-REACTION FORCES COULD BE INTEGRATED, SWEEPING AIR-
AND SEABORNE TROOPES INTO A UNIFIED QUICK-REACTION FORCE
UNDER THE GLOBAL SECURITY STRUCTURE.

THEIR OWN ARMED FORCES. VLADIMIROV SAID HE WAS ARGUING
FOR A STRUCTURE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SUFFICIENT DEFENSES
ON THE BORDERS TO ACT AS A POLITICAL TRIPWIRE, BUT NOT
ACTUALLY ENOUGH TO NEUTRALIZE AN ATTACK OR COUNTERATTACK.

24. VLADIMIROV SAID THAT DEFENSE REFORM STEPS AND
MILITARY FORCE RESTRUCTURING NEED NOT AWAIT PASSAGE OF
THE UNION TREATY AND RELATED LEGISLATION; WHAT WAS NEEDED
WAS AN ELEMENTARY COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGREEMENT AMONG THE
REPUBLICS. HE SAID A DRAFT AGREEMENT WAS ALREADY
CIRCULATING, AND HAD BEEN READ BY SHAPOSHNIKOV AND LOBOV;
HE SAID HE HAD PROVIDED A COPY TO U.S. OFFICIALS DURING
HIS RECENT TRIP TO WASHINGTON.

COMMENT
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18. VLADIMIROV ADDED THE SUGGESTION THAT THE UN, NATO
AND OTHER SECURITY BODIES HAVE OBSERVERS AT NATIONAL
GENERAL STAFFS. HE URGED THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
ADDRESS THESE ISSUES. IN AN ASIDE, HE WORRIED THAT THE
UKRAINE MIGHT ASPIRE TO UNSC MEMBERSHIP, AND URGED THAT
THEY BE TOLD THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF THEY HAD NO
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

25. ROGOV IS LONG, IF NOT ALWAYS FAVORABLY, KNOWN TO
SECURITY SPECIALISTS. WE REPORT HIS AND VLADIMIROV'S
VIEWS NOT SO MUCH FOR THE CONTENT OF THEIR SPECIFIC
PROPOSALS, AS AN INDICATION OF THE ALARM THAT IS
BEGINNING TO PERCOLATE IN SOME QUARTERS HERE ABOUT THE
ROLE OF REPUBLICS, ESPECIALLY THE UKRAINE, IN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS ISSUES. ROGOV PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN THE
BARTHOLOMEW-OBUKHOV TALKS HERE, DEPICTING HIS VIEWS AS
UNOFFICIAL OR, AS IN THE OCTOBER 7 MEETING, "THINKING OUT
LOUD." HIS OWN ANALYSIS DOES NOT SEEM TO JUSTIFY HIS
FIRE-BREATHING CONCLUSIONS THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENT SHOULD
GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL AUTHORITIES IN
STICKING IT TO THE UKRAINIANS, AND THAT U.S. CONCESSIONS
WOULD SERVE TO "OBLIGE" THE UKRAINE TO GIVE UP NUCLEAR
WEAPONS ON ITS TERRITORY.

19. VLADIMIROV SUGGESTED AN ADDITIONAL JOINT PROGRAM TO
COVER "SOCIAL ADAPTATION" OF DISCHARGED MILITARY
OFFICERS, INCLUDING TRAINING, LAND, FUNDS, HOUSING AND
INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES.

26. VLADIMIROV, HOWEVER, MAKES AN IMPORTANT POINT ON
NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL: THE UKRAINE'S POSTURE ON
NUCLEAR ISSUES CANNOT AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL
ASPECTS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES. ACTING ALONE,
UKRAINE CANNOT LAUNCH. IT COULD NOT AND DID NOT
INTERFERE WITH REMOVAL FROM ALERT OF 99 NUCLEAR MISSILES
STATIONED IN UKRAINE (ROGOV GAVE THAT FIGURE LAST WEEK TO
VISITING FORMER NSC STAFFER CONDOLEEZA RICE). GORBACHEV
AIDE CHERNYAYEV MADE A SIMILAR POINT IN AN OCTOBER 17
CONVERSATION WITH THE DCM. CHERNYAYEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK HAD MADE SOME IRRESPONSIBLE
REMARKS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE UKRAINE, BUT CHERNYAYEV
POINTED OUT THAT KRAVCHUK DOES NOT CONTROL THESE WEAPONS.
THAT CENTRAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS
REMAINS IN PLACE. EVEN IF THE UKRAINE SUCCEEDED IN
GAINING PHYSICAL CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR MISSILES ON ITS
TERRITORY THE UKRAINIANS WOULD FIND THESE MISSILES "DEAD
AND USELESS," CHERNYAYEV SAID. STRAUSS BT

20. WRAPPING UP THE DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS ON ARMS
REDUCTIONS AND POSSIBLE COOPERATION, VLADIMIROV CONCLUDED
THAT THE SOVIET STATE COUNCIL WAS PRODUCING NO DECISIONS,
THE GENERAL STAFF WAS CONSERVATIVE, AND THE ONLY WAY HE
(VLADIMIROV) COULD EXERT INFLUENCE ON SOVIET POLICYMAKERS
WAS VIA THE AMERICANS. "YOU ARE OUR LAST HOPE
(POSLEDNYAYA INSTANTSIIYA)," HE CONCLUDED

PLUTONIUM CONTROL REGIME
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21. ROGOV REPEATED A SUGGESTION HE HAD MADE DURING THE
BARTHOLOMEW VISIT: THAT THE SIDES AGREE THAT, AS
PLUTONIUM WAS REMOVED FROM NUCLEAR WARHEADS DESTINED FOR
DESTRUCTION, THE SIDES WOULD RETAIN ONLY A SMALL
PERCENTAGE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, WITH THE REST TO BE
SUBJECT TO SOME FORM OF VERIFICATION TO ENSURE IT WAS NOT
BEING USED TO MAKE WARHEADS. HE ARGUED THAT THIS WOULD
STRENGTHEN PRESSURE ON OTHER COUNTRIES, VIA THE IAEA FOR
EXAMPLE, TO RENOUNCE PLUTONIUM USE FOR MILITARY
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PURPOSES. HE CITED JAPANESE ACCUMULATION OF PLUTONIUM
FOR ENERGY PURPOSES AS AN EXAMPLE, AND URGED A NEW
INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR PLUTONIUM CONTROL

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DEFENSE REFORM
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22. VLADIMIROV ASSERTED THAT NOTHING WAS HAPPENING YET
IN THE DEFENSE REFORM EFFORTS OF GENERAL KONSTANTIN
KOBETS, WHOSE COMMITTEE WAS ONLY NOW APPOINTING ITS
MEMBERS. THIS COMMITTEE AND OTHER GROUPINGS (THE RYZHOV
COMMISSION, THE SHAPOSHNIKOV TALKS WITH REPUBLIC DEFENSE
OFFICIALS) WERE ONLY DISCUSSING THE NEED FOR REFORM AT
THIS STAGE; THEY WERE NOT PRODUCING CONCRETE PROPOSALS
HE SAID THAT GORBACHEV WOULD SOON ISSUE A DECREE
ESTABLISHING A COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF DEFENSE

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Reason: _____
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23. VLADIMIROV SAID BOTH THE CENTER AND THE REPUBLICS
WERE IN SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES OVER DEFENSE BUDGETS. FOR
EXAMPLE, BELORUSSIA HAD SPENT MILLIONS ON CHERNOBYL;
OTHER REPUBLICS HAD NO FUNDS AVAILABLE. YET ALL WANTED

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