

DoS REQUIRED

~~SECRET SPECAT~~

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FOR DIRECT REPLY

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+++EXCLUSIVE+++

IMMEDIATE ZYUW RUEHMOA0720 2811626  
O 081826Z OCT 91  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7657  
INFO USMISSION GENEVA 0342 USMISSION USMATO 0092

THAN ROGOV, BUT DIFFERENCES ABOUT CAPABILITIES ARE LEGITIMATE AND MERIT DISCUSSION. OUR VIEW REMAINS THAT THE PROGRAM IS LIMITED, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO ILLUSTRATE THIS.

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 28720

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

GENEVA FOR USDEL NLT

RELEASED IN FULL BY  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN 2008;  
RECOMMEND FULL RELEASE TO  
REQUESTER

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
TAGS: PARM, MKUC, PREL, ...  
SUBJECT: UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW'S VISIT --  
OCTOBER 7 MEETING WITH SOVIET GROUP

5. WHETHER THE ABM TREATY? ROGOV ASKED WHETHER A TREATY OR AGREEMENT ON GPALS WOULD SUPPLEMENT OR REPLACE THE ABM TREATY. HE ASKED FOR U.S. VIEWS ON HOW THIS WOULD BE FRAMED. BARTHOLOMEW SAID WHAT'S IMPORTANT NOW IS THE SUBSTANCE, AND FORM SHOULD FOLLOW SUBSTANCE. OBVIOUSLY, HE SAID, AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED ON CERTAIN ELEMENTS TO SUPERCEDE THE ABM TREATY. THE FORM COULD BE AGREED LATER. BARTHOLOMEW OUTLINED THE IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR NOW:

1. (SECRET) - ENTIRE TEXT.)  
2. SUMMARY. U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS, TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND KAZAKHSTAN, MET FOR 90 MINUTES OCTOBER 7 MAINLY TO ANSWER SOVIET QUESTIONS ABOUT TECHNICAL LIMITS ON GPALS, AS WELL AS COSTS, AND TO HEAR SOVIET "THINKING ALOUD" ABOUT A JOINTLY DEVELOPED AND OPERATED SPACE-BASED EARLY WARNING SYSTEM WHICH WOULD SUPPLEMENT EXISTING NATIONAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS. ENO SUMMARY.

-- WHY WE ATTACH SUCH IMPORTANCE TO GPALS.  
-- WHAT DO WE MEAN BY GPALS?  
-- WHY GPALS SHOULD NOT BE A CONTROVERSIAL FACTOR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR.

3. ABM: WHAT LIMITS THE LIMITED SYSTEM? SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV OPENED THE MEETING AT 1630, SUGGESTING AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE U.S. IDEA OF A LIMITED ABM DEFENSE AGAINST LIMITED NUCLEAR STRIKES. OBUKHOV NOTED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS IN THE GENEVA SPACE GROUP. FROM THE SOVIET SIDE, ROGOV FOLLOWED WITH A QUESTION ON RESTRAINTS AND GUARANTEES: WHAT WILL LIMIT THE LIMITED SYSTEM? SPECIFICALLY, NOTING THAT GPALS PROVIDE FOR A FAIRLY COMPLEX, THREE-LAYERED DEFENSE, ROGOV ASKED WHAT WOULD GUARANTEE THAT THE SYSTEM REMAINS AT A GIVEN LEVEL? WHAT WOULD GUARANTEE AGAINST UPGRADES TO TIP THE SCALES OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE? WHERE IS THE THRESHOLD?

6. IS GPALS WORTH THE EXPENSE? ANOTHER SOVIET DELEGATION MEMBER (RUSSIAN REPUBLIC REPRESENTATIVE) NOTED THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE OF GPALS AS A GIFT, BUT GPALS WOULD INVOLVE ADDITIONAL BUDGETARY OUTLAYS. HE ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST FOLLOWING THE CHEAPER ROUTE OF MERELY STEPPING UP JOINT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. BARTHOLOMEW RESPONDED WITH FOUR ELEMENTS:

4. UNDERSECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW RESPONDED THAT RESTRAINT AND GUARANTEES WOULD BE FOUNDED ON A SOLEMN BILATERAL AGREEMENT, THE FORM OF WHICH IS OPEN TO DISCUSSION. BARTHOLOMEW SAID HE ENVISIONED A TREATY BACKED UP BY CERTAIN INHERENT TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITS, AND POSSIBLE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. ASD HADLEY ADDED THAT THERE WOULD ALSO BE, PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, LEGISLATIVE LIMITS, WITH THE ADMINISTRATION HAVING GONE TO CONGRESS FOR A LIMITED PROGRAM. A LARGER PROGRAM WOULD REQUIRE A FURTHER REQUEST TO CONGRESS, AND ITS APPROVAL. ROGOV RESPONDED THAT, EVEN WITH THE BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS NOTED, THE LIMITED SYSTEM BEFORE THE CONGRESS WOULD BE CAPABLE OF INTERCEPTING MORE THAN 200 INCOMING RV'S. HADLEY ANSWERED THAT HE BELIEVED THE SYSTEM LESS CAPABLE

-- BUDGET PHILOSOPHY. BOTH SIDES ARE GOING TO BE SPENDING LESS OVERALL ON DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS, BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN LESS SPENDING ON EVERYTHING. THERE WILL BE SOME INCREASES, AND WE VIEW LIMITED MISSILE DEFENSES AS AN AREA THAT WARRANTS INCREASES.  
-- EXISTING SOVIET PROGRAMS. THE SOVIET UNION IS CURRENTLY SPENDING A LOT ON ABM'S, AND, WE BELIEVE, ON THE WRONG KIND. WITH GPALS, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT ORIENTING SPENDING DIFFERENTLY, AND MORE INTELLIGENTLY.

\*\*\*\*\* FOR JS \*\*\*\*\*  
REVIEW FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CIMCS  
SUBMIT JCS-DSS FORM 30 IF REQUIRED

-- NON-PROLIFERATION IS NOT ENOUGH. WE AGREE THAT WE HAVE TO PUSH AS HARD AS WE CAN ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. WE ARE HAVING SOME SUCCESS, BUT THE U.S. HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT A SUCCESSFUL NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY WILL ALSO REQUIRE DEFENSES. THE TWO ELEMENTS ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE ALTERNATIVES, BUT MATCHING PARTS OF A COMPLEX STRATEGY. WE WORKED HARD ON MISSILE NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH SOME SUCCESS, BUT WE WERE ALSO GLAD TO HAVE THE PATRIOTS.  
-- MISSILE ARCS. BARTHOLOMEW REPEATED THAT WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY IN REFERRING TO A LIMITED ABM SYSTEM WHICH WILL NOT THREATEN THE RETALIATORY CAPACITY OF EITHER SIDE. HE SAID HE BELIEVES U.S. DECISION-MAKERS CANNOT RESPONSIBLY LEAVE THE U.S. VULNERABLE TO MISSILE ATTACKS BY IRRESPONSIBLE THIRD COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD HAVE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES. HE SAID HE FELT THAT ON REFLECTION, HAVING SEEN THE MISSILE ARCS FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD AGREE.

ACTION (P.M.)  
INFO CJCS(1) J3(1) J5(1) SECDEF-M(1)  
USDP: SPECIAL MMBDLING(13) USDA: PBL(1) USDA: AE(1)  
USDA: STWFSAC(1) ASD: PA(2) USDP: CH(1) USDP: PO(1)  
DR(1) DO(1) DI-1(1) DD-AC(1) IMA(2) DA-SA(1)  
OSC-CI(1) IWS(1) DA-PA(1) VP(1) DIO(1) OB(1) DIA(O)  
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
+CNO WASHINGTON DC  
+HQS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC  
+HQS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC  
+USMNR SHAPE BE//SURVEY//

7. GPALS: SOVIET EDITORIAL COMMENT. OBUKHOV WOUND UP THE DISCUSSION ON MISSILE DEFENSES BY EXPRESSING HOPE

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UKRAINE'S VIEWS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS "WILL HAVE TO BE  
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT." STRAUSS BT

THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD AGREE NOT TO TAKE STEPS  
ENTAILING ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURES. "WE BELIEVE THERE  
ARE GROUNDS FOR CONCERN." ALSO, HE SAID, THERE ARE  
CONCERNS FOR THE ABM TREATY WHICH HAS BEEN A FACTOR  
FOR STABILITY. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS  
AND THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION, CERTAIN  
CLARIFICATIONS WERE REQUIRED AND A DIALOGUE SHOULD  
OCCUR.

8. SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR JOINT EARLY WARNING SYSTEM.

OBUKHOV INVITED DISCUSSION OF THIS COMPONENT OF  
GORBACHEV'S OCTOBER 5 RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S  
INITIATIVE. ROGOV FOLLOWED WITH A LENGTHY  
DISQUISITION, WHICH HE LABELLED "THINKING ALOUD."  
PLACING NUCLEAR THREATS BY THE U.S. AND USSR AGAINST  
EACH OTHER UNDER THE RUBRIC OF "OLD THINKING," ROGOV  
NOTED THAT DESPITE THE END OF THE COLD WAR, STRATEGIC  
STANDOFF REMAINS TOGETHER WITH THE THREAT OF  
ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED USE, OR BREAKDOWNS IN  
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. ROGOV ADDRESSED TWO  
TECHNICAL EARLY-WARNING ISSUES. REFERRING TO THE  
KRASNOYARSK RADAR, HE SAID THAT SOVIET EARLY WARNING  
CAPABILITY WILL NOT, SO FAR AS THE PACIFIC IS  
CONCERNED, BE AT THE DESIRED LEVEL FOR SOME TIME.  
(NOTE: ROGOV THEN INTERJECTED IN ENGLISH: "I'M NOT  
COMMENTING ON THE REASON WHY -- JUST ON THE FACT THAT  
IT HAPPENED.") HE SAID THAT IN THE NORTH ARCTIC,  
NORAD OVERLAPS WITH THE SOVIET EARLY WARNING SYSTEM,  
WITH POTENTIAL FOR PROBLEMS.

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9. IN THIS CONTEXT AND TO ENHANCE CRISIS STABILITY,  
ROGOV SAID, HE COULD ENVISION A JOINT COOPERATIVE  
EARLY WARNING EFFORT PROVIDING JOINT USE OF A  
JOINTLY-DEVELOPED SYSTEM, WITH NATIONAL EARLY WARNING  
SYSTEMS ALSO RETAINED. THE JOINT SYSTEM COULD BE  
SPACE-BASED, WITH SATELLITES JOINTLY-DEVELOPED,  
-LAUNCHED, AND -MAINTAINED OVER THE NORTHERN PACIFIC,  
NORTH ARCTIC, THE INDIAN OCEAN WHERE THEY WOULD HAVE  
BT

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OTHER USES AS WELL, AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC. ROGOV  
ALSO SUGGESTED MONITORING STATIONS ON LAND, MANNED BY  
U.S. AND SOVIET PERSONNEL ON THE OTHER'S TERRITORY.  
HE SUGGESTED ADOPTION OF FAIL-SAFE DEVICES ON  
MISSILES WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR DESTRUCTION OR  
SELF-DESTRUCTION IN THE EVENT OF ACCIDENTAL OR  
UNAUTHORIZED LAUNCH. REGARDING THIRD COUNTRY  
THREATS, WHICH HE IDENTIFIED UNDER THE RUBRIC OF "NEW  
THINKING," ROGOV SUGGESTED MONITORING OF LAUNCHES TO  
HELP "ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVOCATION."

Office of the Secretary of Defense **5 USC 552**  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 22 Apr 2014 Authority: EO 13526  
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Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 13 -M- 3443

10. CONCLUDING REMARKS. BARTHOLOMEW COMMENTED THAT  
/----- THIS WAS A LEGITIMATE  
MATTER TO DISCUSS, AS REFLECTED IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S  
INITIATIVES, AND THAT HE WAS ENCOURAGED TO HEAR A  
SOVIET TALK ABOUT SENSORS IN SPACE. IN CONCLUDING  
THE SESSION, HE COMMENTED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS  
PROVIDED FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE ERA OF THE THREAT  
-- HIGH, IMMEDIATE, INTENSE THREAT -- IS OVER. THIS  
HAS HAPPENED BECAUSE OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE  
MILITARY BALANCE CAUSED IN PLBWCHMS ONTROL, AND  
BECAUSE OF CHANGES IN THE MILITARY. THE ERA OF  
THREAT IS OVER POLITICALLY, AS WELL. OUR AIM, HE  
SAID, IS TO SHIFT TO DIFFERENT KINDS OF FORCES, WITH  
DIFFERENT INTER-RELATIONSHIPS, WHICH FIT THE CURRENT  
SITUATION. OBUKHOV RESPONDED WITH THANKS FOR THE  
U.S. SIDE'S PATIENCE WITH THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN  
THE SOVIET UNION, AND FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC  
REFORM HERE. THE UKRAINIAN REP FOLLOWED WITH AN  
EXPRESSION OF THANKS TO THE U.S. FOR HAVING TAKEN THE  
INITIATIVE TO INCLUDE THE FOUR REPUBLICS IN THE  
DISCUSSIONS. THE UKRAINIAN REP AFFIRMED THAT

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