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Office of the Secretary of Defense *5452552*
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS *ANR*
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 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
 Date: JUL 25 2013

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

22 JUN 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Middle East Command Arrangements

On June 5th, Ambassador West suggested that the existing DoD organization in Saudi Arabia may not be fully capable of successfully advancing our security interests in that country. In view of the importance of Saudi Arabia to the achievement of our policy objectives and profound changes in the region, some organizational improvement appears to be clearly warranted.

I do not believe, however, that reorganization should necessarily be limited to military activities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Instead, and prior to altering existing DoD activities in the Kingdom in vacuo, I believe that we should examine whether or not now is the time fundamentally to restructure U.S. command arrangements for the Middle East, South Asia and Africa south of the Sahara (which include PACOM, EUCCOM and REDCOM's contingency JTFs) in an effort to construct a more flexible and more responsive structure, one which would be more capable of achieving U.S. goals.

Accordingly, I would like you together--on an expedited basis--to study the present command structure in the region, and to provide me with a recommended revision, one which would reflect the more central place of the Middle East and adjacent areas in today's strategic environment.

I would like to have your report by September 1st.

Harold Brown

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Date:

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JCSM-270-79
29 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Command Arrangements in Africa and the Middle East (U)

1. (S) Reference your memorandum, * 22 June 1979, "Middle East Command Arrangements (U)," which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff study the present command structure in the Middle East and adjacent areas and provide a recommended revision that would reflect the more central place of the region in today's strategic environment.
2. (S) Today, the Persian Gulf area, because of its oil, is of critical importance to the Free World. It is clear that world oil production and the oil requirements of the United States and its major allies are in such delicate balance that relatively minor downward adjustments in production result in grave consequences. Given this unique situation, an adventurous Soviet Government, either directly or through proxies, could attempt to coerce or strangle the larger industrial nations by denying access to Persian Gulf oil. While there is no guaranteed way to overcome this situation, it is appropriate that the United States explore means to enhance its military capability to protect its vital interests in this area.
3. (S) As a first step, it was necessary to examine the command arrangements in Africa and the Middle East. On one hand, if only limited contingencies, noncombatant evacuation, and disaster relief planning and execution were envisioned, USEUCOM's past record in these areas and proximity to the region clearly would support continuation of current arrangements. However, USEUCOM's capability could be severely taxed when major contingencies, up to those postulated in

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the Consolidated Guidance, are planned for and executed, especially when USEUCOM's principal responsibilities to Europe are considered. Moreover, USEUCOM's location on the soil of NATO allies could place political constraints on US freedom of action in executing non-European contingency operations.

4. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff, less the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, ^{a/} believe that a more suitable command arrangement in the region would be to assign the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa to USREDCOM, less the responsibility for security assistance and operations during other than major contingencies, which would be tasked to USEUCOM. USEUCOM would continue its current responsibilities for the Mediterranean littoral states in North Africa. (See map in the Appendix.) Considerable liaison and coordination between headquarters will be required and would be accomplished by command-arrangement agreements between USCINCEUR and USCINCREC.

5. (U) The strengths of this command arrangement are:

a. ~~(S)~~ USEUCOM would continue its daily involvement in the region through its established contacts with local military and political leaders and its planning and administration of the military aspects of the security assistance program. It would continue its contacts with involved European allies who still maintain a significant presence in the region. USCINCEUR would retain control of the Sixth Fleet, the Middle East Force, and other assigned assets which could play an important role in responding to limited contingencies and in planning and executing noncombatant evacuation and disaster relief operations in areas where USEUCOM has long and successful experience.


b. ~~(S)~~ USREDCOM is located in proximity to the majority of the CONUS-based forces which would usually be deployed to the region to meet contingency requirements. Thus positioned, USCINCREC would be the commander responsible for planning, joint training, exercising, deploying, and employing a rapid deployment force to respond to major contingencies. Additionally, USREDCOM would be less encumbered by European/NATO constraints if a unilateral US response were dictated.

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6. (S) Upon receipt of the decision regarding the command arrangement in Africa and the Middle East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will prepare the necessary implementing directives.

• For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DAVID C. JONES, General, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachment

Reference:

- * Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, 22 June 1979, "Middle East Command Arrangements (U)"

a/ 1. (S) The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps do not agree that there is a requirement to change the Unified Command Plan with regard to the Middle East at this time. The issues to be addressed in reaching such an important decision are complex and deserve full examination. The following areas are of particular concern:

- There is insufficient evidence to support the view that USEUCOM's capability would be severely taxed in planning for or executing major contingencies as postulated in the Consolidated Guidance.
- There is little evidence to suggest that USREDCOM could exercise command responsibilities for the area better than USEUCOM.
- Splitting the command arrangements between USREDCOM and USEUCOM in the volatile Egyptian/Israeli border area results in a potentially awkward command situation.
- The potential for instability created by transition from one unified command to another while engaged in a rapidly escalating scenario has not been adequately

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- The proposed arrangement would create a large new unified command in a politically sensitive area for a commander (USCINCRAD) whose sole present function is to prepare reaction forces for rapid deployment from CONUS.

- There has been no comparative evaluation of the concept of a joint task force (JTF) structured to plan specifically for the more demanding Persian Gulf contingencies.

2. (S) In view of the foregoing, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps believe that a more practical and effective command arrangement would be to form a CONUS-based JTF staff, probably under the direction of USREDCOM. This staff would:

- Plan for major contingencies in close coordination with the appropriate unified commander.
- Exercise JTF-designated forces.
- Deploy to the region to execute the contingency plan when directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Once in the field, the JTF would function under the operational control of the assigned unified commander. In the case of the Middle East, it would report to, and be under the command of, USCINCEUR.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

November 10, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Rapid Deployment Forces (U)

As you know, we have evidence of new Soviet thinking on and capability for projection of power beyond the USSR periphery. Our response must include measures which enhance deterrence by facing them with higher risks of escalation in the event of Soviet intervention abroad. Therefore, as part of your ongoing planning for rapid deployment forces, I would like you to examine ways to improve our capability for very rapid deployment of small, highly effective force elements to potential crisis areas. In particular, you should work with the Commandant of the Marine Corps to examine whether the Marines should have a larger role in such planning.

Harold Brown

cc: USD(P)
CMC

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-334-79
29 November 1979

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUL 25 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters (U)

1. (S) Reference your memorandum* requesting the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a CONUS-based joint task force (JTF) of rapid deployment forces to respond to contingencies threatening American interests anywhere in the world.
2. (S) On 15 November 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified** a tentative force composition for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).
3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that the RDJTF Headquarters will be located as a separate subordinate element of Headquarters, USREDCOM, at MacDill AFB, Florida. The headquarters will be moderate in size and capable of deploying on a no-notice basis without significant augmentation. Military personnel from all Services will be assigned to provide balanced representation in this staff nucleus, which will have the capability of being expanded if required.
4. (S) The position of Commander, RDJTF, is to be filled initially by an Army O-9. A nomination will be forwarded by separate memorandum.
5. (S) A small liaison staff from the RDJTF will be established in the Washington, D.C., area.
6. (S) By separate actions, the JPM to establish the manpower authorizations to staff the RDJTF Headquarters is being developed, and appropriate Joint Strategic Planning System

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documents are being changed to task the RDJTF to accomplish those actions you specified in your 22 October 1979 memorandum. These actions will be accomplished to allow the RDJTF to be in place and functioning by 1 March 1980.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Thor Hanson

THOR HANSON
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Staff

References:

- * Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, 22 October 1979, "Middle East/Africa Command Arrangements"
- ** JCSM-318-79, 15 November 1979, "Force Composition for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (U)"

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JAN 26 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Rapid Deployment Forces (U)

~~(S)~~ I have reviewed JCSM-334-79 and JCSM-318-79, which respond to my October 22 memorandum requesting a detailed plan for establishing a joint task force to control the RDF and plan for Middle East contingency operations. It is evident that we have made considerable progress in the development of the RDJTF. My decisions are as follows:

1. Establish the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters at Readiness Command at Tampa, Florida on or about March 1, 1980.
2. Establish a JTF liaison office in Washington (headed by a general or flag officer) to support JTF responsibilities, especially those for contingency planning. There will need to be adequate politico-military interface with the JCS/Joint Staff and OSD on these matters, especially in the light of the early RDF focus on the Middle East/Persian Gulf area. The liaison office will therefore have to be appropriately staffed, and in my judgment this will require on the order of 15-20 people.
3. Develop Terms of Reference (TOR) for the JTF for my review by February 1, 1980. Include in the TOR clear statements of the responsibility of the Commander, JTF, as directed in my memorandum to you of October 22, 1979. In particular the Commander should be responsible for developing plans for the deployment and employment of forces for major contingencies in the Middle East/South Asian area and adjacent waters.
4. I approve your plan for initial subordination of the RDJTF headquarters to USCINCREC, recognizing that, when deployed, the RDJTF will transfer to the appropriate CINC or will report directly to the National Command Authorities, depending upon circumstances. Therefore, write into the TOR a chain of command mechanism by which the RDJTF Commander could report directly to the NCA, and not be dependent upon another CINC.
5. Provide the Commander, JTF, an exercise budget.

Harold Brown

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Date: JUL 25 2013

Review: 26 Jan 1986

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X-06129

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

6 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters

Reference is made to JCSM 334-79 which described the organization of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters (RDJTF).

With respect to paragraph 4 of the referenced memorandum, please obtain both Army and Marine Corps nominations for the position of Commander, RDJTF.

W. Graham Clayton, Jr.
W. Graham Clayton, Jr.

cc: USD(P)

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-59-80
1 March 1980

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief: Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUL 25 2013

Subject: " Strategic Review of the US Unified Command Structure

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following considerations for use in the preparation of your response to the President* concerning possible changes to the Unified Command Plan as it relates to the Persian Gulf region.
2. As you are aware, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently reviewed command arrangements in the Middle East and Africa in response to a request** from you, and provided you with recommendations*** for improvement. As a result of these recommendations, you directed**** the establishment of the organization that has become the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). Further, as you specified, the RDJTF has been tasked with initial planning responsibility for this region to include planning, coordinating, and implementing military exercises with regional states as directed and planning and conducting combat operations in the region.
3. (U) Numerous actions involving the creation of the RDJTF have been and are underway, in many diverse functional areas, to insure that this organization becomes a viable and effective entity.
 - a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed the establishment of the RDJTF Headquarters at MacDill AFB, Florida, as a separate subordinate element of Headquarters, USREDCOM. Under the operational command of USCINCREDE, the Commander, RDJTF, will plan, jointly train, exercise, and be prepared to deploy and employ designated forces of the RDJTF. The actual deployment and employment of the RDJTF may be accomplished under the operational command of the commander of any unified/specified command or under the direction of the NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as appropriate.

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b. A liaison office from the RDJTF, headed by a flag/general officer, is being established in the Washington, D.C., area. This office will support RDJTF responsibilities, especially those for contingency planning, and will provide a politico-military interface with the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Staff/Service staffs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Joint and Service staff officers have been temporarily assigned to perform these functions until such time as the permanently assigned RDJTF liaison staff personnel arrive in Washington, D.C.

c. (U) Terms of reference (TOR) for the RDJTF have been formulated and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These identify the mission, command relationships, forces, tasks, and responsibilities for the RDJTF and have been provided to all Services, unified and specified commands, and appropriate Defense agencies to provide a commonality of understanding among all interested parties. Additionally, the Commander, RDJTF, has been requested to review these TOR for possible revision following experience gained during the first 6 months of RDJTF operations.

d. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the RDJTF Headquarters structure and the related 253 manpower authorizations. The Services are presently assigning personnel to staff the headquarters so that it will be in place and functioning by 1 March 1980. It is anticipated that 100 percent manning will be achieved in the April/May 1980 timeframe.

e. A JCS-directed exercise, POSITIVE LEAP 80, has been approved and is designed to test, validate, and refine procedures and assess capabilities for deploying/employing rapid deployment forces to a non-NATO contingency area. The scenario depicts a crisis occurring in the Middle East requiring rapid reaction by military forces in support of vital US interests. The first phase exercise dates are 12-17 May 1980. Actual commanders and staffs will participate on a normal duty hour schedule, with the exercise culminating in a decision briefing on recommended courses of action for an NCA decision. This decision will be the basis for implementing the CPX phase in June 1980. The CPX will be of 5 days duration commencing 2 June 1980 and will be initiated with an alert order based on the NCA decision. This portion of the overall exercise will emphasize the procedural aspects of the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) and transportation operating agencies (TOAs) in RDJTF deployment.

f. As an adjunct to this planning exercise and deployment CPX, a JCS-coordinated, USREDCOM-sponsored employment CPX is being planned for the 10-15 April 1980 timeframe. As briefed by USCINCRD, the exercise scenario incorporates commitment of rapid deployment forces to a contingency area in the Middle

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4. (U) Throughout the accomplishment of all of these actions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have maintained the subjects of command structure and command relationships in the forefront of their considerations. The objective desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been to develop an organization structure that could provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate the varying command relationships that might be dictated by the daily requirements of normal operations and at the same time permit the efficient and timely support of RDJTF forces, should their employment be required within the region. The sum of these organizational requirements is both varied and of significant magnitude. For example:

a. (U) A commander of a unified command is responsible for functionally interfacing on a daily basis with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the other unified and specified commands, as well as supporting organizations within his region of responsibility such as Department of State, CIA, DIA, and DCA. In addition, his headquarters provides operational direction, intelligence support, and logistic directive authority plus civil affairs, environmental services, and communications-electronics coordination and mapping and charting support to his Service component commanders. Normal day-to-day functions include planning and administration of security assistance, planning and conducting noncombatant evacuations and disaster relief operations, and providing training and coordinating CONUS training for military personnel from selected regional states.

b. (U) In the event of hostilities, a commander of a unified command is expected to provide expanded functional support to the combat force commanders. To illustrate some of the specifics, in case of the employment of the RDJTF in the Middle East, in the area of logistics the commander of the unified command would establish a joint POL office, a joint transportation office, a joint medical regulatory office, the military blood program, and joint central graves registration office. Under his logistics directive authority, he would consolidate overall lift requirements for forces, determine priorities, control all assigned or attached lift, and coordinate with all DOD transportation agencies.

c. (U) The commander of the unified command would coordinate and supervise the development of the command and control network in the area of operations by providing the interface with national level command and control and providing the secure voice system and other physical/technical connecting facilities for full scope tactical communications. As an aside, to illustrate the magnitude of support required for command and control functions, estimates are that it would require 1,000-2,000 personnel and \$50-\$100 million to begin the establishment of this network from a zero base. In civil

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affairs, he would provide liaison with allied and host governments and coordinate refugee assistance. He is also the link with national intelligence support agencies and performs counterterrorism and counterintelligence functions.

5. After careful study of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that employment of the RDJTF under a normal command arrangement (i.e., the JTF directly under the commander of a unified command or functioning as a subordinate unified command) or even in a special situation such as employment under the NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would not eliminate any of the requirements outlined above. Support must be provided, either in whole or in part, from either the Commander, RDJTF, through substantial staff augmentation; the commander of the unified command being tasked for appropriate support outside of operational command lines; or directly through the Joint or Service staffs.

6. Over the course of years the functional responsibilities assigned to each unified command have significantly influenced the evolution of the organizational structure of the commands now supervising the southwest Asia/Indian Ocean region. PACOM has an extensive established shore-based logistic infrastructure to support operations over extended distances, including Clark AFB, Subic Naval Base, and the Navy Support Facility, Diego Garcia, as well as bases in Japan and Guam. The nature of USEUCOM operations has been such that it has not been necessary to establish an extensive logistic structure outside of Europe. With the exception of the Naval Administrative Support Unit, Bahrain, naval logistic support is provided on a contractual basis within the USEUCOM area of responsibility in the Indian Ocean region, and is not configured to provide support over extended distances. In the JCS assessment therefore, rather than change, it would appear that the existing command structure in the region should be retained and that the inherent strengths of both of these unified commands should be utilized to their maximum advantage.

7. For these reasons, the principal conclusion reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning command relationships in the Persian Gulf region was that current area assignment responsibilities as outlined in the Unified Command Plan should be retained. In the event that employment of RDJTF forces within the area is required, the Commander, RDJTF, will be designated as a commander of a unified command for the Persian Gulf region. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide the commanders of the appropriate unified commands and the Commander, RDJTF, with the NCA/JCS/CINC/RDJTF command/support relationships/requirements, together with detailed instructions regarding the designated joint area of operations at the time of plan execution.

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8. ~~(S)~~ To facilitate the implementation of the foregoing command relations concept in the Persian Gulf region and in view of the numerous activities ongoing in this region, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided to designate the Commander, Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR), to perform the additional duty as commander of the forward element of the RDJTF operating in the region on a daily basis. The MIDEASTFOR existing staff will be augmented by approximately 10 additional staff personnel to establish it as a multi-Service staff and to enable it to accomplish the added RDJTF functional responsibilities. COMIDEASTFOR will continue to accomplish RDJTF tasks in the RDJTF areas of responsibility on a not-to-interfere basis with COMIDEASTFOR responsibilities to USCINCEUR/CINCPAC regardless of the operational command status of the MIDEASTFOR. These additional duties will include, within MIDEASTFOR's capabilities as augmented by appropriate RDJTF staff personnel, assistance in developing plans for and conducting, when directed:

- a. ~~(S)~~ Rapid deployment forces operations in Africa and the Middle East/South Asian area and adjacent waters.
- b. ~~(S)~~ Military exercises with regional states, as directed.
- c. ~~(S)~~ Establishment of forward operating base locations in Oman, Kenya, Somalia, and elsewhere within the region as directed.
- d. ~~(S)~~ Liaison for the RDJTF with US diplomatic representatives and other US Government agencies in the nations within the regions.
- e. ~~(S)~~ Collection and reporting of intelligence.
- f. ~~(S)~~ Combat operations in the regions as required.

9. (U) As you are aware, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed the initial RDJTF TOR as a vehicle to guide the development of JCS/RDJTF/unified command relationships. The specific interrelationships between the commands involved with RDJTF operations in the Persian Gulf region will be addressed by the Commander, RDJTF, without delay. Appropriate memorandums of understanding will be accomplished by the Commander, RDJTF, and the other commanders involved; codified in Command Arrangements Agreements executed by these commanders as appropriate; and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

10. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to assess command relationships relating to the RDJTF and the unified command structure in the region. The next JCS formal addressal of these command relationships in the Persian Gulf region will occur in the

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October 1980 - January 1981 timeframe, based upon the knowledge gained from an evaluation of the first 6 to 9 months of RDJTF operations.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

David C. Jones

DAVID C. JONES, General, USAF
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Date: JUL 25 2013

Attachment

References:

- * Memorandum by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 25 January 1980, "Strategic Review of our Unified Command Structure ~~(S)~~"
- ** Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, 22 June 1979, "Middle East Command Arrangements"
- *** JCSM-270-79, 29 August 1979, "Command Arrangements in Africa and the Middle East (U)"
- **** Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, 22 October 1979, "Middle East/Africa Command Arrangements"

- # The UCP specifically indicates that when a unified command is assigned a geographic area of responsibility, that assignment is not intended to be restrictive. Commanders may operate forces wherever required to fulfill their missions. Forces directed by, or operating under, the strategic direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may conduct operations from, or within, any geographic area as may be required for the accomplishment of assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the commanders concerned, or as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- ## The Persian Gulf region is defined as the countries of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on the Middle East landmass; all the countries on the Arabian Peninsula; the countries of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya on the Horn of Africa, including the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters. See map in the Appendix.
- ### The details of the strategic guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be significantly influenced by the specifics associated with a given situation; e.g., size of the force to be employed, scope of the military operations involved, geophysical characteristics of the region, relationship to land/sea/CINC area boundaries.



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

AUG 4 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I approve the clarification of mission and command relationships for the RDTB, recommended in JCSM-205-80 of July 25, 1980. Please put these changes into effect immediately.

I also request that the JCS keep the matter of further evolution of command relationships in the critical Southwest Asia area under periodic review.

Harold Brown

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