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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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OSD 3.3(b)(1)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF  
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
(Special Operations)

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

SUBJECT: Visit of Chiang Ching-kuo to the United States

1. On 30 August we received the following message from [redacted]

2. At a meeting [redacted] Chiang Ching-kuo on 10 August, Chiang stated that he would be carrying three documents to Washington. Chiang described the nature of the documents but not the contents. The documents are:

a. A letter to President Kennedy from President Chiang.

b. A paper on Sino-American cooperation. This includes a summary of the past relationship, an analysis of the new situation and new paramilitary programs, and a complementary political action program which would be in support of paramilitary operations.

c. A GRC estimate of the situation, particularly with reference to the Sino-Soviet dispute.

3. General Ch'en Te-ching was present at the above meeting and took the opportunity to make the following suggestions:

a. That the GRC be given some token atomic weapons capability in order to effectively counter the anticipated Chinese Communist threat. [redacted]

Office of the Secretary of Defense *SVSc0532*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *11 Nov 2013* Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: *X*  
Reason: *3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)*  
MDR: *13-M-1348*

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 11 2013



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CIA 3.3(b)(1)

b. That consideration be given to sabotage operations against Chinese Communist nuclear targets.

c. That a greater effort be made to prevent U.S. trained Chinese scientists from returning to Communist China.

4. [REDACTED] the following comment on the meeting:

From Chiang's remarks it is obvious that both he and President Chiang regard his trip as an extremely important element in fixing the direction of future OBC-American cooperation, particularly with regard to joint action against the mainland.

5. We are passing the above information to the Department of State and to Mr. Michael V. Forrestal, National Security Council.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

/s/ WILLIAM E. Colby

William E. Colby

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 11 2013

Re CIA 4Sep63 memo

6 Sep 63

~~Secret~~

Subject: Visit of Chiang Ching-kuo to the U.S.  
dated 4Sep63

log #205

copies from Gen Lansdale to the following:

Sec/Def  
Mr. Gilpatric  
Gen Taylor  
Mr. Nitze

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Date: NOV 11 2013

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CIA

Memo for the Record  
D. Ellsberg, 26 February 1966

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs.  
EO 13526 3.5(c)

Subject: Colonel Chau and CIA

1. In half a dozen conversations with Colonel Chau starting 29 January he has expressed great concern about the role of OSA in the rural construction program. This memo summarizes the verbal reporting I have made to you after these conversations. Chau's concerns break down into three categories: a) his personal relations with OSA; b) OSA handling of its relations with Thang and the cadre program; c) the impression in Vietnamese minds of the relation of Rural Construction to the Americans, particularly CIA.

2. Frictions and pressures in his relations with CIA have obviously put great emotional strain on Chau because of his past friendship with that agency. In our first conversation and frequently in later ones he would interject with great emotion:

"You know, I have great appreciation and gratitude for help I got in Kien Hoa from CIA: more for the moral support than for material help. They were the only ones who believed in what I was trying to do, and helped me. Believe me, I have nothing against CIA."

"But I think that I was brought to Saigon on a misunderstanding. I thought I would run the program, determine the policies: with consultation with all the agencies involved. But I think that Mr. Jorgenson and Mr. Donahugh only wanted me to do a technical job, administering it but not affecting policy matters. If that is what they want, that is fine, but I do not want that job."

3. Apparently major friction erupted on the issue of the size of the cadre groups. After Thang and Chau had briefed all the province chiefs on a program calling for 80-man groups, Jorgenson and Donahugh visited Thang, and Donahugh reported to the Cadre Working Group that they had agreed on a 50-man group: which would mean a 40-man PAT unit and 10 other cadre instead of 40. Each man on the interagency group got the impression and relayed it to his superiors that the initiative for this major change had come from Thang. (Apparently Donahugh did not say this explicitly, but the several members I have talked to all said that they had received this impression, which they didn't question). Chau

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spoke of resigning; and when Vann, who had been out of town, was called back to dissuade him, Vann questioned the change strongly. Vann and Chau then went to see Thang, who told them that he had not proposed a reduction to 50 men -- he was still in favor of an 80-man team -- but that Jorgenson and Donahugh had told him that it was necessary because of training and budgetary limitations: "and they are the ones with the money."

After negotiation, a 50-man team was decided upon; Chau described this to the Working Group as "a compromise between the 80-man team that Thang and I wanted and the 50-man team proposed by OSA." Donahugh, who was present, did not comment on this characterization of the positions, though it came as a surprise to the other members present. (A mission Weekly Report to the President had gone out already describing the shift to a smaller team as initiated by Thang).

This episode inevitably left bitter feelings all around. (I have not heard an account from the OSA side). Although Chau several times mentioned his respect for Donahugh, when I commented at one point that from everything I had heard I was sure that Donahugh and his colleagues were sincere and well-intentioned, he broke in, "But they said that General Thang wanted 50-man teams!" He felt he had been lied to (though others, searching their memories, conclude that this was not strictly the case).

There were several issues here, from Chau's point of view:  
a) OSA going to see Thang without telling Chau their proposal; and then fostering a misleading impression of Thang's position;  
b) the limitation on the non-PAT elements of the team: still inadequate, in Chau's eyes, at 19 men, let alone the 10 proposed; c) a GVN change in the overall plan, just after briefing the provinces on the old one.

Chau tended to depreciate the importance of the first two points (though they may have affected him more than he said); he emphasized the bad impression given to the province chiefs, who had been told that a new version of the plan would be released that reflected their comments. Now, before they had had time to comment, the national government was changing it without waiting for them, indicating either that province chiefs' opinions didn't really matter, that the government didn't know its own mind, or that the Americans had simply dictated a change.

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3. Chau felt that the OSA representatives were insensitive to the political costs of appearing to be in complete charge of the cadre program. He felt that both the province chiefs and General Thang went too far in permitting this impression (he said he had often remonstrated with General Thang over this) because they felt that CIA "had the money." "It would not be so bad if an American in the province seemed to be higher than the province chief: if he were a mature, experienced person; but when a young, obviously inexperienced American seems to be able to tell the province chief what to do, that makes it seem very obvious that we are just working for the Americans."

Chau referred to several incidents on our trip to Dalat to brief II Corps officials; I had noticed all of them myself. At one point, in front of every province chief in II Corps, Thang had pointed at one and said: "Now, you had better be sure that you send only good men to Vung Tau; because if you send poor men, Mr. Donahugh here (sitting next to him) will send them right back, and I will be very unhappy." Also, the OSA representative had ignored the invitation to fly up in the plane with Thang, Chau and all other members of the working group. As usual they took their own plane. The OSA plane was delayed and the OSA members arrived after Vann's briefing on the cadre program to US attendees; the other members of the working group were disappointed by this, because they had found on earlier trips that the OSA field representatives seemed to have heard little or nothing about any changes from the PAT program.

Chau said that he had not been able to get any OSA people to discuss with him their concept of the program; he felt they were totally ignoring him. (as yet OSA had not moved into the building with all of the other members of the working group).

At the end of one conversation he said: "I do not feel that CIA should not have a large say in the program. It is right that they should; they are paying for the program, and it is right that their views should have great weight. I don't want everything on my own way (Vann comments: "Of course, he does want everything his own way ...") but the question is: Is it to be entirely run by CIA?"

4. Substantively, Chau had come to suspect that OSA did not fully understand or believe in the roles of the non-PAT elements of the team. Their willingness to see these elements cut to 10 men (rather than sacrifice PAT trainees, given limited training capability) -- including them,

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at all, apparently as a sop -- or finally to 19 men, seemed evidence for this. In effect, Chau felt, OSA saw the current Rural Construction Cadre program essentially as an expansion of the PAT program (though it had the added effect of giving OSA -- in Saigon and in the field -- effective control over nearly all cadre in the provinces). Moreover, they either were not aiming at pacifying, as Chau understood it, or they had an exaggerated notion of the role of a PAT team in pacification.

In Chau's view, the PAT team alone was, in practice, only a substitute for PF's; a good substitute, conducting themselves more effectively than most PF platoons both in military and civic action functions: but not a substitute for the Census/Grievance, Civic Action and New Life Development teams on which Chau lays most emphasis for the complex tasks of organizing and motivating the people. At some times, Chau felt, OSA seemed satisfied to see the PAT's quite explicitly performing a PF/RF role only, as in Quang Nam. At other times, OSA seemed to believe that the insertion of a PAT team into a VC-dominated hamlet would somehow generate the information flow between villagers and government, the hamlet organization and eventually self-defense that the Cadre Group, with their more specialised training, were designed to produce.

(Donahugh has commented to me that Chau kept adding so many tasks to his Census/Grievance teams in Kien Hoa -- so many "baroque little frills" -- that the project could not have been administered by any other province chiefs. "What is needed here is really something very simple, some simple little measures." Vann agrees that Chau's Kien Hoa program could bear simplification before being imitated widely; but not to the point of hamstringing the non-PAT elements, which he along with Chau regards as vital. I am not yet able to say whether Chau and Vann are right in believing that OSA accords little importance -- less than they say -- to these elements. There is the evidence of the attempt to take the manpower slash wholly out of the training of these elements; and apparent slowness about educating the OSA field representatives -- used to dealing only with PATs -- about the role of the new elements. (One province representative of OSA told me recently he "didn't see the need for the new parts of the team ... couldn't see any point".

While OSA has endorsed the Census/Grievance mechanism introduced by Chau in Kien Hoa by supporting it elsewhere, Chau feels that their practice and interpretation has been to emphasize only the census-making and intelligence -

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gathering aspects rather than what he regards as most important: the feedback to local government of villagers' aspirations and grievances, and the follow-through on their complaints, informing them of action taken.)

5. Chau says he has lost some of his respect for CIA in the course of working with them in Saigon. "I used to think they had great feel for political and psychological matters." (This was in Kien Hoa, where they backed what he was doing and let him alone!) "Now I think they have little." (Even so, he judged in answer to a question that they had more political sense than any other US field agency.)

Moreover, he felt that top OSA leadership in Saigon was not well informed as to actual PAT/OSA performance in the provinces. "Many of the field representatives are young and inexperienced, and many of them are not good; they don't know what to look for, and they are not sufficiently supervised. OSA has commodities, weapons, money to give; people like province chiefs want these, and they flatter OSA, don't give them a true picture."

6. Even before the episode of the "numbers game," friction had developed between Chau and OSA over the role of Captain Mai, the commandant of the PAT training program. OSA thought very highly of Mai and wanted to keep him in place. Chau expressed, at first, little criticism of Mai as an individual but insisted that he had been known too long as an employee of the Americans, and that if province chiefs were ever to believe that the program was now to be a Vietnamese one, the change must be symbolized by downgrading Mai or letting him go. Chau got a very poor impression on his early visits to Vung Tau of the deference paid by Mai to his American counterparts and the general note there of Mai/Vietnamese subordination to US representatives.

(Vann has described the recent graduation ceremony at Vung Tau in a way that supports this picture of Mai and of OSA insensitivity).

A planeload of American Guests was invited to the ceremony; they were met at the airport by Mai, who took them all to a banquet at Cyrano's in Vung Tau. Because of the banquet (no other Vietnamese were present) the Americans and Mai arrive at about 30 minutes late for the ceremony, where 3200 presumably fired-up PATS were waiting. On the stage in front of these new troopers were four easy chairs, with three rows of chairs in back. The four chairs in front were

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were occupied by Mai, Jorgenson, [REDACTED] and Donahugh; the two rows behind them were entirely occupied by Americans, including seven "giggling, slightly drunk, high-heeled" secretaries of OSA. Vietnamese were crowded behind. During the ceremony, Mai presented some awards to honor students; about half were handed out by Americans.

All in all, a dubious way of arming the PATs psychologically to answer the taunts they would meet in the field of being "an American army.")

7. Since arriving at Vung Tau to prepare the courses for the non-PAT elements, Chau has received quite a different type of impression. "Incredible ... unbelievable ... a new surprise every day," he kept murmuring to me, shaking his head: referring to the apparent lack of OSA supervision of the political/psychological courses at Vung Tau -- lack, it seemed, even of knowledge of their content -- and the corresponding freedom accorded to Captain Mai. No American at the base spoke Vietnamese; and Mai informed him that he did not translate or submit his lesson plans to the Americans at all. (I understand that neither of these conditions obtained at the very beginning of the APA program). "I am completely free in running these courses; the Americans do not ask and do not know what I am doing," Mai insisted. Chau, incredulous, forced him to repeat this several times, and asked him: "How can you justify working for these people, who support this whole program, without keeping them informed of what you are doing?" "I am working for the good of the people," Mai answered.

"I simply cannot believe it," Chau said. "I am going to go to Mr. Jorgenson and ask him, I will say, 'I just want to know, for myself,' ... I will not tell his answer to anyone ... not even you, excuse me ...' is it true that you have not known what is being taught at Vung Tau?"

As for the actual content of the courses -- a current set of lesson plans is now being translated -- they seem to be in close correspondance to the doctrines and symbolism of a particular Dai Viet splinter sect, the Duy Dan faction. The Fairy and Dragon legend which gets strong emphasis in the course is widely recognizable as a Duy Dan creation, as is the symbolism of the "100 Vietnamese Peoples" (Thai, Malaysian, Lao, Montagnard, etc.). Chau suspects that much of the "misuse" of PAT teams by various province chiefs reflected simply their distrust of what seemed to be a propaganda team for the Duy Dan/Dai Viets.

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(Major Be in Binh Dinh had explained to Bungardner almost a year ago that his reason for retraining PAT teams on their return to province was that "I didn't send our people there to become Dai Viets"; Bungardner had paid little attention at the time).

Moreover -- although this is tentative at this point -- there are indications that the students are given an orientation that is almost as strongly anti-GVN as it is anti-VC. No relieving features of the GVN are mentioned, nor is the possibility of reforming it from within. In effect, the students seem to be taught to regard themselves as a Third Force, to await directions when the time will come for a new "Special Politics" (the literal translation of Biet Chinh, as the PATS are known), separate from VC or GVN politics.

"All this might be all right," says Chau, "if that is what the government -- and the Americans -- want. It might be all right to back the Dai Viets, or to prepare the cadres for a Special Politics; but is that what the government has decided to do? Do they or the Americans know that that is what they are doing?"

As for Mai, Chau's already low appreciation has fallen still further. He does not feel Mai has acted honorably with his employers (Chau seems sincere about this, despite the fact that, as I pointed out to him, he "should be glad that it has turned out to be a Vietnamese program after all") Also, although he concedes that Mai spends a lot of time with the trainees and has by now acquired much training experience, he is very dubious about Mai's qualifications as a political instructor. Mai has virtually no time in the field in any capacity, his military career having been spent almost completely in staff communications work. Chau finds his political sense naive and does not believe he has a major impact on the students (others disagree). (Chau thinks very highly of Major Be, for example, and says there "is not the slightest comparison" between Be and Mai, pointing primarily to Be's command and field experience and maturity in political matters).

8. Even prior to going to Vung Tau, Chau felt he had "lost the confidence of OSA" and could no longer be effective in the program; he had asked Thang to be relieved, and Thang had agreed, though asking him to stay on for a couple of months. However, Chau would not in any case have stayed on if it were to be primarily an American program.

With considerable emotion, Chau has said to me on two occasions: "It is better for my country to be taken over by the Americans than by the Communists. If that is the only choice, then I think it is better for the Americans to take it over. But I do not want to be part of that. They can do it without me."

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More specifically, he says: "I like CIA. I have always been a friend of CIA; that is why I speak so frankly to Mr. Jorgensen, because I do not think a friend should hide his feelings. But I do not want to be an employee of CIA. I would not have come here for that."

On another occasion he mentioned: "The generals are all afraid of CIA. They think it is the most powerful US agency; that it has more money and more influence. And they say that CIA can do things to them that other agencies can't. They say, 'If we disagree with NAGV, can NAGV have us assassinated? No, but CIA can.'" ((I was rather startled at this comment, and remarked that after all no major military figure had disappeared lately. Chau said: "Sol Thao." Startled again, I said "Does anyone think CIA killed Thao?" "Many say it," Chau said. "They say that Thao lost his usefulness to CIA." "Do you think that?" I asked him directly. "I don't know, I don't know what to think," he said, (flustered.) (I) Short of assassination, he said later the generals feared that CIA would ruin them by spreading stories - true or not - of their corruption or mistresses.

All in all, he felt the association with CIA was not helpful to the Rural Construction program. "People can understand CIA doing many things ... but they cannot understand CIA running pacification."

9. For future policy, the most important issue raised by Chau is this, is the Rural Construction Cadre Program to be a Vietnamese program, with US support, or primarily a US/CIA program? There are arguments for the latter, in terms of efficiency and control (Chau claims to believe that the US should in any case retain control of financial matters). But if it is to be a US/CIA program, Chau foresees the following problems (aside from his leaving, which is probably too late to change):

a) GVN officials -- the ruling generals, province/district chiefs, division commanders, ministries -- will not support it effectively. They will figure that Americans will take the credit if it succeeds; and in any case, they will feel, "If it's an American program, let them run it." (To be sure, one might question how much they would get behind it even if it were 100% Vietnamese; but if it is identified with Americans, because of heavyhanded American control, their non-involvement is assured). Two years from now, there will be a competent cadre program in operation, but with very little link to any central or provincial authority.

b) The identification with Americans, as it becomes known to local officials and villagers, will seriously hamper the essentially political work of the cadres.

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"You could pacify South Vietnam with American Troops alone," Chau says. "But it would take three million troops, and it would last only as long as they stayed."

The crucial target of pacification, in Chau's mind, is to create a spirit in the rural people of willingness to organize in their own self-defense. This spirit cannot be lit by an American occupying army. Nor will it be generated by Vietnamese cadre widely regarded as "American employees" -- particularly if CIA influence on the program emphasizes the role of the PAF element alone.

10. If these points are taken seriously, the policy inferences would be: either

(a) Change CIA's style and direction of influence significantly, persuading them to be less overt(!) in their involvement and control both in Saigon/Vung Tau and in the field and to allow full weight to the role of non-PAF elements; or

(b) Move CIA out of this overt program as quickly as possible - say two or three months - meanwhile channeling financial and field support through another agency, either AID or NSG (perhaps shifting some field reps to the other agency; also reducing the total number and increasing the quality of field reps.)

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2. Frictions and pressures in his relations with CIA have obviously put great emotional strain on Chau because of his past friendship with that agency. In our first conversation and frequently in later ones he would interject with great emotion:

"You know, I have great appreciation and gratitude for help I got in Kien Hoa from CIA: more for the moral support than for material help. They were the only ones who believed in what I was trying to do, and helped me. Believe me, I have nothing against CIA."

"But I think that I was brought to Saigon on a misunderstanding. I thought I would run the program, determine the policies: with consultation with all the agencies involved. But I think that Mr. Jorgenson and Mr. Donahugh only wanted me to do a technical job, administering it but not affecting policy matters. If that is what they want, that is fine, but I do not want that job."

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at all, apparently as a sop -- or finally to 19 men, seemed evidence for this. In effect, Chau felt, OSA saw the current Rural Construction Cadre program essentially as an expansion of the PAT program (though it had the added effect of giving OSA -- in Saigon and in the field -- effective control over nearly all cadre in the provinces). Moreover, they either were not aiming at pacifying, as Chau understood it, or they had an exaggerated notion of the role of a PAT team in pacification.

In Chau's view, the PAT team alone was, in practice, only a substitute for PF's: a good substitute, conducting themselves more effectively than most PF platoons both in military and civic action functions: but not a substitute for the Census/Grievance, Civic Action and New Life Development teams on which Chau lays most emphasis for the complex tasks of organizing and motivating the people. At some times, Chau felt, OSA seemed satisfied to see the PAT's quite explicitly performing a PF/RF role only, as in Quang Nam. At other times, OSA seemed to believe that the insertion of a PAT team into a VC-dominated hamlet would somehow generate the information flow between villagers and government, the hamlet organization and eventually self-defense that the Cadre Group, with their more specialised training, were designed to produce.

(Donahugh has commented to me that Chau kept adding so many tasks to his Census/Grievance teams in Kien Hoa -- so many "baroque little frills" -- that the project could not have been administered by any other province chiefs. "What is needed here is really something very simple, some simple little measures." Vann agrees that Chau's Kien Hoa program could bear simplification before being imitated widely; but not to the point of hamstringing the non-PAT elements, which he along with Chau regards as vital. I am not yet able to say whether Chau and Vann are right in believing that OSA accords little importance -- less than they say -- to these elements. There is the evidence of the attempt to take the manpower slash wholly out of the training of these elements; and apparent slowness about educating the OSA field representatives -- used to dealing only with PATs -- about the role of the new elements. (One province representative of OSA told me recently he "didn't see the need for the new parts of the team ... couldn't see any point".

While OSA has endorsed the Census/Grievance mechanism introduced by Chau in Kien Hoa by supporting it elsewhere, Chau feels that their practice and interpretation has been to emphasize only the census-making and intelligence -

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gathering aspects rather than what he regards as most important: the feedback to local government of villagers' aspirations and grievances, and the follow-through on their complaints, informing them of action taken.)

5. Chau says he has lost some of his respect for CIA in the course of working with them in Saigon. "I used to think they had great feel for political and psychological matters." (This was in Kien Hoa, where they backed what he was doing and let him alone!) " Now I think they have little." (Even so, he judged in answer to a question that they had more political sense than any other US field agency.)

Moreover, he felt that top OSA leadership in Saigon was not well informed as to actual PAT/OSA performance in the provinces. "Many of the field representatives are young and inexperienced, and many of them are not good; they don't know what to look for, and they are not sufficiently supervised. OSA has commodities, weapons, money to give; people like province chiefs want these, and they flatter OSA, don't give them a true picture."

6. Even before the episode of the "numbers game," friction had developed between Chau and OSA over the role of Captain Mai, the commandant of the PAT training program. OSA thought very highly of Mai and wanted to keep him in place. Chau expressed, at first, little criticism of Mai as an individual but insisted that he had been known too long as an employee of the Americans, and that if province chiefs were ever to believe that the program was now to be a Vietnamese one, the change must be symbolized by downgrading Mai or letting him go. Chau got a very poor impression on his early visits to Vung Tau of the deference paid by Mai to his American counterparts and the general note there of Mai/Vietnamese subordination to US representatives.

(Vann has described the recent graduation ceremony at Vung Tau in a way that supports this picture of Mai and of OSA insensitivity).

A planeload of American Guests was invited to the ceremony; they were met at the airport by Mai, who took them all to a banquet at Cyrano's in Vung Tau. Because of the banquet (no other Vietnamese were present) the Americans and Mai arrive at about 30 minutes late for the ceremony, where 3200 presumably fired-up PATS were waiting. On the stage in front of these new troopers were four easy chairs, with three rows of chairs in back. The four chairs in front were

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CIA 3.3(b)(1) + 3.5(c)

were occupied by Mai, Jorgenson, [REDACTED] and Donahugh; the two rows behind them were entirely occupied by Americans, including seven "giggling, slightly drunk, high-heeled" secretaries of OSA. Vietnamese were crowded behind. During the ceremony, Mai presented some awards to honor students; about half were handed out by Americans.

All in all, a dubious way of arming the PATs psychologically to answer the taunts they would meet in the field of being "an American army.")

7. Since arriving at Vung Tau to prepare the courses for the non-PAT elements, Chau has received quite a different type of impression. "Incredible ... unbelievable ... a new surprise every day," he kept murmuring to me, shaking his head: referring to the apparent lack of OSA supervision of the political/psychological courses at Vung Tau -- lack, it seemed, even of knowledge of their content -- and the corresponding freedom accorded to Captain Mai. No American at the base spoke Vietnamese; and Mai informed him that he did not translate or submit his lesson plans to the Americans at all. (I understand that neither of these conditions obtained at the very beginning of the APA program). "I am completely free in running these courses; the Americans do not ask and do not know what I am doing," Mai insisted. Chau, incredulous, forced him to repeat this several times, and asked him: "How can you justify working for these people, who support this whole program, without keeping them informed of what you are doing?" "I am working for the good of the people," Mai answered.

"I simply cannot believe it," Chau said. "I am going to go to Mr. Jorgenson and ask him, I will say, 'I just want to know, for myself,' ... I will not tell his answer to anyone ... not even you, excuse me ...' is it true that you have not known what is being taught at Vung Tau?"

As for the actual content of the courses -- a current set of lesson plans is now being translated -- they seem to be in close correspondance to the doctrines and symbolism of a particular Dai Viet splinter sect, the Duy Dan faction. The Fairy and Dragon legend which gets strong emphasis in the course is widely recognizable as a Duy Dan creation, as is the symbolism of the "100 Vietnamese Peoples" (Thai, Malaysian, Lao, Montagnard, etc.). Chau suspects that much of the "misuse" of PAT teams by various province chiefs reflected simply their distrust of what seemed to be a propaganda team for the Duy Dan/Dai Viets.

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(Major Be in Binh Dinh had explained to Bumgardner almost a year ago that his reason for retraining PAT teams on their return to province was that "I didn't send our people there to become Dai Viets"; Bumgardner had paid little attention at the time).

Moreover -- although this is tentative at this point -- there are indications that the students are given an orientation that is almost as strongly anti-GVN as it is anti-VC. No relieving features of the GVN are mentioned, nor is the possibility of reforming it from within. In effect, the students seem to be taught to regard themselves as a Third Force, to await directions when the time will come for a new "Special Politics" (the literal translation of Biet Chinh, as the PATS are known), separate from VC or GVN politics.

"All this might be all right," says Chau, "if that is what the government -- and the Americans -- want. It might be all right to back the Dai Viets, or to prepare the cadres for a Special Politics; but is that what the government has decided to do? Do they or the Americans know that that is what they are doing?"

As for Mai, Chau's already low appreciation has fallen still further. He does not feel Mai has acted honorably with his employers (Chau seems sincere about this, despite the fact that, as I pointed out to him, he "should be glad that it has turned out to be a Vietnamese program after all") Also, although he concedes that Mai spends a lot of time with the trainees and has by now acquired much training experience, he is very dubious about Mai's qualifications as a political instructor. Mai has virtually no time in the field in any capacity, his military career having been spent almost completely in staff communications work. Chau finds his political sense naive and does not believe he has a major impact on the students (others disagree). (Chau thinks very highly of Major Be, for example, and says there "is not the slightest comparison" between Be and Mai, pointing primarily to Be's command and field experience and maturity in political matters).

8. Even prior to going to Vung Tau, Chau felt he had "lost the confidence of OSA" and could no longer be effective in the program; he had asked Thang to be relieved, and Thang had agreed, though asking him to stay on for a couple of months. However, Chau would not in any case have stayed on if it were to be primarily an American program.

With considerable emotion, Chau has said to me on two occasions: "It is better for my country to be taken over by the Americans than by the Communists. If that is the only choice, then I think it is better for the Americans to take it over. But I do not want to be part of that. They can do it without me."

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More specifically, he says: "I like CIA. I have always been a friend of CIA; that is why I speak so frankly to Mr. Jorgensen, because I do not think a friend should hide his feelings. But I do not want to be an employee of CIA. I would not have come here for that."

On another occasion he mentioned: "The generals are all afraid of CIA. They think it is the most powerful US agency; that it has more money and more influence. And they say that CIA can do things to them that other agencies can't. They say, 'If we disagree with MACV, can MACV have us assassinated? No; but CIA can.'" (I was rather startled at this comment, and remarked that after all no major military figure had disappeared lately. Chau said: "Col Thao." Startled again, I said "Does anyone think CIA killed Thao?" "Many say it," Chau said. "They say that Thao lost his usefulness to CIA." "Do you think that?" I asked him directly. "I don't know, I don't know what to think," he said, flustered.) (1) Short of assassination, he said later the generals feared that CIA would ruin them by spreading stories - true or not - of their corruption or mistresses.

All in all, he felt the association with CIA was not helpful to the Rural Construction program. "People can understand CIA doing many things ... but they cannot understand CIA running pacification."

9. For future policy, the most important issue raised by Chau is this, is the Rural Construction Cadre Program to be a Vietnamese program, with US support, or primarily a US/CIA program? There are arguments for the latter, in terms of efficiency and control (Chau claims to believe that the US should in any case retain control of financial matters). But if it is to be a US/CIA program, Chau foresees the following problems (aside from his leaving, which is probably too late to change):

a) GVN officials -- the ruling generals, province/district chiefs, division commanders, ministries -- will not support it effectively. They will figure that Americans will take the credit if it succeeds; and in any case, they will feel, "If it's an American program, let them run it." (To be sure, one might question how much they would get behind it even if it were 100% Vietnamese; but if it is identified with Americans, because of heavyhanded American control, their non-involvement is assured). Two years from now, there will be a competent cadre program in operation, but with very little link to any central or provincial authority.

b) The identification with Americans, as it becomes known to local officials and villagers, will seriously hamper the essentially political work of the cadres.

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"You could pacify South Vietnam with American Troops alone," Chau says. "But it would take three million troops, and it would last only as long as they stayed."

The crucial target of pacification, in Chau's mind, is to create a spirit in the rural people of willingness to organize in their own self-defense. This spirit cannot be lit by an American occupying army. Nor will it be generated by Vietnamese cadre widely regarded as "American employees" -- particularly if CIA influence on the program emphasizes the role of the PAT element alone.

10. If these points are taken seriously, the policy inference would be: either

(a) Change CIA's style and direction of influence significantly, persuading them to be less overt(;) in their involvement and control both in Saigon/Vung Tau and in the field and to allow full weight to the role of non-PAT elements; or

(b) Move CIA out of this overt program as quickly as possible - say two or three months - meanwhile channeling financial and field support through another agency, either AID or MACV (perhaps shifting some field reps to the other agency; also reducing the total number and increasing the quality of field reps.)

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714

27 September 1954

1. OBJECTIVES:

- a. To insure survival of Vietnam as an independent nation oriented towards the West.
- b. To continue the battle against the Vietminh to accomplish eventual liberation of Northern Vietnam and eventual reconsolidation of the country.

2. POLICY:

- a. ODYOKE policy dictates that all ODYOKE efforts be directed toward support of the DIEM government.

~~b. Until and unless ODYOKE policy is changed, any plan implemented to accomplish the objectives must be conducted through or conducted in cooperation with the DIEM government.~~

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 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526  
 Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify in Part: ✓  
 Reason: 3.3(b)(1)  
 MDR: 13-M-1348

SUSC 552

3. PLANS:

a. Basic Plan:

The only reasonably cohesive national force subject to direction is the Vietnamese Army. A government without military support cannot long survive in a situation that remains essentially military in nature. At the present time the Vietnamese Army is responsive to the Chief of Staff who, in turn, acts in his own behalf rather than at direction of the President.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

The Basic plan of [redacted] Mission then becomes contingent upon the successful alignment of the Vietnamese Army behind the DIEM Government to provide that Government with the required power to insure the accomplishment of governmental decrees. This effort will continue to be a primary goal of [redacted] working as the situation dictates to accomplish this alignment. The Transfer of loyalty From the Chief of Staff to the President may be done in one of several ways: either by 1) Replacement of The Chief of Staff with an individual personally loyal to DIEM and who commands the loyalty of the troops; or, 2) Convincing the present Chief of Staff that it is to his benefit as well as the good of the country of Vietnam to carry out the orders of the central Government. [redacted] will continue working along either or both of the above lines to attempt to establish the situation which is essential to the fulfillment of the remainder of the Basic Plan.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)


When the above has been achieved, [redacted] will, through the President, move people into <sup>the</sup> ~~three departments~~ of the defense structure, ~~namely~~ <sup>control the following:</sup>

- 1) Psychological Warfare.
- 2) Scout-Ranger or "Special Forces" department.
- 3) Pacification or "Social Action" department.

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CIA 3.3(b)(1)

The Psychological Warfare program, KUHOK-type operations, and  
Pacification or military government-type actions will then be ostensibly  
carried out by Government direction through a Governmental force. Actually  
it will be controlled by KUBARK personnel under direction of the

Chief of Mission.

The actual steps to accomplish the above must necessarily remain elastic to allow for changes in the national situation which are occurring almost hourly. All avenues will be explored and actions taken as the opportunity to further this objective is presented.

b. Alternate Plan:

Recognizing that the most desirable method of supporting the DIEM Government, which is outlined above, may not be possible in the immediate future, an alternate plan utilizing the only other military forces present in the country will also be explored.

Military forces under control of various sects and political organizations exist. The Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, National Resistance Front, UMDC, VNQDD, and others, possess overt, covert, or in some cases both types of military or quasi-military forces. At present these are an unrelated, uncooperating, group of forces used to further the ambitions of a group or individual who may or may not be also interested in the furtherance of a nationalistic movement. Essentially most of the groups or sects are interested in nationalism but rightly or wrongly believe that the competing groups or sects have aims at variance with their own.

At present no firm estimate is possible of the over-all strength of these groups. The current estimate of the National Resistance Front places their armed strength at 600-800 men. A recent estimate of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao forces places their effectives in the neighborhood of 6000 men. Many of the other forces are lying dormant or are at best but a resistance potential rather than a force in being. These forces, however, present the only other military power which might be aligned behind DIEM to provide the support of governmental policy and orders. CDA 3.3(b)(1)

It is the [redacted] plan to develop contacts with as many of the groups and sects as is operationally sound and feasible. Many of these contacts have already been made and operations in conjunction with some of the groups have been approved and initiated. OSD 3.3(b)(1)

Each of the [redacted] contacts will be developed along the lines of a nationalist movement with an anti-communist, pro-nationalist theme. These themes or programs will be so designed that they will be acceptable to the group and in consonance with ODYOKE objectives. As they groups are developed, the program of each group will be oriented to coincide, as nearly as possible, with the plans and programs of all the other groups. When a suitable point of agreement is apparent in the various programs, an attempt will be made to reconcile the remaining

differences and bring about a coalition of the groups and sects  
with a common program which will also be in consonance <sup>or</sup> with the program  
propounded by the DIEM government. [REDACTED] will then further attempt

to bring this coalition to the direct support of the DIEM Government

*During and after  
consolidation,  
these groups will  
attempt to make  
inroads into  
the strength of  
the army by  
recruiting  
nationalists within  
the army for  
their group.*

thus supplying a force in lieu of the National Army. This coalition

will necessarily carry into the cabinet appointments, providing

representation within the government of the various groups whose

support is required. The necessity for this move has already been

recognized by the President in his recent appointments of Cao Dai

and Hoa Hao representatives as committee advisors to the Minister of

Defense.

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

Should the above plan prove workable [REDACTED] will then again  
move personnel into key advisory spots in the government to control  
the same functions of the government as outlined in the Basic Plan.

Here again the actual moves must be made as the situation unfolds  
and details of operation cannot be determined beforehand. Positive  
progress has been made along these lines in the operational development  
of the Dai Viet, National Resistance Front, and contacts with the  
VNQDD. Details for further development of the National Resistance Front

appear in a separate paper.

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c. Emergency Plan:

The least desirable plan and that which holds the least chance of long -range success will be pursued only in the event that no satisfactory power base can be established in support of the DIEM Government. The implementation of this plan will be attempted only when <sup>the</sup> Basic Plan and the Alternate Plan have proved to be impossible under the existing chaotic conditions. OSD 3.3(b)( )

Under direction and guidance of the [REDACTED] Mission, DIEM has proclaimed a National Resistance Movement whereby he has announced his life's aim as a struggle against communism and for consolidation of a free and independent Vietnam. In the event of the collapse of his Government, DIEM has asserted he will flee to a safe area and lead the fight from there. This has the obvious fallacy of failing to determine where the support springs from which will enable him to continue the struggle. CIA 3.3(b)(1)

Under the above [REDACTED] Mission in cooperation with [REDACTED] Mission will aid in the preparation of psywar material to be disseminated by the DIEM Government. Two [REDACTED] selected governmental officials will provide the plan and program which

...mission will be...

CIA 3.3(b)(1)

provided by the Chiefs of Mission [REDACTED] This plan

has the additional disadvantage of possessing no legal basis for

direct OBYCKE participation. [REDACTED]

The National

Resistance Front will be developed as the only military force avail-

able should the Basic and Alternate Plans be discarded.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

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Date: NOV 11 2013

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3512 Conception Street  
Sta. Mesa, Metro Manila  
December 26, 1977

Maj. Gen. Edward J. Lansdale  
#2203 Lorraine Avenue  
McLean, Virginia 22101

CIA  
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1) > 25Yrs


Dear General Lansdale:

I am forced by circumstances to write to you and request once more for your valuable assistance after my attempts to obtain what I sincerely believe is my just reward and/or privilege have been denied to me. The denial of my application for special immigrant status was based on the unusual, unfair and unjustified action of Vice-Consul William H. Barkell. I am confident that a referral of my case to higher authorities will result in the subsequent approval of my petition and a censuring of the said consul's abuse of official discretion. Please bear with me as I continue to appeal for your information the events that took place from the time I first submitted my application up to the present.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter I prepared and attached to the application for special immigrant status which I personally submitted to the office of the now-mentioned visa officer on 24 August 1977. As you will notice I had intended to submit the same to the Consul General (Miss Cleo L. Day) in view of the confidential nature of some of my government services. However, this attempt was thwarted by over-zealous employees who refused to let me in unless I submit my papers to the office of Mr. Barkell, whom they averred is in charge of this type of visa. Upon reaching this office, the Filipino female secretary opened my envelope and went through all my documents. After segregating some and retaining others to me she curtly advised me to leave and just wait for the official reply.

After waiting for two weeks, I received a reply contained in a mimeographed and prepared form (RSL-131-3) dated September 9, 1977 (see xerox copy attached) wherein the consul stated he had to refuse my application because I only earned 13 years and 3 months service from 1961 to 1975. He did not even express any comments on my previous employments prior to 1961. In view of his impersonal reaction, it was understandable for me to believe that Consul Barkell may not have read my letter at all and that the female secretary must have submitted to him only my documents relating to the 1961-1975 portion of employments.

On October 5, 1977, I mailed a letter to Mr. Barkell and requested him to reconsider his decision. I reiterated the facts that I served as one of the undercover agent for the 1135th Counterintelligence Corps, US Army from 1946 to 1949 as evidenced by the enclosed letter of certification signed by Lt. Antonio TACANAG, then Adjutant of the said Detachment and the sworn statement of Lt. Col. Santos T. de BERNANDEZ (notarized right there at the Consular Section of the US Embassy), then Chief of covert operations of the same outfit. I also mentioned Col. Boh's residence and telephone number for any verification should he desire to do so.



CIA 3.3(b)(1)

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

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Office of the Secretary of Defense *SVSC/ESR*  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: *11 Nov 2013* Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: *X*  
Reason: *3.3(b)(1)*  
MDR: *13 -M- 1348*

OSD 3.3(b)( )

the latitude for discretionary action and that he could - on the basis of the facts - have presented - set on my petition favorably. He would be perfectly fitting, proper and justified, I also reminded him that a complete background check has been made about me prior to my various employments in the government. I had not said so, and at the time I was to send him a copy of my letter. I also enclosed his reply dated November 10, 1977. I am sending a xerox copy of his response reply. On the basis of his reply it is certain that the feelings and views expressed by my superiors, as well as my refusal to approve my position has not - based on his 1st reply, I looked for a year and 2 months to complete the required 12 years - but he now sets the opinion that by 12 years and 2 months of my position that of being not considered under exceptional circumstances. See what I have thought a government official of his rank would stop so low as to lie in spite of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Anybody who would review my record of service would have no decision but to approve my application because the facts remain that my length of service with the US Army Investigative Services Office was complete with every job performed under exceptional circumstances. Also see the xerox report on my file, I am documented in fact as was provided by the then US Ambassador in my private association for the US Mission here and abroad. For "duration above and beyond the call of duty" which almost exists as my life is not even being recognized at all.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)



It is my firm belief that the foregoing services have been rendered under extreme exceptional circumstances. I don't very much if any of the employees who have returned in immigrating to the United States under the special immigrant status let us say for the last two years only - could even compare with one half of my accomplished deeds for the success of the US Mission here and abroad. If the foregoing documents I turned do not constitute exceptional services then I do not know the real meaning of the word "exceptional". I wonder how Mr. Barkall will interpret the meaning of the word, I am sure he has a different dictionary.

Sir, now you must understand how I feel and why I mentioned the fact that I am and had. I have been a fighter for democracy for so long and I enjoyed all the risk I took in my fight with you against our common enemy - the communists. In our fight against the Reds, who would trample at our cherished freedoms, is much easier to do. Now my battle is against a different kind and I could not cope with it unless you help me. Please help me so that my years of devotion to everything that America stood for - and for which my father died for - shall not have been in vain. Help me fulfill my wish of immigrating to my father's country so that I may be able to bring my own family to rely on what I strove to accomplish in my years of devoted and loyal service.

Again I extend my best wish to you and your beloved Pat for this festive season and may you have a prosperous New Year. Sir, Help me so that I may be able to say "see you next year, Sir."

Your most loyal servant,  
Jesus "Quir" Alvarado de  
Jesus "Quir" Alvarado

Sir, I will be very grateful for your kind assistance and consider your gift to me and my family for Christmas. Respectfully yours,  
Jesus

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 11 2013

5512 Oorogidar St.  
Sta. Mesa, Manila, R.P.  
August 14, 1977

Honorable Lois M. Day  
Consul General for Consular Affairs  
Embassy of the United States of America  
Ramon Boulayard, Ermita  
Manila, R.P.

Dear Consul General Lois M. Day:

With due respect and high regard, I have the honor to submit for your kind scrutiny and consideration my application for special immigrant status under the provisions of Section (A)(7)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. With this in mind, I am proud to state here that I have served the United States Government faithfully with loyal devotion for more than the required 15 years and that this service was rendered under exceptional circumstances in many instances.

Please allow me to enumerate below in chronological order my services in the United States Government. In order not to clutter the sequel of my various employments I have included those which may not be included as under the U.S. Government. However, it is considered highly significant.

1. February 1945 - October 1945: Labor Foreman, US Quarantine Dept., Base A, APO 75. Reassigned to pursue studies. Enclosure 1 is a xerox copy of the letter of 2nd Lt. Arthur Levine, USMC, Labor Officer. Length of service: eight months. For clearer reading please see attached copy in enclosure 1.

2. February 1947 - November 1949: Undercover-man/cover agent investigator for the 1958 US Army Counterintelligence Group (CIG), Manila. Salary drawn from confidential source and worked directly under then Capt. Charles F.R. Bohman and Special Agent Isabela de Vera. Separative and returned to US Army from the Philippines. Enclosure 2 is a copy of the certification with a xeroxed copy for the source, signed by 2nd Lt. Antonio Tabanag, then sergeant of the Detachment and Enclosure 3 is sworn statement of Charles F.R. Bohman. Length of service: 2 years and 9 months (2) months.

3. From 1949 to 1953 I was pursuing my college education at the Far Eastern University taking up a Bachelor's degree.

4. January 1954 - December 1954: Field Investigator, Intelligence Section, 1st Army Liaison Detachment, 1st Army, Manila. Salary drawn from the 1st Army Liaison Detachment. Length of service: 13 months. Please see enclosure 4, xeroxed copy of the letter of 2nd Lt. Charles F.R. Bohman.

5. January 1954 - June 1954: Investigator/Agent

6. During this period I was sent to French Bataan and acted a courier for the US Military Liaison Group.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)

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Date: 11 Nov 2013 Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: 3.3(b)(1)  
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officers assigned in the area. [redacted]

[redacted] took direct orders from US Army Lt. Dave Smith, Lt. Frank "Zan Zan" Jarner and Lt. Victor Hugo, Jr., all working under [redacted] Gen. Edward Lansdale, head military intelligence in South Vietnam.

Please allow me to take advantage of this opportunity to mention at this point that [redacted]

[redacted] when we landed in Saigon the city was in flames and fighting was raging in the streets between the forces of President Ngo Dinh Diem and those opposed to him. Martial law and curfew was strictly imposed. This danger did not deter me from accomplishing my mission. As soon as we were safely delivered in our hotel in Cholon by a military escort, I tried to get in touch with [redacted] by phone but he was no longer in his office. Without regard for my own personal safety I ventured out into the night and with God's help I was able to deliver the package [redacted] in Saigon on the same date which eventually reached Gen. Lansdale.

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The above feat and other acts performed for the success of the US mission are known to my superiors and duly reflected in a letter of commendation given to me by Lt. Col. John D. MacIntosh [redacted] submitted as enclosure 7 and also corroborated by enclosure 2. As stated by Gen. Lansdale [redacted]

NOTE: Gen. Lansdale's current address is: #2008 Loxdale Avenue  
Kokon, Virginia 22101

> December 1958 - March 1961: Security and Motor Pool Officer, American Embassy, Vientiane, Laos. Performed [redacted] work for the various Special Assistant to the Ambassador and other ranking political officers. Length of service: Two (2) years and three (3) months.

[redacted] However, an incident occurred during this period of employment which almost cost me my life and I believe it to be highly significant. This occurred during the 2nd week of December 1960 when the Laotian Nationalist Forces supported by the American mission started to retake Vientiane which was being held by the Pathet Lao (Communist) and the Neutralist Forces who earlier in the year had staged a coup, de tat. The two aligned forces put up a stiff resistance so much so that the fighting lasted for 4 nights and 4 days. My superiors then [redacted] both stayed at the American Embassy while I was instructed to look after [redacted] residence and his household help - an elderly Chinese married couple.

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NOTE: I voluntarily resigned from this office on July 9, 1968 in my desire to improve my community standing and salary earnings. Please see enclosure 13. I joined the staff of the Secretariat of the Peace and Order Coordinating Council which was created and solely responsible to the President of the Republic of the Philippines. My short stint in this office enabled me to expand my contacts and developed more friends in the different branches of the Philippine government which later proved to be valuable when I later re-joined the US government.

7. April 1960 - September 1975: Security Investigator, Regional Security Office, American Embassy, Manila, R.P. Separation - Voluntary resignation to immigrate to the United States. Length of service: Six (6) years and four (4) months and six (6) days.

From the start of my employment in this office, I was immediately assigned by the then Regional Security Officer (RSO) Mr. Max Caldwell to assist the then Consul General, Hon. Wilbur Olson and Consul Anthony Sage in weeding out undesirable in their office and to put a stop to the anarchy and irregularities which was existing then at that office. My efforts have not been in vain and I am proud to state that I have been instrumental in the success of this mission. It resulted in the removal of two consular employees who were found in cahoots with unscrupulous travel agents; the blacklisting of travel agents and pseudo-travel agents; the destruction of the travel syndicates engaged in the irregular issuance of US visa and the falsification of the US visa stamp; institution of criminal charges against many of them in coordination with the National Bureau of Investigation and the institution of remedial measures to prevent a resurgence of the irregularities.

I believed it is only fair to mention here the dangers I encountered during my mission for the Consular Section. In my relentless drive to thwart the activities of the travel syndicate, and when their attempts to bribe me failed, I started to receive threats of bodily harm and outright liquidation over my office and residential telephone. It was not surprising and I anticipated this threat as I have been accustomed to such threats while I was fighting criminality during my stint with the US Navy at the Naval Base in Subic Bay and Bagley Point. As a matter of course, I informed the local national police agency and my superiors. As a precautionary measure, I was allowed by the RSO with the permission of the Minister, to carry a firearm.

I continued in my investigative work and the threats did not hamper me in coordinating with the NBI in accumulating evidence against the unscrupulous travel syndicate members. Those with sufficient evidence were duly charged with the City Fiscal's Office and on many occasions I have appeared as a witness against them during the hearings at the fiscal's office and later before the Court of Criminal Justice. My appearance during this investigative hearing and trial in court have been cleared with the RSO and the Embassy Legal Office at that time. This effort earned me a commendation and pay increase in less than a year of my employment. Enclosure 14 is a certification of my service record.

NOTE: Even after I have resigned from this employment I have continued to be dedicated and loyal to the US Government by submitting confidential reports regarding various anomalies and irregularities to the current RSO, Mr. Michael E. Oughlin.

Enclosure II is the official Recognition and Appreciation for my service of 10 years awarded dated 21 June 1972 which I received during a public ceremony from His Excellency, Ambassador Henry M. Sullivan.

Enclosure III is the Certificate of Appreciation from His Excellency, Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew of the United States of America which I earned from my services during his short visit to the Philippines.

Please allow me to explain further about my employment as mentioned in Items 1 and 2. Some years ago, I requested Mr. Hugh Ware, Administrative Officer of the now defunct US Army Support Element, 4th Fleet, 503, American Embassy, to submit the request for verification of my employment in these two entities to the Federal Records Center in Missouri. The reply of the Center, dated 4 August 1972, indicated "no record" but suggested I submit additional data and substantiating evidence. In this connection, I wish to mention here that when I applied for employment with the US Navy (Item 6) I submitted to that office the original copy of my separation from the US Quartermaster School Depot, San Francisco, which was signed by 2nd Lt. Arthur Levine. I also submitted to the same office as proof of my employment with the US Army OKO, the original letter of certification given to me by then Lt. Antonio Tabares, who was then the Adjutant of the US Army OKO Detachment at the time. Both of these documents were never returned to me and I did not bother to retrieve them as I was subsequently hired by the US Naval Investigative Service Office. However, I am submitting the only remaining document copy I have for your consideration.

It should be noted that prior to my employment, a complete and thorough background investigation has been made on me and in accordance with procedures in the US Government regarding these previous employments of mine have been duly verified and I would not have been hired by said organization. In addition to these employments, aside from enclosures 1 and 2, I am successfully submitting enclosure 3, sworn statement of Mr. William J. H. Balaban, AFR, Ret., with present address, P.O. Box 1000, San Juan, Rinal with telephone number 70-25-0000.

As for my employment in Items 3 and 5, I am having that letter of Major Gen. Edward H. Snodgrass, USAF, Ret., and sufficient proof for verification purposes to complete my length of service with the US Government. I am also submitting my length of service as reflected in Item 4 as well as this is also clearly manifested in the letter of Mr. Snodgrass. For your information, prior to submitting this application for special immigrant I have also presented enclosure 5 to the current RSO (Dr. Caughlin) and he has approved and requested him to make the necessary verification in order to save time and effort.

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If I may be allowed to compare my years of service with the United States Government, excluding the years mentioned in Item 4, I would have accumulated in my favor a total of twenty (20) years and six (6) months. Without wishing to sound boastful, I do need to state that my few years with Miller Brothers should have been granted the privilege as Special Investigator could open doors with my achievements. My loyalty to the United States is second only to my father. My father's loyalty and devotion to all things American is second to none. Please allow me to include several allusions about my late father. Your claim should be sufficient to prove my point. His commitment and respect medals and distinctions are no means to mention here. However, I would like to mention here that even when my father and Elmer retired from the US military service he continued to make hopes that he feels significant and important to the people wherever. He was even one of the most respected and an active member of the Philippine Stateset, U.S.A. service. I was one of his converts and I was also silently supporting this movement prior to the start of Martial Law in September 1972. I sincerely believed that our country was being betrayed and corruption was not heading to a revolution with the communists forces actively leading the group. The movement for statehood would have succeeded as there were already more than 5 million members fighting for a change. Martial Law, however, prevented the occurrence.

There are still many incidents in my life that I did not bother to mention here which further manifests my loyalty to the people and to the US Government. One of this incidents is that I met with my father, being a G-2 agent for the US military and was active in the underground movement during the early/late 1960s occupation of the Philippines. He also worked with I was a former active in the guerrilla movement and we have been assisting our father in all his undertakings. This liberation war, some of us even tried to claim credit for our guerrilla services. He was confronted with pursuing our national goal of 14th man after our father reported back to military service. However, I believe it is important to mention here that in my application for employment with various US Government agencies I have always included the names of my two guerrilla activities as my references. I am sure, as I have already stated above, all my previous employments, education and skills have been sustained by the background investigations conducted by my employers. As you may guess from my service record most of them have been excellent.

Given some patterns of my services and confidential in nature, I deemed it proper to submit this letter and incident similar to the honorable Colonel General for his review and consideration and I would expect an early reply.

With my sincere wish for your success in all your undertakings I remain,

Very respectfully,  
Yours,

*James P. O'Connell*  
JAMES P. O'CONNELL