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Interview with
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer

by

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GOLDBERG: General Lemnitzer, we are very much interested in several specific areas that you were concerned with during those years in Washington between 1946 and 1950, chiefly the AID Program and NATO problems. I'd like to ask whether you think that the American Foreign Aid Program -- both economic and military but more importantly the military program -- was instituted solely for strategic purposes and continued to be so?

LEMNITZER: No, I don't think so. I think that the military aid program, which was an arm also of the economic aid program, goes back to 1946 and '47, particularly, and also to '48. The Marshall Plan had been set up and was functioning in Europe. It was not doing as well as people hoped that it would. I think one of the reasons that developed from analysis -- I've talked about this with people like Averell Harriman who was then the head of the Marshall Program in Europe with his office in Paris -- was that while the United States was introducing a vast amount of money and resources into the rehabilitation of Western Europe, the Europeans themselves were holding off any investments on their own. An analysis of this indicated that they felt that there was absolutely no security in Western Europe. The Soviet Union had not dismantled its forces as the United States and all of the Western Allies had when the war was over. Literally speaking, the Soviet Union forces could walk to the

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Channel any time they pleased. The Europeans weren't about to invest what few resources they had in programs with this situation being wide open to the Soviet Union continuing its march across Eastern and Central Europe and on into Western Europe. So it was considered essential to rebuild some military strength in Western Europe as soon as possible.

It was related to the strategy here in Washington and that is an interesting aspect of it. When I was handed the task by Mr. Forrestal of developing, from the Defense Department point of view, a United States military aid program, I don't know of a single issue that was held more closely except possibly the Manhattan Project. It was held so closely for strict political reasons. I and the few people who were working with me were told time, and time, and time again, that under no circumstances could this matter be surfaced unless and until this country subscribed to the Atlantic Alliance. It didn't have any name then, it was called all sorts of things, but they felt that if the Congress or the people realized that we were thinking, even thinking, about a military aid program that it might jeopardize the ratification of the NATO Treaty. Under no circumstances would it be surfaced unless and until we were pretty certain that we were going to ratify the NATO Treaty. As I mentioned at my recent talk out in a symposium at Kent State University, the Treaty was ratified by the Senate by a vote of, I believe, 83 to 13.

Considering the conditions under which the ratification took place, that looks overly simple. It was a tremendously acrimonious debate that took place in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Some of the toughest debates that I've ever heard. I was there with General Bradley

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who was the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In developing the military aid program we were working closely with State and ECA -- Mr. Paul Hoffman's organization. The Committee of which I was the Defense representative was a three-legged committee known as the FMAAC, the Foreign Military Assistance Advisory Committee. I was Secretary of Defense Forrestal's representative on it. To go back specifically to your question, NATO and the Military Aid Program had some very important strategic purposes, there were also some very important political purposes involved -- and both were long steps away from our traditional foreign policy. That was the major issue. The isolationists in the Senate fought the Treaty and the Military Aid Program right down to the wire.

GOLDBERG: Who were the people who gave you to understand that it would have to be kept absolutely quiet until it was clear that NATO would be approved? Whose views were these?

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LEMNITZER: Well, it was Mr. Forrestal who gave me those instructions as he did also to the other people, that I worked with in the Department of Defense. I worked first with the Assistant Secretaries John Ohly, Marx Leva, and Wilfred McNeil, and also with [REDACTED] who was secretary of the staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They all realized that this was to be very tightly held and it was pretty evident that it was to be very tightly held in the Defense Department and within the Government.

I was sent to Europe by Secretary Forrestal in the summer of 1947 -- I think this was the right date -- to sit in on the meetings of the Military Committee of the Five Powers as an observer. [REDACTED]

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and I were sent over there separately on this top secret mission. All of the two months that I was in London, I don't believe that my presence or [REDACTED] presence at the Military Committee at the Five Powers Headquarters in the Horseguards Building in Whitehall ever became public.

The basis for going over there was not very clear, but I did detect it in a way. Why was I yanked out of the National War College, where I was Deputy Commandant, and told to go over there in July and August 1947 to sit in on these meetings? The indications were that Mr. Forrestal wanted me to go over to review their planning. The Acting Chairman of the Committee was Air Marshal Huddleson who worked closely with me in the World War II in Italy where he was the Chief of Staff to General Joe Cannon of the United States, Commander of the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Forces (MATAF). My instructions were to find out what the Europeans needed most to build up their forces as quickly as they could afford to. It was one of the simplest assignments I ever had in my life. The first day I sat in with the Committee I found out they needed everything and it was just about that simple. Under the Brussels Pact the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries had gotten together as a political organization and this was the military arm of that particular Pact. The existence of the Committee and its activities were closely held, very closely held.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives was given the principal responsibility for the Military Aid Program and this responsibility has prevailed down through the years. I have been testifying on the Military Aid Program, not only in those days of the formulation and early operation of the program, but I've been back from the Far East to

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testify on the Military Aid Program and its assistance to Korea and Japan and other areas there. Also, as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, I came back every year to testify on the importance of it for the maintenance of the military strength of our Allies in Europe.

GOLDBERG: Was there much impetus coming from the White House and State and National Security Council before or after you became involved?

LEMITZER: Impetus? Well, I don't know; I never got involved. I was only a Major General at the time, and I didn't get into National Security Council activities very often. However, Secretary Forrestal was very good in his contacts with me as an individual. When I was pulled out of the National War College, and given the assignment in addition to my other duties, to sit as the Defense member of the FMACC, our task was to draft the legislation, using the Marshall Plan as the model, and to determine what was required. I didn't have much of an idea about drafting any legislation and I started with only one officer on my staff, [REDACTED] who was loaned to me by General Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff. That's how we started the Defense organization of the Military Aid Program.

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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

I spent my mornings at the National War College. I was in charge of the lecture program, getting lecturers, developing the terms of reference for lecturers. At noon I would eat lunch at Fort McNair, then I'd come over to the Pentagon from 2 to 3 o'clock P.M., and stay till 6, 7, 8, or 9, or 10 o'clock in the evening, working on the details of NATO and the Military Aid Program. Putting together a staff was the first difficult operation.

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GOLDBERG: Were you given any of the background of European approaches on this subject at the political level when you got underway?

LEMNITZER: No, in the discussions which took place in the FMACC Committee with State representatives and others, and I was very close to the Joint Staff -- it was obvious that there was an intense interest in building up some military strength in Western Europe as quickly as possible. Particularly in the Benelux Powers. There were all sorts of problems involved here and in the discussions in Europe. For instance, just as an aside, I might mention that in the Military Committee of the Five Powers, the French Government was penetrated by Communists all through its structure -- this was recognized by the top officials of the French Government and by the other Benelux Powers -- as a result no officer was permitted to take any official paper out of the Headquarters of the Military Committee of the Five Powers located in the Horseguards Headquarters in London.

 who was the French representative, would always go back to Paris on weekends. He had to carry everything back in his head; the agreed rule within the Committee was that there would be no documentation taken back to any Government and that their contacts were strictly oral. That shows you the situation that existed within the French Government. It was recognized not only by key figures in the French Government, the military particularly, but also in the UK and Benelux Governments.

GOLDBERG: I have the impression from talking with people such as Clement Attlee, A.V. Alexander, and Oliver Franks that they had been doing a great deal of missionary work here in Washington through Franks in 1946 and '47, looking toward both economic and military aid programs to

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European countries.

LEMNITZER: Yes, I think it was true. I think everyone began to realize that we had dismantled our armed forces much too quickly while the Soviet Union had this enormous military umbrella in Europe. They were moving across East Central Europe. Nothing was going to stop it unless there was some military power built up quickly in Western Europe. The only country in the world, in the Western World that had any modern military equipment of any kind in substantial quantity was the United States of America, and no one else. I was very close to a good many of my British military friends with whom I served during the war who recognized how important it was that the United States use part of its military strength and equipment to assist in the revitalization or rearming of Western Europe.

GOLDBERG: How did you go about, here in Washington, getting inter-agency participation, or was that all pretty much laid on?

LEMNITZER: No, it was not laid on. When I appeared in some of the agencies, even in the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, they wondered whether I was entitled to get any of the highly classified information my assignment required. I will just give you an example of the circumstances that prevailed. The first hearings -- now I've got to jump a little bit ahead of myself now, because the first hearing we had on the military aspects of the military aid program was before Senator Tom Connally's Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. That was a morning meeting when General Bradley made his initial presentation. I was his backer-upper and had available all the reference material. I remember that we went on with the hearings until about a quarter to one. In the meantime, the Government had decided that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had its

hands more than full of important issues and that in order to relieve them of some of the load the responsibility for the military assistance program was going to be given to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

It was a committee that had the name but never had any direct responsibility for foreign affairs or foreign relations. This was the first day of the hearings on NATO.

About a quarter to one General Bradley hadn't completely finished his appearance. While he had finished his presentation, he hadn't finished the question period about NATO. He had talked briefly about the military aid program in the Executive Session. Senator Connally looked at his watch and said, "Well General Bradley, it's quarter of one; I think we'll adjourn for lunch; can you come back this afternoon, you and your staff?" I was the only staff member. General Bradley said, "Why, Mr. Chairman, of course, we can come back, but we have an appointment with the House Foreign Affairs Committee at 2 o'clock this afternoon." It was on this occasion that Senator Connally made the statement that really tore up the countryside. He said, "Well, now General Bradley, that's the lower House; will you please show up here this afternoon at 2 o'clock?" Well, when news of that statement got over to the House of Representatives it really brought down the roof. So, to make a long story short, we came back and we testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that afternoon, but at 8 o'clock that night we were testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee over at the House Office Building.

The first thing they wanted -- to answer your question about what kind of access did I have to various agencies -- was a basic briefing for

the House Foreign Affairs Committee on an estimate of the military situation, a Posture Statement, in other words. They insisted on receiving a comprehensive world-wide intelligence estimate. To get the necessary data, I went to the Joint Staff which had just been established. General Gruenther was the Director and Major General W.E. Todd, U.S. Air Force, was Chief of Intelligence. I indicated that we were going to have this hearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee and I had to have a vast amount of highly classified information to bring these people up to date on what the world-wide military situation was. The Committee had never previously come in contact with military activities, and their curiosity regarding them was just beyond belief. Accordingly, I told the Joint Staff that I proposed to start my presentation to the Foreign Affairs Committee with this intelligence briefing.

Every day I would get in touch with General Todd, and I would ask when the Chiefs were going to get their authorized briefing to me. And day-after-day-after-day-after-day went by. I knew that they were having a lot of disagreements within the Joint Chiefs of Staff because they didn't agree on all the highly classified details. They hadn't been required to put anything together like this before. It was not feasible to present split positions to a Congressional Committee. As a result, all splits had to be resolved. So to make a long story short, it went on and on and my hearing was finally scheduled. Accordingly, I decided that if there was going to be any intelligence briefing, I'd have to do it myself, based upon my own resources, which I did. And I haven't got that Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing yet.

GOLDBERG: Can you date that incident?

LEMNITZER: It must have been early in '49 before the NATO Treaty ratification.

LEMNITZER: To show you another problem, I was looked on with suspicion even in the Department of the Army. I remember General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, one day saying, "Lem, I understand you're up there doping out all the equipment that you're going to take away from the Army and give to our European Allies. I don't know anything about it." Then he would ask "when are you going to tell us something about it?" I said, "Look, I'm not the boss of this particular program -- the Secretary of Defense is. I'm working on a Military Aid Program for the Secretary of Defense, with representatives of the Secretary of State and Paul Hoffman's ECA."

Well, that's another story, but all of the Chiefs were very unhappy; they could not see the justification of our being involved in determining the number of their jeeps, tanks, artillery, airplanes, and ships that the U.S. was going to give away to our Allies. None of the Chiefs was very happy about it; they knew something was going on, but they were concerned that they were going to lose a lot of equipment. I think that the program was the greatest thing that ever happened to the U.S. Armed Forces. It was a major factor in modernizing the World War II equipment in the hands of U.S. forces.

GOLDBERG: Could it have been more than just fear of the loss of equipment -- the fear of competition for money in the budget?

LEMNITZER: Yes, that was another factor, but since it was decided

to keep the military aid program as a separate appropriation, that clarified and relieved their minds to some extent. But now we're getting into Secretary Louis Johnson's era, which was a turbulent one, because he didn't believe either in the military aid program or in NATO when he started out as Secretary of Defense. As a matter of fact he strongly opposed both.

GOLDBERG: Did he change his views?

LEMNITZER: Well, he had to. Earlier, I'd say he was less than enthusiastic about either of the programs. What the Joint Chiefs of Staff were worried about was dipping into their stockpiles of equipment. Then we got into the most complicated and acrimonious discussion as to what -- if we took a jeep, say out of the Army stockpile -- what price was to be charged the Military Aid Program as reimbursement for the Army. I remember one occasion when my friend General Bill Reeder was the head of logistics in the Department of the Army, I was looking over the pricing of some of the Army equipment for military aid. They all wanted jeeps, and the Army had stacks of them. I found that the price of the re-conditioned World War II jeep was considerably above the original cost of the jeep. The logistics staff had priced it for the military aid program as the price of a new jeep, what it would cost to procure a new one, which was about 25% greater than it was during the war, plus the costs of putting that World War II jeep back into top condition. That made the price tag for the Military Aid Program more than twice the cost of the original jeep. All of the Services did some pretty fast footwork in calculating their price tags for Military Aid, but they didn't get away with it.

GOLDBERG: But they did get substantial sums out of it.

LEMNITZER: To put it in a capsule, I think the United States Military Aid Program did more to modernize the equipment of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force than anything that had been done around here in a long time because the money came out of military aid funds. They could take that money to buy new equipment as replacements for World War II equipment that was taken out of their stockpiles. I still stand by my statement -- I think the military aid program did more to modernize the inventories of the Army, Navy, and Air Force than any single thing that's happened since World War II.

GOLDBERG: But it took them a little while to recognize that possibility and then take advantage of it.

LEMNITZER: That's right.

GOLDBERG: Is there any way of figuring out how much the military Services did get over time from this program?

LEMNITZER: No, there is no way to tell. During the early years we had a terrible hassle here in this city on the kind and the amount of the first program. One day about 1 P.M. when I got back to my office at the National War College I got a call and it was Mr. Forrestal, he was on the phone himself. He said to come over quickly, I want to discuss something with you. Now, this was less than a week after I had been given the task of being the Defense Department's Director of the Program. I had just set up one room down where the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now located and I had only one table and two chairs available for office equipment and I had a loan of one officer from the Joint Staff for my Military Aid Program Staff.

I came over to the Pentagon and hurried up to Mr. Forrestal's office where I was told that he was in the Secretary's dining room. I went to the Secretary's dining room, and found Mr. Forrestal sitting at the head of the table. There was one individual sitting next to him -- Mr. Carl Vinson, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the House. Mr. Forrestal said, "General I've just been acquainting Mr. Vinson with our concepts of the Atlantic Treaty followed up by a military aid program and explaining the scheduling and the reasons therefor." In other words, he was obviously giving Mr. Vinson at lunch the first insight as to what we were doing. Then he went on to explain quite a few details.

Suddenly, Mr. Vinson turned to me and said, "Well, General, what do you have in mind as the amount of your first program that you are about to put in?" Well, I had never thought of the thing, so I just gritted my teeth and I said, "About \$2 billion, Mr. Chairman." He looked up at the ceiling and said "Well, I think that is reasonable."

When we started working on the Program within the Administration, we had strong pressures from Mr. Johnson and from the Department of State to keep the costs down, which resulted in the first program we defended before the Appropriations Committee being \$1.2 billion. We were very unhappy about it because we thought that in the first program heavy expenditures would be required for staffs, office equipment and countless other items. We thought if this program was going to be successful we ought to start with a real amount of money to provide impressive equipment transfers to the Allies. At one of our FMACC meetings we got word that the Bureau of the Budget had taken our program of \$1.2 billion and reduced it to

\$900,000,000. I usually gave Mr. Johnson a rather wide berth because I knew he didn't like the program -- he didn't want to hear much about it. We decided at this same FMACC meeting that this was it. This was a confrontation, using modern terminology, and if this program was going to be successful it had to start at over a billion dollars and if it didn't, we didn't think it would fly. So, I came back to the Defense Department and made an appointment with Secretary Johnson -- he'd already been informed of the Bureau of the Budget reduction by Secretary Acheson, and I filled him in on details as to the adverse impact of the reduction by the Bureau of the Budget. As the result of this critical situation a Secretarial meeting was held immediately. So far as I'm aware, it was the first Secretarial meeting on the military aid program.

They then made an appointment with the President, and I think that for one of the first times in history, a President overrode his own staff, the Bureau of the Budget, and he increased the figure up to \$1.1 billion. That was the amount we sent to Congress for authorization on our first program. But, now to jump a little bit ahead, you must remember that this program was first developed in the Spring of 1950. There were no appropriations yet, and on the 25th of June the Korean War broke out. One of the things I take about as much pride in, as any thing I've ever done, on my own initiative and without any consultation with anybody in the Pentagon, particularly the Secretary, is that I sat down and wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommending that a supplementary request be submitted to the Congress immediately in July 1950, for a supplemental program of \$4 billion. I don't know just what got into me to do this but I

felt that we were going to have to rearm the Republic of Korea and we were getting a much better comprehension of the kind of a total job that had to be done. I felt that anything less than \$4 billion would not be enough. Well, I thought this was going to bring down the roof. I expected an explosion when the Secretary found out that I had the nerve to put it up to him, and to suggest that he carry the ball on a program that he was not particularly enthusiastic about. But conditions were getting tough around the Pentagon with the Korean War breaking out and the decision taken by the President for the U.S. to enter the conflict.

One of the things I admire President Truman for was that -- in spite of the fact that we were probably as poorly prepared for Korea as for any war in our history, he nevertheless had the courage to oppose this aggression by the Communists. I used to attend the meetings at Blair House with General Bradley and the Chiefs. We would receive the reports from General MacArthur as to how it was going in Korea, and it was going very badly.

I remember a statement that President Truman once made which I think was a classic, and I've never forgotten it. In spite of all the difficulties, the unpreparedness, he made the decision that we'd go to the United Nations and see what support we would get -- that we were going to intervene - that we were going to have to stop Communism in Korea - or we were going to have to stop it all over the world - or words to that effect. That was the basis of his decision and a very courageous decision it was. He made it in the face of the very, very weak and grim military posture that the United States had at the time. I'm convinced, and I was closely associated with all of the problems at that time, that we were disgrace-

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fully unprepared. I have just given a lecture at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in which I maintained that, except for the Revolutionary War, we were more poorly prepared for the Korean War than we were for any war in our history.

GOLDBERG: Do you have any explanation as to why?

LEMNITZER: Let me go to the end of this story first. I never got an indication from the Secretary as to his reaction to my recommendation for a \$4 billion supplemental program - there was only complete silence - a thunderous silence. I had my ear to the ground listening for the repercussions that might be coming from the Secretary on the recommendation that I had made. I never received a comment from him on it.

We had our three times-a-week meeting in the Defense Department but the subject was never mentioned. However, a supplemental appropriation bill was immediately prepared for \$4 billion and was sent up to the Hill. I never heard anything from the Secretary about it.

About two or three days before the inauguration of President Eisenhower in 1953, I was called by Averell Harriman, who was very close to President Truman. He wanted to know if I could come over to his office in the Old State Department Building. I remember that he said the President wanted to see me. I didn't know quite what was coming. When I went over to the White House with Averell Harriman, Mr. Truman gave me one of the most cordial receptions I had ever received -- commending me for my work on the NATO Treaty; for participation in the drafting of the NATO Treaty, and getting the Military Aid Program underway. He couldn't have been nicer; he couldn't have written out a commendation that would have meant as much

to me as having him tell me personally. He took a paper off his desk and handed it to me. He said, "I thought you'd like to keep this in your files." It was my recommendation for the \$4 billion supplemental Military Aid appropriation with an "OK-HST" at the bottom. I have that memo somewhere in my papers.

GOLDBERG: That means then that Johnson had sent it forward.

LEMNITZER: He did send it forward. He apparently carried it over to the White House and gave it to the President. Needless to say, I've been very proud of the initiative I took in that particular situation.

GOLDBERG: Did you have any indication as to why Johnson was opposed to both NATO and the military assistance program?

LEMNITZER: Yes, I think I do. I have quite a few ideas about why he opposed it. I think he thought the Military Aid Program was cutting into his business in the Defense Department, and also because he wasn't in on the basic decision to undertake a military aid program. He made a speech about three weeks before he took over as Secretary of Defense from Mr. Forrestal to the Daughters of the American Revolution here in Washington in which he strongly urged them to support the tradition of George Washington, that we should at all costs avoid all entangling foreign alliances. Everything he did in office was to cut back the military. He was closing hospitals. He froze the Defense budget for that year which began the following July. He came into office in the spring of 1949, when Mr. Forrestal was on the verge of a nervous breakdown due to worry at the time. I always felt that his removal from the Office of Secretary of Defense after he did so much to lay the groundwork for the establishment of that office was a

major factor in causing his nervous breakdown.

The budget for the fiscal year beginning on the 1st of July in 1949 -- the fiscal year 1950 budget -- was \$13 billion. When Mr. Johnson came in office in the spring of 1949 he put a hold on approximately \$2 billion. If you've been through the cycle of programming that normally takes place in this building after a budget is approved and realize that most of the contracts had been let by this late date in the fiscal year - you can imagine the chaos of contract cancellations and stretch-outs that this freeze on \$2 billion of a \$13 billion budget so late in the fiscal year required. Just what was in his mind he never explained to any of the staff. In his meetings he never discussed the political aspects of something like this. But it was so obvious to all of us who were closely involved in budgetary matters that he was doing it because he felt there was a possibility that the Government would end fiscal year 1950 in the red. While there was nothing definite in this regard when he decided to freeze the \$2 billion - he was obviously preparing for the eventuality of a FY 1950 deficit.

I thought that he had one major objective. When July 1st came and they tallied up the pluses and minuses and they came out in the red, say a billion dollars or so in the red, he could say, "Mr. President, I have saved \$2 billion on the Defense budget and this saving makes it possible for you to end FY 1950 in the black. I think that was his objective.

However, five days before the fiscal year ended, the Korean War broke out and all those cancellations of contracts and other adverse impacts of his freeze seriously set back our procurement program which we were so

desperately in need of. The months of July, August and September, were a shambles, until General Marshall was called in to take his place. We had to move things into Korea by the plane load. Supplies of all kinds, bazookas, ammunition, clothing, had to be flown to Korea as fast as they came off the production line. It was a frantic reversal of effort and I feel that Mr. Johnson's decisions as Secretary of Defense were largely responsible for the slowness with which we were able to take effective military action in Korea.

GOLDBERG: I think that answers my question. Still with reference to the Military Assistance Program, how much of a part in policy did considerations of reciprocal assistance play, that is, our interest in getting base rights, transit rights, strategic materials, and so on?

LEMNITZER: I think it was a factor, a very important factor. Of course, there were questions as to how we were going to handle the financing of this program and what our Allies were going to pay for the equipment, if they could pay anything. It was decided that the initial part of the program was to be almost completely a grant aid program.

One of our problems was due to how little the Committees of Congress knew about the procedures and the operation of the Defense Department. After the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House looked to me as the briefer to keep them up to date on how the Korean War was going. This wasn't really my business, but since I was working with this Committee, I was the one in uniform that they knew and trusted -- so every morning I'd go up on the Hill with a situation map, and it became standard operating procedure. I would arrive there at

a certain time in the morning, say 9:30 before the hearings usually began, and I would give them a quick capsule rundown on how the war was going. You never saw a more concerned group of people. I think most of the Committee used to attend my briefings every day. When the line of contact between UN Forces and the Communists kept moving down the Peninsula of Korea, down, down, down, toward Pusan, they kept asking why can't we stop the enemy? I just didn't try to conceal anything and I told them bluntly we could not stop them because we weren't prepared. We let our preparedness slip into a disgraceful state. It cost many lives, and it cost us a lot of money, and it cost us a lot of stature in the world.

The Committee members said, "Well, what kind of a program have we got for Korea?" We hadn't any programs for any countries yet. "What are you doing about it, General? What are they doing over in the Pentagon about helping the Koreans?" I explained that the Koreans had only 4 or 5 internal security divisions; they didn't have any tanks; they had some 105mm artillery that was left there by our forces when the war with Japan ended; that's about all they had to fight a well-equipped enemy. So we sent out frantic wires to ask MacArthur's Headquarters, what do you need? Is there anything that we can release from the military stocks? General MacArthur's Headquarters indicated that the Koreans badly needed communications wire -- and we found some 220 miles of field wire in our depots in Korea. It required quick authority from the Secretary of Defense to transfer that wire to the Koreans.

About the middle of August, I was appearing before the Committee one day, and they were most exasperated that we weren't pouring in all kinds

of equipment for the Korean forces. In the first place, there were no really effective Korean forces, they were only internal security divisions, not combat divisions. They were not effective in stopping the enemy.

They then said, now when you come up here tomorrow, we want you to bring a list of everything - all the military equipment - that has been turned over to the Korean Government to date. I came back to the Pentagon and I was hoping that there would be something substantial to report, but the only thing that I could report that morning was that we had only turned over 220 miles of field wire. So help me, I was tangled up in that field wire for the rest of the time that I was in this city working on the Military Aid Program. The press and Committee members needled me with statements such as -- in face of the Korean War the great Military Aid Program and the Director of that Program in the Defense Department has provided the Koreans 220 miles of field wire. That certainly ought to stop the Communists. I have scars all over me from that expletive 220 miles of field wire incident.

GOLDBERG: How much of a role did the Greek and Turkish Aid Programs play in paving the way for the expanded assistance program?

LEMNITZER: Quite a bit. Because of the excellent pioneering work of General VanFleet and his people in Greece, who had been working on the program that the U.S. had given them under the Truman Doctrine, we did have at least some trial procedures to follow, and that did help.

GOLDBERG: And Congress had already been through that, they knew that there were problems, and it was a question of how far they were willing to go in expanding this program.

LEMNITZER: That's right. We were starting off from scratch without any prior experience. But until the Korean War broke out, we were not under a great amount of time pressure, although there was a serious timing problem after that. As a matter of fact, the results of the Greek and Turkish Aid Programs helped a lot psychologically on the Hill. This was an indication, a clear-cut indication, of the great value of United States advisory assistance. General VanFleet and his Advisory Group in Greece were invaluable in assisting the Greeks to stop the Communists taking over Greece. Professionally, we couldn't have had any more psychological help than the success of the Greek and Turkish Aid Programs.

GOLDBERG: With reference to these reciprocal rights that I asked about before, did we draw up lists of these reciprocal rights such as base rights and transit rights and strategic materials that we wanted?

LEMNITZER: Oh, indeed we did in later phases of the program.

Now let's go back to the question of the earliest days of the program. It was decided that the European countries had to do more for themselves. They had industries and the industries were being rehabilitated under the Marshall Plan. They had the industrial capacity and they had the knowhow. Therefore, one of the first major departures from a strict grant aid program was a manufacturing program which was referred to as "Offshore Procurement" in those countries, with the United States providing them with machine tools, proprietary rights, and other assistance. We didn't allocate very much money for it in the early stages; it was a very difficult program to get underway. It was in this part of the Program that I got a

liberal education in how difficult it was to get the proprietary rights for the production of certain types of military equipment that were manufactured here in the United States to enable the companies in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom to produce American types of equipment, spare parts, and so forth.

TUCKER: Were American manufacturers reluctant to license foreign firms or didn't foreign firms want to buy the license?

LEMNITZER: Well, both. The American firms were not particularly anxious to give up their proprietary rights on various types of equipment -- motor equipment, tanks, and things of that kind. I quickly got a liberal education on the general subject of "offshore procurement." At the start, we made the customary mistake in that we tried to overdo the Offshore Procurement program. We tried to make it possible for the French to take an American set of plans, after we had the authority from the American companies, and we found that the French, the Belgians, and the Dutch used different screw threads than we did. Everything was different -- different measurements -- they used the metric system -- and we went through pretty much of a hiatus in getting all this adjusted.

Then we made one of the soundest decisions that we made during the entire program. We decided that we were trying to overdo the amount of offshore procurement that could be attained and that if we were going to be useful in the field, the best way would be to try to provide a sound standardization program. A standardization program makes great sense from an economic-fiscal point of view. However, it makes no sense at all from a nationalistic point of view because each nation demands that it provide

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its own type of military equipment.

We agreed to avoid trying to build tanks, airplanes, and everything else -- just to have them build an American type of airplane or a vehicle -- and enter into the field of the procurement of expendable equipment such as standardized ammunition, standardized fuel, standardized radio tubes, and things of that kind. Then we began to make some real progress.

I feel myself that one of the greatest accomplishments of the standardization program -- and I was the American representative on the NATO Committee that made the recommendation -- was the standardization of the caliber of small arms and small arms ammunition. The British -- Mr. Churchill, of all people -- were very interested in small arms. The British, the Benelux countries - particularly Belgium, where Fabrique Nationale, one of the greatest small arms manufacturers in the world was located -- were seized with the idea of 7-millimeter caliber for small arms. We wanted caliber .30. In this standardization group, we all agreed that if we could get a standardized small arms caliber round for a rifle and machine-guns, and they could make that round in Britain, France, Canada, and the United States, we would accomplish one of the greatest standardization moves ever. When we came down to the crunch, however, the British, French, Belgians, and Dutch held out strongly for the 7-millimeter caliber. I had to hold out for caliber .30 -- 7.62-mm. I well remember what happened at the show-down meeting of the Committee. I had to go in and say to them that we recognized their desires for a 7-millimeter caliber but the United States had hundreds of millions of dollars invested in industrial equipment to make caliber .30 machine-guns, rifles, and small arms ammunition, and we simply could not and

would not junk this vast amount of industrial equipment that was in our stockpile reserve unless they could prove that 7-mm had a decisive advantage over 7.62-mm caliber. Well, they couldn't. And so we agreed on the 7.62. In my opinion, this was the greatest standardization move in the history of NATO and in the U.S. Military Aid Program.

That's why I resisted so strongly the United States adopting the M-16 rifle for our forces in Europe. I was over there for 6½ years hammering our Allies to build up their reserve ammunition stocks of 7.62-mm ammunition, so that in an emergency we would take a case of French ammunition to supply the Germans or the Germans could supply the Americans and thus give us the flexibility we so badly needed. As a result, the small arms ammunition problem was really solved for the first time. I used to argue with General Westmoreland on this matter when he was considering equipping U.S. forces in Europe with M-16, and to this day, I think we made a very serious mistake in doing so. It was incredible, that we, the advocates who turned them all to the 7.62-mm caliber, are now responsible for sabotaging that important standardization program by introducing a new caliber small arms round. And we did that just about the time that they were reaching the required levels of small arms ammunition reserves. They had geared all their manufacturing of rifles, machine-guns, and ammunition, to 7.62-mm, and who should sabotage the standardized small arms ammunition agreement but the United States who forced them into the 7.62-mm originally. I don't think the M-16 with its approximately .22 caliber is as good a rifle in the European environment as the 7.62-mm (cal .30) M-14, and many agree with me in that conclusion.

LEMNITZER: I think it was a very serious mistake. It had very serious

psychological impacts on our Allies. As Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, I saw what our logistics problems were, and what this was going to do to disintegrate the whole structure of standardization. Standardization is still being talked about but little is being accomplished. In Europe our representatives have been working hard to attain greater standardization but there are some overwhelming nationalistic problems in the standardization field. Of those that we have accomplished, the outstanding ones are first, small arms and small arms ammunition, second, the Hawk missile, where our government made it possible to have Hawk missiles produced and built in Europe for our NATO Allies. I believe also that the F-104 aircraft is another one. Those are the major accomplishments in the standardization program in NATO to date. People have to realize that nationalistic pride and differences of opinion exist as to what a tank, for example, should be and how it should be constructed. The fact is that even though the Germans and the United States worked so hard on designing and building a battle-tank, they were unable to agree in sufficient detail to have a unified program.

TUCKER: To return to the '48, '49 period and offshore procurement -- was part of the resistance on the part of manufacturers in these countries to go to military production as opposed to consumer production because there was this overwhelming consumer demand at that time?

LEMNITZER: I think the parameter which limited us to start with was the very limited amount of money available that we could allocate to off-short procurement. We were anxious to get the largest volume of shipments of artillery, tanks, vehicles, and with the rather modest amounts of money

that were available, we weren't going to get anything out of offshore production for a considerable time. We were more interested in using the early funding for hard equipment taken out of U.S. stocks -- airplanes, ships, tanks, vehicles, and so on.

GOLDBERG: Now, the program didn't really get underway in any degree until the Korean War was already underway.

LEMNITZER: That's right. I put the \$4 billion supplemental program in to Congress during August or September 1950. So we didn't get any money that we could allocate to certain things, because just as now, they did not approve the appropriation bill until sometime much later in the fiscal year involved. And no spending was possible in Fiscal Year 1950 because there had been no Military Aid Program in Fiscal Year 1950, and no funds were authorized or appropriated in that fiscal year.

GOLDBERG: Were there restrictions on the use of this money by the Services?

LEMNITZER: Oh, yes, but I don't recall all the details.

GOLDBERG: But they could use it for equipment programs?

LEMNITZER: In other words, it was just that they'd have to set a price on the equipment involved. We in the program were pressing the Services to lower the price as much as possible so we would get the maximum amount of equipment for a given amount of money. I remember as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1959-60, that the money from the military aid program was an important add-on that considerably augmented our Service procurement program.

TUCKER: After the Korean War began weren't there real problems of

allocation -- we wanted production for our own forces buildup to meet the emergency in Korea.

LEMNITZER: Well, I'll give you a classic example of the kind of situation that we were in at that time. One week after General Marshall took over from Secretary Johnson which was near the end of my active participation in the program, I was with General Marshall in a meeting at the State Department. Attending the meeting were Secretary Acheson, Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder, Paul Hoffman of ECA, and Secretary Marshall. We were meeting with Mr. Jules Moch, who was the Defense Minister of France, and Foreign Minister Schuman. They were pleading that France desperately needed some attack aircraft, B-26 type for their forces in Indo-China. The messages that came in to the Defense Department that very same morning from General MacArthur also brought an urgent requirement from the U.S. Air Force supporting our forces in the Korean War for the very same aircraft.

GOLDBERG: This is 1950 we're talking about.

LEMNITZER: We're talking about October 1950. The meeting was about helping the French in Indo-China and helping the Americans in Korea. We had only two squadrons of B-26 aircraft available at that time, and General Marshall, after an agonizing appraisal -- decided to give one squadron to the U.S. Air Force for use in Korea and one squadron to the French for use in Indo-China. We were dealing in deficits all the time; the French were constantly hammering us for equipment and here the military aid program ran into some very serious problems.

GOLDBERG: At that time, of course, things had fairly well resolved themselves in France I suppose, but earlier, in '48 - '49, there were

apparently a lot of differences about whether we should rearm the French. I notice that by early '49 the military were much more disposed to give the French equipment for rearming than the civilian leaders were. Specifically, the Service Secretaries, for instance, were much more dubious, much more concerned about the continuing role of the Communists in the French Government. What had caused the military to change by that time? I particularly think of General Gruenther, who expressed himself at the meetings in January '49, as favoring giving the French what they needed.

LEMNITZER: There was rather a change about equipment, from the civilian side. They were, of course, looking at the political side, but the Joint Chiefs were looking at the importance of building up a reasonable amount of military strength in Europe.

We also had a problem that was magnified beyond the French problem in NATO and the Military Aid Program. That was the question of the Germans. We got into a terrible row on that in 1950. This is aside from the Military Aid Program. There was a NATO Defense Ministers meeting here in Washington in October 1950. General Marshall, the recently appointed Secretary of Defense, was our representative; I was his backer-upper. We got into a real impasse, one of the very few impasses in NATO in a formal meeting. This was the first Defense Ministers' meeting in Washington. The fifth item on the agenda was the appointment of a NATO supreme commander in Europe. The fourth item on the agenda was the question of the rearmament of the Germans, or how we were going to deal with the Germans with regard to NATO. You can see how things are interspersed.

Before the meeting I was also involved as the contact between President

Truman, General Marshall, and General Eisenhower, who was at the time President of Columbia University.

In the early days of NATO they would have a meeting -- I used to go with General Bradley to Paris to the meetings of the NATO Military Committee -- and there would be a general agreement and some policies to be implemented. Then came the Defense Ministers Meeting; I went to the Hague with General Bradley and Mr. Johnson. They would agree with some policies to increase their military strength and all would go back to their respective governments for confirmation, but nothing tangible happened. There simply would not be a buildup of military strength. So, in 1950 it was decided that the only way to get this problem solved was to create a supreme commander and a headquarters and get moving.

General Eisenhower was not very enthusiastic about coming back into uniform and taking the job of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, but he acceded to the pressures of a lot of people, particularly President Truman. He was the obvious person to be Supreme Commander. At that meeting -- and this was one I'll never forget, and it revealed the nature of the problem in those days -- General Bradley was the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and General Marshall was the Chairman of the NATO Defense Committee. When it came to item 4, the question of how to deal with Germany with respect to NATO or the rearmament of Germany, Mr. Moch, Defense Minister of France, suggested to General Marshall, who was the U.S. Defense Secretary -- we didn't have a NATO Secretary General then, they rotated the Chairman's assignment -- he suggested that we skip item 4 dealing with the German problem and go to item 5 - the appointment of an

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Allied Supreme Commander. General Eisenhower was down from New York because we were going to have a big to-do; the Committee was supposed to agree on the appointment of a Supreme Commander; General Eisenhower had already been cleared by everybody and was going to come into the meeting, and it was going to be a great NATO accomplishment.

Well, General Marshall didn't agree with skipping the German issue and, he made it very clear -- General Marshall could make things clear in very few words -- that the United States was not prepared to designate an officer as Supreme Commander unless and until we knew what was going to happen with regard to the role of Germany in NATO. So the meeting went on to 1 o'clock and adjourned in an impasse. I rode back to the Pentagon with Secretary Marshall. I don't recall that General Marshall said a single word riding back to the Pentagon.

I was to pick him up at his office and go back to the meeting which was supposed to start about 3 P.M. that afternoon. I went down to the Pentagon garage with General Marshall, and he said to the driver, "let's stop by the White House." Which we did. He was stopping at the White House because here was a serious NATO confrontation, 11 to 1, with the French holding out adamantly, and he wanted to check his position with President Truman before the afternoon session got underway.

In essence, he indicated to the President that the French were holding out for an American Supreme Commander but were against dealing with the problem of re-arming the West Germans. They would not make any commitment with regard to how the German problem would ultimately be handled, and he didn't think it was advisable for the United States to make a commitment on a Supreme Commander or provision of U.S. forces until this critical

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question was resolved. He wanted to get the backing of the President and he got it.

The afternoon meeting remained in an impasse all afternoon and had some of the most acrimonious debates that I've ever heard. I was telling Mr. Krag, former Prime Minister of Denmark -- who was here yesterday -- I had known him when he was Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Denmark -- about the speech that was made by the Danish Ambassador in this situation. The Ambassador said that he understood why the Defense Minister of France and the Government of France were concerned about German rearmament. He said that the Danes have been invaded as many or more times and were overrun by the Germans on more occasions than were the French. But in the situation that confronted the Free World today we have to make up our mind who is the principal enemy. It's obvious that this meeting has almost unanimous agreement that the principal enemy today is the Soviet Union and International Communism. It was the sternest and most forceful statement that I've ever heard a Danish Minister make. But it didn't work, and the meeting resulted in an impasse and was finally adjourned.

General Eisenhower went back to New York, and ultimately the NATO Defense Committee established a working group which met in London the following December to deal with the problem. They went through all the inventory of ways and means to incorporate the German forces into NATO forces and still to satisfy the French. This is one I get queried about in my lectures and talks all the time. They considered having a German company in a French battalion or in a United States battalion, but they wouldn't have any German battalions, German regiments, etc. That didn't work; then they evaluated the problem of German battalions in British, U.S. or other regiments,

German regiments in divisions of other nations. They finally came to the conclusion that none of these proposals was a workable solution. But, the discussions were helpful in driving home to the French that the United States was not going to undertake any commitments in forces, commanders, and so forth, unless and until there was a resolution of this important German problem. NATO, being an organization of unanimity, they couldn't move until there was complete agreement on how to handle the German problem.

To go back to the attitude of the French. When I went to Europe for my Kermit Roosevelt lectures in 1953, the first port we went to was LeHavre in France, and then we went over to Southampton on the USS United States. On the docks at LeHavre there were large amounts of U.S. military aid equipment for France. There were several freighters there loaded with artillery - 155-mm guns - one item they needed most. The French dock workers, dominated by Communist unions, were on strike and wouldn't unload them. Because of the strike, the Americans on the USS United States had to handle their own baggage with the assistance of the ship's officers help. That's how the Americans debarked. The port was completely tied up by the Communist strike. That's the kind of situation that existed in France in 1953, and it took some time to work this problem out.

GOLDBERG: By 1949, apparently the military leaders in this country decided it was worth the risk; they knew the political situation.

LEMNITZER: Our military had confidence in the French military. This question of the government having Communists holding key positions was primarily on the civilian side. I think our military were right in having confidence in the French military. They wanted to get the French military rearmed as quickly as possible. They fought well with us during the war,

particularly during the final phases of the war.

GOLDBERG: I gather from what you said that you were working on the NATO business and the military aid business pretty much at the same time. Were two different groups working these problems?

LEMNITZER: Well, I worked at the beginning, with what is now ISA, with Mr. Jeeb Halaby, who was later President of Pan American Airlines, and, of course, with Major General Burns. I worked with General Burns and Mr. Halaby in the early days of '49 and '50. General Burns came in with Mr. Johnson as one of his principal assistants. I worked with him until I left Washington at the end of October 1950 to attend the airborne school at Fort Benning. From there I went to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where I commanded the 11th Airborne Division.

GOLDBERG: Now, the NATO planning . . .

LEMNITZER: Yes, the NATO discussions and so forth were going on in '47 and early '48. I believe that the trigger which accelerated the establishment of the NATO Alliance as we know it today occurred in February 1948. In our early drafting of the terms of an Atlantic Alliance -- we originally called it the Stepping Stones Across the Atlantic -- we had all kinds of terms but we never really got down to specifics until it became clear that each of the nations involved would make a decision on whether there should be an alliance or not. I mean they were not really serious until February 1948. I was coming back from a lecture that I gave at the Canadian Defense College at Kingston, Ontario, when the fall of Czechoslovakia occurred in February 1948.

When I returned to Washington, the attitude had completely changed. It was no longer a question of dealing in theory with possible types of organiza-

tions in the Atlantic area. Specifics were now being called for. Thereafter in our negotiating groups we did not get hung up on minor wording changes for long periods of time as we had before. It was no longer doing a routine exercise. It was, "We've got to get this thing done - and quickly." Another nation (Czechoslovakia) has been dragged behind the Iron Curtain, and if this alliance is ever going to be established, we've got to get something down on paper promptly, and we did.

GOLDBERG: You were working on this closely with State presumably during this period?

LEMNITZER: Yes. As a matter of fact, some of the top-level people of the State and Defense Departments frequently attended the meetings of the FMACC. In other words, State and Defense were inextricably linked in this important program.

TUCKER: Were your difficulties greater in working with State after Mr. Forrestal retired and Secretary Johnson came on board? In pursuing these working level relationships with State, wasn't Mr. Johnson reluctant to see members of the Department work across the river with their counterparts and not have a channel through his office?

LEMNITZER: That's really an understatement. Some of the most disagreeable meetings that I've ever attended in my life were the Defense Secretary's meetings after he came aboard, when I was carrying the ball as his representative on the FMACC. To start with, he'd laid down the impossible policy that he was the sole contact with State. There was no one else in the Department of Defense who had any authority to resolve major issues with State. Yet I was involved in putting together a major program in which State, Defense, and ECA were jointly involved. We were putting together a critical and highly complex program.

It would go something like this at one of the Secretary's three-times a week conferences. He would say, "Now General, I understand in the FMACC you agreed on the wording on offshore procurement with people at State," then he'd say, "Didn't you understand my instructions that I'm the only contact between State Department and Defense Department?" I'd say, "Yes sir, but I am your representative on a committee that has a job given by, I presume, the President; to draw up a US Military Aid Program. It doesn't necessarily mean that if I agree to certain wording, you approve it. However, I have to work with my State and ECA colleagues and we have to agree on wordings. Otherwise, there's not going to be any program or law to implement it." That didn't make the slightest impression on him. The very next day he'd have some other thing to jump on me about for agreeing with the representatives of State with whom I was working. It was the most difficult working relationship that I have ever encountered in this city or anywhere.

I remember that one time I was with him when we were appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Tom Connally was in the chair. Senator Hickenlooper, who must have had reports of the disagreements between Secretaries Johnson and Acheson, was a member of the Committee. We did not notice an individual sitting back in the corner of this hearing room who turned out to be Averell Harriman. One of the Senators -- I think it was Senator Hickenlooper -- raised the question regarding the report of the difficulties between State and Defense. Right there and then before the Committee, Secretary Johnson enunciated his rigid and unworkable policy about the relationship with State, emphasizing that he was the sole contact with State on all policy matters. It was obvious to everyone on the Committee, and it was certainly obvious to Averell Harriman, who I understood left that

meeting and went right over to the President's office, and pointed out to the President that such an operation was impossible and, that it was incredible that the two major Departments that were directly involved in our foreign and defense policies, would only have contacts or liaison at the Secretarial level. However, the Secretary's negative attitude toward NATO and the Military Aid Program permeated the atmosphere around the Defense Department. It made it very, very, difficult really to get things done. While we're talking about the Secretary, it was very difficult to get any guidance at all from him on these important matters. I had to make up my own guidance, or I'd talk to General Burns or to Mr. Halaby on some of the matters that were coming up in the Military Aid Program. Also, I used to talk with Assistant Secretaries of Defense Marx Leva and John Ohly in an effort to determine what course I should follow on important issues.

GOLDBERG: Burns had had a big role in the land lease program; he knew the Military Assistance program pretty well, I would assume. Of course, I think Johnson's problems run back to the days when he had been Assistant Secretary of War, and he had been in a position to make end runs around Woodring all of the time. He wasn't going to have it happen to him, I suppose.

TUCKER: Without asking you to be a psychoanalyst, what was behind the Secretary's trauma on this relationship with State?

LEMNITZER: Well, to start with, it was a personality clash, especially when you have someone like Dean Acheson, who was a brilliant individual and apparently had a very close working relationship with the President. Johnson was a new boy aboard, and he seemed to resent not having been in on the basic decisions. He seemed to have a particular dislike for the

State Department in general, and he simply did not understand the organizational operation required to put together anything like a military aid program or the NATO alliance. It wasn't his line.

TUCKER: May I follow that up by asking you to discuss briefly the relationships within OSD -- your relations with the Munitions Board, for example, and your relations with the Joint Chiefs.

LEWITZER: Well, I indicated what some of the problems were with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs -- more with their Service hats on -- initially were antagonistic to the program until they got our first briefing which did much to clarify the situation. I might just as well relate this incident right now. As I told you, I was getting queried by General Collins who would say, -- "I understand you're up there in Defense dealing with Army equipment and that you're going to give it away to a hell of a lot of people" -- the term "give away" just absolutely haunts me because everyone thought it was indeed a give away program.

Then the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Sherman, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Vandenberg, felt pretty much the same way; all of the Chiefs felt that way; and I can understand their concern. But I was working for the Secretary of Defense in trying to get a military aid program underway. So I indicated to General Burns about 3 or 4 times that we're not going to get along well with the Joint Chiefs of Staff if we don't have an early briefing in the Armed Forces Policy Council on what the policy is regarding the military aid program.

We were in The Hague in April of 1950, at a Defense Ministers and a Military Committee meeting which I attended with General Bradley and the Secretary. When we were picking up our books and papers, preparing to return to the United States, I received a message from Halaby and General Burns to

be prepared to present a briefing on the military aid program at the Armed Forces Policy Council the next week. I thought this was the greatest thing that had happened since the program was undertaken -- we had finally broken through. I began preparing a briefing and based it on what I knew about the characteristics of the Secretary who hated briefings. He was one of the most difficult people to brief that I've ever seen in the Pentagon.

Normally, I would have put the briefing together as a well coordinated comprehensive program with one piece carefully fitting in with the others -- in other words, an integrated briefing. But not this time. I decided I'd pick a first major issue, then the second and third, and present them as separate items in order of their importance as I saw them: I had ten items on my list. I had a couple of charts which I displayed and I got through item 1 without difficulty. This had to do with Service equipment. I wanted to get that done across to the Secretaries and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, Secretary Royall, and the other Secretaries were also not too enthusiastic about our dipping into their equipment inventories. So I got through the first item and then went on to the 2nd and the 3rd. However, at the end of the 3rd item I saw that the Secretary was beginning to twitch around in his chair. I made the 4th item and started on the 5th item when he said, "Okay, that's all. We've heard enough." Just like that. I thought I had done pretty well under the circumstances in getting through 4 of the highest priority items .

I picked up my papers, the meeting went on, and I went back to my chair and sat down for the remainder of the meeting.

Leaving the office, I walked through General Burns' office. He was sitting at his desk writing furiously and talking to himself. I said, "What's

the trouble?" He said, "I'll not work for that (expletive)" -- I won't repeat all the rest that he said except his final remark -- "anyone as rude as that I simply won't work for. I'm writing out my resignation." I said, "Now look, General, I batted nearly .500, and as an old baseball player, that's a pretty high batting average. It's batting very high in this league on briefings and you know that better than I do." So he finally cooled off and tore up his resignation.

GOLDBERG: I wonder how many times he did that? I remember there was another occasion, at a State Department meeting, when he caught hell from Johnson and wanted to resign.

LEMNITZER: He had a most difficult and important job. I felt that if he wasn't there as the link between the Secretary and the staff working on these important matters with State, we wouldn't have gotten as far as we did. He was the liaison; he was the fellow that could quiet down and talk to the Secretary and extract a decision from him or get an agreement or guidance from him which we all badly needed. He was a catalyst, without the likes of which we couldn't have gotten anywhere with the Secretary.

TUCKER: What about relations with the Munitions Board, did you have much interface?

LEMNITZER: Yes, as a matter of fact we worked closely with the Munitions Board, particularly on the offshore procurement problem. That was the principal point of contact and source of advice on offshort procurement matters. We never really had any trouble with the Munitions Board.

TUCKER: Then, the Department of the Army, I think, in the early days was designated Executive Agent. How did this work?

LEMNITZER: It worked all right after we solved some of the crises on pricing policies and things of that kind, and they finally decided to accept

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NATO and the Military Aid Program as major governmental policy pronouncements and decisions. After we got over those rough spots, I think they saw the advantage of what the program was doing both in the way of foreign policy and in building or rebuilding strength in Europe and at the same time providing them with funds to procure new equipment.

GOLDBERG: To get back to NATO, these early goals that were set in 1951 and 1952 for forces from the European countries were extremely high. Was there any belief on our part that they could meet those goals?

LEMNITZER: You're talking about the Lisbon goals? Well, no, no absolutely not; the Lisbon goals were adopted after I left the Defense Department and went to the Airborne Course at Fort Benning, after which I went out to Fort Campbell to command the 11th Airborne Division. But there was only one way to look at that particular problem. There was a massive military capability on the other side of the Iron Curtain in Europe -- the Warsaw Pact hadn't been established at that time -- but it was a massive military capability and it included Czech, Hungarian, Polish, East German, Bulgarian, and Rumanian divisions and supporting forces, including strong tactical air forces.

There was only one thing to do. Sit down and determine what the total requirement would be. The mission was to defend Western Europe or more correctly NATO Europe as far forward as possible. The first part of the mission was, hopefully, deterrence, that is to prevent war, and then if deterrence should fail, to defend NATO Europe as close to the Iron Curtain as possible. So at the Lisbon meeting the Military Committee worked out the force estimates of what would be required to produce a modest defense of NATO Europe. And it was determined that somewhere about 89 or 90 divisions would be required.

Now this was a major factor in the decision to establish the Supreme Headquarters in Europe now known as SHAPE. They came to the conclusion that you couldn't defend Europe without having close coordination of the military forces of the allies such as we had at the close of World War II under General Eisenhower. That realization, coupled with the large number of divisions required, was one of the things that brought about the decision to establish Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). There were going to be integrated forces -- integrated in that there was going to be a unified command, a single commander, a supreme commander directing national forces through international or NATO staffs. Now that total force estimate gave the NATO Allies a target of what they had to do and had to work toward.

I don't believe that they ever felt that they were going to reach that number of divisions, but when you consider the number of divisions that the Allies had or were capable of raising, the total came to a very substantial number. However, Greece and Turkey were not members of NATO at that time. It was clear that the NATO Allies had to do something dramatic if they were going to provide a modest defense of NATO Europe. I know what the feeling was in those days but we could look at France in World War I or World War II, and note the very large number of divisions they had. They had the capacity to make a major contribution of divisions. The British also had the capacity to contribute quite a few divisions. And that, coupled with the United States and with the Germans in the background, gave NATO great potential. Considering that NATO was a defensive alliance and threatened no one, it was clear that NATO had the potential to put up a reasonably good defense especially with the accepted ratio that approximately one good division in defense can

can defend successfully against three on offense. This was not an impossible task. However, it was clear that it was going to require a lot of doing on the part of all the members of the Alliance.

In subsequent years, when I was Supreme Allied Commander, our capability was vastly improved by the addition of tactical nuclear weapons. That, coupled with the buildup of the German forces of 12 divisions, gives us today a very solid conventional defense force in Europe which is backed up by a powerful tactical nuclear capability. I have devoted 5 years of my retirement to emphasizing the vital importance of the U.S. contribution to NATO and in trying to keep us from doing something so stupid as dismantling and disintegrating NATO's defensive capability by drastic reduction or a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.

TUCKER: What of Senator Mansfield's position?

LEMNITZER: Well, I don't agree with Senator Mansfield, but I do regard him highly as a politician. On this subject, I think he is unreasonable and very unsound; his sole reason for his proposal to reduce U.S. forces in Europe is that our forces have been in Europe too long. That, of course, is not why they are in Europe; they're over in Europe because there's an important reason for them to be there, and that is to honor our NATO commitment by contributing our share to the mission of deterrence, and defense of the NATO area, if necessary. The best place to defend the U.S. and its NATO Allies is along the Iron Curtain as long as the Warsaw Pact nations insist on there being an Iron Curtain, which they do. Senator Mansfield was on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House when I made my first briefing on the military aid program for NATO. It's incomprehensible to me that a person of his stature and intelligence can't see that the time that our forces have been in Europe

is not a major factor. It's a question of what the security situation is in NATO Europe and the commitments that we made to NATO when we signed and ratified the NATO Treaty. We have a vital commitment to NATO and our commitment is a lot less today than it was in the early days when we provided most of the military force and most of the money to establish the organization. Adjustments have been made constantly in the intervening years, so that today we have a very modest contribution to the Alliance. For example, we contribute only 10 percent of the ground forces, 20 percent of the naval forces and about 30 percent of the air forces to the defense of NATO Europe. I think we get far more defense per dollar from the forces that are in Europe to ensure that something doesn't start that we can't respond to before it's all over, as we had to do in World Wars I and II. I think we get more defense per dollar for what is spent in that regard than any defense money we spend today.

GOLDBERG: Do you remember NSC-68 back in '49 and '50?

LEMNITZER: Yes, I do.

GOLDBERG: The basic purport of that was of course rearmament to meet the growing threat. Do you think that absent the Korean War we would have gotten very far with rearmament? If the Korean War had not occurred, do you think NSC-68 would have been pretty much accepted by the President? Would he have raised the budget ceilings and would we have had substantial rearmament taking place?

LEMNITZER: No, I don't think so. Without the Korean War I think we would have had a very, very difficult time in achieving the goals and accepting the policies of NSC-68. I think it was obvious to our civilian officials in this country, as it was to the military, how disgracefully unprepared we were for

the Korean War. The Soviet forces were not demobilized at the end of World War II, as ours were. They were firming up their hold on the satellite nations. We couldn't negotiate with them. You know, under the Charter of the United Nations it was the general concept that the major Allies of World War II would act in concert to keep the peace. While we're talking about this, I'd like to go back to one thing that has been forgotten in this country -- or rather two things have been forgotten in this country.

I was on the Joint Strategic Survey Committee [in 1945-47] as General Marshall's representative; General Fairchild of the Air Force was General Spaatz's representative, and Admiral Russell Willson of the Navy was Admiral Nimitz's representative. One of our first problems was to put together a recommendation for a force to contribute to the so-called United Nations peace-keeping forces. We had a hell of a lot of problems within our own Government as to what we would come up with. Well, we worked it out -- there were lots of arguments but agreement was finally reached -- an Army corps as a part of the ground element, a naval task force which is kind of an elastic commitment and not as fixed as an army corps, and a U.S. tactical air task force comparable to what the army corps would normally require for air support. Over it all was our Strategic Air Force capability, which would not be made a part of our contribution to the United Nations peace-keeping force, but would be available to support it, if necessary. After we put this recommendation together, the British did the same thing; France didn't have much of a voice in it because they didn't have a capability at that time, and the Russians were supposed to be doing the same thing. And what happened? At the United Nations Security Council meeting which considered the peace-keeping force, it got about 6 straight vetos from the Soviet Union which killed the concept entirely.

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Now I'd like to couple this with another thing that people have forgotten. You will recall that it was American policy after World War II to place our nuclear capability at the disposal of the United Nations for peace-keeping purposes -- the Baruch plan. In my opinion it was the greatest offer for peace-keeping that the world has ever seen or ever will see. And it was turned down by the Soviet Union. They were at the time using every means-fair and foul-to obtain information regarding our nuclear capability and know-how and were developing their own nuclear capability.

Every once in a while when I get into an argument, particularly in the colleges and universities, with groups of students or with a faculty group because they frequently maintain that we in the United States are the disturbers of the peace in the world and are war-mongers, I insist on their listening to me explain what happened in the United Nations when the peace-keeping force was considered. Just put yourself in the position of trying to imagine what the world would be like if an effective peace-keeping force had been established by the United Nations following World War II. Would we have had the Korean War? Would we have had a Vietnam War? Or would we have had the recent wars in the Middle East, if the United Nations had had the kind of effective peace-keeping force that was envisaged in 1946-47 at the time of the signing of the United Nations Charter?

TUCKER: Was the JCS active in taking a position on the Baruch plan or was this an NSC question?

LEMNITZER: Well, the NSC was not an organized body then. We're talking about '46 and early '47 now. But under Admiral Leahy's tutelage, they promptly approved our plan for the very substantial peace-keeping force that was recommended. Admiral Leahy handled the matter just as in a regular formal meeting

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff today. As a matter of fact, he acted in the role of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the JCS was officially established and designated as such in the Defense Act of 1947.

GOLDBERG: Well, then one would have to say that we probably wouldn't have had rearmament, primarily for economic reasons.

LEMNITZER: Well, I wouldn't say that we wouldn't have had rearmament. I think one of the things that bothered Mr. Forrestal was the way that we demolished our capability after World War II in the face of the intelligence reports coming out of Moscow and from behind the Iron Curtain.

It was my good fortune to be intimately involved in activities in 1945 that made me realize what the Soviets were up to in their plans for the post-war period. In 1945 I was designated by Field Marshal Alexander as his representative to go to Switzerland and work with Allen Dulles on plans for the surrender of all German forces in Italy and Southern Austria. I've been told by Averell Harriman that a disgraceful telegram was sent by Stalin to Roosevelt and Churchill accusing them of trying to make a separate peace with Germany because of my mission in Switzerland with Allen Dulles. I had been queried the day I arrived in Switzerland by Field Marshal Alexander as to whether a Russian representative could come and be a member of my small group. My mission was one of the most highly classified clandestine operations that occurred during World War II. That's why we titled the book we wrote about it as "The Secret Surrender." Accordingly, it was a shocker to me to be asked if a Russian officer could join my group, because the only Russians we had in Italy at the time were on the Allied Control Commission in Rome. I sent back a message to Field Marshal Alexander -- I knew this would quickly get all around -- that I had no objection to a Russian, provided that he spoke English and came

alone. That was the antithesis of the Russian gang I knew in Rome, because they always insisted on having a political commissar with every military on special missions, and none of them that I knew of spoke any English. When the message from Stalin reached the President, Averell Harriman was present in the White House. He thinks to this day that, that for the first time, he saw indications of a change in Mr. Roosevelt's attitude toward the Russians. The Stalin message made him realize what the Russians were ultimately up to in their post-war planning. Previously he was treating them as one of our loyal allies, the same as he was treating the British.

GOLDBERG: Roosevelt's reply did indicate how shocked he was.

LEMNITZER: Winston Churchill received a similar message from Stalin and he promptly sent a very strong response to Stalin. But, in answer to your question, it's a fair one. Whether we would have moved as fast as we did without the Korean War, the answer is absolutely no. Without the Korean War it would have been more a program of the political leadership, convincing the people that we had to do these things in the light of the massive threat presented by the Soviet Union and its Allies. The threat was identified and particularized by what was happening in Korea. Everyone knew that what was happening in Korea was happening there with the full cognizance, support, approval, and connivance of Moscow and Peking.

GOLDBERG: So, apparently it did take an act of violent aggression, such as Korea, to turn Truman around. There had been a great deal of pressure on him at the time of the Czechoslovakian coup, at the time of the Berlin airlift -- there were an awful lot of people, both civilian and military in government, who felt that the time had come to do something positive by way of rearmament. He didn't go for it, he didn't raise the ceiling, in spite of pressure from Forrestal and other people. It took something like

Korea to do it then.

LEMNITZER: I'm sure that is right. NSC-68 set the goal, set the policy, but I don't think we would have ever gotten the support around the country, in the Congress, or even within the government itself, if it wasn't for the terrible war that confronted us in Korea. I still believe there would never have been a war in Korea if we had been properly prepared militarily, and if we hadn't made a couple of erroneous and serious policy statements in the press by drawing the line, declaring that Korea was outside the line and beyond the area of United States interest.

GOLDBERG: Yes, but Secretary Acheson always points out that MacArthur had said the same thing before he did.

LEMNITZER: However, it was only a week before the beginning of the Korean War that John Foster Dulles was in Korea up on the 38th parallel proclaiming our support of the Republic of Korea, after the UNCURK had been denied entrance into North Korea. On that occasion he compared the very weak defenses that the Koreans had built on the 38th parallel with the Maginot line. The communists walked right across that line about a week later. No, I don't think there would have been a Korean War if we had not declared Korea to be beyond our area of interest and if we were better prepared militarily. I don't think we would have had some of the other international problems at that time if we had maintained a greater degree of preparedness. Remember, there was a threat against the Government of Lebanon during President Eisenhower's administration, and the communist forces were organized to take over the government of Lebanon to get a better hold on the Middle East, better than they had. Our landing in

Lebanon dissolved that threat. These were political probes, and Korea was a military probe to see if they could get away with it, or if the United States and other nations of the Free World were prepared and determined to resist their objective of Communist world domination.

TUCKER: Early in the operation of military assistance, aid was funneled directly to France and the Associated States in Indo-China, in either '49 or early '50. What was the genesis of that, apart from the \$75 million that was added on for "the area of China," in the authorization act.

LEMNITZER: Well, the attitude on Indo-China presented one of the other side issues that was really very bothersome to us. We were anxious to build up the strength in Europe, and we hated to see the large amounts of money that we were fighting so desperately to get into the program going to Indo-China. It was perfectly natural for France to want military aid for their forces in Indo-China. We got into a serious policy disagreement about what we should do about aiding the French in Indo-China. We wanted to find out if we were doing it right and how our aid was being used in Indo-China. The French didn't want a MAAG there because we had a MAAG in France. Lieutenant General Graves Erskine of the Marine Corps was made available to me to send to Indo-China to see how our military aid was being used and how the war was going. We got into a frightful argument here in Washington with regard to aiding the French in Indo-China.

While on his mission to Indo-China, General Erskine used a term that just absolutely flew the lid off the situation. He got into an argument with the French military authorities in Indo-China. He didn't agree with the way they were fighting the war, and sent back a message in which he used the

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expression that it was going to be impossible for France to hold on and control this situation in Indo-China if they insisted on fighting from their "beau geste towers." This expression absolutely infuriated the French. A lot of francophiles here in Washington wanted Erskine relieved. I told them that, as a matter of fact, many U.S. military officers completely agreed with him. The French controlled the countryside and the people during daylight, and then come back into their "beau geste towers" at night. The people who were building the roads in the day time were blowing them up at night. So we just didn't like the idea of our aid going there and the way the French were using it, but the French were adamant. They said "we've been in this country a long time; we know how to fight this war, and what we want is the aid without any supervision." And that unfortunately was the policy that was adopted and agreed to.

We were anxious to help France, but they wouldn't accede to our insistence upon a MAAG, which had some responsibility for checking on the way the aid was being used. Ultimately, you know, there were hundreds of millions of dollars worth of equipment, when they collapsed and were defeated in 1954, that had never been uncrated or unboxed. A former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Logistics, Frank Higgins, referred to it, when we went to Indo-China and made a survey of it, as "the Acre of Diamonds" comparable to the tremendous jewel displays in Bangkok.

GOLDBERG: And the issue here in Washington, I suppose, was very largely between State and Defense, with State pushing for giving the French help in Indo-China.

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LEMNITZER: I would say that they favored aiding the French in Indo-China more than we did here in the Pentagon. Understandably, we were very anxious to aid France to disengage in Indo-China so that they could devote their efforts and resources in the European area. Indo-China was draining France of its resources and manpower, and the enormous effort they were making there was contravening everything we were trying to do in Europe.

TUCKER: Indo-China was a hostage to the European program.

LEMNITZER: We made an enormous effort to provide the aid to assist the French in Indo-China. Later, we found out that the French were really not using the aid effectively. However, these are the kinds of policy arguments and problems you get into in carrying out this kind of a military aid program.

GOLDBERG: I think that concludes our questions, General. I want to thank you very much for your time and your patience.