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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JAN 31 2014



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DIA

No DIA objection to declassification subject to results of concurrent JCS, State, and CIA review. JDC 4 Apr 12

[Handwritten signature]

10 FEB 1982

Refer to: I-35071/82

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAR 2 1982

THROUGH: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DEF SEC HAS SEEN*

SUBJECT: US Counterterrorism Efforts -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S) Notwithstanding the successful recovery of General Dozier, US capabilities for combatting international terrorism are not adequate. The shortcomings that afflict our efforts flow not from limited capabilities, conflicting ambitions, or even bureaucratic differences, but are institutional. We have a policy running on inertia, and are compelled to adjust our operational approach to the policy beyond the point where thought, discussion and experience tell us that the policy itself may be inadequate and requires adjustment.

(S) The attached information memorandum (Tab B) and discussion paper (Tab C) address our limitations, as well as steps we must consider if we are to combat terrorism rather than merely rescue its victims. (The latter have been discussed with Dr. Ikle and General Stilwell, and both are agreed we must now move in these directions.)

(S) The point to be taken here is that we began several years ago with an idea that we must confront terrorism, built a policy around it, and have now had time to assess and test that policy and find certain fundamental changes necessary, particularly in the area of command and control. This step would logically precede further operational or C² adjustments.

(S) The IG on Counterterrorism is a valuable instrument for policy development and should be maintained, and should continue to have a policy initiative, but not the only initiative. The IG/T should be subordinate to a tasking authority located in the NSC whose role should dominate U.S. CT efforts at the political level. This element would revivify the IG/T, task agencies and departments associated with a CT role, service the SSG in terrorist incidents, and supersede the lead-agency system.

(U) Recommendation: That you propose a discussion of the necessary changes in a letter to the President's National Security Advisor (Tab A).

Approve _____

DOS

Other _____

NO OBJECTION TO FULL RELEASE

#4
12-M-1508

Declassified Secret
Date 11-13-2012
Chief, Records & Declassification Division, WHS

[Handwritten signature]
Noel C. Koch

COPY NO. 1

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs

Attachments (Tabs A-C)

a/s

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-18642

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TAB A

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Dear Bill,

The increasing threat to U.S. interests from international terrorism is a matter of grave concern to all of us. The Department of Defense has a rather unique perspective on the problem inasmuch as operational responsibility for counterterrorism chiefly falls to us.

Careful assessment of the United States' capabilities in this vital area suggests a number of shortcomings, which cannot be addressed within the present organizational framework nor, in certain respects, even within the context of existing policy. Virtually all of these shortcomings have to do with policy level command and control of our efforts. I am not persuaded that this is adequate, nor can it be made adequate within the present construct. Rather, a strong argument can be made that a new authority should be created within the National Security Council, which would be serviced by the existing IG/T, would oversee counterterrorist components of all related Departments and agencies through an inter-departmental working group, and would service the SSG in terrorist incidents.

I suggest that we discuss this informally to explore what might be the most expeditious means of strengthening our counterterrorist efforts.

Sincerely,

CIA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO ^{TON, D.C. 20301}
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF
THIS DOCUMENT: DATE: 24-May-2012

Office of the Secretary of Defense ^{SUSC 8552}
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 31 JAN 2014 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 1.4(a)(6)(g)
MDR: 12-M-1508

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TAB B

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

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The ability of the United States Government to deal with the problem of international terrorism is nowhere consistent with the statements made by the President and the Secretary of State regarding our intentions in this area. After one year in office, our progress in confronting what the President called "this scourge of civilization" is marginal.

1. Crisis Management.

The "system" in place is theoretical, highly problematical, and loaded toward an accommodation of bureaucratic sensibilities, rather than efficient and decisive operation. The "lead agency" concept implicitly assumes that a terrorist incident will unfold along clean jurisdictional lines; its virtue is that, notionally, no agency has to relinquish authority to any other agency.

Like an old wheelbarrow, if this concept is pushed very far it will collapse. It has never been pushed as far as rigorous consideration of what will happen in a real incident. Inter-agency exercises are minimal and inadequate. No agency which might be called on to act in a terrorist incident has any but the most rudimentary awareness of other agencies' capabilities. The limited exercising that has been done reveals shortcomings which remain unrectified. For example, a DOD/DOJ exercise in October, 1980 demonstrated the need for an MOU clarifying our respective roles. Fifteen months later, the MOU is still being worked on and we have high hopes it will be concluded in another two months.

The Vice-President is designated crisis manager, but this designation is not congruent with the lead-agency concept. Moreover, the Vice-President's office has not exercised its role, nor given any evidence of preparation for assuming the role. There is nowhere a single, authoritative focal point within our government with a menu of all the counterterrorist capabilities of all agencies or departments which might be called on in a terrorist incident.

The only effort to educate the decision-making level in management of a terrorist-related crisis has been the DoD-sponsored QUICK CHECK.

Planning for incident management abroad provides a most singular summary of the problem. The implicit over-riding object of current policy is to protect the authority of the Ambassador, rather than successfully to resolve the incident. These objectives may prove to be mutually exclusive if the exigencies of successful crisis resolution contravene other U.S. interests. A less parochial approach (State is the policy-making element here) would have been to recognize that these objectives must be co-extensive, and therefore

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that they require institutionalized relief from this responsibility for the Ambassador. This would not diminish, but preserve, his authority.

The Dozier incident provided at least one grievous example of the inherent shortcomings in our crisis management system.

As the lead agency, State had control, closely assisted by DoD, with others assembled in a working group tailored by no apparent principle other than that the members also serve on the IG on counterterrorism. State assumed that intelligence collection and analyses on the incident were being handled by CIA. It was three weeks before State realized that CIA was doing nothing to pull together multi-source intelligence, assess it, and provide operational guidance based on it. You will recall that this issue surfaced during QUICK CHECK.

But repeatedly it was revealed in field exercises going back as early as August, 1981. The need for fusion of intelligence at the incident site was recognized but, in the Dozier incident, our efforts to accomplish this were resisted for more than two weeks and became a point of contention before we were finally able to get agreement to do it.

(S) 2. Intelligence.

The first line of defense against terrorism is intelligence which allows us thoroughly to understand the phenomenon as it manifests itself in each country, the individual groups, individuals themselves, doctrine and methods of operation; to track groups and individuals, anticipate threats and defend against them or destroy them; and, effectively handle an incident if one occurs.

Our agencies have very few assets dedicated to this problem-- CIA's commitment has been negligible and CIA should have the primary responsibility. The problem is compounded by fundamental conflicts between and within agencies on such issues as threat, sponsorship, etc.



(S) 3. Operational Capabilities.

JS 1.4 (a)(g)

(The following is predicated on what we know in DoD, and may be incomplete.)

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Our ability, in fact, to "counter" terrorism is at once gravely limited and dangerously over-rated.



JS 1.4 (a)(g)

Against "show business" shootings (knee-capping and other maiming), assassination, kidnapping, we have only such passive defenses as increased alertness and avoidance. Against bombing we have explosive ordnance disposal teams, but the obvious prerequisite for their employment is that the device hasn't already detonated. Against chemical and biological attacks we have intelligence and detection, and an excellent tactical threat assessment capability, but chiefly we have only the facts that these are very blunt instruments and that there is an apparent reticence on the part of terrorists to resort to them. However, given the ease with which poisons can be made and disseminated, we believe it is only a matter of time until they are. We see increasing prospects for a nuclear incident.



JS 1.4 (a)(b)(j)

All this points to the conclusion that we cannot combat terrorism reactively, but must adopt an offensive strategy. This is the subject of a separate paper (Tab C).


Conclusion: Working with J-3, I have assembled a weekly working group to bring together all DoD expertise on the problem of terrorism, critically to examine existing policy and to propose changes, and to inject a sense of urgency into confronting the problem. Our special concern is the fact that there is, and will continue to be, an inordinate reliance on U.S. military personnel to cope with international terrorism, and we wish to ensure that they are not jeopardized needlessly.

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Counter-Terrorism: Taking the Offensive

The United States has had virtually no experience with terrorism and, in dealing with it, we are well behind those nations where it is endemic. We approach it in theoretical terms, and this underlies our present policies. As the threat has been largely notional, we have approached the problem at the policy level in a desultory fashion, and this has meant that our theorizing and the policies which flow from it lack a necessary rigor.



JS 1.4 (a)(g)

With statistics suggesting an order of preference, terrorist strike tactics break down as follows: explosive or incendiary bombing, kidnapping, assassination, aircraft hi-jacking, hostage/barricade incidents. There are trade-offs in all the various forms of terrorist activity which do not require discussion here.

There is one contemporary example of a country eliminating its terrorist threat. Uruguay, galvanized at last by the murder of U.S. police advisor Dan Mitrione, decisively defeated the Tupamaros. In the process a moderate, progressive, pluralistic and civilian-run nation was transformed into a military dictatorship. On the historical continuum of leftist revolution this has been a desirable outcome. In defeat, the Tupamaros made a major contribution by creating the objective circumstances in which an insurgency can grow.

The choice for the Western democracies and their non-totalitarian friends starkly comes down to taking the most ruthless action against the terrorists themselves, individually, or to a slow insidious emergence into repressive societies which is the terrorists' reward for their labors, and which sets the stage for a new revolutionary phase.

We must develop a menu of offensive options and with them wage an unrelenting war on terrorism.

Some of these will be violent, some benign. They include the following:

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1. Decoy, or "sting" operations: This would involve using a priority target to stimulate a terrorist attempt. As with routine procedures for any takedown, it would anticipate elimination of the terrorists.

Of necessity this would take place in a risk area, all of which are abroad, necessitating the closest possible cooperation with host government CT elements.

There is, of course, no reason why a US national should be used for such a purpose since the threat in these areas is, at least until recently, higher for the locals and the incentive for such action commensurately higher. We would propose exploring a scenario with a foreign government, however, opening the possibility that they may choose to undertake such action using their own people exclusively. Drawing terrorists into an attempted strike, and successively destroying the strike team, would have the effect of destabilizing their planning processes, as well as publicly dealing a psychological blow. The scenario offers the opportunity of significantly raising the risk factor for kidnapping and assassination, thereby expanding our operational reach beyond the hostage/barricade situation.

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3. Isolation: Terrorists who are captured and convicted go to prison where they maintain their connections outside, and in some cases may direct their operations from prison, and also work to radicalize their fellow inmates. This has been a common feature of terrorist incarceration in Italy and Germany. Italy even now is revising its 1975 prison reform laws to eliminate their egregious abuse by the Red Brigades.

While we have given no attention to it, and the problem seemingly has diminished, a similar situation has obtained in our prisons where Black Muslims, the BLA, SLA, Weather Underground and other terroristic offenders are treated as ordinary prisoners and not prevented from continuing many of their activities from within.

Terrorists must above all be isolated from each other and from outside contacts who might permit direction of outside activities. They must be isolated from their fellow inmates, to assure these do not become radicalized, or become conduits to the outside, negating efforts to fractionate the terrorist unit by isolation.

4. Re-education: While all left-wing terrorism predicates itself ideologically, all of it relies on the propaganda of the deed to provide the public with intellectually bite-sized lessons on the ideological premise. This flows from a "liberal" (in the classical sense) conception, based in a distinct and peculiar epistemological conviction. As a practical matter, however, the terrorist incident identifies itself with the terrorist or terrorist group, rather than with the ideology which it seeks to inculcate.

The short of it is that the terrorist group is extremely vulnerable to any attack which dismisses its ideological justification and focuses on less exalted or authoritative motivations. The only credible means of launching such an attack is with those who have been part of the group, have committed themselves to its beliefs and its purposes, and who have gone through the experience and come out on the other side. Paradigms would be a reprogrammed Moonie, reformed alcoholic, a blooded soldier who has left the Mafia, Whittaker Chambers.

~~This suggests that we should select out ranking terrorist prisoners--immediately after they are taken--reprogram them, and then put them before the public through radio, TV, lectures, interviews and writings. The primary target of this effort would be the "legals" and unengaged elements which surround the terrorists, providing sympathy, passive support and a degree of public "legitimacy," without themselves becoming directly involved in terrorist activities. The secondary target is the self-esteem and self-confidence of the group itself and its individual members which can be eroded by eroding their public image.~~

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5. Psychological assault: We must develop an arsenal of psychological weapons to attack the terrorist, to strip him of the glamour the impressionable discern in his activities, to play on his paranoia, and on the convictions which led him into terrorism.

An example, in addition to the impact of re-programmed terrorists: Wanted posters displayed more prominently than at present. Both the British and the Germans use these. The Germans' are a garish orange and red, with the word Terrorists prominent. This tack could be combined with TV spots, now used in some areas for regular criminals--these might be in the form of micro-documentaries which give enough background on the individual to portray him as adolescent, misled, vicious, used, et al. These expedients have to be designed to cope with the contagion factor.

In incidents, we need a menu of psychological counter-attacks. Example:

a) We might have treated the kidnapping of Dozier as almost inconsequential, refusing all comment other than, in effect, "these things happen, life goes on"--appointing a successor immediately, bringing his wife and family home. The drama must be drained from these incidents, and the conflict itself depoliticized as one more criminal act, with no impact on the target.

b) In certain cases, such as the MO of the Red Brigades in which the communique is a means of communication, as well as the principle propaganda tool (aside from the terrorist act itself), we should disrupt the process with disinformation, floating tailored communiques, issuing tailored ransom demands--generally breaking up the communications process and frustrating the carefully developed propaganda effort, and working to generate dissension within the terrorist group--which should be possible wherever it is cellularized.

c) Since the press serves as the terrorists' amplifier, the public affairs policy in any terrorist incident would be to provide no information whatever, thus causing the terrorists themselves to overload the media, putting the media in a position of looking like unwitting accomplices and thereby driving them away from heavy interest in the incident. This policy should extend to trials of terrorists.

6. Rewards: No matter the extent to which they strive for self-sufficiency and autonomy, terrorists have to live and eat, have their clothes cleaned, their teeth fixed, etc. They move through a world which is composed of unengaged sympathizers, or oblivious people. Substantial rewards may well sensitize the oblivious and tempt the unengaged. We (DoD) are formulating a legislative proposal that will provide for such rewards.

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