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EVALUATION OF THE JCS CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM IN CONNECTION WITH EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 (U)

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1. The attached report is an independent, subjective evaluation performed under contract for the OJCS and does not reflect an official position of the Department of Defense.
2. This report is one of several efforts conducted to document the findings from Exercise PROUD SABER 83. Others include the OJCS Detailed Analysis Report and separate reports by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Defense University, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Analysis results must be considered in light of exercise artificialities and, therefore, may not represent systems performance under real-world conditions.
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EVALUATION OF THE JCS CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM
IN CONNECTION WITH
EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 (U)

SEPTEMBER 15, 1983

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CONTENTS

Page determined to be Unclassified
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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: **DEC 3 1 2013**

	Page
PREFACE	iii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 General History and Status of U.S. Mobilization Preparedness	1
1.2 Purpose and Scope of the JCS PROUD SABER Evaluation . . .	3
1.3 The Unique Challenge of PROUD SABER	4
2. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JCS CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM.	5
2.1 Some General Weaknesses Affecting OJCS Crisis Management Preparedness	5
2.1.1 Lack of familiarity with plans	5
2.1.2 Lack of senior-level involvement in contingency planning	6
2.1.3 Lack of staff preparedness for crisis management . .	7
2.1.4 The reactive nature of the JCS organization	7
2.1.5 JOPS lack of flexibility	8
2.1.6 Lack of feedback from exercises into the DoD resource planning and budgeting processes	9
2.1.7 The exercise --a questionable measure of progress in certain areas	9
2.2 Effectiveness of the Crisis Action System in supporting JCS Decision-making and Force Management	10
2.2.1 The Crisis Staffing Procedures (CSP) of the JCS. . .	10
2.2.2 Effectiveness of the CSP during PROUD SABER.	12
2.2.3 Global strategy and theater prioritization	14
2.2.4 Mobilization management.	15
2.2.5 Execution monitoring	16
2.2.6 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	18

UNCLASSIFIED

2.3 JCS Support of the NCA 19

 2.3.1 JCS/OSD interface. 19

 2.3.2 The role of the OJCS in security assistance
 decisions. 21

 2.3.3 Medical resource problems. 22

2.4 JCS Support of the CINCs 23

 2.4.1 General. 23

3. ADEQUACY OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS SUPPORTING THE JCS 25

 3.1 General. 25

 3.2 The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
 (JOPES). 25

 3.3 Intelligence Information 26

 3.4 Modern Management Aids 26

 3.5 Adequacy of Deployment Information 27

4. EXERCISE DESIGN. 29

 4.1 General. 29

 4.2 Future Exercises 29

APPENDIX A: The Senior Evaluation Team A-1

APPENDIX B: The Military Operation Planning Process B-1

APPENDIX C: An Emergency Action Package for Evacuation of
Noncombatants (Prepared for OSD; included here
as an illustration) C-1


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
PREFACE

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked a team of retired senior military officers and a former assistant secretary of defense to observe and report on Exercise PROUD SABER 83.

General Walter T. Kerwin, USA(Ret), chaired the Team. The members of the Team are listed in Appendix A. They are unanimous in their support of the Team's conclusions as represented in this report.



WALTER T. KERWIN, Team Chairman



WILLIAM K. BREHM, SRA Corporation

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION (U)

1.1 (U) General History and Status of U.S. Mobilization Preparedness.

(U) NIFTY NUGGET -- The first major exercise. Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 and its companion civil exercise, REX-78, found the United States unprepared for a major mobilization, as expected. Shortcomings existed both in resources and in emergency planning and management. The civil and military leadership thus began the difficult task of building a modern mobilization capability. At DoD, all organizational levels initiated steps to improve mobilization and deployment planning and management. The DoD Mobilization and Deployment Steering Group was established to review progress.

(U) Joint Chiefs of Staff initiatives. The JCS created the Joint Deployment Agency and later realigned the Joint Staff to centralize mobilization planning within J-4 and expand the role of the J-3 in joint operation planning. The J-3 evaluated the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS), validated the shortcomings identified in the exercise, and initiated a redesign to provide a new system that will be both more comprehensive and more flexible.-- the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

(U) Office of the Secretary of Defense initiatives. OSD, finding itself unprepared to perform its crisis management role and lacking even a clear definition of emergency management functions, began by developing a mobilization plan. OSD then undertook a serious effort to develop a crisis management system, recognizing that whereas the OJCS and the Services had special operating procedures for crises and periodically practiced them, OSD had none. Crisis management roles have now been defined, lead and supporting responsibilities have been drafted, a staff coordination process has been designed to facilitate decision-making in major crisis situations, and emergency action checklists are being developed.

(U) Federal level initiatives. FEMA, with White House backing, has stimulated mobilization preparedness planning among the civil departments and agencies. The NSC staff formed an interagency Mobilization Planning Study

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Working Group, under whose auspices the development of a Federal Master Mobilization Plan was begun. DoD and FEMA are cooperating to improve the preparedness planning and management interfaces between the two organizations. In 1981, the President formally established the Emergency Mobilization Planning Board, chaired by his National Security Advisor, to oversee Federal mobilization preparedness activities.

() Resource Problems. In the resource area, PROUD SPIRIT in 1980 and PROUD SABER again in 1982 demonstrated that large shortfalls in materiel and support continue to inhibit the capability to deploy and sustain our major conventional forces in combat in a manner consistent with national security objectives. Several of these shortfalls could be "war stoppers". For example:

- o Industrial capacity. The U.S. industrial base cannot meet critical early demands for military equipment and ammunition. Most items would require six months to two years to reach adequate production levels.
- o War reserve stockage levels. War reserve stocks are far short of the levels needed to satisfy demands until the industrial base can reach sustaining rates.
- o Reserve Component readiness. The Reserve Components, particularly the ground combat arms, are far short of the equipment needed to maintain training and deployability objectives.
- o Medical care. A shortage of surgeons and a lack of theater medical materiel resources suggests that only 1 in 10 surgical casualties could be adequately treated in a major NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.
- o POL distribution. The ships, vehicles, and facilities available to supply forward operating forces in a bare-base environment such as Southwest Asia are far short of requirements.

While these support shortfalls are well known in DoD, the programming and budgeting process still emphasizes the procurement of major end-items at the expense of a balanced capability. The new, higher levels of major item procurement are likely to exacerbate rather than to relieve the imbalance problems.

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1.2 (U) Purpose and Scope of the JCS PROUD SABER Evaluation. The Chairman, JCS, asked the Senior Evaluation Team^{1/} to focus on two management issues:

- 1) The effectiveness of the JCS Crisis Action System (CAS) within the national system for crisis management; and
- 2) The adequacy of existing management information systems in providing the logistics information needed by the JCS in a crisis.

The Team restricted its coverage of exercise activities to the Washington area. For that reason, and because participation of many major Joint and Service commands was limited, a rigorous assessment of their ability to implement major national-level decisions was not possible. The Team held discussions with most of the Senior DoD exercise participants, and observed the following activities:

- o Meetings of the Exercise Operations Deputies and the Exercise JCS;
- o Operations Planners Group (OPG) and Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) activities;
- o Meetings of the prototype OSD Crisis Management System (CMS)^{2/} council, boards, and committees;
- o OSD Crisis Coordination Group (CCG) activities;
- o Meetings of the government-wide Emergency Resources Board (ERB) chaired by the Director of FEMA;
- o Meetings of the Exercise Mobilization Crisis Action Group (MCAG), which played the role of the National Security Council and was chaired by a senior member of the NSC Staff; and
- o Service Staff daily situation briefings.

^{1/} The Senior Evaluation Team comprises a group of retired senior military officers and a former DoD civilian executive. The Team, supported by a staff of professional analysts, has been active in the planning and evaluation of the series of major mobilization exercises that began with NIFTY NUGGET in 1978. The members of the Team are listed at Appendix A.

^{2/} The CMS was originally called the Crisis Management Organization (CMO). The CMS is not an organization, but rather a staff coordination process. Thus the word "system" has been substituted for "organization".

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In pursuing its objectives, the Senior Team focused on:

- o The effectiveness of the Joint Staff and the JCS Crisis Action System in supporting the crisis management responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- o The ability of the Joint Staff to anticipate, develop, and present the type of decision data needed by the JCS in a crisis;
- o The adequacy of joint plans, planning and information systems, and procedures in satisfying mobilization and deployment management needs;
- o The adequacy of the OJCS interaction with OSD, the Service Staffs, the CINCs, the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA), and the Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs); and
- o The state of knowledge of OJCS personnel as to their crisis management functions and the plans, procedures, and authorities for mobilization and deployment.

1.3 ~~(S)~~ The Unique Challenge of PROUD SABER. PROUD SABER required strategy and resource decisions not faced in previous mobilization and deployment exercises. Whereas the reinforcement of Europe was the major focus of earlier exercises, PROUD SABER required the U.S. to respond concurrently to critical situations in Southwest Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Caribbean, while confronting a deteriorating situation in Europe. This global orientation of the exercise, as expected, brought to the forefront many very difficult management problems.

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CHAPTER 2. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JCS CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM (U)

2.1 (U) Some General Weaknesses Affecting OJCS Crisis Management Preparedness.

2.1.1 (U) Lack of familiarity with plans. Many of the recommendations of the Chairman's Special Study Group, contained in their report on the Organization of the Joint Staff^{3/}, have been implemented. Key among them, from the standpoint of crisis management effectiveness, was the 1982 transfer from the J-5 to the J-3 of much of the responsibility for the review and cognizance of joint operation plans. The rationale for that change was that the J-3, who has Joint Staff responsibility for managing the implementation of the plans, should also have the responsibility for and be the resident expert concerning their content.

This is an important institutional move, and its utility is already clear in the initiatives now being taken by the J-3 organization to improve military planning and execution. PROUD SABER, however, revealed no particular improvements in the level of understanding of Joint Staff officers (in J-3 or elsewhere) regarding the content of OPLANs.

During decision and information briefings in the JCS Emergency Conference Room (ECR), the briefers were frequently unable to answer fundamental questions relative to the plans under consideration or in the process of being implemented. That might be expected if the briefer is not the desk officer responsible for the plan in question, as was the case sometimes during the exercise. However, in several instances, no one in the ECR (at any level) was able to come to the aid of the briefer. Probably the greatest difficulty the officers have is in anticipating the competition among the CINCs for resources, and then in assessing the impact of that competition in the form of modified strategies and plans. The Team believes that the two major reasons for

^{3/} Report for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chairman's Special Study Group, The Organization of the Joint Staff, Systems Research and Applications Corporation, February 1982.

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this are the complexity and inflexibility of the planning system (and thus of the plans themselves), and that the Joint Staff as a group does not delve deeply enough into the plans in the plan review process. The reasons are of course related. The work on JOPES will help remove the first reason, but the second can be alleviated only by greater involvement by the Joint Staff in plan review and analysis.

Contributing to this problem also is the fact that several of the joint plans, particularly those used in mobilization and deployment exercises, are oriented more toward deployment than employment, and thus do not lay out the theater commander's plan for employing the forces. When a situation develops that requires the same forces in two or more geographical locations, the JCS must undertake the time-consuming process of going back to the CINCs for the answers to "what if" questions; the Joint Staff is not equipped to help. Clearly, greater Joint Staff expertise is needed concerning CINC plans for the employment of assigned forces so that, in a crisis, better informed judgments can be made concerning the allocation of forces among the CINCs. OJCS "in-house" expertise could be improved by periodic visits to the CINCs' headquarters by the cognizant Joint Staff plans officers for discussions and terrain orientations (as appropriate) relative to the CINC's force employment plans. Alternatively, the CINC's planners could make periodic visits to the Joint Staff to provide detailed orientations on employment plans. The ideal solution would be to combine one or both of the above measures with an assignment policy that would have CINC war planners serve follow-on tours as plans officers on the Joint Staff. To supplement in-house expertise in times of crisis (and during exercises), the CINCs should provide liaison officers to the Joint Staff.

2.1.2 (U) Lack of senior-level involvement in contingency planning.
The difficulty of dealing with CINC OPLANs is also a symptom of excessive reliance on action officers. Senior decision-makers, as observed frequently in PROUD SABER, had to be educated practically from "square one" each time a key decision was required concerning the implementation of an OPLAN. The

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DEC 3 1 2013

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senior people, when briefed in the ECR, had not previously been confronted with, or thought through, the issues they were asked to resolve. Exercises are not a substitute for institutionalized senior-level involvement in the plan review process. The recent development wherein the CINCs are brought in to brief the Chiefs personally on their respective OPLANS is a major step, but a more elaborate procedure is needed. A general description of the planning process recommended by the Senior Evaluation Team is given at Appendix B.

2.1.3 (U) Lack of staff preparedness for crisis management. PROUD SABER demonstrated that, despite increased emphasis on emergency planning over the past four years, the principal Pentagon staffs are still basically unprepared to deal with major crises. There was confusion as to the basic roles and responsibilities of the various staffs (e.g., there was confusion during an OpsDepts meeting concerning the role of the Joint Staff in determining force generation requirements); there was widespread unfamiliarity in all the principal staffs with the authorities available to the Department of Defense, the civil agencies, the President, and the Congress in dealing with resource matters in an emergency (e.g., some key OSD executives did not know that the President can mobilize up to 1 million reservists without prior Congressional approval); there were few checklists available to facilitate consideration and implementation of major crisis actions; and staffs were unskilled at developing, assessing, and presenting options and alternatives for various aspects of crisis response. The key to overcoming these shortcomings is the institutionalization of crisis management in general, and the preparation of emergency action packages. (The latter are discussed below in Section 2.2.2.)

2.1.4 (U) The reactive nature of the JCS organization. The JCS must be actively involved in the development of national policy to ensure that the NCA understands the strategic implications of the competition for limited military forces, especially in a multi-theater threat environment. The JCS must also anticipate the probable need to modify strategy and plans, and should adjudicate (largely in advance) probable competing demands. In PROUD SABER, the Exercise JCS did not often make any clear contribution to the

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Date:

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development of national-level policy; the JCS tended to wait for policy guidance rather than to assist in its development. That perhaps could be attributed to foreknowledge of the exercise scenario, or to the fact that surrogates were playing the roles of OJCS principals. But it may more nearly reflect the fundamentally reactive nature of the JCS system in crises involving large-scale employment of U.S. forces — a problem that is exacerbated by the joint coordination process involving the Services that makes it difficult to develop timely and substantive joint military advice. JOPES, if properly conceived and implemented, should provide the mechanism to permit the Joint Staff to understand plans at the aggregate level, and thus to anticipate issues. It will remain for the JCS to charge the Joint Staff with the responsibility for so doing, and to give it enough latitude to develop and analyze alternatives under time-urgent conditions.

2.1.5 ~~(S)~~ JOPS lack of flexibility. PROUD SABER demonstrated, as have previous exercises, that the Joint planning and execution systems do not respond well to major mid-stream changes in force deployment schedules; ergo, the special TPFDD developed for the exercise. As noted in the Introduction, JOPS' shortcomings are well-known, as are the inability of management information systems to support rapid replanning and the inability of mobilization and transportation systems to respond to change on short notice. As noted by the Chairman, there is a tendency under such circumstances to push plans through to conclusion — to resist changes or interruptions. This not only inhibits the tailoring of military decisions to meet the real situation, but also threatens crisis termination efforts. This further underscores the need for JOPES, and indeed sets certain criteria for JOPES.

~~(S)~~ The Team also notes that the JCS decision not to duplicate the allocation of forces in JSCP, and to include in the allocation process the combat and service support forces, are important steps that will not only add realism to plans but will force important resource issues to the surface during the plans review process rather than allow them to remain hidden until execution.

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2.1.6 (U) Lack of feedback from exercises into the DoD resource planning and budgeting processes. While emergency planning and management is improving, the Evaluation Team sees little improvement in war reserve stockage levels, spare parts inventories, surge production capability, and other basic support prerequisites of balanced preparedness. The OJCS staff resources are limited in PPBS and DRB support capability. However, since Joint operation plans should be capability-constrained, as such they should constitute a good test of the effectiveness of the resource allocation (PPBS) process. If the capability plans reflect an unsatisfactory degree of risk, then a change in resource allocation should be made to improve the capability, or else national security objectives should be reviewed. Thus, the review of capability plans (and the exercises) provides the only means, short of actual war, for exposing the major risks inherent in joint plans resulting from limited capabilities. Yet the loop is not closed, and the fact that there is a strategy/capability mismatch does not seem to be getting through. The Team believes that this is largely because the SecDef, the CINCs, and the JCS are not as personally and jointly involved in the development of objectives, assumptions, and plans for the deployment and employment of military forces as they need to be. The Team again refers the reader to the process outlined in Appendix B which is aimed at correcting this problem and closing the loop.

2.1.7 The exercise -- a questionable measure of progress in certain areas. Although exercise play was generally realistic in PROUD SABER and thus provided a valid indication of progress in many areas, there were areas in which the design of the exercise masked known problems. For example, to avoid the current inability of the joint deployment community to quickly accommodate major deviations from established movement plans, a "global" time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) was developed for the exercise that incorporated the several Joint OPLANs that were known to be needed. That effectively "resolved" the major force allocation problems (but without senior-level participation). Exercise controllers ensured that player decisions were constrained within the bounds of existing Joint Deployment System and Transportation Operating Agency capabilities to accommodate changes. Therefore, a casual observer saw no major problems in managing the flow of forces in

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several directions at the same time, and might conclude that the rapid reflow problems first highlighted in NIFTY NUGGET had essentially been solved. Any exercise requires compromise to achieve its specific objectives. But some major problems may have been "assumed away" in the design of PROUD SABER.

(U) Endorsement of Current Initiatives

(U) The major initiatives now underway -- namely, those to revise the joint operation planning process, including the development of JOPES, and to develop a Joint Staff training program -- are critical to solving the problems cited above, as well as many of those noted in the sections that follow. The Senior Evaluation Team urges the Joint Chiefs to lend their personal support and attention to these initiatives.

2.2 (U) Effectiveness of the Crisis Action System in supporting JCS Decision-making and Force Management.

2.2.1 (U) The Crisis Staffing Procedures (CSP) of the JCS. The CSP "pyramid" has the Joint Chiefs at the top, the OpsDepts immediately below (performing the bulk of the strategic planning and monitoring functions), the Operations Planners Group (OPG) below the OpsDepts (serving as the nerve center for the staff action process), and the Joint Staff and Service Staffs at the foundation to provide analytical, planning, and management support. The CSP calls for the OpsDepts or the DepOpsDepts to be committed to the Joint arena 24 hours a day. The clear intent is that they should serve as a "brain trust" for the JCS, meeting as necessary in shirt-sleeve working sessions during critical periods in a crisis to identify issues requiring Joint Staff analysis and provide guidance for such analyses, to develop options and alternatives for JCS consideration, and to address and act on other problems within the authority delegated to them by the JCS. The JCS should meet as required, after having been prepared individually by their respective members of the OpsDepts.

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The OPG, headed by the J-3, OJCS, is composed of O6-level planners from the Joint Staff directorates and DIA, and O6/O7-level planners from the Services. The Joint Staff Directorates respond to the OPG in the development of staff recommendations concerning crisis actions. The OPG is responsible for recommending to the OpsDepts the agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the OPG (the J-3) is authorized to act on behalf of the JCS in certain specified matters. Implementing directives for operational decisions of the NCA or the JCS are prepared and dispatched by the OPG.

The Crisis Staffing Procedures are designed to cut through the cumbersome, day-to-day "rainbow" procedures for staffing joint actions, and to that end the Service planners in the OPG have coordinating authority on directives that implement decisions of the JCS.

The CSP concept has never been faithfully exercised, and therefore it is difficult to judge its adequacy on the basis of exercise observations. In JCS exercises, the OpsDepts do not really perform their intended role -- no doubt because of their "real-world" management burden. They or their surrogates normally meet for 1-2 hours daily to receive situation updates and decision briefings. They often face the issues for the first time during those meetings and, as a group, have had little or no input to the development of options and alternatives. Their opportunity for problem-solving is thus severely limited.

Therefore, the management problems described in this report cannot necessarily be attributed to deficiencies in the concept. Many are undoubtedly the result of artificialities in the way the concept is exercised. Others may be due simply to the lack of action guides for carrying out the staff work necessary to support the concept.

The full-time use of surrogates at the one- or two-star level to perform the planning role of the OpsDepts during exercises would provide substantial benefits in terms of testing and refining the CSP.

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2.2.2 (U) Effectiveness of the CSP during PROUD SABER. A principal output of any staffing process is advice to the decision-maker. The adequacy of the staffing process is measured by the degree to which reasonable options are identified and assessed, and the ability of the staff to present the information to decision-makers in a manner that best facilitates their thought processes. The decision briefings presented in the ECR during PROUD SABER suggest that improvements are needed in both areas. In several instances, the briefings left the decision-makers with the burden of integrating the facts (to the extent facts were available) for themselves. The information presented was often just a static display of statistical data, with little indication of the effects the decision at issue might have on other operational requirements. So, in many cases, when options were briefed it appeared that an assessment of available information had not really been made.

(U) As a case in point, in the decision briefing to the Exercise OpsDepts relative to the implementation of CINCPAC OPLAN 5000, the options provided by the CINC were briefed in isolation, one from the other. The baseline plan from which the options were derived was not presented, and the format of the presentation did not permit a comparative analysis of the options. Nor was the impact of the various options on other CINC plans presented. Thus, the senior players around the table tried to mentally collate the information presented by the briefer, asked numerous questions for which few answers were forthcoming, and had to build their own charts on scratch-pads so that they could better grasp the implications of the various options. Finally, they gave guidance to conduct a more thorough analysis and to restructure the briefing for a later presentation to the Exercise Joint Chiefs. As suggested previously, a broader use of the OpsDepts should result in better initial guidance to the staff, and presumably a better product.

(U) The Team mentions these deficiencies not to be critical of the briefing officers, who must prepare the briefings under severe time-pressures. Rather, the fault lies with the fact that the potential issues have not been thought through in advance of crises, and that analytical tools and briefing formats have not been developed to facilitate the collation,

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analysis, and presentation of information during crises. The Team feels it essential that these deficiencies be remedied, and in addition that the flag officers with responsibility for subjects being briefed give careful guidance to the staff and review the briefings before they are presented to decision-makers in the ECR. There is little evidence of the latter, at least in the decision briefings the Evaluation Team observed in PROUD SABER and previous exercises.

(U) Another deficiency in the functioning of the CSP during PROUD SABER was the lack of adequate coordination between operators and logisticians in the formulation of recommendations to the JCS. For example:

- o Tactical fighter squadrons were deployed to Korea without the necessary units, equipment, and supplies to sustain their operation.
- o The decision was made to deploy tactical fighter squadrons to the Mediterranean area without an adequate transportation feasibility analysis.
- o To counter the Caribbean threat, a decision was made to relocate tactical fighter squadrons within CONUS without a logistic feasibility analysis.

(U) As previously noted, during this and other exercises observed by the Senior Evaluation Team, the Joint Staff appeared more reactive than anticipatory. A request is received from a CINC and it is processed, or a recommendation comes in from a Service and it is staffed. But the Joint Staff tends not to take charge of the situation. Such requests have to be answered of course, but the Staff needs to apply a broader perspective in assessing the strategic indicators and looking farther into the future. Otherwise, it cannot adequately assist Chiefs in providing strategic direction to the CINCs.

(U) The Services should naturally take the lead in raising issues in the JCS arena that relate primarily to Service resource requirements. On the other hand, one would expect issues of a strategic or joint operations nature to be anticipated and introduced by the OJCS. Several issues of the latter type were apparently first raised during PROUD SABER in the form of

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Service Chief memoranda to the JCS: A Chief of Staff, Army Memorandum (CSAM) suggested that the Secretary of Defense should ask the Secretary of State to undertake negotiations with foreign nations for sealift and airlift support for U.S. force deployments; another CSAM addressed Soviet overflights of Mexico, and recommended that the SecDef ask the SecState to initiate immediate consultations with the Mexican Government to end the overflights; and a Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum (CNOM) raised the issue of seeking allied assistance and military support in responding to the global politico-military situation. As noted above, we believe the OJCS, and more specifically the OpsDeps, should take the lead in generating the types of initiatives suggested in these memoranda. The results of this and previous exercises, as well as several studies of the Joint System, indicate that the OJCS does not often do so.

(U) There is a basic need throughout the Federal Government for well-thought-out emergency action packages (EAPs) that provide checklists to guide the staff action process and include the product of as much advance analysis of potential issues as possible. The EAPs should also provide formats and approaches for decision briefings and decision memoranda to assist the action officer and his supervisors in assuring that essential information, formatted in a way that is helpful to the decision-maker, is presented. OJCS action packages of that type would have facilitated the staffing of major issues during PROUD SABER as well as their presentation to the Exercise OpsDeps and JCS. (OSD has developed the first few in a series of such EAPs that address major actions in which it plays a key role. They were used during PROUD SABER, where applicable, and proved most beneficial. An example is attached as Appendix C.)

2.2.3 ~~(S)~~ Global strategy and theater prioritization. The lack of a global strategy, a planning deficiency recognized for the past several years, contributed to the difficulty of force allocation decisions during the exercise. The Army OpsDep stressed the need for a global strategy early in the exercise. This was followed by an Army Chief of Staff Memorandum to the JCS noting the lack of an overall mission statement and concept of operations

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 31 2013

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for the concurrent execution of operation plans for three theaters. The memorandum proposed that an estimate of the situation be developed to consider properly the current status of OPLAN implementation in the context of the threat, regional priorities, and resource requirements and availability. The Army initiative was not acted on by the Exercise JCS during the course of PROUD SABER.

✓ Rather than developing a global strategy, the Exercise JCS tended to focus on one trouble spot at a time, with little effort to postulate the ultimate objective of the Soviet Union in simultaneously fomenting crises in widely separated areas of the world. In particular, the Team felt that inadequate consideration was given to the deteriorating situation in Europe. No effort was made to develop overall force structure requirements based on the worldwide threat, and therefore Joint Staff and Service mobilization planning was constrained to the immediate requirements of OPLANs approved for implementation. Without a global strategy, coherent, long range planning was not possible.

✓ In an actual situation, an early NCA decision on strategy and theater priorities would be the key to sound allocation actions on the part of the JCS. The lack of a global military strategy, thought out in advance to the extent feasible, is a major deficiency in our national preparedness planning. The Evaluation Team recommends that the JCS formulate and seek approval of such a strategy as a matter of priority.

2.2.4 ✓ Mobilization management. As noted above, there was little effort during the exercise to add up the strategic indicators and project what the military force requirements might be three months or a year hence. Without an overall strategic concept, Service mobilization requirements could be determined only in the context of operation plans that had been approved for implementation. Thus, when the exercise chronology called for a full mobilization decision, the Services responded that it was not needed. They had yet to fully use the partial mobilization authority provided earlier by

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:

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Presidential action. Nevertheless, the JCS decided to recommend that the President seek a Congressional declaration of national emergency to facilitate a rapid transition to full mobilization should the situation deteriorate further. A secondary rationale was to demonstrate U.S. resolve. Acting as the Congress, the exercise control staff promulgated the declaration. However, because force expansion requirements were not further developed by the JCS, the exercise ended with the Services still in a partial mobilization posture.

(U) The OJCS should consider and provide advice on mobilization matters to a much greater extent than was the case in this exercise. The Evaluation Team believes that, in addition to the basic issue of which forces should be mobilized and on what schedule (for which there was little OJCS analysis during the exercise), there are issues concerning such matters as manpower policies and industrial production requirements on which the Joint Staff should play a stronger role. In the manpower area, for example, such issues as the volunteer policy after reinstatement of the draft and policies for the use of conscientious objectors by the Services deserve Joint military advice. Not only is equity at issue in these examples, but the nature of their resolution may have significant implications in terms of the operational effectiveness of the total force.

2.2.5 ~~(S)~~ Execution monitoring. The information presented in ECR briefings on the status of deployments to Southwest Asia and Alaska was, in the view of the Senior Evaluation Team, inadequate. The main deficiency was that the briefings failed to convey how well the deployments were progressing in relation to the plan. They generally provided only statistical data on the number of people and units that had arrived at destination. For example, at the 28 October meeting of the Exercise OpsDepts, the substance of the information presented on the RDJTF status was that 10,000 short tons of cargo and approximately 9,000 personnel had been deployed to Southwest Asia -- but no information was given as to what those numbers represented in terms of either the planned flow to that point or the total requirement. It was also briefed that the RDJTF corps headquarters had arrived in Southwest Asia, but neither the briefer nor anyone else in the ECR knew its specific location.

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DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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In an earlier meeting of the Exercise JCS, a question was asked as to the status of deployments to Southwest Asia. The response was that the deployments were "on schedule" and that a more complete briefing would be presented the following day. Such fundamental information should be briefed to the JCS on a daily basis.

Near the end of the exercise, a member of the Senior Evaluation Team asked a briefer from the Joint Staff about the source of information he had briefed on the closure of specific Army units into Southwest Asia. He replied that he had received the information from the Army Planner in the Operations Planners Group (OPG). In following the audit trail, it was learned that the Army Planner had received the information from an action officer in the Army Operations Center (AOC) who had, in turn, extracted it from the OPLAN 1003 time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL). Additional investigation revealed that an RDJTF SITREP had been received the previous day in the AOC and in the Joint Staff Emergency Action Center that identified the specific Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units that had closed into staging areas. The action officer in the AOC who had provided the information to the Army Planner was not aware of the existence of the SITREP, nor was the Joint Staff briefer.

(U) Several instances were observed by the Air Force member of the Senior Evaluation Team in which information presented in the Air Command Post was different from that presented in the NMCC about the same matter, and at about the same time. This problem can be attributed to dual reporting chains -- one from theater component commanders to their Service headquarters, and another from the component commanders through their theater commanders to the JCS.

(U) Finally, the status of the civil situation with regard to mobilization was not briefed in the Joint arena until nearly halfway through the exercise. Such information would be "need to know" for the JCS in a major crisis.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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(U) In summary, important status of action information was not routinely briefed to the JCS during the exercise, and the information that was presented was frequently not very meaningful or useful. This reflects the fact that the crisis information requirements of the JCS have not been carefully spelled out. Important work is currently underway in that regard. The Evaluation Team urges that the senior officers in the OJCS personally involve themselves in the detailed review of that work. It is fundamental to effective crisis management, and is crucial to the on-going WMMCCS Information System and Joint Deployment System design efforts.

2.2.6 (U) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). The major objective of NEO play during PROUD SABER was to test Department of Health and Human Services plans for the repatriation of evacuees on arrival in CONUS. There was no intent to examine plans for the overseas evacuation phase. However, the departure, mode of travel, and destination of evacuees from Southwest Asia, Korea, and Panama were reported to provide the information needed for repatriation play. Evacuation operations were portrayed as having no significant impact on deployment schedules. This calls into question the degree to which NEO demands on strategic airlift have been factored into the plans. During a visit to the Military Airlift Command Headquarters during PROUD SPIRIT in 1980, the Senior Evaluation Team was briefed that it would take an average of five hours to reconfigure a C-5 or C-141 aircraft to carry passengers, which would add roughly 10% to the sortie time in the case of an evacuation from Europe. Aircraft payloads would also have to be reduced to accommodate passenger conversion kits. The OPLANS did not have those considerations factored in, even though the probability is high that political considerations would delay a formal evacuation decision until reinforcement operations were underway. That situation apparently still exists.

(U) The Evaluation Team believes that there is need for a thorough review of noncombatant evacuation plans, particularly with regard to potential NEO demands on strategic lift resources dedicated to deployment operations. Where the likelihood of NEO requirements is high, they should be factored into the OPLANS.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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2.3 (U) JCS Support of the NCA.

2.3.1 (U) JCS/OSD Interface. The testing of a prototype OSD Crisis Management System (CMS) during PROUD SABER resulted in more extensive participation of the OSD staff than in any previous exercise. It also greatly increased the visibility of interactions between the Joint Staff and OSD. The CMS concept provides for a Crisis Management Council (CMC) chaired by the Secretary of Defense, and several functionally oriented boards and committees chaired at the USD/ASD and DUSD/DASD levels respectively. The boards and committees include representatives of OSD offices, the Services, the Joint Staff, the Defense agencies, and appropriate civil agencies. The Council and the boards and committees are convened by their chairmen for advice on decisions they must make or recommendations they must provide to higher authority. Thus, the CMS provides a mechanism through which the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Defense agencies can contribute, in an institutionalized way, to the development of OSD recommendations and decisions on crisis matters. The nerve center of CMS is the Crisis Coordination Group (CCG), composed of representatives of OSD principals, the Services, the Joint Staff, certain of the Defense agencies, and selected Federal civil departments and agencies. The role of the CCG is to facilitate the OSD coordination process. The members of the CCG are responsible for passing actions to appropriate offices within their organizations and maintaining information on the status of those actions. So, in effect, the CCG performs much the same function for OSD that the OPG performs for the OJCS. The primary difference is that, whereas the OPG has certain authorities to issue orders and directives in the name of the JCS, the CCG has no such authority to act in the name of the Secretary.

(U) The composition of the Crisis Management Council has been a topic of discussion between OSD and the Joint Staff. The OSD view (which the Evaluation Team shares) has been that it should consist of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the two under secretaries, the ASD(MRA&L), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — with other OSD principals and the Service Secretaries attending at the request of the Secretary, and as

UNCLASSIFIED

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

DEC 3 1 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

appropriate to the issues on the agenda. The Joint Staff view has been that it should consist of only the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Chairman. For the purpose of the exercise it was decided that the Chairman would advise the SecDef separately and would not be included in the Council. The Council met three times, in one instance chaired by the Secretary and in the other two by the Deputy Secretary. In addition to the OSD principals, the Service Secretaries were invited to attend, in part for orientation. The primary issue at the first meeting concerned the security assistance priorities to be addressed at an exercise National Security Council meeting that evening. The second meeting, also in preparation for an exercise NSC meeting, addressed issues relative to the support of full mobilization (health care personnel requirements, civilian manpower and military inductee ceilings, Mater Urgency List (MUL) revision, and supplemental funding for industrial production). The subject of the third meeting was critical health care resource shortfalls in the context of the exercise scenario.

(U) With regard to the conduit for JCS (or CJCS) advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Evaluation Team believes, as does the Joint Staff, that the initial advice should be a matter for direct interaction between the JCS (or the Chairman) and the Secretary. However, for many issues on which advice is thus provided, it is likely that the Secretary will turn to his principal OSD advisors as well. Should they have views or recommendations different from those of the JCS, it seems essential (particularly when national security is at stake) that the Secretary bring the two sides together so that each can consider and respond to the other's position. In addition, there are likely to be instances in a crisis in which the Secretary will need immediate advice from his military and civilian principals, and time to fully develop JCS and OSD positions is not available. It is in these two situations that the CMC can usefully assist the Secretary in formulating his decisions or recommendations to higher authority, and the Team believes that the participation of the CJCS or his personal representative would be absolutely essential in providing fully-rounded advice. Issues such as those discussed in the CMC meetings during PROUD SABER simply cannot be adequately addressed in the absence of the joint military voice.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5.
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Joint Staff support to the CMS boards and committees was excellent in the manpower, logistics and materiel, and health affairs areas. It was inadequate in the politico-military area, with no representation at one key meeting of the Policy Guidance Committee at which chemical weapons policy was addressed, and only O-6 level representation at meetings of the Politico-Military Board. Joint Staff representatives to the Crisis Coordination Group were not available full-time, and therefore did not contribute substantially to the interactions between the Joint Staff and OSD.

In PROUD SABER, the deployment progress information provided to OSD by the OJCS was minimal. The Evaluation Team believes it essential that key members of the OSD staff be given more information on the status of military operations. Certainly, international political problems will be encountered that will require action by the State Department or the White House. DoD advice will be needed, and the conduit for such advice is the OSD staff. Resource problems that require action by the OSD staff will be likely as well; e.g., transportation problems that dictate requests for additional civil or international strategic lift assets, or airlift routing problems that require State Department assistance in securing additional overflight and landing rights. The Team strongly recommends that the OJCS provide to the OSD staff the information it needs to carry out its responsibilities for policy development, interagency coordination, and support of military resource requirements during crises.

2.3.2 (U) The role of the OJCS in security assistance decisions. PROUD SABER was the first exercise that has delved extensively into security assistance priorities in a major crisis. What to do with the materiel in the Foreign Military Sales pipeline faced the players with decisions as to relative priorities, both among recipient nations and between them and our own military forces.

The primary deficiency noted with regard to OJCS involvement in security assistance decisions was a failure to consult adequately with the CINCs in the development of JCS recommendations to the NCA. The CINCs, who

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:

DEC 3 1 2013

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administer the FMS Program to countries within their theater boundaries, are in the best position to judge the military needs of those countries. Their recommendations not only should be sought, but should weigh heavily in decisions concerning the redistribution of security assistance materials. The failure to involve the CINCs in security assistance matters during PROUD SABER was due perhaps to their very limited level of participation. However, player actions should not be constrained by the fact that organizations with which they would coordinate in an actual situation are not playing. If the proper course of coordination would in an actual situation involve those non-participants, the exercise control staff should respond on their behalf.

2.3.3 ~~(S)~~ Medical resource problems. In an exercise meeting of the Crisis Management Council, the Deputy Secretary of Defense categorized the medical care situation on which he was briefed as a "war stopper." The briefing postulated a capability to handle only 1 in 10 surgical casualties should the situation evolve into a NATO conflict. Several factors contributed to that estimate, the primary being the shortage of surgeons for forward operating hospitals. In addition, even if the surgeons were available, there are not sufficient medical materiel and supplies to satisfy wartime demands. Other problems exist with regard to standardization of medical units and equipment among the Services. Notwithstanding the lack of resources for a NATO scenario, there were also shortfalls in medical support for the RDJTF in Southwest Asia and for U.S. Forces in Korea. Only one additional field hospital could be mustered for Korea. At exercise termination, hospital support for the RDJTF had not yet been deployed because the airlift requirements had not been programmed into the OPLAN TPFDD. In addition, there were no hospital ships available to support the RDJTF.

~~(S)~~ The lack of medical capability can affect the outcome of a conflict just as surely as can the availability of airplanes, tanks, and ammunition. It should be given greater visibility in JCS estimates of operational capability, and a considerably higher priority by the Services in terms of programmatic actions to reduce the shortfalls.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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2.4 (U) JCS Support of the CINCS

2.4.1 ~~(S)~~ General. PROUD SABER and the two previous mobilization and deployment exercises have provided little insight into the effects of JCS and NCA decisions at the theater level; nor do any of the current major exercises provide for a realistic interaction between the CINCs and the JCS. In the mobilization exercises, CINC participation generally has been limited to response cells that inject pre-agreed information and requests into play to stimulate decisions by player staffs in the Pentagon. The focus has been on the mobilization process within CONUS, and the movement to and outloading of forces from CONUS FOEs. The biennial JCS-sponsored regional command post exercises, because they normally focus on the support of a single theater, do not bring out the prioritization problems that would be likely to face the JCS in a real situation. In these exercises, the CINC usually gets what is called for in his plan. The potential for any military confrontation involving U.S. forces to spread to other parts of the world would probably cause severe perturbations in the TPFDLs of all the CINCs, since there are insufficient forces to support all requirements concurrently. In the third major category are the biennial NATO-wide WINTEX/ CIMEX exercises. In these exercises, because of international political considerations, SACEUR normally gets the forces promised in the Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ), and generally on schedule according to the reinforcement plan. So, again, the competition for resources among the theater commanders does not surface in a substantial way.

(U) Given the characteristics of the latter two types of exercises, it appears that the biennial mobilization and deployment exercises provide the best vehicle to realistically examine the critical interfaces between the theater commanders and the JCS. The Team recognizes the difficult scheduling problems that have precluded effective CINC participation in the past three such exercises. However, the Team strongly recommends that a way be found to bring the CINCs into them fully in the future.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 31 2013

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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CHAPTER 3. ADEQUACY OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS SUPPORTING THE JCS (U)

3.1 ~~(S)~~ General. PROUD SABER provided positive indications of progress in correcting problems that have plagued the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) in previous exercises. The performance of the WIN was substantially improved over that in NIFTY NUGGET and PROUD SPIRIT. The Army used WIN as a primary means of message traffic from the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon to all the subordinate Army commands and to the component commands overseas. The down-time of the system was very low -- comparable to that of the AUTODIN system -- and most of the problems were related to human error rather than equipment malfunctions. The Air Force experienced similar success. However, except for the (simulated) prolonged loss of communications with Osan Air Base following a North Korean chemical attack, it was the Team's overall impression that crisis-related DoD communications and information systems were not greatly challenged by the exercise, primarily because of the low level of play by the theater commanders. The readers of this report should thus be cautioned against concluding from PROUD SABER that these systems are now in good shape. It is important that the actions underway to correct known problems continue to receive the strong backing of the Services and the JCS.

(U) In that regard, the Evaluation Team is encouraged by plans for the WWMCCS Information System (WIS), which, over the period of the next 7 to 8 years, will revamp the WWMCCS by totally replacing the current hardware and software. The Team emphasizes, however, that WIS requirements will be driven by the new JOPES, and that the latter must allow for senior-level involvement as noted in Appendix B.

3.2 (U) The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The JOPES, now under development, will eventually replace the JOPS, the JDS, and major portions of the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS). A JOPES Users Group, reporting to the Operations Planning Steering Group headed by the Director, Joint Staff, has developed the JOPES Required Operational Capability (ROC) statement, and is proceeding with the development of the JOPES Master Plan.

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DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:

DEC 3 1 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

It is critically important that the Chairman, the Service Chiefs, and other senior members of the OJCS involve themselves early in the development of the Master Plan and that they continue to be involved until fully satisfied with the system design and performance requirements.

3.3 (U) Intelligence Information . As a general observation, it seems certain that critical intelligence information would be flashed individually to the Chairman, the Service Chiefs, and other key members of the OJCS at the time it is received in the Pentagon. In actual crises, the detailed repetition of such information at meetings of the JCS (as is the norm in exercises) would seem a poor use of their time; in fact, some of the very critical information presented in the PROUD SABER meetings was several hours old. Only a quick review of information previously provided to the Chiefs, along with any new information and fresh assessments is needed. The Team recognizes that this was an exercise, and that formal intelligence updates at JCS meetings may be the only practical solution, considering other commitments of the Chiefs. On the other hand, their time might better be spent reading a 1-or 2-page fact sheet before the meetings, rather than receiving a lengthy intelligence briefing during the meetings. We recognize that it is important for the subordinate echelons of the Joint Staff and the Services to receive daily intelligence updates, but those could be provided in some other way.

3.4 (U) Modern Management Aids . During PROUD SABER, the Army Staff experimented with secure teleconferencing with the major Army commands during daily briefings for the Chief of Staff. It was an audio link only, but the commanders of FORSCOM, TRADOC, etc., were able to participate on a real-time basis during the briefings. In like fashion, it would seem useful to tie the Service and CINC operation centers into meetings of the JCS. It would significantly expand the expertise available to respond to the Chiefs' questions, and would provide the Service and CINC staffs a "heads up" on decisions coming out of the meetings, as well as on issues to be worked.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3.5 (U) Adequacy of Deployment Information . Early in the exercise, a statement was made by a senior member of the Joint Staff that up-to-date information on the status of deployments could not be retrieved from the data base. He indicated that, in an actual situation, they would phone the appropriate headquarters for current deployment information. A related problem was highlighted during a Navy briefing in which it was noted that one fleet command was exercising the JDS data base properly, while another was inputting much erroneous data. This caused major mismatches in fleet force structure print-outs, with the data base indicating ships in the wrong locations. As a result, the Navy Staff was forced into a manual information collection and analysis mode. The problem was attributed to unfamiliarity with the system in the fleet at fault. It highlights the importance of simplifying data requirements and reporting procedures, and emphasizes the need for manual capabilities to back up critical automated systems.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW ED 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 31 2013**

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CHAPTER 4. EXERCISE DESIGN (U)

4.1 (U) General. The Evaluation Team notes that PROUD SABER is the third consecutive mobilization and deployment exercise in which only the first few days of the crisis have been tested. The exercises have therefore contributed little to the identification or understanding of problems that would confront the Department of Defense and the nation in the later stages of a large-scale conventional conflict. They have hardly scratched the surface in addressing wartime industrial production capability, the adequacy of sealift, or the resource implications of combat attrition.

(U) PROUD SABER is also the third consecutive exercise in which the theater commanders, who are the principal benefactors of the mobilization and deployment processes, have participated only in a very limited way. Thus, the critical interactions with the overseas commands have not been examined, nor have the problems that will confront the CINCs been identified, much less realistically addressed.

(U) On the positive side, PROUD SABER represented a substantial improvement over past exercises in civil department and agency participation. Eventually, Congressional involvement must be provided, with selected members of Congress and/or Congressional staffs given an opportunity to deal with decisions they might face in a major crisis. This would also foster a better understanding of the DoD's need for a balanced program and provide a further test of the key political assumptions associated with joint operation plans.

4.2 (U) Future Exercises. The Evaluation Team believes that the mobilization and deployment exercises beginning with the Army's MOBEX-76 have contributed significantly to the identification and correction of numerous U.S. preparedness problems. It now appears that a "segmented" approach to such exercises should be tried. An exercise conducted in three or four short segments over the period of a year, for example, could examine an extended conventional conflict at selected stages from the pre-hostilities phase through conflict

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:

DEC 3 1 2013

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termination. Successive segments of the exercise would reflect the course of events resulting from player decisions during previous segments. Staff analyses would be required following each segment to develop the results of those decisions and to update the scenario for the next segment. Such an approach would not only provide a more thorough test of policies, plans, systems, and procedures, but would permit the examination of strategies, airlift, sealift, and other sustainment capabilities (including industrial mobilization and force expansion) at successive stages of a crisis.

The Team recognizes that an exercise of this type would be an ambitious undertaking, but believes the benefits would greatly outweigh the difficulties. And, as noted above, the CINCs must play fully, however the exercise is designed.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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APPENDIX A

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 31 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

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APPENDIX B

The Military Operation Planning Process

(March 7, 1983)

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 31 2013

The process that results in military operation plans for readying, deploying, and employing military forces should serve several purposes:

- (1) Provide "on-the-shelf" plans.
- (2) Force the analysis and planning required for joint and combined operations.
- (3) Provide capability plans to reveal the areas of greatest potential payoff for the allocation of new DoD resources. Such plans test the adequacy of the Defense program against stated national security objectives. This feedback into the PPBS and DRB cycles is essential and is the principal means available to the CINCs to bring their experience and perspective to bear on the DoD planning, programming, and budgeting process.
- (4) Ensure tailored levels of aggregation to permit the principals at each command level to review and discuss jointly the validity and utility of the plans and their underlying assumptions as they are prepared. This essential review process should include the SecDef, the JCS, and the CINCs.

Objectives 3 and 4 above are not served at all by the current process, and the utility of the plans that are produced is often severely limited. The process lacks flexibility to make changes to meet actual contingency needs, and there is virtually no discrimination in level of plan detail reported to the various levels of command. ADP support systems are quickly saturated under emergency conditions, and the lack of modularization of plans makes it virtually impossible for constructive interaction to take place between the

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SecDef, the JCS, and the CINCs in discussions that relate the plans, their underlying assumptions, and their implied capabilities to specific national security objectives. The preparation of major plans takes far too long, and indeed in some cases is never completed. The monitoring of plan execution is extremely difficult, particularly at the JCS level, making it virtually impossible to anticipate problems and bottlenecks or to track progress. Steps to interrupt and modify plans are inhibited even though such steps may be eminently desirable.

The planning process must be revised to overcome these shortcomings and to meet the four objectives listed above. The process must be supported by a planning system that meets these as well as additional criteria. The system, to be called the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), is basically a set of definitions and procedures. JOPES, in turn, will be supported by a management information system (MIS) that includes one or more ADP systems. The most critical of the ADP systems in the JOPES MIS will be the WWMCCS Information System (WIS).

The new process (and JOPES) must provide explicitly for the receipt of written, specific SecDef policy guidance regarding operation planning. The JCS and the CINCs should assist in its preparation, so that the SecDef has the benefit of military advice in framing the guidance. One approach would be for the Joint Staff to prepare the initial draft of the guidance document.

The CINCs must be able to produce initial plans within a reasonable period of time (weeks, not years), and be able to make refinements quickly following their review discussions with the JCS and the SecDef. JOPES must permit the comparison of plan options to assist in this review process, both to refine military strategy and to show explicitly where capabilities reflected in the resource-constrained plans could be markedly improved by the allocation of additional DoD resources in the interest of meeting national security objectives.

Page determined to be Unclassified
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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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Under emergency conditions, JOPES must permit the rapid modification of plans to suit specific actual contingencies, probably within hours, and in the process afford the real-time interaction of the SecDef, the JCS, and the CINCs at a level of detail appropriate to this highest command level. Similarly, JOPES must permit the rapid creation of new plans under emergency conditions for "no-plan" situations.

JOPES must also permit the monitoring of events as plans are executed, reporting to each level of command (up to and including the JCS and the SecDef) the level of detail that permits each command echelon to take action appropriate to that level of command. Formats for presenting such information must be worked out in advance and standardized so that both the commanders and action officers are fully familiar with them and to ensure that maximum advantage can be taken of modern ADP support. Emphasis should be placed on reporting actual progress versus plan, and on developing the ability to anticipate problems, especially those requiring priority judgments on the allocation or reallocation of resources. In that vein, JOPES must force to the surface issues involving the competition for resources (especially under "multiple-plan" situations) in such a way that the CINCs, the JCS, and the SecDef are able quickly to revise military strategy to best apply available resources to the developing contingency or series of contingencies.

No plan must be so complex or so obscured by detail that commanders (including those at the highest level) are inhibited from interrupting or modifying its execution. JOPES also must not call for a level of plan detail (at any command level) that taxes either the capability of ADP systems support or the human capability to use it. No plan can perfectly match the contingency that later develops; thus any plan will be at best an approximation of the plan that is ultimately needed, and it is therefore sensible to set criteria for JOPES that accept approximate accuracy and that do not demand exquisite detail. The force module must be one of the key ingredients in the new JOPES, both for the creation of basic operation plans by the CINCs and for the development of movement plans by the JDA and the TOAs.

B-3

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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The planning guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense should be policy guidance, should be updated and reissued as often as necessary, and contain the following kinds of information:

- (1) A prioritized list of contingencies in which the SecDef is especially interested and for which the SecDef wants plans prepared. There should be no implication that the list is necessarily exhaustive or dispositive of all contingency possibilities. The JCS and the CINCs should be free to create additional plans for situations they consider to be important.
- (2) A date upon which the operation plans are to be capable of execution. This date is not merely a deadline; it has the major effect of specifying the force and supporting resources that the CINCs should assume are available from the standpoint of the overall Defense program. This is not an allocation of forces since that is largely a JCS task (with NCA oversight), but rather a clear instruction that operation plans are to be capability plans (not requirements plans) and thus capable of being executed with the resources available on the date specified.
- (3) A set of national security objectives for each contingency listed. These should be in sufficient detail to enable a field commander to develop matching plans.
- (4) A set of assumptions and ground rules. These should provide information on key factors or decisions that are primarily political in nature and which the military leadership should not be asked to surmise. Examples of such policy guidance are:

-- The conditions under which conscription would be reinstated and other manpower mobilization steps taken;

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 31 2013

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- the conditions under which various national emergencies would be declared and the authorities that would flow therefrom;
- the conditions under which allied participation could be expected in combined operations; and
- assumptions regarding basing and overflight rights.

- (5) A set of scenarios to be associated with the contingencies listed. These should develop further the circumstances under which planning contingencies might develop.

With the SecDef guidance in hand, the JCS should furnish guidance to the CINCs via the JSCP, and the CINCs should then prepare or update their plans in accordance with JOPES procedures. The CINC plans, accompanied by transportation feasibility plans, should then be submitted to the JCS for review and for more detailed transportation planning by the JDA/TOAs. The JCS should hold a planning conference during which the CINC personally briefs the JCS on his plans. Based on this review, refinements should be made by the CINC, a final review conducted by the JCS, and a joint conference held with the Secretary of Defense. This is a critical opportunity for the SecDef not only to judge the responsiveness of the planning process in terms of meeting his guidance, but also to be directly involved in ratifying the plans and -- in the process -- developing confidence in both the plans and the JCS planning process. The Secretary will also see first hand -- through the comments of the JCS and the CINCs -- how additional resources applied to critical areas could bring operation plans into closer harmony with national security objectives. It is in this context that the flexibility to analyze various options within JOPES is absolutely essential. Only in this way can gaps between the resource-constrained capability plans and national security objectives be fully revealed, quantified, and remedied in the interests of military preparedness.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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APPENDIX C

An Emergency Action Package for Evacuation of Noncombatants

The attached EAP, though prepared for OSD staff use, is the type of "on the shelf" action package the Senior Evaluation Team believes is needed to facilitate the OJCS staffing process for major crisis actions.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

C-1

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

C-2

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DOS
NO OBJECTION TO
FULL RELEASE W/
CONCURRENCE OF
JCS

DOS
RETURNED TO ORIGINATING
AGENCY - DOD

OSD EMERGENCY ACTION PACKAGE #16
EVACUATE NONCOMBATANTS

SEPTEMBER 9, 1982

Page Determined to be Unclassified
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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 31 2013

CONTRACT NUMBER: DNA001-79-C-0438

NAME OF CONTRACTOR: Systems Research and
Applications Corporation
Suite 245
2425 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22201
Tel: (703) 558-4700

CONTRACT PROJECT DIRECTOR: William K. Brehm

CONTRACT EXPIRATION DATE: May 31, 1983

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OSD EMERGENCY ACTION PACKAGE #16

EVACUATE NONCOMBATANTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
*Foreword	ii
Background	1
Authorities and Responsibilities	1
Alternatives	5
Summary of Interested Parties' Views	7
Decision	8
Appendix A - Decision Document	A-1
Appendix B - Decision and Action Process Summary	B-1
*Appendix C - Decision and Action Process Formats	C-1

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 31 2013

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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EVACUATE NONCOMBATANTS

FOREWORD

NOTE: This "foreword" is for staff use only. It is not intended to accompany the decision package forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

This Emergency Action Package -- one of a series -- is an illustrative model of a document that would be submitted to the Secretary of Defense in a time of crisis for his decision on whether to recommend the evacuation of U.S. and selected alien noncombatants from overseas crisis areas.

The model itself is intended only as a prototype that could save valuable time in the drafting of an actual document, tailored to the specifics of an actual crisis.

Noncombatant evacuation is closely linked to other crisis issues, especially those dealing with the implementation of military plans and augmentation of DOD strategic lift. Thus, it is important to address the evacuation issue in the context of related crisis measures that have already been taken or are under consideration. The table on the following page lists these other measures, and describes their linkage to an evacuation decision.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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OTHER CRISIS ACTIONS LINKED TO NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION

<u>ACTION PACKAGE</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>LINK TO EVACUATION</u>
6	Provide DOD guidance for crisis response	Sets political and military context in which an evacuation decision must be reached.
9	Implement military plans	Evacuation concurrent with major deployment operations could affect deployment schedules. On the other hand, continued presence of U.S. noncombatants in a threatened area could adversely affect plans for the employment of U.S. forces.
14	Obtain civil strategic lift augmentation	An evacuation decision might increase the requirements for such augmentation.
15	Suspend movement to designated overseas areas	Could precede or accompany a decision to evacuate non-combatants.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

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Date: _____

OSD EMERGENCY ACTION PACKAGE #16

EVACUATE NONCOMBATANTS

1. Background.

The situation in _____ [area(s)] _____ has reached the point where the threat to U.S. noncombatants (and if applicable, the impact of their presence on military operations) dictates consideration of their evacuation. [NOTE: Provide a synopsis of the threat to noncombatants and the potential effect of their presence on military operations.]

Figures 1 and 2 provide the estimated numbers of U.S. noncombatants in the area(s) of immediate and potential threat, respectively. Also shown are estimated numbers of aliens that the U.S. might be called upon to evacuate.

2. Authorities and Responsibilities. This section describes broadly the authorities and responsibilities for the emergency evacuation of noncombatants and for their reception and assistance in CONUS or other safe havens.

Executive Order 11490 assigns to the Secretary of State the overall responsibility for developing plans for the protection and evacuation of American citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their property. The Secretary of State has delegated basic authority and responsibility for implementing evacuation plans to Chiefs of Mission and principal diplomatic officers. Each Chief of Mission maintains a country evacuation plan.

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

FIGURE 1. POTENTIAL DOD, OTHER U.S., & ALIEN NONCOMBATANT EVACUEES
IN AREAS OF IMMEDIATE THREAT

CATEGORY	LOCATION					TOTAL
	A	B	C	D	ETC.	
DoD:						
Army	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Navy	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Marine Corps	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Air Force	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Other	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
TOTAL	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXXXX
Other U.S. Citizens						
	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Potential Alien Evacuees:						
Nationality "A"	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Nationality "B"	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Etc.	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
TOTAL	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXXXX
GRAND TOTAL	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXXX

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 IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
 Date: DEC 3 1 2013

FIGURE 2. POTENTIAL DOD, OTHER U.S., & ALIEN NONCOMBATANT EVACUEES
IN AREAS OF POTENTIAL THREAT

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>					<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>ETC.</u>	
DoD:						
Army	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Navy	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Marine Corps	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Air Force	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Other	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
TOTAL	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXXXX
Other U.S. Citizens	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Potential Alien Evacuees:						
Nationality "A"	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Nationality "B"	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
Etc.	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXXX
TOTAL	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	XXXXXX
GRAND TOTAL	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXXX

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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The Secretary of Defense is responsible for advising and assisting the Department of State in planning for the evacuation from overseas areas of dependents, and U.S. teachers, administrators, and other U.S. citizens working in dependent schools. [If pertinent, it should be mentioned that, by joint agreement with the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense also has primary responsibility for carrying out the evacuation of DOD-sponsored noncombatants from the Federal Republic of Germany, and of all U.S. citizens from West Berlin, Guantanamo Bay, and the Panama Canal.] Theater and Service component commanders and the Military Airlift Command maintain plans for assisting in noncombatant evacuation operations. DOD sealift assets may be employed as well.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has the lead in developing advice to the Secretary of Defense on the need to evacuate noncombatants. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the theater commanders, are responsible for managing DOD evacuation operations. Except under a declared national emergency, DOD is responsible for receiving and assisting evacuees it had sponsored overseas upon their arrival in CONUS. The Department of the Army is the DOD Executive Agent in carrying out that responsibility and is assisted by the other Services as necessary. Other OSD offices are involved in the decision and implementation processes as indicated in Appendix A.

If the evacuation is conducted under a declared national emergency, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is responsible for receiving and assisting all evacuees upon their arrival in the United States. In cases in which evacuees are removed to safe havens other than CONUS, the State Department is responsible for coordination with host governments for their support.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

3. Alternatives.

a. Statement of Alternatives.

1. Do not evacuate noncombatants.
2. Evacuate U.S. noncombatants on a voluntary basis via commercial carriers (using scheduled and chartered lift).
3. Evacuate, on an emergency basis, all U.S. and selected alien noncombatants from area(s) of immediate threat, using all available civilian (including CRAF) and military airlift.
4. Evacuate, on an emergency basis, all U.S. and selected alien noncombatants from areas of both immediate and potential threat, using all available civilian (including CRAF) and military airlift.

b. Implications of Alternatives. [Note: This section should briefly address each alternative in terms of the risk to noncombatants, international and domestic implications, and effect on military operations (if applicable). For example, the following discussion might apply in the early stages of a European crisis that could evolve into NATO-Warsaw Pact hostilities.]

1. Alternative 1: No Evacuation. U.S. noncombatants in the vicinity of military installations and along likely enemy avenues of advance would be in grave danger in the event of hostilities. Substantial loss of life could be expected. In addition, the presence of U.S. noncombatants in combat zones could lower the combat effectiveness of our forces. Should the enemy succeed in penetrating U.S. and allied defenses, large numbers of U.S. noncombatants might be taken hostage. The increasing demand for evacuation indicates that this alternative may be unacceptable to the Congress and the public. On the positive side, a decision not to evacuate noncombatants now could have a

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

stabilizing effect on the crisis to the extent that potential adversaries would interpret such decision as a sign that the U.S. does not consider hostilities inevitable. A stay-put policy for U.S. noncombatants could also be interpreted by the Allies as a commitment to "share the risk", and should reduce the potential for panic among the host nation populace. It would also permit U.S. reinforcement plans (if implemented) to proceed on schedule, without the complications inherent in evacuating noncombatants aboard aircraft that are shuttling troops and supplies to Europe.

2. Alternative 2: Voluntary Evacuation. This alternative would reduce the U.S. noncombatant population and demonstrate concern for their safety without sending potential adversaries a signal that the U.S. considers hostilities inevitable. Significant numbers of noncombatants are likely to opt for evacuation. Should involuntary evacuation later become necessary, the reduction in evacuees would lessen the potential for disruption of reinforcement flow and combat operations. On the negative side, substantial numbers of noncombatants would remain at risk and, should hostilities erupt prior to their evacuation, would face the same dangers cited for Alternative 1. For this reason, the Congress and the public may consider this alternative an inadequate response.

3. Alternative 3: Involuntary Evacuation from Areas of Immediate Threat. This alternative would evacuate noncombatants from areas in which combat would be likely during the initial "X" days of hostilities. By stopping short of a complete evacuation, it should signal U.S. resolve without necessarily being perceived by potential adversaries as a sign that the U.S. considers hostilities inevitable. The Congress and the public might consider this an acceptable alternative at the present time. On the negative

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 31 2013

side, a large-scale evacuation could spur panic among the host nation populace, which in turn could threaten the safety of the evacuees and interfere with U.S. and allied military preparations. [If the evacuation were to be carried out using returning military airlift during a large-scale deployment of U.S. forces to the region, the extent of the interference in the deployment should be stated.]

4. Alternative 4: Involuntary Evacuation from Areas of Both Immediate and Potential Threat. This alternative offers the best chance of completing the evacuation under peacetime conditions, and could be expected to have the solid support of the Congress and the public. However, each of the negative implications cited for Alternative 3 would probably be magnified. [As for Alternative 3, if the evacuation is to be carried out concurrently with deployment operations, the extent of the interference in the deployment should be addressed.]

4. Summary of Interested Parties' Views. [Note: This section states which alternative each interested DOD and Federal civil organization supports and, unless the recommendation is unanimous, the organization's reasons for proponency of that alternative.] Example:

Alternative 1 - No support.

Alternative 2 - No support in DOD. However, DOS favors. They feel that voluntary evacuation will result in a substantial reduction of noncombatants in areas of greatest threat without causing widespread panic in host nations or further destabilizing the international situation.

Alternative 3 - All (except DOS) support.

Alternative 4 - No support now, but all agree that expansion of the area

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to be evacuated should be considered if the situation takes a drastic turn toward armed conflict.

5. Decision.

Alternative approved: _____

Modification as follows: _____

Signature and Date: _____

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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EVACUATE NONCOMBATANTS

APPENDIX A - DECISION DOCUMENTS

(Note: Two decision documents are required. The first is a Secretary of Defense memorandum to the Secretary of State outlining his recommendations on the evacuation issue. The second is a Secretary of Defense memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services outlining DOD support to be provided in implementing any evacuation measures ordered by the President.)

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

A-1

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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A-2

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

DEC 3 1 2013

OSD EMERGENCY ACTION PACKAGE #16

EVACUATE NONCOMBATANTS

APPENDIX B - DECISION AND ACTION PROCESS SUMMARY

<u>STEPS - ACTIONS</u>	<u>OPR</u>	<u>SUPPORT</u>
1. Assess threat to noncombatants	JCS	ASD(ISA and/or ISP) with State DIA
2. Determine potential numbers of evacuees	USD(P)	ASD(ISA and/or ISP) with State JCS Services
3. Review and update noncombatant evacuation plans	JCS	ASD(MRA&L) ASD(ISA and/or ISP) Services
4. Determine airlift, sealift, and other special requirements (e.g., medical care) to support an evacuation	JCS	Services
5. Assess military implications of evacuation alternatives (effect on deployment schedules; effect on military operations)	JCS	Services TOAs
6. Assess international political implications of evacuation alternatives	USD(P)	ASD(ISA and/or ISP) with State DIA
7. Determine legal implications of mandatory evacuation	Gen. Counsel	Services
8. Determine status of plans for reception of evacuees in CONUS	ASD(MRA&L)	Army with DHHS
9. Determine availability of safe havens, if needed	USD(P)	ASD(ISA and/or ISP) with State
10. Review this EAP for conformance with current law and policy	USD(P)	General Counsel
11. Complete draft decision paper	USD(P)	ASD(MRA&L) ASD(ISA) ASD(ISP) General Counsel JCS Services

B-1

UNCLASSIFIED

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

DEC 3 1 2013

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|--|---------------------|--|
| 12. Review paper, as necessary, before Policy Guidance Committee, Politico-Military Board, and Crisis Management Council | USD(P) | |
| 13. Obtain SecDef decision | USD(P) | JCS |
| 14. Forward SecDef recommendations to State | USD(P) | |
| 15. Obtain Presidential decision | State | SecDef |
| 16. Coordinate with State Department concerning (1) evacuation plans and (2) negotiations with foreign governments for (a) assistance in protection and evacuation of DOD-sponsored noncombatants and their property, (b) safe havens, and (c) transit and overflight rights | USD(P) | JCS
ASD (ISA and/or ISP)
ASD (MRA&L) |
| 17. Coordinate with DHHS concerning plans for reception of evacuees in CONUS | Army | JCS |
| 18. Issue evacuation warning order | JCS | |
| 19. Alert local military and civil authorities in the U.S. as to potential number of evacuees and reception sites. Establish coordination with local authorities and agencies near reception sites (community services, housing authority, Red Cross, etc.) | Army
(with DHHS) | Other Services |
| 20. Issue evacuation execution order | JCS | |
| 21. Manage the evacuation | JCS | CINCS
Services |
| 22. Manage, support, or monitor the reception of DOD evacuees in CONUS, as appropriate | Army | Other Services |

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

OSD EMERGENCY ACTION PACKAGE #16

DEC 3 1 2013

EVACUATE NONCOMBATANTS

APPENDIX C - DECISION AND ACTION PROCESS FORMATS

NOTE: This appendix does not accompany the decision package forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. It is intended to help the OSD staff by providing 1) formats for the collection of data needed to build the decision package, and 2) formats for collecting information and updating the Secretary and other OSD principals on evacuation progress. The data collection formats will also provide useful backup information with which to answer detailed questions during briefings.

FORMATS

- 1 -- Categories of Potential Evacuees
- 2 -- Evacuee Ports of Embarkation
- 3 -- Evacuee Ports of Debarkation
- 4 -- Evacuation Safe Havens
- 5 -- (Area) Evacuation Status as of (Date)
- 6 -- Evacuation Status Summary as of (Date)

C-1

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5

Date: DEC 3 1 2013

FORMAT 1. CATEGORIES OF POTENTIAL EVACUEES

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>					<u>TOTALS</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Etc</u>	
DoD Dependents	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXX
DoD Civilian Employees	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXX
Other Federal Employees	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXX
Other U.S. Citizens	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXX
Aliens	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXX
TOTALS	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXX	XXXX
Number requiring medical evacuation	XX	XX	XX	XX	XX	XXX

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FORMAT 2. EVACUEE PORTS OF EMBARKATION

DAILY CAPACITY
(INDIVIDUALS)

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>POE</u>	<u>DAILY CAPACITY</u> <u>(INDIVIDUALS)</u>
"A"	1 -	xxx
	2 -	xxx
	3 -	xxx
	4 -	xxx
	TOTAL	xxxx
"B"	1 -	xxx
	2 -	xxx
	3 -	xxx
	TOTAL	xxxx
"C"	1 -	xxx
	2 -	xxx
	3 -	xxx
	4 -	xxx
	TOTAL	xxxx
"D"	1 -	xxx
	2 -	xxx
	TOTAL	xxxx
ETC.		---

	GRAND TOTAL	xxxxxx

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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FORMAT 3. EVACUEE PORTS OF DEBARRATION
(CONUS)

<u>POD</u>	<u>DAILY CAPACITY (INDIVIDUALS)</u>
"A"	XXXX
"B"	XXXX
"C"	XXXX
"D"	XXXX
ETC.	<u>XXXX</u>
	TOTAL
	XXXXX

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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FORMAT 4. EVACUATION SAFE HAVENS

<u>SAFE HAVEN</u>	<u>EVACUEE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN</u>	<u>NUMBER OF EVACUEES TO BE RECEIVED</u>	<u>AVERAGE STAY EXPECTED</u>
Country "A"	_____	XX	days
	_____	XX	days
	_____	XX	days
Country "B"	_____	XX	days
	_____	XX	days
Country "C"	_____	XX	days
	_____	XX	days
Country "D"	_____	XX	days
Etc.	_____	XX	days

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 3 1 2013

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

DEC 3 1 2013

FORMAT 5. (Area) EVACUATION STATUS AS OF (Date)

EVACUEE CATEGORY	TOTAL REQ'T	EVACUATED TO DATE		REMAINING REQ'T
		Planned	Actual	
DoD-Sponsored	xxxx	xxx	xxx	xxxx
Other U.S.	xxxx	xxx	xxx	xxxx
Aliens:				
Nationality "X"	xxx	xx	xx	xxx
Nationality "Y"	xxx	xx	xx	xxx
Nationality "Z"	xxx	xx	xx	xxx
TOTALS	xxxxx	xxx	xxx	xxxxx

Evacuated to CONUS: xxx
At Safe Havens: xxx

ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE: _____

NOTE: This format should be replicated for each evacuation area.

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FORMAT 6. EVACUATION STATUS SUMMARY AS OF (Date)

<u>COUNTRY/AREA</u>	<u>TOTAL REQ'T</u>	<u>EVACUATED TO DATE</u>		<u>REMAINING REQ'T</u>	<u>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE</u>
		<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>		
"A"	XXXX	XXX	XXX	XXXX	
"B"	XXXX	XXX	XXX	XXXX	
"C"	XXXX	XXX	XXX	XXXX	
"D"	XXXX	XXX	XXX	XXXX	
ETC.	XXXX	XXX	XXX	XXXX	
<u>TOTALS</u>	XXXXX	XXXX	XXXX*	XXXXX	

* Evacuated to CONUS: XXXX

At Safehavens: XXXX

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C-8

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