



DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUN 11 2012

Doc. No. 18

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Ch. XII  
44

JCSM-297-70  
18 June 1970

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibilities  
in the Ryukyus (U)

1. ~~(U)~~ Reference is made to:

a. A background paper, subject: "Future US-Japan Defense/ Security Responsibilities for Okinawa," which was forwarded for approval on 29 November 1969 by the US Military Representative on the Okinawa Negotiating Team (USMILRONT) for use in discussions with the Japanese.

b. DJSM-203-70, dated 6 February 1970, subject: "Future US-Japan Defense/Security Responsibilities for Okinawa," which recommended that: (1) the USMILRONT background paper, as amended, be approved for use in discussion of the subject with the Japanese; (2) a proposed memorandum be forwarded to the USMILRONT approving the use of his paper, as amended, and providing general guidance for discussions with the Japanese; and (3) specific plans for deployment of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) to Okinawa, assumption of defense responsibilities, and availability of facilities should await a CINCPAC plan and a formal statement of intention of the Government of Japan (GOJ) regarding JSDF deployments.

c. A message from CINCPAC, 180246Z May 1970 (JCS IN 12834), subject: "Okinawa Reversion Planning," which discussed a proposal to release Naha Port to the GOJ for commercial purposes in exchange for a Japanese-funded US port to be built at the Machinato Complex, and which recommended that this be included as a separate priority item in the negotiation process with Japan.

d. A message from the American Embassy, Tokyo, 9358/ 101030Z November 1969 (JCS IN 52233), subject: "Okinawa Reversion: Economic/Financial Aspects," which stated in part, that, in the proposed lump-sum agreement, the GOJ will

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA  
Unauthorized disclosure subject to  
administrative and criminal sanctions  
Punish as provided in Executive Order  
11652, Section 1.4(b), and  
50 USC Act 1954~~

OK  
R-1-0001

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ Copies each  
of \_\_\_\_\_ pages series "A"

~~GROUP - 3  
Downgraded 12 year  
interval  
automatically declassified~~

3370 OSR DOC 12-3

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-\_\_\_\_\_

Hand Japan Okinawa 10-16 1968 MLP EI

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

include \$200 million as payment in kind for residual value of military facilities, "attributed" to possible military relocation and other unspecified costs to the United States related to reversion.

e. A message from the American Embassy, Tokyo, 9390/120755Z November 1969 (JCS IN 55434), subject: "Okinawa Reversion-Economic/Financial Aspects," which stated that the "real" agreement is that the GOJ is paying \$150 million for residual value of US military bases on Okinawa and \$50 million [redacted] and that the Japanese understand that the "flat fee" for this is \$200 million but the basic agreement is disguised by ascribing its purpose to covering military relocation and other costs incident to reversion.

f. A joint State-Defense message for the American Embassy, Tokyo, 073229/132359Z May 1970 (JCS IN 96066), subject: "GOJ Compensation for US Military Relocations and Other Costs Incident to Reversion," which stated, in part, that the Department of Defense will prepare a list of expected costs incurred, including a justification, as a result of reversion, to be used in negotiations with the GOJ.

2. In reference 1b, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that plans for deployment of the JSDF to Okinawa and assumption of defense responsibilities should await a CINCPAC plan, which would be forthcoming. This plan, which has now been forwarded by CINCPAC and has been reviewed and amended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is contained in the Appendix hereto. The objective of the plan is to maintain US capability in east Asia by preserving the integrity of regionally oriented combat-ready forces with the required logistical support base and, at the same time, provide for accommodation of the relatively small JSDF with minimum new construction and no requirement to acquire additional real estate. Within these parameters, the study recommends what is believed to be the most effective phasing of the assumption of defense responsibility for Okinawa by the GOJ. It is noted that a formal statement by the Japanese of intentions regarding JSDF deployments has not yet been received by US negotiators; thus, the study is based on informal statements of JSDF intentions. However, it has been indicated that the JSDF proposal has the approval of the Japan Defense Agency, and it is considered adequate to allow informal negotiations to proceed. It is noted further that the timing of deployment of the JSDF to Okinawa is for planning purposes only and that there may be some political problems involved with deployment of Japanese Forces prior to R-day. It is expected these will be discussed and resolved prior to the formal proposal by the GOJ for deployment to Okinawa. The plan in the Appendix does not include a

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~SECRET~~

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED] due to a recent request by the Office of the Secretary of Defense which revised options to be considered. This aspect of Okinawa reversion is being developed as a separate entity and will be forwarded by 1 July 1970, as requested.

3. The CINCPAC proposal contained in reference 1c, regarding the release of Naha Port to the GOJ for commercial purposes in exchange for a Japanese-funded US port at Machinato, has merit and could be attractive to the Japanese. It is recognized that they may not be willing to consider this project as a separate negotiation project outside the \$200 million which has been identified for relocation and other costs incident to reversion. However, it is a possibility that should be explored in discussions with the Japanese. If they are not receptive to this proposal, the project could then be considered along with other relocation construction projects and evaluated with them for priority and funding considerations.

4. It is believed that the US-Japanese lump-sum agreement, as indicated in reference 1e, precludes the need for justification of the \$200 million, as required in reference 1f. More importantly, it appears possible that further discussion of this figure, which is part of the lump-sum settlement and a precondition to US agreement to reversion, could open the door to renegotiation. As indicated in the plan in the Appendix, actual relocation costs may not include a major portion of the \$200 million. In addition, the actual relocation and other costs will not be known until after reversion takes place. To identify costs too early would tend toward premature judgments as to how this \$200 million is to be allocated; moreover, since this amount is to be paid in goods and services over a 5-year period after reversion, it is desirable to retain maximum flexibility in identifying both costs and the method of payment.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The attached plan on Japanese assumption of defense responsibilities in Okinawa be approved and forwarded for use by US negotiators in negotiations of this subject with the GOJ. However, the relocation costs and projects included therein are not complete due to the many unknown factors relating to reversion and, thus, are not intended to be a final position on the subject.

b. The proposal for release of Naha Port to the GOJ for commercial purposes in exchange for a Japanese-financed port facility to be built at the Machinato Complex be approved for exploratory discussions with the Japanese as

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

6/12/52

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUN 11 2012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a quid pro quo item separate from the \$200 million identified for relocation and other costs incident to reversion. If this proposal is not favorably received by the Japanese, this project could then be considered along with other relocation projects and costs incident to reversion for possible funding with the \$200 million lump-sum agreement.

c. The US negotiators for economic and financial aspects of reversion be advised that the \$200 million of the lump-sum agreement should be considered an agreed sum, not subject to further negotiations and that the \$200 million is to be maintained in a special account payable in Japanese goods and services against which the Department of Defense can draw, as requirements/other costs become known, for a 5-year period after reversion.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*E. G. Wheeler*

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

Office of the Secretary of Defense 50.S.C. 3552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 11 Jun 2012 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 6.2(a) \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 12 -M-0450

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

men

~~TOP SECRET~~