United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 3, 1993

The attached report is a working paper prepared by the United States Department of Defense's Office of POW/MIA Affairs to further the work of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POWs/MIAs. As head of the U.S. delegation to the Joint Commission, I presented this draft report to General Dmitriy Volkogonov, my counterpart in Moscow, during our meeting in early September. The report was intended to foster investigation by both countries and contains subjective opinions on the transfer of prisoners of war to the USSR; it is not an official conclusion of the Joint Commission on the fate of Korean War era American POWs.

At the same time, this report indicates that the U.S. side of the Commission believes that American POWs might have been transferred to the former Soviet Union in the course of the Korean War.

There is no doubt that further research is essential. The Russian side of the Commission has already begun to investigate the facts presented in this report. Joint efforts in this direction are continuing. Members of the Russian and American sides of the Commission are continuing their examination of the archives of the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. We are also conducting on-site interviews with persons who might have had connections with the possible transfer of American POWs to the territory of the USSR at the beginning of the 1950s. Any and all information is being carefully checked. We will continue our joint efforts until such time as we are satisfied that our remaining questions are answered.

Malcolm Toon

Malcolm Toon
Ambassador
Co-Chairman of the
U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on
POWs/MIAs

#43

NOT RELEASED TO PUBLIC BY DOD (AS OF 28 [illegible])

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This study is to be used for internal use only. It contains subjective evaluations, opinions, and recommendations concerning on-going analysis that may impact future U.S. foreign policy decisions. This document has not yet been finalized for public release.

The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs

To the Soviet Union

Joint Commission Support Branch
Research and Analysis Division
DPMO

25 August 1993

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Executive Summary

U.S. Korean War POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union and never repatriated.

This transfer was a highly-secret MGB program approved by the innner circle of the Stalinist dictatorship.

The rationale for taking selected prisoners to the USSR was:

o To exploit and counter U.S. aircraft technologies;

o to use them for general intelligence purposes;

o It is possible that Stalin, given his positive experience with Axis POWs, viewed U.S. POWs as potentially lucrative hostages.

The range of eyewitness testimony as to the presence of U.S. Korean War POWs in the GULAG is so broad and convincing that we cannot dismiss it.

The Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps which supported the North Korean and Chinese forces in the Korean War had an important intelligence collection mission that included the collection, selection, and interrogation of POWs.

A General Staff-based analytical group was assigned to the Far East Military District and conducted extensive interrogations of U.S. and other U.N. POWs in Khabarovsk. This was confirmed by a distinguished retired Soviet officer, Colonel Gavriil Korotkov, who participated in this operation. No prisoners were repatriated who related such an experience.

o Prisoners were moved by various modes of transporation. Large shipments moved through Manchouli and Pos'yet.

o Khabarovsk was the hub of a major interrogation operation directed against U.N. POWs from Korea. Khabarovsk was also a temporary holding and transshipment point for U.S. POWs. The MGB controlld these prisoners, but the GRU was allowed to interrogate them.

o Irkutsk and Novosirbirsk were transshipment points, but the Komi ASSR and Perm Oblast were the final destinations of many POWs. Other camps where Americans were held were in the Bashkir ASSR, the Kemerovo and Archangelsk Oblasts, and the Komi-Permyatskiy and Taymyskiy Natinal Okrugs.

POW transfers also included thousands of South Koreans, a fact confirmed by the Soviet general officer, Kan San Kho, who served as the Deputy Chief of the North Korean MVD.

The most highly-sought-after POWs for exploitation were F-86 pilots and others knowledgeable of new technologies.

Living U.S. witnesses have testified that captured U.S. pilots were, upon occasion, taken directly to Soviet-staffed interrogation centers. A former Chinese officer stated he turned U.S. pilot POWs directly over to the Soviets as a matter of policy.

Missing F-86 pilots, whose captivity was never acknowledged by the Communists in Korea, were identified in recent interviews with former Soviet intelligence officers who served in Korea. Captured F-86 aircraft were taken to at least three Moscow aircraft design bureaus for exploitaiton. Pilots accompanied the aircraft to enrich and accelerate the exploitation process.

The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs
to the Soviet Union

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The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union

Introduction

The United States lists 8,140 casualties from the Korean War whose remains have not been repatriated. Some of that number are "truly unaccounted for" in that there is no evidence at all as to the circumstances of their loss or to their ultimate fate. One estimate is provided at Appendix A.[1] Since the Joint Commission was established, a mass of convincing evidence has accumulated that U.S. POWs were taken to the Soviet Union in a tightly controlled MGB operation and never repatriated.

We believe that the transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union involved two separate programs.

1. **Technological Exploitation.** This program was a pure intelligence collection program for the purpose of acquiring high-tech equipment and their operators technical exploitation. The F-86 Sabre Jet was the great prize. However, we believe that Soviet intelligence collection requirements were not limited to the F-86. There is growing evidence that other types of aircraft, including the B-29, were also the subject of intelligence collection.

2. **The Hostage Connection.** The other program was based on the collection of POWs as hostages and for general intelligence exploitation.

These programs are discussed in Parts I and II which present our assessment of the origins and operation of the transfers.

From the conduct of the transfer operation, we switch in Part III to the next stage in the issue: evidence of Americans actually within the Soviet concentration camp system. Here we discuss the mass of sightings by citizens of the former USSR of U.S. Korean War POWs.

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[1]The "truly unaccounted for" casualties of the Korean War include those who were killed on the battlefield and those who were taken prisoner where there were no witnesses or reporting by the enemy. All wars, especially those that involve rapid retreats and advances, heavy casualties, and fighting over rugged terrain such as the Korean War result in large, unexplained losses.

Note 1: Throughout this document references will be made by various quoted sources to the primary Soviet security organ as the NKVD, the MGB, or the KGB. All references are to the same organization and represent only an organizational name change. At the time of the Korean War, the organization was titled the MGB and will be referred to as such. Quotations will not be altered where the speaker is imprecise. The MGB (Ministerstvo Gosudarstvenoi Bezopasnosti) was formed in March 1946 by the merging of the NKVD and the MVD (Ministry of Internal Security). This new organization was broken back into its original two parts in March 1953 after Stalin's death. That part that had been the NKVD was renamed the KGB.

Note 2: Task Force Russia was organized under the auspices of the U.S. Army in June 1992 to support the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. There were two elements in the task force: (1) The Washington-based analytical, translation, and administrative element (TFR-H), and (2) the Mosocw-based research, interview, and liaison group (TFR-M). In June 1993, Task Force Russia was subordinated to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs, and TFR-H was renamed the Joint Commission Support Branch (JCSB). The Moscow-based element will continue to be designated Task Force Russia - Moscow (TFR-M).

Note 3: Translations of documents provided by the Russian side of the Joint Commission were translated by TFR-H and are numbered as TFR documents, e.g., TFR-36, and are referred to as such in the narrative.

Part I

Technological Exploitation

The First Modern Air War. One of the worst-kept secrets of the Cold War was the head-to-head clash in Korea between the two former Allies of World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States. Although the ground war was fought essentially with the weaponry and tactics of the Second World War, the air war was the first major field test of the new air power technologies of the postwar world. The Korean War was the first modern air war and was characterized by an entirely new technology that was electronics intensive and depended not only on the keen wits and high mastery of the pilots flying the jet combat aircraft but on a host of advanced support activities such as air-intercept radar and airborne reconnaissance.

The Technology Gap. This was the backdrop for an even more insidious form of warfare. The Soviet Union cloaked its participation in the Korean War partly to conceal its urgent need to bridge the technological gap with the West which was widening geometrically even then. Based upon a precedent repeatedly acknowledged by senior Soviet officers, which began with the wholesale reverse engineering of the Massey-Ferguson tractor by the State Automobile Factory in the 1930s, the Willys Jeep in the 1940s, and a variety of propeller technology aircraft during World War II, the Soviets sought to avert the inevitable by systemized theft of design.

The 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. The Soviet Union initiated its battlefield testing in the Korean War with the activation of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps Headquarters in Antung (now Dandong), Manchuria, in November 1950, just as North Korea teetered on the edge of destruction. The Corps was charged with a threefold mission: (1) air defense of the area north of the 38th Parallel; (2) protection of the trans-Yalu bridges; and (3) training of North Korean and Chinese pilots. Analysis of documents provided by the Russian side, however, shows that the 64th had yet another mission: the management of the overt and covert Human Intelligence (HUMINT) effort targeted against the U.S. air forces. A review of the documents provided by the Russians reveals regular and intense coordination between Moscow, the senior advisors to the Korean General Staff, and the Commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps (General Georgii A. Lobov) on a variety of topics related to prisoner of war interrogation and control. The gaps in this documentation insinuate a direct role which the Russian side to date denies.

The air-focused Soviet priorities are perhaps best summed up by the comment of retired Colonel Aleksandr Semyonovich Orlov, a

veteran of the 64th, and the chief of intelligence for one of its divisions. He casually dismissed the significance of ground forces personnel with the comment that he knew more about the operations of the American infantry battalion than a U.S. Army captain would. Orlov, himself a captain at the time of the Korean War, then described in painstaking detail Soviet intelligence collection requirements which were focused on aircraft technical parameters.[2]

The Soviet Interrogation Effort. The Soviet interrogation effort was largely disguised. Soviet interrogators, when present for interviews, wore Korean and Chinese uniforms without visible rank, and in some cases were ethnic Koreans or other oriental Soviet nationalities. One such officer is Colonel Georgii Plotnikov, who called himself by the Korean translation of his name Kim-Mok-Su, which means carptenter in both languages.[3] Another Soviet officer was a Buryat Mongol.[4] Most Soviet involvement was probably concentrated on the preparation and translation of collection requirements to be filled by their North Korean and Chinese allies. Some, however, appears to have taken place without the Chinese and North Koreans. One such case is that of escaped POW Marine Corporal Nick A. Flores who was mistaken for an F-86 pilot when captured by Soviet anti-aircraft troops and sent directly to Soviet interrogation at a Soviet airbase in Antung. This case is developed in more depth at the end of this section. Additionally, General Lobov, Commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, has stated that at some point in the war, the Chinese and North Koreans became somewhat less cooperative in turning over captured U.S. POWs for interrogation. As a result, Lobov had 70 Soviet teams out looking for shot down U.S. pilots.[5]

According to one report, Stalin had singled out U.S. Air Force POWs to be held as hostages.[6] All USAF POWs already held in the

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[2]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Colonel Aleksandr S. Orlov, 18 December 1991, Moscow.

[3]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview With Colonel Georgii Plotnikov, 17 December 1991, Moscow.

[4]Paul M. Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview With Colonel (ret) Viktor A. Bushuyev, 16 September 1992, Moscow. This Soviet Buryat Mongol was named Kolya Mankuev.

[5]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with General Georgii A. Lobov, 18 December 1991, Moscow.

[6]Celestine Bohlen, "Advice of Stalin: Hold Korean War POWs," New York Times, 25 September 1992.

camp system were segregated from other POWs, held in separate camps under Chinese jurisdiction on North Korean territory, and subjected to interrogation by Chinese and Soviet personnel. One such POW was USAF Sergeant Daniel Oldewage who has stated that he and a number of other captured USAF NCOs were transported to Antung for interrogation by the Chinese and the Soviets. Oldewage stated that the Soviets were dressed in Chinese uniforms and appeared to be pilots based upon their thorough professional understanding of air operations against the B-29.[7]

The Soviet Hunt for F-86 Pilots

According to U.S. Air Force data, 1,303 USAF personnel were declared missing for all reasons between 25 June 1950 and 27 July 1953. After reclassification, this figure had been reduced to 666 whose bodies were not recovered (BNR).[8] Of that number, the argument can be made from an analysis of their circumstances of loss, that several hundred survived their crashes and were potential candidates for transfer to the Soviet Union. There is almost blatant evidence that this was, indeed, the case for a number of technically proficient, well-educated, and highly-skilled pilots of the F-86 Sabre jet. Most captured American pilots who did not die in the prison camps did in fact return. However, there is one major statistical aberration: the F-86 pilots.

A total of 56 F-86 aircraft were downed in aerial combat or by anti-aircraft artillery. From these aircraft, 15 live pilots (Appendix C) and one set of remains were repatriated. Of the 40 remaining losses, for whom no pilots were repatriated, the circumstances of loss indicate a high probability of death for nine. Of the 31 remaining cases (Appendix B), conditions were such that survival was possible. The 55 percent missing in action rate is unusually high compared to missing rates for pilots flying other airframes.

In late Summer 1992, the Russian side provided two lists of U.S. POWs that they stated had been provided to them by the Chinese

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[7]Transcription by Task Force Russia of a videotape statement by Daniel Oldwage, 13 May 1993.

[8]USAFEAF Battle Casualties -- Korean War Summary, cumulative with adjustments through 6 October 1953. The reclassified 637 included: 370 declared dead, 44 returned to military control (REC), 220 declared POW, and 3 recovered before the end of the war.

and/or North Koreans.[9] One list had 59 names and the other 71 names. There were 42 names that appeared in both lists and in almost identical sequence. The list of 59 names purported to be of those POWs who had transited an interrogation point. On a number of documents provided by the Russian side (translated in TFR-76) were the names of Soviet officers who had had some role in interrogations or the reporting process. The most prominent of them was a Lieutenant General Rastuvayev whose position was such that he could report on occasion directly to the Defense Minister and the Chief of the General Staff.[10] The names of these Soviet officers are at Appendix F.

At the request of the American side, the Russian side provided the interrogation files associated with these two lists. However, the Russians provided files for only 46 individuals. By reviewing the archival data handwritten on the files, Task Force Russia determined that 120 pages were missing. In those cases where interrogation material was missing, another 41 names can be correlated from the two lists.[11] Analysis of ancillary information and coordination with Air Force Casualty Affairs indicates that the 120 missing pages should contain data on eight identifiable MIAs. In addition to these eight, a ninth MIA was identified in the interrogation files whose name was not on either list. The nine MIAs are listed below:[12]

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[9]The first list with 59 names on it was entitled, "A List of Air Force personnel shot down in aerial combat or by anti-aircraft artillery during combat operations in Korea and who transited an interrogation point." The second list of 71 names was entitled, "A list of USAF aircrew members participating in combat operations in North Korea in 1950-1953 and about whom information is found in files of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps." Both documents have been translated in TFR-3.

[10]General Rastuvayev appears to have been the liaison officer between Kim Il Sung and Stalin. He signed a letter discussing the captured American General Dean to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff.

[11]Add the two lists: (59 + 71 = 130). Subtract the duplicated names (130 - 42 = 88) which provives 88 individuals. All but one of those names (Kharm) has been matched with a POW, thus 87 identified names. Add the number of names mentioned in Russian documents and the number we think should also be in the files (46 + 41 = 87), and we arrive at the number 87 again as the total number of identified POWs.

[12]Task Force Russia (POW/MIA), "Report to the U.S. Delegation, U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, 4 June 1993; and Task Force Russia (POW/MIA), "Report to the U.S.

Table 1. USAF Korean War POWs
On Whom the Russian Archives Should Have Information

Name	Aircraft	Duty Position
1. Tenney, Albert Gilbert, CPT	F-86	Pilot
2. Wendling, George Vincent, MAJ	F-86	Pilot
3. Harker, Charles A., Jr., 1LT	F-84	Pilot
4. Niemann, Robert Frank, 1LT	F-86	Pilot
5. McDonough, Charles E., MAJ	RB-45C	Pilot
6. Unruh, Halbert Caloway, CPT	B-26	Pilot
7. Shewmaker, John W., CPT	F-80	Pilot
8. Reid, Elbert J. Jr., SSgt	B-29	Gunner
9. Bergmann, Louis H., SSgt	B-29	Radar Operator

Of the seven pilots in this group, three flew the F-86 and one the experimental RB-45C reconnaissance aircraft, types of aircraft in which the Soviets had high interest. In addition to the F-86s, the Soviets would have had an equally high inerest in the RB-45C flown by Major Charles McDonough. The North American RB-45C was the first operational U.S. multi-engine jet bomber employed by the U.S. Air Force, and its reconnaissance configuration would have made it doubly interesting.[13] The Russians have even provided evidence of their interest in the B-45 series in a document dated 6 February 1951 in which intelligence collections requirements against U.S. forces in Korea were listed (TFR 34-46).[14] U.S. records also show that SSgt

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Delegation, U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, 18 June 1993.

[13]There were only three of the RB-45Cs in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO); they arrived at Yakota on 29 September 1950. By November and December they were flying along the North Korean-Manchurian border on a daily basis. Although the RB-45C could outrun MiGs, it had little maneuverability at altitude. Soviet ground controllers could have prepositioned MiGs for intercept. As shown in the interrogation of Major McDonough provided by the Russians, the Soviets were interested in the B-47 as well.

[14]TFR 34-46 is a list of Soviet intelligence collection requirements in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO) dated 6 February 1951 and includes the following items

> 7. Through interrogation of prisoner pilots, ascertain the morale of flight personnel, intensity of aircraft flights by type (heavy, medium bombers, fighters), personnel, deployment, turn-around time and the tactical

Bergmann, a radar opearator on a B-29, was interrogated at least once by the Soviets.[15] Furthermore, retired Soviet Colonel Viktor A. Bushuyev, Deputy Chief of Intelligence for the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps stated that they had attempted to interrogate an F-86 pilot named Neiman or Naiman that most likely was 1LT Robert F. Niemann, USAF, shot down on 12 April 1953.[16] Another pilot among the 31 missing was mentioned in an interview by Colonel Valentin Sozinov. He stated:

> The name of Major Delit came up in my conversation with Lobov. I don't know what his position is. But he also ejected and was captured and then escorted somewhere. I think he was on the People's Republic of China territory.[17]

We believe this individual is Major Deltis H. Fincher, USANG, shot down on 22 August 1952.

The 15 F-86 Pilots That Came Home

Colonel Valentin Sozinov, an advisor to the Korean General Staff, admits to having interrogated one of the leading F-86 personalities, Colonel Walker 'Bud' Mahurin, a World War II ace and a wing commander in Korea who was eventually repatriated.[18] However, in a recent interview, Colonel Mahurin recently stated that he had no memory of being inerrogated by Soviet personnel.[19]

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nature fot he 6002nd, 6140th, 6131st, 6147th tactical support wings, quantity of B-45 jet-engined bombers nd F-84 jet fighers, and to whichunits they are attached and deployed.

[15]Air Force Manual 200-25, Missing in Action -- Korea, 16 January 1961, p. 11.

[16]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Colonel Bushuyev, 16 September 1992, Moscow.

[17]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Col. Georgii Plotnikov and Col. Valentin Sozinov, 30 March 1992, Moscow.

[18]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Col. Georgii Plotnikov (ret) and Col. Valentin Sozinov (ret), 30 March 1992, Moscow.

[19]Task Force Russia Interview with Colonel Bud Mahurin, November 1992; Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Col. Georgi Plotnikov and Col. Valentin Sozinov, 30 March 1992, Moscow.

We believe that there were four critical factors that could have led to Colonel Mahurin's eventual repatriation, as well as the return of the other 14 F-86 pilots who were repatriated (Appendix B): (1) In the case of Colonel Mahurin and the other 14 pilots, one critical factor may have been that they had been seen by too many people in the POW camp system. Having been formally enrolled in a prisoner of war camp, moving them to another country might have been considered too obvious. It is doubtful that there was any contact at all between the aviators who are still considered missing and those who were repatriated.[20] Whereas prisoner of war status may not have assured survival, it possibly assured accountability. (2) The second critical factor was the nature of the intelligence collection requirement for F-86 pilots. A collection requirement like this probably was specialized and probably changed over time. An example of this sort specialized collection requirement was the intensive interrogation over a short period of time of all B-29 crewmen in Camp #2, described in a U.S. report as being "prompted by an intelligence requirement.[21] Documents provided by the Russians

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[20]Air Force Manual 200-25, Missing In Action Korea, 16 January 1961. This document is the Air Force element of the so-called "389 List", developed after the Korean War, which is a list of 389 missing in action cases. The nature of the loss in each was such that the United States Government believed the Communist side should have knowledge of them. AFM 200-25 then represents an exhaustive review of all available information at the time on each of the Air Force's 187 losses. In each case, is included the testimony of U.S. personnel who had any information on the cirumstances of loss. In none of these did a repatriated pilot report contact with the MIAs. The Joint Commission Support Branch is now interviewing repatriated F-86 pilots to recreate that data base and ascertain if any pertinent information was omitted.

[21]OSI Special Report (Office of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Headquarters USAF, "USAF Prisoners of War in Korea," 1 July 1954, p. 13. The study states: "On one occasion all B-29 crew members were taken from camp and interrogated on all phases of their B-29 training, equipment, tactics, organization, etc. Thus it appeared that these interrogations were prompted by intelligence requirements which were sent down to the camps from higher Chinese headquarters." Since only the Soviet Union was capable of defense against the B-29 and was at that time intensely interested in defense against US strategic bombers, it is certain that this intelligence requirement was initiated by the Soviets. This intelligence requirement probably was behind the interrogations described by Sgt Oldewage.

A separate line of investigation into B-29 crewmen who may have been transferred to the Soviet Union is in preparation.

(TFR-76) of interrogations show a great interest in the advanced models of the F-86. In this case, there would have been no need to take all the F-86 pilots. (3) The third factor may have been a matter of quality. Initial interrogations of F-86 pilots may have indicated which would have been the most useful in meeting intelligence requirements. Repatriated pilots may not have been suitable. (4) Pilots shot down over China were eventually turned over to the Chinese. Of the fifteen F-86 repatriated pilots, three were retained by the Chinese and released with the Arnold B-29 crew in 1955. They were 1Lt Roland Parks, 1Lt Edwin Heller, 1Lt Harold E. Fischer. All three had all been shot down and captured in China.[22]

The fact that the Soviets did not transfer these fifteen pilots to the Soviet Union does not mean that the Soviets did not take an interest in them. Of the 15 repatriated F-86 pilots, the Russians have provided information showing that the following seven were interrogated.

1Lt Charles E. Stahl
1Lt Daniel D. Peterson
1Lt Vernon D. Wright
1Lt Michael E. Dearmond
1Lt Vance R. Frick
1Lt Roland W. Parks
Col Edwin L. Heller

One of these pilots, 1Lt Roland Parks, will have an interesting tale to tell later in this narrative.

Soviet pilots also had interesting stories of contact with U.S. POWs. Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Roshchin stated that an American pilot named Muller had also been shot down. Roshchin described Muller a "real master, the number one American pilot" who "shot down more than ten planes." Roshchin described a photo of the pilot standing next to the tail of his aircraft.[23] We believe he was describing Lt. Col. Harold E. Fischer, the only Korean War ace with ten kills to his credit, and the only ace among the missing. Fischer stated that the only contact he had with Soviets was right after his shoot down and capture in China. Two Soviets arrived and confiscated his only two possessions, his ID

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[22]Joint Commission Support Branch, Interview with Retired Colonel Edwin L. Heller, 23 August 1993. Heller stated that he had been badly wounded in the loss of his aircraft and spent his two years of captivity under Chinese hospitalization and underwent four major operations.

[23]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Vladimir M. Roshchin, 18 February 1991, Moscow.

card and a photo of his crew chief standing next to his F-86. Subsequently, this very photo was produced by the Soviet ace who claimed to have shot Lt. Col. Fischer down.[24]

A Chinese Link in the Chain of Evidence. An interview with Shu Ping Wa, a former head of a division-level POW collection team (164th Division) in the so-called Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) serving in Korea, showed that a policy existed to turn over pilots to the Soviets. As he testified in the video recording shown at the April 1993 Commission meeting in Moscow, he himself turned over three American pilots to the Soviets just north of the front lines some time in the Winter months between November 1951 and March 1952. He stated that his superior told him that the "Russians wanted the pilots."[25]

A Special Air Force Unit. According to Dr. Paul Cole's interview with General Lobov, a special Soviet Air Force unit was organized and deployed, under the command of General Blagoveshchenskii, with the mission to capture F-86 pilots. Its mission was to force down Sabre jets in order to capture the pilots alive. The unit was composed of flyers from units in Mary, in the Turkmen SSR, and from the Primorskii Krai along the Pacific coast. Nine expert pilots were assigned to this mission, each of whom was required to sign a secrecy statement.[26]

> The mission was to cut a Sabre jet out of a dog fight, then force it to land intact. If the plan worked, the plane and the pilot could be captured simultaneously. In 1951 the mission was a failure. In the course of the operation the Soviets lost two of their own aircraft, perhaps because the Soviet pilots in this unit were forbidden to engage American aircraft in combat. The Soviets managed, however, to damage one Sabre jet which then made a forced landing. It is not known what happened to the pilot, though the Soviet pilots participating in the mission were told the American pilot managed to escape to the Yellow Sea where he was picked up by U.S. search and rescue forces. Some of the Soviet pilots doubted this version of events since they saw the American

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[24]Joint Commission Support Branch, Interview with Retired Colonel Harold E. Miller, 23 August 1993.

[25]Korean War POW Transfers to the Soviet Union: Eyewitnesses (RT: 18:35), prepared by Task Force Russia, April 1993.

[26]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Major Valerii Amirov, 18 December 1991, Moscow.

land several kilometers from the sea.[27]

Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Roshchin, author of the Korean War memoirs cited by Major Amirov in the publication, Na Strazhe, distinctly recalls seeing documents in the office of his regimental commander about the capture of an American pilot named Carl Crone in conjunction with a special operation in 1951 to capture an F-86. One of the 31 missing F-86 aviators believed likely to have survived is Captain William Delbert Crone.[28]

Major Avraham Shifrin. The most specific comments by former Soviet officers concerning the transfer of F-86s and their pilots to the USSR were those made by former Major Avraham Shifrin, at that time a lawyer in the Ministry for Military Production. Shifrin discussed his relationship with renowned aircraft cannon designer A. Nudelmann and General (NFI) Dzhakhadze[29], commander of Vasilii Stalin's support regiment at Bykova, near Moscow.[30] Shifrin recalls that Nudelmann expressed regular concern about the F-86, and about the recurring jamming problems with the cannon he designed for the MiG 15. He also recalled that Dzhakhadze related having to fly to Korea in his "Douglas, in order to pickup crash parts of MiGs and F-86s." Dzhakhadze had related to Shifrin that while he was in Korea on such a mission, the 'security organs' had asked him to transport a group of American F-86 pilots to Kansk in Western Siberia. The move had been done clandestinely, with the pilots travelling in civilian clothes under security escort.[31]

The Hunt for the F-86 Sabre Jet

Practically all Soviet officers interviewed about Human Intelligence collection in Korea have concentrated on the F-86 in more or less detail. A significant number of documents provided

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[27]Paul M. Cole, RAND Corporation, World War II, Korean War, and Early Cold War MIA-POW Issues (Draft) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 1993) p. 593.

[28]Valerii Amirov, "A Front Far Away From the Motherland," Na Strazhe, Moscow, 30 June 1992.

[29]TFR-M requested the Russian side to find General Dzhakhadze. To date, the Russian side has been unable to do so.

[30]Task Force Russia-Moscow has been making strenuous efforts to locate General Dzhakhadze to date but to no avail.

[31]Task Force Russia interview with Avraham Shifrin, 23 March 1993, Jerusalem.

by the Russian side likewise focus on this airframe.

Two senior Soviet officers distinctly remember a specific mission to capture an F-86, preferably intact, for the purpose of technical exploitation. Several others have commented on knowing about such missions. In a December 1991 interview, Colonel Georgii Plotnikov stated "our troops were hunting for F-86."[32] On 30 March 1992, Colonel Valentin Sozinov recalled a specific order to capture an F-86. Even General Lobov has stated:

> We wanted the F-86 gun sight at all costs. One F-86 crashed after it was hit. The aircraft lost fuel which prevented the pilot from ditching in the sea. The other F-86 landed in shallow water at low tide, the only problem was the gun sight had been damaged by gun fire by the crash. One F-86 was located off shore.[33]

Major Valerii Amirov, writing in Na Strazhe on 30 June 1992, again describes the arrival in North Korea in 1951 of the special detachment charged with the specific mission of taking an aircraft intact:

> This was very difficult to do, even though the best pilots joined this newly formed unit. During a battle, nine planes tried to force a Sabre to the ground and to force the pilot to land. But it didn't work and our men took losses . . . During a routine raid by American aviation, a fragment of an anti-aircraft shell damaged the rudder of one of the engines and the pilot landed on the seashore . . . . Around the downed Saber, a lively aierial battle was declared right away. The Americans rushed in to destroy the plane with bombs, the Soviet pilots to protect it until the gorund forces could access it. Finally, we succeeded in saving the Saber; it was disassembled, and was shipped to the Soviet Union. The fate of the American pilot remained unknown.[34]

Sand in the Fuselage. In addition to officers of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps in Korea, other former Soviet officers had memories of the seashore landings. On 30 March 1993, Task Force Russia in Moscow (TFR-M) interviewed a retired KGB lieutenant colonel, Yuriy Lukianovich Klimovich, who had served in Korea and

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[32]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Colonel Georgii Plotnikov, 17 December 1991, Moscow.

[33]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with General Georgii A. Lobov, 18 December 1991, Moscow.

[34]Valerii Amirov, "A Front Far Away From the Motherland," Na Strazhe, Moscow, 30 June 1992.

recounted that there was an effort to capture intact F-86s.[35] He also stated that he knew of an F-86 that had been forced down on a beach and transported to the Sukhoi Design Bureau in Moscow for exploitation.

> Klimovich had appeared on the Ostankino 1 TV New Magazine show "Chorta S Dva" and told of two F-86 "Sabre" fighters being brought to Moscow in 1951/52. Klimovich told TFR-M that a very close friend and confidant, now deceased, had confided to him that a U.S. F-86 and an American pilot had been brought to Moscow. His friend reportedly told Klimovich that one of the aircraft was in excellent condition and was disassembled at the Sukhoi Design Bureau in an attempt to copy it. Klimovich said that neither his friend nor he knew what happened to the alleged American pilot since he fell immediately into KGB hands.[36]

Lieutenant Colonel Klimovich then escorted Task Force Russia interviewers to the Sukhoi Design Bureau where they met designers who clearly remembered that an F-86 had been brought to the bureau during the Korean War. These designers confirmed Klimovich's assertion that two F-86s had been brought to Moscow, one in good and the other in poor condition. They recounted that it had been stripped of markings and serial numbers. None of them had spoken to an American pilot but they concluded that a pilot would be invaluable in helping them discern operational characteristics during reverse engineering. They did, however, receive information from a member of the project that appeared to be from a pilot. One of the designers remembered that this individual had once told him he was participating in the interrogation of the aircraft's pilot. The designers also stated that the aircraft had been at the Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG) Design Bureau.

The Task Force Russia interviewers then visited the Zhukovskii Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute (Tsentral'niy Aerogidrodinamicheskiy institut imeni Professora N. ye. Zhukovskogo-Tsagi)(formerly MiG Design Bureau) on 1 April 1993 escorted by Lieutenant Colonel Klimovich. There they spoke to Professor Yevgeniy I. Rushitskiy, Chief of the Institute's Information Division and Chairman of the History Section.

> During the course of the interview, Professor Rushitskiy confirmed that an F-86 had been delivered to the institute

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[35]The Russian side of the Joint Commission had been informed of the scheduled interview but declined to participate.

[36]Amembassy Moscow Message, 1411521Z Apr 93, POW/MIA Team - Moscow: Weekly Activity Report 13/93, March 28 to April 3, 1993.

to be disassembled and copied. According to the professor, when they were finished, all parts from the F-86 were destroyed or recycled. He also stated that when the aircraft was delivered to them from the State Red Banner Scientific-Research Institute of the Air Force[37] at Chkalovskyair Field north of Moscow, there were no longer markings or identification numbers of any kind on it.

One of designers distinctly remembered the study and disassembly of a sand-filled fuselage of an F-86 at the design bureau. This source also remembers an American pilot having been available at another location for follow-on questions. This story was repeated by other personnel from the Design Bureau.[38]

The remarkable central fact of this episode is that at least two and possibly three F-86 were captured and returned to Moscow for exploitation. At least one of the F-86s was captured by being forced down on a beach. This same information is provided by three separate sources: General Lobov, the retired KGB officer, and the designers from the Sukhoi and MiG Design Bureaus. The inescapable follow-on question deals with the presence of the pilots of the aircraft, held to assist in the exploitation of the aircraft. That presence is maintained by both the retired KGB officer and the designers. Who were the pilots? What became of them after they provided his information? Likely candidates are shown at Appendix B.

MGB and GRU: Who Did What?

In interviews with numerous former officers of the GRU (Military Intelligence) who served during in the Korean War, a distinct picture emerges of the specific roles of both the GRU and the MGB in the handling of POWs. The military intelligence officers uniformly describe a division of labor in which Army personnel capture POWs, GRU officers conduct tactical and operational interrogations, and then POWs are turned over for custody and final disposition to the MGB. This system operated from before World War II to the present. These officers repeatedly assert that if any POWs were taken to the Soviet Union, it would have been a closely controlled operation of the MGB at the time.

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[37]Gosudarst-vennyi Krasno-Znamennyi Nauchino-Issledovatel'sky Institut V.V.S.

[38]Amembassy Moscow Message, 1411521Z Apr 93, POW/MIA TEam - Mosocw: Weekly Activity Report 12/93, March 28 to April 3, 1993; also debriefings of Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Poltoratsky, U.S. Army Reserve, who had been a member of the TFR-M team that visited the design bureaus.

Colonel Georgii Plotnikov was asked hypothetically if it would have been possible to effect such a transfer without GRU officers being aware of it. "Yes," he answered without hesitation. "It would have been a KGB [MGB] operation in cooperation with North Korean intelligence. The Soviet Army had no Gulag and was not prepared to deal with a stream of prisoners. The KGB [MGB] could do all of these things." The Soviets had the capability to move POWs, the Koreans would have permitted such an operation, and transport across the PRC would have been no problem, in Plotnikov's view. "At the time there was train service from Pyongyang to Moscow with a stop in China." The POWs, he stated, "would have been loaded into trucks with canvas drawn around them, then transferred to trains at night . . . The North Koreans hated Americans. They would have cooperated in such an operation if asked by the Soviets. The North Koreans could have not said no to a Soviet request." In Plotnikov's view, "specialized organs" in the Soviet Union would have made requests for particular types of Americans. "Design Bureaus might have made such requests," he said. The Deputy Chairman of the KGB [MGB] would be the lowest political level that could have approved such an operation that kept the GRU out of the picture.

> Grabbing American POWs [would have been a] political decision in response to a request. Infantry was of no interest to Soviet intelligence. There would have been no regular transfer. American POWs would have been moved as specialists fell into the camps. They would be identified and moved. The interest would not have been in people who operated equipment as much as it would have focused on people who understood the principles of how things worked.[39]

Plotnikov's 'hypothesis' conforms to Avraham Shifrin's account of transfer of POWs by the "security organs" as well as the accounts of the exploitation of F-86s and at least one pilot by the Sukhoi and MiG Design Bureaus.

Further confirmation of the MGB role was provided by Major Valerii Amirov.

> The intelligence center in Sarashogan (Sary Shagan) belonged to the KGB [MGB]. A task was [started] from 1949-1950. Soviet engineers started to design Soviet anti-aircraft and missile equipment and weaponry. In other words the SA-75 (SA-2 Guideline) complex that later provoked such noise in Vietnam. They had to create a radar system for that complex and secondly, a missile system. The American Air Force then

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[39]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Trip Report of Moscow Visit December 15-22, 1991, pp. 10-11; and Interview with Colonel Plotnikov, 17 December 1991, Moscow.

was better than the Soviet one, by its flying characteristics. They were mostly interested in the Sabre planes, the F-84 [the Sabre was the F-86], it was also called "Cross". They were interested in weak points of the American planes. How to guide a missile in order to make Air Force actions more difficult. Second, they were interested in flying characteristics, materials used for building these planes and so on.

The source [of the requirement] was one of Beria's [Chief of the MGB] deputies, who was curator of that complex's construction. The construction of that rocket complex was a state task. In other words, it was like Komsomol [Young Communist League] construction. It was one of the most important directions of the engineers activities. Since Korea was a first encounter of the Soviet and US military equipment and technology, and the US Air Force was stronger then, there was a classified directive issued by the KGB . . . on collecting all the information concerning the US Air Force . . .

The First Directorate of the MGB was responsible for collecting information, and the other one, whose number I don't know was in charge of providing security. Discipline was very strict. Pilots could not cross certain parallels in order to fall on their own territory. In order to collect all the necessary data on the aircraft technology the first group was organized. They would collect planes' fragments and send them back through a window on the border. There was a window on the Soviet-[Chinese] border, Otpor station. This was the window for transporting planes, their fragments. They would transport everything including pieces of metal up to some navigation equipment, all documents they could find. They transported all this through Otpor[40] - Alma Ata - Sarashogan [Sary Shagan]. . .[41]

Major Amirov further stated that in January-February 1952, the MGB issued a secret directive through the Ministry of Defense to forces in the field in Korea to not only try to shoot down planes but to also capture pilots.[42]

So far in the work of the Commission, most of the information provided by the Russian side has been from former officers of the

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[40]Otpor was a czarist era name for Manchuria.

[41]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, Interview with Major Amirov, 18 December 1991, Moscow.

[42]ibid.

GRU. There has been a traditional rivalry and animosity between the GRU and KGB that may have influenced the uniform finger pointing by the GRU officers interviewed by the U.S. side. Unfortunately, the Russian side has provided no former officers of the MGB/KGB as sources of information. The only former officers of the MGB/KGB that have provided information have been those discovered through the research efforts of TFR-M. One was Lieutenant Colonel Klimovich who led TFR-M team members to the design bureaus. The other was KGB Lieutenant Colonel Valerii Lavrenstov whom TFR-M team members met in their early December visit to the Khabarovsk Krai. He confirmed much of the information provided by the GRU officers.

> Lavrentsov stated that during his research on Japanese and Korean POWs he ran across some interesting information that suggests that some Americans may have been held in Khabarovsk in "special houses" until they were able to recover from their wounds and were then sent on to Moscow and other places; however, there is no evidence in Khabarovsk who these people were.
>
> Lavrentsov agreed with the TFR-M assertion that the MGB would have beent he only organization with enough resources to accomplish that mission, even if only a few Americans were involved. Although he did not exclude GRU participation, he speculated that the Americans could have been moved by either train, ship or air to the USSR, and that when they wer in Soviet custody, their names would most certainly have been changed to Slavic ones. Lavrentsov suggested that an entire false background would have been concoctated for each prisoner.
>
> Lavrentsov said that the Americans would have been mainly pilots, taken for their technical expertise . . . According to Lavrentsov the GRU would have been intersted in the technical information, however, the security and movement of the POWs would have been handled by special MGB troops sent from Moscow . . . The reason he knows this occured was because he was able to find records of "unknown" people ordering food, drinks for "special houses."[43]

From the American side of the war, Lieutenant Colonel J. Philip Corso (Chief, Special Projects Branch of the Intelligence Division, Far East Command) was able to put together a picture of the personalities who ran the POW operations for the Communist side. This picture is reflected in the following statement:

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[43]Amembassy Moscow Message, 311004Z Dec 92, Subject: POW/MIA: TFR-M Members Visit to Irkutsk and Khabarovsk.

The control system for POW camps in North Korea shows the extent of involvement of Soviet "Advisors." The Secretary General of the top secretariat was a Soviet officer named Takayaransky, Director General of the POW control bureau was a Colonel Andreyev, USSR; its Deputy Director, Lt. Col. Baksov, USSSR; for the North Koreans, General Kim Ill, North Korean Army (alias Pak Dok San, USSR) and General Tu Fing, Chinese. The Chief of the Investigation Section (one of the three components of the bureau) was Colonel Faryayev, USSR).[44]

Three Case Studies: Inadvertant Glimpses into the Soviet Handling of POWs

The following three cases of Cpt Albert G. Tenney, 1Lt Roland Parks, and Corporal Nick Flores are examples of special handling of U.S. POWs by the Soviets. Cpt Tenney was never identified by the Communists during the Korean War as having been captured. 1Lt Parks and Cpl Flores were captured directly by the Soviets, interrogated, and, for unique reasons, turned over to the Chinese. We believe that save for these special circumstances, discussed below, both would have been likely candidates for transporation to the Soviet Union.

The Case of Captain Albert G. Tenney, USAF. Information on one of the pilots mentioned on Table 1, Cpt Albert G. Tenney has recently come to light. This information indicates that he and his aircraft may well have been transferred to the Soviet Union.

Several months ago, a Task Force Russia-Moscow interview revealed thatin the early 1950's, an F-86 was captured intact in North Korea. This plane was shipped intact to the Soviet Union for technical exploitation by the MiG and Sukhoi design bureaus in Moscow. The interviewee also stated that, at the time of delivery, the fuselage of the F-86 was filled with sand, indicating that the plane had made a forced landing on a beach. He also stated that the pilot of this aircraft accompanied the F-86 to Moscow, where he underwent debriefing.

The Joint Commission Support Branch recently interviewed former Korean era prisoner of war Brigadier General Michael Dearmond, USAF, ret. General Dearmond was an F-86 pilot who was shot down and subsequently interrogated by the Russians. He stated that he

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[44]Atrocities Speech --Preliminary Synopsis, 12 November 1953, p. 6; attached to this document is a cover letter to the Central Intelligence Agency, signed by Charles R. Norberg, Chairman of the POW Working Group, 12 November 1953.

had never heard of pilots disappearing but recounted that one incident was mystifying to him. Dearmond's interrogator once brought an identification card and a "chitbook" (officer's club purchase coupon book) from an F-86 pilot and asked Dearmond to explain the "chitbook." Dearmond asked about the fate of the pilot and the Korean interrogator stated that the pilot had crashed into the Yalu River and died. Dearborn remembers that the pilot was a Lieutenant (Tenny was promoted to Captain while in MIA status). The mystery came in Dearmond's observation that given the fact that the pilot ostensibly died in the Yalu River, the "chitbook" was not, and appeared never to have been wet. Dearmond stated that he completely disbelieved the North Korean's account of the fate of the unidentified pilot.[45]

On 21 December 1992, 72 pages of Korean-era documents (TFR 76) were passed to Task Force Russia-Moscow by the Russian side of the Joint Commission. These documents dealt exclusively with the Korean War period. Among these documents were inventories of personal effects, documents, etc. taken from shot down pilots. Only one of these inventory lists (TFR 76-37) has an identification card and a "chitbook" (listed as: an Officer's club ticket with coupons for mess. Consisting of 7 pages in two booklets). This is the inventory list for the F-86 pilot Captain Albert G. Tenney.

Captain Tenney (see Appendix B for circumstances of loss) crashed in the water at the mouth of the Yalu River on 3 May 52. The circumstances of his crash lead analysts to believe that he could have survived the crash. If the Koreans had tried to salvage his plane, they most likley would have towed it to shore and onto the beach. Since the landing gear was up at the time of Captain Tenny's crash, the plane would have been dragged onto the beach nose first, accounting for the mass of sand in the fuselage.

One final piece of evidence is provided through material provided by the Russian side of the Joint Commission. Captain Tenney's name appears on the "List of 59" entitled "A List of United States Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through an Interrogation Point."

The Case of First Lieutenant Roland Parks, USAF. The case of 1Lt Roland Parks, one of the repatriated F-86 pilots, is particularly interesting. In this instance, the Soviets directly interrogated an F-86 pilot, but because he had inadvertantly violated Chinese airspace, eventually turned him over to the Chinese.

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[45]Joint Commission Support Branch Interview with Brigadier General (ret) Michael Dearmond, USAF, 18 August 1993.

In an operation over North Korea his aircraft compass gyros became inoperative and he became separated from his flight. He finally ejected over the Liaotung Peninsula when he ran out of fuel somewhere between the Soviet military zone around Port Arthur and the Chinese city of Dairen. He was captured by Chinese peasants and picked up by Soviet personnel. He was taken to a Soviet airfield and briefly interrogated. Then he was taken to Port Arthur and rigorously interrogated by:

> relatively high-ranking Soviet military personnel. They went over the same questions, got the same answers but then extended the interrogation to a regular military intelligence interrogation. No question was raised as to the wrongfulness of his landing in Port Arthur. He recalled that the interpreter, whom he described as a wizened hunchback, had at one point said to him that 'we may tell the United States Government that you were killed in a crash.' No reason was given him for turning him over to the Chinese Communists.[46]

1Lt Parks' experience was recounted in his own words in U.S. News and World Report:

> 17 Sep 52. The Russians told me they were taking me to Moscow. I had told them I did not want to be turned over to the Chinese, and that's probably why they told me they were taking me to Russia. I thought they were taking me to the Siberian salt mines. I had made up my mind that if we kept going north toward Siberia I was going to go over the hill [escape] at all costs.
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> 18 Sep 52. We . . . finally arrived in Antung about 3 p.m. Near Antung airfield we stopped. A Russian officer went away and came back in about an hour with some Chinese officers. Then I was blindfolded while we drove about 30 minutes more, stopping at what I learned later was a Chinese military base . . . The Russians took away from me everything Russian that they had given me, destroying any

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[46]Samuel Klaus, "Interview with Lt. Roland W. Parks," 15 July 1955. The interview further stated, "When the Chinese got him they told him that they did not know what they were going to do with him. He might, they said, be sent to Korea to a prisoner of war camp, but on the other hand his case was special because he had come down in China." The fact that the Soviets turned Parks over to the Chinese might have been a necessary bow to Chinese sovereignty, since he did bail out, albeit inadvertantly, over Chinese territory.

evidence that I had been in Russian hands.[47]

In the absence of 1Lt Parks' official debriefings[48], the JCSB reinterviewed him recently. He provided the following information:

> About two weeks after Parks arrived at this compound [at the Port Arthur naval base], he was issued a full set of cold weather clothing: boots, overcoat, and shirts. Parks was told to put them on by the senior officer who questioned him. Parks was told, "We are leaving." Parks asked where he was being taken, and the Naval officer stated, "to Russia." Parks asked again, and the officer stated, "Siberia, where your situation can be properly resolved for you to return to the U.S." Parks stated that he did not want to go to Siberia because he had heard of the salt mines. The Naval officer stated that there were no salt mines in Siberia, and that he the Naval officer) was certain because he was from Siberia. Parks asked why he was going to Siberia and was told, "because diplomats must resolve these cases, but you will go and be with other Americans like you." Parks was loaded onto a truck and never saw the Naval personnel again . . . . For reasons that were not explained to Parks, he was taken by vehicle along the coastal road to the POW collection point in Antung, and was turned over to Chinese custody. Parks believes that they "changed their minds" about sending him to the Soviet Union because of his youth and lack of significant information.[49]

In this case, we have first-hand evidence that the Soviets interrogated an F-86 pilot directly with no Chinese or North Korean participation. Not only did they taunt him with hiding his POW status behind the plausable story that he had crashed but

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[47]"Prison Diary of Lt. Parks," U.S. News and World Report, June 24, 1955, p. 34.

[48]One of the serious gaps in our knowledge is the absence of the USAF debriefings of its repatriated pilots. In a letter to Mr. Roger Warren, dated 13 May 1991, Colonel Elliott V. Converse, III, Commander, Headquarters United states Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, wrote that these debriefings were destroyed about fifteen years before. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps debriefings were discovered by the JCSB at the National Archives in Washington in the late Spring of 1993. The JCSB requested the Archives to begin declassification. The Army's debriefings are at Fort Meade, Maryland.

[49]Joint Commission Support Branch, Interview of Retired Colonel Roland Parks, 24 August 1993.

they also frankly stated that he would be transported to the Soviet Union. Only some unknown understanding with the Chinese resulted in his transfer to their custody. One can speculate that the Chinese would naturally be sensitive, as a matter of sovereignty, about the custody of a U.S. pilot who landed on their territory. Since 1Lt Parks figured in the subsequent major propaganda campaign built around the so-called 'Arnold B-29 Crew', the Chinese were probably eager to acquire U.S. pilots who could fill the bill of indictment that the U.S. had criminally violated Chinese sovereignty.

The Case of Corporal Nick Flores, USMC. Our most persuasive argument comes from the debriefing and recent personal account of former POW Corporal Nick A. Flores, USMC.[50] In Corporal Flores' case, we have a foot soldier who was interrogated by the Soviets at Antung <u>because he was mistaken for an F-86 pilot</u>.

Taken prisoner at Koto-ri in November 1950, Corporal Flores spent almost three years in a prisoner of war camp. Corporal Flores resisted his captors at every opportunity and attempted to escape three times. On the last occasion, he stayed at liberty for approximately ten days. His fellow prisoners outfitted him with uniform parts that would give him the best chance at survival: USAF boots, coveralls, and flight jacket, the latter with 'U.S. Air Force' written on the front. Corporal Flores led a dozen men out of Camp One at Chang Song on 22 July 1952. The majority of the men returned to the camp due to sickness, wounds or illness, or fear, but Corporal Flores and one other POW pressed on. On 28 July they agreed to split up in order to increase the chance that one would escape to UN lines. Corporal Flores pushed on westward toward the coast since he had heard the U.S. Navy was operating off shore near Sinuiju.

On the morning of 1 August, however, he blundered into a camouflaged anti-aircraft position overlooking Sinuiju. There he surprised a group of Caucasians wearing 'clean' uniforms and speaking Russian. Confronted by an apparent officer in English: "You are the American pilot," Flores was bound and blindfolded. Instead of being returned to his POW camp, he was bundled into a truck and taken across the twin bridges at Sinuiju to Antung in Manchuria. He was taken into a building where. His escort officer turned him over to someone else, saying again in English, "Here is the American F-86 pilot." He then met a translator and an interrogator who introduced himself as a Soviet colonel whose name he cannot remember. During the interrogation, he heard the

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[50]The following information was taken from Corporal Flores' debriefings after his repatriation and from extensive interviews with members of Joint Commission Suppport Branch, 3-10 August 1993.

noise of several other people who appeared to have been listening.

Over the ensuing four-hour interrogation, Corporal Flores continued to maintain that he was a Marine enlisted man and an escaped POW but realized that his U.S. Air Force uniform clearly identified him as an aviator. What he did not know was that, shortly before he had stumbled upon the anti-aircraft position, another American had been in that vicinity. At 0920 hours, Major Felix Asla, USAF, piloting his F-86 in the vicinity of Sinuiju's twin bridges, was jumped by MIGs and was last seen spinning toward the southeast. Major Asla was never seen again.

During the four hours of interrogation, Corporal Flores was repeatedly told to confess that he was an F-86 pilot and was asked the identity of his unit and the location of its operating base. The interrogator also pursued another line of questioning by asking repeatedly about his knowledge of germ warfare. Ominously, the interrogator said that "all the other pilots had confessed," so he should as well.

After approximately four hours, in which he was never physically mistreated or abused, another person came into the room and interrupted the interrogation with a message in Russian. The Soviet colonel was audibly distressed and upset with whatever information he had just received and broke off the interrogation. Corporal Flores was taken to another room and asked by someone identified as a nurse if he needed any medical help. She asked several questions posed as if he were a pilot but left when he maintained he was not. After about 18 hours he was loaded aboard a truck, still blindfolded. The blindfold was then removed, and he was able to see the earth-covered bunker where he had been. It was located on a major airfield with rows of MiGs parked nearby. He was then driven back under guard across the Yalu river and turned over to North Korean authorities who returned him to Camp One.

The significance of Corporal Flores' experience in Soviet hands is that it demonstrates that the Soviets had a special handling procedure for pilots, especially F-86 pilots. This special procedure involved taking the captured pilot directly to a Soviet interrogation site, completely bypassing the normal POW camp processing procedures. This procedure confirms statements of Shu Ping Wa who, described the direct transfer of American pilots from capture to Soviet custody. There were three key elements of this special handling procedure illustrated in the experience of Corporal Flores:

1. He was taken directly from capture to Soviet custody for interrogation.

2. He was believed to be the pilot of an F-86.

3. There was no mistreatment, in expectation of potential cooperation in the fulfillment of intelligence collection requirements.

Conclusions

The Soviets had a program of the highest priority to capture F-86 aircraft and pilots for technical exploitation.

- The Soviet forces in North Korea had 70 teams whose mission was the recovery of U.S. pilots. The Chinese turned pilots over to Soviet officers as a matter of policy.

- Soviet policy was to establish a veil of deniability over the transfer of prisoners by taking them directly after capture to the Soviet Union. Such prisoners were never mixed with the general POW population in North Korean or Chinese hands.

- There is no record of repatriated U.S. POWs who were transported to the Soviet Union for technical exploitation and then repatriated.

- The Soviet forces in Korea devised and executed a plan to force down at least one F-86 intact.

- Intact F-86 aircraft and at least one pilot were delivered to the Sukhoi and Mikoyan Design Bureaus for exploitation.

- A number of POWs, notably including F-86 pilots, were transferred by air to the Soviet Union for exploitation of their technical knowledge.

- The evidence suggests that the Soviets had a special interest in the MIAs shown on Table 1 and specifically Cpt Albert Tenney and 1Lt Robert Neimann. There is a good chance that Cpt Tenney and his aircraft were transferred to the Soviet Union for exploitation.

Part II

The Hostage Connection

POW Exploitation. By the middle of 1950 when Stalin ordered the invasion of South Korea, the Soviet Union already had extensive experience with the transfer and incarceration of large numbers of prisoners. Tens of millions of its own citizens had been consigned to the GULAG as well as millions of German and Japanese POWs and POWs from other armies allied to the Axis. The Axis POWs, in particular, were specifically exploited as labor, much of it skilled, to rebuild the war-ravaged and labor-short Soviet Union. The labor camp system had become an industrial empire of Beria's NKVD within the Soviet Union, an empire constantly in need of fresh workers to replenish and expand the work force.

In 1950 the MVD produced a thousand-page study on the exploitation of foreign POWs. This Top Secret document was entitled, About Spies, Operative Work with POWs and Internees taken Prisoner During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People, 1941-1945. "This document summarizes and assesses the methods and results of programs used to exploit foreign POWs on Soviet territory."[51] As part of this exploitation program, Soviet security agencies heavily recruited agents among these POWs to be activated upon their eventual return to their homelands. Additionally, the Soviet Union used the possession of these POWs to exact important political and economic concessions from the new governments of Germany and Japan. Therefore, by the middle of 1950, the Soviet Union had at hand a vast, well-practiced, efficiently-operating, and profitable system for the collection, incarceration, and exploitation of POWs.

The Stalin - Chou en-lai Meeting. The exploitation of POWs as Soviet state policy was blatantly contained in the minutes of a 19 September 1952 meeting between Stalin and Chinese Foreign Minister Chou en-lai in which he recommended that the Communists keep back twenty percent of United Nations POWs as hostages.

> Stalin. "Concerning the proposal that both sides temporarily withhold twenty percent of the prisoners of war and that they return all the remaining prisoners of war - the Soviet delegation will not touch this proposal, and it

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[51]Paul M. Cole, The Sharaskha System: The Link Between Specialized Soviet Prison Camps and American POW/MIAs in Korea? (Draft) (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corp., 1993) p. 14.

remains in reserve for Mao Tse-tung."[52]

This letter was provided by the Russian side of the Joint Commission. We believe that large numbers of United Nations POWs, the overwhelming number of whom were soldiers of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), were already being secreted away in camps throughout the Soviet Union, as will be shown by the statements of Lieutenant General Khan San Kho and Zygmunt Nagorski.

Lieutenant General Kan San Kho. The essence of the Stalin - Chou en-lai meeting was corroborated by a senior retired Soviet officer, Kan San Kho, who had been seconded to the North Korean People's Army, promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, and who eventually served as the deputy chief of the North Korean MVD. He stated in November 1992 that he assisted in the transfer of thousands of South Korean POWs into 300 to 400 camps in the Soviet Union, most in the taiga but some in Central Asia as well. LTG Kan's testimony shows the POW element of the GULAG was operating efficiently at this time in absorbing large numbers of UN POWs. Although LTG Kan admitted only to knowledge of Korean prisoners, his interview strongly suggests the possibility that other UN POWs, including Americans, could also have been condemned to the camp system.[53]

Colonel Gavril I. Korotkov. Another Soviet source is retired Soviet Army Colonel Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov, who served from July 1950 to mid-1954 as part of a general staff-based analytical group reporting to Marshal Rodion Malinovskiy, then commander-in-chief, Far East Military District, on developments in intelligence (tactical and technical) gained from the ongoing war in Korea. Specifically, Korotkov's political section was responsible for reporting on political information, the morale and psychological well-being of U.S. units engaged in Korea. This information was to be used in support of propaganda activities and possibly the refinement of operational/contingency plans. Colonel Korotkov provided the following information in an interview in August 1992:

Soviet military specialists had been given approval to interrogate U.S. POWs. There were two stages to this process:

> Stage 1, Interrogations in North Korea. These were conducted at the front, immediately after POWs had been

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[52]"Minutes of the Meeting Between Comrade Stalin with Chou en-lai, 19 Sep 1952, translated in Draft TFR 37-11.

[53]Amembassy Moscow Message, 271140Z, Subject: POW/MIA: Interview with General Kan San Kho.

transferred into the hands of the North Korea-based Soviet forces. Initial contact focused on gaining operational and tactical intelligence, such as order-of-battle, etc.

State 2, Transfer to the Soviet Union. Korotkov was not aware of exactly who selected which American POWs for transfer to the Soviet Union for further interrogation, or which criteria were used in the selection process, but the most likely characteristics were experience, i.e., seniority - field grade officers and above. Two separate groups handled these military interrogations, the GRU-subordinated intelligence group which was interested in detailed tactical and technical intelligence, and the main political directorate-subordinated group, which was interested in political intelligence.

Korotkov had only limited knowledge of the procedures for the movement of Americans to and through the USSR. he did not know where the processing facilities or camps were located in North Korea. On several occasions he had visited the Soviet naval base at Pos'yet which served as a transit point for the movement of American POWs north to Khabarovsk. Although there was an airfield nearby, he believed that the bulk of the Americans were transported from Pos'yet to Khabarovsk by rail. But most likely at least some of the POWs were moved from North Korea or China by air.

Korotkov stated that the American POWs were kept under the control of the MGB. Generally, military interrogators had only a few hours with the Americans, although they sometimes had up to a few days, depending on the nature and perceived value of the information or source. While the POWs were at Khabarovsk, the MGB controlled them when they were not being interrogated. Once the process was completed, the POWs were returned to the control of the MGB. Therefore, Korotkov stated, he had no direct knowledge of the fate of these personnel. Although Korotkov did not know the exact number, he felt that the number of Americans processed through Khabarovsk was in the hundreds. Despite the fact that his political group had access to only a portion of the total number of POWs interrogated by the analytical group, he felt confident in this high estimate. Following the rout of the 24th Infantry Division in July and August 1950, there were "tens of American POWs" as Colonel Korotkov put it, but the number climbed quickly through the first months of the war. Furthermore, he indicated that operational directives said that Americans caught behind North Korean lines should be taken alive, not killed. A number of American pilots were taken alive. Moreover, Korotkov indicated that the Koreans were quite willing to allow the Soviets direct access and eventual control over U.S. POWs. By contrast, the Chinese, according to Colonel Korotkov, were very reluctant to release control over Americans who came into their hands.

Colonel Korotkov further stated that he had personally interrogated two American POWs, one of whom was a LTC Black. He could not remember the names of any other of the American POWs who had been processed through Khabarovsk. All reports on U.S. POW interrogations from Colonel Korotkov's analytical group were forwarded to the Headquarters, Far East Military District. The political group's reports were also sent directly to the Soviet Army's Main Political Administration, 7th Directorate, and the technical group's reports were sent through GRU (Military Intelligence) channels to Moscow. An effort was made to gain the cooperation of POWs and turn their allegiance. Those prisoners who demonstrated a willingness to cooperate were separated from the majority and given favorable treatment. However, as he remembers it, the number of Americans who cooperated was very small, in contrast with the Soviet experience with German POWs in World War II, of whom a higher percentage was willing to cooperate. An overall report was compiled which assessed the morale of U.S. servicemen in Korea. Colonel Korotkov stated that he had seen a copy of this report in the GRU archives at Podol'sk.[54]

In his first interview, Colonel Korotkov stated that he had interviewed a U.S. officer, LTC Black. We believe that this may have been USAF LTC Vance Eugene Black who was reported by other POWs to have died of mistreatment and malnutrition in a North Korean POW camp.[55] Another retired Soviet officer, GRU Colonel Aleksandr Semyonvich Orlov, stated that he had arranged for an interview by a Pravda correspondent with LTC Vance Black.[56] In his subsequent interview with MG Loeffke, Colonel Korotkov denied having interrogated LTC Black, stating that he perhaps we had confused the name with a black POW. Task Force Russia interviewers, however, were adamant that he had been referring to

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[54]Amembassy Moscow Message, 241259Z Aug 92 Subject: POW/MIA Team Interview with Colonel Korotkov.

[55]Lieutenant Colonel Vance Eugene Black, assinged to the headquarters of the 19th Air Force, was on a B-29 of the 98th Bomb Group that was shot down by enemy flak on 2 May 1951 over Pyongyang, North Korea. He died in captivity on or about 1 November 1951. His death was witnessed by 1Lt Robert J. O'Shea, USMC. Lt. Col. Black died of mistreatment, and starvation at the infamous North Korean POW camp called "Pak's Palace".

[56]Amembassy Moscow Message, 151645Z Oct 92, Subject: POW/MIA: POW/MIA Team Interview With Colonel (Ret) Orlov. See also Pravda Special Correspondent, "The Way of Interventionists," Pravda, 14 August 1951, p. 4 (translated in TFR 31-1). Colonel Orlov stated that LTC Black was considered a suitable subject for interview because of his position as a staff officer.

the family name "Black" rather than to the black race. In this second interview, Colonel Korotkov remembered that the first officer he interviewed had been an Army first lieutenant, most likely from the 24th Infantry Division, but that he could remember nothing else. He had better recall about an Air Force pilot because he found much in common with him, such as color of hair (light), height (about 6'2"), rank (captain). He also said the pilot was about 28 to 30 years old. Colonel Korotkov also stated that while he was assigned to the project of interrogating Americans in the Far East during the Korean War, he also interrogated Japanese POWs, captured in World War II, and still held in Soviet cutody. Here is an admission that foreign POWs were part of an overall system of exploitation.[57]

Colonel Korotkov changed his statement in a subsequent interview with Major General Bernard Loeffke, former Director of Task Force Russia (now Joint Commission Support Branch - JCSB), in September 1992 after being contacted by a member of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. He then stated that the interrogations took place somewhere undefined, which he could not remember, in the Chinese-Korean-Soviet tri-border area. In MG Loeffke's words:

> Since that encounter, the colonel changed his story as to the location where he interrogated U.S. POWs. Even after having been contacted by the KGB official, COL Korotkov agreed to answer questions on tape in front of Russian LTC Osipov, General Volkogonov's assistant. This interview took place on September 29. He said he and other Soviet officers in Soviet and at times Chinese uniforms had interrogated U.S. POWs over a 1-2 year period (1951-52) in an area near the borders of USSR, Korea and China. In this new version, Korotkov claims that he did not know, if that particular location was in Russia or not. The important point is that he would not say that it was not inside Russia. In all previous interviews he had specifically said that these interrogations took place in Khabarovsk. The colonel was obviously willing to oblige the security services by not saying that it took place in Khabarovsk; but he was not willing to say that it did not take place on Russian soil. The colonel's official statement on tape, and in front of a Russian officer assigned to the Joint POW/MIA Commission cannot easily be refuted. Korotkov is a respected military

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[57]Amembassy Moscow Message, 261132Z Oct 92, Subject: POW/MIA: Follow-Up Interview with Colonel Gavriil Korotkov.

officer with prestigious academic credentials.[58]

What Colonel Korotkov did not do was to deny that Soviet military personnel, including himself, were directly involved in the interrogation of a "large" number of American POWs during the Korean War.[59] In a subsequent videotaped interview recorded by Mr. Ted Landreth, an Australian journalist, Colonel Korotkov clearly stated that American POWs had been taken "through Khabarovsk" into the camp system. Their ultimate destination he did not know.

Later in discussions with Colonel Stuart Herrington, during the December 1992 Joint Commission meeting in Moscow he restated that the prisoners were escorted by a female Soviet Border Guards Officer in Soviet uniform. He also stated that he conducted his interrogations in Soviet uniform. During the Korean War, as the Russian side has explained, the Soviets attempted to establish deniability of involvement by a policy of dressing its military personnel, who served in Korea, in Chinese or North Korean uniforms. U.S. intelligence reporting during the Korean War as well as the testimony of a number of POWs who had contact with Soviet personnel tends to confirm this policy. There are also some examples of the Soviets' failure to adhere to this policy, usually involving hasty interrogations conducted shortly after capture. However, these examples are in the minority. Specifically, there are no known examples of Soviet officers wearing Soviet uniforms participating in formal interrogations with the exceptions of the cases of 1Lt Parks and Cpl Flores, cited in Part I. For Soviet personnel to have worn their uniforms during the interrogation of U.S. POWs argues at a minimum that the POWs were in the Soviet Union and that the Soviet authorities may have considered the issue of deniability to be irrelevant for men who were never going home.

Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso. Further evidence comes from contemporary U.S. intelligence sources. LTC Philip Corso, who served as Chief, Special Projects Branch of the Intelligence Division, Far East Command, under Generals Douglas MacArthur, Matthew Ridgway and Mark Clark during the Korean War. One of his primary duties was to keep track of enemy POW camps in North Korea, their location, the conditions at these camps, the estimated number of U.S. and other UN POWs held at each camp, and their treatment at the hands of the enemy. He has stated

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[58]Amembassy Moscow Message, 021430Z Oct 92, Subject: POW/MIA: Maj Gen Loeffke's Personal Assessment of Moscow POW/MIA Team's Operations.

[59]Amembassy Moscow Message, 261132Z Oct 92, Subject: POW/MIA: Follow-Up Interview with Colonel Gavril Korotkov.

emphatically under oath before the U.S. Senate that U.S. POWs were taken to the Soviet Union. He stated that his information came from hundreds of intelligence reports from agents, defectors, North Korean and Chinese POWs, civilians, and repatriated U.S. POWs.[60] He also stated that at least two and possibly three trainloads of U.S. POWs were transferred from Chinese to Soviet custody at the rail transshipment point of Manchuoli on the Manchurian-Chita Oblast border of China and the Soviet Union. He estimated that each trainload could carry a maximum of 450 POWs. His information formed the basis of a major national policy decision by President Eisenhower in 1954. LTC Corso's professional determination of the situation was based on the concentrated application of the intelligence resources of the United States.[61]

LTC Corso stated during a videotaped interview with Task Force Russia in January 1993:

> I secured this information from I'd say, hundreds of prisoner of war reports, from Chinese and North Korea, who actually saw these prisoners being transported and later I talked to a few high level Soviet defectors who confirmed it - that this transfer was going on . . . . And that they were being taken to the Soviet Union. We estimated they were taken there for intelligence purposes. The operation, as far as we were concerned, was a GRU/NKVD operation in those days. And it was mostly to elicit information from them, possibly take over their identities or use them as agents, or . . . to assume their identities. And we had information along this line that this was being done . . . . Also, we had information that once the information was taken from them, and they were used, how the Soviets saw fit to use them, they were eliminated, and they would never come back. Which actually happened - they never came back. They were killed, which was Soviet policy, also.
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> The source of this information, as I said, was hundreds of prisoner reports, North Korean and Chinese prisoners that we took, defectors and other intelligence that I can't describe for certain reasons. And, as I say, photographs, because we

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[60]The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has conducted an intensive search for the hundreds of intelligence reports that Lieutenant Colonel Corso has cited. No reports of that magnitude have been found.

[61]Statement of Lt. Col. Philip J. Corso, U.S. Army (ret.), Hearings of U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, Washington, D.C., November 10, 1992. Interview with Lt. Col. Corso by Task Force Russia, 11 November 1992.

> photographed the camps, and so we saw movements, and the people on the ground, civilians, also would come through. This was the intelligence process, put together very, very carefully, for a long period of time, matching all information and putting them together to show a pattern in the picture.[62]

LTC Corso's single most dramatic source was North Korean Lieutenant General Pak San Yong. Pak was a Soviet colonel of Korean ethnicity who had been seconded to the North Korean People's Army and promoted to lieutenant general. He was also a member of the North Korean Communist Central Committee. Pak had been captured and disguised himself as a private but had been denounced by anti-Communist fellow prisoners. Under interrogation, he revealed that U.S. POWs had been sent to the Soviet Union and that they had been prioritized by specialty and that he had a list of those specialties. Pak had no information on the number of POWs sent to the Soviet Union.[63]

In response to a question on how closely the defector information paralleled the information from POWs, LTC Corso responded:

> Very close, in fact. What I was seeking from the defectors was the KGB/GRU operation. Not so much that prisoners were being taken to the Soviet Union, because we already knew that. But I wanted to learn more of the method of the operation of the GRU/KGB on how they used these prisoners, because that was the intelligence aspect of this. We knew that some were being used for espionage and maybe some for sabotage and we wanted to know what we could find out. So, mostly, my information on numbers and the transfer of prisoners was not taken from defectors. I didn't need that from defectors - we had that information, but operations within the Soviet Union, and the way they treated and what they did with these prisoners - that was where we were lacking in a lot of our information. And that I tried to get - and I got it - from defectors.[64]

LTC Corso's concern that U.S. POWs were being recruited and trained for espionage missions was born out in June 1954 when the U.S. Army advised the Air Force that

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[62]Statement provided by LTC Corso to Task Force Russia, 23 February 1993, and video interview of LTC Corso conducted with Task Force Russia on the same date.

[63]Annex B to Task Force Russia Biweekly Report 13 November 1992, Subject: Interview with LTC (Retired) Philip Corso.

[64]Ibid.

evidence had been uncovered which concerned the assignment of Sabotage and Espionage missions to repatriated American prisoners of war during "Big and Little Switch," and that quite recently new cases of this type have been discovered.[65]

The memorandum further stated that "Army intelligence could not rule out the possibility that POWs had accepted 'sleeper' missions." The Army took this seriously enough to bar repatriated POWs from accepting overseas assignments for eighteen months after their return to the United States.[66]

Lieutenant Colonel Delk Simpson. LTC Corso's determination and that of the Far East Command were corroborated in part by a more humble source in March 1954 when a former Soviet railway worker made an extensive statement to the U.S. Air Force Liaison Officer, LTC Delk Simpson, in Hong Kong. He also described his observation of the transfer of several trainloads of U.S. POWs from Chinese to Soviet custody at Manchuoli, his place of work, in 1951 and 1952. He first observed POWs in the railroad station the Spring of 1951. About three months later, he observed a second shipment and was impressed with the large number of blacks among the POWs. He was also able to identify OD outer clothing and the field jacket M1943, the very uniform item that the mass of U.S. POWs would be wearing. The railway worker further stated that he was told by a close Russian friend whose job was numbering railroad cars passing through Man-chu-li that numerous other POW trains passed through Man-chu-li. These shipments were reported often and when United Nations forces were on the offensive.[67]

John Foster Dulles. Based on the Hong Kong report and other information that the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, sent a message to Ambassador Boylan in Moscow on 19 April 1954 stating, "This report corroborates previous indications UNC POWs might have been shipped to Siberia during Korean hostilities." He then instructed Ambassador Boylan to approach the highest

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[65]Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Intelligence, Department of the Army (Secret) from Gilbert R. Levy, Chief, Counter Intelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, June 14, 1954.

[66]Paul M. Cole, World War II, Korean War, and Early Cold War MIA-POW Issues (draft) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 1993) p. 578.

[67]Foreign Service Despatch, Amcongen, Hong Kong, Desp. No. 1716, March 23, 1954.

available level Foreign Ministry official with an Aide Memoire.[68] On 5 May, the following message was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry:

> The United States Government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The United States desires to receive urgently all information available to the Soviet Government concerning these American personnel and to arrange for their repatriation at the earliest possible time.[69]

The Soviet Foreign Ministry responded with a dismissive note on 13 May 1954:

> The assertions in the note of the United States Government that American prisoners of war, participants in military action in Korea, have been transferred to the Soviet Union and are at the present time maintained under Soviet guard are without any kind of basis and are clearly invented, as there are not and have not been any such persons in the Soviet Union.[70]

Captain Mel Gile. Echoing the claims of both LTC Corso and LTC Simpson, was the information provided by CPT Mel Gile, Far East Command Liaison Group, during the Korean War. In interviews in 1990, CPT Giles maintained that one of his agents had found that 63 U.S. POWs were being shipped by truck and rail from Pyongyang, North Korea to Chita, in the Soviet Union in January 1952. Gile insisted that the report was considered so credible that the U.S. command cancelled air strikes on the railway that would be carrying the POWs.[71]

CCRAK. An example of the reporting sources described by LTC Corso was an Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities

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[68]State Department Message from Secretary of State to U.S. Ambassador, Moscow, dtd 19 April 1954.

[69]Aide Memoire (No. 947) from U.S. Embassy Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, May 5, 1954.

[70]Soviet Foreign Ministry Note, dtd May 13, 1954.

[71]"Chronology of Policy and Intelligence Matters Concerning Unaccounted for U.S. Military personnel at the end of the Korean Conflict and During the Cold War," Prepared by the Office of Senator Bob Smith, Vice-Chairman, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, November 10, 1992, p. 6.

Korea (CCRAC) memorandum of 24 February 1953 which reported:

> The following information was received from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea Government. Report originated from the Nationalist Chinese Embassy --
>
> According to reliable information, the Communist Chinese Force have transferred UN POWs to Russia in violation of the Geneva Conference. These POWs will be specially trained at Moscow for espionage work. POWs transferred to Moscow are grouped as follows: British 5, Americans 10, Canadians 3, and 50 more from various countries.
>
> Russia has established a Higher Informant Training Team at Uran, Hodasong (phonetic) in Siberia in October 1952. 500 persons are receiving training, one third of them women. Japanese constitute the largest group and the others are Korean, Filipinos, Burmese, and American.

The date of this information is October - 22 December 1952. The U.S. Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea, comments in this memorandum:

> This office has received sporadic reports of POWs being moved to the USSR since the very inception of the hostilities in Korea. These reports came in great volume through the earlier months of the war, and then tapered off to a standstill in early 1951, being revived by a report from January of this year (1953). It is definitely possible that such action is being taken as evidenced by past experience with Soviet authorities. All previous reports state POWs who are moved to the USSR are technical specialists who are employed in mines, factories, etc. This is the first report that are being used as espionage agents that is carried by this office.[72]

Zygmunt Nagorski. In addition to the Man-chu-li transit point, other routes for POW transfer to the Soviet Union have been identified. The journalist, Zygmunt Nagorski, obtained this information from two members of the MVD and an employee of the Transsiberian Railroad. This other POW transit point was through the North Korean-Soviet border at Pos'yet between November 1951 and April 1952 when ice closed the Pacific coast and the Tatar Straits. These POWs were taken from Pos'yet through Chita by rail to Molotov (now Perm). The dates of this operation coincide

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[72]Memorandum, Headquarters, Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea, 8242 Army Unit, CCRAK # M-101, 24 February 1953, Subject: CCF Military Conference concerning the Far East Situation.

exactly with the dates for the transfer of POWs in the Hong Kong report, November 1951 to April 1952.[73]

Another route was by sea when the ice receded. POWs, apparently mostly South Koreans from the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and other South Korean political prisoners, were transported by sea to Soviet Far Eastern ports such as Magadan and Okhotsk from which they were moved to the infamous Kolyma complexes around Yakutsk and to Vankarem on the Chukotsk Sea and to Ust Maisk on the Aldan River. These prisoners apparently were selected because of their anti-communist attitudes. The POWs sent to the Yakutsk ASSR were forced to build and staff coal mines, earth works, and dams and were under the supervision of the Ministry of Coal Production and the Ministry of Forests. The camps were under the command of an MVD officer named Sorotchuk. The POWs sent to the Chukotsk Peninsula, apparently to the number of at least 12,000, were used to build roads, electric power plants, and airfields. A civilian party functionary, probably a member of the MGB, was in charge of political education and indoctrination. He appeared to have been an ethnic Korean Soviet named Chinbo. There was a high mortality rate among all these prisoners.[74]

From Pos'yet and possibly Man-chu-li about 300 U.S. and/or European POWs reportedly were transported by rail to Chita and from there to Molotov (now Perm) in February 1952 under heavy MVD guard. In the previous August and November of 1951, there had also been the movement of POWs from Chita. These latter POWs had been sent to Archangelsk Oblast to camps at Kotlas on the Northern Dvina and to Lalsk. In March of 1952, POWs passed through Khabarovsk and Chita to Molotov about every two weeks in small groups of up to 50 men. Chita appears to have been a concentration point for the POWs where they were incarcerated in the local MVD prisons, and when a sufficient number had been collected, then sent on to Molotov. The POWs may have been undergoing a selection process at this time. From December 1951 through the end of April 1952, trains of U.S. and European (probably British) POWs passed at intervals into the Komi-Permysk National District to Molotov, Gubakha, Kudymkar, and Chermoz. In April 1952, a number of U.S. officer POWs, referred to informally as the 'American General Staff', were kept under strict isolation in Molotov. In the town of Gubakha and in the industrial regions of Kudymkar and Chermoz, there were three isolated camps and one

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[73]Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report, 15 July 1952, Subject: Location of Certain Soviet Transit Camps for Prisoners of War from Korea. Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr., "Unreported G.I.'s in Siberia," Esquire, May 1953.

[74]Ibid.

interrogation prison for U.S. POWs. At a camp called Gaysk about 200 POWs were kept and forced to work in workshops assembling rails and doing various technical jobs. These camps were completely isolated. Political education and indoctrination was carried out by the local Party organization headed by a functionary named Edovin, a delegate from the Obkom of the Komi-Perm National District. All these camps were under the command of an officer named Kalypin. Every few days several of the POWs were removed from the camps and not returned.[75]

In 1990 Nagorski was quoted in the Los Angeles Times as stating that in the 1950s his foreign reporters had an extensive 'source network' of truck drivers and other working-class Soviets employed at or near prisons in Molotov, Khabarovsk, Chita, Omsk, Chermoz and elsewhere. Nagorski claimed his sources informed him that there were still up to 1,000 Americans POWs in Siberia from the Korean War when he last had contact with them in the late 1950s.[76]

Other Foreign Sources. Over the years reports of American POWs in Soviet custody were provided by a number of foreign sources which are described below:

> **Turkish Traveler.** On 5 February 1954 a reliable, friendly foreign intelligence service reported to an agency of the the U.S. information they had received from a Turkish source traveling in Central Asia. The source, who had been interrogated in Turkey, states that while at Mukden, Manchuria, he "saw several coaches full of Europeans who were also taken to the USSR. They were not Russians. Source passed the coaches several times and head them talk in a language unknown to him." The source stated that one of the coaches was full of wounded Caucasians who were not speaking at all.[77]

Conclusions

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[75]Ibid.

[76]Senator Bob Smith citing the Los Angeles Times, 8 July 1990.

[77]Charity Interrogation Report No. 619 referenced in declassified cables dtd 23 march 1954 and cited in "Chronology of Policy and Intelligence Matters Concerning Unaccounted for U.S. Military Personnel at the End of the Korean Conflict and During the Cold War," Prepared by he Office of Senator Bob Smith, Vice-Chairman, Select Committed on POW/MIA Affairs, November 10, 1992.

The Soviets transferred several hundred U.S. Korean War POWs to the USSR and did not repatriate them. This transfer was mainly politically motivated with the intent of holding them as political hostages, subjects for intelligence exploitation, and skilled labor within the camp system.

- There were at least two rail transshipment points for POWs:

  - Through the Manchurian rail transshipment point of Man-chu-li into the Soviet Union.

  - Through North Korea to the rail center at Pos'yet across the border in the Primorksiy Krai.

  - Large numbers of UNC POWs were transported by sea to a number of Soviet ports on the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk for rail transportation into the interior of the Soviet Union.

- Large numbers of South Korean POWs were also taken as part of this program and made up the bulk of the transfer population.

- A intense period of activity for the rail transportation of POWs was November 1951 through April 1952. Transportation by ship took place, for at least some of the prisoners, during the ice free months.

- From Khabarovsk POWs were sent by rail to another collection point in Chita and then to a number of camps in the Komi-Perm National District.

Part III

Evidence from Within the Soviet Union

Once the transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union was completed, the prisoners would have faced a long period of imprisonment. In that time, the opportunity increased for their whereabouts to become known to citizens of the USSR. Most of that knowledge appears logically to have come from other prisoners in the vast Soviet concentration camp system. Before 1992, occasional reports of contact with U.S. POWs in the Soviet camp system filtered out of the Soviet Union and were recorded by United States intelligence agencies. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of former Soviet citizens have come forward to report such contacts.

One of the difficulties in matching the names provided by these former Soviet citizens was the practice by Soviet prison authorities to often change the names of foreign prisoners and to forbid them to use their real names. This practice was confirmed by Lieutenant General (retired) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Yuriy Filippovich Yezerskiy.

> Yezerskiy stated that tracking down specific foreigner prisoners in the former Soviet prison system would bevery difficult because the names of foreigners were routinely changed, usually to other foriegn rather than to Russian names. He suggested that the best source for the real names of prisoners wouldlikely be other prisoners who knew them. He suspected that records of name changes may exist, most likely somewhere in Moscow.[78]

In possible confirmation of Lieutenant General Yezerskiy's testimony, none of the persons named in the following sighting reports can be identified through U.S. casualty records of the Korean War.

Sightings in the Komi ASSR

Sighting No. 1. Lieutenant General Yezerskiy further stated that he had seen four to five Americans in Vorkuta, in the Komi ASSR, in 1954-1956. These individuals were at the time all in their early to mid-twenties. He said he thought they were all from the

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[78]Amembassy Moscow Message, 2711132Z May 93, Subject: POW/MIA Team - Moscow: Weekly Activity Report 19/93, May 9 to 15, 1993.

World War II period but that they could have been from the Korean War.

Sighting No. 2. The Case of Captain Mooradian. One of the most precise reports was made by Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kazersky to Task Force Russia-Moscow team members on 27 October 1992. Mr. Kazersky had been decorated twice in the Great Patriotic War but thereafter had been sentenced to twenty years in the camps. He served at a camp called Zimka in the Komi ASSR and was released in the general amnesty after Stalin's death. He stated that while in the camp, he met U.S. Korean War POW from California. According to the TFR-M report:

> Kazersky was aware that there were Americans at Zimka from camp rumor, and, in the Fall of 1952 or the Spring of 1953, he had a single enounter with an American pilot who had been shot down in North Korea and forced to land in Soviet territory near Vladivostok. The pilot said his plane had a crew of three and his radioman had been in Zimka as well, but had possibly been moved to another camp called "Yaser" after a brief period. The pilot did not know what had happened to the third crew member.
>
> The pilot remained at Zimka for three to six months, and was then transferred to an unknown location. He was about thirty years old, five feet seven inches tall, slender, dark-haired and dark-complected, and in good health. He did not smoke and had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks. Kazersky believes he was of southern European origin, perhaps Italian or Greek. The pilot, whose nickname was "The American" (Amerikanets) lived in barracks number six, and worked in the consumer goods (Shirpotreb) section making frames for greenhouses. Kazersky had direct contact with the American only once and communication was difficult. the pilot had been in isolation for a year or more, and had learned very little Russian. Kazersky knew very little English. He could not recall the pilot's name (prisoners were almost always addressed by nickname, but is still firmly convinced that he was an American pilot.[79]

At our request provided this information to Air Force Casualty Affairs which did a computer search of its MIAs using the military and biographical information stated by Mr. Kazersky. Air Force Casualty found a suprisingly close match in Cpt Ara Mooradian, USAF, who was reported missing in action on 23 October 1951. Although not all information matched perfectly, there was agreement on the following points:

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[79]Amembassy Moscow Message, 301715Z Oct 92, Subject: POW/MIA: Interview with Nikolay Dmitriyevich Kazersky.

1. Mooradian's date of loss could have placed him in a camp at the time stated by Kazersky.

2. He was from Fresno, California, the state Kazersky remembered.

3. Mooradian fit the physical description and was dark-haired and complected. He was of Armenian origin and could have been confused in Kazersky's memory for a southern European.

4. Six members of Mooradian's B-29 were listed as missing in action, two bodies were recovered, and five were repatriated. The man Kazersky met could have been refering to the survivors of his crew that were in the camp, one of whom was the radar -- not raido -- operator.

5. Although there was nothing in Cpt Mooradian's file that indicated he had a facial scar, an examination of his photo in Air Force Manual 200-25 showed a faint round scar on his right cheek.[80] This photo was enhanced by the National Photographic Interpretation Center whose analysts concluded that the mark was not a photographic anomaly but probably was indeed a scar.

The areas of disagreement with Kazersky's statement are:

1. Mooradian's aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea which was on the opposite side of the Korean Peninsula from Vladivostok.

2. He was the bombadier rather than the pilot of his B-29.

3. His aircraft had a crew of thirteen and not three.

4. Cpt Mooradian was 6'1/2" tall instead of 5'8".

At a subsequent interview, Mr. Kazersky was shown a photo line-up of missing pilots and asked to identify the American he had met. He chose four photos as possibly being the one, one of which was that of Cpt Mooradian.

Sighting No. 3. On 18 March 1993, TFR-M team members interviewed former prison guard Grigoriy Nikolayevich Minayev in St. Petersburg. Minayev claimed a guard from another battalion who worked at the maximum sercurity prison in Mozindur (Mezhador), just south of Syktyvkar, Komi ASSR, told him in September 1983 of an American Korean War POW who was being kept there under maximum security (Osobyy Rezhim). In addition, Minayev said that his

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[80]Air Force Manual 200-25, Missing in Action -- Korea, 16 January 1961, p. 95.

warrant officer training courses mentioned that foreign inmates were held in Syktykvar during the fifties and sixties. While he was guard at the inter-oblast MVD/KGB hospital (ITK-12) in St. Petersburg, Minayev maintained that as recently as three years ago he saw foreign inmantes brought there and secretly treated in a separate hospital wing in a ward for "imperialist intruders."[81]

Sighting No. 4. On 26 March 1993, in response to the advertisement placed in the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Alekandra Yakovelenvna Istogina called TFR-M to report that her husband, Leonid Sidko, had met an American POW in Minlag Camp, Inta, which is located south of Vorkuta in the Komi ASSR. She stated that Sidko had met and served with the American from 1953 to 1954, whose name he remembered as Alek Muller Zayolitz. According to Istogina, her husband had described him as approximately 30 years old, had dark hair, and spoke Russian well. She said her husband indicated that the American was transferred with several Germans to Moscow in 1954.[82]

Sighting No. 5. On 6 April 1993, TFR-M team members received a letter at the U.S. Embassy in Talinn from Mr. Elmar Vesker. Mr. Vesker stated that after Stalin's death in March 1953, an American named Boris Holtzman, was taken to Schahto Kapitalnaya Camp 75/1 in Vorkuta. The American spoke some Estonian and fluent English and Russian. He was about 175-180 cm tall, stout, round-faced, curly-haired. Mr. Veskar stated that the American was sent to the Soviet Union from China and captured. He was first imprisoned in a special camp in Moscow after which he was taken to Vorkuta.[83]

Sighting No. 6. On 15 April 1993, TFR-M team members in Tallinn, Estonia, received a letter from Mrs. Lidia Hallemaa. Mrs. Hallemaa enclosed a photo, taken in 1955 in a prison camp in Vorkuta, where her brother Otto Adler had been imprisoned. Adler told his sister that three or four Americns were imprisoned in the same camp. Mr. Adler is now dead.

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[81]Amembassy Moscow Message, 281821Z Mar 93, Subject: POW/MIA: Interview With Former Prison Guard Grigoriy Minayev in St. Petersburg.

[82]Amembassy Moscow Message, 060913Z Apr 93, Subject: POW/MIA Team - Moscow: Weekly Activity Report 12/93, March 21 to 27, 1993.

[83]Amembassy Talinn Message, 201028Z Apr 93, Subject: POW/MIA: Information from Residents of Estonia.

Sightings in Khabarovsk

Sighting No. 7. Japanese POWs. A Japanese POW from World War II repatriated from POW Camp No. 21 at Khabarovsk, stated that (1) he had heard from a camp guard that two Americans had been brought to Khabarovsk prison and were being investigated as spies; (2) he had heard from Soviet guards, prisoners, and laborers in April and May 1953 that 12 or 13 Americans, crew members of a military plane shot down by the Soviets were in a Khabarovsk prison; (3) he heard from prisoners in 1951 or early 1952 that an American fisherman, captured in the Gulf of Alaska, was brought to the Magadan region; and (4) he heard from a guard on a Soviet prisoner train at No. 2 station, Khabarovsk, in about June 1952 that there was a prison camp in the USSR for Americans only. Another Japanese reported that he had heard from the chief of the POW camp at Debin in October 1953 that an American Air Force officer was in a military hospital 500 miles north of Magadan (location unlocatable due to phonetic rendering). He reported that the officer had been sentenced to 25 years in prison in 1925 as a suspected spy.[84]

Sighting No. 8. On 4 August 1992, Task Force Russia-Moscow team members interviewed Vladimir Yakovlevich Voronin, a prisoner in Semipalatinsk, who claimed to have met three Americans while serving an earlier sentence from 1951 to 1953 at the 5th Lagpunt in Khabarovsk.

> To the best of Voronin's recollection, the three Americans arrived at the camp in October 1952, and departed two months later. Voronin mainly observed the Americans at a distance, overa period of only a few weeks. The three Americans left the camp together with the Vlasov contingent (anti-communist Russians who had served under General Vlasov with the Germans in World War II) of about 20. A camp orderly, Volodya Khrustalev, told Voronin that the American had left with the "traitors". Krustalev told Voronin tht the Vlasov troopers were shot, but he did not know the fate of the Americans . . . . No one really knew who these Americans were, Voronin asserted. They were rumored to be U.S. military flyers, but none spoke Russian.[85]

Voronin further related that he had had contact with one American for an hour on a woodcutting detail. The American was notably thin, well over six feet (the tallest man in the camp), appeared

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[84]Information Report, 29 December 1953, Subject: American Prisoners-of-War Held in the USSR.

[85]Amembassay Message, 050135Z Aug 92, Subject: Interview in Semipalatinsk with Individual Who Saw Americans in Khabarovsk.

to be about 30, had light hair and fair complexion. The other Americans appeared to be of darker complexion and were about 5'10". All three Americans stood together at camp roll calls.[86]

Sighting No. 9. On 22 March 1993, TFR-M received from the Central Russian Military Museum copies of a secret telegram and a top secret report from the files of the convoy trooops which show the transfer in September 1953 of a Cecil August Stoner (NFI) from Khabarovsk to Moscow.[87]

Sighting No. 10. On 7 April 1993, TFR-M received a letter from Artur Roopalu in Estonia. Mr. Roopalu stated that in 1951, he spent two days in a Vladivostok transit camp with two Americans. They had arrivd there ealier and stayed after he left. These Americans did not have contact with other prisoners. One of them was abut 185 cm tall, well-built, dark, and the other was 180 cm tall. Mr. Roopalu heard in this camp that many Americans were taken from Khabarovsk to Magadan and from there to Kalama [Kolyma] or Puhtavanina.

Sightings in Irkutsk

Sighting No. 11. In August 1956, a recently returned Austrian prisoner of war, Mr. Albert Skala, reported to the U.S. Embassy in Vienna that he had known a U.S. Army officer, named Lieutenant Racek, with whom he had been imprisoned in the Soviet Union. Mr. Scala stated that the American was an officer of armored forces in Korea. Skala stated the he first met Racek in 1951 in Prison #2 in Irkutsk and that the two were cellmates there and subsequently in Lubyanka Prison in Moscow until the time of Skala's release in 1955.[88]

Sighting No. 12. On 11 December 1992, a TFR-M team representative interviewed Romas Kausevicius near Vilnius, Lithuania. Mr. Kausevicius consistently repeated his story of meeting an American pilot named Robert in an Irkutsk KGB prison

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[86]Ibid.

[87]Amembassy Moscow Message, 060913Z Apr 93, Subject: POW/MIA Team - Moscow: Weekly Activity Report 12/93, March 21 to 27, 1993.

[88]Amembassy Vienna, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 169, August 21, 1956, Subject: American Citizen Detained in USSR.

cell in June 1950.[89]

Sighting No. 13. From 6-12 December 1992, TFR-M team members traveled to Irkutsk and Khabarovsk to investigate the claim made by Mr. Romas Kaluskevicius that he had met an American POW in transit prison Camp #7 in Irkutsk in the late Summer of 1950. TFR-M confirmed that Mr. Kaluskevicisu was, indeed, imprisoned in Irkutsk in that period, ending on 3 August 1950.[90]

Sighting in Taishet

Sighting No. 14. On 6 April 1993, TFR-M received a letter from Enn Kivilo in Estonia. Mr. Kivilo stated that he was imprisoned in prison camp L/P 011 (50 km from Bratsk in the direction of Taishet) in 1952 and served with an American POW named Jimmy Braiton or Baker. The American was about 180 cm tall, had dark eyes, played chess very well.[91]

Sightings in Mordova

Sighting No. 15. On 2 August 1993, TFR-M team members interviewed Mr. Boris Uibo in Estonia. Mr. Uibo stated that in 1952 he served with an American Korean War POW in Camp #18, a close-hold camp for foreign prisoners, near Potma in Mordova (Mordvin ASSR). This American's name was Gary or Harry and, according to Uibo, definitely an American shot down in the Korean War. The American and Uibo worked together making wooden chess pieces. Uibo described Gary as no older than 25. Uibo stated that there was a concerted effort by the Soviets to hide the fact that they were holding foreign prisoners. Sometime late in 1953, Uibo was transferred to a hospital in Camp #9 and lost track of Gary. Uibo said that Soviet citizen prisoners were permitted to write two letters per year in Russian so they could easily be censored, but foreign prisonsers, including Gary, wer not permitted this privilege even thought hey could have got someone to translate their letters into Russian. He said no Soviet would take the risk of sending a letter on behalf of, or mentioning, a

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[89]Amembassy Moscow Message, 311510 Dec 92, Subject: POW/MIA Team - Moscow: Weekly Activity Report 22/92, December 6 to 26,1992.

[90]Amembassy Moscow Message, 311004 Dec 92, Subject: TFR-M Trip to Irkutsk and Khabarovsk.

[91]Amembassy Talinn, 201028Z Apr 93, Subject: POW/MIA: Information from Residents of Estonia.

foreign prisoner.[92]

Sighting No. 16. Sometime in the Winter of early 1954 after his release from Camp #9, Mr. Uibo was transferred to Camp #5 where he was assigned to work in the power station. It was at this camp that he met a black American pilot whom he described as 180 cm tall, slim, and athletic. He worked in a woodworking shop where furniture was made for the Kremlin. He believes that the American was still in the camp when he was released on 30 March 1955.[93]

Sighting in Novosibirsk

Sighting No. 17. On 22 June 1993, a TFR-M team representative interviewed Mr. Bronius Skardzius near Utena, Lithuania. Mr. Skardzius told of his encounter with Americans at a Novosibirsk transit prison about June, 1952. He stated that there were two American pilots in the group of prisoners brought into his small room. The other prisoners were Germans. The Americans told him they had been shot down in Korea. They were dressed in khaki shirts and trousers with no belts or shoelaces (the authorities did not allow these to be kept). The first American told him that he was a captain in the Air Force.[94]

Sighting in the Bashkir ASSR

Sighting No. 18. On 13 April 1993, TFR-M team members in Tallin, Estonia, received a letter from Felix Pullerits. Mr. Pullerits stated that from 1953 to 1955 he was imprisoned along with an American pilot named Lieberman, in a prison camp of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Building No. 18, near Salavati in the Ishinbai district of Bashkiria (Bashkir ASSR).[95]

Sightings in Norilsk

Sighting No. 19. During the week of 19-26 April 1993, TFR-M team members interviewed Mr. Apollinaris Klivecka in Vilnius,

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[92]Amembassy Moscow Message, 161156 Aug 93, Subject: POW/MIA Interviews in Estonia.

[93]Ibid.

[94]Amembassy Vilnius Message, 191431Z Apr 93, Subject: Reports of Contact with POW/MIAs.

[95]Amembassy Talinn Message, 201028Z Apr 93, Subject: Information from Residents of Estonia.

Lithuania. Mr. Klivecka stated that while imprisoned in the Kairakam (Death Field) worked at the infirmary a the camp near Norilsk. In 1953 shortly after Stalin's death (March), he was ordered to inspect twenty prisoners who were waiting at the guard gate. He stated that two of them were so emaciated and exhausted that he recommended they be placed in the infirmary. One of them was a Japanese officer from the Kwangtung Army captured at the end of World War II. The other was an American pilot, named Robertson. The American spoke fluent Korean and also used a Korean name, Kim Sung Chung. He spent three months recuperating and regaining his strength. Since the infirmary was shorthanded, he was trained as a nurse's aid. Mr. Klivecka stated that Robertson and he lived in the same barracks until his release in January 1955. The American explained that he had been shot down over North Korea but had not been captured immediately. Since he spoke Korean, he turned himself in claiming that he was fleeing South Korea and that his mother was Korean, his father European. Korean officals sentenced him to a work camp where American POWs were imprisoned, especially pilots. When one of them recognized him, his Korean captors interrogated and tortured him. After he revealed his identity, he was turned over to the Soviets. Since he used two names, he was accused of espionage and sentenced to 15 years inprisonment. After Stalin's death, all the prisoners received Red Cross packages except the American.[96]

Sighting No. 20. The weeks of 3-14 May 1993, TFR-M received a letter from Mr. Valentinas Piekys, Vilnius, Lithuania who wrote that he had been a political prisoner in the Kapchikan Komsomolsky Camp near Norilsk. He stated that in 1949-1950 two Americans in military uniform were brought to the camp. They were in the camp for three months and then sent to some other place.[97]

Sightings in Kemerovo

Sighting No. 21. During the week of 19-26 April 1993 in Vilnius, Lithuania, TFR-M team members received a letter from Mr. Povilas Markevicius. Mr. Markevicius wrote that in the Spring of 1952 he met two American prisoners while imprisoned in Kemerovo Oblast. The Americans said they had been sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. He described the one he had conversations with in poor Russian as about 170-173 cm, of swarthy complextion, and with dark hair. The other American was taller and with auburn

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[96]Amembassy Vilnius Message, 261531Z Apr 93, Subject: Report of Contact with POW/MIAs.

[97]Amembassy Vilnius Message, 170936Z May 93, Subject: POW/MIA Report of Contacts.

hair. The main topic of conversation was always escape. One rainy and windy night in the Spring the Americans actually did escape. Usually when escaped prisoners were caught,their dead bodies were put in the middle of the square to threaten others. However, he did not see any dead bodies after this incident.[98]

Sightings in Kazahkstan

Sighting No. 22. In April 1993, TFR-M team members in Vilnius, Lithuania, received a letter from Mr. Jokubas Bruzdeilinas who was imprisoned in a camp for political criminals at the Dzezhkazgan Mines, Karaganda Oblast, Kazakh SSR. Mr. Bruzdeilinas wrote that he served with an American pilot of the rank of major named Joseph shot down in either Korea or Vietnam. His date of birth was approximately 1920. This argues for an officer in the Korean War. Mr. Bruzdeilinas also wrote that the pilot was a Lithuanian American which was why he was put in a camp for Lithuanian prisoners.[99]

Sighting No. 23. During the week of 3-14 May 1993, TFR-M received a letter from Mr. Jonas Zilaitis who wrote that he had served in the Kengyro Camp, Dzezkagan Oblast, in the Kazakh SSR. He claimed to have met a black American pilot there approximately at the time of a prisoner rebellion in May-June 1954.[100]

Sighting in Archangelsk

Sighting No. 24. On 12 January 1993, a retired Ukranian military veteran telephoned the U.S. Embassy in Kiev that he saw an American citizen in a prison camp in Russia's Archangelsk Oblast in 1969 or 1970. He did not meet the man personnaly but heard him speak English. The veteran identified himself only as "Viktor" said he had been assigned to the labor camp (Vypravno-Trudova Kolonia) in the Achangelsk provincial center of Yerstevo as a driver. Viktor characterized the American prisoner as robust and taller than average. Viktor was never told his name and heard no more about him. Vikor put his age at late 50s to

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[98]Amembassy Vilnius Message, 261531Z Apr 93, Subject: Report of Contacts With POW/MIAs.

[99]Amembassy Vilnius Message, 1914312Z Apr 93, Subject: Reports of Contact With POW/MIA's.

[100]Amembassy Vilnius Message, 170936Z May 93, Subject: POW/MIA Report of Contacts.

early 60s.[101]

Patterns Among the Sightings

Out of twenty-two sightings, six are in the Komi ASSR. The Komi ASSR was home to the infamous Vorkuta concentration camp complex. We know that there were Americans in this particular area because five of the most well-known U.S. citizens imprisoned in the Soviet Union (John Noble, William Marchuk, Homer Cox, Leland Towers, and Milford Cumish) all served their sentences in just this area. John Noble has stated that, although he did not see any American POWs in his camps at Vorkuta, he did hear rumors that they were in the complex.[102] The Komi ASSR also on a direct rail line from the Komi-Permskaya National District and the Perm Oblast, the areas Mr. Nagorksi identified as the end of the line for Americans POWs.[103] Apparently the end of the line was a little further north than Mr. Nagorski was able to detect.

Another four sightings were in prison camps in and around the city of Khabarovsk. Each of these sightings is described in terms of the transit of prisoners. Khabarovsk was a transit point for U.S. POWs as also described by Mr. Nagorski. This association was confirmed by Colonel Korotkov's statements that tens if not hundreds of POWs were interrogated there and his later statement that they transited Khabarovsk to unknown locations within the camp system. Three of the sightings were in Irkutsk, also a transit point in the movement of prisoners.

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[101]Amembassy Kiev Message, 141707Z Jan 93, Subject: Additional POW/MIA Information.

[102]John Noble, Interview with Task Force Russia, 1992. Mr. Noble stated further that he did see former Soviet soldiers in the camps as prisoners, sentenced for having been captured in Korea by the Americans who repatriated them.

[103]Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report, 15 July 1952, Subject: Location of Certain Soviet Transit Camps for Prisoners of War from Korea; Zygmunt Ngorski,Jr., "Unreported G.I.'s in Siberia," Esquire, May 1953.

Summary

The Soviet and Americans sources and documentation already discussed present a consistent and mutually reinforcing description of Soviet operations to transport U.S. Korean War POWs to the USSR. These sources, where they frequently overlap, agree in the following basic elements of this operation:

1. The Soviet Union transported U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union and never repatriated them. The transfer program had two elements:

   - The first element was an in execution of an intelligence collection requirement and resulted in the transfer of a limited number of POWs with specialized skills, mostly F-86 pilots and other personnel for the purpose of technical exploitation.

   - The second element was politically motivated and resulted in the transfer of several hundred POWs with the intent of holding them as political hostages, for intelligence exploitation, and for use as skilled labor within the camp system.

2. The transfer operation was conducted and carefully controlled by the MGB.

3. Khabarovsk was a center for POW control operations in the Soviet Far East. Interrogation operations were based there. It also served as a temporary internment site for POWs. The Komi-Permskaya National District, the Perm Oblast, and the Komi ASSR appear to be the locations where many of these POWs were kept.

4. Other prisoners, mostly F-86 pilots, were exploited to support the work of Soviet aircraft design bureaus.

Postscript

After the death of Stalin in March 1953 and the subsequent execution of Beria, the possession of U.S. POWs as hostages may have been seen as a liability by the succeeding Soviet leadership. With the deepening of ideological animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union, acknowledgement of the taking of POWs to the Soviet Union, could only have further worsened that already deadly relationship. According to COL Corso, President Eisenhower did not press the POW issue to the

hilt because he feared that it could have precipitated general war. Eisenhower feared 8,000,000 American dead if war occurred at this time. From the other side of the dark glass, the new Soviet leadership might well have had the same fears and consigned the POWs in their hands to oblivion.

Appendix A

How Many Men are Truly Unaccounted for from the Korean War?

One of the more difficult problems we face in arriving at an estimate of how many Korean War POWs that may have been taken to the Soviet Union centers on a determination of how many men are truly missing in action from that conflict. Any POWs transferred to the Soviet Union would come from this group. Presented on the next three pages is one estimate of "truly unaccounted for", prepared by Dr. Paul M. Cole, RAND Corporation, in close consultation with the U.S. Army Central Investigation Labratory, Hawaii (CILHI)

Dr. Cole's calculations yield a total of 2,195 who are truly missing. By eliminating cases where the death was witnessed or documented, he has arrived at the total of 2,195 individuals whose fate is unknown. Unfortunately, this method does not yield a list of the 2,195 **by name**.

At this time, CILHI is reviewing each of its 8,140 casualty (BNR) files and entering the information into a new database. This project will be not completed in less than year. Upon completion, the database will be able to provide a by-name list of those who are "truly unaccounted for".

BNR Cases That Could Not Have Been Transported to the USSR[104]

As of February 1993 the number of American BNR (Body Not Recovered) cases from the Korean War stood at 8,140. This figure is used as the baseline for the following derivation of how many BNR cases were confirmed as deaths by eye witnesses. The purpose of this exercise is to determine the number of U.S. BNR cases whose death was not witnessed or otherwise documented. Those whose deaths were witnessed or documented are not candidates for transport to the USSR.

The subset of BNR cases that could have been transported to the territory of the USSR may be estimated by subtracting from the 8,140 figure the sum individuals whose death was witnessed or otherwise documented. Among the BNR cases that could not have been transferred to the territory of the USSR are the following:

(1) BNRs whose death was witnessed by repatriated POWs and others and reported to UNC and U.S. officials.

(2) BNRs lost outside of Korea (Japan, for example) and after the Armistice. Korean War casualty data include a number of deaths that occurred beyond the geographic limits of the KWZ (Korean War Zone) and after the end of the Korean War. These cases were included in Korean War data at the time of the incidents under the Graves Registration Sevice concurrent death policy.

(3) BNRs located in UN cemeteries in North Korea.

(4) BNRs whose isolated burial locations were recorded by the GRS. These locations are usually specific to name and always include geographic location.

As shown in the following table, the deaths of at least 73 percent of all BNR cases were witnessed by repatriates or otherwise documented.

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[104]Paul Cole, RAND Corporation, World War II, Korean War, and Early Cold War POW/MIA Issues, Volume I: The Korean War (draft) (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, Aug 1993) pp. 163-164.

Table 2. BNR Cases Where Death was Witnessed by Repatriates Or Otherwise Documented

1.	Missing at action at sea:	293
2.	Confirmed POW (BNR) deaths:	2,119
3.	Total U.S. graves on North Korean Territory:	2,096
4.	U.S. Burials linked to aircraft crash sites:	412
5.	BNR cases occuring outside Korea:	53
6.	BNR (died during death marches):	959
7.	Post-war BNR cases grouped with war data:	13
	Total confirmed or Documented BNR Deaths	5,945

Notes:

1.This figure derives from CILHI data as of February 1993.

2.The total number of witnessed POW camp deaths is 2,730. The 2,119 number represents current POW (BNR) cases, thus 611 remains were recovered and indentified since the 2,730 figure was derived.

3.UNC temporary cemeteries, 1,520; Total isolated burials, 576 (Army 217; Air Force 4; Branch and nationality unknown, 108; Memorial Division, QM data on unidentified American isolated burials, 247). This figure does not include POW camp graves since (a) These were the subject of Operation Glory repatriations and, (b) The total number of POW deaths (buried and unburied) is counted in category two.

4.Headquarters Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ) consolidated lists of air crashes into onemaster list that shows 322 crash sites and 412 casualties listed by KCOMZ as "number of remains" and "burial" number. There isno indication that these remains are any other than American personnel.

5.Figure derived from CILHI data. This includes BNR cases that occurred in Japan or between or between Japan and Korea, for example.

6.This number derives from evaluated reports of deaths on marches obtained following Operation Big Switch. The number of evaluated cases was reduced from 1,367 based on Little Switch debriefings or repatriates to 959 following evaluation of Big Switch repatriate reports.

7.Data from CILHI records.

Maximum of 2,195 BNR Cases. Of the 2,195 BNR Cases with no direct evidence of death (8,140 - 5,945 = 2,195), a large percentage were combat fatalities who were disintegrated by explosives or simply lost on the battlefield. Given the nature of the and duration of combat in Korea, the estimate of battlefield casualties that resulted in BNR cases[105] ranges as high as 3,070. There is no way to be precise about this figure, but it must be greater than zero in calculation.

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[105]Col. Harry Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts on File, 1987) p, 165. Summers estimates that the majority of MIA cases were due to combat conditions that did not permit the recovery of the body.

Appendix B

31 Missing USAF F-86 Pilots Whose Loss Indicates Possible Capture

	Name	Date of Casualty
1.	Cpt William D. Crone	18 Jun 51
2.	Cpt Robert H. Laier	19 Jun 51
3.	1LT Laurence C. Layton	2 Sep 51
4.	1LT Carl G. Barnett, Jr.	26 Sep 51
5.	Cpt Charles W. Pratt	8 Nov 51
6.	1LT Charles D. Hogue	13 Dec 51
7.	1LT Lester F. Page	6 Jan 52
8.	1LT Thiel M. Reeves	11 Jan 52
9.	1LT Charles W. Rhinehart	29 Jan 52
10.	1LT Thomas C. Lafferty	31 Jan 52
11.	CPT Charles R. Spath	3 Feb 52
12.	CPT Jack C. Langston	10 Mar 52
13.	1LT James D. Carey	24 Mar 52
14.	Maj George V. Wendling	13 Apr 52
15.	CPT Albert G. Tenney	3 May 52
16.	CPT John F. Lane	20 May 52
17.	Maj Felix Asla, Jr.	1 Aug 52
18.	Maj Deltis H. Fincher	22 Aug 52
19.	Cpt Troy G. Cope	16 Sep 52
20.	2LT Jack H. Turberville	18 Nov 52
21.	1LT Donald R. Reitsma	22 Dec 52
22.	2LT Bill J. Stauffer	26 Jan 53
23.	1LT Paul J. Jacobson	12 Feb 53
24.	1LT Richard M. Cowden	9 Mar 53
25.	1LT Robert R. Neimann	12 Apr 53
26.	Cpt Frank E. Miller, Jr.	27 May 53
27.	1LT John E. Southerland	6 Jun 53
28.	1LT Allan K. Rudolph	19 Jun 53
29.	Cpt Charles E. Gunther	19 Jun 53
30.	1LT Jimmy L. Escale	19 Jun 53
31.	2LT Gerald W. Knott	20 Jul 53

Source: USAF Casualty Affairs

1. Pilot: Captain William D. Crone, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 18 June 1951
Status: MIA

Captain Crone was participating in a four ship combat mission in the Sinuiju area. Approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Sinuiju, the formation was attacked by eight enemy aircraft at 25,000 feet. Captain Crone was last seen in a 360 degree tight right turn. Circumstances of his loss could not be ascertained and an aerial search revealed no clues as to his fate.

2. Pilot: Captain Robert H. Laier, USAF
Date of Casualty: 19 June 1951
Status: MIA

Captain Laier was participating in a four ship fighter sweep in the area of Sinuiju when he came under attack from enemy aircraft. When last seen, his aircraft was seriously damaged, trailing smoke, and in a steep dive at approximately 10,000 feet, 30 kilometers southeast of Sinuiju. An aerial search for his aircraft wreckage was unsuccessful. A subsequent, unofficial Chinese propaganda broadcast supports a belief that he survived the shootdown and was captured. **Additional information: Captain Laier had some engineering training at the University of Nebraska.**

3. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Laurence C. Layton, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 2 September 1951
Status: MIA

Minutes after arriving in the target area, the flight engaged in combat with a number of enemy fighters. During the action, Lieutenant Layton's plane was hit. He radioed that he was going to try to reach the northwest coast of Korea and bail out. Another member of the flight accompanied Lt Layton and observed him parachute from the damaged F-86 near the mouth of the Chongchon-Gang River, roughly six miles off the coast. Subsequent information reveals that Lt Layton is believed to have been rescued by persons aboard a large power boat operated by the enemy.

4. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Carl G. Barnett, Jr., USAFR
Date of Casualty: 26 September 1951
Status: MIA

Lieutenant Barnett was on patrol just north of the Sinanju River at 26,000 feet when his element engaged in aerial combat with

Four MIGS. Both F-86s of his element turned into a tight right turn. After about 160 degrees of the turn, the element leader still had visual contact with Lieutenant Barnett. One or two of the MIGs were firing at what was estimated as a 70 degree deflection angle and well out of range. Upon completion of the turn, the flight leader looked for Lieutenant Barnett but was unable to establish visual contact. When last seen, Lieutenant Barnett appeared to be in no trouble and in the opinion of the flight leader, if he was hit, it was an extremely lucky shot. An F-51 pilot in the area at the time reported seeing an F-86 trailing smoke at 8,000 feet and in a 30 degree dive. Other than the smoke the aircraft appeared to be under positive control. Subsequently, this F-86 crashed and when the F-51 pilot investigated, saw no signs of life near the wreakage.

5. Pilot: Captain Charles W. Pratt, USAF
Date of Casualty: 8 November 1951
Status: MIA

Captain Pratt engaged a twelve ship enemy in the Pyongyang area. Seconds later, he radioed that his F-86 had been hit and that he was going to bail out. When last observed, his aircraft was at an altitude of 15,000 feet, heading toward the coast west of Pyonyang in a forty-five degree dive. A subsequent aerial search was unsuccessful. **Additional information: Captain Pratt had engineering training and had attended the USAF Institute of Technology in Dayton, Ohio.**

6. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Charles D. Hogue, USANG
Date of Casualty: 13 December 1951
Status: MIA

Twenty miles northeast of Sinanju, a flight of enemy fighter aircraft was encountered and during the ensuing action, Lieutenant Hogue radioed that he believed he had been hit. During the remainder of the engagement, which continued for about four minutes, visual and radio contact was lost with Lieutenant Hogue's F-86. However, a subsequent radio message received by the element leader indicated that the missing pilot was apparently south of Chinnampo and in no difficulty. The F-86 failed to return to base and all efforts to locate it and the fate of the pilot were unsuccessful.

7. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Lester F. Page, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 6 January 1952
Status: MIA

After attacking a flight of four MIGs, Lieutenant Page radioed that he thought he had been hit during the encounter. His flight

leader inspect his aircraft from the rear and observed no visible damage. Lieutenant Page then turned south toward Chodo Island and when last seen by his flight leader was at approximately 30,000 feet. An extensive aerial search revealed no information as to the fate of Lieutenant Page or his F-86.

8. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Thiel M. Reeves, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 11 January 1952
Status: MIA

Upon reaching Sinanju, the flight encountered and engaged eight enemy fighters in battle. During the ensuing action, Lieutenant Reeves radioed that his F-86 had been hit and that he might have to bail out. He headed toward the west coast of Korea at an altitude of 34,000 feet followed by his wingman who subsequently lost sight of him near the island of Chodo. An aerial search along the west coast of Korea was unsuccessful.

9. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Charles W. Rhinehart, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 29 January 1952
Status: MIA

During a combat mission over North Korea, Lieutenant Rhinehart's F-86 experienced a flameout and all attempts to restart were unsuccessful. At an altitude of 4,000 feet, he was seen to successfully parachute from the plane and to land in water off the mainland amid an area of numerous sand and mudflats, some 25 miles south of Chongju, North Korea. A subsequent aerial search of the area failed to locate any trace of Lt Rhinehart. **Additional information: Lieutenant Rhinehart had studied aeronautical engineering at Iowa State College, had gone through USAF All-Weather Interceptor Aircrew Training, and had gone through conversion training on the F-86-4 fighter, the newest variant of the F-86 at that time.**

10. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Thomas C. Lafferty, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 31 January 1952
Status: MIA

No circumstances of loss known.

11. Pilot: Captain Charles R. Spath, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 3 February 1952
Status: MIA

Captain Spath was forced to bail out due to damage sustained by his aircraft. Last radio contact indicated he was at 16,000 feet

and was 40 miles from Wonsan. An intelligence report of 11 Jul 52 reveals that during the latter part of May 1952, unsuccessful attempts were made to rescue a downed F-86 pilot in the area 40 miles northwest of Wonsan who had been shot down on 2 September 1952. Rescue efforts were discontinued when it appeared that the pilot had been captured and that numerous, armed enemy personnel were in the area. This intelligence report was associated to Captain Spath as he was the only F-86 pilot shot down in the Wonsan area during the first three days of February 1952. **Additional information: Captain Spath was an Honors graduate in Mathematics at Miami University of Ohio.**

12. Pilot: Captain Jack C. Langston, USAF
    Date of Casualty: 10 March 1952
    Status: MIA

No circumstances of loss known.

13. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant James D. Carey, USAF
    Date of Casualty: 24 March 1952
    Status: MIA

While in an encounter with three enemy MIGs over Lieutenant Carey was last seen inverted at 24,000 feet in a dive. All attempts to establish radio and visual contact were unsuccessful.

14. Pilot: Major George V. Wendling, USAFR
    Casualty: 24 March 1952
    Status: MIA

In the vicinity of the Sui Ho Reservoir, Major Wendling's flight engaged several enemy fighters in aerial combat. During the ensuing fight, Major Wendling radioed that his plane had been hit. The damaged plane went into a spin and when last seen was heading southeast toward the Yellow Sea. Minutes after his last radio message, the pilot of a friendly aircraft observed a huge splash in the waters of the Yellow Sea, followed by an oil slick, approximately 70 miles south of the target area. Whether this splash was caused by Major Wendling's plane could not be ascertained and a subsequent search of the reported crash area failed to reveal any trace of the missing officer or his F-86. A subsequent enemy propaganda broadcast from Peking, China on 25 April 1952 alleged that Major Wendling was killed when his plane was shot down near Ch'angtienhok'ou, Liaotung Province, China. **NOTE: Major Wendling is a good candidate for having been taken to the former Soviet Union. The discrepancy between his last reported action, possible crash in the Yellow Sea, and the Chinese propaganda report on his death in a plane crash are too vast for plausability. In addition, Major Wendling's name appears on the "List of 59" entitled "A List of United States Air**

Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through an Interrogation Point." Additionally, The Joint Commission Support Branch believes that further information on Major Wendling exists in the Russian archives as concluded in its "Preliminary Analysis of Korean War Interrogation Material" report dated June 1993.

15. Pilot: Captain Albert G. Tenney, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 3 May 1952
Status: MIA

While making a high speed descent over North Korea, Captain Tenney's flight was attacked by enemy aircraft. During the engagement, Captain Tenney's aircraft was seen to dive away from an enemy MIG and execute evasive manuevers at an extremely low altitude. He was informed of his low altitude and was instructed to pull up. Immeadeatly thereafter, he leveled the wings of his F-86which then struck the surface of the water in a low-angle high speed glide approximately 3 miles off shore near the mouth of the Yalu River. Enemy aircraft forced the leader to leave the area and prior to his departure, he did not see Captain Tenney abandon the F-86 or the aircraft sink beneath the water. Later in the day, search aircraft returned to the scene of the crash landing. North Korean surface craft were observed in the vicinity, but no trace of Captain Tenney or his aircraft were found. Captain Tenney's F-86 was not seen to disintegrate or sink and a the possibility exists that favorable conditions prevailed whereby Captain Tenney survived and was rescued by North Korean surface craft seen in the area.
NOTE: Captain Tenney's name appears on the "List of 59" entitled "A List of United States Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through an Interrogation Point." Additionally, The Joint Commission Support Branch believes that further information on Captain Tenney exists in the Russian archives as concluded in its "Preliminary Analysis of Korean War Interrogation Material" report dated June 1993.

16. Pilot: Captain John F. Lane, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 20 May 1952
Status: MIA

After completing a combat escort mission, Captain Lane and his leader left the target area and headed south at an altitude of 30,000 feet. Soon after departure, they were attacked by two enemy aircraft approximately 40 miles northeast of Sinuiju. Following the first burst of enemy fire, Captain Lane radioed that his aircraft had been hit. Shortly thereafter, the leader saw the F-86 spinning earthward but was unable to maintain

observation. Captain Lane was not heard from again and an intensive aerial search was unsuccessful.

17. Pilot: Major Felix Asla, USAF
Date of Casualty: 1 Aug 1952
Status: MIA

Major Asla was engaged in aerial combat when he became separated from his wingman. He twice radioed for information as to whether visual contact could be established with his aircraft. The messages did not indicate that he was experiencing any difficulty at the time, although it appears that he failed to receive replies from the other pilot, who repeatedly advised that he did not have visual contact and was leaving the area. Subsequently, a report was received from a member of another flight in the area who witnessed an enemy fighter attack on Major Asla's F-86 and that his plane had lost the left wing. The aircraft was last seen spinning downward from an altitude of 23,000 feet at a point 15 miles southeast of Sakchu, North Korea. A subsequent aerial search failed to reveal any trace of the missing aircraft or pilot.

18. Pilot: Major Deltis H. Fincher, USANG
Date of Casualty: 22 August 1952
Status: MIA

While patrolling the assigned area at an altitude of more than 37,000 feet, enemy fighters were encountered and engaged in battle. During the ensuing action, one of the enemy planes attacked Major Fincher's F-86 and he began violent evasive maneuvers. His plane did not appear to be damaged at this time and he subsequently inquired as to whether he was still being pursued by the MIG. His wingman had lost visual contact during the battle and received no response to his radio call advising Major Fincher of this fact. No further messages were received from Major Fincher and his F-86 was not observed again. An extensive aerial search failed to reveal any trace of the missing aircraft or pilot.

19. Pilot: Captain Troy G. Cope, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 16 September 1952
Status: MIA

After several encounters with enemy fighter aircraft while participating in a fighter sweep operations along the Yalu, Captain Cope radioed that his ammunition was exhausted. Accompanied by another flight member he headed downstream on a course south of the Manchurian border and parallel to the Yalu. Approximately 10 miles south of Antung, two flights of MIGs were

sighted and, while maneuvering to attack, the accompanying pilot noticed three other enemy aircraft in the area. He promptly radioed this information to Captain Cope who acknowledged the message. Because of the prevailing conditions, the two F-86s became separated. Efforts to re-establish visual or radio contact with Captain Cope were unsuccessful. An extensive aerial search revealed no traces of Captain Cope or his aircraft.

20. Pilot: 2nd Lieutenant Jack H. Turberville, USAF
Date of Casualty: 18 November 1952
Status: MIA

After completing a combat patrol mission over the Chong Chong River, North Korea, the two F-86s in his flight began the return flight to base at approximately 40,000 feet. Upon reaching a point near the Han River, Lieutenant Turberville radioed that he was having difficulty with his oxygen. The message was somewhat garbled and appeared to end abruptly. His plane was then observed to nose down sharply and to disappear into an overcast at an altitude of about 36,000 feet. The flight leader followed Lieutenant Turberville into the overcast and emerged at 25,000 feet, but sighted no trace of the missing aircraft. An extensive aerial search revealed no traces of Lieutenant Turberville or his aircraft.

21. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Donald R. Reitsma, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 22 December 1952
Status: MIA

While patrolling along the Yalu River, Lieutenant Reitsma and his element leader encountered and engaged eight enemy fighters in combat. During the ensuing action, Lieutenant Reitsma radioed that his engine was out and that he was heading south toward Chodo Island of the western coast of Korea. He subsequently transmitted a message which revealed that he was twenty miles south of Long Dong, a North Korean peninsula approximately 85 miles north of Chodo. He further advised that his radio receiver was not operating. Lieutenant Reitsma was not heard again and an extensive aerial search revealed no traces of Lieutenant Reitsma or his aircraft.

22. Pilot: 2nd Lieutenant Bill J. Stauffer, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 26 January 1953
Status: MIA

Lieutenant Stauffer was on a combat air patrol over North Korea when six MIGs were intercepted. During the battle, his aircraft was observed to have crashed into a small hill in an inverted position. Lieutenant Stauffer was not observed to have bailed

out.

23. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Paul J. Jacobson, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 12 February 1953
Status: MIA

Over the town of Sinuiju, Lieutenant Jacobson's flight encountered and engaged in battle six enemy aircraft. Lieutenant Jacobson was last seen at an altitude of approximately 36,000 feet and was apparently experiencing no difficulty at the time. Following the battle, he failed to rejoin the flight and air search of the area failed to reveal any trace of him. An intelligence report from an interrogation of a captured Chinese soldier revealed that at 1000 hours on 16 February 1953, a UN pilot was shot down over the Sinuiju, North Korea. The pilot was captured and taken to Antung where he was placed on exhibition in the marketplace and labeled a "crook of the air" by a Communist officer. A brief description of the pilot was given and to a degree the information appears to conform to the official data of record concerning Lieutenant Jacobson. Although the date of 16 February is at variance with the date his F-86 was lost, it has been established that no other UN plane became missing in the Sinuiju area during the period in question.

24. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Richard M. Cowden, USAF
Date of Casualty: 9 March 1953
Status: MIA

No circumstances of loss known.

25. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Robert R. Niemann, USAF
Date of Casualty: 12 April 1953
Status: MIA

Lieutenant Niemann and his wingman were on patrol in the Sui Ho reservoir area. Enemy aircraft were encountered by Lieutenant Niemann and his wingman and during the ensuing action he was heard to say "Here he comes again." No further transmission was received from Lieutenant Niemann whose F-86 was last seen at an altitude of 15,000 feet. Repeated attempts to contact him by radio were unsuccessful and an air search of the area revealed no trace of him or his plane.
NOTE: Lieutenant Niemann's name appears on the "List of 59" entitled "A List of United States Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through an Interrogation Point." Additionally, The Joint Commission Support Branch believes that further information on Lieutenant Neimann exists in

Russian archives as concluded in its "Preliminary Analysis of Korean War Interrogation Material" report dated June 1993.

26. Pilot: Captain Frank E. Miller, Jr., USAF
Date of Casualty: 27 May 1953
Status: MIA

No circumstances of loss known.

27. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant John E. Southerland, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 6 Jun 1953
Status: MIA

As Lieutenant Southerland's flight was preparing to attack an enemy target, he radioed that his F-86 was experiencing engine trouble and he requested to remain at high altitude until the bombing attack was completed. Immediately after this transmission, flames were observed coming from the fuselage of his aircraft and seconds later the F-86 rolled violently to the left and started downward. Lieutenant Southerland was seen to bail out of his airplane at an altitude of 12,000 feet. Enemy fire appeared to be concentrated on his parachute as he descended but he was not observed to be injured. Lieutenant Southerland landed in the Kumsong area, several miles behind enemy lines, and his parachute was seen on the ground for several minutes before it disappeared from view. Efforts to establish visual or radio contact were unavailing and the search was suspended after three hours due to intense enemy ground fire and poor visibility.

28. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Allan K. Rudolph, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 19 June 1953
Status: MIA

Upon arriving in the Yalu River area, Lieutenant Rudolph reported that his F-86 had developed engine trouble. The decision was made to abort the mission and as Lieutenant Rudolph's flight turned to the south, a ball of flame was observed coming from the tail pipe of his aircraft. He reported that the engine was no longer operative and he was advised to head for water were his rescue could be more easily effected. Lieutenant Rudolph was observed to pull up slowly into the overcast at an altitude of approximately 16,000 feet. Lieutenant Rudolph's wingman followed him into the overcast, but upon breaking into the clear saw no trace of Lieutenant Rudolph or his aircraft. A report from a radar controller revealed that the missing officer had turned south as per instructions and his course was tracked by radar until he reached a point four miles northeast of Nemsi-dong, at which time the F-86 faded from radar. An aerial search of the

route taken by Lieutenant Rudolph proved unavailing.

29. Pilot: Captain Charles E. Gunther, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 19 June 1953
Status: MIA

No circumstances of loss known.

30. Pilot: 1st Lieutenant Jimmy L. Escalle, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 19 June 1953
Status: MIA

While performing a low-level reconnaissance of roads in North Korea, Lieutenant Escalle and his wingman sighted several camouflaged trucks and began a strafing attack. After breaking off the target, Lieutenant Escalle radioed that he was making another attack since he had sighted more vehicles in the area. No further transmissions were received from him and efforts to re-establish radio contact proved unavailing. A subsequent aerial search of the area were Lieutenant Escalle was last seen revealed the wreckage of an aircraft but no trace of the pilot was found.

31. Pilot: 2nd Lieutenant Gerald W. Knott, USAFR
Date of Casualty: 20 July 1953
Status: MIA

Lieutenant Knott was flying a rescue cap mission over a downed pilot. The downed pilot was spotted in a boat that was paddled by Koreans or Chinese. The flight leader and Lieutenant Knott went down to take a look. As they went down, Lieutenant Knott seemed to drift toward and under his leader. He went straight in and crashed. Joint Commission Support Branch has documents (TFR 138-321 to 138-324) which were turned over by the Russian Side of the Joint Commission on 13 April 1993. These documents are after action reports of Soviet AAA batteries stationed in North Korea. They attest that a battery of Field Post Number 83554 shot down an F-86, which crashed on the shore of the bay, at 1612 hours. The report states that a search group of FPN 83554 located wreakage with a tail number of 12756 and that the pilot of this aircraft successfully ejected and was captured by the Chinese Volunteers. Lieutenant Knott was flying F-86-E number 51-2756.

Sources: USAF Casualty Affairs and U.S. Army Central Investigation Laboratory Hawaii.

Appendix C

Korean War USAF F-86 Pilots Who Were Captured and Repatriated

	Name	Date of Casualty	Date of Repatriation
1.	Maj Ronald D. Shirlaw	3 Apr 51	2 Sep 53
2.	1Lt Bradley B. Irish	24 Oct 51	4 Sep 53
3.	1Lt Fred T. Wicks	24 Oct 51	2 Sep 53
4.	1Lt Dayton W. Ragland	28 Nov 51	28 Aug 53
5.	1Lt Charles E. Stahl	7 Jan 52	6 Sep 53
6.	1Lt Daniel D. Peterson	15 Jan 52	31 Aug 53
7.	1Lt Vernon D. Wright	15 Jan 52	5 Sep 53
8.	1Lt Michael E. Dearmond	21 Apr 52	3 Sep 53
9.	Col Walker M. Mahurin	13 May 52	6 Sep 53
10.	1Lt Charles M. Kerr	21 May 52	6 Sep 53
11.	1Lt Vance R. Frick	21 Jun 52	6 Sep 53
12.	1Lt Roland W. Parks	4 Sep 52	31 May 55
13.	1Lt Paul C. Turner	14 Sep 52	31 May 55
14.	1Lt Edwin L. Heller	23 Jan 53	31 May 55
15.	1Lt Harold E. Fischer	7 Apr 53	31 May 55

Source: USAF Casualty Office

Appendix D

Outstanding Questions

1. **Background.** The following Soviet officers were identified during the Korean War by U.S. intelligence as staffing the secretariat that ran the POW camp system for the Communist side:

a. Secretary General: Takayaransky

b. Director General, POW control bureau: Colonel Andreyev

c. Deputy Director, POW control bureau: Lt. Col. Baksov

d. Representative of the North Korean People's Army, General Kim I: alias Pak Dok San (ethnic Korean Soviet officer)

Question. Can these officers be made available for interviews? Will the files for this secretariat be made available.

2. **Background.** Colonel Gavriil Korotkov described a General Staff-based analytical group, of which he was a member, reporting to Marshal Rodion Malinovskiy, then Commander-in-Chief, Far East Military District, which conducted intensive interrogations of large numbers of U.S. POWs.

Question. Where are the records of this organization? Have the archives of the General Staff and Far East Military District been reviewed?

3. **Background.** Based on interrogations, Colonel Gavriil Korotkov's General Staff-based analytical group prepared a report which assessed the morale of U.S. servicemen in Korea. Colonel Korotkov stated that he has seen this document in the archives at Podol'sk.

Question. Where is this document and can it be made available to the Joint Commission?

4. **Background.** Colonel Korotkov stated that all reports on U.S. POWs from his analytical group were forwarded to the Headquarters, Far East Military District. The political group's reports were also forwarded directly to the Soviet Army's Main Political Administration.

Question. Where are these reports? Have the archives of the

Far East Military District and the Main Political Administration been reviewed?

5. **Background.** In 1950 the MVD produced a thousand-page study on the exploitation of foreign POWs. This TOP SECRET document was entitled: About Spies, Operative Work with POWs and Internees taken Prisoner During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People, 1941-1945. This document should give important information on the system for the control of POWs at the time of the Korean War.

Question. Where is this document?

6. **Background.** On 30 March and 1 April 1993, retired KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Lukianovich Klimovich related how F-86s and pilots had been captured in Korea and transported to aircraft design bureaus in Moscow. This was confirmed at the Sukhoi and MiG Design Bureaus. At the latter, Professor Yevgeniy I. Rushitskiy confirmed specifically confirmed this and stated that the aircraft had been stripped of markings at the Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force.

Question. Where are the records from the three design bureaus dealing with the technical exploitation of the F-86, of which the interrogation of the pilots was a part?

7. **Background.** Colonel Alkesandr Seymonovich Orlov has stated that he helped a Pravda correspondent obtain an interview, with KGB permission, with a US POW named Lieutenant Colonel Black, a senior wing staff officer (believed to be Vance Eugene Black). Colonel Korotkov also mentioned being familiar with Black's name. Since two distinguished former Soviet officers remembered this officer over forty years after the Korean War because he was considered an important intelligence catch, it is likely that there is an interrogation protocol.

Question. Where is the interrogation report on Lieutenant Colonel Vance Eugene Black?

8. **Background.** Colonel Orlov stated in a 1992 interview with Task Force Russia that the interrogation protocols he prepared questions for should have been kept in the archival fonds of the GRU, Soviet Advisory Group, and 64th Fighter Aviation Corps?

Question. Have the archives of the GRU, Soviet Advisory Group, and 64th Fighter Aviation Corps been thoroughly searched for these intelligence protocols?

9. **Background.** Retired Lieutenant General Kan San Kho stated in a 1992 interview with Task Force Russia that as a Soviet officer seconded to the North Korean People's Army, he had assisted in the transfer of thousands of South Korean POWs into 300 to 400 camps in the Soviet Union, mostly in the Taiga but some in Central Asia.

Question. Where are these camps? What was the program by which the South Korean POWs were transported to the Soviet Union? Who were the officers involved in this operation? What archives contain the records of this operation? What other United Nations Command POWs were included in this program?

10. **Background.** Both 1Lt Roland Parks, USAF, and Cpl Nick Flores, USMC, were captured and interrogated by Soviet forces during the Korean War, turned over to the Chinese and eventually repatriated.

Question. Where are the interrogation protocols on these two men?

11. **Background.** The archival markings on the interrogation protocols associated with the list provided by the Russian side of the 59 U.S. aircrew who passed through an interrogation point show that many interrogation files are missing.

Question. Where are the missing interrogation protocols?

12. **Background.** The Russian side turned over a list of effects of an F-86 pilot named Neimann, who was described as dead. However, Viktor A. Bushuyev stated that the Soviets attempted to interrogate an F-86 pilot named Neimann who resisted interrogation, claiming that his wounds excused him. There is a missing U.S. F-86 pilot named 1Lt Robert F. Neimann.

Question. What happened to 1Lt Neimann If Soviet records show him dead, and a Soviet officer describes him as alive, did he die in Soviet custody? Have the files of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps been searched for this protocol?

13. **Background.** Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Roschin has been quoted in an article in the Soviet press he remembers seeing a report on the capture of an American pilot named Crone in conjunction with a special operation in 1951 to capture an F-86. The U.S. is missing Cpt William D. Crone, USAF pilot, shot down on 18 June 1951.

Question. Have the files of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps

been searched to find the interrogation protocol for Cpt William Crone?

14. **Background.** An intelligence collection requirement for F-86 aircraft and pilots was obviously functioning for a period during the Korean War. Such a requirement, according to Soviet officers, could only have been levied by the KGB, either Beria himself or one of his deputies. Major Amirov has stated that such a collection requirement was indeed levied by the KGB but through the Ministry of Defense.

Question. Have the KGB Archives been searched for this collection requirement, similar to the one issued by the KGB for the capture of pilots during the Vietnam War? Have the Ministry of Defense Archives been reviewed for this collection requirement?

15. **Background.** Former Soviet Major Avraham Shifrin stated that Soviet Air Force General Dzhahadze, of the Ministry of Defense support regiment stationed at Bykova, tranported F-86s pilots to Kansk in the Soviet Union at the order of the KGB.

Question. Have the records of this regiment been reviewed for its invovlement in the transporation of U.S. aircraft parts and pilots to the Soviet Union?

16. **Background.** In an interview with Dr. Paul Cole, Major Valerii Amirov stated that a special air force unit had been organized under General Blagoveshchenskii, with the mission to capture F-86 aircraft and pilots. He cited Lieutenant General Georgii Lobov, Commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, as his source.

Question. Have the archives of the Soviet Air Force been reviewed for any reference to this special unit?

17. **Background.** General Lobov stated in an interview that 64th Fighter Aviation Corps had 70 teams out looking for downed American pilots.

Question. Has the Russian side been looking for members of these 70 teams? If not, will they do so?

18. **Background.** U.S. Air Force POWs were gathered into a special camp during the Korean War. At one point, all B-29 crewmen were put through intensive interrogation.

Question. Why did the Soviets order all USAF POWs segregated into a special camp? Where are the interrogation reports from the B-29 crewmen?

19. **Background.** A number of GRU officers have been interviewed under the auspices of the Russian side of the Joint Commission; however, no former officers of the MGB/KGB have been provided.

Question. Will the Russian side provide the U.S. side with former officers of the MGB/KGB for interview?

20. **Background.** A number of former Soviet officers, including retired MVD Lieutenant General Yezerskiy, and inmates of the GULAG system state that foreign POWs such as the Americans would have been forced to assume new identities.

Question. Will the Russian side provide an explanation of this policy and a list of the new identities forced upon U.S. POWs?

Appendix E

Individual Sources of Information Cited in this Study

Russian:

Major Valerii Amirov
Colonel Viktor A. Bushuyev
Mrs. Aleksandra Y. Istogina
Lieutenant General Kan San Kho
Mr. Nikolai D. Kazerskiy
Lieutenant Yuriy L. Klimovich
Colonel Gavriil I. Korotkov
Lieutenant Colonel Valerii Lavrentsov
Lieutenant General Georgii Lobov
Mr. Gregoriy N. Minayev
Colonel Aleksandr S. Orlov
Colonel Georgii Plotnikov
Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir M. Roshchin
Professor Yevgeniy I. Rushitskiy
Colonel Valentin Sozinov
Mr. Vladimir Y. Voronin
Lieutenant General Yuriy F. Yezerskiy

Estonian:

Mrs. Lidia Hallemaa
Mr. Enn Kivilo
Mr. Felix Pullerits
Mr. Artur Roopalu
Mr. Elmar Vesker
Mr. Boris Uibo

Lithuanian:

Mr. Jokubas Bruzdeilinas
Mr. Romas Kausevicius
Mr. Apollinaris Klivecka
Mr. Povilas Markevicius
Mr. Bronius Skardzius
Mr. Jonas Zilaitis

Israeli:

Mr. Avraham Shifrin

American:

Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Corso, USA
Brigadier General Michael Dearmond, USAF
Colonel Harold E. Fischer, USAF
Corporal Nick A. Flores, USMC
Captain Mel Giles, USA
Colonel Edwin L. Heller, USAF
Colonel Walker Mahurin, USAF
Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski, Journalist
Sergeant Daniel Oldwage, USAF
Colonel Roland Parks, USAF
Mr. Shu Ping Wa, formerly of the CPV
Lieutenant Colonel Delk Simpson, USAF

Appendix F

Soviet Officers Whose Names Are Associated with Combat Operations and Interrogations of U.S. Korean War POWs

Close review of available documentation yields the following list of Russian names, some with official titles. These names should be researched and those individuals still living and available for interview should be contacted.

(a) Korea area

BELENKO--Commander of AAA unit, Field Postbox 54892 Nov 51, near Pukhakni, Simchen district, Senchen, N. Korea. (TFR 76-18)

KOZLOV, Major (fnu)--senior intelligence officer of Field Postbox 54892 in late 1950; signed reports on interrogations of US pilots (TFR 76-30 & 76-32)

KUZNETSOV, (fnu)--member of 54892 staff, prepared questions for interrogation of US pilots in late 1950 (TFR 76-30 & 76-32)

LEVADNYJ, Sr. Sgt. P.A.--his AAA unit downed a US aircraft in Nov 51 (Pyongyang Highway) (TFR 76-18)

PLOTNIKOV (fnu)--translator at Field Postbox 54892 in Spring of 1952 (TFR 76-42)

PODLINENSTEV--intel officer, Korea, Nov 51, possibly Chief of Intellligence (TFR 76-18)

RAZUVAYEV (fnu) Lt Gen--TFR 42-10, Ambassador to Korea: (1) mentioned in first Zanegin message on use of Soviet interpreters w/US POWs (TFR 42-3); (2) author of message to VASILEVSKIJ and to SHTEMENKO concerning capture of General Dean in Korea (TFR 2-4); (3) mentioned in Zanegin's message on use of Soviet interpreters with US POWs (TFR 4-20); (4) mentioned in Central Committee & Politburo communications on issue of UN POWs (TFR 42-9 et seq.).

SAN'KOV, Col.--Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Field Postbox 54892, mid-1953 (TFR 76-33, 76-34 and 37-66 through 37-100)

SOKOLOV--Field Postbox 10899, recipient of messages or routing officer (TFR 76-18)

SUSLIN, Col.--Chief of Staff of Unit, Field Postbox 54892, early 1951; other staff members may include MAMAYEV and KHASANCHIN (TFR 76-28, TFR 76-25)

TASHCHAN, Guards Lt Col--Chief of Intel for unit Field Postbox 54892 in Feb 53. (Spelling of name is peculiar.) Additional staff members may include MUNKUYEV, ZUBKOV. (TFR 76-35 through 76-42 and 76-24)

YANUSHEVICH--Chief of Staff, AAA unit Field Postbox 10899,

Nov 451 (TFR 76-18)

ZANEGIN, B.-- wrote two messages concerning use of Soviet interpreters in Korea (TFR 37-44 and 37-45); one message on POW "Harding" in China (TFR 4-14)

(b) China area

IGOSTOSERDOV, Gen (fnu)--posted in Mukden early 1951, (TFR 76-25).

KRYMOV (fnu)--addressee of POW report ("Harding"), June 1952 (TFR 4-14)

MAKAROV (fnu)--sent POW report ("Harding"), June 1952 (TFR 4-14)

COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL

Stenographic Transcript of
HEARINGS
Before the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

DEPOSITION OF

Thursday, November 19, 1992

Washington, D.C.

COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL

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1111 14TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-5650
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1 COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL

2 DEPOSITION OF

3

4 Thursday, November 19, 1992

5

6 U.S. Senate

7 Select Committee on POW/MIA

8 Affairs

9 Washington, D.C.

10

11 Deposition of the witness herein, called

12 for examination by counsel for the Select Committee on POW/MIA

13 Affairs, pursuant to notice, in Room S-407, The Capitol,

14 commencing at 10:05 a.m., on Thursday, November 19, 1992, the

15 witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, CVR-CM,

16 a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, and the

17 proceedings being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN

18 SCHAFER, CVR-CM, and transcribed under her direction.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 APPEARANCES:

2

3 On behalf of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs:

4 JOHN ERICKSON, ESQ.

5 Investigative Counsel

6

7 On behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency:

8 DOUGLAS O. BOWMAN, ESQ.

9 Office of Congressional Affairs

10

11 On behalf of the Defense Intelligence Agency:

12 FRED GREEN, ESQ.

13 Department of Defense

14 Special Counsel for POW/MIA Affairs

15

16 On behalf of the Witness:

17 BARRY G. STIEN, ESQ.

18 Benson, Stien and Braunstein

19 1333 H Street, N.W.

20 West Tower, Ninth Floor

21 Washington, D.C. 20005

22 (202) 393-8500

23

24

25

1 C O N T E N T S

2 THE WITNESS EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR

3 THE SELECT COMMITTEE

4 By Mr. Erickson 4

5 Afternoon Session - Page 65

6

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 Whereupon,

3 (b)(6)

4 the witness herein, was called for examination by counsel for

5 the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and, having been duly

6 sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as

7 follows:

8 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE

9 BY MR. ERICKSON:

10 Q. Would you please state your full name for the

11 record?

12 A. (b)(6)

13 Q. Your address? Your residence, where you live?

14 A. (b)(6)

15 Q. Your date of birth?

16 A. (b)(6)

17 Q. And your Social Security number?

18 A. (b)(6)

19 Q. First of all, I'd like to thank you on (b)(6)

20 behalf of the committee for coming in for this deposition. I

21 expect this to be an unclassified deposition. I have no

22 documents that I plan on showing you. As I stated earlier,

23 when we take a break I'm going to review some documents, but

24 as of this point, I don't think we will get into any

25 classified information. If we do, I would expect the

1 attorneys from CIA or DIA to so signal, and I will steer away
2 from it.
3 I have been informed by the Department of Defense
4 that you do not hold a security clearance. Is that correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. I am going to mark as an exhibit our authority and
7 rules.
8 (The document referred to was
9 marked Exhibit No. 1 for (b)(6)
10 identification.)
11 BY MR. ERICKSON:
12 Q. Did you receive a copy of this?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Do you have any questions that I can help you with?
15 A. No.
16 Q. I see that you brought counsel with you. Would you
17 identify yourself?
18 MR. STIEN: Counsel is Barry G. Stien, 1333 H
19 Street, Northwest, West Tower, Ninth Floor, Washington, D.C.
20 20005.
21 MR. ERICKSON: I see that the Defense Intelligence
22 Agency is represented. Would you identify yourself for the
23 record?
24 MR. GREEN: Yes, I am Fred Green. I'm a DOD special
25 counsel for POW/MIA affairs. And I am representing the Agency

1 today.

2 MR. ERICKSON: And the Central Intelligence Agency

3 is represented.

4 MR. BOWMAN: I'm Doug Bowman, from the Office of

5 Congressional Affairs, representing the CIA.

6 BY MR. ERICKSON:

7 Q. Next I'm going to mark the notice of the Senate

8 deposition.

9 (The document referred to was

10 marked Exhibit No. 2 for (b)(6)

11 identification.)

12 BY MR. ERICKSON:

13 Q. Did you receive a copy of this?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And Exhibit No. 3 is the deposition authorization

16 signed by Chairman Kerry and Vice Chairman Smith. Did you

17 receive a copy of this?

18 (The document referred to was

19 marked Exhibit No. 3 for (b)(6)

20 identification.)

21 THE WITNESS: Yes.

22 BY MR. ERICKSON:

23 Q. We have received a copy of what purports to be a

24 summary of your resume. It's my understanding it was prepared

25 by your employer. Do you want to take a look at it? Is there

1 any correction or anything that you have an objection to in
2 that summary?
3 A. No, I looked at it yesterday.
4 Q. I just want to go over a few ground rules with you.
5 I have several questions that I am going to ask you. If at
6 any time you don't understand my question, please ask me to
7 repeat. You have a right to review your transcript. You can
8 notify me, or you can call me. We will make arrangements for
9 you to come in. It takes about a week for the transcript to
10 be typed and come back to the committee. Or you don't need to
11 review it. That's strictly up to you.
12 MR. STIEN: For the record, we will review.
13 MR. ERICKSON: I will call you when it gets in, and
14 make arrangements for you to come up and review it.
15 BY MR. ERICKSON:
16 Q. I want to remind you that the deposition is under
17 oath. If at any time you want to take a break for the
18 restroom, or for smoking or for whatever else, just signal.
19 My plan is to go about an hour, and then take a break.
20 At any time if you want to consult with your
21 counsel, I expect you to do that. I think this will take
22 maybe 2 hours, maybe 2-1/2. So please don't feel rushed, and
23 try to understand the questions and give us as much
24 information as you can.
25 Do you have any questions on anything I've gone

1 over, or what we are going to do today?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Have you been instructed by any Government agency on

4 what to say, or what not to say here today?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Have you been threatened directly or indirectly on

7 your testimony today?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Would you describe for the record a little about

10 your personal background, where you grew up, where you went to

11 school, and your military career?

12 A. I was born in I joined elementary (b)(6)

13 school, and after that gymnasium. And then the Germans closed

14 the schools, and I must go work like worker. And after World

15 War II, I joined the Communist Party in 1946, which my father

16 opposed because he was a member of the Catholic Party.

17 And because my background, some brothers of my

18 father were Communist, I was selected to grow in the party as

19 high as possible. So I was called to military service when I

20 was 20. And sent to the school for political commissars. I

21 finished the school in 1951, and was appointed the deputy

22 commander and political commissar for the regiment. I was a

23 lieutenant.

24 And 2 years later, I was appointed the deputy

25 commander of the brigade, and political commissar. And in

1 1954 I was elected to Kologium, which is like Senate, and to
2 central committee of the Communist Party. I was the youngest
3 member of the parliament, and of the central committee of the
4 Communist Party.
5 And the same year I was appointed deputy commander
6 of the all engineer troops in And in 1956 I (b)(6)
7 was appointed chief of staff of minister of defense. From
8 that position, I have in my hands everything that goes to the
9 minister from the Soviet Union Politburo government, and out
10 of the minister. I prepare for him all the comments,
11 everything.
12 And I was still a member of the parliament. In the
13 last 4 years, I was a member of the presidium of the
14 parliament, the leadership of the parliament. And in 1964 I
15 was appointed first secretary of the Communist Party, and the
16 minister of defense. Which means, from a party point of view,
17 I controlled the ministry of defense. I was in charge of it.
18 Since 1954 -- I mean '56 -- I was secretary of the
19 defense council of the Communist Party, which was the highest
20 body which controlled military forces, intelligence services,
21 and security forces. And I was secretary of collegium of
22 ministers of defense, who are the top military leaders. They
23 meet every week and discuss the major things for military.
24 And I was member of the bureau of the main political
25 administration.

1 So I don't know if it is enough, but it was crazy
2 every day, some meetings and decisions. And I was also
3 chairman of the agriculture subcommittee in the party. So I
4 think that's it.
5 Q. What military schools did you attend?
6 A. I was, first I was in the school of political
7 commissars. That was 60 percent military training, and 40
8 percent Marxism. And after that, I guess in 1956, I studied,
9 how do you call it, the military college. You study at home,
10 and you give them the paperwork, and I don't know --
11 MR. STIEN: Home-study course?
12 BY MR. ERICKSON:
13 Q. Correspondence course?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. What year did you join the military forces of
16 ?
17 A. 1950.
18 Q. And how many years did you serve in the --
19 A. Until I . (b)(6)
20 Q. And what year did you ? (b)(6)
21 A. '68.
22 Q. So you were in the --
23 A. 18 years.
24 Q. 18 years. And what was the highest rank or grade
25 that you obtained?

1 A. I was promoted major general in October of 1967. I
2 was colonel when I was 27, and general when I was 40.
3 Q. How would you describe your access to military
4 information in (? By that, good? I saw (b)(6)
5 everything?
6 A. I saw everything.
7 Q. You saw everything. During your time in the
8 military in , were you ever stationed in another (b)(6)
9 country? Or were all your assignments in ?
10 A. No, just . I mean, trips, yes, to the (b)(6)
11 Soviet Union, and Egypt, all Warsaw Pact countries, but I was
12 never stationed like military attache.
13 Q. What foreign language ability do you have outside of (b)(6)
14 and English?
15 A. Russian, and a little bit of German.
16 Q. Did you learn your Russian in grade school and high
17 school?
18 A. No, I learned it when I was in the military service,
19 because we must take courses. And when I corresponded with
20 the military, the political military college, you have also
21 Russian. And of course I was every day with Russian officers
22 and generals. So they never learned to speak , everybody (b)(6)
23 was learning to talk to them in Russian.
24 Q. Were most of your 18 years in the capital city of
25

1 A. Right. No, no, no, sorry. Since 1951, as I said
2 before, I was the deputy commander of the regiment in the city
3 of . And since 1952 I was the political commissar and
4 deputy commander of the brigade in the city of
5 And there I was until 1954. Since 1954 I was in
6 Q. Are you married?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Do you have any children?
9 A. Yes, two.
10 Q. How old are your children?
11 A. One is 40, and one is 4.
12 Q. 40 and 4?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Congratulations.
15 A. Born on same day and same month, different years.
16 Q. Do you currently have any relatives in
17 ?
18 A. Yes, I have father, my sister, and her family.
19 Q. When is the last time you were in ?
20 A. Pardon me?
21 Q. When was the last year that you were in
22 ?
23 A. '68.
24 Q. '68. When did you arrive in the United States?
25 A. February of '68.

1 Q. And what city did you first come to?

2 A. Washington.

3 Q. Are you a U.S. citizen?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And when did you gain your citizenship?

6 A. I got -- it was special bill by Senate, because I

7 travel a lot. And I had all these problems. So President

8 Ford signed a special bill, I think it was in '73, I believe.

9 Q. Did you bring any family members with you to the

10 United States?

11 A. My son, older son.

12 Q. The one who is 40?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Are you currently employed?

15 A. Yes, by DIA.

16 Q. When did you become employed by DIA?

17 A. '81.

18 Q. 1981?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. What are your current duties at DIA?

21 A. I am an associate researcher.

22 Q. Have your duties changed in the last 11 years, or

23 have you always been doing roughly the same things?

24 A. Roughly the same things.

25 Q. What do you research?

1 A. Soviet Union and East European countries.

2 Q. And you prepare memos and position papers?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Have you ever held a security clearance by the

5 United States Government?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You have held one, but you do not have one now, is

8 that correct?

9 A. Yes. I have to say one thing -- I was 2 years out

10 of Government, and at that time I worked for System Planning

11 Corporation in Arlington. And there I had so-called

12 industrial clearance.

13 Q. Since you came to the United States in 1968, have

14 you always lived in the Washington, D.C. area?

15 A. Yes, all the time.

16 MR. ERICKSON: Let's go off the record.

17 (Discussion off the record.)

18 MR. ERICKSON: Let's go back on the record.

19 BY MR. ERICKSON:

20 Q. Do you know what a polygraph is?

21 A. Sure.

22 Q. During your time in , were you ever

23 polygraphed?

24 A. They don't have the system.

25 Q. They do not have the system. Have you ever been

1 polygraphed in your life?

2 A. Here in the United States.

3 Q. And how many times?

4 A. Two times.

5 Q. Do you recall what years?

6 A. When I came here, and 4 or 5 weeks ago by DIA.

7 (Discussion off the record.)

8 MR. ERICKSON: Let's go back on the record.

9 BY MR. ERICKSON:

10 Q. You had a conversation with two investigators from

11 the U.S. Senate Select Committee, is that correct?

12 A. Right.

13 Q. The polygraph that you just mentioned, was that

14 before or after your discussion with Mr. LeGro and Mr.

15 McCreary?

16 A. Before.

17 Q. Were you ever polygraphed after you talked to

18 investigators from our committee?

19 A. No.

20 Q. When did you obtain your job with DIA? You said --

21 A. 1981.

22 Q. 1981. How did you obtain your job? Did you see an

23 advertisement, or did a friend tell you about it, or what were

24 the circumstances?

25 A. No. I exactly don't know how it happened, but I

1 think some agencies of Government helped me to get the job.
2 Because I was called for an interview, and I got the job.
3 Q. I am now going to focus on some questions about your
4 service in the , when you were in the armed services of
5
6 A. Right.
7 Q. You stated earlier that you joined the armed
8 services when you were 20 years old?
9 A. Let's see --
10 Q. I thought that's what you said.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. When did you join the --
13 A. 1950.
14 Q. 1950.
15 A. Yes, I was probably a little older than 20.
16 Q. Were you drafted?
17 A. Yes, I was drafted.
18 Q. Did you join as an officer or an enlisted man?
19 A. No, I was drafted an enlisted man.
20 Q. And then you rose to the rank of major general?
21 A. Right.
22 Q. During your 18 years, did you ever see any combat
23 action?
24 A. No.
25 Q. You said that you were never stationed outside of

1 . You did take some trips. Obviously, you
2 weren't in World War II. Did you ever visit Korea, or did you
3 participate in any way in the Korean War?
4 A. No. Oh, I mean not in Korea, but -- no, no.
5 Q. Okay. What about the Vietnam War? Did you ever go
6 to Vietnam? Or did you in any way participate in the Vietnam
7 War?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Do you have a college degree?
10 A. Well I guess the military college is the same level,
11 no? But not civilian, no.
12 Q. All of your training was in or did
13 you go to school in Russia and other countries?
14 A. Never.
15 Q. What would you classify as your major course of
16 studies?
17 A. Military political college.
18 Q. Do you hold any other postgraduate degrees, outside
19 of those that you obtained from the military colleges in
20
21 A. No.
22 Q. What was your military specialty?
23 A. I was brought to engineer corps.
24 Q. The engineer corps?
25 A. Yes. And after then, just military-political

1 career. Except then I was chief of staff for minister of
2 defense. It was not political position, it was not political
3 commissar. I was simply in charge of all his staff.
4 Q. When were you first elected or appointed to the
5 parliament?
6 A. '54.
7 Q. And how many years did you serve in the parliament?
8 A. Until I defected, '68. Until '68.
9 Q. And you said you were chairman of the agriculture
10 committee?
11 A. I was chairman of the agriculture subcommittee, that
12 was in charge about technology, agricultural technology I
13 think, because of my background, probably, my father was
14 farmer. And I was the last 4 years a member of the presidium.
15 Q. Were you ever in the military intelligence
16 service? Something similar to the GRU of the Soviet Union?
17 A. Never.
18 Q. Were you ever in what would be similar to the KGB in
19 ?
20 A. Never.
21 Q. What were your major assignments in
22 if you could kind of detail the dates when you were at various
23 commands, to the best of your ability?
24 A. You mean the most important posts?
25 Q. Yes. Yes, please.

1 A. I would say the most important position was the
2 chief of staff of minister of defense, and after then first
3 secretary, because the chief of staff of minister of defense,
4 as I said before, everything would go to minister from foreign
5 countries, especially Soviet Union, would go through my hand.
6 Everything what goes through government, politburo, defense
7 council, I prepare.
8 I had special office which was Secretariat of the
9 defense council, which has all the documentation in their
10 hands. And, of course, I had those section which take care
11 about guests of minister, visitors, mostly Soviets, but any
12 visitors from any country. So I think there I had most
13 information which anybody could have.
14 Q. And your resume indicates you were chief of staff to
15 the minister of defense --
16 A. Right.
17 Q. -- in 1956.
18 A. Right.
19 Q. How long did you serve in that position?
20 A. Until 1964 -- 8 years. And after then I was the
21 First Secretary of the Communist Party.
22 And from there -- I want to finish this -- from that
23 position, chief of staff of minister of defense, I was
24 secretary of the defense council, which again I have to
25 repeat, not because I was secretary but because the power of

1 the committee, the collegium of ministry, had meeting every
2 week, the defense council approximately every 2 weeks.
3 The members of the defense council were seven
4 members: First secretary and president of was
5 chairman; prime minister was member; minister of defense;
6 minister of Interior, which is like Soviet KGB; the chief of
7 state planning commission was member; and deputy to first
8 secretary, second secretary of the party.
9 Are they seven already or I forgot somebody? But
10 they were seven of the most important members in the
11 hierarchy.
12 Q. In the hierarchy of the Communist Party, where is
13 first secretary?
14 A. Well, the first secretary is the most powerful man,
15 or was, in the country, because without him nobody can do
16 anything, especially military. He was also chairman of the
17 defense council, of course, and without him you cannot do
18 anything, you know? Minister was in his office every Monday.
19 I report that was going on, he give me order what to do. So
20 he was the most important person.
21 Q. Did you have access to sensitive information in all
22 of these positions that you've detailed?
23 A. Absolutely. The highest secrecy.
24 Q. Did you have access to information on
25 military activities outside of ?

1 A. Yes, because most of these things must go through
2 the defense council. It was not just some individual activity
3 of some agent. But if it means every important activity,
4 like, let's say in Korea or other places in whole world,
5 trained couriers and all these things, of course it goes to
6 defense council.
7 Q. And your access to this material was by reviewing
8 messages and papers and discussions?
9 A. Sure. Plus I was sitting there, and when they
10 discuss it I make notes. After then I must type it. It must
11 go back to the minister, he sign it, go with that to
12 president, like chairman of the council. He signed it, and I
13 delivered it to members of the defense council or anybody who
14 got order from defense council to do something -- foreign
15 minister, anybody who was involved.
16 Q. Okay. You said your highest rank was major general?
17 A. Right.
18 Q. Is that a two-star general?
19 A. One.
20 Q. One.
21 A. One.
22 Q. So the U.S. equivalent would be a brigadier general?
23 A. I think correct.
24 Q. Next, I want to ask you some questions about your
25 position as the defense secretary. How did you become the

1 secretary of the defense council?

2 A. Because -- I have to explain it. Officially, who

3 was secretary was minister of defense. I was the -- I don't

4 know how to say that in English -- I was the guy who did

5 everything, who prepared everything, sitting in defense

6 council, make notes, and they changed something because to

7 defense council goes the -- everybody must, for anything,

8 mobilization or whatever, for an activity, present it to

9 defense council some documents.

10 So when they go through, usually we have like 12,

11 maybe 15 documents which defense council must approve, and the

12 session was always afternoon. And if they changed anything, I

13 make notes. After then, I had a special staff for defense

14 council which was in the secretariat of ministry of defense,

15 special guard. And when it was done, I must go through again

16 and sign it and deliver it to everyone who was concerned.

17 That is why I say I think it was many times Russians were

18 present and they delivered some orders.

19 Q. And you were in this position from 1956 to 1964?

20 A. Right.

21 Q. For 8 years.

22 A. Right.

23 Q. Okay. Was membership in the Communist Party

24 required for this position?

25 A. Oh, absolutely. Absolutely.

1 Q. Is this a government position or a party position?
2 A. It was the party government, because if you can go
3 to , you see the documents which the defense
4 council passed, the defense council said to minister of
5 health, to minister of foreign affairs. They give them order.
6 Same like politburo is party, but they give order to
7 everybody. You know, nobody can move without them.
8 Later on, when I was already here, they changed the
9 name and make it the highest council of the -- of the defense
10 of the country, or something like that. They tried to make it
11 legal, because people complained it was actually illegal under
12 party. It was not under constitution, it was -- but who can
13 complain at that time?
14 Q. I'd like to focus on when you were there. In the
15 relationship between the Government and the party, which was
16 the most important?
17 A. To me? The party. The party was power.
18 Q. The party, in essence, controlled the Government?
19 A. Absolutely. Absolutely.
20 Q. During these 8 years that you were in this position,
21 would you describe the main individuals or the main
22 departments that you worked with, be they the Communist Party
23 or the military? Who did you have the most contact with
24 during these --
25 A. Well, the most important was, as they call it,

1 administrative department. But they changed name many times
2 because it was cover name. They were department A, after then
3 department 11, after then department 14, and finally the name
4 was Administrative Organs Department. So if you hear it you
5 would think they take care of some administration or work.
6 But it was the department which controlled military forces,
7 everything that was related to defense, intelligence, and
8 contracting. Generally, they controlled ministry of defense
9 and ministry of the interior.
10 And I forgot to say before, last 4 years, I was also
11 member of that department. I was first secretary of the party
12 at the ministry of defense, and member of the department.
13 Q. So this would have been from 1960 to 1964?
14 A. No, from '64 to '68.
15 Q. Oh, okay.
16 A. I mean, from '84 -- '64 to '68. Sorry. '84, I was
17 already here. It was the most important because these people
18 are so powerful they even discuss if minister should be fired
19 or not. What can I tell you?
20 Q. You indicated that you attended meetings. Who did
21 you write reports for, or who did you report to?
22 A. Well, when I was chief of staff of minister to
23 minister or defense council or this department. Those were
24 the three major.
25 Q. Are you familiar with the term, insider? Would you

1 classify yourself as an insider in the Government and in the
2 party during this time in ?
3 A. Yes, I do. It means you are in.
4 MR. STIEN: Off the record.
5 (Discussion off the record.)
6 THE WITNESS: Yes.
7 BY MR. ERICKSON:
8 Q. Next, I'm going to go to information on POW's. In
9 your interview with our investigators, you stated that you had
10 knowledge about POW treatment during the Korean and Vietnam
11 Wars, is that correct?
12 A. Right.
13 Q. And you met with two investigators from our
14 committee approximately a month ago?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Would you describe -- did you contact them, or did
17 they contact you?
18 A. They contact me through DIA.
19 Q. In the interview, and in your book Red Cocaine, you
20 describe medical support to the North Koreans.
21 A. Right.
22 Q. I apologize for having you repeat a lot of
23 information that you've written about and given, but that's
24 the nature of a deposition, so would you describe for the
25 record what type of medical support gave to the

1 North Koreans, the dates, and other information of that
2 nature?
3 Q. had hospital in Korea -- North
4 Korea -- which the activity of the hospital was actually to
5 train the military personnel for the war, the personnel,
6 and test some drugs. That was the major activity of that
7 hospital.
8 Q. There was one hospital, or more than one hospital?
9 A. To my best recollection, one, but I'm not sure
10 because we -- at that time, I was not chief of staff of
11 minister of defense. This is for the -- the knowledge is for
12 the -- for the discussion, from the documents which go to
13 defense council about test the drugs. And they always said
14 hospital, so I don't know if it was two or one.
15 Q. Do you know the date or dates the hospital was
16 built, when it was constructed, when it was manned by
17 doctors, and when did they turn it back to the
18 Koreans?
19 A. I don't know when it was built, but I think it
20 operated there 4 years, until end of the war. So exactly what
21 year or month it was built, I don't know.
22 Q. How many doctors or nurses or
23 medical specialists were at the hospital, if you know,
24 approximately?
25 A. You mean through that 4 years or just at the time?

1 Q. What would be the normal staff of the hospital?

2 A. I would say up to 10 doctors?

3 Q. And the purpose --

4 A. They changed them, I think, 6 months, you know, they

5 trained them.

6 Q. And what was the purpose of the hospital?

7 A. The purpose was train the medical personnel,

8 military, for the next war, prepare them, because it is

9 different if you are in the peacetime, different if you are in

10 the war time, and test the drugs.

11 Q. What kind of drugs, if you know?

12 A. To my best recollection, I have to say -- I have to

13 think about the names, if you need it, because I have notes

14 which I wrote when I came here that I cannot find at this

15 time. But drugs control the mind, for example, of the

16 military people in the wartime.

17 Q. Okay. Now what -- I want to go back -- you told me

18 that you entered the -- you were drafted in 1950. What was

19 your -- what was your job in the Army between 1950 and 1053?

20 A. 1950, 1953, I was deputy commander of brigade.

21 Q. In ?

22 A. Sure. In .

23 Q. Since you stated you didn't have any -- you weren't

24 in Korea, how did you happen to learn about this information,

25 and when did you learn about it?

1 A. Well, first of all, I know about it since '54 -- I
2 mean, direct knowledge from the discussion of the defense
3 council, discussion in collegium. Beacause, for example, we
4 invited to the collegium doctors which were involved in war in
5 Korea. They reported to collegium to test the results of the
6 test of the drugs.
7 Q. Did you ever, in the college, hear a lecture by one
8 of the doctors that was in this hospital in Korea, or did you
9 read about it?
10 A. No, no. I heard it in the collegium of minister,
11 where they go directly and report it to the top military
12 people, the results from the tests.
13 Q. But my question is, you read their reports or did
14 you listen to them, or orally give their reports?
15 A. Both, because if they wrote the reports, 100 pages,
16 not many people have time to read it, so we always invited
17 them to collegium and they talked to the members of collegium.
18 Also, I must say the Soviet top military people,
19 they lectures us every -- I would say twice a year, and they
20 used some statements about the results of the test of the
21 drugs.
22 Q. So you first learned this information in 1954 when
23 you were attending courses or reading other material, is that
24 your statement?
25 A. I'm just thinking.

1 Q. Please take your time.

2 A. I must say I learned before that also, but mostly

3 from friends, not official documents or official statement

4 from Russian general or whatever. This official-unofficial, I

5 tell you for example, when they build the hospital in Korea, I

6 think 1952, the -- because the engineer troops, they were --

7 they had also the construction units or whatever.

8 And also, the people who take care about the mines

9 and these things -- I don't know how to say -- so we were

10 asked, our brigade, to select some people for the purpose go

11 to Korea one day. So it was, I think, '52 when the military

12 looked for these professionals to send them to Korea.

13 But officially, the papers, the lectures, and

14 documents since 1954.

15 Q. Where do you think these documents that you saw

16 would be stored today? Or would these documents have been

17 destroyed?

18 A. If they were destroyed, I don't know. I was not

19 there. But it must be most of them in party archives.

20 Q. In the Communist Party archives?

21 A. Right, I think. Plus, of course, if the defense

22 council give order to, I don't know -- let's say, example,

23 appoint General Rudolph Babaka ambassador or charge d'affairs

24 to Korea, these documents should also be in the ministry of

25 defense. I'm just thinking where could even be small pieces -

1 if they destroyed the documents from the defense council,
2 which I don't know.
3 Q. Well, understanding you've not been in
4 since 1968 --
5 A. Right.
6 Q. But based on your knowledge of the operation of the
7 government and the people, do you think these documents would
8 still be available today, in the archives somewhere?
9 A. If Russia didn't take it, the Soviet Union, I would
10 say yes.
11 Q. Do you think the present Government
12 would make these documents available to a U.S. Government
13 committee?
14 A. This is what I want to tell you, because when I
15 talked to your staff and people from DIA, they asked me some
16 names, for example, to give them some names.
17 I would like to tell you, for example, that General
18 Babaka, who was in Korea like charge d'affairs, but he
19 controlled everything, he was military intelligence officer,
20 this guy is sort of Stalinist. I cannot imagine this guy
21 would tell somebody anything. But there are people who must
22 have knowledge, you know. About this guy like him, I'm even
23 afraid he can make even personal revenge how much he hate
24 United States and so.
25 But on the other hand there are guys like my best

1 friend, and you can believe he was best friend, was Dr.
2 Bednar, to whom I told I will defect to the United States,
3 because he visited United States and so on. He was not even
4 member of the Communist Party. He works at central military
5 hospital in the psychiatric department where they test the
6 drugs, and so on. This guy would be very happy to help.
7 And I'm trying to contact them personally for my
8 reason to prove I am right.
9 MR. ERICKSON: Why don't we take about a 5 or 10
10 minute break.
11 (Recess.)
12 MR. ERICKSON: Let's go back on the record.
13 BY MR. ERICKSON:
14 Q. General, is there anything that you want to change
15 or modify in anything that you've told me so far, bearing in
16 mind that you're going to have an opportunity to review the
17 entire transcript. But I always give witnesses a chance to
18 change something or if you've had a chance to think about
19 something that you said that you want to correct, we can do
20 that now if you'd like to.
21 A. No. I just want to say one thing for the record.
22 The gentleman who talked to me from your committee.
23 A. Mr. LeGro and Mr. McCreary?
24 A. Yes. In that memo they wrote, they said I'm willing
25 to go back to with them and help them talk to

1 some people. I think Mr. Green agrees he was there.

2 I said absolutely the opposite from this. I said I

3 would never go to because of the death penalty.

4 I was still not rehabilitated. The country is full of KGB.

5 What I will do there, I told them, if they invite

6 their people, let's say to Germany or United States, I'm going

7 to help and talk, but never go back to . I'm

8 not in a hurry, I hope. Maybe I one day I will take my son

9 and we'll older, but not now. So it was wrong in that

10 statement.

11 Q. What memorandum are you talking about?

12 A. What they wrote after the meeting. It was published

13 in newspaper. It leaked to the press.

14 MR. STIEN: That's what came out in the LA Times,

15 something to that effect.

16 THE WITNESS: I think it was the Los Angeles Times

17 that published.

18 BY MR. ERICKSON:

19 Q. But you're not talking about a committee memo that

20 you saw, you're talking about a newspaper article?

21 A. Yes. And I saw also the memo, I'm sorry.

22 MR. GREEN: Could we go off the record for a minute?

23 (Discussion off the record.)

24 BY MR. ERICKSON:

25 Q. When was Red Cocaine first published?

1 A. I would say it's probably already 2 or 3 years.
2 Actually, it was not very much published, you know.
3 Q. Would you summarize what you saw in the documents
4 that you read or heard about concerning any American POW's in
5 Korea and their treatment at this hospital?
6 A. Well, as I told you, for was the practice and the
7 analysis of the health, physical health and mental problems of
8 the soldiers, Korean and American soldiers.
9 I would like to tell you big sample. When they make
10 autopsy of the bodies, they came to conclusion -- and you can
11 probably find it in documents -- that 22 percent -- I remember
12 like today the young American soldiers already passed as they
13 called many heart attack. Koreans, I don't know, 2 or 4
14 percent.
15 So from these things, this analysis, they make
16 conclusion for the next war why Americans, what to do, maybe
17 make more heart attacks. I'm just telling you example. These
18 were things which were not related to test of the drugs,
19 Soviets or . These were related to the different live,
20 different country.
21 And second thing was the test of the drugs which
22 participate with the Soviets on the program.
23 Q. So am I to understand this hospital was staffed by
24 both and Soviets?
25 A. Officially, just but Soviets were there

1 also, because they advise everything.

2 Q. And you say the tests were done on both

3 Americans --

4 A. And Koreans.

5 Q. And South Koreans or North Koreans?

6 A. I'm sorry, but I don't know.

7 Q. Were any numbers of tests revealed, like for example

8 we tested 100 soldiers or 25 or do you remember?

9 A. This I have to explain. For example when we discuss

10 it with DIA, if they said in the report which goes to the

11 Defense Counsel even later on because the program continued,

12 the program which they started in Korea continued through

13 Vietnam War, test the drugs. Not autopsies by in these

14 things, but the drugs.

15 If I say, let's say, to DIA and to repeat it if they

16 said, we test 120 soldiers on the brain damage by the drugs

17 and we test 60 soldiers about heart problem, I don't know if

18 these were separate soldiers. I just don't know. I don't

19 somebody to take me wrong, because maybe one group of doctors

20 they test the brain from same body and the other maybe livers

21 and the heart.

22 So, I must say like in -- well, we are talking about

23 Korea now.

24 Q. I'd like to stay focused just on the Korean War for

25 now if we could.

1 A. I understand.

2 Q. My purpose of my question, General, is to try to

3 find out the contents of the documents, how detailed they were

4 or was it more written as a medical report or do you remember?

5 A. Talking about the hospital, it was the medical

6 problems, the interrogation of the soldiers from intelligence

7 point of view. It was strictly conducted by Soviets and

8 Koreans. We got results from that, but I don't know how many

9 soldiers they interrogate, how many they were officers or

10 whatever.

11 I'm talking right now about the hospital.

12 Q. Well, the Korean War, as you know, was a UN conflict

13 and there were soldiers from many different countries. Did

14 they specifically name United States or American or were they

15 Caucasian prisoners of war?

16 A. They were most interested about Americans and

17 Koreans, because different ethnic group, you know, the drugs

18 work different on Koreans or let's say on black Americans and

19 white Americans than the drugs affected Americans. So they

20 will not worry if they will find Australia or let's say,

21 whatever troops were there, but they were most worried --

22 worried, more interested -- about United States troops.

23 Q. But in hearing these lectures or reading the

24 reports, they made a differential between the black Americans

25 and the white Americans?

1 A. Yes, absolutely.

2 Q. To the best of your knowledge, how many pages or how
3 many documents are there that you saw that discussed this
4 particular testing in Korea?

5 A. Well, first of all, at least twice a year. How it
6 works, the Defense Counsel, as was everything in Communist
7 country, everything is planning. So I must present to Defense
8 Counsel plan for one year, which all the government officials
9 and everybody give me request what they want to send to
10 Defense Counsel.

11 And after them, if it was the most important
12 security things, you must send report to Defense Counsel about
13 any issue -- let's say industrial espionage -- you must send
14 them if the order was to steal from French and British
15 technology. If you have there 3 months, the intelligence
16 services are for this and this, so maybe they send every 3
17 months. But if not, every 6 months we must present to Defense
18 Counsel a report how the plan -- how the different agencies
19 achieved the goals which Defense Counsel gives them.

20 So at least twice a year, if nothing goes awry, we
21 must present this report to Defense Counsel, because end of
22 the year you've asked for the budget. Okay, comrades, you
23 give us such an order, Ministry of Defense and Interior, we
24 did this, this, this for the next year. We need such a
25 million for other operation.

1 Q. Well, directing your attention to this medical
2 experiment which you said took place roughly from 1949 to
3 1953, the end of the war, were the doctors doing any
4 experiments in 1956 or 1957? Or were they still relying on
5 the records from the Korean War?
6 A. When Vietnam War started, it was other source of the
7 information. But after the Korean War, I think they just go
8 ahead what they had because they test something on the
9 prisoners.
10 Q. So what you're saying is, this issue was constantly
11 being reviewed and updated every 6 months?
12 A. After the Korean War, I would say yes.
13 Q. I'm asking because your statement is a very general
14 one that every 6 months all issues were being reviewed.
15 So my question is, do you remember this as being a
16 standing issue or policy that you reviewed especially when you
17 were in the Minister of Defense for 8 years?
18 A. At least once a year, absolutely. When we sent
19 report what was done over last year and what for we need money
20 for next year. You cannot do anything without decision of
21 Defense Counsel.
22 Q. But what type of things, if you remember, were being
23 discussed about the testing of drugs on American service
24 members?
25 MR. STIEN: What time?

1 BY MR. ERICKSON:

2 Q. Anything that you can remember. I'm trying to
3 narrow down the type of report. Basically, what you've told
4 me so far or what I've heard is that there was this hospital
5 setup in Korea from roughly '49 to '53. And do you remember
6 seeing reports and do you remember early in your military
7 career hearing some lectures about certain tests that were
8 done on Koreans and Americans at that time?

9 You have further told me that at least once a year
10 and maybe twice, this policy or the study of drugs and the
11 effect on American service members was being reviewed. So I'm
12 trying to get a little more detail of what was being said in
13 these reports.

14 And I understand that, with your impressive
15 credentials, there was a lot of paper that went through your
16 desk. But I'm merely asking if you remember anything specific
17 about this at any time that you were in on this
18 narrow issue. And if you don't, I understand.

19 A. What I want to tell you is this issue, chemical
20 weapons, biological weapons, drug, different drugs, it was not
21 just mentioned like special issue. It was special, but also
22 if you discuss the future war, which you discuss almost all
23 the time from different angles, you have there the effect of
24 this, because otherwise of course we have to win the war and
25 beat NATO and all these things.

1 So you have, even if these reports -- let's say you
2 discuss operation plan in the general staff, which is a top
3 secret document. The member of the Defense Counsel, they go
4 to the general staff. The document can never can be taken out
5 of general staff. There we were sitting 2 days with the chief
6 of general staff and Russians explain the next war and they
7 mention, okay, NATO has this, we have this. And they mention
8 again this problem, the drugs, biological weapons, et cetera.
9 So it was not one occasion when you mention these
10 things, no one document. It was, I would say, not 100, but
11 few other documents. When they mention this problem, like
12 very important weapons against NATO.
13 Q. Do you ever recall hearing any lectures or reviewing
14 any documents of any other East European bloc country having a
15 similar hospital in Korea during the Korean War?
16 A. No. I never heard about it.
17 Q. Bearing in mind that there were troops from some
18 Western European countries, do you ever recall any tests being
19 done on French soldiers or British soldiers or any other
20 nationalities outside of Koreans and Americans?
21 A. To my best recollection, when they summarize it,
22 what effect on the white in this thing, of course, Europe was
23 include. But I never saw a report which said special tests on
24 Germans. I didn't see all reports because at that time I was
25 not in Defense Counsel. But what I saw or what I heard when

1 Soviet lectures us, if they mention Europe, it was like global
2 effect.
3 Q. This hospital in the Korean War, you said
4 earlier that it was built by engineers?
5 A. Yeah. We had --
6 Q. Do you remember any detail on the size of the
7 hospital or as, I believe in the hospital language, how many
8 beds, how large was it?
9 A. That I have to think about. I don't want to give
10 you a wrong --
11 Q. Do you know if there was any intelligence
12 people assigned to the staff of the hospital?
13 A. Of course they were. As I told you, General Babaka,
14 he was the chief of the GRU and he was charge d'affaires or
15 ambassador, we called him, who was in charge about all
16 operation in Korea. It is why they send General there.
17 Q. In the Army, do you have medical
18 doctors that are in military uniforms?
19 A. Absolutely everyone.
20 Q. And the doctors assigned to the hospital in Korea,
21 were they military doctors or were they civilian
22 doctors?
23 A. Military.
24 Q. Do you know if there were any nurses assigned to
25 this hospital?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Do you recall how large the staff was at any one

3 time?

4 A. No. I have to think of it, because I was more

5 concentrated on how many nurses or people who work for the

6 laboratory. I don't know.

7 Q. Was this hospital strictly for research or were they

8 actually treating other medical emergencies?

9 A. It was strictly research and a training.

10 Q. Do you remember hearing or seeing any documents

11 where the intelligence personnel would interrogate any

12 of the prisoners of war/patients at this hospital?

13 A. Well, who did everything and controlled were

14 Russians. help. Because, you know, if they treated a

15 patient, somehow you have opportunity to talk to him. Maybe

16 he is willing to talk better than if somebody take in special

17 room and interrogate. In this case, the participate.

18 But originally was completely in charge by Russians.

19 Q. Do you know or do you remember -- again, I'm always

20 referring to what you read or heard on this issue -- where the

21 patients or prisoners drugged prior to interrogation or was

22 there any information about that?

23 A. Regular drugs, like marijuana or whatever, I don't

24 know. This is what you mean?

25 Q. No, I'm wondering, was there any information that

1 you read or heard about when they interrogated the prisoners,
2 were the prisoners brought in under some type of influence of
3 drugs or not? Or did they even address that?
4 A. Drugs which they got from the Americans?
5 Q. No, drugs that they got from the hospital, that the
6 hospital --
7 A. Oh, before they interrogated them? Oh, yes, yes,
8 sure. Because they also test these drugs, what is the memory
9 and everything, sure.
10 Q. Was there any information on the length of stay at
11 the hospital by some of these patients, if you recall?
12 A. No. I don't know.
13 Q. Was there any information whether Soviets were
14 present during any of these interrogations?
15 A. They orchestrated everything. You can not do
16 anything without them. Because it was Soviet order for
17 to build the hospital.
18 Q. Do you recall the names of some of the drugs that
19 were used at this hospital?
20 A. That I have to take a look at my notes, because I
21 make some notes after I defected. I'm not a doctor, you know.
22 Q. I understand. Do you know if there were any guards
23 at this hospital?
24 A. Absolutely.
25 Q. Were they Soviet, or North Korean guards?

1 A. What have there were not regular military,
2 but they were military contract agents which is under Ministry
3 of Interior.
4 Q. Was there ever a mention of any North Korean guards
5 at the hospital?
6 A. Yeah. They were there mainly for deception to show
7 them outside it is Korean.
8 Q. Was there any evidence -- you mentioned that this is
9 a research hospital? Do you know if any North Korean troops
10 were ever treated at this hospital or was this mentioned?
11 A. I don't know that, because if they mentioned it,
12 they say Korean soldiers. If they were both sides, I don't
13 know.
14 Q. And again, you don't remember the size of the
15 medical team?
16 A. The medical team? I said before I think it was
17 around 10 doctors.
18 Q. And how many nurses?
19 A. It was changed.
20 Q. I understand. They would be transferred in and out.
21 A. Right.
22 Q. Was there a Soviet medical team there also?
23 A. Sure.
24 Q. Do you remember any names of any people that were
25 ever stated at this research hospital?

1 I realize, General, we're going back many, many
2 years, but perhaps a name or some of the reports you might
3 recall, some doctor that gave the lecture. Maybe he or she
4 was present in Korea or anything along that line.
5 We're just trying to get as much information on this
6 subject that you can remember.
7 A. I would like to ask if it will be maybe possible to
8 come back, look all my notes.
9 Q. Well, my suggestion would be this. If it's
10 agreeable to your counsel, when you come to review your
11 transcript, you might, please feel free to bring your notes
12 with you. And in the transcript you're going to see where
13 I've asked the size of the hospital and the drugs and that.
14 And when you come to that in your transcript, then you can
15 fill in the answer. I think that would be easier for
16 everybody.
17 A. Okay.
18 Q. If there was a commander at this hospital, who would
19 that commander report to back in .? What
20 department of agency would the hospital have been under?
21 A. Everything goes through intelligence service, GRU.
22 I mean, the channel, the communication. General Babaka was
23 again in charge, because everything was based on the military
24 operation. The civilians didn't have anything to do with
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and so on.

1 So all this information go through GRU and from the
2 GRU, it goes to the medical team or researchers in
3
4 Q. You mentioned earlier he was in charge of
5 intelligence, but also the ambassador to North Korea.
6 A. Well, because, at that time, any foreign policy
7 didn't have any reason. The main thing was military operation
8 and it is why they officially appointed me charge d'affaires
9 or ambassador, but he was GRU because everything was under
10 control of GRU.
11 Q. To your knowledge, is he still alive?
12 A. I don't know. I didn't have 24 years contact with
13 anybody, because I didn't want to put people to dangerous
14 situation. If he is alive, he will live in probably, in
15 because it was his home town. And what I
16 heard when I was already here, he was appointed military
17 commander of that region or something like that. If he is
18 alive. I don't know. Probably when Communism collapsed, he
19 gave up.
20 Q. To the best of your knowledge, were there any other
21 soldiers or civilians anywhere else in Korea
22 during the Korean War or was it just this one location?
23 A. No, they were more to help with
24 construction, especially when the war moved back from North
25 Korea. They were much more people.

1 Q. Do you have any idea of their location or was it
2 basically just moving throughout North Korea?
3 A. I don't have idea about location, but you know, it
4 was in the papers. But it's not easy to remember the official
5 names. I just remember, I think, one document in 1952 or
6 something I saw.
7 There was fight about budget because the Minister of
8 Defense and Interior request more money in foreign currency
9 than the Minister of Finance can give them. And it was not
10 for military operation. It was for the others. So there were
11 other people and other operations in Korea.
12 Also, military equipment and --
13 Q. Was it the general policy of the Soviet Union when
14 they task to go and do these projects in Korea
15 to reimburse or to increase the aid to offset some of these
16 expenses?
17 A. Oh, yeah, absolutely.
18 Q. Do you know or did you ever read about any of these
19 other advisers, construction or ordinance people, even
20 having any contact with any American POW's? Or was it just at
21 this hospital?
22 A. Well, if they have the contact with the other POW's,
23 I can just guess, I would say I don't think so. But I never
24 saw anything.
25 Q. Switching to the tests, could you give us some

1 examples of what kind of tests were actually performed in
2 Korea?
3 A. As I said before, there were different drugs which
4 they would test. All reason was war, prepare for the war, how
5 such drugs can affect troops, for example, affect the mind,
6 affect the decision process, again, related to the war. Or
7 drugs which could be effective for a heart attack and this
8 type of drugs. Everything not drugs which will improve not
9 health or something. Everything related to the war, how it
10 will affect NATO troops, operations.
11 Q. From the tests, who would receive the results? This
12 would go, you said, to the intelligence agency in
13 ? Was this then disseminated throughout the
14 Warsaw Pact or to the Soviet Union?
15 A. To the Soviet Union and Soviets decide where to send
16 it, if they give Bulgarians or Germans. I don't know. I just
17 can say when we have joint meeting of the Warsaw Pact, like
18 Marshal Grechko and his people, they mention it in front of
19 all ministers of the general staff. But how much they give,
20 they decide, the Soviets, not
21 Also, if let's say, cooperated with
22 Germany because they were a very effective, especially Vietnam
23 War, the Soviets said, you will cooperate with these German
24 scientists. Because it was so top secret they control who has
25 clearance to participate.

1 Q. Do you have any idea who devised the tests, who came
2 up with the idea, maybe we should test this drug? Did this
3 come out of or Russia or who made up the method
4 of testing?
5 A. The method of this testing, how to use it, I think
6 it was some joint -- I must say the Soviets didn't control
7 every day if you give the soldier shot. But generally they
8 give the instruction, what to do, how to do it. Of course,
9 the have rights to say we recommend this or this, (b)(6)
10 because of the scientist work.
11 But again, major decisions and approve the test was
12 in Soviet hands.
13 Q. So the actual approval came from the Soviet Union
14 rather than ?
15 A. Yes. Soviets. can say what they think, but
16 Soviets make decision because they have own research.
17 Q. And I believe you stated earlier that the reason for
18 going to Korea was based on request from the
19 Soviet Union to do that.
20 A. Absolutely. Soviet coordinate everybody, this
21 project, how many each of satellites, put technology and all
22 these things was coordinated.
23 Q. Were there any other Warsaw Pact doctors at this
24 hospital or were they strictly ?
25 A. No, it was , Soviet.

1 (Recess.)

2 BY MR. ERICKSON:

3 Q. Let's go back on the record. Once again, General,

4 is there any statement that you've made that you'd like to

5 change or modify in any way?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Do you have any information on how the Korean or

8 American patients were obtained for the hospital?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Was there any information in the lectures or

11 documents that you saw on what happened to the patients after

12 the experiment was over?

13 A. They have to die. They don't have choice, because

14 many of these people were mentally destroyed.

15 Q. Did the method of death, was that ever explained?

16 Were they shot or did they treat them with some drug that

17 caused instant death? Or was that ever explained?

18 A. I just -- it was not even in the document, in the

19 session of Defense Counsel, the Chief of General Staff explain

20 that order of Soviet Union, any soldier or any person who die

21 under this program, nobody can never find anything, body,

22 bones or something, you know. So whether they cremated them,

23 I don't know. But it was order from Soviet Union and they

24 strictly control it.

25 Q. And those would have taken place at the hospital or

1 did it say?

2 A. Didn't say.

3 Q. I want to focus in now on the chain of command, the

4 organization of the hospital. Do you know who was in charge

5 of the hospital in Korea? Was there a commanding officer or a

6 chief administrator or how was the hospital organized?

7 A. About that, I don't know too much.

8 Q. And what organization or organizations in Prague

9 would the hospital report its findings or any information that

10 they wanted to relay to ? (b)(6)

11 A. I can tell you who was involved in this program,

12 which was the health administration, military health

13 administration, which was under the rear service, chief of

14 rear service. The chief of rear service was General Chlad.

15 He was former Soviet citizen.

16 Q. He was a former Soviet citizen?

17 A. Right.

18 Q. Do you know if he is still alive?

19 A. I don't know. Before I left he hadn't died. Who

20 was involved was, is they call it, Scientific Institution of

21 Air Force and Central Military Hospital and of course, GRU,

22 GRU and Ministry of Interior, the KGB. (b)(1)

23 Q. On the construction of the hospital, once again, who

24 constructed the hospital?

25 A. Was who in charge was the construction

1 administration, military construction administration.

2 Q. Do you know who planned the construction and the

3 layout of the hospital? Was it done by or by Soviets?

4 A. Architecture Institute, military again.

5 Q. So the Soviets were not involved in the planning or

6 the construction?

7 A. Well, they were involved because they have their

8 advisers, so called. Without them, you cannot write one page.

9 Q. Who paid for the construction of the hospital?

10 A. Was gift to Korean people.

11 Q. What was 's interest in the Korean

12 War?

13 A. You mean generally?

14 Q. Generally, yes.

15 A. Well, the major interest was always help our

16 countries to win the war, to prove to United States they

17 cannot win the war. It was the major interest.

18 The second interest was when the Chinese must step

19 in to do everything possible, push them out, because the

20 Russians didn't want Chinese to expand power. And there was

21 this research and experiments for the war.

22 Q. Where would the documents for the planning and the

23 construction, the actual plans, where could they be found

24 today? In what agency would they have been kept?

25 A. The health administration. I don't know if it's

1 correct translation. Architecture Institute, officially, in
2 they call it
3 Institute of Projects. Does that make sense in English?
4 Q. Various reports were coming back from this hospital
5 periodically. Did the Army or Security
6 Service ever use the results of any of these tests, either
7 quote, on enemies of .?
8 A. Sure, all the time.
9 Q. Am I correct, you said this was part of a large
10 scheme to quote, fight the next war. And this was updated and
11 was part of basically an annual review?
12 A. Exactly.
13 Q. Were any of the US prisoners of war from Korea ever
14 taken to ?
15 A. To Soviet Union. To Soviet Union. You mean from
16 Korea?
17 Q. Yes. We have this hospital in Korea that, according
18 to your testimony the way I understand it, was doing
19 experimental drugs on American POW's.
20 So my question was, was all of the testing done in
21 Korea or were some of these prisoners transported to
22 ?
23 A. For test, to , no. To Soviet Union,
24 because from the reports -- I don't know how many -- from the
25 reports they still continue after war, continue test.

1 Q. In the Soviet Union?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So you have seen some documents whereby some

4 American prisoners from Korea were taken to the Soviet Union?

5 A. No. At that time I was already in the Defense

6 Counsel. And the reports from the joint teams -- because they

7 were joint teams between Soviet Union, and

8 other Warsaw Pact country, I don't know what other Warsaw Pact

9 country participate. But the tests continued in the Soviet

10 Union and they give the researchers and scientists

11 results of some of these tests.

12 Q. To your knowledge, did any of the doctors or

13 medical staff from this hospital in Korea go with the

14 prisoners to the Soviet Union?

15 A. Well, if they go with prisoners, I don't know. But

16 they were many times in Soviet Union after, when the tests

17 continued, when the program continued.

18 Q. Do you have any idea of the number of US POW's from

19 Korea that would have been transferred to the Soviet Union?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Do you have idea how the prisoners that were

22 transferred were selected? Was it because of their technical

23 knowledge, their age? Was there ever any criteria for the

24 selection of these?

25 A. Two different things. One, regular espionage what

1 is the technology what is normal for any war. I'm talking
2 more about continuity of the tests of the drugs. And I think
3 if you see from the result what Soviets did, they took some
4 prisoners who were already on that program to continue,
5 because the program was not finished.
6 And when they start to test something on one soldier
7 or officer, they want to finish it. Do you know what I mean?
8 So this was it.
9 Q. Who would have made the decision to transfer the
10 prisoners from Korea to the Soviet Union?
11 A. The Soviet Defense Counsel.
12 Q. Did you ever see any information or hear anything
13 that U.S. POW's from Korea were transferred to any other
14 country besides the Soviet Union?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Have you ever visited any of these test sites in the
17 Soviet Union?
18 A. No.
19 Q. You did tell me earlier that you have visited the
20 Soviet Union on numerous occasions?
21 A. Many times.
22 Q. But during your visits, this particular area was not
23 discussed by you?
24 A. With the Soviets?
25 Q. Yes.

1 A. If I was with minister many times, in Soviet Union
2 or in when let's say Marshal Grechkov came,
3 the supreme commander, it was many times discussed between
4 minister.
5 Q. But you never toured, physically toured --
6 A. Especially for this?
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. No.
9 Q. So you never saw any American POW's being tested in
10 the Soviet Union?
11 A. No, no.
12 Q. Were any American POW's from the Korean War taken to
13 for further testing?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Do you know what parts of the Soviet Union they were
16 taken to?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Do you know how they got from Korea to the Soviet
19 Union?
20 A. No. I just can guess, but I don't know.
21 Q. Again, I'm trying to find out what you read from the
22 reports, or heard in the lectures.
23 A. I understand.
24 Q. I don't want to be detailed, but these are just
25 questions that may have been in the reports that we are trying

1 to find out.

2 A. Right.

3 Q. Do you know what agency of the Soviet Union would

4 have been in charge of this continued testing?

5 A. I just can say, from the communication point of view

6 with the Soviets -- it was similar, like in

7 except in Soviet Union was also more involved, Academy of

8 Science, where the Soviets have special military programs.

9 Selected scientists in some of them were, but

10 not many because they didn't have clearance like in the Soviet

11 Union.

12 Q. Do you know whether these prisoners were taken to

13 one location or to several locations?

14 A. I don't know.

15 Q. Do you have any knowledge what would have happened

16 to them after the testing was over?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Do you have any knowledge whether any of these

19 prisoners were ever released or repatriated to the United

20 States?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Do you have any knowledge whether any of these

23 prisoners that were taken to Russia were ever resettled in any

24 country, including ?

25 A. Not in , not the people who were

1 selected for the test. But they have also some people, and
2 same with Vietnam, who were selected for intelligence
3 purposes. They interrogate them and they find out they are
4 anti-imperialists, or whatever, how they call it.
5 So I think these people were settled down in the
6 Soviet Union, because they have the propaganda and some other
7 things. And I don't think these people were killed. I don't
8 know. I was not there, I'm sorry. But I know there were some
9 people who settled.
10 Q. Now, you stated earlier that those who were tested
11 at this hospital in Korea, after the tests
12 they were killed, and there was no evidence of anything. Did
13 you ever see or read anything, or hear anything about what
14 would have happened to them, the continued testing in Russia?
15 A. No.
16 Q. And how did you learn about the American POW's being
17 transferred to Russia?
18 A. Because from the reports, the tests continued. They
19 were there.
20 Q. You saw this in documents, then?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Did you ever see any of the American prisoners?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Did you ever see any photographs of the American
25 prisoners?

1 A. No.

2 Q. In any of the documents that you saw in

3 were there any photographs attached to the

4 reports?

5 A. I saw some photographs, but not when, I don't know

6 if it was when they were already in the Soviet Union or it was

7 still in Korea. Some photographs, a bunch of soldiers. How

8 they looked after, I think they say 2 years of tests of the

9 drugs, which affected your brain.

10 Q. Did you ever see any photographs of the hospital

11 itself?

12 A. No. I saw the plan.

13 Q. The plans of the construction of the hospital?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Did any of these reports show, or were there even

16 any photographs of American dogtags or uniforms or anything,

17 that would identify these prisoners as United States service

18 personnel?

19 A. No.

20 Q. They were just identified in the reports or in the

21 lectures that you heard?

22 A. Um-hum.

23 Q. Now I'm going to focus on what's called the Cold

24 War. From your resume, and from what you've told me today,

25 you were in a position of authority up until 1968 in

1 Would that be a fair statement?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. How many countries did you visit prior to leaving in

4 1968? Where did you travel?

5 A. Except Warsaw Pact countries, nothing else.

6 Q. Did you visit all of the Warsaw Pact countries?

7 A.

8

9 Q. Which country did you visit the most?

10 A. Soviet Union.

11 Q. And approximately how many times have you been to

12 the Soviet Union?

13 A. Probably 4 or 5 times a year, every month, maybe, or

14 6 weeks.

15 Q. And approximately how long would your visits last

16 when you went?

17 A. The longest one was, I think, in 1963. In 1963 I

18 think was the longest visit, 1 week. In 1967, also a 1-week

19 visit.

20 Q. But most of your visits were just for a day or two?

21 A. 2, 3 days.

22 Q. When did you leave for good, you said

23 February of '68?

24 A. '68.

25 Q. And where did you go?

1 A. To Yugoslavia. From Yugoslavia to Italy. And from
2 Italy to the United States.
3 Q. And how did you go from to
4 Yugoslavia? Fly? Drive? Train?
5 A. Drive. I drove my car. And I drove to Rome, and
6 from Rome I flew to the United States.
7 Q. What was the major purpose of your visits to the
8 Soviet Union? Military?
9 A. Just military.
10 Q. And what would be --
11 A. Military, or international policy. I would say it
12 was meeting of the political consultative committee, which was
13 the highest body there. You discuss, I don't know, global
14 policy in Europe or against the United States. Do you know
15 what I mean.
16 But on the other hand, on the military defense
17 council, it was just military things, so it was different
18 meetings, but if it was not this official meetings, everything
19 else, when I go there with some other people, it was for
20 military and intelligence, and counterintelligence.
21 Q. Were your meetings generally just with Soviets, or
22 were other members of the Warsaw Pact there?
23 A. Well, if it was meetings of Warsaw Pact, all of them
24 were there. Sometimes Romania was not there. But if it was
25 individual meetings, you deal just with Soviets.

1 Q. During your travels to Russia or other Warsaw Pact
2 countries, did you ever talk about U.S. POW's from the Korean
3 War?
4 A. Just from the point of view of the tests.
5 Q. I want to come to Vietnam, probably after our break.
6 But did you, during your travels up to '68, ever talk about
7 any U.S. prisoners of war from Vietnam during your visits to
8 Russia or the Eastern Bloc countries?
9 A. Not Eastern Bloc countries, but Russia, yes --
10 Soviet Union.
11 Q. Did you ever meet Francis Gary Powers, who was shot
12 down over the Soviet Union?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Would the Soviets have ever debriefed you on any of
15 the results of their interrogation of Powers, that you recall?
16 A. They debriefed him.
17 MR. STIEN: They would debrief him, he would not be
18 debriefed.
19 BY MR. ERICKSON:
20 Q. I said, did the Soviets ever share any of their
21 debriefing of Powers with you?
22 A. Not with me. But the chief of general staff, and
23 the chief of GRU, they were called to Soviet Union and (h)
24 they debriefed them.
25 Q. Do you remember any cases in which U.S. military

1 personnel were captured during the Hungarian uprising in 1956?

2 A. By Soviets?

3 Q. By any Eastern Bloc country.

4 A. 1956, Hungary. Not by but I also don't know

5 of the others. But I don't know numbers or how many. But

6 when the Soviets tried to justify the Soviet operation in

7 Hungary, when they sent -- it's not report, but information to

8 defense counsel, because participated very

9 much. They said they have proof from American citizens. Of

10 course, they believe all of them are CIA, which they took from

11 Hungary. They have proof.

12 It was the Russian language, imperialistic plot to

13 destroy Hungary. And after that, they should have evidence

14 they should go back to which they tried to

15 make scared the leadership. But how many and, or names,

16 I'm sorry I don't know.

17 Q. Did you ever remember any instances or cases where

18 U.S. military personnel were captured during the Cuban missile

19 crisis in 1962?

20 The reason we're asking these questions is, the

21 broad scope of any American service people ever being

22 captured, and in your position in perhaps you

23 saw some message traffic that related to this. I'm not

24 suggesting they were.

25 A. Right, I know, I know. No, I just, they were just

1 some reports which they said that some soldiers crossed the
2 border to some American soldiers from Germany.
3 Q. You are suggesting that they defected from the U.S.
4 Army?
5 A. It was official. They were some, taken from
6 Austria, Czechoslovakia. But the Cuban crisis, I don't know.
7 Q. You left prior to the Soviet --
8 A. Invasion.
9 Q. -- invasion in '68?
10 A. Right.
11 Q. Do you have any knowledge of any U.S. military
12 personnel ever being put on trial for acts of criminal, for
13 any criminal acts, spying or espionage in any of the Eastern
14 Bloc countries during -- prior to you leaving ?
15 A. I have to think about that. Trial. There were
16 trials of spies, but, well, some were captured like, I think
17 you remember the case of somebody who was former citizen of
18 the United States, but before he was citing citizen who
19 has travel agency somewhere in Chicago, or I don't know, and
20 they invited him to Soviet Union for business deal. Travel
21 agent.
22 And when he flew back, our plane has some
23 difficulty, and must land in because he is supposed to
24 travel with the Soviets to Vienna, I think. And planned on
25 that, and the KGB stepped in to get him out, and the plane was-

1 fixed again, and he was, I don't know how many years in that
2 jail. He was, I think Kennedy was president. And he sent a
3 letter to president. And so finally they release him.
4 There was another one who was captured in Vienna.
5 That one I don't remember the name. And he was tried in
6 But some others I have to remember, because
7 these were the most publicized cases.
8 Q. Well, perhaps when you come to read your transcript,
9 you can add some others. I think we are at a good place to
10 take a break. Let's go off the record.
11 (Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the deposition in the
12 above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m.,
13 this same day.)
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1 AFTERNOON SESSION

2 (1:00 p.m.)

3 Whereupon,

4

5 the witness on the stand at the time of recess, having been

6 previously duly sworn, was further examined and testified as

7 follows:

8 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE (RESUMED)

9 BY MR. ERICKSON:

10 Q. once again is there any testimony that you

11 have given previously that you would like to change or modify

12 in any way?

13 A. No.

14 Q. I'm going to shift to the Vietnam War POW issue now.

15 In your interview with two of our committee

16 investigators, you stated that you recall two to three groups

17 of 25 each, U.S. POW's taken from Vietnam to

18 and then on to the Soviet Union. Do you recall making such a

19 statement?

20 A. Yes. I think I said 20 to 25. Not exactly 25,

21 because I'm not sure if it was 25 or 24.

22 Q. What years did these trips take place?

23 A. I think first one was end of '65, or beginning '66.

24 And other one '66. And the last one which I saw was the

25 spring of '67.

1 Q. And each one of these groups would have been roughly
2 20 to 25 American POW's?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Did you see the American POW's yourself?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. What was your duty at the time? And did it change
7 from '65 to '67, or were you in the same position?
8 A. I was in the same position.
9 Q. Which was?
10 A. First secretary of the Communist Party to minister
11 of defense.
12 Q. And how were these American POW's transported from
13 Vietnam to
14 A. Soviet airplanes, they escorted them, Soviets and
15 together. Counterintelligence took them to the
16 facility, and that's it. And three guys, or four guys I'm not
17 sure, they wait in They were the guys who were
18 actually the interrogators, because they already worked with
19 them when they stay in
20 Q. Approximately how many days or how many hours did
21 they stay in
22 A. 5 to 7 days, no more.
23 Q. And what was the reason or rationale to bring them
24 from Vietnam to rather than straight to the Soviet
25 Union?

1 A. I think this is how Soviets operated. They try to
2 cut the throat. Nobody knows they go to Soviet Union. It is
3 how they use courier, transport couriers from Latin America,
4 the same, they use Not just this time. And
5 since they were there, they gave them the physical
6 examination.
7 Q. Did you see each of the three groups personally?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And where did you see them? What location, and what
10 was the occasion that you would go out to see them?
11 A. They were -- I saw them on three occasions. One is
12 at a military barracks, which belongs to military
13 counterintelligence in And a small group, they
14 separate I think three guys in the last group, and they put
15 into one other house, other villa. I don't know if they
16 separate them because they were officers, or they had special
17 interest with them.
18 And I saw they was in the villa, the safe house.
19 Q. What was the reason, if you know, that the Soviets
20 were taking them to Russia?
21 A. Some, the Soviet general in General
22 Kuschev, Alexander Kuschev, told me some of them they used. I
23 don't know if they were the guys they separated from some
24 others, to have them for propaganda, and have them analyze the
25 operation of the Vietnam War from the American side.

1 And the others, it was to continue the drug test.

2 Q. Was there some message traffic or information that

3 you knew they were coming, or were you notified after they had

4 already landed in ?

5 A. No, no, we knew they were coming. I was waiting in

6 the barracks.

7 Q. Could you describe the physical condition, and how

8 were the prisoners dressed?

9 A. They have some badge or uniforms like field

10 uniforms, and physically they were not chubby, but I don't

11 think they were -- they didn't look to me sick, I would have

12 to say.

13 Q. Do you know any of their names, or any of their

14 ranks?

15 A. I never saw the names, because it was Soviet

16 operation. I never saw the names.

17 Q. Did you personally talk to any of them?

18 A. Oh, God, if I talk to them I would be not here,

19 because it was the main thing prohibited. Nobody can contact

20 them. They even said, you don't smile to them. They

21 interrogate the chef who was formerly in jail because he tried

22 to be too friendly. First of all, I didn't speak English, and

23 secondly, I wouldn't even try.

24 Q. Who in the Soviet Union would approve this program

25 or transfer?

1 A. Oh, it must be Defense Council or Politburo. No
2 other way.
3 Q. Would anyone in have to approve it?
4 A. Not approve it. They just informed the First
5 Secretary this will happen, and that was it. There was not
6 too much discussion.
7 Q. On each of these three trips, did they take the
8 prisoners to the same location at each time, or were
9 there different locations?
10 A. The major group, same location, yeah. If they
11 separate two, three guys, they have -- that time when I was
12 there, they have a few at safe houses, and I never saw them in
13 same safe house every time.
14 Q. Were you invited to go out to see them, or did you
15 go out of your own curiosity?
16 A. No, no, no. It was my duty to see how it is
17 prepared.
18 Q. How did you learn about each of these trips? How
19 did you find out about them?
20 A. Because the Administrative Organs Department, his
21 name is Mamula, he just called me and say, you are in charge
22 to control the security and how it is prepared.
23 Q. In your discussions with some of the Soviet guards
24 or people that were accompanying these flights, or your
25 exchange with other Soviets, were there other flights to any

1 other Eastern European countries that were discussed?

2 A. I never heard.

3 Q. Could you be more specific as to where they were

4 held in or could you pinpoint exactly where you were?

5 A. If we have map, I can show directly. The (b)(6)

6 name of the part of and this barracks,

7 when they were to military counterintelligence they have their

8 special battalion where they train terrorists and other people

9 for war, so it was the most secret place.

10 I don't want to waste time how I find out about such

11 places, but it was the most secret place guarded by military

12 counterintelligence, and of course in that case the Soviets

13 guards were around POW's, so it is one thing.

14 The one villa, the guys who were separated, the name

15 or the street is Roseveltova, for President Roosevelt, number

16 1, and the other one is, street name is but I don't

17 remember the number -- 3, or -- I'm not sure about. I have to

18 look in the map which I have at home.

19 Q. During the time you saw the prisoners, were any

20 pictures taken of them?

21 A. Not by us, no.

22 Q. Were there any documents outside of the Soviet

23 aircraft was going to land at a certain time, are there any

24 documents that would verify that a certain number of American

25 prisoners were going to be on these aircraft?

1 A. I don't know. I just got order from the head of the
2 Ministry of Organs Department, no paper, no nothing.
3 Q. It was a verbal command.
4 A. Right.
5 Q. Did you just see them one time, or did you go see
6 them every day, or what was your responsibility during their
7 visits?
8 A. The main group I saw just one time. The second
9 group, I was there two times, I think. The smaller group, I
10 was in that villa probably three times a week.
11 Q. You just referred to the main group and a smaller
12 group. Could you be more specific? What was the main group?
13 A. They were the people who -- they put them to the
14 barracks, let's say, 19, 20 people.
15 Q. Of each of these three flights, then.
16 A. Right.
17 Q. I'm with you.
18 A. From one flight, you know, when they went in the
19 closed vans to the barracks, this group which they separated
20 didn't go even out to the barracks, they took them immediately
21 to separate place, and from one group. I don't know whether
22 it was second or third. The Ministry of Interior took one
23 specially separate. I don't know why.
24 Q. What was done to the prisoners during their stay in
25 ?

1 A. They just took them to the main military hospital
2 for a physical check-up, and the Soviets interrogated with
3 them.
4 Q. Were they guarded by Soviet or soldiers?
5 A. Well, generally both. The Soviets were in that part
6 of the barracks, and all barracks were guarded by the
7 counterintelligence.
8 Q. These barracks that you talk about, were they
9 strictly for the Soviet troops?
10 A. No, no. There was a battalion of military
11 counterintelligence which prepared generally citizen for
12 terrorism, assassinate people, and so and so, if the war will
13 start in the west.
14 Q. Realizing it's a long time ago, but the group that
15 came in in 1965, do you remember, perhaps, what time of year
16 or what month it was?
17 A. As I said, it was late '65 or beginning '66, but I
18 don't know exactly if it was December or February.
19 Q. The second group that came in --
20 A. It was later on. It was August.
21 Q. Of '66.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. And the '67 group.
24 A. It was, I think, late spring '67. It was last time
25 when I saw.

1 Q. May, perhaps.

2 A. May, June.

3 Q. Were these American prisoners mistreated in any way

4 that you observed?

5 A. I don't think so, not in I think (b)

6 coming from Vietnam it was heaven for them -- food and clean

7 beds and everything.

8 Q. Can you tell us the names of anyone else that you

9 saw observing the U.S. prisoners when they were in

10

11 A. You mean citizen, or Russians?

12 Q. Well, either.

13 A. Well, the Russians who escorted them, I don't --

14 there were three guys who were with them. I talked to the

15 colonel many times, but I'm not sure about the man's name, but

16 who was in charge was who was president or

17 the supreme commander of Warsaw Pact forces in

18 Alexander Kuschev.

19 Q. He's Russian.

20 A. Russian, a 3-star general.

21 Q. What about any officials that were in charge of the

22 counterintelligence at the barracks where they stayed?

23 Do you have any names of people that would have known about

24 these trips?

25 A. Who knows for sure was the chief of

1 counterintelligence. His name was Of
2 course, minister, First Secretary, the head of the
3 Administrative Organ Department,
4 Q. What was the individual's name that told you to go?
5 A. the head of the Administrative
6 Organs Department of Central Committee.
7 Q. Was he the one that told you on all three occasions
8 to go there?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Can you think of anyone else?
11 A. First of all, I don't remember the name of the
12 commander of the battalion, but in the military
13 counterintelligence, probably for sure some other people were
14 involved, because just the chief cannot do everything. But I
15 just don't want to tell you names of his deputies, because I
16 don't know which one was exactly involved. I think one of
17 them was his deputy. His name was -- who was generally in
18 charge of the guards for everything. His name was
19
20 Q. Did any of the Soviets tell you the reason they were
21 taking these POW's to Russia?
22 A. Well, what we know was for sure, for the continuity
23 of the drug program, but not officially. When I was once
24 fishing with General Kuschev we discussed the Vietnam War, how
25 it is analyzed. He told me what they think is wrong with

1 American troops, and so on, and he told me some of the
2 prisoners, American prisoners are very helpful to analyze the
3 operation of the United States forces, so that means -- the
4 minister also mentioned it a few times, but I never saw any
5 document about that.
6 Q. That was going to be my next question. Do you know
7 of any documents that might be in the archives in
8 about these three occasions?
9 A. It could be -- exist, you know. There was a system.
10 These things were usually discussed between Minister of
11 Defense, Minister of Interior, the KGB, and First
12 Secretary. In my practice, I think even whole Politburo
13 didn't know these things, and First Secretary or any secretary
14 of the Communist Party, they wrote notes.
15 They call it order of First Secretary, I think,
16 because they were more and more careful what decision they
17 make. I think this order must go to Minister of Interior, and
18 if you have -- and have possibility to go to archives of
19 Minister of Interior or Central Committee. It must be there.
20 Q. When you were in was it common (b)(6)
21 practice to archive all of these records?
22 A. In Ministry of Defense, yes. Central Committee, I
23 don't know.
24 Q. Are you aware that the Government does not
25 confirm your story on these three visits by Soviet?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Is there anyone that you know of that can verify

3 these three visits, outside of the names that you've already

4 given us? Is there anyone that we could contact in the United

5 States that perhaps used to live in or Russia

6 that would know about these?

7 A. Well, unfortunately, I don't know who lives in the

8 United States.

9 Q. From the time the first flight in '65 or early '66

10 was there, during any of your visits to the Soviet Union when

11 you were updating, as you said earlier, this drug-testing

12 program, was there ever a reference to these new American

13 POW's that were arriving in the Soviet Union?

14 A. It was referenced all the time when they analyzed

15 the testing, but I'm thinking if it was ever in the documents

16 from the Soviet Union to

17 Q. What I'm suggesting, is perhaps in one of

18 the debriefings at a Warsaw Pact meeting or information coming

19 out of the Soviet Union -- please don't let me put words in

20 your mouth -- but recently arrived Americans from Vietnam have

21 been tested and the results are as follows, or upon testing

22 Americans from Vietnam we find different results than what we

23 did from Korea?

24 A. No.

25 Q. I'm not suggesting perhaps that would have been

1 done, but okay, why was picked out rather than (b)
2 Poland or Romania or Hungary, if you know?
3 A. Because the Soviets always repeat they trust
4 more than anybody else in Warsaw Pact, and we
5 can document that on many, many things which I mentioned
6 earlier to DIA.
7 For example, they give a permit
8 organize own front, which is military structure, regiment,
9 division, army front. The commander of front has rights to
10 use nuclear weapons, and it was checked out, they never gave
11 this permit to Poland or East German or Bulgaria, and I can
12 tell you many other things.
13 The Soviets pay even operation abroad,
14 intelligence operation, because was more
15 educated people, but not enough money, so it was not first
16 case when Soviets use for such things.
17 Q. You stated, I believe, earlier, it was or is common
18 Soviet practice to take people not directly to their country
19 but to a third country first.
20 A. Yeah. We used North Korea, for example, for people
21 from Latin America, and if somebody complains, Americans,
22 somebody, they say, I'm sorry, this is business. We
23 don't control them.
24 Q. To your knowledge, prior to your leaving
25 in '68, were there any advisors or

1 hospitals in Vietnam?

2 A. No. I don't know.

3 Q. Not that you're aware of.

4 A. No.

5 Q. What kind of assistance, if any, did

6 give Vietnam, North Vietnam during the Vietnam conflict that

7 you're aware of?

8 A. All kind of assistance. Most, of course,

9 technology. It was very high budget for that, for the

10 technology. Some specialists, of course, spare parts,

11 political assistance to work with other countries against

12 United States -- what else. Medical equipment, but I never

13 heard, I never saw that we built a hospital like in Korea.

14 Q. I'm curious, if you know, judging on this constant

15 experiment, the Soviets test with going to

16 Korea during a conflict in '49 through '53 to set up a

17 hospital to do drug testing. What would be the reason -- once

18 again, we had another conflict in Vietnam. To me, there would

19 have been another opportunity for first-hand information.

20 A. They did it in cooperation with Vietnamese, but with

21 Vietnam it was not so easy like with Korea, I can tell you.

22 They didn't accept easy some proposals.

23 Q. The Vietnamese.

24 A. The Vietnamese they always repeat everything is

25 international duty of and others. We want to

1 send there, for example, pilots, say it was voluntary, but it
2 was not voluntary because they thought the Americans have
3 privilege to train specially Air Force in the war, and Soviet
4 generally they don't have this, so we pushed them to take a
5 regiment, and again change them. They never accepted. They
6 say, if we take it, if it was excused or not, we have to take
7 Chinese troops, and we don't want Chinese. If we take them,
8 they will never go back.
9 Always, we have there in 1967 I believe the highest
10 delegation premier minister, chief of main political
11 administration, They were there to force
12 Vietnamese, even tell them we will not supply with more
13 military technology if they wouldn't do this, this, this. It
14 was not easy.
15 I met first Vietnamese delegation before they
16 attacked the south with the generals that was the head, and
17 Soviets and they even laugh about it, and I remember
18 when Pham Van Dong, prime minister was in he
19 said they will destroy American Imperialists. They don't care
20 if the war take 10 more years, but economically they will
21 destroy the United States, and the Soviets and there
22 laugh about it. They thought they are stupid, but did they
23 hurt American economy, the war? Sure, of course it did.
24 Q. Did you ever personally visit Vietnam?
25 A. No.

1 Q. Do you know if there were any hospitals set up in
2 Vietnam by any other --
3 A. No.
4 Q. Did you ever hear of any drug testing going on by
5 the Vietnamese on U.S. POW's?
6 A. Yeah, because they give us the results. I don't
7 know what other ones were, the countries. I'm sure the
8 Soviets, but you give them -- you know, you
9 ask them, what do you want if they test, give them some drugs
10 which they want.
11 Q. Do you remember the name of what drugs they were
12 using?
13 A. No. It is what I told you. I have to look at the
14 notes.
15 Q. Do you know of any other Warsaw Pact countries that
16 might have received U.S. prisoners on their way to the Soviet
17 Union?
18 A. I don't know.
19 A. I think, but I didn't see. I think East German
20 participate on the test, but I don't know if they have any
21 prisoner.
22 Q. Would you guess that this program of taking 20 to 25
23 prisoners, perhaps yearly from Vietnam to the Soviet Union
24 would have continued after you departed
25 A. The program continued. There's no question about

1 that. If they some others, I don't know. But program
2 continued.
3 Q. Were the Vietnamese, if you know, cooperative with
4 the Soviets to release these prisoners of war from Vietnam to
5 the Soviet authorities?
6 A. Well, as I told you they were not very cooperative,
7 but I think Soviet has much stronger weapons that
8 to force Vietnamese to do something. Not just
9 the supplies, but international negotiation. And these things
10 the Soviets, where doesn't mean too much.
11 Q. After you left in '68, did you ever
12 learn of any other groups of U.S. POW's being taken out of
13 Vietnam to any other country?
14 A. No.
15 Q. But it would be your guess that the program
16 continued?
17 A. Well, the program is not a guess, because I left
18 February '68. In November or December of '67 was already
19 approved the budget for that, and the approval of the defense
20 council. So, if they cancel it later, which I believe it is
21 impossible, I cannot say. But before I left, the program as
22 on.
23 Q. I'm now going to talk a little bit about you leaving
24 and your arrival. And if I get into classified
25 information, I ask you gentlemen to please warn me.

1 When did you leave and why?

2 A. I left February 25th. I crossed the border. I was

3 28th in United States.

4 I prepared defection a few years before. I supposed

5 to go the soccer team military plane to Belgium,

6 and they decide to send a few busses of fans of the

7 team.

8 Of course, all the busses were just military

9 intelligence officers, and there is supposed to be one

10 political leader of that trip, of the group, and it was up to

11 me to select someone who will go there.

12 I want to go there and never come back, forget to go

13 back. But, first of all, I will go out of my son, and they

14 didn't agree. Nobody can take member of family. Then,

15 secondly, they say I know too much and have methods which

16 they grab you, give you some shot, and 2 hours you tell them

17 everything.

18 And then they give you other shot and you are okay.

19 They send you back. So, I cannot go. Who was going was my

20 deputy at that time. So, I didn't have opportunity to do that

21 and, of course, I look for other opportunity which always it

22 was problem with my son, because without him I cannot go.

23 Finally in 1967, when was the fight in the party for

24 power I got order from the chief of main

25 political administration, Soviet minister of defense, to use -

1 all power which I have to protect the first secretary and
2 president in power before they want to fire him.
3 After then they realize it is too late, and the
4 liberals go more and more to power. They want to save him,
5 liquidate the liberals, and then after that, liquidate him. A
6 typical Soviet way which I didn't, because his son was my best
7 friend. He was in military service.
8 And I know from that family and from everybody else,
9 because it was hot situation in the man is
10 finished. To somebody protecting him, he must be absolutely
11 crazy.
12 So I didn't anything to help him stay in the power,
13 nothing. They said, I want to use troops, and I didn't have
14 any power to troops. I just control ministry of defense who
15 control troops or some other people.
16 So I can -- except pick up some five my friends and
17 tell them take machine gun and kill central committee. But it
18 is not banana republic to do this way, so I didn't anything.
19 called me and told me, you didn't what I
20 told you. I said, I know, comrade general. He said, you know
21 what it means. I said, yes, I know. It was like Monday or
22 Tuesday.
23 Saturday, and that time I always prepared my much
24 stronger defection than before. I must go a little bit back.
25 In February, we and the Soviet party celebrated the Red Army

1 and I -- '67. And I came home and I told my son, John, I
2 cannot go anymore to these parties. They pick up drink after
3 drink, and you go to poor people, and have lectures and tell
4 them how socialism is super, and they don't have bread, you
5 know.
6 And my son told me, well, how about that we will
7 defect. I said, well, why would you never like to defect. I
8 never think -- thought he would think about it. He listened
9 Radio Free Europe all the time, and he said, because I want to
10 race the car, and I cannot do that in a communist country, but
11 I can do that in Great Britain or the United States. So, I
12 was thinking, if your son want to race the car, there is some
13 reason for General to defect.
14 Q. A good reason?
15 A. Yeah. So I said, John, let's do and prepare. And
16 when I saw the fight in October, how it start again, you
17 cannot imagine these guys in the Politbureau, how they call
18 each other bastards and prostitutes and all these things.
19 Again, you must go and lie to people. Unity of the party.
20 These angels, great leaders.
21 So, I go to my son and his girlfriend, who is today
22 his wife who, by the way, they said was my mistress when I
23 defected. They have daughter. I told him, okay, let's go and
24 prepare it. She did the best job. I contact American Embassy
25 two or three times.

1 Q. In ?

2 A. In through this girl and her friends. They

3 told the press attache or cultural attache it one general,

4 they didn't say name, who would like to defect if they can

5 help somehow. They said no because the would take it

6 like provocation. They thought they used me to contact the

7 embassy.

8 But when he cross the border, we will help him. At

9 that time, I don't need help, honestly. So, I was on my own,

10 and when the general official told me you know what it means,

11 I know what it means.

12 Q. What does it mean?

13 A. For me? To liquidate me. So, it was like Monday,

14 Tuesday, and Saturday was published article which you can pick

15 up in library of this great building. They said, one

16 general, his name was Pepich, who was long-time KGB agent

17 because his wife works for Hungarian -- her father was

18 prominent Hungarian fascist.

19 He publish article and said, what I did in my

20 position in the ministry of defense was actually sabotage of

21 military readiness. If somebody say so, you don't have to

22 wait too long. Communist death penalty because it is never

23 cracked.

24 So, I told my son John, tomorrow we are leaving.

25 So, he pick up his girlfriend, and left Sunday morning, 6:00

1 because I thought the secret police, after the Saturday
2 parties, they would be more close eyes. And I used the
3 simplest way, which I think is the best, because, I'm sorry,
4 the intelligence services they think everything too
5 complicate.
6 So, we left 6:00 in front of the office,
7 ministry of defense -- my office. And we want to take also
8 another girl who helped contact American Embassy, but she said
9 she cannot go. So, she stayed.
10 So, we left. What I did, I ask for passports for my
11 son and me to go skiing to Poland in the weekend. It was just
12 one mistake, because they give me diplomatic passport. The
13 girlfriend of my son, she just asked tourist permit, visit
14 Bulgaria, and it was just two small pages, no picture in
15 Bulgarian and Russian language. She never had any problem.
16 And we play game finally. First, then I ask
17 passport. I want to go to Poland. Once we were on the road,
18 we play game. We are going to Bulgaria. At that time, you
19 have permit to go to Bulgaria through Yugoslavia, and you have
20 three days to cross to Yugoslavia. Once I defected, they
21 cancel it, this permit.
22 So, we didn't have problem in Hungary. Cross border
23 to Yugoslavia. We wait. We were there 6:00 Monday morning.
24 From friend of mine, who was my best friend, a doctor, he told
25 me how to handle it in the village corporal. He was ready go

1 finally he give me for one day.

2 So, I took the car, go to the cross-border station

3 where Yugoslavians go with busses to work in Italy. Then they

4 saw my car. They said, get out of line. I thought, that's

5 it. One call from Embassy and so on.

6 And the policeman was unusually smart. He said, you

7 don't have permit to go to the West. I said, are you

8 Italian or policeman, or Yugoslavian? I don't have a

9 problem with your country, tell me what you want. He said,

10 don't give me this baloney. I know the regulations.

11 They took me to the station, let me wait in the

12 hallway 30 minutes -- longest 30 minutes in my life, I can

13 tell you, and they talked behind the closed door with

14 telephones. And finally he came out, and the boss came out of

15 the station and said, let him go. I don't know if they

16 already have message, because of the -- I think in this case I

17 can mention They told me, they said we contact American

18 Embassy. They send message everywhere I was

19 Get me out. So, I was in Trieste, look for American consular.

20 And generally I look. I was lost. And finally one guy told

21 me where it is. I went to the consulate, and the next day I

22 was in Washington.

23 Q. You first arrived in U.S. custody by going to the

24 U.S. consulate in Trieste?

25 A. Yes.

1 with me, because he was originally born in Yugoslavia. If I
2 cannot do that legally, take me secretly across the border to
3 Italy. I refused because he wanted to go back, and they will
4 kill him.
5 So, we were at 6:00 morning in that village. We
6 wait in the forest. After then, 9:00, we go to Italian
7 consulate and ask for visa, visiter for one day, Trieste, the
8 harbor. They give the visa to girlfriend of my son the time,
9 which I can show you all these papers Monday. So my passport
10 and my son, diplomatic passport, they said we cannot give it
11 to you because you have such a position. There was Parliament
12 and so on. When you come back, they will kill you.
13 I said, look, in it's changed. We
14 have Dubchek and all these things. Plus, I know they want to
15 copy Maybe you will be interested later on.
16 And so don't worry. And the guy said, no, no, no, come back
17 1:00, which was not pleasant because I supposed to be in
18 parliament. I'm sure they look for me. I was covered by
19 INTERPOL.
20 So, what can I do? Wait again in the forest. Come
21 back 1:00, and the counsel talked to me. And if you know in
22 Italy, 5 million people what were communist, you see everyone
23 communist and Russian agent. So, again he talked to me. I
24 said, look, it is not your business. You cannot go back, he
25 repeated. I cannot tell him I don't want to go back. So,

1 Q. And then the next day you were flown to Washington,
2 D.C.?
3 A. No, second day. Next day I drove the car from
4 Trieste to Rome, and day after I flew to New York.
5 Q. It's my understanding that when people defect to the
6 United States, you're normally debriefed?
7 A. Right.
8 Q. Where did your first debrief take place? In Italy
9 or in the United States?
10 A. Here. Here in the United States. Well, I'm sorry.
11 Small in Italy, where the guys asked me who I am, what I did.
12 I showed them ID.
13 Q. Did the debrief that you went through in the United
14 States touch on any POW/MIA issues?
15 A. You mean, if I said so?
16 Q. Yes. Did you talk about the hospital in
17 Korea? Did you talk about the three flights?
18 A. I think so. Not three flights, no.
19 Q. You talked about the Korean experience but not the
20 Vietnamese, or do you remember?
21 A. I think about Korea, we were talking about more
22 details. We were talking a lot about Vietnam, but what I want
23 to say is I don't think that time anybody has interest in POW.
24 Most discussions were about general policy, orientation.
25 There were already the talks in France between Vietnamese and

1 Americans, so their interest was, what are the Russians orders
2 as most distinct.
3 (Discussion off the record.)
4 BY MR. ERICKSON:
5 Q. It's my understanding, when you came to Washington,
6 D.C., as is common practice, you were debriefed?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. In this debrief, did anyone ask you about any POW
9 issues, or did you volunteer any, if you can remember?
10 A. I think it was -- it was both ways, but most these
11 discussions were about Korea. Discussion about Vietnam, it
12 was not major issue.
13 Q. When you mentioned the situation in Korea, what was
14 the reaction, if any, of the people that were debriefing you,
15 or were they just taking notes?
16 A. They have a question and they take notes. They took
17 notes, yeah.
18 Q. Did you ever see any report from your debriefing?
19 A. Never.
20 Q. Do you recall whether you were considered a good
21 source? That is, a person with access to provide reliable
22 information?
23 A. Can I tell you something? Everybody repeat to you,
24 it is super, this information. What can I say? Nobody never
25 told me -- nobody never questioned me if things which I said -

1 are wrong or right, never.

2 Q. Were you able to speak English at this time, or did

3 you have an interpreter?

4 A. Interpreter.

5 Q. Were you given a polygraph at this time?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Was there ever any correspondence written to

8 discredit you as a source of information?

9 A. I don't know.

10 Q. Then I trust you don't have any copy of any

11 correspondence that you're aware of?

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. I believe you indicated that DIA hired you in 1981.

14 Is that correct?

15 A. I think on April 7.

16 Q. Of 1981?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. How did you come to work for DIA?

19 A. I was recruited.

20 Q. Do you know who was responsible for hiring you and

21 why?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Do you believe that DIA trusted your information?

24 A. Well, they say yes, if it is true.

25 Q. Did any DIA officer ever talk to you about your

1 knowledge of POW's either from Korea or Vietnam?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Was this interview recorded?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Was it under oath?

6 A. Not all of them. I think one or two, when they

7 talked to me individuals. It was when the book was published

8 1 year ago or 2 years ago.

9 Q. What book are you referring to?

10 A. Red Cocaine. At that time, I don't think it was

11 recorded, but when they talked to me recently, everything was

12 recorded.

13 Q. Well, how many times have DIA officers talked to you

14 about POW's approximately?

15 A. Including last week or the week before, I think five

16 times. Three individuals, and after then a group of people.

17 Q. You started working for DIA in 1981?

18 A. Right.

19 Q. When was the first time, if you remember, that

20 anybody in DIA talked to you about POW's?

21 A. After the book was published. I think 2 years ago.

22 Q. The book was published in 1990 is my understanding.

23 A. Okay. In that case, it is 2 years ago.

24 Q. What did you tell the DIA officers when they

25 interviewed you about your knowledge of POW's?

1 A. I think generally what we discussed today. Same
2 things.
3 Q. About North Korea and Vietnam?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Are you in a position to know what DIA did with the
6 information that you told them?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Do you believe, based on your knowledge and
9 experience, that the United States Government has the
10 capability to check out or verify your story?
11 A. Sure.
12 Q. How would we do this?
13 A. How you will do that?
14 Q. Yes?
15 A. I guess go to look at the archives,
16 and find people who are in the life and talk to them.
17 Q. In summing up, very briefly, I want to make sure
18 that I've understood your testimony. And please don't let me
19 put words in your mouth. If for some reason you've changed
20 your mind, or maybe I misunderstood your answers, please
21 correct me.
22 A. Absolutely.
23 Q. But I've gathered today that your testimony is that
24 military doctors and medics conducted experimental drug
25 and other testing on U.S. POW's during the Korean War in

1 Korea.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. That some of these U.S. POW's were taken from Korea

4 to

5 A. Not from Korea, from Vietnam.

6 Q. So, U.S. POW's were not taken from Korea to

7

8 A. No.

9 Q. Okay. That U.S. POW's were taken from Vietnam in

10 late '65, early '66, in the early fall of '66 and in the late

11 spring of '67 to Czechoslovakia and then moved on to Russia?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And that you learned this information, all of it,

14 from basic documents, from attending certain military course

15 lectures, and from personally seeing the U.S. POW's that were

16 moving from Vietnam to Russia?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you believe that any of these 70 to 75 POW's that

19 you saw, from '65 to '67, are still alive today in the Soviet

20 Union?

21 A. I think so. I think it's possible. They were young

22 people.

23 Q. I'd like to ask you if between now and a week or 10

24 days, when I notify your attorney that your transcript is

25 back, I hope that you can review some of your notes, and feel

1 free to bring your notes to the review of the transcript, and
2 provide any other documentation to us for verification of your
3 story.
4
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12 Q. Again, between after this deposition and when you
13 review it, if you can think of any other people or information
14 or organizations that we can go to, I'd ask that you write it
15 on the piece of paper as you review the transcript.
16 A. I will be helpful as much as possible.
17 Q. If the archive files were made available to
18 this committee without restriction, which organization's files
19 should we look at first? Which would provide the most
20 information for us on this situation we're talking about?
21 A. I think the archives of defense council, archives of
22 ministry of interior, and ministry of defense.
23 Q. you mentioned earlier that you recalled
24 talking to DIA officials on five different occasions. I'd
25 like to go through each one and make sure whether you remember

1 whether you talked about the Korean hospital drug experience,
2 number one, and whether you talked about American POW's from
3 Vietnam being moved through to Russia.
4 When was the first time you talked to DIA officials
5 on POW matters that you can remember?
6 A. When I talked to -- first time was when the book was
7 published, and one gentleman from DIA, from the office which
8 take of POW, he talked to me generally about the book, about
9 the drugs. If it is true they test the drugs in Korea. He
10 talked to me a year later a second time.
11 Q. Let me go back. The first time he talked to you,
12 then, was in 1990, and he talked to you about the drug testing
13 at the hospital in Korea?
14 A. Right.
15 Q. Did he mention or did you mention anything to him
16 about the three flights in Soviet aircraft from Vietnam to
17 and on to Russia?
18 A. No.
19 Q. The second time that you spoke to him?
20 A. It was continuing about same things. He probably
21 studied and come back. And we discussed same things.
22 Q. So, once again, during the second interview, you
23 talked only about Korea and not about Vietnam.
24 A. No, no.
25 Q. When was the third interview?

1 A. The third interview was, I would say, 2 or 3 months
2 ago.
3 Q. And did you talk about Korea during that interview?
4 A. I think in this interview we talk most about Vietnam
5 because the gentleman -- actually, when talk to me; next week
6 he flew to Vietnam with some delegation to look at the stuff,
7 and mostly we discussed Vietnam to tell him where he can find
8 documents in So it was discussion about it.
9 Q. Was Korea mentioned during that interview?
10 A. I don't think so.
11 Q. Then the next interview was a DIA official?
12 A. It was with a group of, I think, four or five
13 people. Mr. Green knows these people.
14 Q. Was Korea discussed during that interview?
15 A. No, it was Vietnam. They said that they are happy
16 that I told them about Korea, but we didn't discuss it.
17 Everything was Vietnam.
18 MR. GREEN: Excuse me. Was that after your
19 interview with the Senate Select Committee staffers?
20 THE WITNESS: Right.
21 BY MR. ERICKSON:
22 Q. When was your last interview?
23 A. The last one was last Tuesday, last week Tuesday.
24 And it was just about Vietnam, again. They go to more details
25 from the first interview.

1 Q. Now, let me sum up and see if I have this correct.
2 Your five interviews with DIA -- the first one was after the
3 publication of the book Red Cocaine. And during that
4 interview with DIA, you only talked about the Korean War
5 POW's?
6 A. Yeah.
7 Q. Your second interview took place with DIA about a
8 year later, and you only talked about --
9 A. It was the same gentleman.
10 Q. But you only talked about Korea. Your third
11 interview, which took place approximately 3 months ago, which
12 would have been August --
13 A. I would say August, September.
14 Q. You talked for the first time to the DIA official
15 about Vietnam?
16 A. Right.
17 Q. And you talked a little about Korea?
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. About 5-6 weeks ago, two Senate investigators talked
20 to you. After that time, you again talked to DIA, but you
21 only talked about Vietnam and not Korea, and about a week ago
22 you had another interview with DIA, and you only talked about
23 Vietnam and not Korea?
24 A. No. The Senate investigators -- I think they talked
25 to me more about Korea than Vietnam.

1 Q. I'm not asking you what our investigators talked
2 about. But the fourth and fifth interview with DIA took place
3 after our investigators talked to you?
4 A. Right. It was just about Vietnam.
5 Q. I have no more questions. I want to thank you for
6 coming. If you have anything that you want to add to the
7 record, or anything you want to say, I always give the deposee
8 the opportunity to say anything that you want to. Please feel
9 there's no requirement that you say anything.
10 A. Maybe after I read.
11 Q. Well, I will notify your attorney as soon as I get
12 the transcript and make arrangements for you to come.
13 A. Okay.
14 MR. ERICKSON: Let's suspend the deposition.
15 (Whereupon, at 2:26 p.m., the taking of the instant
16 deposition was suspended.)
17 _____
18 Signature of the Witness
19 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _____ day of
20 _____, 19_____.
21 _____
22 NOTARY PUBLIC
23 My Commission expires:
24
25

[redacted]-1415/PW [redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

On 2 November 1992, [redacted] escorted by [redacted] interviewed [redacted]. The subject of the interview was: Did Jan Sejna ever tell DIA personnel anything about medical testing on American POWs from the Korean and Vietnam Wars or anything about the subsequent transfer of these POWs to Russia or elsewhere. The session lasted approximately 45 minutes.

[redacted] reported that during his initial debriefing by [redacted] he discussed medical research and the transfer of American POWs from Korea to Russia during the war with his debriefers. He could not remember what information, pertaining to Vietnam, was discussed; however, [redacted] explained that he defected at the height of the Vietnam War and certain aspects of it were discussed. He said he could not recall if medical testing of POWs from the Vietnam War and their subsequent transfer to Russia was discussed with [redacted]

[redacted] emphatically stated that this information was not reported to DIA personnel during his tenure until he was interviewed by Nick Eftimiades, POW/MIA, in May 1991. During this interview, the medical testing on U.S. POWs from Korea was discussed. No mention of Vietnam was made.

The above seems to confirm the findings of a complete review of DIA holdings of [redacted] interview transcripts and tapes conducted by DIA DIW3 and POW/MIA. No mention of POW medical testing from Korea or Vietnam was discussed. Nor was there any references to the transfer of POWs to Russia, [redacted] or elsewhere. On exception is a brief discussion of a 1986 article, written by Joe Douglass and [redacted], that talks about medical research done at a Czech hospital in Korea during the war. During the discussion of the article, [redacted] stated that similar research could have been conducted in Vietnam by the Russians but that he had no firsthand knowledge of this.

Sejna reported that he had been informed by sources on the Hill that a [redacted] letter signed by [redacted] had been sent to the Senate Select Committee stating that Sejna had no information on POWs and was not a credible witness. He offered to obtain a copy of the letter for us.

Sejna said that during his association with [redacted] Congress had on 10 different occasions tried to have him testify but that [redacted] had prevented him from doing so. He said he was working with [redacted] to have not testify an eleventh time. [redacted] stated that he would not testify before the Senate Select Committee because he concerned with his security and the welfare of his wife and son. Even if he was subpoenaed, he would not go. "A jail in Maryland is better that a jail in Siberia." He mentioned that William Legro and John McCreary have reported that, during their interview of 21 October, [redacted] is supposedly to have said that he would be willing to go to [redacted] to investigate this aspect of the POW issue, [redacted] denied this statement.

[redacted] informed us that he was attempting to contact friends of his in [redacted], including his stepson, to determine if anyone connected with the Korea medical testing program and POW transfers were still alive. If so, [redacted]

[redacted]

would attempt to have them come to the U.S. and testify as to their knowledge of this issue. It was unclear whether [redacted] was limiting his search to Korea or whether his search would involve Vietnam War era information. [redacted] was considering approaching Ross Perot to help fund this endeavor but would wait until after the elections. He did not want to do anything to embarrass the current administration.

Throughout the interview, [redacted] kept reiterating that he wanted to do his best in providing information that would be helpful to the U.S.

[redacted]
Intelligence Officer
2 Nov 92

[redacted]

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

May 90

[redacted]/NF-0421/POW-MIA

TO: Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
Studies and Analysis Division
ATTN: Mr. Matt, Chief
Fort Detrick, Fredrick, MD

SUBJECT: Request for Information: POW/MIA Requirement (U)

1. (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency's Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action is tasked with providing the fullest possible accounting of Americans who became missing while serving their country during all military conflicts. One element of the Special Office is following up on unaccounted for as a result of the Korean conflict.

2. [redacted] Recently, this office received an unconfirmed source report describing drug testing on United Nations POWs during the Korean conflict. The source alleges that between 1952 and 1954, he saw documents that reported on a program in which Soviet and [redacted] doctors used UN POWs as test subjects for various drug and radiation tests. They were conducted at a [redacted] hospital in North Korea. The program was directed by the [redacted] Central Military Hospital [redacted] under the Military Health Administration. Other participating agencies were: Soviet GRU, [redacted] GRU and Air Force Research and Scientific Center. [redacted] individuals involved with the project were Major General [redacted] (Army), Professor [redacted] - Cardiologist, Central Military Hospital, Professor [redacted] Brain Surgeon, Central Military Hospital, and Professor [redacted] Psychiatrist/Program Director, Central Military Hospital.

3. [redacted] We are interested in any related documents which may be held by your organization. Of particular interest is material concerning Soviet or East European drug testing activities during the 1950s; the Central Military Hospital in [redacted] or any [redacted] hospital operating in North Korea from 1950 through 1954.

4. (U) Point of contact for DIA/POW-MIA is Nicholas Eftimiades, commercial/ [redacted]

5. (U) Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

ROBERT R. SHEETZ
Chief
Special Office for Prisoners
of War and Missing in Action

[redacted]

[redacted]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE: To provide updated information and an interim assessment on the assertions concerning U.S. Korean War POWs made by [redacted] (b)

2. BACKGROUND: [redacted] is a defector who has been working for DIA in an open source exploitation program for approximately 10 years. Recently he alleged that during the Korean war American POWs were used as test subjects in medical, psychological, and drug induced behavior modification experiments. Subsequent to the conclusion of the tests, several dozen POWs were executed.

3. DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION: On 02 April 1992, [redacted] was polygraphed by DIA (OSC-3B). He showed "no deception indicated" on questions concerning his knowledge of drug experiments conducted by Soviet and [redacted] forces on American POWs in North Korea. POW/MIA is investigating and analyzing the source's reported information. (b)(1)

POW-MIA has conducted interviews and an extensive review of open source and archived intelligence materials in an effort to confirm or refute the source's allegations. We have determined that the [redacted] Government did have a large hospital facility, staffed by [redacted] medical personnel, operating in North Korea during the war. The [redacted] medical personnel identified by Mr. [redacted] had the placement and access he asserted. In addition, special interrogation facilities were maintained in North Korea and China. Caucasians believed to have been Soviets or East Europeans were described by returned U.S. POWs as directing operations at one of the facilities. Intense interrogations and environmental control practices were practiced at both facilities. A Rand corporation researcher in Moscow has interviewed Soviet officers who were involved in screening activities in North Korean POW camps.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS: Brief DIA command element, DASD for POW/MIA, and the U.S. Department of State. Present a diplomatic demarche to the [redacted] Government requesting access to relevant records and persons. Coordinate with POW Commission to request similar information from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Brief the U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. (b)(1)

5. DIA/POW-MIA POC is Nicholas Eftimiades, COMMERCIAL/STU III (703) [redacted], (b)(6)

18 Apr 92

[redacted]

[redacted]-0418/POW-MIA

1. PURPOSE: [redacted] To provide information for a proposed diplomatic demarche to the [redacted] Government.

2. POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:

a. [redacted] During an Escape and Evasion research project in September 1990, Air Force Intelligence (AF/INU) debriefed a United States Government (USG) source on Soviet Prisoner of War (POW) interrogation techniques. He alleged that some of the POW handling techniques were based on research conducted during the Korean war. This research comprised medical, psychological, and drug-induced behavior modification experiments performed on American POWs. Source also stated that a number of American POWs were executed at the conclusion of the tests. Subsequent to the completion of Operation Desert Storm, DIA's Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (DIA/POW-MIA) was informed of the investigative lead and conducted an initial interview with the source.

b. [redacted] DIA/POW-MIA conducted an intensive and extensive review of open source literature and archived intelligence materials. The [redacted], was tasked to search archived intelligence reports as well as current sources and defectors. Department of Defense (DoD) elements were similiarly tasked. The investigative and analytical effort culminated with a report of investigation received from the [redacted] Intelligence Service in March 1992. While the information developed does not corroborate the specific operation, it does confirm corollary elements of the source's report such as the existence and location of field elements and of [redacted] and Soviet institutions in North Korea. In addition, developed information confirmed the correct names, placement, and access of several individuals identified by the source. Also, it should be noted as background that the source has provided reliable information to the USG for over 20 years. Upon completion of the investigative effort the source was polygraphed on the essential elements of the reported information with "no deception indicated."

c. [redacted] Source's Report: During the Korean war a Soviet and [redacted] drug testing program utilized American and other United Nations POWs as laboratory specimens. The program was initiated by the then Soviet Union's Main Medical Administration of the Ministry of Defense and conducted jointly with medical personnel from the [redacted] Military Health Administration and

[redacted]

[redacted]

Korean doctors. Testing was done in a [redacted] built hospital in North Korea. Analysis was conducted in [redacted] by the Central Military Hospital and the Air Force Research Institute.

(1) The drug experimentation program's primary objective was to develop methods of modifying human behavior and destroying psychological resistance. The program studied the effects of various drugs and environmental conditions on American soldiers and pilots. A secondary objective of the program was to train [redacted] and Soviet doctors under wartime conditions.

(2) At the conclusion of the testing program a number of American POWs were executed. The individuals were executed to preclude public exposure of the information. This action was discussed by Department Eight (Administrative Organs Department of the [redacted] Government) and the Soviet Main Health Administration and Administrative Organs Department. The source has indicated that these and other Soviet organizations were participants in the testing program.

d. [redacted] POW-MIA investigation and analysis has confirmed that the [redacted] Government did have a large hospital facility, staffed by [redacted] medical personnel, operating in North Korea during the war. In addition, special POW interrogation facilities were maintained in North Korea and Mukden, China (Mukden was the location for Japan's biological warfare testing program during WW II). Caucasians believed to have been Soviets or East Europeans were described by returned U.S. POWs as directing interrogation operations at both facilities. Intense interrogations and environmental control techniques were also practiced at both facilities. The activities at these two known special interrogation facilities cannot be directly linked to research at the [redacted] hospital based on currently available information.

e. [redacted] At the request of DIA, [redacted] has queried the [redacted] on this matter. The [redacted] has confirmed the existence of the Air Force Health Research Institute, the Central Military Hospital in [redacted], and the identities of physicians identified by the USG's source. The physicians served in the Central Military Hospital and in the [redacted] hospital in North Korea. [redacted] sources deny that their personnel conducted any activities other than medically treating North Korean civilians.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. [redacted] All available intelligence and open sources have been exploited to collect information on the Soviet [redacted] drug experimentation program. More detailed information on the

[redacted]

program-related activities, personalities, and organizations of the former [redacted] Government is listed in the enclosure below. To resolve the question of American unaccounted for from the Korean War, additional information must be obtained from the current [redacted] Government and the Commonwealth of Independent States. At a minimum, this would include archival records access to validate known information and develop additional leads for follow-up. The ultimate goal would be the development of information concerning unaccounted-for Americans possibly involved in the program sufficient to determine and document their fate.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE:

FURTHER LEADS

[redacted]

The information provided below is for use in possible demarche preparation and to assist in in-country investigative efforts:

1. [redacted] Participating [redacted] agencies were as follows:

   a. [redacted] GRU (Military Intelligence)

   b. Department 8 in 1954 (Administrative Organs Department)

      (1) [redacted]
      (2) [redacted]
      (3) [redacted]
      (4) [redacted]
      (5) [redacted]
      (6) [redacted]
      (7) [redacted]
      (8) [redacted]

   c. Military Council of the Ministry of Defense

      (1) [redacted]
      (2) [redacted]
      (3) [redacted]

   d. General Rear Services Department

   e. Air Force Research and Scientific Center

   f. [redacted] medical departments and personnel who had involvement with drug testing on American POWs.

      (1) [redacted] Central Military Hospital [redacted] under the Military Health Administration.

      (2) Major General [redacted] (Army)

      (3) Professor [redacted] -Cardiologist, Central Military Hospital

      (4) Professor [redacted] -Brain Surgeon, Central Military Hospital

      (5) Professor [redacted] -Psychiatrist/Program Director, Central Military Hospital

~~CLASSIFIED BY: POW-MIA~~
~~DECLASSIFY: OADR~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

2. [redacted] Participating Soviet agencies were as follows:

a. Main Medical Administration of the Ministry of Defense

b. Military Research Center

(1) Academy of Medical Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

c. GRU (Military Intelligence)

d. KGB - Department of Military Counterintelligence

e. Rear Services Department

3. [redacted] The following Soviet medical departments and personnel who in 1950 investigated the Japanese biological warfare program in Mukden, China:

a. Academy of Medical Science of the U.S.S.R. ZHUKOV, Verezhnikov, N.N.

b. Colonel of Medical Services, KRASNOV, V.D.

c. Director of the Department of Microbiology of Khubarovsk Medical Institute, Professor KOSARYEV, N.N.

d. Docent in the Department of Microbiology of Khubarovsk Medical Institute, LIUKINA, E.G.

e. Lieutenant Colonel of the Veterinary Service, ALEXANDROV, N.A.

f. Parasitologist KOZLOVSKAYA, O.L.

[redacted]

[redacted]

DDO 91-02320

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

Ref-

[redacted]-0532/POW-MIA

5 JUL 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Request for Information: Defectors with Information Pertaining to U.S. Personnel Unaccounted-for as a Result of the Korean Conflict [redacted]

1. [redacted] The Defense Intelligence Agency's Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action is tasked with providing the fullest possible accounting of Americans who became missing while serving their country during all military conflicts. One element of the Special Office is following up on unaccounted-for as a result of the Korean conflict.

2. [redacted] Recently, this office received an unconfirmed source report describing drug testing on United Nations' prisoners of war during the Korean Conflict. The source alleges that between 1952 and 1954, he was briefed on a program in which Soviet and [redacted] doctors in North Korea conducted medical and behavioral experiments on U.N. POWs. A number of POWs were executed at the conclusion of the tests. The program was directed by the [redacted] Central Military Hospital [redacted] under the Military Health Administration. Other participating agencies were: Soviet GRU, [redacted] GRU and Air Force Research and Scientific Center. [redacted] individuals involved with the project were Major General [redacted] (Army); Professor Dr. [redacted] Cardiologist, Central Military Hospital; Professor Dr. [redacted] Brain Surgeon, Central Military Hospital; and Professor Dr. [redacted] - Psychiatrist/Program Director, Central Military Hospital.

3. [redacted] We are interested in access to defectors or other sources which may be in a position to confirm of refute our information. Of particular interest is information concerning:

a. Soviet or East European drug testing activities during the 1950s.

b. The Central Military Hospital in [redacted], or any [redacted] or Soviet medical activities in North Korea from 1950 through 1954.

c. Any individual with information concerning United Nations Command Forces held prisoner of war or unaccounted-for during the Korean conflict.

[redacted] BY: POW-MIA

[redacted]

[redacted]

d. Anyone who (from 1950-1955) was on the Soviet or [redacted] (b) Central Committee of the Communist Party.

e. Anyone who worked for (1950-1955) the [redacted] Rear Services (b) Department, Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee, Collegium of the Military, Central Military Hospital, Military Health Administration, GRU, or Air Force Research Medical Center.

f. Any East European or Soviet diplomat or intelligence officer stationed in Korea during the war. The source has provided the name of a defector, Ruras (sic), who was formerly Poland's Ambassador to Japan.

g. Any North Korean official involved in POW handling or medical services.

4. (U) Point of contact for the DIA/POW-MIA Special Office is Nicholas Eftimiades, [redacted]

5. (U) Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

DENNIS M. NAGY
Executive Director

SECRET-NOFORN

undated

BRIEFING SHEET
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION PROGRAM ON KOREAN WAR U.N. POWS.

1. BACKGROUND: A defector who has been working for DIA in an open source exploitation program for approximately 12 years recently alleged that during the Korean war American POWs were used a test subjects in medical, psychological, and drug induced behavior modification experiments. Subsequent to the conclusion of the tests, several dozen POWs were executed. The source has undergone a polygraph examination on his knowledge of this program with "no deception indicated."

2. SIGNIFICANT POINTS

* During the Korean War, a joint Soviet and [redacted] drug testing program utilized American and other United Nations POWs as laboratory specimens. A number of American POWs were executed at the conclusion of the tests.

* The program was directed by the Central Military Hospital [redacted] under the Military Health Administration. Other participating agencies were: Soviet Main Health Administration, Soviet GRU, [redacted] GRU and Air Force Research and Scientific Center.

* Program objective was to study the effects of various drugs and conditions on officers and pilots.

- Test effects of depressants and hallucinogens
- Test exposure to radioactivity.
- Train Soviet and [redacted] doctors under wartime conditions.

* American POWs were executed at the conclusion of the tests.

- Showed signs of experimentation
- Autopsies were conducted
- Interred in North Korea

3. RECOMMENDATION

* Present diplomatic demarche to the [redacted] Government.

- Request access to historic records.
- Request access to persons.

* Present questions to the Commonwealth of Independent States through POW/MIA Commission.

4. POC for DIA/POW-MIA is Nicholas Eftimiades [redacted]

SECRET-NOFORN

ASSOCIATION CHART FOR [redacted]



* ACCESS TO POW DRUG TESTING PROGRAM.

GENERAL SECRETARY

[redacted]

MOI

GRU

KOREAN WAR POW DRUG EXPERIMENTATION PROGRAM



[redacted]

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

27 APR 1992

[redacted]NF-0466/POW-MIA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Defense Intelligence Agency Report [redacted]-0418 (U)
Information Memorandum

1. [redacted] The enclosed intelligence report summarizes the results of a DIA investigation into possible drug experimentation on U.S. Prisoners of War during the Korean War carried out by Soviet and [redacted] personnel. The purpose of this program was to develop comprehensive interrogation techniques involving medical, psychological and drug-induced behavior modification. Information uncovered by DIA indicates that up to "several dozen" unwilling participants in this program may have been executed upon its conclusion in North Korea. (b)(1)

2. [redacted] The source was well placed in that he personally saw progress reports on the work in North Korea that were forwarded to top leadership in the [redacted] Central Committee and Ministry of Defense. He remains a very sensitive source who has provided reliable information to the U.S. intelligence community for many years. The source is most reluctant to have his identity become known or to be tied to the information he provided. It should be noted that the source did submit to polygraph examination during which no deception was indicated. This report is classified both to protect the source's identity and to ensure proper security is maintained during possible demarche and follow-up investigative activity.

3. [redacted] I have furnished the attached report to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for their information. Normally, intelligence reports concerning American prisoners of war are distributed within the Government to the Military departments, the intelligence agencies, the Department of State, the temporary Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, the House POW/MIA

[redacted] DIRECTOR, DIA [redacted] DELIVER BY HAND TO [redacted]

[redacted]

COPY 8 of 9

[redacted]

[redacted]

Task Force, etc. However, as the attached intelligence report could seriously impact ongoing foreign policy activities of the United States Government, I await instructions on any further dissemination of the subject report.

JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

1 enclosure:
DIA memorandum #
0468/POW-MIA [redacted]

cc:
PDASD, Mr. Ford
DASD POW/MIA, Mr. Ptak
DIA: DR, DD, COS, Chf POW-MIA
GC: Mr. Allard

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: 26 MAR 1992

REPLY TO ATTN OF: POW-MIA [redacted]-0347/POW-MIA

SUBJECT: Request for Polygraph Approval of [redacted] (b)(1)

TO: DD

1. [redacted] Mr. [redacted] is a defector who has been working for DIA in an open source exploitation program for approximately 10 years. Recently he alleged that during the Korean War American Prisoners of War (POW) were used as test subjects in medical, psychological, and drug-induced behavior modification experiments. The tests were conducted in a [redacted] built hospital located in North Korea. Subsequent to the conclusion of the tests, several dozen POWs were executed. (b)(1)

2. [redacted] Inquiry has determined that the [redacted] Government did have a large hospital facility, staffed by [redacted] medical personnel, operating in North Korea during the war. Special interrogation facilities were maintained in North Korea and China. Caucasians believed to have been Soviets or East Europeans were described by returned U.S. POWs as directing operations at one of the facilities. Intense interrogations and environmental control techniques were practiced at both facilities. (b)(1)

3. [redacted] Assuming [redacted] agrees to be polygraphed, request authority for the DIA Polygraph Program Office (OSC-3B) to administer a specific issue polygraph examination to [redacted] to determine the veracity of his statements regarding drug testing on American Korean War POWs. (b)(1)

ROBERT R. SHEETZ
Chief
Special Office for Prisoners
of War and Missing in

CC:
OSC-3B

APPROVED: 3/26/92

DISAPPROVED: _____

[redacted]

[redacted]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 1-80)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-114
* U.S. GPO: 1990-262-081/90286

OASD: FMW-MA

~~SECRET~~

Draft

~~Please Do Not Disseminate~~

Memorandum

Subject: Information on the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs
To: Alan Petak
From: Joseph Douglass JD

The following information (and associated remarks) is taken from my notes of debriefings of a former communist official of special importance, [redacted] is now an American citizen. When he defected in 1968, then [redacted], held a variety of top-level positions in [redacted] that brought him into first-hand contact with Soviet intelligence operations of the highest sensitivity. Among the positions he held were chief of staff to the Minister of Defense and secretary of the Defense Council, which was the highest decision-making body in areas of defense, intelligence, counter-intelligence, and foreign policy in the communist system. (b)(1) (b)(1)

That is, [redacted] was a member of the decision-making hierarchy, in daily contact with top-level communist officials from around the world, and privy to military and intelligence plans and operations. His reports have been assessed within U.S. intelligence to be of the highest credibility and have been repeatedly confirmed as other information has become available. To my knowledge, although many have tried, no one has ever shown his testimony to be wrong or misleading. A few examples taken from my debriefings should explain why I believe there may be considerable detail on the fate of American POWs that has not yet been pursued. (b)(1)

During the Korean War, [redacted] intelligence, operating under instructions from the Soviet Union, constructed a hospital in North Korea. Ostensibly, the hospital was built to treat casualties of the war. In reality, it was an intelligence research facility in which [redacted], Soviet, and North Korean doctors would experiment on U.S. and, to a lessor extent South Korean, prisoners of war. (b)(1) (b)(1)

[redacted] military intelligence operations in North Korea came under the direction of Soviet military intelligence. The [redacted] official who was in charge of their portion of the operations in North Korea was [redacted], of the Military Intelligence Administration [redacted] of the [redacted] General Staff. [redacted] was in North Korea under (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

diplomatic cover. The hospital was under his authority. The [redacted] official immediately in charge of the hospital was (b)(1)
Colonel Professor [redacted], who was a heart specialist. [redacted] (b)(1)
learned about the hospital directly from [redacted], from various (b)(1)
official reports on the experiments, and from briefings to the
Defense Council by experts such as [redacted] and [redacted] a (b)(1)
neurologist who was also a member of the medical team at the
experimental hospital in North Korea, and from other top-level
officials in [redacted] and the Soviet Union. (b)(1)

The experiments were justified by the Soviet officials as preparations for the next war. The Soviet objective was to determine the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. servicemen so that the Soviets could better assess the ability of U.S. soldiers to survive and operate in the rigorous conditions of all-out global war. Special experiments were devised and run to test the psychological and physiological endurance limits of U.S. servicemen.

The fate of some U.S. POWs is inextricably tied to these experiments. This is one of the reasons why the KGB and GRU are less than enthusiastic in their efforts to uncover the fate of U.S. POWs. The Soviet experiments to test the limits of psychological and physiological stress likely would surface in the process.

The U.S. POWs also were used as guinea pigs to test a variety of chemical and biological warfare agents and drugs that were being developed for military and intelligence use. One of the series of experiments conducted on U.S. POWs was to test the effectiveness of different mind-control drugs. As it turned out, the most effective drugs were those that had been developed at the Czechoslovak Air Force Scientific Center.

Many older Americans can still recall the radio broadcasts and filmed newsreels that were shown at the movies in the mid 1950's in which the propaganda statements of U.S. servicemen in North Korea denouncing America were aired. It was Soviet and [redacted] mind (b)(1)
control drugs that caused the captured U.S. servicemen to renounce America, speak of the benefits of the communist system, and subsequently refuse to return to the United States following the cease fire. That is, it may be most unjust to assume that all the Americans who refused repatriation are defectors, deserters, or traitors.

To further investigate the bio-chemical aspects of U.S. servicemen, which was also part of the Soviet search for

vulnerabilities, autopsies were performed on dead servicemen whose bodies were taken by the North Koreans and on those POWs who did not survive the various experiments at the intelligence medical facility. To further show the coupling of seemingly disparate intelligence operations to the POW issue, it was because of these autopsies on U.S. POW/MIAs that the Soviets, Khrushchev in particular, first seized on the idea of waging war on American youth with narcotics.

The idea of using narcotics as weapons, as different from their use as intelligence tools, was a major thrust of communist China's foreign policy adopted in 1949. The Korean War was the first war in which the Chinese would push narcotics as a way to undermine the effectiveness of the opposition's military forces. This strategy would later be employed with greatly enhanced effectiveness against the French, and later the Americans, in Vietnam. During the Korean War Soviet KGB intelligence was especially interested in the Chinese narcotics operation and followed it with great care. One of their findings was the existence of a surprisingly high incidence of use of hard narcotics, such as heroin, cocaine, and the synthetic hiropon, among U.S. servicemen when contrasted with similar use by South Korean servicemen, a factor of two greater.

It was as a consequence of the autopsies that this information came to take on strategic importance. During the autopsies, the Soviet and [redacted] doctors discovered that an unusually high (b)(1) percentage of the young U.S. servicemen had cardiovascular damage -- "mini heart attacks" was how the Soviet doctors described the damage -- a much higher percentage than among South Koreans. While several possible contributing factors were identified, such as diet, the doctors recognized the correlation between the incidence of heart damage and use of hard drugs and concluded that the drugs were probably a major cause.

When Khrushchev learned about this finding, he immediately recognized the potential of narcotics as a strategic weapon and commissioned a study to determine the potential effectiveness of narcotics trafficking as a strategic weapon for use against the West, the United States in particular. This was the origin of what would become by 1962 one of the most important Soviet-bloc intelligence operations undertaken to undermine our society, military effectiveness, and economic stability. Their primary initial targets were our youth, which are the backbone of any nation's military strength, and our colleges, because that was where our future leaders were to be found.

What happened to the unaccounted for American POWs in the Korean War? Most are probably dead. But, some of the roughly 8,000 still unaccounted for might be alive. Were any of the American POW guinea pigs likely to have been returned? When I put this question to [redacted], his response was emphatic. "No way!" he exclaimed, adding that [redacted] intelligence also built a crematorium in North Korea to help dispose of the remains of U.S. servicemen following the autopsies -- the ultimate fate of a majority of the American POW guinea pigs. (b)(1) (b)(1)

Obtaining information about the fate of POWs from the Vietnam War from the KGB and GRU likely will be even more difficult than from the Korean War because the intelligence programs they may be tied to are even more serious than those highlighted above. Before his fall from power in September 1964, [redacted] explained, Khrushchev put the wheels in motion to continue in North Vietnam the experiments that were begun in North Korea during the Korean War. The experiments had been considered extremely profitable and there were many new drugs, chemical and biological agents and possible counteracting vaccines developed in the intervening years that needed to be tested. (b)(1)

Accordingly, arrangements were negotiated with the North Vietnamese and medical experiments using American POWs as guinea pigs were continued. Doctors from East European countries besides Czechoslovakia were involved. Most of the experiments on U.S. POWs were conducted in military hospitals in North Vietnam. But, the most sensitive experiments were conducted in KGB and GRU facilities back in the Soviet Union. This is why the movement of U.S. POWs to Russia and their interment in prisons and psychiatric "clinics" as revealed by Mr. Yeltsin takes on added significance.

It is highly unlikely that information on these activities will ever find its way into the Russian archives. Being research operations, the activities directly relate to special capabilities that are in being today and to covert operations over the past twenty years of the highest sensitivity.

For openers, the POW experiments are coupled with efforts to develop new generations of military chemical and biological warfare agents, efforts that, according to [redacted], were more sensitive and more highly classified than nuclear weapons programs. These agents were seen as the ultimate replacement for nuclear weapons. The date when these new generations of chemical and biological weapons were to be entering the stockpile was 1984. One experimental gas, tested in Afghanistan in 1979 and 1980, froze soldiers in place. (b)(1)

They were killed before they ever knew what happened. This was referred to as "black rain" because of the dark cloud that was seen by distant observers when the munitions were released.

The fate of American POWs is also coupled to the development of chemical agents and drugs for intelligence applications. One class of drugs was the so-called mind control drugs, similar to the ones tested on U.S. POWs during the Korean War, but improved in the intervening years. One of the follow-on mind control drugs describe by [redacted] was able to be administered covertly through food. After the victim was given the drug, he could be "conditioned" by the carefully directed conversation of those around him over a period of ten days and be given a "new view of life" without ever realizing what was happening. This drug was so successful that it entered operational use in 1967 when it was first used to turn influential anti-Soviet individuals in various countries into neutral and even pro-Soviet supporters. This was but one of a wide variety of drugs that were tested on U.S. POWs. (b)(1)

Another family of chemical agents that a serious investigation might uncover is the family designed mainly for assassination purposes. This would be tremendously sensitive -- not just the capabilities, but in addition specific operations using the drugs that may also be uncovered in the process because of preliminary tests on U.S. POWs.

That is, the telltale trail of U.S. POWs impinges on these extremely sensitive Soviet intelligence capabilities and operations. There are many more, but the above survey is more than an adequate sample to illustrate the underlying problems. It goes without saying that neither the KGB nor the GRU are likely to find and volunteer such information on their own initiative!

The above information on Soviet operations that used U.S. POWs is presented in the hope that it will clearly demonstrate that the search for the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs is not limited to an investigation of the archives, both ours and theirs. There are a wide variety of approaches to take, and potentially excellent sources of information that are close at hand, one of which is implicit in the above information, which are just bits and pieces that emerged from debriefings on a variety of subjects, most of which had nothing to do with the POW/MIA problem.

MEMORANDUM

For: Senator John F. Kerry, Chairman
Senator Robert C. Smith, Vice Chairman
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

From: Dr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. JDD

Date: July 20, 1992

Subject: KGB/GRU Information on U.S. POW/MIAs

Like you, I am appalled at the negligent manner in which our government has sought the return of American POW/MIAs.

I am writing this memo to bring my knowledge on this subject to your attention and to express my interest in assisting you in your efforts 1) to determine the fate of American POW/MIAs and 2) to obtain their release or the return of their remains.

Based on newspaper accounts, it appears to me that you have encountered difficulties in obtaining support and information from the KGB and GRU. I have in mind recent statements by Col.-Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov that Vietnam will be a difficult case because much of the information "has not reached the archives," by Yevgeny Primakov, that the KGB has "found no new information that missing Americans from the Vietnam conflict were held in Russia," and from reports that Russian intelligence agencies are resisting efforts to uncover files on U.S. POW/MIAs.

I have been in the defense and national security business for over twenty-five years. From 1975 to 1990 I was heavily involved in the analysis of Soviet operations and strategy. Based on this work, I believe there is a considerable information in the KGB and GRU on the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs from the Korean and Vietnam Wars and other situations. I also believe there are approaches other than "searching the archives" that may be much more effective.

To explain my beliefs and to indicate why my experience may be particularly relevant to your efforts, I would like to share with you selected portions of my notes on my debriefings of a particularly important Soviet bloc defector, [redacted]

[redacted] is now an American citizen. When he defected in 1968, then [redacted] held a variety of top-level positions in [redacted] that brought him into first-hand contact with Soviet intelligence operations of the highest sensitivity. Among the positions he held were chief of staff to the Minister of Defense and secretary of the Defense Council, which was the highest decision-making body in areas of defense, intelligence, counter-intelligence, and foreign policy in the communist system. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1)

That is, [redacted] was a member of the decision-making hierarchy, in daily contact with top-level communist officials from around the world, and privy to military and intelligence plans and operations. His reports have been assessed within U.S. intelligence to be of the highest credibility and have been repeatedly confirmed as other information has become available. To my knowledge, no one has ever shown his testimony to be wrong or misleading. Let me begin with some of my notes on [redacted] recollections of the Korean War. (b)(1) (b)(1)

During the Korean War, [redacted] intelligence, operating under instructions from the Soviet Union, constructed a hospital in North Korea. Ostensibly, the hospital was built to treat casualties of the war. In reality, it was an intelligence research facility in which [redacted], Soviet, and North Korean doctors would experiment on U.S. and, to a lessor extent South Korean, prisoners of war. (b)(1) (b)(1)

[redacted] military intelligence operations in North Korea came under the direction of Soviet military intelligence. The [redacted] official who was in charge of their portion of the operations in North Korea was [redacted] of the Military Intelligence Administration [redacted] of the [redacted] General Staff. [redacted] was in North Korea under diplomatic cover. The hospital was under his authority. The [redacted] official immediately in charge of the hospital was [redacted], who was a heart specialist. [redacted] learned about the hospital directly from [redacted], from various official reports on the experiments, and from briefings to the Defense Council by experts such as [redacted] and [redacted] a neurologist who was also a member of the medical team at the experimental hospital in North Korea, and from other top-level officials in [redacted] and the Soviet Union. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1)

The experiments were justified by the Soviet officials as preparations for the next war. The Soviet objective was to

determine the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. servicemen so that the Soviets could better assess the ability of U.S. soldiers to survive and operate in the rigorous conditions of all-out global war. Special experiments were devised and run to test the psychological and physiological endurance limits of U.S. servicemen. The fate of some U.S. POWs is inextricably tied to these experiments. This is one of several reasons why the KGB and GRU are less than enthusiastic in their efforts to uncover the fate of U.S. POWs. The experiments likely would surface in the process.

Additionally, the U.S. POWs were used as guinea pigs to test a variety of chemical and biological warfare agents and drugs that were being developed for military and intelligence use. One of the series of experiments conducted on U.S. POWs was to test the effectiveness of different mind-control drugs. As it turned out, the most effective drugs were those that had been developed at the [redacted] Air Force Scientific Center. Many of us can still (b)(1) recall the radio broadcasts and filmed newsreels that were shown at the movies in the mid 1950's in which the propaganda statements of U.S. servicemen denouncing America were aired. It was the [redacted] mind control drugs that caused the captured U.S. (b)(1) servicemen to renounce America, speak of the benefits of the communist system, and subsequently refuse to return to the United States following the cease fire. I understand our defense establishment lists such people as defectors and traitors. This may be a most unjust approach to a very complex problem.

To investigate bio-chemical aspects of U.S. servicemen, which was also part of the Soviet search for vulnerabilities, autopsies were performed on dead servicemen whose bodies were taken by the North Koreans and on those POWs who did not survive the various experiments at the intelligence medical facility. To further show the coupling of seemingly disparate intelligence operations to the POW issue, it was because of these autopsies on U.S. POW/MIAs that the Soviets, Khrushchev in particular, first seized on the idea of waging war on American youth with narcotics.

The idea of using narcotics as weapons, as different from their use as intelligence tools, was a major thrust of communist China's foreign policy adopted in 1949. The Korean War was the first war in which the Chinese would push narcotics as a way to undermine the effectiveness of the opposition's military forces. This strategy would later be employed with greatly enhanced effectiveness against the French, and later the Americans, in

Vietnam. During the Korean War Soviet KGB intelligence was especially interested in the Chinese narcotics operation and followed it with great care. One of their findings was the existence of a surprisingly high incidence of use of hard narcotics, such as heroin, cocaine, and the synthetic hiropon, among U.S. servicemen when contrasted with similar use by South Korean servicemen, a factor of two greater.

It was as a consequence of the autopsies that this information came to take on strategic importance. During the autopsies, the Soviet and [redacted] doctors discovered that an unusually high percentage of the young U.S. servicemen had cardiovascular damage -- "mini heart attacks" was how the Soviet doctors described the damage -- a much higher percentage than among South Koreans. While several possible contributing factors were identified, such as diet, the doctors recognized the correlation between the incidence of heart damage and use of hard drugs and concluded that the drugs were probably a major cause. (b)(1)

When Khrushchev learned about this finding, he immediately recognized the potential of narcotics as a strategic weapon and commissioned a study to determine the potential effectiveness of narcotics trafficking as a strategic weapon for use against the West, the United States in particular. This was the origin of what would become by 1962 one of the most important Soviet-bloc intelligence operations undertaken to undermine our society, military effectiveness, and economic stability. Their primary initial targets were our youth, which are the backbone of any nation's military strength, and our colleges, because that was where our future leaders were to be found. A thorough investigation of the fate of U.S. POWs ultimately should also lead American intelligence to the sources of the narcotics plague that has grown exponentially since roughly 1959, when the Soviet trafficking strategy went operational.

What happened to the unaccounted for American POWs in the Korean War? Most are probably dead. But, some of the roughly 8,000 still unaccounted for might be alive. Were any of the American POW guinea pigs likely to have been returned? When I put this question to Sejna, his response was emphatic. "No way!" he exclaimed, adding that [redacted] intelligence also built a crematorium in North Korea to help dispose of the remains of U.S. servicemen following the autopsies -- the ultimate fate of a majority of the American POW guinea pigs. (b)(1)

Obtaining information about the fate of POWs from the Vietnam War will be even more difficult than from the Korean War because many POWs are coupled to extremely sensitive programs. Before his fall from power in September 1964, [redacted] explained, Khrushchev put the wheels in motion to continue in North Vietnam the experiments that were begun in North Korea during the Korean War. The experiments had been considered extremely profitable and there were many new drugs, chemical and biological agents and possible counteracting vaccines developed in the intervening years that needed to be tested. (b)(1)

Accordingly, arrangements were negotiated with the North Vietnamese and medical experiments using American POWs as guinea pigs were continued. Doctors from East European countries besides [redacted] were involved. Most of the experiments on U.S. POWs were conducted in military hospitals in North Vietnam. But, the most sensitive experiments were conducted in KGB and GRU facilities back in the Soviet Union. This is why the movement of U.S. POWs to Russia and their interment in prisons and psychiatric "clinics" as revealed by Mr. Yeltsin takes on added significance. (b)(1)

It is highly unlikely that information on these activities will ever find its way into the Russian archives. Being research operations, the activities directly relate to special capabilities that are in being today and to covert operations over the past twenty years of the highest sensitivity.

For openers, the POW experiments are coupled with efforts to develop new generations of military chemical and biological warfare agents, efforts that, according to [redacted] were more sensitive and more highly classified than nuclear weapons programs. They are also coupled to the development of chemical agents and drugs for intelligence applications and their nature likely will raise serious questions about a wide variety of assassination activities, including several undertaken against a variety of the highest-level national and international leaders. (b)(1)

They are coupled to the development of a wide variety of mind-control drugs. One that was describe by [redacted] was a follow-on to the drug used to reverse the values of selected U.S. POWs during the Korean War and cause them to disown America as described earlier. The new drug tested in the mid-1960's was covertly administered through food. It was operationally used as early as (b)(1)

1967 to turn influential anti-Soviet individuals in various countries into neutral and even pro-Soviet supporters.

That is, the telltale trail of U.S. POWs impinges on these, and other, extremely sensitive Soviet intelligence operations and capabilities that are still highly valued today. It goes without saying that neither the KGB nor the GRU are likely to find and volunteer such information on their own initiative!

I am convinced that the above is only a fraction of the information that is close at hand respecting the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs. The above information is just bits and pieces I collected in the process of pursuing other subjects. I have not had the time or support to conduct careful debriefings on the POW/MIA issue -- but would welcome the opportunity to do so. There is no doubt in my mind that considerably more information could be extracted from further debriefings, and that among the items of greatest interest would be the names of other officials and participants from various former communist countries who would also have detailed memories based on first-hand knowledge. Once identified, these people could be contacted and the process repeated. The result would be a mass of detail that would be most difficult to refute and which then could be used as the basis for specific discussions with President Yeltsin to obtain his assistance in a much more direct attack on the KGB and GRU bureaucracies than merely looking for needles in the archive haystacks.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss the above in detail with you and address any questions you may have. An overview of my background is attached for your information. My phone number is [redacted] (b)(c)

Finally, I would like to caution your staff not to take any precipitous action based on the above without careful deliberation. That is, there are a number of important operational nuances that I did not discuss above because of their sensitivity.

Who's Holding the Psychotoxins and DNA-Altering Compounds?

by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.

Our worst fears have finally been confirmed. The Soviets deliberately violated the 1925 Geneva hemical Weapons Protocol and the 1972 iological and Toxin Weapons Convenon on a massive scale. Confirmation omes from defectors, Russian newspaers, and official spokesmen—including ussian President Boris Yeltsin. The most erious error of Western intelligence agenies which monitored these develpments was the gross underestiation of the size of the Soviet—ow Russian—effort.

The military containment facilty at Sverdlovsk that accidentaly released a cloud of anthrax rganisms in 1979 and killed hunreds of civilians is now known o have been a biological warfare roduction facility. When Yeltsin was asked in May 1992 why he had kept quiet about the illegal biological weapons development programs, he responded: "First, nobody asked me about it. And second, when I learned these developments were under way I visited Andropov [who] phoned Ustinov and ordered these production facilities to be completely scrapped. I believed that this had been done. It turned out that the laboratories were simply moved to another oblast and development of the weapons continued."

New Families of Deadly Agents

The Sverdlovsk admission is, however, more of a distraction than a serious concern. Similarly, data on continued biological experiments in the Aral Sea, while titillating, are not strategically significant and serve only to draw attention away from more important revelations. The existence of a far greater threat—which Russian officials have not yet confirmed but which is now being reported in Russian publications and has been confirmed by knowledgeable sources—involves massive programs to develop qualitatively new families of chemical and biological agents using genetic engineering and biotechnology.

These programs involve developing for military and intelligence use organisms which produce unusual diseases for which no cures exist. Organisms that are devastating by themselves are made qualitatively worse by incorporating into their DNA structures new genes that produce other deadly toxins. Very sophisticated chemicals that affect the functioning of the brain—neurotoxins, peptides, and small-molecular-weight proteins, for example, have been produced and refined. DNA segments that can produce these sophisticated chemicals have also been isolated and spliced into the DNA of organisms that can then be surreptitiously introduced into humans, where they live and become small manufacturing plants.

Reports published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in 1991 and 1992—based on information obtained from people who worked on military biological and chemical warfare programs—say the work was organized by the Main Administration for the Microbiological Industry. The program began in the mid-1960s; in the early 1970s, the Scientific Research Institute of Applied Microbiology was set up, ostensibly to boost genetic engineering and microbiology. But this was just a cover, the reports explain, for the development of advanced technology biological weapons.

Accidental Release of Anthrax from Biological Warfare Facility at Sverdlovsk



What the Pentagon long suspected has been confirmed.

"No-Name" Contacts

The programs have been cloaked in secrecy at the highest classification level. One of the laboratory directors explained that they were given their orders orally by people in civilian clothes. There was no paper trail. The lab directors often did not even know their contacts' identities, only their surnames. When the officials arrived they were accompanied by sector directors who made the introductions. These "no-name" officials gave assignments and then took away the finished product in special vehicles.

Many laboratories were covertly tied into the project. Those identified in the Russian press include the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Applied Microbiology at Obolensk, a virology center in Koltsovo, the Biological Instrument Building Institute and the Biochemical Machine Project in Moscow, the Institute for Ultrapure Drugs in Leningrad, and secret centers in Kirov, Sergiyev Posad, and Yekaterinburg. US and UK intelligence sources have identified no fewer than 16 major biological warfare agent production and storage facilities, and this is probably just the tip of the iceberg. Underground production and storage facilities, hidden from "national technical means," have also been reported. Faculty members at major universities, such as the Moscow Higher Technical School, Moscow State University, and the Second Medical Institute, were also involved, as were medical

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spitals, especially military facilitie- spital research centers, and prisons (: ting). Based on what has been revealed far, the total number of biological, emical, and medical scientists involved ould seem conservatively to exceed 000, not including Eastern European ientists who were also part of the effort.

Son of Legionnaires' Disease

One of the organisms which has attract- considerable interest is the one respon- ole for Legionnaires' disease. One of the teresting aspects of this organism is its ility to live and reproduce in chlorinated ater as well as in the human body. This ight be an excellent host organism for vert delivery to selected population seg- ents through public water supplies, since could be modified to spread diseases that herwise could not survive in chlorinated ater.

Mind control drugs have been a major oviet development objective since at ast the early 1950s. One interesting pro- ct involves the creation of special bacte- a capable of secreting psychotropic sub- ances that can be used to control a erson's psyche. The military and political nportance of psychotropic substances oes back 25 years. In 1967, a military extbook mentioned psychotoxins and the beginning of a development that is di- ected toward the complete influence and ontrol over human consciousness." In 971, an East German research paper iscussed substances that could "cause sychic disturbances when present even in inute quantities in the air" and which ould render people incapable of fighting. Other compounds discussed were super- nfective agents and psychotoxins directed against the further existence of an inde- endently thinking and acting society."

A high-ranking defector—the former ecretary of the Czech Defense Council—as stated that Czech scientists had suc- essfully developed and tested a number of such substances in their chemical and biological warfare R&D program in the mid- to late 1960s. One of the drugs inhibited the decision process (an excel- lent weapon for use against command and political authorities); another affected judgement centers in the brain and caused people to say what they were thinking (an excellent nonviolent way to end an adver- sary's career). Another (whose develop- ment efforts went back to the Korean War when the chemicals were tested on Ameri- can POWs), was designed to enable intel- ligence operatives to covertly change a person's attitudes through carefully struc- tured conversations, for example, to turn an anticommunist into a neutral or com- munist supporter within two weeks. Re- portedly, as early as 1967 these drugs were being administered, covertly through food, to foreign dignitaries whose atti- tudes the Soviets wanted to change. The frightening potential results from modify- ing certain organisms—perhaps harmless ones, such as *E. coli*—so that they pro- duce substances whose potential is real- ized only after they enter the victim.

US' Nonresponse

US officials have been most reluctant to face the problem of modern chemical and biological warfare. Since 1969 intelli- gence has been suppressed, the strategic value of advanced developments has been ignored, and the capability of scientists of the former Soviet bloc to apply genetic engineering to develop new, sophisticated agents has been labeled a "future," rather than "present" possibility. US policy has been driven by two forces—one refuses to recognize the potential of modern chemi- cal and biological warfare that has been a reality for two decades; the other places our security and trust in the promise of arms control. While the latter is, theoreti- cally, a hopeful approach, the question, What do you do when agreements are violated? remains to be answered.

The programs have been cloaked in secrecy at the highest classification level. One of the laboratory directors explained that they were given their orders orally by people in civilian clothes. There was no paper trail.

Given all the lies of all the Soviet leaders over the years, what value should a prudent national leader place on new Rus- sian assurances that all such programs have been terminated? Why should Yelts- in be considered any more credible than Gorbachev, whom Yeltsin has said lied to us? This is a particu- larly thorny issue be- cause it has become exceeding difficult— realistically impossi- ble—to distinguish be- tween benevolent and malevolent research and development.

Secrecy has been in- tense and deception programs designed to cover activities re- main in place. The fruits of a 25-year ef- fort are not likely to be casually discarded. And the develop- ments do have major military utility (as s[illegible] in Afghanistan, where one chemi- [illegible] seemed to render enemy soldiers un- conscious before they even knew they were under attack), as well as population control, and intelligence significance.

Let's Acknowledge the Problem

What can be done? At this juncture, several appropriate responses seem obvi- ous: Stop denying the importance of such capabilities and begin to recognize the full range of possibilities. Greatly expand West- ern intelligence efforts to understand the full range of the former Soviet bloc efforts in these areas. For both these actions, it is essential to not limit the scope to advanced chemical and biological warfare but to also consider related technical approaches such as electromagnetic field activities, which can achieve equally devastating ef- fects on human brain chemistry.

Rather than press Boris Yeltsin for his assurances that these programs will be terminated, a more productive approach might be to ask him and leaders of the various republics to announce that all se- curity restrictions which might inhibit sci- entists and engineers from talking about projects that are in violation of any arms control agreement are hereby rescinded. All people with knowledge of these efforts should be invited to come forward and report on such activities. Subsequent dis- closures would likely provide ample grist for some most interesting exchanges be- tween Pentagon officials and the Congres- sional panel which is set to examine the state of US military chemical and biologi- cal defense preparedness (July *AFJI*).

Joe Douglass is the coauthor (with Neil Livingstone) of America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare *(Lexington Books).*

Congress will study US chemical/biological defenses.

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j. CCF Interrogation of U.S. Air Force Personnel in MUKDEN, Manchuria

One of the most intensive and well-planned interrogation programs conducted by the CCF was carried out at MUKDEN, Manchuria, between January and September 1953.[31]

Eleven members of a B-29 crew that had been shot down over Korea in July 1952 were transported separately to MUKDEN and (supposedly unknown to each other) were placed in solitary confinement in what one POW called a jail. Elaborate precautions were taken to keep the POWs incommunicado, and each of the eleven was interrogated individually at great length.

Some of the POWs had previously, in Korea, "confessed" to participation in Bacteriological Warfare, but, without exception, they state that they repudiated these "confessions" at MUKDEN.

One source states that 80 POWs were scheduled to undergo interrogation at this interrogation center, but there are no facts available to substantiate this claim. It is evident that some sort of experimental interrogation was conducted with this very select group; although Bacteriological Warfare "confessions" were emphasized during most of the questioning periods, there was probably another motive behind the program, since, as mentioned before, several of the POWs had already "confessed" to Bacteriological Warfare participation.

Interrogation by Soviet + Communist personnel

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Several POWs state that they were continually exhorted to confess their "crimes," but their captors would never specify the nature of the so-called "crimes."

Enemy interrogation techniques at MUKDEN primarily emphasized mental duress, as opposed to extremes of physical torture. Unlike the great majority of interrogations conducted in Korea, however, the enemy "conditioned" the prisoners extensively by subjecting them to long and often painful physical harassment. Some POWs were forced to wear leg-irons for considerable periods of time, and one returnee relates that enemy personnel constantly kicked the leg irons against his legs and ankles. Other prisoners report that they had to stand for hours under rain spouts during heavy rain storms. These and other similar experiences undergone by the POWs in MUKDEN indicate that the Chinese, while they did not resort to such methods of torture as the "thumb-screw" and the "rack," exhibited no hesitancy about inflicting less crippling forms of pain.

The POWs at MUKDEN were usually interrogated by three-man teams consisting of an interrogator, an interpreter, and a clerk who recorded the answers. During the course of an interrogation, the interrogators were often rotated, this permitting the questioning to continue without interruption for extended periods. In one instance, in which the interrogation reportedly continued for forty hours, a POW was forced to stand at attention during the

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entire period, with only a few minutes off to visit the latrine.

The motivation behind the MUKDEN interrogations is obscure. Only one group of prisoners was taken to this center; the questioning indicated generally the same type of intelligence interest as that which was displayed in Korea; and, although the degree of physical discomfort was somewhat greater, there was no basic variation in the interrogation technique.

Section IV - Interrogation by Soviet Personnel

Although many repatriates observed Caucasians in North Korea and believed that they were Russian, less than one-tenth of one per cent of the prisoners report having been directly interrogated by Soviet personnel.

The few interrogations by alleged Soviet interrogators (in some instances the POWs could not be sure as to their nationality) were conducted primarily with USAF prisoners and were concerned, for the most part, with information pertaining to the Air Force. Nearly all of these interrogations were conducted in the early stages of the conflict (1950-1951) and no individual POW experienced more than one. An exception to this statement involved the interrogation of a USAF lieutenant, who was questioned at SINUIJU shortly after capture and was later taken to ANTUNG, Manchuria, where he was interrogated eight or ten times by Russians. Later, at "Pak's Palace" in P'YONGYANG, he observed that a Russian in civilian clothes seemed

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to be directing the questioning of the NK interrogators. This case appears to be one of the few instances in which the Russians had any kind of a planned program for the direct interrogation of an individual prisoner.

Another POW relates that, at "Pak's Palace," an individual who he believed to be a Russian general officer attempted to question him at length about USAF techniques and equipment.

From the above, it is perhaps safe to conclude that the primary role of the Russian interrogator in the Korean conflict was that of an observer and, occasionally, an advisor.

Section V - Interrogation of Counter-Intelligence Personnel

Both the North Koreans and the Chinese were especially interested in interrogating anyone who had been connected with intelligence - in particular, those who were associated with CIC. "Wrongdoers" were often accused of being CIC agents. One U.S. POW, who had parachuted behind the enemy lines and had been subsequently captured, was suspected by the NKA of being a CIC agent. He appears to have run the full gamut of beatings, starvation, solitary confinement and other forms of torture, mental and physical, while the enemy tried in vain to make him talk.[32] Although most of the rough treatment suffered by this POW occurred while he was in the hands of North Koreans at "Pak's Palace," his original captors, the Chinese, also "roughed him up" considerably. Following his

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release from "Pak's Palace," he was transferred to the CCF POW camp at PYOKTONG and interrogated again, this time in the presence of a man whom he believed to be a Russian.

At Camp 5, a CCF interrogator named TONG was especially interested in CIC or CID personnel and questioned at great length those whom he suspected of being connected with either of these organizations or with the FBI.

On one occasion, the Chinese issued a statement ordering investigators connected with CIC, CID or other agencies to turn themselves in, since capital punishment would be imposed upon them if they were later discovered.

Section VI - Comparison of Chinese and North Korean Interrogation Techniques, as Described by a Returned POW[33]

One prisoner, who was interrogated extensively by both the Chinese and the North Koreans, had an opportunity to compare the techniques and the efficiency of the two intelligence establishments. He believes that the Chinese were better prepared for interrogation and more skillful in their application than the North Koreans. The Chinese demanded answers to all of their questions and insisted that all topics be discussed in great detail. In describing the assignment of personnel in an Engineer battalion, the POW was forced by the Chinese to enumerate the functions of every man in the unit. On the other hand, while answering a

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similar question for the North Koreans, he found that he could not remember what he had said previously to the Chinese concerning seventy-five of the enlisted men in the battalion, and he was permitted to note their duties as "general." The North Koreans were apparently satisified with mere volume, whereas the Chinese usually demanded specific answers; in addition, the former often sought techincal information which was apparently beyond their own comprehension. This attitude, plus the fact that they sometimes approached an interview with preconceived ideas as to what the answers should be, often led them to record information which was completely absurd. At "Pak's Palace," for example, a POW was directed to prepare a sketch of a section of a Bailey Bridge. When he indicated five holes at the end of one panel by which it could be bolted to the adjoining section, his interrogator insisted that this could not be correct. The POW asked the interrogator how many holes he thought there should be, and the interrogator suggested twenty. Twenty holes were therefore drawn, despite the interrogee's professional knowledge that this number of holes would so weaken the section that it would become structurally unsound.

The fact that the Chinese appeared to have a very extensive collection of U.S. FMs and TMs, while the North Koreans possessed only a few mimeographed copies of TO&Es, indicates that there was very little exchange of interrogation aids between the two nations. (For a list of questions asked by both the NKA and the CCF, see app. V.)

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9 Jul 94

PP SSSS

DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA//

CDR JTFFA CAMP SMITH HI

USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

(b)(1)

FBI WASHINGTON DC//INTD-CI-2H//

INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36/J233//

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//

NSC WASHINGTON DC

USDLO HONG KONG HK//PW-MIA//

USDAO SINGAPORE SN//PW-MIA//

USDAO MANILA RP//PW-MIA//

USDAO KUALA LUMPUR MY//PW-MIA//

CDRINSCOM FT MEADE MD//IAGPC-L//

(b)(1)

: text line = line #41]

e #45] DIA/NMIC/PW-MIA/DB-2C/RTS-2D/DAH/DAM/(JSI5)

e #49] N. EFTIMIADES/PW-MIA/X2776/NE

e #51--indent 2] MR. ROBERT R. SHEETZ,PW-MIA,CHF ~~(b)(6)~~

0337

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RR SSSS

t line each continuation page = line #5]

/PW-MIA

L: [ ] IIR 6-014-00 -92

[ ] NONE

RY: [ ] USSR, [ ] N. KOREA

ECT: [ ] IIR 6-014-00 -91/SOVIET, [ ] DRUG TESTING PROGRAM

TING IN EXECUTIONS OF US POWS DURING THE KOREAN WAR. [ ]

ING: [ ] THIS IS AN INFO REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

[(U)] 910509 (NICHOLAS EFTIMIADES)

: [ ] D-DC2-43468; D-VOP-43639

CE: [ ] SOURCE IS A [ ] FORMER GENERAL OFFICER WHO

ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES.

IS THE SECOND DEBRIEFING OF SOURCE REGARDING KOREAN WAR POWS.

SOURCE HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED POW/MIA RELATED INFORMATION.

HAS REPORTED TO VARIOUS USG AGENCIES OVER A PERIOD OF 20 YEARS

HAS BEEN ASSESSED AS RELIABLE. IN ADDITION, SOURCE HAS

ERGONE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION WITH NO DECEPTION INDICATED.

MARY: [ ] FROM THE YEARS 1951 TO 1954 AMERICAN POWS IN

TH KOREA WERE USED TO CONDUCT DRUG AND MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

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AL POWS WERE EXECUTED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TESTS. THE
NG PROGRAM WAS OPERATED BY SOVIET AND [ ] GRU'S (b)(1)
ILITARY HEALTH ADMINISTRATION PERSONNEL.

[ ] IN 1954 THE SOURCE WAS THE POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF
] ENGINEERING CORPS. AT THAT TIME, HE WAS (b)(1)
NED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE
STRY OF DEFENSE. WHILE IN THESE ORGANIZATIONAL BODIES SOURCE
ALSO A MEMBER OF DEPARTMENT 8 (ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS
RTMENT). THE DEPARTMENT MET ON THE AVERAGE OF ONCE PER WEEK
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AND
RITY ACTIVITIES. THE INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE IN DEPARTMENT 8 IN
AND WERE AWARE OF THE DRUG TESTING PROGRAM WERE MR. (FNU)
A - CHIEF; GENERAL VACLAV PRCHLIYZ - CHIEF, MILITARY SECTION;
ANTONIN SELESOVSKY - DEPUTY CHIEF, MILITARY SECTION; LTC VACLAV
ANEK - CHIEF MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SECTION; MR. (FNU)
HTA - CHIEF, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SECTION; COL (FNU)
IROVSKY; COL JAN RUDOLF; AND COL VACLAV VAKAV.

] WHILE IN DEPARTMENT SOURCE REVIEWED WRITTEN REPORTS AND
PRESENT IN BRIEFINGS WHERE DRUG TESTING ON AMERICAN POWS WAS
CUSSED ON APPROXIMATELY 8 OCCASIONS. THE TESTS WERE CONDUCTED
A [ ] BUILT HOSPITAL BUILT IN 1951 IN NORTH KOREA. THE (b)(1)

SECRET

0339

NA NND 942006

AL WAS OSTENSIBLY USED TO TREAT KOREAN VICTIMS OF THE WAR;
PRIMARY PURPOSES, HOWEVER, WERE TO CONDUCT SPECIALIZED
RCH ON HUMAN RESISTANCE TO VARIOUS DRUGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
TIONS, AND TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE WAR.

THE DRUG EXPERIMENTATION PROGRAM WAS UNDER THE OVERALL
TION OF THE SOVIET AND GRU'S, AND UTILIZED AMERICAN POWS
ST SUBJECTS. THE ACTUAL RESEARCH WORK WAS CONDUCTED BY
T, AND KOREAN DOCTORS IN COUNTRY.

SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE TESTING PROGRAM
AL AMERICAN POWS WERE EXECUTED. SOURCE BASIS THIS ON A
ERSATION IN NOVEMBER 1954 IN BETWEEN COL. KISLICIN OF
SOVIET HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS
RTMENT, AND MR. (FNU) SALGA CHIEF OF THE
RTMENT 8. KISLICIN EXPRESSED CONCERN AS TO WHAT SECURITY
URES WERE EMPLOYED TO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION ABOUT THE DRUG
ING PROGRAM WOULD NOT BECOME PUBLIC. SALGA, ALONG WITH HIS
TY MR. (FNU) BLECHTA, ASSURED HIM THAT ALL THE REMAINING POW
SUBJECTS HAD BEEN ELIMINATED.

SOURCE RECALLED ANOTHER DISCUSSION WHICH OCCURRED IN
JMN OF 1955. SOURCE WAS BRIEFED (AND REVIEWED A WRITTEN REPORT)
GENERAL EVREN CHLAD, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL REAR SERVICES

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

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TMENT (NOTE-MILITARY HEALTH ADMINISTRATION AND CENTRAL
ARY HOSPITAL WERE UNDER REAR SERVICES DEPARTMENT). THE
T AND ACCOMPANYING BRIEFING WAS BASED ON AUTOPSIES OF AMERICAN
AND HIGHLIGHTED THE EFFECTS OF DRUG EXPERIMENTATION ON
US ORGANS OF THE HUMAN BODY.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE TESTING PROGRAM WAS TO DETERMINE
TIVE WAYS OF DESTROYING HUMAN RESISTANCE AND MODIFYING
IOR. SOURCE COULD NOT REMEMBER THE NAMES OF DRUGS WHICH WERE
DURING TESTING. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE
TS, HOWEVER, IS GENERALLY INDICATIVE OF DEPRESSANTS AND
UCINOGENS). SUBJECTS WERE SELECTED AND TESTED ON THE BASIS OF
ATION, RANK, RACE, AND GEOGRAPHICAL UPBRINGING. THE SOURCE
TED THAT AS A RESULT OF THE EFFECTS OF DRUG TESTING, SEVERAL
N UN POWS WERE LEFT MENTALLY INCAPACITATED.

THE SENIOR GRU OFFICER IN COUNTRY WAS GENERAL (b)(6)
LF BABKA. BABKA HELD THE EQUIVALENT OF AN AMBASSADORIAL RANK
WAS IN CHARGE OF ALL GRU INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (b)(6)
UDING THE ADMINISTRATION AND CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES OF THE
EARCH HOSPITAL. THE ACTUAL SCIENTIFIC TESTING PROGRAM WAS THE
PONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY HOSPITAL IN SOME (b)(6)
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY WAS ALSO ATTRIBUTED TO THE

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AIR FORCE RESEARCH MEDICAL CENTER, WHICH ANALYZED (b)(6)

RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED ON AMERICAN PILOTS.

SOURCE ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS IN AN OPEN AND FORTHRIGHT

R. HE MADE NO NOTICEABLE ATTEMPT TO EVADE QUESTIONS AND IS

ABLE TO FURTHER INTERVIEWS AND POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS.

W-MIA ANALYSIS OF THIS INFORMATION IS ONGOING.

-end of text---)

SP: PG 2430//

MSOBJS: 13//

: N/A

: NONE

RU: U.S. NO

: NICHOLAS EFTIMIADES, GG-12, INTEL OFFICER, (b)(6)

MIA2.

R: MR. ROBERT R. SHEETZ, PW-MIA CHIEF (b)(6)

L: N/A

L: N/A

SEM: NONE

NING:

0342

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- - - - -

INTERVIEW

- - - - -

MAY 7, 1991

- - - - -

-0343
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I N T E R V I E W

A (Inaudible).

Q How do you spell (inaudible)?

A R-o -- just like (inaudible) -- and he was -- I think it will be good if you can talk to him. He was in the Korean War. He was like Polish Intelligence Officer in Korea, in that mission -- you know, international mission or whatever was that.

Q Okay, in Korea?

A In Korea. I think he can help you with good information.

Q How do you spell his name?

A [illegible]

Q Okay. All right.

A Here in Virginia I hear many lectures. In (inaudible), he is -- he is very good there. He was Director of the Polish mission.

Q Okay. All right. I'll find out and, hopefully, I'll get a chance to talk to him.

Let me ask you, your name is David --

A No, no, [illegible]

Q How do you spell it?

A [illegible]

Q [illegible] Okay. I wasn't sure.

This whole thing comes under the drug

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1 testing program. All my questions deal with that drug
2 testing program and how American prisoners of war in
3 Korea were treated, how you know, what access that you
4 might have had to knowledge about how they were
5 treated, and what subsequently might have happened to
6 some of them. That's what all of my questions focus
7 on.
8 From 1950 to '54, around that time period,
9 what ranks -- I mean, what rank were you, where did
10 you fit into the system, in the military system?
11 A In 1950-54?
12 Q Yes, around that time period that the Korean
13 War was active?
14 A I was in the beginning Commissar of Brigade,
15 and after then I was Foreign Commissar of Engineer
16 Corps, and elected to Central Committee of the
17 Communist Party and (inaudible).
18 Q Is that during the '50s time frame?
19 A Yes.
20 Q Okay. So, you were in the political
21 commissar structure, basically?
22 A Yes.
23 Q Was it -- through which of those positions
24 did you find out about this program?
25 A It was -- as I told you, I was in the

1 Central Committee of the Communist Party.

2 Q As a member of the Central Committee of the

3 Communist Party of [redacted] you were briefed (b)(1)

4 into the program?

5 A Yes.

6 Q Okay. Do you remember, when did the program

7 start that you know of, (inaudible)?

8 A Let's see, it was -- my memory is not very

9 good. It was when [redacted] built the hospital (b)(1)

10 in North Korea. Let's see, the war finished in --

11 Q '53.

12 A '53. I think probably I'm talking about the

13 involvement of [redacted] involvement of the (b)(1)

14 Soviet

15 Union -- they start before [redacted] but (b)(1)

16 [redacted] I would say, probably '51 and -- (b)(1)

17 because [redacted] built a military hospital then, (b)(1)

18 and generally around that time, the ambassador in

19 North Korea was General Yugo (phonetic) -- I (b)(1)

20 think at that time he was colonel.

21 Q [redacted] he subsequently was the Ambassador (b)(1)

22 to Moscow at that one point, wasn't he?

23 A I don't know before or after.

24 Q After.

25 A But before the war ended, he was in Korea

1 like ambassador, he was Interregion Office. And the
2 major reason for the hospital was not to help the
3 Korean soldiers, it was research actually. The
4 and many military doctors for (b)(1)
5 training actually.
6 Q Okay. We'll get to that in a second, but
7 it's around 1951, so the war is raging when this
8 hospital is built. The war is on.
9 Do you remember where the hospital was, or
10 the name?
11 A No.
12 Q The city? What part of the country, north
13 or south?
14 A I don't -- you know, it is already so many
15 years, and nobody never talked to me except this
16 headquarters guy. I mean, I can -- I can -- if you
17 have more question, I can think about and look at my
18 papers.
19 Q Okay. I'll write down some questions as we
20 go along here, and you can think about those because -
21 - I remember where, you know, if it was in Chun Yao
22 (phonetic), or up north, or where, or how often it
23 might have been.
24 A Okay.
25 Q Here is a start, maybe you can think about

1 that. The program started somewhere around '51 or
2 thereabouts.
3 A Yes.
4 Q And did it go through the war, to the end of
5 the war, after the war?
6 A Oh, sure, it was around there. And Colonel
7 General came back I think a year after (b)(1)
8 the war (inaudible), I think. So, he was over there
9 to the time (inaudible), they issue the drugs, and
10 they make research about (inaudible) of soldiers --
11 you know, difference between Korean soldiers and
12 American soldiers, because America industrial country,
13 Korea very primitive, was the difference which was big
14 difference.
15 Q Was heading this program, was he in (b)(1)
16 charge of this program (inaudible)?
17 A Yes was in charge of everything (b)(1)
18 generally, (inaudible) doctors -- I mean, the doctors
19 from the Central Military Hospital. I can tell you,
20 for example, officer (inaudible), doctor (inaudible).
21 (Inaudible) was our specialist, (inaudible) was
22 (inaudible). So, there were many, many (inaudible) of
23 the military doctors who spent, I don't know, maybe
24 six months one year, another (inaudible).
25 Q So, they rotated (inaudible). Were you --

1 these doctors that were rotated through you, you're
2 talking doctors who were sent to the military (b)(1)
3 hospital?
4 A Yes.
5 Q Were the (inaudible) doctors also run
6 through the same way?
7 A Not in the hospital. (b)(1)
8 Q And they worked in Korea also, for six
9 months, a year, whatever?
10 A Yes.
11 Q This is kind of a joint program?
12 A Yes, it is, because they come from Warsaw ~~(b)(1)~~
13 Pact to Korea.
14 Q Warsaw Pact country to Korea. Were they -- ~~(b)(1)~~
15 this hospital was built by right? (b)(1)
16 A Right.
17 Q Was the logistics help with the supplies,
18 was this all from in-country, or was it sent through
19 the logistics chain? Was it shipped in?
20 A Yes, It was all supplies was (b)(1)
21 (inaudible). (b)(1)
22 Q military? (b)(1)
23 A Yes. Main Health Administration, Military
24 Administration, they responsibility from the
25 (inaudible) -- everything was under the which (b)(1)

1 mean generally under the GRU but, of (b)(1)
2 course, (inaudible) was under the Health
3 Administration.
4 Q (Inaudible). Was the Soviet GRU also
5 involved?
6 A Oh, yes. (Inaudible). Actually, if you go
7 to the end, who is provide everything for soldiers,
8 you know, because what did, everything (b)(1)
9 was under the instruction from Soviet Union, and all
10 the information go to Soviet Union.
11 Q What other agencies have been -- you (b)(1)
12 have the Central Military Hospital under the Military
13 Health Administration, right?
14 A GRU, Central Health Military Administration,
15 which is part of the logistics.
16 Q That would be part --
17 A Career services.
18 Q Career services.
19 A Career services. The Central Military
20 Hospital was involved under what is the Air Force
21 Research Medical Center, was involved because we
22 started from the pilot's point of view.
23 Q From a pilot's point of view.
24 A Yes. (Inaudible) was general for the
25 supply, but not for the research.

Q Who was?

A (Inaudible) GRU.

Q The Reassurances Department, they, I guess, transported -- this must have taken doctors, nurses, medicine, equipment -- lots of transportation, lots of movement, because North Korea had nothing, so this must have been a tremendous logistical effort.

All this came under the Reassurances Department?

A Yes.

Q Were these taken to the Soviet Union by train, or (inaudible), or any ideas?

A I think I don't know how it was, but Deputy at that time was General Chlad, C-h-l-a-d. He was general originally from Soviet Union.

Q He was in Reassurances Department?

A He was -- he was Chief of (Inaudible). Part of that administration was also under him. So, he had personal responsible for supply.

Q When we say the Health Administration, we're talking about the Military Health Administration?

A Sure.

Q Okay. Just wanted to make sure. He had responsibility, I guess, overall for that?

A Yes.

1 Q Anyone else that was under that program?

2 A Pardon me?

3 Q Any other departments that you remember that

4 was under there, that would have actually had more

5 involvement, moving all that -- the transportation,

6 the communication, the support?

7 A Well, of course, there were some others

8 participate because I don't know if you know the

9 system in Communist country. The system is any

10 material from pencil to paper has some Russian

11 (inaudible), somebody who is responsible. I tell you

12 example, if you take (inaudible), there is maybe

13 icemaker which is there at the responsibility for the

14 chief of the health service to develop the icemaker,

15 after (inaudible words) production and so. But if you

16 take automobile which (inaudible) who is responsible

17 for the automobile, develop supply is the chief of

18 automobile administration. The Chief of Health

19 Service must ask him, tell him I need (inaudible)

20 maybe ten automobiles, I don't know, and he supply.

21 So, from this point of view, there are more

22 administration which were involved, you know, or for

23 example if they need radio, it is the responsibility

24 of the chief of communication service.

25 So, from this point of view, the chief of

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1 the Health Service and GRU make all plan and all list
2 of equipment and material which they need to other
3 people who are involved, but let's say they have
4 general responsibility to give it to them, and that's
5 it, after it was up to GRU and the Health
6 Administration or (inaudible) service, to ship it.
7 Based on, for example, a person was involved
8 very much was in the Personnel Administration and
9 Military CounterIntelligence, because everyone who
10 goes there must be approved by Military
11 Counterintelligence.
12 Q That's interesting. So, Military
13 Counterintelligence keeps tabs on everybody who went -
14 -
15 A And, of course, it is controlled by
16 Russians, you know, because Russia is (inaudible)
17 military counterintelligence.
18 Q Was the Military Counterintelligence under
19 GRU, obviously, right, and the GRU? (b)(4)
20 A No, no, no. Military Counterintelligence is
21 GRU, they come from GRU.
22 Q Okay.
23 A From (inaudible).
24 Q Outside of the Party, basically?
25 A Pardon me?

1 Q I'm sorry, go ahead. A Party function --

2 A Sure, the Party is over everybody, but

3 generally the military counterintelligence, that

4 belongs to Minister of Defense. Right now, we have

5 some new situation, but before when it was Russian

6 system except in Poland, the Military

7 Counterintelligence was part of Ministry of Interior.

8 And they had even special section inside GRU, that

9 were sitting there all day long. And when Personnel

10 administration selected people who supposed to go to

11 Korea, they must present it to Military

12 Counterintelligence, and they must approve it. After

13 then, it goes to Politburo to approve it. All these

14 groups,all these leaders, they were approved by

15 Politburo, not just decision of Minister of Defense.

16 Q As we said, you don't remember. Maybe you

17 could check your papers for the hospital name, the

18 location. This was a hospital dedicated to research,

19 as you say. Did it have other functions? I mean, did

20 it have a cover? Did it treat locals? Did it, you

21 know, say, treat anyone for physical problems, or was

22 it a straight research institution?

23 A Well, officially, it was help to Korea,

24 treated Korean soldiers, but the main reason was the

25 research, and the reason was trained doctors for their

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1 work, because you are a military doctor, but you
2 cannot be trained directly in the field, if somebody
3 was lost a leg or something, so it was the --
4 Q Wartime?
5 A -- the drugs, you know, some new drugs. So,
6 all this -- for example, I told you I believe, for
7 example, they say -- I believe it was 22 or 25 -- I
8 think 22 percent American soldiers, young boys, they
9 already passed out the drug, many had the drug --
10 Q Twenty-two American soldiers?
11 A Twenty-two percent.
12 Q Oh, 22 percent American soldiers.
13 A You know, and Korean, I think, 2 percent.
14 So, they study what is the problem of the industrial
15 country like American, why it is, what is inference of
16 this -- they call it mini heart attack, which means
17 you don't know. Their heart was already damaged. So,
18 all these things they study. I remember when
19 Professor Dufrek (phonetic) gave us a briefing, for
20 example, on all these problems, to help to military
21 people.
22 Q This is interesting to me. How often were
23 you briefed -- I mean, you were briefed on this
24 program? That was the way you knew about it, because
25 you were briefed? And you met some of the professors,

1 some of the doctors, who had been in Korea?

2 A No, not all of them.

3 Q How long would you say -- how many people

4 knew about this program? How well known was it?

5 A How many people? I don't know. The

6 Minister of Defense, General (inaudible) -- quite a

7 few people know because, first of all, the military

8 leaders, no question about it, and in the Central

9 Committee, the -- oh, what is the name -- the

10 administration -- the department which controlled

11 military forces and secret police, Minister

12 (inaudible)'s department. Of course, they know it. I

13 would say it must be probably -- probably -- at least

14 a hundred people.

15 Q That knew of the existence of --

16 A At least, you know, because maybe some

17 people who supposed to supply, they didn't know what

18 for it is. They just tell them "This is Politburo, you

19 must give ten automobiles", or whatever, and in that

20 system you don't question why, but really people --

21 the Health Administration, GRU, the Department in

22 Central Committee, Secretary (inaudible) -- at least

23 hundred people know, or more. I'm not talking about

24 people who were directed, just people administrate on

25 this thing.

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1 Q And how frequently were you briefed? And
2 this is you and the Central Committee, now.
3 A You are talking about Central Committee
4 under military leadership, you know, because many of
5 the briefings were continued after then because the
6 war was over and the hospital stayed there, and some
7 scientific study which they would make together with
8 Russian could take maybe a year or more. And after
9 then I was Secretary of Collegium of Ministers, which
10 were ten top military people.
11 Q Secretary of --
12 A Collegium, which are top ten military people
13 -- you know, it is body there. People in (inaudible)
14 and minister is chairman. It is like collective
15 leadership of military forces.
16 And, so, that was twice a month on the
17 program for enlightening these people, and they made
18 the briefing -- for example, I told you the purpose of
19 (inaudible), our problem and the war, you know, that
20 information.
21 Q (Inaudible)
22 A I call him about 20 minutes.
23 Q When you were on the Central Committee, you
24 were briefed once a month? Twice a month?
25 A Yes.

1 Q Twice a month, about?

2 A Yes, at least. At least.

3 Q And how long a period was that, a year? Two

4 years?

5 A You mean in Korea?

6 Q Well, when you were on the Central Committee

7 and you were getting briefed twice a month, over what

8 length of time? Over two years?

9 A Until I defected.

10 Q Okay. So, from '51 on?

11 A No, from '54 until I defected because, in

12 the beginning, I was Secretary of the Collegium, and

13 after then I was member of the Collegium.

14 Q Oh, okay.

15 A So, before it was Central Committee, but

16 after then I was also member of the Administrative

17 Programs Department. You invited people there to --

18 I'm sorry, I was also Secretary of Defense Council of

19 Central Committee for all these major reports because,

20 usually, these reports need money and maybe some

21 organization changes because conclusions and such --

22 so, all these things go to Defense Council.

23 Q So, during the war years, during --

24 A During the war years, I was Commissar of

25 Engineer troops, and member of the Administrative

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1 Organs ~~Programs~~ Department of the Central Committee, and
2 since 1954 I was member of the Parliament, Collegium
3 of Ministers, so I had --
4 Q So, as Political Commissar of Engineering, I
5 assume you didn't have access to this program?
6 A I had, because the engineer troops, they had
7 responsibility for when the hospital was built
8 originally.
9 Q So, you had --
10 A I know from the beginning.
11 Q So, through the Central Administrative
12 Organs ~~Programs~~ Department, you were called on, you knew
13 there, briefed. Throughout those war years, you'd say
14 at least twice a month you had some information on the
15 program and you were briefed on it?
16 A Yes.
17 Q So, that's twice a month. So, that's a lot
18 of briefings we're talking about -- 50-60 times that
19 you were briefed on the progress of this program.
20 A Because it was very important, you know. Of
21 course, there was other functions of the hospital --
22 intelligence, for example.
23 Q Intelligence function, that type of thing?
24 A Yes.
25 Q There were intelligence officers then

1 stationed there, as well as doctors and nurses?

2 A Because as I told you, the top boss, General

3 Batkla, was intelligence officer, and the GRU

4 completely controlled everything.

5 Q Did the Chinese or the Koreans know about

6 (a) the intelligence function, and (b) the drug

7 testing?

8 A No.

9 Q So, those countries knew about neither of

10 those things.

11 A No, they didn't, because there was problem

12 between Chinese and Korean, you know, and all the

13 Russians and Chinese, which we didn't know at the

14 time, I'm sorry. At the time, everything was quiet.

15 But (inaudible), the Russians and Chinese already know

16 things are not going very well. And as you know, the

17 Koreans, they don't like Chinese. Of course, they

18 didn't know.

19 Q Okay. All right. Do you know something

20 about the actual testing program, what type of tests

21 were done, what drugs were used, anything you might be

22 able to remember about that? I mean, when you were

23 briefed -- were these medical tests that were done?

24 Were they psychological tests? Were they drug test

25 effects on troops just to give surgeons war

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1 experience? What?

2 A Well, the tests made psychological and

3 physical, you know, because you have preparation for

4 the next war. And for the purpose, of course, they

5 had being doing research for different drugs in

6 [ ]. The physical, I already told you the

7 reason for the heart problem.

8 Q Well, what kind of (inaudible) that you

9 spoke about, now this was determined by autopsies on

10 American soldiers?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Were these battlefield casualties, or people

13 at the hospital, or people who died in prison camps?

14 A Casualties and people who die --

15 Q In the prisons?

16 A -- in prisons. So, they study all kind of

17 the physical, the mental stress, or physical --

18 Q What about drug testing on soldiers?

19 A I think, to me, the most important was the

20 psychological test, Korean and American, however, I

21 believe at the time there were also Australian

22 soldiers there, and some others.

23 Q So, there were others -- U.N. forces or

24 Australians?

25 A Yes, Australians.

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1 Q Was there anyone else there, or you don't
2 know?
3 A I think there were also some -- Australians
4 -- who else was there? There were quite a few
5 Americans and Australians.
6 Q What were the tests that were done? What
7 did you know about them? What were they testing for?
8 A Well, first of all, they test the mental
9 condition of the soldiers when they were captured, not
10 just (inaudible words) -- when they captured them, how
11 was the mental condition for the soldiers who were in
12 battlefield? How was the mental condition after they
13 were prisoners, how it was changed, and they studied -
14 - I don't know the name for the will of soldiers, you
15 know, how strong --
16 Q Determination or will?
17 A Exactly. How did they study them? What
18 types of tests did they use to determine the will of a
19 soldier?
20 A (Inaudible words) -- professional question -
21 - let me think. I'd have to go back to the briefings.
22 Q Well, take your time. I've never been
23 (inaudible) this.
24 A I just remember. I feel (inaudible), I
25 think, like 200 soldiers (inaudible), and then they

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1 put the soldiers to different conditions, you know,
2 separate them from the others. Generally, the
3 soldiers didn't know what happened to them, you know,
4 and I'm thinking what was the name of the drugs which
5 they used.
6 Q If you don't know, sir --
7 A published a book which he called
8 (inaudible), and generally this book -- you know, I
9 just don't know how he named that because I must go
10 through (inaudible), we did it together. Most things
11 which are there are from me, and there is also part
12 about drugs test in Korean War, and I don't have it
13 here. If you want, I have it home, I can bring it.
14 Q Yes. As a matter of fact, I'd like borrow a
15 copy.
16 A Yes, you can look at it. It was just
17 published.
18 Q Do you know who the publisher is?
19 A Pardon me?
20 Q Who is the publisher?
21 A It was some publishing company in Atlanta, I
22 don't know -- I don't remember. But there are some
23 details -- of course, you work on that all year, and
24 someone who just question -- I didn't know what
25 questions you have. I had to bring my notes from my

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1 house.

2 Q Sure, that's fine. Maybe we could talk

3 sometime --

4 A Maybe we can meet again.

5 Q Yes. We'll just go through some of these

6 things, and we can meet again and talk about them.

7 But as you remember them, there were drug tests,

8 actual drug tests done on soldiers --

9 A I'm sorry?

10 Q -- to study their will, reactions, and the

11 effects of war?

12 A Yes.

13 Q And you say at one point there were about

14 200 soldiers you remember?

15 A (Inaudible words) 200 soldiers.

16 Q Okay. So, this is perhaps out of a briefing

17 where they said of 200 soldiers tested, these were the

18 results?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Did they talk about the criteria used for

21 testing -- I mean, white, black, American, Australian?

22 Did they use that as a basis? How were people

23 selected? How were they selected to be subjects for

24 testing as opposed to a regular prison?

25 A For sure they were talking about black and

1 white.

2 Q About their race.

3 A It was one of the major issues, you know,

4 because, you know, under Communist theory, they

5 believe the black will not fight for white Americans.

6 So, they were very much interested to test it but, of

7 course, is difficult to say so because I don't want to

8 be racist, but --

9 Q Yes, but this was the way things were, the

10 way the testing was done.

11 A True is true, know what you can do, and the

12 conclusion was not once but many times, when black

13 soldiers were much more easy to -- for psychologic

14 influence, combination with the drugs, than white

15 Americans. White Americans were more difficult, the

16 will, influence the money and all these things, than

17 were the black soldiers. From that they also

18 developed some theory of what to do in the (inaudible)

19 after Europe, you know, how to separate white and

20 black, and there was no question about that.

21 Q Did they also test people according to

22 officer, enlisted, things like that?

23 A Well, the officers and enlisted men, but

24 they have different groups. For example, they also

25 did different things, but analyses were about soldiers

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1 who were more intelligent, more educated soldiers,
2 than soldiers who were less educated. It was not only
3 black and white.
4 Another thing, of course, for example,
5 study, which you can maybe say was stupid, but they
6 study also the difference of officers -- because
7 (inaudible words) from south.
8 Q South United States?
9 A They believed a preference generals from
10 south. I don't know, but I'm sure they still believe
11 it today. So, they studied this problem.
12 Q The big question that I can think of is when
13 they got the POWs coming to this hospital, did they
14 come from the camps or from the battlefields? How was
15 this determined?
16 A Well, they -- you know, the troops (b)(b)
17 were nothing, but (inaudible) Chinese and Koreans.
18 So, the not just -- there was an agreement with (b)(d)
19 Korea, not just to study the soldiers in the hospital
20 because there were not too many, it was not too big
21 hospital, you know, but they also study the American
22 soldiers injured by the Koreans in the camp, it was
23 agreement. So, the tell the Koreans, okay, (b)(d)
24 they would like to select the people. We would like
25 to study this group of soldiers, and Koreans, of

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1 course, they cooperate, but problem was, you know, if
2 the soldiers were in Korean (inaudible), the (b)(6)
3 cannot control all the treatment every day, then there
4 was problem because if the soldier was in the (b)(6)
5 hospital, it was different things. You made
6 (inaudible) for all day. If it was in Korean
7 hospital, it was (inaudible) and all these things were
8 different, you know, so they were careful when they
9 analyze it, how atmosphere influence soldiers in
10 there.
11 Q The soldiers that were studied in the
12 Korean's hands, were they studied by Korean doctors,
13 or Czechs?
14 A They were doctors. (b)(6)
15 Q So, the Koreans knew that this type of
16 program was going on. They knew something.
17 A Sure, sure, sure.
18 Q So, they did know.
19 A They didn't know the intelligence, but the
20 medical, yes.
21 Q Now, were these tests done, that you can
22 remember, in Korean hospitals, or in the prison camps,
23 or --
24 A I think both -- both -- because different
25 things were soldiers who were wounded and different

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1 soldiers who were just in the prison camp, because
2 they were two different groups, but it was both.
3 Q I don't know if you would say it was a wide-
4 range testing program, as you can remember?
5 A Pardon me?
6 Q Enough to say it was a wide-range testing
7 program, at least as in the hospitals and possibly in
8 the --
9 A Yes.
10 Q The reason I ask is that -- you know,
11 obviously, if you're all the way back in
12 so much gets lost and it's years
13 later, so I want to make sure I get exactly the facts
14 right.
15 A Sure.
16 Q Okay. You said that the reports -- you were
17 briefed about twice a month, just as an average?
18 A Yes, not just the report but, as I told you,
19 there was, for example, it was published -- not
20 (inaudible) -- it was just for the top military and
21 Party, and some records which go to Politburo and
22 Defense Council, some part of it was published for
23 this because they thought, for example, commander of
24 tank troops, he should know how they analyzed drivers
25 of the tanks.

(b)(1)

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1 Q Were these published during the war, or
2 after the war?
3 A Most of these things were published after
4 the war because it takes time to analyze it. They
5 collect material, they exchanged information with
6 Russians, many things were joint theses, doctors
7 and Russian doctors. So, they put together material
8 and make some conclusion.
9 Q The analysis of the study, at least on the
10 paper, went on after the war?
11 A Most of it after the war, yes.
12 Q During the '50s?
13 A Yes, most of them after the war. And during
14 the war, there were more intelligent briefing and
15 information than scientific. But after the war, it
16 take I don't know how many years, and they study
17 different themes.
18 Q How many POWs would you say underwent
19 testing? I mean, you said maybe a figure of 200 for
20 the (inaudible) testing. Overall, over the years of
21 the war, how many -- now, this is just, I guess, your
22 opinion or, if you can remember a fact, but how many
23 would you think underwent -- how many do you
24 speculate?
25 A I tell you, for example, how many -- let's

(b)(1)

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1 see -- (inaudible words) -- because usual they give
2 us -- as I remember, the figures were different from
3 the real -- for the heart, for instance, I would say -
4 - I would say, probably about 800.
5 Q Eight hundred. Let's say the figure 500 to
6 1,000. Did people die as a result of testing? I
7 mean, could that have happened? And if not, what
8 happened? I mean, were they sent back to the camp
9 population? Were they sent back?
10 A What do you -- send back?
11 Q Well, you have 800 POWs who have undergone
12 various types of medical tests. What happens to POWs?
13 A Well, if you get people who were in the
14 hospital because they were really wounded or
15 something, right (inaudible), but if you would get
16 people who were prisoners of the war, who were in the
17 camp, you know, they just go back in the camp because
18 they take him to the hospital for the test maybe every
19 day, or I don't know how often, but he was still in
20 the camp. For example, if they test people how
21 psychologically they are influenced because they are
22 in the camp, so they keep them there. (Inaudible
23 words.)
24 Some test they test the influence of the
25 drugs. For example, (inaudible) the drug which

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1 influence your mind in the decisionmaking process,
2 especially (inaudible words), maybe they took the
3 officers or enlisted men or warrant officers for some
4 reason, to military hospital, tell him some reason,
5 and keep him there ten days or two weeks, depends on
6 how long they need him, and took him back.
7 Q And put him back to the camp population.
8 Send him back.
9 A Send him back. You might understand it was
10 they themself experiment, you know, because (inaudible
11 words), before that it was no such -- except Russians
12 in World War II, but in the World War II studies
13 incredible scientific research. (Inaudible words)
14 scientific decision you die or not for Russia, but
15 right now it was different story, and I must
16 especially the satellites push Russian more than
17 Russian themself.
18 Q Why?
19 A Well, because, the satellites are more --
20 Poland -- they are more intelligent, (b)(6)
21 they are more ahead than Russian primitives. Do you
22 know what I mean?
23 Q I spent five months in Russia.
24 A So, a program which lets a developed
25 in the beginning we had some problems (b)(1)

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1 with the Russians --- you know, why you want to study,
2 and all these things --- and we try to prove them what
3 studies are making the rest, for example --- Germany
4 and (inaudible) --and in the modern world, we have to
5 do especially nuclear war (inaudible words).
6 Q Well, we can talk again. I wanted to ask
7 you --just to go back to the drug testing and POWs, I
8 was an American officer in a POW camp, and I'm
9 thinking for some reason you're going to go to the
10 hospital for a checkup, there for a few weeks, and I
11 know maybe some drug testing was done on me.
12 Now, after the drug testing was done -- ten
13 days, two weeks, maybe six months, whatever --
14 A They send you back.
15 Q They send me back to the camp. Were any
16 prisoners ever -- you know, did they die under the
17 drug testing, or executed? The reason I ask is
18 because, you know, this was a different time in the
19 '50s, but we still don't hear many stories about drug
20 testing going on, and if people come back into the
21 camps, it's logical that we're going to hear about it
22 when they come out. So, this is what is confusing.
23 A (Inaudible words) -- I'm sure that some
24 prisoners are still alive, no?
25 Q Yes, sure.

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1 A You can talk to them. Maybe some of them --

2 Q Okay, but if any died under the program --

3 A Yes, they were, they were, and I'm just

4 thinking -- (inaudible words) -- there were some heart

5 failure, collapse. They were -- but these things --

6 they were some people, some soldiers who -- I mean,

7 just thinking how many, who had just -- (inaudible)

8 brain damage, and they say they must eliminate them,

9 so they were actually reported like missing in action.

10 I remember when the doctor come back and he

11 was in Collegium of Ministers, and just (inaudible

12 words). He reported in his briefing -- because they -

13 - they never took the documents they die because of

14 high dosage or damage to brain.

15 I am trying to remember if his briefing --

16 for questioning -- Deputy Minister General (inaudible)

17 was a very (inaudible words) --

18 Q Who is this now?

19 A (Inaudible), he said who cares how many

20 American soldiers die. It is better to know now than

21 be too late. I must say, nobody (inaudible) American

22 soldiers. I tell you that (inaudible) -- it was not

23 too many. I think it was like 12 soldiers or

24 something. It was not -- (tape side ended)

25 Q So, you said the ones that maybe had brain

1 damage and that were not going to be sent back home,
2 were not (inaudible words) five, fifty, or even --
3 A I think I told you I have to look at some of
4 my notes, if you want --
5 Q I do, very much.
6 A And then you come back next -- because I
7 didn't know your questions.
8 Q Okay.
9 A I have to look at my notes, but I know for
10 the heart problem, I'm positive it was -- I don't know
11 -- 12, 14, something like that.
12 Q Died during testing?
13 A Yes. Not too much. Of course, there was
14 not problem. The heart collapse and that's it, you
15 die. But the brain damage --
16 Q But these are people whose hearts collapsed
17 and died as a result of testing?
18 A Yes.
19 Q They tried different drugs, the heart
20 collapsed. Okay. For brain damage, you said there
21 were more. Let's say there were more -- 10, 20, 30?
22 A It was more. It was much more, because for
23 them was very important, for example, influence of the
24 thinking -- you know, the decisionmaking process,
25 especially for officers. So, they really experiment

1 very hard.

2 Q Do you think it's over a hundred?

3 A I tell you let me look at the notes. I

4 don't want to --

5 Q Sure. Okay. The ones who died though, they

6 were in the hospital? They weren't shipped back to

7 the Soviet Union and [ ] were they?

8 A No, no, no.

9 Q So, they are buried somewhere there?

10 A They are buried.

11 Q Okay. I'm just about done.

12 A Of course, after they died, they still did

13 look at many --

14 Q Did autopsies?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Autopsies were then done subsequent to those

17 who died?

18 A Yes.

19 Q You mentioned about they knew about it, and

20 I think you also said the Polish representative there.

21 Ruras, did he know about this?

22 A I don't know how much he knows. I'm just

23 telling you he was like the Intelligence Officer,

24 Polish Intelligence Officer. If you want, I can call

25 him. We are good friends.

(6)(6)

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1 Q Okay. Well, just hold that till next time
2 we speak. I'll probably ask you --
3 A I can call him and make arrangement for you
4 very easy.
5 Q I'd like that, but let me read the book and
6 see all that's written down.
7 A He was there, and I think he was back even
8 after the war. He was pretty well in the Korean
9 business.
10 Q Intelligence Officer.
11 A Yes. How much he knows -- he was in the
12 Polish mission in -- what was the name?
13 Q Seoul or Panmunjom?
14 A Yes, you might say the Americans other side
15 --
16 Q The north side?
17 A He was on the north side. He was in the
18 international commission or how they call it?
19 Q The U.N. Armistice Commission?
20 A No, no, the U.N. The U.N. established some
21 five country -- different country -- Poland was one of
22 them -- (inaudible) -- he was one of them and they
23 ordered to (inaudible) business with Americans and
24 drugs.
25 Q That's interesting. Do you think -- what

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1 did you mean, they also started to make some business
2 with drugs?
3 A Sells drugs, change drugs for information.
4 Q With the Americans?
5 A Yes. I remember there was one guy whose
6 name was Colonel Borsky (phonetic), he was originally
7 from Russian front, and when he revolted, he said it
8 is much easy to regulate western soldiers and
9 especially American -- I don't mean just (inaudible
10 words) -- through drugs than through woman -- you
11 know, the old style (inaudible) or whatever. So, he
12 recommended to use much more drugs in intelligence
13 services.
14 Q And this guy was a colonel? (b)(6)
15 A A colonel. He was also in the U.N. (b)(6)
16 mission in (inaudible words) --
17 Q Panmunjom?
18 A Yes.
19 Q And you also said that after that drugs were
20 being sold to recruit people?
21 A Oh, yes, Colonel Borsky -- Colonel Borsky.
22 Q This was to soldiers, or POWs, or both?
23 A I gave (inaudible words) -- no, no, no, not
24 prisoners of the war, regular soldiers, each date of
25 contact. They would change some drugs for weapons

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1 because they want -- they play big deal, you know,
2 because maybe you can buy (inaudible words), because
3 they change (inaudible), it was espionage, make
4 themselves successful.
5 Q These are basically the soldiers that they
6 had contact with?
7 A Yes.
8 Q Well, that will be interested. I'm sure
9 someone is going to be interested in talking about
10 that one.
11 But did and Soviet diplomatic (b)(6)
12 representatives -- I mean, there were diplomats in
13 Korea at the time. Do you think they had knowledge of
14 this program, or was it strictly by the military
15 intelligence?
16 A I can tell you something. At that time in
17 the war, Korean War, as far as I know -- I cannot
18 speak for (inaudible words) or whatever -- but talking
19 about Soviets and all the guys that are all (b)(6)
20 GRU or KGB, there was no one Korean diplomat.
21 Q But even as GRU and KGB, did they have
22 access to the program? Did they know about this?
23 A Some. Some, probably like Batkla, he was
24 the top boss. How many others at the embassy -- I
25 mean, all of them know there is the hospital, but I

1 don't think all of them know about the scientific
2 problem, about the research. It was strictly a few
3 people.
4 Q If they all knew about the hospital, was it
5 like a military hospital, or even what it was (b)(6)
6 called, by any chance?
7 A What was the name?
8 Q Yes.
9 A I think it was the friendship.
10 Q Korean friendship. There were a lot - (b)(6)
11 of those.
12 A Yes, but everybody knows -- I mean, the
13 who were there and in in this military (b)(6)
14 hospital. All the doctors were military.
15 Q When you were Political Commissar of the
16 Engineer Corps, troops, or what?
17 A First Brigade, and then all the Engineer
18 Corps.
19 Q Right, Engineer Corps. Did engineers (b)(6)
20 build this hospital, or was it Koreans?
21 A The leaders or whatever, they were (b)(6)
22 Some workers were Koreans. The men who were workers.
23 Q Can you --
24 A Because we had engineer troops with
25 experience. For example, we were in charge of

1 building the (Inaudible) for Politburo and Defense
2 Council next to I have political (b)(1)
3 responsibility for it, and (inaudible words) hospital.
4 It was two stories, 50 meters, underground in rock
5 areas. No one (inaudible) can destroy it. And it was
6 for Defense Council and military leadership. From
7 that they directed troops. (b)(1)
8 Q Is there any other agencies or people that
9 you can remember off-hand that were involved in the
10 program that knew about it, that might have
11 information on it?
12 A You mean in (b)(1)
13 Q Soviet Union, U.S., (b)(1)
14 anyplace?
15 A As I told you, except Health Administration
16 -- I'm thinking of the name of the commander at that
17 time -- General (inaudible) -- of course, all
18 information is controlled from security -- the best
19 information of military contractors.
20 Q Under the Ministry of Interior.
21 A Because they control the scientists, they
22 control everything, and they had major responsibility.
23 Q In the same thing like us, I (b)(1)
24 guess the records are archived and stuff like that,
25 and packed away in libraries and things like that.

1 So, the military counterintelligence no longer exists
2 under BMOI (phonetic), is it?
3 A No, they are now under Minister of Defense.
4 Q Are there areas where you would think -- if
5 you were looking at this problem now, what would you
6 say were areas that you would think these people
7 published reports, or they'd publish reports and they
8 should know about it, and that kind of thing?
9 A Well, I tell you what, if you go to
10 you want to find out. To me, (b)(1)
11 I would start, if I go there, with archive of Minister
12 of Defense. At that time, before it was established -
13 - in the beginning of the war, there will be probably
14 not too many papers because everything was decided not
15 by individual like Secretary General of the Communist
16 Party, the Prime Minister of Defense (inaudible), he
17 was the most powerful man because he married daughter
18 of the Secretary General -- you know -- so many
19 things were made by direct order.
20 Later on, some things should go to, as they
21 call it, Council of Defense -- these were just three
22 people -- Secretary General, Minister of Defense, and
23 Premier Minister -- and they make the major decision.
24 But I tell you something, when I was
25 appointed the Secretary or Chief of Cabinet of

1 Minister of Defense, there was archive of the former
2 minister who was fired and, unfortunately, many things
3 he burned before he left the office, you know, because
4 he had experience already what happen in Russia. But
5 still there were many safes which were full of
6 documents, and I go through some of them, and there
7 were very, very interesting top secret things --
8 communication between the Russians and and such (B)(1)
9 -- and also about people who were executed without
10 trial, and all these things -- was about this --
11 Q Did this program have a name of any type,
12 such-and-such program?
13 A Yes, the program is named. It was -- how to
14 say it in English -- was Analysis of -- Analysis of
15 Human (inaudible).
16 Q Analysis of Human (inaudible). That was the
17 cover name for the program?
18 A Yes. So, (inaudible), and I took the worst
19 cases and I go to First Secretary at that time, and I
20 ask him investigate. When I come back to my office,
21 the KGB took everything. I never saw it. Simply, I
22 close the door and talk with the Minister and, when I
23 come back, everything disappear. Where they took it,
24 I don't know, but what I'm saying is, the best things
25 would probably look at archives because I don't know

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1 the archives of Central Committee, if it is property
2 still of the Communist Party or not. I don't know
3 what is today the status.
4 Q Not to mention what has probably been
5 destroyed.
6 A Yes. Well, for sure, the archive of
7 Minister of Defense which were -- must be some reports
8 which minister sent to Defense Council.
9 Q What about Central Military Hospital, would
10 they have kept records over the years?
11 A I don't think so. Maybe they -- I don't
12 know. I'm sorry, I don't know, but that time, because
13 it was generally top secret, you know, it was at the
14 Ministry of Defense.
15 Q That's running out. The number is -- is
16 there anything else you can think of that might be
17 interesting on this?
18 A I told you about the Russians' operation
19 (inaudible).
20 Q There is one thing I can think of that maybe
21 I didn't cover. Was there any transportation, any
22 movement of POWs, that you ever heard about, or saw,
23 or knew about? I mean, were they ever taken out of
24 Korea? Were POWs ever transported out of Korea?
25 A Not to Not to (b)(1)

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1 If to Russia, I don't know, you know. (b)(1)
2 I wouldn't be surprised if not, because Russians, you
3 know, but not to (b)(1)
4 Q Okay. And to the Soviet Union, you don't
5 know.
6 A I don't know. I never heard that.
7 Q Some of the tests that you mentioned --
8 let's say, the tests were a year long, and then the
9 analysis continued afterwards. Would you -- this is
10 all just speculation -- say that they were taken
11 anyplace while the tests continued, towards the latter
12 part and maybe after the war? I wouldn't think that
13 they would keep a testing program going, that wouldn't
14 make sense.
15 A Well, I think, Colonel, I think it didn't
16 stop same day when the war stopped. It is no good
17 (inaudible words), you know, and it take time before
18 it was turned to Koreans, the hospital, because before
19 they turn it to them, they clean everything because
20 they don't want to give it to them. But not long
21 after the war, I would say so, before it was turned to
22 Koreans because I know they want to finish some
23 research. So, it is why some doctors stay there
24 three-four months more, you know, to finish it. And
25 it took probably, I would say, ten months-one year.

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1 Q And the prisoners, to the best of our
2 knowledge, were repatriated in '53. So, if it took
3 six to eight months afterward, something like that --
4 ten months, as you say -- would they still have been
5 working on POWs, or just concluding observations and
6 research and writing?
7 A Well, concluding observations, to finish
8 with some Korean soldiers -- you know, Korea let us do
9 that.
10 Q (Inaudible) South Korean soldiers, or North
11 Korean soldiers?
12 A South.
13 Q Yes, obviously South Korean soldiers.
14 A Yes. They let us do that. I think it
15 continued a few months after the war, still continued.
16 Q Would you think -- the question is, would
17 you think that there were any U.N. POWs there after
18 the war, after their repatriation, or if they got them
19 all out before?
20 A I think there were still some soldiers
21 because question was, as I remember, what to do with
22 them because they were in that process, and
23 (inaudible) like sick people, and they didn't want to
24 do that, you know? So, the question was, what to
25 (inaudible), take them to or turn them

(b)(1)

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1 to Koreans (inaudible words). And at that time
2 (inaudible words) decision was it's impossible to take
3 them to So, they return to North
4 Koreans.
5 Q To the best of your knowledge, what do you
6 think (inaudible) should have been done?
7 A (Inaudible)
8 Q This is after the war. Say, after the war,
9 there was a group, the tests concluded a few months
10 after the war, and they said "We can't take these to
11 Do we give them to the North Koreans?
12 Give them back to the Americans?"
13 A Yes, they can do what they want. I mean,
14 generally, they do what the Soviets recommended
15 because, if United States blame North Korea, okay,
16 they were together in the war, who cares? The
17 decision was turn them to Koreans.
18 Q And, generally, the Soviets (inaudible
19 words) responsibility of dealing with these people, is
20 that correct --let the North Koreans deal with their
21 problem?
22 A Exactly. The Soviets didn't want any
23 responsibility for that.
24 Q (Inaudible)
25 A No.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

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1 Q You think we're talking one, ten people, or
2 you don't know?
3 A I think (inaudible words). I remember they
4 mention also how many Soviets they had, but I think
5 had like seven soldiers -- I think
6 seven or eight -- it was not more than ten.
7 Q And the Soviets?
8 A What?
9 Q Soviets?
10 A Soviets have more, but I tell -- I just know
11 the report of GRU, when it was discussed, they said
12 the Soviets had more and they will do same things, but
13 I don't know -- I never saw -- but they will do same
14 things.
15 Q Okay. Thank you.
16 A And it was, you know, discussion about
17 soldiers, if it will be possible to let them
18 (inaudible words), and they said it is impossible
19 because you don't know what will be future -- farther
20 effect on brain -- you know, these people are not --
21 Q (Inaudible words).
22 A -- normal.
23 Q Normal.
24 A So, be some (inaudible) in United States
25 which nobody will do.

(b)(1)

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1 Q Okay. When you came out sometime ago, were
2 you asked about this when you talked?
3 A I talked about some, but I tell nobody I
4 have even copy of written record about the
5 (inaudible), the drugs and these things, and nobody
6 talk to me. I think it was -- you know, I did not at
7 that time chance to talk to somebody like you, who
8 does research or this thing, and people who are
9 (inaudible) business, they don't care too much whether
10 ten-twenty years -- they want to know who is agent
11 today and all this stuff. But I have even some copy
12 of the record which I --
13 Q Can I ask you, maybe next time we meet, I
14 can ask you to bring a copy of that with you?
15 A I will look for that thing in my mess
16 because, you know, nobody was interested, and many
17 times I clean my shelves, and nobody is interested
18 (inaudible), you know, but like these things about the
19 drugs, maybe (inaudible) --
20 Q Well, we'll talk to you.
21 A -- because I know I brought it to you -- you
22 know --
23 Q Okay. I keep my interest in this very
24 discreet. Let's work a little more on this, and get a
25 lot more down on paper.

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1 A Sure, sure. You can think -- you know, I
2 will think more because, as I say, I didn't know the
3 question, and what will be good, really, if you can
4 read at least that part about the book.
5 Q This book was based, I guess, on your notes,
6 or a lot of it on your notes.
7 A Yes.
8 Q I understand.
9 A And it was, as I know, (inaudible) to (b)(1)
10 give it to (inaudible), who is the Assistant to
11 Secretary Advisor, he give it to twice. They (b)(1)
12 didn't have any objection to publish it.
13 Q All right. Tell you what, I will get my
14 hands on the book. I'll prepare just a couple of --
15 some information points, and I'll drop it off to you.
16 Maybe I'd ask you some looking in your notes, and then
17 we can meet again in another week or so.
18 A Sure. I know that my -- as I told you, my
19 (inaudible words) over weekend, and whatever I find --
20 because then (inaudible) that I wrote many names and
21 facts, you know, in the evening when I sit down, and --
22
23 Q (Inaudible words).
24 A I have good memory on what happened in the
25 meetings. I'm not very good about dates, you know,

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1 but, you know, you have almost every day some
2 meetings. It is difficult to -- somebody tell you,
3 was it in May or -- I know it was in the Spring, '65
4 or something, but whether it was May 5th or 10th --
5 Q Sometimes it's just easier to remember, you
6 know, spring, winter, summer -- that's easy to
7 remember.
8 A It is easy, yes, because you know what
9 happened, and it was that time and so, but if you go
10 to Collegium, Minister of Defense comes there,
11 Parliament -- you know --QI know we're talking 40
12 years, I know.
13 A Yes, so many meetings, and it's not easy.
14 But, anyway, I will do these things. If you want to
15 buy the book, I don't know where they exactly sell it.
16 Q I think I've seen it. It has a red cover
17 with black letters on it.
18 A I don't know, but --
19 Q I'll find it.
20 A Let me know when I can (inaudible words).
21 Q Okay. Great. Okay, it's 10:00 o'clock.
22 : -- concluded at 10:03 a.m., Tuesday,
23 May 7th, 1991, at Bolling Air Force Base, Building 4)

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2/10/81 - JN - [illegible]

[TAPE 1, SIDE A, in here]:

[Transcriber Note: At least five different debriefers involved. No attempt made to distinguish among them. Unfortunately, since Source is located far away from the microphone, he is hard to hear and understand. On the other hand, the main debriefer comes through loud and clear (and he is American)].

[Debriefer]: Yesterday, you said in your lecture that, I think that it was some time in the '60s, there was an integrated intelligence service, OK, that protocols had been signed by all the Bloc [blocked by next]

[Source]: '65.

[Debriefer]: '65, OK. When that protocol was signed for the integrated intelligence services, was there any part of that that outlined specifics, like would the narcotics element or aspect have been involved in that protocol? Was it just sort of an overview, a general [blocked by next]

[Source]: General agreement. Actually, what they did already before was put on the legal base.

[Debriefer]: Legalized operating charter?

[Source]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: Whose charter was it?

[Source]: Who prepared or who. . . Soviet Union.

[Debriefer]: Yeah, but it was a party document?

[Source]: No, it was signed by. . . Before the Soviets send it to party, they prove it. And, after then, it was. . . In the document I believe they mention it, I think it was chief of the intelligence services, and they signed the document.

[Debriefer]: OK, all right.

[Source]: Except Rumania.

[Debriefer]: I'm sorry. I wasn't here.

[Debriefer]: Except Rumania?

[Source]: Except Rumania. They say, actually, the Moscow is the center. The satellites participate and participate in the intelligence strategy, intelligence operations, tactical, they participate on the development of the technology, they participate on the analysis, and all these things.

[Debriefer]: There was an agreement to cooperate, but with. . . in the protocol they all signed, was there any reference to joint operations?

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[Source]: Joint operations? Sure. The whole document was about joint operations. I mean, all operations now are joint operations.

[Debriefer]: You mean subordinate level?

[Debriefer]: Well, it was my opinion, like when the Soviets conduct any kind of intelligence or reconnaissance operation, KGB, GRU operations, with the bloc, there is Soviet control, but the operation isn't conducted by a joint element. In other words, it would be just the East Germans conducting an operation that may have gotten Soviet [blocked by next]

[Source]: Oh, well, it depends on how you call joint operation. If you think they say they cooperate on the strategic operation, operation, and so, of course, they don't say in this protocol such an operation is joint operation, because the protocol doesn't know what operations will be next 5 years or 10 years, you know. But, generally, any operation is joint operation. It doesn't matter one [redacted] and Russian agent do that, but from Soviet Union are the directives. Actually, the others join the Soviet Union, you know? It is what I mean when I say everything is joint operation anyway.

[Debriefer]: Joint is not necessarily integrated. You're talking about integrated. They don't integrate.

[Source]: But, after then, they tell [redacted] you operate there, the [2G] there, and they do themselves, you know? Soviets just control it.

[Debriefer]: I think the key word is directives, just like directives for the broad [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Yeah. While we're on the subject, did you ever hear at any time of any sort of integrated arrangement where they would operate together? I would think not.

[Source]: They call it integrated intelligence system.

[Debriefer]: Yeah, but not at the operational level.

[Source]: But, the operational level [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: It would be too complicated.

[Source]: They are that they cooperate in that there are advisors. For example, if Soviets give you instruction for the plan for next year, because everything is long-term, 5 years and longer, so, let's say, they call the chief of General Staff, I'm talking about GRU, and intelligence chief of GRU to Moscow maybe in June or July and tell you for the next year these are the directives. This you do yourself, this you do with us, this visit at Budapest and you will cooperate with the Hungarians, here you will cooperate with Poland. So, the chief of GRU is in Budapest or they visited you and you put together plan how you will cooperate in such an operation.

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SECRET NOFORN

[Debriefer]: Yeah. And, you had your advisors.

[Source]: Soviet advisors?

[Debriefer]: Yeah.

[Source]: Sure.

[Debriefer]: At various levels.

[Source]: When I defected, in [redacted] there were military advisors and half of them were [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: What date was this, [redacted]

[Debriefer]: The protocol?

[Debriefer]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: '65.

[Source]: '65.

[Debriefer]: Oh, '65. I'm sorry. I misheard.

[Source]: So, most of them were in the intelligence service, you know, because, before KHRUSHCHEV, they were from regiment [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Yeah, I remember. I just misheard the [blocked by next]

[Source]: But, later on, they were just on the top and in the intelligence services. Here it is somewhere.

[Debriefer]: I just didn't hear the year, [redacted], that's all. (b)(3)

[Source]: OK, go ahead. I will look for it.

[Debriefer]: [redacted] as you're looking through there, may I ask a question? As an operation is unfolding, say its being carried out by the. . . The Russians have told the East Germans or the Poles to carry out an operation [blocked by next]

[Source]: I'm sorry.

[Debriefer]: Go ahead.

[Source]: It was October '64.

[Debriefer]: October '64?

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[Source]: "The major principles of the cooperation between intelligence services of the states of Warsaw Pact were decided by the protocol of the conference of chiefs of intelligence services October 3, 1964 and bilateral agreements between Czech intelligence services and Soviet Union, Poland, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria." Not Rumania.

[Debriefer]: How long before that protocol was established, [redacted] had the bilateral agreement with [redacted] been established? Do you know?

[Source]: It was since 1950, when they cleaned the intelligence services, because there were still bourgeois officers. So, between '48 and '50 was clean-up and, after then, they started. I'm sorry I interrupted.

[Debriefer]: That's all right, [redacted] Thanks. If the Russians had said to the East Germans, you carry out such and such an operation, presumably, as that operation was being carried out, there would be reporting requirements, right, back to the Russians on how the operations went? How did that. . . how would that work in reality? Who would be reporting to whom?

[Source]: In the everyday practice, for example, I know best the military, GRU, because I was not in KGB, here you have office of chief of GRU and here is office of the Soviet advisor. The doors are open. He can go anytime and listen and take what he want. Any major sections there are also advisors. United States, Canada, and so and so. So, these guys generally are informed every day about the routine. Otherwise, if it is operation what. . . An example, what to say? Some, as you say, where they say OK, you, [redacted] East Germany, you have a such a task in Latin America, because Soviets did lot through East Germany in Latin America. That operation should be finished by July, I don't know what. So, when it is in the process, the advisor control it. Once it is finish or something else is important, the chief of GRU has his channel to Soviet Union or, if it through different calls or send courier there, he must send message or today they have already computers, because they already start when I was there, so they have actually double information. One is through advisor and other directly responsibility of chief of GRU through the chief of GRU of Soviet Union.

[Debriefer]: You're talking about at least two levels of advisors in the old days? At least two levels in GRU?

[Source]: Yeah. One the boss and other the major sections.

[Debriefer]: And, did not the advisor have some sort of a role like a governor on a car to run the day-to-day operations, if he wanted to?

[Source]: Oh, sure. He is the boss. For example, when we had. . . I will tell you about this information how they is passed. The [redacted] leadership which is led every day morning, you have Secretary General and Premier Minister has on the table an information, written information, what happened last day. Important things, not small things. Otherwise, Minister of Defense he goes every. . . I don't know today GORBACHEV part, but it was written KHRUSHCHEV, BREZHNEV, every Monday afternoon to Secretary General, give them part of

his report to him, his intelligence services, service operation, and operational-strategic importance. When operation is finished, sometimes it is very important also in the process, the Minister of Defense and chief of KGB, they must reported at Defense Council. Otherwise, Defense Council got every 6 months a report, because they prove the plan for next year. After 6 months, when the plan proceed, they got report how it proceed and, when the year was over, before they prove new plan, they get the report how they achieve the goals in the old plan. If it is some special operation, Soviets also can send special officers from GRU or KGB who directed the operation, if it is. . . For example, Hungarian revolution or Polish GOMULKA when he was there. They send directly officers, because they directed [redacted] to operate in Poland against GOMULKA at that time and the guy was sitting directly there, in the headquarter, and the situation was how he directed the operation. (b)(6)

[Debriefer]: They did the same thing in Hungary, too?

[Source]: Yeah, it was same thing.

[Debriefer]: So, you had a switching of a portion of the mission on the errant little brothers, bring them back into line!

[Debriefer]: [redacted] I wanted to ask you a question about some things in your article that you wrote on the Soviets and drugs. You mentioned a joint military-civilian study with Soviets, [redacted], and North Koreans looking at the American experience of American troops with drugs in the Korean War. I was wondering if you could give us some more details on that study? (b)(6) (b)(6)

[Source]: First of all, I want to tell you something then before I start, because I know some people say this, I'm sorry, because we are morally in this bullshit, but I [2G] don't cut too much, because it took United States at least 3 years to find out that Defense Council exist and almost 20 years China-Russian problem exist. Actually, I cannot have job from [2G], because Mister ANGLETON came to conclusion I was sent here like influential agent, because I said there is confict between China and Soviet Union. So, in the beginning, it hurt me. Not any more. I want to show you just. . . I cannot find the article, because we just move and I am not organized. I mentioned the drug business. [redacted] [phonetic], who was Korea when was the Korean War, criticized the work of Korean intelligence services, mostly prostitute and alcohol, only he suggested to use drugs instead of dollars, because they are they are cheaper and more effective. It was when Korea already was in progress.

[Debriefer]: This is [redacted]

[Source]: I didn't write these things, ladies and gentlemen. This was written in 1970 by the man who interrogate me. Thanks God because I take copy!

[Debriefer]: When your case officer was debriefing you?

[Source]: Yes. I have other document which I have to find where I mention also that. Nobody never talked to me. It is not my fault. If JOE DOUGLASS

wouldn't call me and said: "[redacted] can you tell me something." I will completely forgot it. I have to tell you same was about the training of sabotage and terrorists, 1971. These articles that I already mentioned, nobody never talked to me. It is not my fault. I am sorry. Now, about the Korean War. I tell you what happened. [redacted] built in Korea when was the war hospital, military hospital. ([redacted] sent there doctors for practice to take care about wounded people, care people, and so and so, prepare themself for the war. After the war, they did, they took time and for the Soviets also. The first report was presented to Collegium of minister, minister and top 10 highest people, I think sometime in October '56, I'm not very good especially about that. You know, it is so many years, but I think it was sometime in the fall. In '57 they presented other report to Defense Council. On that report to Collegium of Minister of Defense were presented four military doctors. At that time, the [redacted] phonetic], who was deputy chief of the Medical Administration of the Rear Service, and [redacted] I always mixed [redacted] and [redacted] both phonetic]. They were two colonels. Doctor [redacted], who was head of the Department of the Central Military Hospital take care about heart trouble, study the heart and these things.

[Debriefer]: Cardiologist, yeah.

[Source]: He was experienced man, because he was already in the [IG] course in the Soviet Union, officer who came to [redacted] Actually, he was [IG] [redacted] from the Soviet territory. They sent officers to that course. [redacted] [phonetic], who was psychiatrist, take care about nerves problem, also head of the department in the Central Military Hospital, and one other gentleman, lieutenant colonel, I don't remember his name. They give first time briefing to Collegium of minister. It was not just about Korea. What they did. . . Actually, the analysis about Korea probably was finished before. I don't know, I was not there. I got the job in May of '56. But, what they did, they generally represented to Collegium of minister analysis about the physical and mental problems of the NATO soldiers, NATO troops, including United States. Where they are strong, where they are weak, and so and so. To prove the weak part, it said the political things like blacks will not fight and this Marxism there. They include the health problem, physical and mental problem, influenced by, first of all, the system, the pressure to the young people, in schools, when they have job, unemployment, and all this baloney.

[Debriefer]: Stress factors?

[Source]: Yeah. The chemicals in the food, not very good chemically, and so on, and drugs. What influence is this on the mental, physical, and hard drugs. They say, and I remember it like today, when they check the killed soldiers, the United States soldiers, 22 percent had so-called mini-heart attack. For this reason, the stress, the things, the chemical things in the food, and drugs.

[Debriefer]: After autopsies?

[Source]: Autopsy, yeah.

[Debriefer]: Twenty-two percent?

[Source]: Twenty-two percent young American soldiers has so-called mini-heart attack. It was. . . . If he lied, I was not in Korea. This was evidence what they got when they had autopsy and so and so. Now, the Collegium of minister they decided to, because they were very excited about it, too. I think they got 6 or 8 months study what possibility [redacted] has to use these drugs to make the enemy weaker.

[Debriefer]: Did they make any distinction between the American and some of the other allied troops who were fighting in Korea? Do you recall it? Because there were a few.

[Source]: Not. . . . I just know they said in the Korean soldiers 2 percent. They covered the Americans, because this was the most biggest crisis. Two percent Koreans and 22 percent Americans. So, the Collegium give order to [redacted] appointed him head of the group that is supposed to study how [redacted] can effectively use this weapons against the imperialists and, the same time, I realize later the Soviets did actually same things the [redacted] participated in.

[Debriefer]: But, it was a [redacted] initiative?

[Source]: No, I don't think so.

[Debriefer]: I mean the reporting. The reporting was a [redacted] initiative? That's a question.

[Source]: It was, JIM, part of the plan for Collegium. Where was the initiative I don't know, but, as far I know, I tell you, after this meeting, for example, we had meeting of Defense Council, I think next month, because sometimes everything was twice a month and sometimes just once if Secretary General was somewhere. We had meeting of Defense Council and minister, my minister, told NOVOTNY that this was very interesting discussion in Collegium and I give them order study and presented and I will presented it next year to the Defense Council. This is 1967 and. . .Nope, it was coffee break and it was always interesting, because you learn a lot, and First Secretary and Minister of Interior, who is [redacted] KGB, and they started to discuss it and they said, Minister of Interior said: "You know, when the Soviets, the comrades. start to think about these things, [redacted] who was a member of Politburo, [redacted] she asked the Chinese counterpart for experience, because the Chinese they were involved for a long time and Chinese refused to share their experience.

[Debriefer]: This is the comment by the Minister of the Interior during tea break?

[Source]: During coffee break, my minister told NOVOTNY. I was present at these things, you know, so it means from that I can the Soviets [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: It had come up before?

[Source]: What they did before, you know, because [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: From [redacted]

[Source]: Yeah. They have to have from Chinese experience and Chinese. They were mad, because Chinese said no.

[Debriefer]: This is Madame [redacted] that we are referring to?

[Source]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: Very interesting!

[Debriefer]: And that was uring the Korean War that they had asked?

[Source]: No. I don't know when they asked exactly. This was [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: At some time previous to this.

[Source]: Some time in November or just before November. No, it must be sometime before [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: So, its one-upsmanship on the part of. . . OK.

[Source]: Apparently it was different story, you know, but [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Did the doctors. . . When the doctors presented this very logical study, clinical study, not necessarily aimed at anything, just reporting, narrative reporting, did they say anything about source of drugs or did they have no information?

[Source]: Where from were the drugs? No, they didn't tell. It was not intelligence report. It was strictly professional report with the help of enemy soldiers.

[Debriefer]: [redacted], did you ever hear where the [redacted] built this hospital in North Korea? You mentioned they built it during the Korean War.

[Source]: No.

[Debriefer]: Probably as a gift to the North Koreans.

[Debriefer]: It may have been a mobile [hospital] for that matter.

[Source]: At that time was the. . . They did it. . . One major purpose was to train the doctors.

[Debriefer]: Who was it? Was it [redacted] or what was the man's name that you used initially.

[Source]: [redacted] was the head of the [redacted] delegation after war in the neutral zone. [redacted]. He is always from the east. But, that timewho was in Korea officially was ambassador, deputy chief of [redacted] military intelligence [redacted] [phonetic]. Later on, he was general. He was officially ambassador in Korea and he was in charge about all operations, you know. The GRU completely controlled it.

[Debriefer]: So, from the interior minister came the word that Soviets had made an attempt to get out of the Chinese something and they got turned out?

[Source]: Chinese turned them down. They were very mad.

[Debriefer]: But, they had. . . They were very mad. Who?

[Source]: The Soviets.

[Debriefer]: OK.

[Source]: And [redacted] also. [redacted] was. And, [redacted] I tell you, he. . . was cautious, more careful, but [redacted] he wants to push a lot. He was a very radical man, so he said. . . Because [redacted] said we have to wait for Soviet comrades, because I send [redacted] to Soviet Union and so and so and [redacted] said what for we have to wait? We have some. . . our operations for our major things. If Soviets. . . under the Soviets direction we should do this, this, and we can start. Why we have to wait?

[Debriefer]: Can you comment in any way at all, the slightest connection, how would the Soviets have. . . would they have assumed that the Chinese had been doing this?

[Source]: No, they know that.

[Debriefer]: They know that.

[Source]: At this time were Soviet advisors there.

[Debriefer]: OK. All right. OK.

[Source]: They were still there. After then, they kicked them out. It is why they asked them. They were absolutely positive the Chinese were already ahead.

[Debriefer]: Were there any [redacted] on the other side of the line, other than the support people, logistics?

[Source]: In Korea?

[Debriefer]: Yeah.

[Source]: No.

[Debriefer]: OK, all right. But, they were taking care of both Chinese and North Koreans or were the Chinese being stand-offish about that, too?

[Source]: No, Chinese they don't, but, as far I know, they reported they took care about Koreans and Americans and Australians and those.

[Debriefer]: But, the Soviets had advisors with the North Koreans?

[Source]: Oh, oh. Yeah.

[Debriefer]: They also had them with the Chinese?

[Source]: I have to mention that [redacted] said the Koreans are much more cooperative than Chinese, because that time Koreans were still very good friends of Soviet Union. Later on, they [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: They were also in the barrel, too, more.

[Source]: Yeah. They didn't like Chinese the Koreans so it is just one thing what I heard. They are much more cooperative with the [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: So, you knew nothing about the Soviet-Chinese connection?

[Source]: No, no. What do you mean connections?

[Debriefer]: Well, in the same vein, with liaison people with the Chinese?

[Source]: No. I just know what later on they criticized them. The KGB very much monitored the traffic how Chinese to do that [2G] [redacted] and all these things. But, I don't anything if Chinese give them something or not.

[Debriefer]: Or whether they had advisors or not?

[Source]: No.

[Debriefer]: OK.

[Debriefer]: [redacted] would it be fair to say that the Chinese use of drugs as a strategic weapon became an intelligence target for the KGB? To find out more about it?

[Source]: Yes, it was. It was, because, I don't know, it was like they many times even mentioned how much it represented, you know, I think you mentioned it in some article. Also, they asked [redacted] intelligence service in some states to also monitor if they had possibility the Chinese and North Koreans involvement in drug business.

[Debriefer]: So, they were operating against those allies as well?

[Source]: Because I think the Soviets already are fearing about China. It started when MAO TZE-TUNG asked for Mongolia and STALIN said no. Ater then, MAO TZE-TUNG asked [XG] and he said no, so it was no question about that. There is some development, not very pleasant.

[Debriefer]: You want to go on with the narrative?

[Debriefer]: Let's go back again to the article that he wrote with Mister DOUGLASS when you mentioned that, between '56 and '60, the Soviets, it mentions in the article anyway, spent 4 years developing production techniques, marketing strategies, tactics, training intelligence cadres for operations, this was in the drug area. Could you tell us if you on this production techniques, do you know which types of drugs the Soviets or any Eastern European countries were investigating in particular and do you which organizations or maybe research facilities might have been involved in this?

[Source]: I can tell you not all of them, because I am not scientist and specialist for that, but like LSD and these drugs. These things are what I remember. I dont' remember talking about all these things. I don't know. But, I can tell you about the centers, the research centers. First, it was the Central Military Hospital where they built special next to the hospital research center for study of drugs and antibiotics. [XG] bacteriological weapons and they tested them on the monkeys and some prisoners. I can tell you.

[Debriefer]: He said prisoners?

[Debriefer]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: Political prisoners?

[Source]: And, I can tell you how, for example, friend of mine was politcal commissar in Central Military Hospital. It was why we were. . . It was reason why they sent him there, because he was long-time KGB agent and he married daughter of KGB colonel and they sent him there for two reasons, actually Soviet [1G], because the secrecy of all these development and, secondly, they believed commander of the Central Military Hospital that time was General [redacted]

[Debriefer]: Is he the man you said has retired now and is living in [redacted] now?

[Source]: He was Jewish guy and, therefore, he is the leader of the Jewish opposition. And, it was good operation, because his wife, the daughter of the KGB colonel, she was Jewish. It was Jewish family, you know, so he. . . Actually, when he, I just tell the story. When he stepped to the hospital and checked on that facility, they [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Who he?

[Source]: That friend of mine, [1G] [blocked by next]

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[Debriefer]: Oh, the political officer. OK.

[Source]: He stepped there and they didn't give him, I don't know, the [redacted] [pressurized suit] mask and so he got disease from the biological weapons there where that research was. He was after then many months they treated him. He was very sick.

[Debriefer]: Do you know what the nature of it was?

[Source]: I don't know. He just said by the monkeys where they tested it.

[Debriefer]: OK. Yeah, you've mentioned this gentleman before. You mentioned BW [biological weapons] before, but I don't remember drugs before.

[Source]: Yeah, yeah. It was same [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Under the same management? Imean, was it the same department or what?

[Source]: No, not same department, but [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: OK, different department.

[Source]: [Continuing] director of the center was same director, but different sections, you know, departments. And, second place was in [redacted] where is the medical college. And, next to the medical college is military medical college. They just save money, because they have so many medical doctors there. It was east 100 kilometers from [redacted]. There was other center where they did the research. It was good camouflage, because there was the college. The professor scientists were there anyway.

[Debriefer]: Was [redacted] the man that you said was in retirement?

[Source]: [redacted] [phonetic].

[Debriefer]: And, in [redacted] maybe today? I don't know, he could be dead. Who knows?

[Source]: I don't know. When I left, he was still around.

[Debriefer]: We touched on this, but not. . .

[Debriefer]: Uh, huh.

[Debriefer]: Baloney slices 18 ways!

[Source]: He was two-star general. If he is today alive, he will be probably, I don't know, close to 80. But, he was also the major authority in the [redacted] Corps in the front. He was super doctor, but he was. . . I think he was even in jail in '50s and he was rehabilitate.

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[Debriefer]: Was there. . . There was a drug connection in the combination military/civilian medical college as well?

[Source]: No. It was civilian college and next to it was military college.

[Debriefer]: Yeah, but you said in the Main Military Hospital there was both drug, which is new to me, and BW, which you said before. And, there was. What effort was going on in the military college and the civilian college, drug and BW?

[Source]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: You think both of them?

[Source]: Also, Academy of Science participate on some secret projects.

[Debriefer]: How about the installation up on the German border that you've talked about before?

[Source]: Well, there they tested [2G], as I mentioned.

[Debriefer]: Both drugs and BW?

[Source]: I never heard drugs. Chemical and biological, yes, but drugs I never heard. They test these things on the prisoners in the [two [redacted] words], which was the long-term prisoners.

[Debriefer]: Hard core. If one doesn't get you, the other will! [Laughter]

[Debriefer]: Let me ask one question just to nail this something that has been bothering me down. I think we've already had the answer [1G]. In this work, they distinguish between drugs and biological weapons. They didn't consider drugs biological weapons. There were two separate things. Did they [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Interesting that they are.

[Debriefer]: They are. You know, I don't dispute that they are. I just want to make sure that are. We tend to oversimplifly things here: NBC, CBR. If you have to jam drugs in there, it becomes DNBC.

[Source]: That time, too, we are talking about biological weapons or when the, let's say, General Staff presented to Defense Council the plan of scientific development, they were talking more about biological weapons for the wartime. Drugs, it was first of all even I would say more secret, because it was also peacetime and, of course, they didn't want it anybody discover it. So, it was always secret.

[Debriefer]: Interesting concept! Drugs for peacetime biological weapons!

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[Debriefer]: These two research centers that you were talking about, one in [redacted] and the other 100 away. Did they specialize in. . . In both places, did they specialize in drugs and biological weapons?

[Source]: Yeah, they did. Yeah.

[Debriefer]: OK.

[Source]: But, you know, they shared. . . Again, I am not scientist, but they shared some part of the basic research and application research they did in [redacted] and other part in Central Medical Hospital. It means they didn't [fades] That time when I defected who was in charge was [redacted] [phonetic], because the [redacted] was already chief of the Health Administration. He was the old guy and then he retired.

[Debriefer]: So, you saw documentation talking about this. You heard reporting to several bodies talking about this. Did you ever visit these installations or was this information hearsay or reporting?

[Source]: I visited Central Hospital many times, because I had my. . . My best friends were doctors and [2G], but I never go to that place. Sorry. I didn't want to spend time in the Central Military Hospital [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Then, where would information come from?

[Source]: I visited [redacted] with the minister.

[Debriefer]: This came through official reporting then?

[Source]: Yes.

[Debriefer]: OK.

[Debriefer]: Why would the minister have visited? I mean, I can see periodic visits to a military medical college, but when you accompanied the minister to [redacted], was there any explanation of why you were going, why a specific visit?

[Source]: Well, the Central Military Hospital was the most important military center [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: You're talking about the defense minister, I assume, because I missed that.

[Debriefer]: Yeah. You mentioned that you accompanied the defense minister.

[Source]: Yes. It was the most important military medical center for the peacetime and wartime, because, in the wartime, they. . . First of all, part of them go with front like medical administration and part go to underground bunker. They were even have responsibility for Politburo, I mean Defense Council, you know? Plus, they did lots of research and the best specialists were always transferred to Central Military Hospital, you know?

[Debriefer]: So, you're talking about all phases of military medicine?

[Source]: All phases. I walk in [redacted] in the research with the minister. I didn't go to that monkey. . . They even recommended minister was actually hero, but they recommended that better don't go in if something happened so we visited some parts of that center.

[Debriefer]: Where did the drugs come from that they studied in the research centers? How did they obtain them?

[Source]: I don't know. I would just guess, but I don't know. Well, first of all, they had their own production, because it was very important project. The recommendation what to produce and how effective it is. Also, I know in many cases when they arrested agents and I tell you that was a problem, because the African students, students from the Third World country, they were always involved in the drug business. When some traffics go through [redacted] to places, for example, to West Germany, they arrested the men, took the drugs, filled it with aspirin, took the drugs [XG] aspirin to Germany. That was one case. I don't know if they did it every day.

[Debriefer]: Who is they again? I. . .

[Source]: [redacted] counterintelligence. I know this case from different sources, but I don't know how many times they did, you know. So, actually, this time they stole it themself. I think they make good money! They took it from the Arab who was from Egypt in the college, like Lumumba, in [redacted] this college, and sell it themselves. So, I cannot tell you if they buy the drugs in New York. I don't know.

[Debriefer]: Well, they would have that certain stash for normal medical purposes, I would assume, to start with.

[Debriefer]: They would have to have. . . There are lots of places. I just wondered if ordered particular things. The percentages of the various drugs varied by supplier and the place of sale and all that sort of thing. I was just wondering.

[Source]: I don't know. I think if they need anything they didn't have any problem in customs.

[Debriefer]: Let me ask a logistics question, [redacted] Presumably, someplace in the military Ministry of Defense under the rear services man you've got a medical chief there, too.

[Source]: Yeah. That is what I say. The [redacted] was chief.

[Debriefer]: Oh, I'm sorry. I missed that. OK. So, he had to be in on this, too, to some extent I would think.

[Source]: Well, he was. His deputy. . . That [redacted] was first deputy. There was I think General [redacted] [phonetic] was his name. [redacted] was deputy and he

was in charge, because the chief. . . Of course, generally, he is charge, but he has so many things and this was so important. Also, I think, he was old officer from the bourgeois. They didn't trust him like they trust and knew [redacted] and, after then, [redacted] was chief and Colonel [redacted] was his deputy and he was in charge. He was his first deputy. Again, the chief has complete responsibility, but he will not operated, you know, every detail every day. He doesn't have time for that.

[Debriefer]: [redacted] in the article you mention that very important meeting, I think 1967, in which NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV said, in effect, let's use drugs as a weapon against the West.

[Debriefer]: In '62.

[Debriefer]: Or '62 was that? '62, I'm sorry.

[Source]: '62 it was. In '67 it already was not KHRUSHCHEV.

[Debriefer]: OK. That's right. I'm sorry. Of course, it had to be '62. But, in that same part of the article, as I recall, you mentioned that there were representatives at that meeting who questioned the morality of using drugs, OK? Do you recall anything more about that? Why some of them and who they were that questioned whether it was moral for Marxist-Leninists to use drugs?

[Source]: Well, I think they were probably some even in Soviet Union. I think, because KHRUSHCHEV said some think, some people think. He didn't say what people, but some people think it is not moral, because,usually, who if they had possibility people like International Department, because, after then, they have troubles if they are catched, KGB don't explain, don't go explain to our President what happen, but ambassador must go, you know. But, so I don't who that was, but, on that meeting, Hungarians were very carefully, KADAR was very carefully, because I think they. . . The detente was rapidly go up, you know? They collected money from the West and everything and they were worried it could make some troubles, you know, if they go so far.

[Debriefer]: Backfire.

[Source]: But, KHRUSHCHEV made them shut up.

[Debriefer]: What was the main purpose of the general meeting to start with?

[Source]: Where?

[Debriefer]: The meeting at which he made his comments, because you must have had a big agenda.

[Source]: Oh, there was many things. It was agenda I think. . . Let me see. Probably five different things on the agenda, including economy, the relationship with China, what else was there? [Repeats agenda items] Directives of improvement of relationship with Third World countries who were on the not

capitalistic way, give them some discounts. Like CASTRO was mad, because they got his country and he didn't. . . It was not anything for drugs.

[Debriefer]: Yeah. Was it a regular, recurring, meeting or was a special meeting called or what?

[Source]: Well, no one meeting is regular, you know, except military every September or August is regular every year. Otherwise, no one meeting is regular. It is Soviets decided it is meeting called, somebody push like Rumanians, as they did, at least in the beginning of CEAUSESCU and so they send you, secretary general sends letter to first secretaries or secretary general and say we recommended such a time such a meeting with such agenda. What do you think?

[Debriefer]: So, everybody was. . . There were representatives of all the pact countries?

[Source]: Everybody was there.

[Debriefer]: Everybody. OK. When was the last meeting that you can recall of that kind before that time?

[Source]: Before I defected?

[Debriefer]: No, no. Last. I'm trying to get some idea of how often these took place. You say they were not regular recurring meetings.

[Source]: This meeting or published or not, I don't know. I don't know how many were published. If they want to make it political purpose, they publish it. If they don't want, they dont' publish it. Proximately twice a year.

[Debriefer]: OK. So, in that sense, it is kind of recurring, it is kind of a regular meeting and they come up a couple of times a year.

[Source]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: OK.

[Source]: It can be more even if something special like, for example, Caribbean Crisis or '67 Middle East, you know. It is special thing that is by emergency, too, but regularly to analyze their economic development and political something. For example, meeting with Mister REAGAN. GORBACHEV thinks it is [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: You did say you did put our Rumanian friends in there, OK? Right.

[Source]: Yeah, they were there.

[Debriefer]: The Bulgarians, of course, were there, [redacted] Now, the reason I bring up Bulgaria is for this reason. You know, in your article, you mention

how very secretive this was and its obvious why it was handled so secretively, but we also know Bulgaria's Kintex [phonetic] organization has been deeply involved in drug matters, drug trafficing, and so forth. In the context of that strategic plan that you discuss in the article, from everything you know in your experience, would you say that it would be likely that the Kintex involvement by Bulgaria would be a logical outcome of that strategy? In other words, would Moscow have said to the Bulgarians: "You're going to play this part in the strategy," and either direct them to use this international trade organization, quote unquote, or whatever? I mean, does that seem reasonable to you that Kintex's involvement is a logical outgrowth of the strategy that you discussed there?

[Source]: I think so. I think so, because [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Turn the question around. Is it likely that there would be any circumstances under which they would take independent action?

[Source]: Bulgarians?

[Debriefer]: Yeah.

[Source]: Yeah, they can. I mean, if it fits generally to that strategy. If it is for a real strategic purpose, if the Soviets exactly tell you what to do, but, after then, you have also some your interest, your [IG] separately, you know, and there you can [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Leeway. But, is it likely they could take on an activity which is that sensitive and delicate to the whole East-West relationship?

[Source]: I can tell you one things. When the KHRUSHCHEV mentioned, the ZHIVKOV and DZUROV they were the strongest supporters of that.

[Debriefer]: OK.

[Source]: I remember like today the GOMULKA. He didn't say anything at all, you know? KADAR, he said [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Go carefully!

[Source]: "Comrade KHRUSHCHEV, I agree. We can make money and it is effective, but I recommended be very carefully, because it can show us not as the best and so on." But, ZHIVKOV and DZUROV, Minister of Defense, they were tough, tougher than KHRUSHCHEV.

[Debriefer]: Hard-liners?

[Source]: Yeah. And, as I know after then, later on, they. . . BREZHNEV even used them like example how they were successful, because they go through the commercial organization, what is it?

[Debriefer]: Kintex.

[Source]: Kintex, yeah. It looks to me my experience it is Bulgarian GRU, because the most or many of these commercial organizations in my experience are used more by GRU than KGB. KGB were more involved diplomatic corps and these things. GRU, at least in [redacted] I participate on many meetings. Any director or president of [redacted] [all phonetic] he was actually you take it agent of GRU, because he knows how many places he must GRU, he knows who are the guys, you know?

[Debriefer]: You said BREZHNEV, apparently at a later meeting, [blocked by next]

[Source]: Sorry?

[Debriefer]: You said BREZHNEV was supposed to have held up the Bulgars as shining example. What was the occasion for this? When did this happen?

[Source]: I think. . . Let's see. . .

[Debriefer]: You know, not precisely, but approximately.

[Source]: Yeah. I heard him mention Bulgarians twice and this I [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: In connection with what?

[Source]: Well, first. . . Once, he mentioned Bulgarian success in Middle East. For example, in Saudi Arabia, they recruited the military officers.

[Debriefer]: OK.

[Source]: And before, he mentioned Bulgarian success with the drugs and I think it was sometime '66. I think.

[Debriefer]: This is LEONID IL'ICH now?

[Source]: Yeah. He said they should share their experience with them, because they had not just success with some production, but also some success with distribution.

[Debriefer]: How many people were present when KHRUSHCHEV surfaced this? Roughly?

[Source]: Let's see, probably [counting] 50.

[Debriefer]: Fifty people? This is an agenda he's discussing?

[Source]: Secretary General, Premier Minister, Minister of Defense, the people who take care about the bureaucratic, and then. So, it was proximately five, six people from each country. And Soviets.

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[Debriefer]: What measures were taken to. . . Once it was decided to use drugs this way, what measures were taken to prevent drugs becoming a big problem within the bloc? If you're going to manufacture and otherwise obtain them and you're going to distribute them and all that for a variety to [fades] undermines society.

[Source]: I tell you, sir, the drugs were not problem at all [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: I was going to ask that, too.

[Source]: [Continues] the same as in European countries and I think probably as you know how the self-deception is working in communist system, I think they even didn't think it will be one day problem, you know? Some people used drugs regularly at the pharmacy. I remember Permetrazine [phonetic]. It was drug, I use it myself when I escorted CASTRO. I don't know how many weeks never sleep, so I go to the colonel and said to help me something. He give me Permetrazine, because I came home 5 o'clock morning from CASTRO. He go sleep, wake up 12, but I must go to office. He give me this Permetrazine which make me wake up maybe 3, 4 days and I caught up maybe 2 days, mostly it was this stuff, you know? There was some very good stuff, [XG] from Hungary. They had very good stuff, but it was I think developed from regular drugs, because, when they did the research, they also used it like possibility what drugs they want for themselves. I mean official drugs where you need a prescription. But, except. . . For some reason, I never. . . Of course, different was Bulgaria. Hashish and these things, you know? But, in Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, Soviet Union, I never heard they would think about drug problem which they have to handle. Alcohol [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Just to sort of put a cap on it, you mentioned that your best friends were doctors and movie actors. Of course, in the West, those are exactly the people who have access to drugs and that wasn't a problem for them?

[Source]: Yeah. I think many of them did, but I don't know if they supplied them from the research center. Some of them is the regular drug, the medicine, which was there. For example, friend of mine you [XG] Hungarian drugs. It was crazy. He said it was so fantastical that you actually. . . Almost like cocaine, make you happy all the time.

[Debriefer]: Walk off the ground, huh?

[Source]: I was strange person. I tell you I use it, because I wrote that time [2G] and I said: "Look, I need something. I cannot stand it."

[END TAPE 1, SIDE A]

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[TAPE 1, SIDE B, in here]:

[Source]: . . . We can never mention the final communique and [1G] and these things, because President and administration each change every 4 years, but ROCKEFELLER is there for whole life. It doesn't mean they use that ROCKEFELLER. I'm sorry. He just means the, I don't know, president of General Motors or Chase Manhattan Bank. I don't who he is. You know, he is there maybe for life, but admimistration is change every year, so, if we discredited somebody from the administration [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: [redacted], you [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: In other words, there was a link between the use of that and the special propaganda?

[Source]: Absolutely, because they can use it if they want to discredited somebody. On the other hand,. . . This was the typical example of what he told us about the final solution.

[Debriefer]: You insulted us once before, me and PHIL, when we were sitting here, when you said we ranked. . . who the targets were and you said that he said the hell with the mid-level government official. Go ovet their hands.

[Source]: Yes.

[Debriefer]: Was this connected at the same time to that?

[Source]: Yeah. It is same as I mentioned as they call it. . . How they call it? You know, they came to conclusion like, I don't know, 100 hundred years ago, again I say example. It doesn't mean that it has to stay so. Like FORD. He owned the company and he directed. . . Actually, he can handled what he want, because. . . Today, they came to conclusion it is impossible. He can not do that without the middle-man, you know? And, the middle-man, if it technician or scientist or director of some factory, he is far as more important than working class, because he not just influence the FORD, but he also the working class.

[Debriefer]: Yeah. Both ways.

[Debriefer]: And, he's there a long time.

[Source]: He is there long time, actually for whole life. It is his job, so it is why we have to go to this community to influence them. And, not just with drugs, you know? Generally, they counted them like new class.

[Debriefer]: But, this was part of the same discussion that we had before about that? The target areas, with intelligence people being where?

[Source]: Intelligence people?

[Debriefer]: As targets.

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[Source]: Oh, yeah. Sure, sure. I just mentioned a few. Military intelligence, counterintelligence services. There is no question about that.

[Debriefer]: Did they ever use it to recruit? The GRU? Did they use drugs that you know of to recruit?

[Source]: Drugs? Sure. This is what [redacted] recommended already after his experience in Korea, because they worked together with Americans and others and he said the drugs are most effective.

[Debriefer]: For recruiting agents.

[Source]: For recruiting. Better than [XG] this therapy [XG] The drugs are the best.

[Debriefer]: Better than money?

[Source]: Drugs maybe are worth more than money and make you happy probably!

[Debriefer]: [redacted] after that important '62 meeting when the decision was made in effect by NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV, I guess, that this would be done, it takes a while for a plan like that, a strategy like that, to be together. Now, following the '62 meeting, what evidence did you have that the KGB and/or the medical, you know, people were working together to put together such a plan? Were there other meetings or other conversations or other memoranda?

[Source]: First of all, you have some meetings there, but you have every year process. It is nothing, because one day they give these directives and, after then, you never hear it, because when the two services presented, let's say, the plan for next year for intelligence services, if they need it, if they have to change something, let's say,. . . What I want to say is this. For example, in 1964, when they decided to move the production closer, for example, the [redacted] don't know what did Soviet Union and CASTRO, I mean some details, but [redacted] for example, got directives to help the production in Mexico and Dominican Republic. I just tell you example, how many times you hear it, it was special report next to the 1-year plan, special report about this order from Soviet Union which they didn't want to include to the book like this, because that report had maybe 60 pages [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Production of what?

[Source]: [1G]. Because CASTRO in his contacts and groups which he infiltrated or established, he has opportunity in many places in Latin America, because they thought if there are possibility, it is better than ship it from Soviet Union, because they make it somewhere there. So, it is what they. . . I think it was '64. [redacted] intelligence service got directives to help establish through some groups in Mexico, I don't know through whom. I don't know the details and Dominican Republic production there.

[Debriefer]: And the other country you mentioned?

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[Source]: Dominican Republic.

[Debriefer]: You mentioned two.

[Source]: Mexico, where [redacted] had very good position, the intelligence services. I don't know why CASTRO did or maybe he did other groups, I don't know, because [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Were there Cubans at the initial meeting?

[Source]: In 1962?

[Debriefer]: '62.

[Source]: No.

[Debriefer]: No. OK.

[Source]: [redacted], earlier in our discussion, you mentioned that, under this integrated intelligence services protocol that was signed, when was it, in the '60s? Yeah, '64. Right, 3 October '64. That the Soviet Union had delegated to East Germany, did you say, responsibility for Latin American communist parties or the working with?

[Source]: Yeah. Until 1964, until this conference, East Germany didn't participate on the strategic intelligence which include sabotage [fades] because Soviets never said they openly don't trust them, but it was clear. Later, when they had new cadres not influenced by Nazis [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: You're only 7 years into the Warsaw Pact.

[Source]: Yeah. When they did it and you have it here GDR already, not Rumania, but GDR participating, you see. This is not my [blocked by next]
[Debriefer]: No, I wasn't questioning it. I was just trying to establish that I understood you correctly that the Soviets had delegated responsibility to East Germany.

[Source]: Well, not complete responsibility. They involved them, you know?

[Debriefer]: The role.

[Source]: They involved them, because they had, they came to conclusion in [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: ULBRICHT was suspect?

[Source]: What did you say?

[Debriefer]: ULBRICHT was suspect?

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[Source]: DDR, Deutsche Demokratische Republik, when that was first time. What Soviets came to conclusion? After, of course, they trust them more. The Germans in Latin America and Middle East and some countries in Africa, for example, South Africa, they can do better job than they can do, because the Nazis and the emigration from the Germany after war, you know, and, of course, if the. . . For example, they say in the Middle East many don't see difference between West Germany and East Germany. For them, Germans were heroes. You know, ROMMEL, field marshal, he was hero. He liberated them. So, for them, like Germans they didn't care east or west so it is why they said it is necessary to give them own responsibility. It doesn't mean for whole Latin America. I don't know. Maybe they came to conclusion, I just say example, you know, Uruguay. The Germans have better opportunity than [redacted]

[Debriefer]: OK. Well, a good example of that just within the last few days you notice that this drug kingpin who was captured has a German father. He is the son of a German engineer who emigrated to Columbia. So, there are important German populations in certain Latin America [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: STROESSNER!

[Debriefer]: Well, they used to say there were not Argentinians. They were Germans, Italians, and Japanese.

[Source]: I think the Soviet analysis was very good and it makes proud Germans, because they always feel discriminated. And, I tell you, to me, they were very successful, because they try to prove they are better than the others and, of course, the Hitler discipline, you know [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: There was actually competition among the communist intelligence services in that regard then?

[Source]: Oh, yeah.

[Debriefer]: Really? Very interesting!

[Source]: Oh, yeah.

[Debriefer]: Now, within the structure that you worked, JOHN, you presumably would have knowledge of or see reports on German intelligence activities in Latin America, would you not? Particularly in the wake of this '62 decision to use drugs as a strategy.

[Source]: Well, I tell you what we had except the records which were presented to Defense Council and. . . But that, you don't have too much time. I always try to first charter how many spies are there. But, you know how it works. They never mail it, because regular documents I delivered to members of Defense Council not late than week before the meeting, before the session. This report about the intelligence services, which was joint report, civilian and military, I [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Joint [redacted]

[Source]: I brought it with my briefcase to the meeting, opened the seal envelope, secretary, First Secretary said: "Comrades, 1 hour back." I give it to them and they had 1 hour, including eat, to read it. After 1 hour, "Comrades. Any objections?" If somebody said something, I made notes. After then, day after, I change it.

[Debriefer]: Who prepared the joint report?

[Source]: The GRU and the civilian intelligence.

[Debriefer]: STB? SNB?

[Source]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: Working together?

[Source]: Yeah, Ministry of Interior in [redacted] And signed it Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior.

[Debriefer]: Jointly, OK.

[Source]: Next day, I had to change what was change, burn all documents except two examples. One was in archives of Defense Council. . . Three. Another Ministry of Interior, and GRU. And that's it. After then, the very important information were and I tell you, honestly, the British with whom I work 1 year here under the direction of US government, they said one things which I remember until today. They said: "If US Government was smart, they tell you sit down somewhere 1 year. We pay you such a money and write on the paper or on the tape everything what you remember from Defense Council, because it was impossible if you are interrogate. You work 18 years, so, through that interrogation, because the people have narrow interests. One has interest about chemical weapons, plus they never tell you what they want to know. So, you go to the meeting, you cannot think about. OK, if they interrogate me, if you are double agent, I agree. But, if somebody talk to you about chemical weapons, for example, they should tell you maybe day before. I can think in the evening, you know. But, it is different story. So, to me, very important [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: You didn't do that for the Brits, though?

[Source]: For me very important were meetings every week, Friday. the Collegium of Minister of Defense, you go the GRU [1G], you ask the chief of GRU and Soviet advisor give us informations what happened last week and what they think they will do next week. They didn't tell you General WILLY BRANDT, you know, but they tell you information about the military, NATO, United States, they told you information about Third World country, Latin America, Africa, what happened, where we were successful. So, the members of Collegium they can question them. Sometimes, they said: "Comrades, this we cannot say in front of 10 people." But, otherwise, they answered. From this point of view, I can tell you, the Germans actually was not one meeting where they were not mentioned, Germans, East Germans. I mean [blocked by next]

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[Debriefer]: They were always mentioned?

[Source]: Always mentioned.

[Debriefer]: OK.

[Source]: '66, '67, after this conference. Success of the East German intelligence services I remember not just Latin America, but also, for example, South Africa, also through the former Nazis and German emigrants.

[Debriefer]: Success in drugs or just in general?

[Source]: No, no. Generally, about intelligence matters.

[Debriefer]: Across the board, yeah.

[Source]: And, in Latin America, about the. . . where was the interest of the, let's say, Soviets and Czechoslovak intelligence services? It was the mostly. . . First of all, development of the revolution movement, the position of different politicians and parties to the United States. The preparation of the people who can participate on national front if some revolution will be there. Possibility to use these Latin Americans to got informations from United States. I remember, for example, Panama where they reported actually the politicians there, they said sources help provided about US military presence there. So, many of these things, and Czechoslovakia was also very successful in Panama, I must say so, but, as I say, shortly before I defected, many of these informations were from East Germany.

[Debriefer]: This was not the joint now. This was GRU talking?

[Source]: Just the GRU.

[Debriefer]: OK. And then,, periodically you got this double, bigger, picture?

[Source]: Yeah. It was. They also exchange, of course, information, because it is mentioned, you remember we discussed it. They have German committee, the GRU and civilian intelligence, what they [IG] decide who will handle what case and they have also exchange information.

[Debriefer]: This is what you mean by from each according to his ability?

[Source]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: [redacted] could you. . . did you ever see any information that indicated which drug organizations that the Soviets or Eastern Europeans or the Cubans had connections with, either in Latin America or Turkey or in Asia? Did you know specific organizations and how were they connected? How was that maintained organizationally?

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[Source]: I tell you they did mention even individuals, but it is so many years. When we worked on that, I told JOE I will look, because, I'm sorry. I'm mess, generally, because we visit some secretary and I have all papers. I told you I look for my notes, because, after I defected, let's say in the evening and so, because I know after 20 years you don't remember it. I made some notes about names, organizations, generally notes, but I was still not able to find it, you know. It is somewhere in my papers and JOE want to write more and I promise him this. When I find it, maybe before I give it to JOE, you know, I mean, it is not in secret. I would be happy to help.

[Debriefer]: When they started off this initiative in this '62 meeting, [blocked by next]

[Source]: Generally start '56. In '62, it was official direction by KHRUSHCHEV.

[Debriefer]: Yeah, OK. Did they put any sort of priority on it? Did they hope for the kind of success that they eventually seemed to get?

[Source]: Priority of country or what?

[Debriefer]: No, I mean I'm trying to figure out how much proportion of time and effort was spent on it as opposed to other things on the agenda of those meetings, for example.

[Source]: I would say if, for example, '62, the meeting was 2 days. This problem was maybe 2 hours.

[Debriefer]: Two hours out of a 2-day agenda. OK. Did it pick up steam at the next momentum?

[Source]: Yeah. They. . . I think that they push it very hard, because the Russians, I think it is also in the article, they were [1G] jealous and it looks like stupid, because MAO TZE-TUNG was ahead with this thing. So, they tried to push very hard. Of course, on the other hand, the KGB are very carefully. They didn't want to goo it up, so it was even that much a proportion. But, what they push lots was the scientific development and the production, because that time, in the beginning, they didn't have opportunity to use, I don't know, maybe this guy who is in jail or who said he will help to defeat imperialism or other words using him. I don't say I know they use him, but everything must be production there, in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, or Soviet Union. So, these things they push very strong. After then, it goes most all the time through the apparatus, you know. SAVINKIN, for example, the head of the Administrative Organs Department or the chief of GRU, the head of the Medical Administration on that meetings.

[Debriefer]: Was your equivalent of SAVINKIN involved in the same way, on a smaller scale?

[Source]: What you can do without them? Nothing!

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[Debriefer]: No, no. I mean the [redacted]

[Source]: Sure, absolutely. [redacted]

[Debriefer]: So, he was the coordinator?

[Source]: He was the coordinator, he was. . . You know, these people are actually more important than KHRUSHCHEV.

[Debriefer]: Yeah, yeah.

[Source]: And, after then, its up to them and usually they are ready, because they want to be more successful, reported him that they are successful. So, it is why I mention SAVINKIN and same was in [redacted] when the [redacted] and [redacted] and the guy who was in charge in Administrative Department was [redacted], because he was in charge of all the rear service so he was in charge about scientific development and production in the military facilities.

[Debriefer]: SAVINKIN had just taken over the job, huh?

[Source]: Later, before it was the general, what was his name? Who was killed in Yugoslavia?

[Debriefer]: The one who bumped into the mountain, yeah.

[Source]: SAVINKIN was later.

[Debriefer]: He was the deputy at that time?

[Source]: Yeah. He was [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Again, what percentage of his time and effort, give us a guess, would you think would be taken up by something like this, as opposed to all the other things he had to do?

[Source]: Well, I must say the guy who was directly in charge, like that [redacted], it cannot be one meeting he wouldn't pay attention, you know? It cannot be one meeting he didn't reported to [redacted] the head of te department. because when minister goes Monday to [redacted], he reported him himself, [redacted] knows the view from other side, which are his party bureaucrats and sources. So, this. . . You know,. . . Let's face it, that [redacted] he didn't anything else except [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: That was his full-time job?

[Source]: That was full-time job.

[Debriefer]: And, what would he have been, a [blocked by next]

[Source]: He was lieutenant colonel.

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[Debriefer]: Yeah, but in the Administrative Department, is he a section head or a deputy section head.

[Source]: In Soviet Union it was section head. [redacted] is too small. We had always one man for this.

[Debriefer]: So, you had one man in the Administrative Department who more or less his full-time was this?

[Source]: Yeah. It was [redacted] and who was in charge about the [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: [redacted] was the [redacted] guy.

[Source]: [redacted], yeah. He was lieutenant colone and a former politcommissar and who was in charge about intelligence service was [redacted] [phonetic]. He was guy who was in charge of the military intelligence.

[Debriefer]: And, this was [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Oh. They had a slot in the GRU then?

[Source]: They had what?

[Debriefer]: There was a section also in the GRU.

[Source]: In GRU was politcommissar and party committee. There was [redacted] He is today head of the Military Section of the Central Committee. [redacted]. I said [redacted]

[Debriefer]: And what was his job before?

[Source]: Who? The [redacted]

[Debriefer]: Yeah.

[Source]: [redacted] Sorry, I speak wrong. [redacted] Sorry! Because the politcommissar in GRU and right now he is head of the Military Section at the Administrative Organs Department in the Central Committee.

[Debriefer]: Does your memory go back to who in GRU and what area they belonged to? That was involved in the drug arrangement?

[Source]: I don't know. I know more about the research, how they did that within the departments.

[Debriefer]: OK. You wouldn't want to hazard a guess?

[Source]: I don't want make misunderstand.

[Debriefer]: But, it wouldn't have been spread throughout GRU?

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[Source]: I don't think so. My guess would be, I don't know, it will be together with sabotage and this things.

[Debriefer]: Yeah, OK. Some special [blocked by next]

[Source]: Really special Top Secret, [2G] in this case.

[Debriefer]: How about military medical? Is there some specific [blocked by next]

[Source]: The decision of Defense Council just said chief of General Staff should establish in the GRU selected special people and establish special group for this and they didn't. . . That left it up to him.

[Debriefer]: You can't make a comment on the people in military medical?

[Source]: Comment what?

[Debriefer]: As to full-time job, where it would be located.

[Source]: Well, the full-time job, as I told you, who was when I defected in charge was the [redacted] who was first deputy of chief of Medical Administration, but the people who did really. . . didn't anything else were the research and this things. I have to think little bit about things. Let's see. [redacted] The chief was General. . . [Musing a bit] I tell you you had good opportunity. I'm sorry. You know, I am trying to refresh the names back. There was doctor, he visited United States and he was ready defected, but nobody never contacted him.

[Debriefer]: Ready to?

[Source]: He was ready.

[Debriefer]: Well, a lot of them are ready to, its getting over the wall that is the. . .!

[Debriefer]: Well, in this case, he was already in the United States.

[Source]: He was doctor of psychology. He travelled to whole world. He was, I tell you, my best friend in military hospital.

[Debriefer]: When was this?

[Source]: When he was here? Last time '67 and I asked him why you didn't [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: That wasn't my watch, [redacted]

[Source]: He was my good friend and I was first secretary of the party and I told him: "Why you didn't defected?" And, he said: "Well, first of all, I was there few times before. Nobody never talked to me except one [XG] women

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his friend there. But, because I have to. . . Nobody told me how it will work, I have to make my examination and these things and my language is not very good." And, he was just divorced and married again in small [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: And, his job was what, besides being a doctor?

[Source]: He was doctor in Central Military Hospital and his job on the side was doctor of the psychology and, actually, I say [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Steroid control!

[Source]: [Continues] him to be fired, because they said he hit his mother--in-law and she fell down from the stairs and die after that. [redacted] [phonetic] was on his side, because she was [XG], but they want to fire him and I helped him be not fired. This is shame, you know, how we operated. He was ready to go, you know, and he was somewhere with his wife. She have child play also the woman's basketball or volleyball, I don't know.

[Debriefer]: The new wife?

[Source]: His wife.

[Debriefer]: The new one, yeah. OK.

[Source]: She was beautiful lady. He was ready to stay immediately.

[Debriefer]: How to get a new wife? Be a sports medicine doctor!

[Source]: [XG] I'm not sure. Nobody ever touch him and talk to him! If somebody talk to him, I will tell you, he brought so many informations from the Central Military Hospital, unbelievable! Because he was also good friend of that politcommissar, because he need from him for toothaches the special balms where you can buy in that special store the food and that. So, he supplied the politcommissar. You know, everybody is corrupted, these special stores.

[Debriefer]: Well, its a good story and its true. I understand it. That should prove to you that there is a divine being. Somebody takes care of us, because we. . .

[Debriefer]: Could I jump backwards just a bit?

[Debriefer]: Sure.

[Debriefer]: Before you came out in '68, did you ever hear of the Soviets, the [redacted], or the Vietnamese, or anybody else for that matter, doing autopsies of US troops from Vietnam for the same purposes as in Korea?

[Source]: Not [redacted]. Soviets. Soviets analyze the Vietnam War from all aspects.

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[Debriefer]: But, they also collected bodies like that and autopsied them?

[Source]: Yeah, yeah.

[Debriefer]: Do you have any idea of how many or the statistical basis they used in Korea? Roughly how many, how many dead were autopsied?

[Source]: I don't know.

[Debriefer]: Do you think they had enough so that they got a good idea of the drug use or was it just a small sample?

[Source]: Well, I tell you something [blocked as two debriefers discuss transportation and scheduling matters. Can't hear Source] I guess, because the First Medical Directorate didn't have anything to do with the report to use drugs or something. It was strictly professional medical report.

[Debriefer]: Oh, just to see what [blocked by next]

[Source]: Yeah. The discussion to do that very [1G] came from the [XG] so these doctors when they reported it, they reported facts. What it is in West Germany, United States, and so and so. What influence the soldier psychology [blocked] So, if it will be already intelligence report, I will say [blocked] and make conclusions, because from professional you get that. But, I don't know how many. I'm sorry.

[Debriefer]: But, you have heard that the Soviets did this in Vietnam?

[Source]: So, they did it in Vietnam. Yeah.

[Debriefer]: When did they start doing that, do you know? What can you tell me about their doing it in Vietnam?

[Source]: I think when he was doctor [XG] in Vietnam. Actually, there was [blocked by discussion of transcript distribution] and no Vietnam was involved. I was still chief of staff of minister all that time and chief of General Staff of Vietnamese visited all our [2G].

[Debriefer]: Well, for us, the [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: '56.

[Debriefer]: The major involvement was '65.

[Source]: '65.

[Debriefer]: But, I had friends over there in '59, with the military mission!

[Debriefer]: Yeah. People go back to '45.

[Debriefer]: '54, right after Dien Bien Phu. [Everybody makes an input all at the same time]

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[Source]: This must be when the North Vietnamese prepared the major offensive or activity. I don't know how to call it. I would say probably '62. I would say again I am sure I have somewhere in the notes. So, it was first agreement, because they ask already weapons and so on, you know? That time already Soviets make agreement with them. They can send there people where they study themselves.

[Debriefer]: Who is them, PHIL?

[Source]: Soviets.

[Debriefer]: No, no. Soviets made agreement with them.

[Source]: Vietnamese.

[Debriefer]: OK.

[Source]: It is where they study military, medical, and all these operations and they did it. I must tell you the highest marshals do that, not for [1G], you know. [redacted] we had there just. . . The last highest delegation was I think '67, Premier Minister LENART and chief of Main Political Administration PRCHLIK, they were there. But, the study, medical and the others, even push Vietnamese to take the troops of East Europe. We push them very hard to take them like voluntarys. Of course, they will be regular Air Force regiment, because Soviets thought United States have advantage. They actually trained to fight us in the war and the Soviet Union didn't have this opportunity. So, it is why we push Vietnamese to accepted.

[Debriefer]: They made the offer?

[Source]: They didn't accepted it, because they said if they accepted it it, they must also accepted Chinese troops. If they accepted it, they will never go out. They already know that time, PHAN VAN DONG, the secretary general. He said: "No way. It will be not Chinese Air Forces, it will be Ground Forces and they will extend some territory and will never go out." Maybe it was excuse, I don't know.

[Debriefer]: Who was going to be? It was going to be across the board air elements or Soviet or what?

[Source]: To study?

[Debriefer]: No, the Air Force element. The volunteers were to be largely aviation?

[Source]: The Air Force?

[Debriefer]: What kind of volunteers?

[Source]: Air Force.

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[Debriefer]: Air Force. OK. And, to be from all the countries? A contingent from each one of the countries?

[Source]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: And, they made this offer?

[Source]: We already had regiment ready to go there.

[Debriefer]: They had coordinated it with the little brothers before, the Soviets?

[Source]: The Soviets coordinated it.

[Debriefer]: They had alerted people?

[Source]: They coordinated it. Soviets give us order to push that so, when they visited, we pushed them. Take it, give us this opportunity, and we'll help you if you help us. And, that time they said no.

[Debriefer]: What kind of a size unit was the [redacted] unit?

[Source]: We had ready regiment.

[Debriefer]: Regiment. How about the others?

[Source]: Everyone, I don't know who they are, but Poland regiment, East Germany, Hungarians. Wing or how you call this? Smaller than regiment.

[Debriefer]: Squadron.

[Source]: So, everyone got from Soviet Union directive, but, of course, Soviets more, what to prepare, what to do and, I tell you, we were ready to go there. They just accepted Soviets like advisors, because there was problem. The Vietnamese even didn't use correctly the technology, you know, and it was mess, also. The Czechs sent there trucks, Rumanians trucks. Now, they mix everything, they didn't have spare parts, and so and so, you know, so it was larger decision how to improve this and not waste money. So, they accepted also Soviet advisors. But, when [redacted] was there and [redacted] the Vietnam Soviets told them, there were lot of Soviets in Hanoi, they told them stories what happened. One day, Vietnamese told them they can not go to missiles base which they install there, because they got message it will be attack from United States and they can be killed. The Soviets refused and took the trucks and go there. The base was full of Chinese who make copies about the equipment and everything. So, they were mad, because actually Vietnamese cover the Chinese.

[Debriefer]: This is already schism time?

[Debriefer]: Oh, yes. This is after, this is '62 or later?

[Source]: '67.

[Debriefer]: This is after schism. OK.

[Source]: Now this is what they officially reported when they come back.

[Debriefer]: Well, [redacted] it was really more like '69, wasn't it, when the big, you know, the conflict on the Ussuri River [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Domyanskiy [sic],

[Debriefer]: Demanskiy Islands. [Everybody jumps in to discuss this point]

[Debriefer]: '65 the Soviets decided treated China like the worst enemy like United States. '65. All intelligence. . . First [redacted] military attache, GRU man, colonel, was sent to Peking '65. Before, they were just politcommissars like to Hungary or. . . '65 first agent was sent.

[Debriefer]: So, his job as agent was to keep eyes on the Chinese?

[Source]: Yeah. That might be possibility, you know, but they didn't have too many possibilities. I think Soviet also analyze wrong Chinese situation. They analyze it is no opposition. They decided go from down up, from the region and so, against MAO TZE-TUNG, but we see that time the President was in a position finally LIN PIAO and others, actually even in Ministry of Defense and [1G], you know? So, there was lot of opposition and Soviets didn't know that. They didn't believe that, you know? And, it was really mistake.

[Debriefer]: That's one on them. OK.

[Source]: For example, [XG] visited us, the directives were trying to influence him somehow and he didn't believe it, but I tell you it works. He sent MAO TZE-TUNG a letter and he criticized small production of iron and this and, of course, after then, he disappeared. As friend of mine who was there said, they don't executed people, they put into helicopter and drag him to jungle and say: "Comrade Marshal, you are free." They didn't kill him.

[Debriefer]: LIN PIAO?

[Source]: The snake did it and crocodiles, you know! And, how they. . . We had already information that time, I can tell you rest [XG]. When our delegation visited Peking, they came back and Soviet general, advisor to chief of General Staff, General KOROTKOVO, who was commander of Soviet troops or. . . Yeah. Soviet troops in Korea when was the war, not the Japanese, you know? He came to me and he said: [redacted] you think your minister is pro-Chinese?" He didn't have any idea. Our delegation just come back from China. Minister publish article. Chief of Main Political Administration how fantastic is communism in China and so and so [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: This is post-World War II? Pre-Korean war? This is prior to Korean War?

[Source]: No. No, no. This is after.

[Debriefer]: After. OK.

[Source]: And, I look at him like he drunk, you know? It was 9 o'clock morning, which isn't anything unusual for Russians! I said: "Comrade General, are you crazy? He is more pro-Russian than you are!" And, he had list of people and ask me, generals and officers, if somebody is pro-Chinese. First time I heard it! So, when he left, I called General [redacted] and I said: "Look what happened to me!" And, he said: "What for? He visited me yesterday and asked me about you and others." So, GRU already collected, this was 1962, information who is pro-Chinese, who is pro-Soviet. Officially, still everything was [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: As early as '62! That's interesting.

[Debriefer]: Were any. . . Was anybody listed as being pro-Chinese?

[Source]: No. Not soever. I heard just one guy, MINASH [phonetic] the writer who one day get attack in meeting when he said, and he was member of Central Committee, "it is not our business," but, it was already '67, when the writers and those at that level, "it is not our business to advise China what they can do, because we are, sorry to say, a shit compared to then. We have 15 million, they have almost 1 billion. So, what they do that is their business. Let's handle our troubles." He was first man who openly said such a things, but, otherwise, in the party, I never heard it.

[Debriefer]: I'd like to go to back. Just one more thing and I feel obligated to ask you. On the people who were autopsied in Korea and in Vietnam, what was done with the bodies after the autopsies?

[Source]: I don't know.

[Debriefer]: Especially on the Vietnam thing. That's a very interesting point. My own feeling is that they would return or allow to be discovered any autopsied bodies.

[Source]: That is probably why you cannot find them today.

[Debriefer]: That's what I would think, for some of them in any event.

[Source]: I don't know. It is possible ship them to Soviet Union. I don't know.

[Debriefer]: Well, there are a whole hell of a bunch of people in the opposing forces who don't care about autopsies and only the scientists care about autopsies.

[Debriefer]: Only the scientists care, but, once you've got a body and its got to be in reasonable condition if you're going to get a good autopsy. You're going to have to have a fairly decent number to have a meaningful autopsy, unless you just want to know about Johnny Jones over there. And, the

other thing is that, if you were really interested in this for the depredations of our, you know, of our way of life, you sure as heck want to check out pilots and a lot of people, wouldn't you?

[Debriefer]: Well, except [blocked by next]

[Source]: Maybe that is why sent specialists Soviets, East German, Czechoslovakia, when the boat "Pueblo" was seized, but it was not autopsy. It was more for [blocked by next]

[Debriefer]: Brainwashing.

[Debriefer]: Psychological assassination.

[Source]: [Contining] brainwashing and psychological examination.

[Debriefer]: But, as I understood the purpose of the initial report from Korea, was a more or less purely scientific report, not aimed at anything, whereas the Vietnamese thing may have [blocked by next]

[Source]: Is what I told PHIL. It was strictly professional report.

[Debriefer]: The Vietnamese may have built on the Korean experience.

[Debriefer]: But, what [redacted] is just saying here is sort of key. Its a professional report. At least its objective, its scientific. It isn't done for political reasons.

[Source]: Or for espionage or money. It was strictly the first report, professional medical report.

[Debriefer]: Which implies a representative sample, some size of sample.

[Debriefer]: What are we missing, 11,000? Something like that I remember hearing, Korea?

[Debriefer]: I don't know. No, the total missing I don't think is that high, is it?

[Debriefer]: I think so. I'm not sure.

[Debriefer]: The total casualty figure was something like 50,000-55,000, wasn't it, KIA?

[Debriefer]: There is 11 in there, 1100 or 11,000.

[Debriefer]: I think its 1100 for Korea.

[Debriefer]: OK. That's a long way back from the reservoir.

[Debriefer]: Last question, last question. I just want to review the organizational elements you said that were involved in this job, OK, full time. You mentioned the AO, Administrative Organs, had a section, OK.

[Source]: In Soviet Union. [redacted] one man for medical, other for intelligence.

[Debriefer]: OK. You mentioned the military center for research.

[Source]: Yeah. [redacted] and [redacted]

[Debriefer]: Yeah. And, you mentioned in the GRU there was an element, special unit.

[Debriefer]: Probably.

[Debriefer]: Probably a special unit. Like KGB?

[Source]: It is my guess. Maybe next to.

[Debriefer]: Do you that KGB or do you have to guess?

[Source]: I don't know. I am sorry.

[Debriefer]: You don't know.

[Debriefer]: You don't think that's their style?

[Source]: No, no, no. I don't say. I say it is when we discuss the commercial organizations, what they are used by GRU. No, no. They participate also, because the reported decision was joint decision, but I don't know how Minister of Interior establish organization there.

[Debriefer]: Anyone else?

[Source]: Except for Department of Special Propaganda for some deception.

[Debriefer]: To discredit.

[Source]: Yeah.

[Debriefer]: We. . . I want to keep on the one more question. We didn't touch [redacted] [friendship] at all. You used the word [redacted]

[Debriefer]: [redacted] [friendship of peoples], you know, the Friendship of Peoples organization.

[Debriefer]: Which was to be the cover. We didn't touch that at all today. We can do that next time? OK.

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[Source]: That's up to you.

[Debriefer]: I'll turn it off, OK?

[END TAPE 1, SIDE B]

[Transcriber Note: Tape 2 included in this job is blank on both sides]

SECRET NOFORN

INTERVIEW WITH [redacted]

10 NOVEMBER 1992

AT THE DIAC

PRESENT: Robert Sheetz, [redacted] and Alan Young

Bob: Vietnam War, that's what my office is concerned with.

SOURCE: Is that where you're from DIA?

Bob: DIA.

Bob: You've interviewed several times with people from my office including Nick Eftimiades, [redacted] and LTC Young, I don't think you've met Mr. [redacted] yet, he's the Chief of our Analysis Branch, and people in our office have been working the Vietnam problem trying to account for American missing men for a long time. We've got people in the office who have been working this problem for over 20 years. My Deputy's been in the office for 20 years, we've seen all the intel reporting from not only DOD sources but also from the CIA. And we've had a chance to review information that you've previously provided to both DIA and the CIA so we've seen everything that you've said on the record to both CIA during your debriefing and here at DIA. And I guess my real concern at this point in time is I think ought to be your concern as you're about to be called as a witness and have to make an official appearance up on Capital Hill. They're going to make you do that. You're not going to be able to get out of it so what I think needs to happen at this point is that we all understand exactly what information you have that bears on accounting for American missing men from the Vietnam War. I know you have passed alot of good information about a lot of topics and information that you had about medical experimentation on Korean War prisoners has been very useful and has already started several investigative measures that have taken place outside the United States and we're very grateful to have received that information. But I have to tell you that having reviewed everything that you've said to the CIA and to DIA there are some inconsistencies in what you have to say about Vietnam and that's why we're here today, to talk about Vietnam. Okay?

I'd like to start by asking you to read that and tell me what it says.

Source: I never heard anybody talking about that, about Vietnam.

Bob: Those are your words when you were debriefed by the CIA in 1968. Here's the question, comes right off the tape.

Source: I'd like to get the tape

Bob: We can arrange that.

Source: Any source which says something about me I like to see it

Bob: These are your words.

Source: I like to see the tape.

Bob: Assuming that this is correct, and we'll make sure you get to hear this, assuming this is correct...

Source: Because if you take one sentence from whole tape...

Bob: Oh I understand, understand, we've listened to the tapes so I'm convinced that this is accurate...

Source: I want to see

Dave: Can I ask you a question?

Bob: Sure.

Dave: What was the word they used for prisoners?, is that it, can I ask the question in English?

Bob: I'm not sure.

Gary: The answer was given in [redacted] so I assumed when you debriefed with the CIA, you talked in [redacted] mostly, is that correct?

Dave: Were you debriefed in [redacted]

Source: Yea, it was always in country and as I saw some other stuff oh it was in Belgrade and that, it was absolutely disaster, so I like to see.

Bob: We'll make sure that happens.

Source: And it was just one thing when I come to them about Vietnam.

Bob: This is what I would call an open-ended question, it introduces a topic and gives you the opportunity to respond in anyway that you would choose to respond. And

you gave what I would call a rather broad blanket response that you didn't have any knowledge about American prisoners

Source: I would like to speak

Bob: So how do we get from there to where we are now, with your most recent statements about 100 Americans in groups of 20-25 being taken from Vietnam thru Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union. How do we get there.

Source: I talk to your people, I told them I come to CIA 25 years ago which.....

Bob: Where does your knowledge come from on that point?

Source: Look first of all I was Chief of Staff for Ministry of Defense since 1956 okay, everything that goes to ministers hand go thru my hands and out of it. That time I was I don't know how you say Minister of Officially Secretary of Defense Conciege and I was the man who make all the notes in Defense Counselor and preparer of decision of the Defense Counselor and very very good other Ministers or whatever. The Defense Counselor you can find it in the files in [redacted] was the highest decision making body in the military intelligence and counter intelligence things

I was secretary of the of College of the Minister in Defense then later I was member. It which was the ten highest military people, I was member of the leader of main political administration and I was member of Presiding Apparant. So I think I help you information find these bodies.

Bob: But you spoke..

Source: I was with the first Vietnamese delegation when they came to [redacted] I was the Chief of General Staff, I take care of all them. I was present at all meetings he had with them

Bob: With the Vietnamese.

Source: With the Vietnamese.

Bob: How many meetings were there?

Source: They were in [redacted] 1st time, one week. (b)(1)

Bob: When was that?

Source: Uh it was uh shortly after the war started 19..., maybe it 1964 - 1964 I was uh I don't know, maybe 60's.

Bob: Do you know what those meetings were for? What was the purpose?

Source: Well I believe they probably all were super confidence to Soviet Union and uh he ask super super calls me super make friends let me see

Bob: How many such trips do you recall?

Source: From Vietnam?

Bob: Delegations from Vietnam?

Source: Every year they come. Because you have planning for five years running so they always come here ask what they want be ask them, we told them what we can give them they thought it was pressure from Soviet Union push into negotiate with U.S.

Bob: Were you present at any of those meeting?

Source: Sure.

Bob: And did you see the written summaries of what was discussed at those meetings?

Source: Yes, because I Russian.

Bob: In those meetings, what discussions were there about American prisoners?

Source: Well first you know cause they were Vietnamese it was not so easy like with Koreans, Koreans did almost everything what national [redacted] ask. Vietnam it was little bit difficult because anything that what you ask they simply want to show they are the winners without any help which Koreans didn't. You let in the beginning, we tried to be very friend to poor, later on the Russians try to squeeze them because losing lots of money you know you have uh for example maybe I just say example, [redacted] thanks and that spare bunch from Romania and it was not very good coordinate you have that knowledge and it cannot work and spend funds with somewhere else or not at all you know, so a Russian pushed them to try to squeeze them and of course all were overcome under a series of directions and uh later on they tried to squeeze them to more negotiate with Americans through two parts because they didn't want to Russian pushed them to do it so it was un you know every year 95 days/things which you discuss with them.

Bob: Okay, you were present at these meetings and you wrote up the historical records of these meetings based on your job in the Secretariat and what discussion do you remember from these meetings was there any ever any discussion about American Prisoners?

Source: Uh, at least 2, 3 times.

Bob: And what was that discussion about?

Source: Well the discussion was first of all Soviets and uh Czechs others they have uh question which they would like to ask the prisoners when they were interrogated understand or in Paris, second, it was uh discussion condition what does this because Soviets know that conditions are not very good and they were worried it could be some international scandals. Soviets didn't want to be scandalized. It was discussion with the Soviets and [redacted]; also don't know the others about continuing with some medical analysis of the American Soldiers.

Bob: You said discussion with Soviets but you don't know about Czech.

Source: No, I say Soviets & [redacted] I don't know the others I don't know the ...

Bob: So at these meetings in [redacted] that you attended and you wrote up the historical records for, you recall that Soviets were there too?

Source: No.

Bob: No, so how what is how do you come by your knowledge that that topic was discussed with the Soviets with regard to the Vietnam War.

Source: Because Soviets told us what to talk to them and what to proceed or coordinate generally to negotiations and the questions because you have these things, the Soviet General move to or wherever and tell you we have such an interest and letting you finish and we give them the record.

Bob: And how did the Soviets, were you there when the Soviets passed these orders for the interrogation or for discussion with the Vietnamese?

Source: I was where

Bob: What you're describing sounds to me as though there was a premeeting with uh where the Soviets gave their instructions on how the dialogue with the Vietnamese was to go.

Source: It is always even if it is not under dub meeting before you have such a things the Soviet General go to you and tell you I got instructions from MOD or Supreme commander of certain Country do this, this, this.

Bob: Do you remember who that Soviet General was that gave you those instructions on how to deal with the Vietnamese?

Source: Sure, it was General Kuchev

Bob: General Kuchev

Soruce: General Kuchev, Kuchev

Bob: How do you Spell that.

Source: K U I think and C H E V, Alexander.

David: Like Kruchev with no R.

Soruce: Yea, okay, Alexander Kuchev.

Bob: So, he was knowledgeable then about medical experimentation, what were his, as closely as you can remember, what were his instructions with regard to medical aspects of American Prisoners.

Source: They want to call thing some of the best research which based on ????? everything was related to the next war. and as you know Col the records they start in Korea test some drugs and so and they want to call some of this test research of course.

Bob: And where was the [redacted] role for being there?

Source: The [redacted] has very good research to share I told it the other guys already before the Central Military Hospital, Air Force Medical Scientific Institute, they went in there mostly to buy lots. Some scientists participate from the Academy of science. So [redacted] very much annoyed because I didn't confer to Romanians and Bulgarians. Uh [redacted] had much better kind of, as they call it, scientists or persons. So it is pro Czech did find Russian culture the best brothers and they always trust Yugoslavia more than anybody else so in many many cases what they didn't get somebody else they get [redacted]. This can be proved for many things.

Bob: So this Russian General said that the Russian, the Soviets, were interested in continuing a similar program to what they had in place with [redacted] help during the Korean War.

Soruce: Yea, that program was not as....

Bob: Tell me about the program.

Source: As big like in Korea because in Korea they had the hospital, you can do much work directly there. But in Vietnam was not such a things like [redacted] hospital

Bob: Well how was it supposed to work in Vietnam?

Source: Mostly thru Vietnamese.

Bob: And who was cooperating on the Vietnamese side?

Source: You mean the officials of Vietnam?

Bob: Yes.

Source: What institutes ...

Source: I don't remember.

Bob: Did you see written reports like you did in Korea on this alleged Vietnamese experimentation program.

source: Sure.

Bob: And when did you see those?

Source: Every year if it was not separated report. Things which was most important go like separated to Defense Counsel. If it was not uh most important every year the MOD and Minister of Interior was in charge of [redacted] KGB to supervise. They must present to Defense Counsel a record how they achieved the things which Defense Counsel give them order the year before; because every year he present to defense plan which I prepared.

Bob: Sure.

Source On what day will discuss next year but whatever Minister must to send to Defense Counsel or anybody else and up till then he must protect of every aspect

Bob: So it's a yearly report.

source: Every six months and every year and if it was important

origin it was sent by report I don't know

Bob: And what did those reports say that from the time of the American involvement really go started in Vietnam and people unaccounted for, prisoners started to be listed until you defected in 1968 right? What did those reports say?

Soruce: Every year

?: When did the program start?

Source: You have a real good time to think what happened every year, thirty years ago

Bob: Summarize in general

Source: But you think I'm computer or what, that is the problem everybody always never tells me about what we be discussion when we started to discuss. Ask me what happened 40 years ago. Nobody asked me about that 25 years ago when I came in here.

Bob: We did ask you.

Source: Show me the tapes, I like to see it.

Bob: We'll arrange that

Source: Yea

Gary: When did the program start, from your recollection?

Source: Pardon?

Gary: When did the program of drug testing in Vietnam start, how many years before you left [redacted] had the program been put in place in Vietnam. Just give me your best estimate.

Source: It started immedidately when they have American prisoners.

Gary: Okay, when was that, was it many years before you left [redacted]. Was it close to before you left.

Soruce: No, it was not until about 66 or because before

Gary: Before '66

Source: Sure.

Gary: Long time before, short time

Source: Uh I, I must say I'd like to say probably 66, 67, um I'm just thinking about the current delegations maybe 63/64

Gary: Early on, and do you have some feeling for the number of tested subjects. When was the first time that you saw such a report on this program? You must have seen numbers of people coming back, how many PW's did they test?

Soruce: In Vietnam?

Gary: Yes

Source: Well I tell you this this is uh.....

Gary: Would they not have reported how many number that they had tested in a year.

Source: Maybe

Gary: Oh

Source: Because most this uh this informations how many prisoners or how many they most of this cames Soviet Union to us because uh we didn't have so good cooperation in Vietnam.

Gary: I understand that, yea.

Soruce: But how many every year.

Gary: I would think as a planner, once this program began rolling you would have goals. We needed to test this many people this year, next year we need to test this many, you don't remember numbers like that.

Source: You cannot have number of people because you do not know how many prisoners you would have, no?

Gary: Once you have a baseline then you know you have so many to go.

Source: You have in the record how many people were test, but uh how many were really how many want to test next year, I think it is difficult because you don't know how many you have.

Gary: So you have no memory of any numbers on the report of how many were tested rather than how many were tested.

Source: Because it is different question, but how many they want

test is

GARY: Okay, try try either one.

Source: I can uh say maybe when uh you read some of the records I think 19?? I can say, lets put it this way the last that I saw was 1967 which is the closest date that is uh I can forty five at least Czech with four difference drugs and uh four different drugs were test different each drug but approximately I would say uh 220

Gary: For each drug or for the total program.

Soruce: No for I don't know if they tested two drugs on same person.

Gary: Okay

Source: But what they said this drug was tested I think approximately it was 222 or 210 I don't know, approximately...

Gary: You think that was the size of the program

Source: Yea.

Gary: In any of that time when you were looking at these reports did the Chinese have any role in this? Is the totally a Russian [redacted] program? (b)(

Source: At least the Chinese were not put together with sofar with the Soviets because as you know Soviets have many problems but what we learn again mostly from Soviets uh the Chinese did many things which Vietnamese didn't let us do in Vietnam. How much they did and what they did over there I don't know.

Bob; Do you have any idea in Vietnam where these drug experiments were carried out.

Source: In Vietnam?

Bob: Yes. and uh did the reports...

source: Our delegation was that the highest delegation in 1967 which was uh

Bob: The [redacted] delegation for Vietnam. (b)(

Source: Right. Premiere Minister [redacted] was there, geomain political administration, General [redacted] and uh and they tried to pushed Vietnamese to do many things. Was very (b)(

difficult to begin deal with them because every thing that they feel you try to control them. They refused but ah I saw the record when they come back I don't think they ever visited any installation for these things, these tests

BOB: What do you know of who, were those drugs. How would these drugs be administered

Source: How would they

BOB: How were they given, by shots,

Source: I don't know

BOB: Do you know the names of the drugs

Source: I can think about but they were a specialty drug. They must preparation for the drug. They order the drugs like control the mind

BOB: These are soviet drugs

Source: No they were [redacted] also but you see they don't develop mind altering drugs. This is why they got the records from the Soviet Union.

BOB: Who provided the drugs to the Vietnamese [redacted] sources, Soviet sources

Source: To ship in drugs??

BOB: Uh um

Source: I think both but mostly Soviets

BOB: From the reports that you saw, what did the reports talk to in terms of how. There were prisoners kept many places, in Vietnam where were, what was the ground site, the field site in Vietnam that was used for administering this program. What do you know about how the program was run, where was it physically located. What kind of details do you have?

Source: The, it was not big like in Korea; in Vietnam what [redacted] did, I don't know from Russian did as most things go through them usually just through Hanoi through the Ministry of Defense everything. How much I remember records particularly in the beginning when [redacted] want to send a great drug bus like we did in Korea for experimenting and they never accepted, the Vietnamese so if you have the records that of that ????

everything was through Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Health for Vietnam. If Russians have access to go there I don't know. I know examples which again I of causing the record of language when Premier Lenard come back and also many times from Soviet. They didn't let Russians go there or [redacted] but they let Chinese go to some military installation and if Soviets find out they were liberated to go there or not I don't know

BOB: The last time you saw a report it crossed you desk, it was in 1967 on this program and that report talked to experimental design of several hundred perhaps 200 + - four different drugs - drugs provided by both the Soviets and the [redacted] and actually administered to the prisoners by whom

Source: You mean the drugs I don't know if Soviets have different or not I know everything was done by the Vietnamese it is why the Soviet Air Corp and [redacted] also had some suspicions if it is correct because they told the Vietnamese don't have such a good scientist or doctor

Bob: The last time you saw the report, a report, every six months, was 1967

Source: Correct

Bob: Ah, what else did those report have to say, or what other knowledge do you have about American prisoners, I ask you a very broad question I want you to respond to me as broadly as you can remember, any other information that you can remember about Amercian prisoners in vietnam, in other places

Source: Ah, anything

Bob: Anything and everything that you can remember dealing with American prisoners

Source: First of all the records cover the interrogation what they learned from american prisoners they interrogate

Bob: Tell me again who, who prepared these reports

Source: From where

Bob: The ones you saw, the reports you are talking about, that talk about the interrogation of prisoners, who prepared those reports

Source: The records were from Vietnamese but in Vietnam you had uh like which [redacted] didn't have in Korea, in Vietnam you had lots of Russians, KGB advisethose were the only advisers you saw so I, nobody told me but I assume they somehow give questions to Vietnamese that is their interest uh but the interrogation records how they interrogated the American soldiers was from Vietnam with sometimes we got in with Soviet comments sometime not sometime just as Vietnam, how they got it okay

Bob: What kind of questions were there, do you remember

Source: Well they ask from uh simple military questions about the units, commanders, technology uh how it operate all this stuff I think is nothing now everybody do it but ah they ask also questions of uh these prisoners of ah not just about the military but also incornation but in connection home, you know, your prisoners have some knowledge of something in United States maybe are you sorry or whatever, so they ask questions so it was all very large many questions which they had but I think the important things is accept this regular interrogation which everybody knew wartime uh regular questions to worry about senority because they already intelligence about the minority how disloyal they are and all these things generally start the unit of associate from and of course there were questions about drugs they were questions questions which they always seperate how drugs influence behavior of the soldiers, they were reports in the report if they have it was same like inquire if it is a wounded vet soldiers, American soldiers what and they go back when the Chinese step in so like the dated war prisoners and soldiers who are American when they perform autopsies of the dead American soldiers, what they find out

Bob: Do you remember how many were there are a lot of autopsies or few or, I guess what you are saying is that the soviets participated in those autopsies

Source: I think so, yea

Bob: Got any idea how many there would have been in the reports you saw until you left in 67 or the last report you saw in 67

Source: No, didn't because different things they were specialities, hard specialities but I know all these things so it goes always different different numbers for such a thing were the guys who checked the heart

problem , check the brain problem, now in 1967 or 68 I mean to say 67 or 66 I think it was in 66 the record was end of year in December early January 67 I think around 80 soldiers were autopsied gave them much, more problably double more, for the, as they call it, internogota dileverence you know loans that is most

Bob: So that would be 120

Source: And uh they were, I, approximately something about the brain, research

Bob: These are big numbers here

Source: They are

Bob: And uh the overall experimental design

Source: But they also had reports about Vietnam soldiers there they compared it

Bob: So this was

Source: 66

Gary: Yet the reports that you saw were the only interrogation reports of people who were undergoing drug testing or did you see interrogation reports in general

Source: Pardon me

GAry: Two questions, you saw interrogation report, were they only of the subjects that were being drug tested is that the only interrogation reports that you saw or did you see other interrogation reports

Source: You know it is what I said in the beginning,

Gary: I didn't understand you clearly, the interrogation report that you saw were only of people who were being drug tested or they were everybody, pws in Vietnam

Source: The interrogation

Gary: uh uh

Source: No, it is as I told you in the beginning, the reports covered interrogation about this unit, about his grandparents and all these things, and special part was drug testing

Gary: So you are saying that all the interrogation reports that you saw involved drug testing on the pws, you didn't see any interrogation reports of people who were not drug tested

Source: What do you mean, if they, if they interrogate him about his unit, and about his commander and I don't know how many people they, I assumed they ask any prisoner

Bob: What I understood, let me see if I have this right, that the reports that you are referring to that we are asking about, are the reports that deal with this experimentation program on Americans and not other pows, were talking about the medical experiments

Source: Medical, not drugs, yes you know I must say I don't know if they tested lets say for medical experiments if they test somebody for liver, internal organ if same person did the heart I don't know you know again somebody tell me

Bob: Lets see if I can put a couple of more things together here, initially, I think you said that reports of the interrogations were, interrogations done mostly by the Vietnamese using questions that the czechs and russians had given the vietnamese to conduct the interrogation

Source: I think who gave them all the questions was the Russians because if we give a question we give the Russians and they give

Bob: So the questions came from the russians, given to the vietnamese, the vietnamese conducted the interrogations and then you saw the written summaries prepared by the vientnamese

Source: Well we certain amount from the soviets

Bob: Alright, okay, the vietnamese gave them to the soviets and you saw them.

Source: Right

Bob: So that was one channel of information about interrogations, seems like there is another channel of information here dealing with the actual results of the drug experiments.

Source: I have to tell you also when we got these things from the soviets they had all intelligence themselves because they did not trust completely the vietnamese so

I don't know how many troubles they did so they tried to normal intelligence channels being established collected their own information so it is what I told you sometimes they said this is not accurate, you can not prove it was american like this

Bob: Was this KGB or GRU

Source: I think both

Bob: The reports that the Russian summaries that you saw would it be your assessment that they were reporting information obtained by both services in this one summary or did you see two different summaries, one a KGB summary and one a GRU summary

Source: No, they give us always one

Bob: So that summary included as you would think the information that came from the Vietnamese to the Russians, asking the questions that the Soviets wanted plus an additional assessment done by the Soviet intelligence services as to the accuracy and

Source: Yes, I think they, nobody told me whatever services were over there but I always assumed they were both over there because as you see the KGB are involved and the GRU involved

Bob: What I was trying to summarize right there was what I think I heard you say with regard to the interrogation results, now lets shift gears and talk about medical experiment results - seperate reports

Source: For the

Bob: Seperate from the interrogation results or what it in the same document

Source: About the drugs,

Bob: Yes, the results of the interrogations of the prisoners, the answers to the questions that the soviets gave to the vietnamese, was that in a seperate set of reports from the results of the medical experiments and the autopsies

Source: Well in the records six months, and one year, it was always also all combined with drugs

Bob: All combined in one report

Source: Yea, seperate

Bob: The interrogate, but

Source: In the details, money, prof and so because the drug experiments was state secrets because you know communist system is secret documents from state, how much money to do that it was always seperate which didn't wait for one year or six months, not always, but most time, if there were some important resources or

Bob: Thinking now just about Vietnam, not the Korea information you had given us previously but Vietnam, who actually conducted the autopsies

Source: In Vietnam

Bob: uh uh

Source: For sure Vietnamese was number one but I think soviet participates

Bob: [redacted]

Source: As far as I know I never saw it, we tried to put Vietnamese let us enter those we tried recruit them, take our pilots but tried they never let us in

Bob: Trying to put a few things together here, four drugs , roughtly 220 total people in the experiment that you knew of as of the last time you saw a report in 1967. If you add up the number you gave us for the autopsies for the various times it would tell you that everybody that was in the program was killed, died, sixty were given brain autopsies on their brains, 120 on their hearts and a similiar number you said on other internal organs so that would tell me that everybody died

Source: What I told you, I don't know if they tested internal organs, and I don't know, example 50 people and they tested 44 for heart, I don't know if they were the same soldiers, you know what I mean, it says we test or we analyze

Bob: So the same autopsy could have been on three or four people

Source: That I don't know

Bob: Okay, do you remember anything from the KGB and GRU report that were summarized about what they said about their ability to talk with american prisoners

Source: You mean like this

Bob: You know like we are talking now

Source: You mean KGB and GRU by themselves, uh I can just tell you I didn't see any record

Bob: Didn't mention it

Source: Soviet intervention I can just say that General Kuschev, he never left this record he said they had limited possibility because the american i mean Russian/Soviet mostly they were interest to go to officers, the present of american officers

Bob: The Vietnamese let them sit in on the interviews and ask questions

Source: I think how it goes if Vietnamese give them the record of interrogate such people so Russian push them to let them to maybe go themselves and ask more questions

Bob: Typical debriefing

Source: Yea

Gary: Are you aware that the, did they test american blacks or other populations of the pws

Source: Ah the black were special interest

Gary: Okay, and do you know anything about any of the numbers of blacks that might have been tested are you

Source: Ah at the, well first of all they, I mean the soviets, ran a presented czechoslovakia the report of about the interrogation they always seperately mentioned the blacks and how the you know how it was to see the black testing I think it was black testing no no

Bob: Drug testing only or drug testing and interrogation

Source: Both interrogation and testing but the drug testing atleast some of the drug but they were also analyze laborically and they said didn't have same effect like on the white for example to control the mind the, on the black people it was not so effective because they the black people are infeority they are, their intelligent development is not as high as the white people and they are effected more with the drugs which affected physically it is physical condition of the body then mental state because they development is

lower

Gary: What conclusions did the experiements draw on the black population that was tested. What did you learn? What was learned?

Source: Well, the conclusion was the development of the drugs in case of the war that black enemy would be much less agressive or how do you say they will be much less enthusiastic maybe you see what there was there would be much less or much more effected by the propaganda for example they will be much more resistant to some diseases for example some oh god it was

Gary: These conclusions that are being drawn how large a subject population did they have do you remember how many do you remeber the number of blacks they experimented on, they experimented on officers, they experimented on blacks do you remember the number or portions

Source: They mentioned how many persons were white, asian, black

Gary: We don't need the exact I just want a feel for numbers that you recall

Source: They would mention the number of persons were intellectuals, how many persons were llets say lower

Gary: Upper class, so forth

Source: Blacks -

Young: I heard you say a comment about you would like to check your notes -

Source: Yea

Young: Do you have notes on this subject sir

Source: Yea, I have notes, I mean you know when the CIA interrogate me I go home and write down because it was the same like these things you go to the ???? nobody will tell you what they will talk to you the next day and then they ask you about chemical weapons or nuclear weapons or then the guys go back and say oh he was general and he doesn't know about chemical weapons of course I know where they how they will be used and so forth but I am not chemical scientist to tell them you it is same as you tell me about these drugs I know how they were used, I know how they analyze it and so forth

but uh how they produced them, from what I don't know so when I came home after then I thought they will ask me again so I go home in evening make some notes

Bob: Those notes are from the time of your initial debriefings in 1968-69, you still have those

Source: I hope - many things that we discuss for example with them in the car when they took me for for I don't know I can tell you example like talk them to about soviet strategy plan, in the car after that nobody never ask after then well they say, why he didn't tell us - okay if I told you and you don't ask me then you're not interested, no I should go and say please ask me

GAry: What was the end result of the drug experiments - was there a drug in particular that was chosen as effective - do you recall a particular drug that was the result of all this experimentation

Source: Well all of them were effective different ways -

Gary: But in terms of the objectives - the military objectives in this program did one of them come out as a success in particular

Source: I think the drugs, from what I am thinking, which affected the mind was very effective

Gary: Do you recall the name of that drug

Source: This is what I am thinking at least what they said because [redacted] did not state very much on these drugs so it was very effective but I think also the drug which make you half dizzy you kndow so ???? drugs are effective, effective to command center and centralistic but when it comes to names I will find out from my friend from Military hospital the name of the drugs

Gary: Perhaps we could help you find your friend - in all this time who else in the [redacted] governemnt did you ever talk to anyone about this program - how about your boss - did you ever talk with boss on the Defense Council about this program

Source: The drug program

Gary: Uh uh the drug program in Vietnam - did you ever talk to anyone one on one just as we are talking

Source: The drugs we talked all the time in defense council

also I tell you what was fantastic in defense council was when you have break because the meetings were always I don't know around fifteen programs and therefore you have sometimes from one oclock to midnight so you have breaks and in the breaks you hears more than from the official effort because the Minister of Interior and third or first secretary I got yesterday a phone call from the Chief of KGB and we talked about this and this and then lets say when we go home I always go with minister to dinner you discuss again these things the Minister told you the Minister of Interiour is stupdi it is not like this so sometime it was better than what I heard at the offical

Gary: Briefing understand but this is a very significant program - can you remember talking about his particular program with one individual - the minister - some other person - I would certainly remember that

Bob: Well let me come at this a different way when NIck talked with you previously about the Korean program you were able to provide him with a list of names of doctors and other people who could provide more information - both russian names and [redacted] names I think we need the same kind of list of other people that we can talk to who would have knowledge about the Vietnamese drug program. I think that is really what we want to get at here who should we talk to

Source: Ah, first of all, the very good knowledge about the Korea/Vietnam must have General [redacted] to continue on with this experiment so he I think is very knowledgeable guy about these things

BOB: Have you talked with him at all

Source: Pardon me

BOB: Have you talked with him through the years since you've been back

Source: (Sigh) how many times how many times we were drunk together how many times a year was he in [redacted]

BOB: That that's when you were still in [redacted]

Source: That's true

BOB: Since you've been in the United States have you talked to him

Source: I didn't talk to anybody I didn't want to bring no troubles and I'm trying to - I already contact my friends and trying to find out if there is just work involved and I go make myself interrogation of that find some documents to prove I'm right okay I already start the process

BOB: Who else besides Gen [redacted]

Source Well uh

BOB For vietnam

Source There are many people of course numbers of different countries who I don't know who is in like work or not I don't know of these that ????????? so I don';t know who is that there is [redacted] who was in vietnam himself that is he is the right

BOB: Who is this

Source: [redacted] he was the Premier Minister before [redacted] if he will talk to somebody, I don't know but he worked general staff [redacted] he in charge of the ?????? villager of the ?????

BOB: Who was that

Source: [redacted] he was chief of the general staff. Of course to me because I don't know how much these top people are told because they also plead guilty you know for example about korea i mentioned general [redacted] but I mean [redacted] but again if you talk to this guy he is he can promise the vietnamese the [redacted] troops but the soviets and most kgb supplied the [redacted] cause which was in the civilian units and some soviet citizens he is one of them everybody know he works for the kgb not [redacted] but how much he will say, I don't know but he was for example in Korea now they called to vietnam I think what will be better to think about some middle level people or low level because the top bosses all of them are tough comrades I'm sure if I go meet some of them which I would like to do with some financial help or supplement they will be able to talk to me and maybe bring some documents I don't know what they destroyed what they didn't . but at least supply information where we can go where we can find it and it will be best things but to talk to I'm not very enthusiastic about that I'm thinking more about doctors for example but I like [redacted] who was my best friend - you can imagine if I told him I will be defective how we trust each other even in the United

States and he won't come to the department of mentalrology in central military hospital which each day they participate on the drugs control the mind not just on your soldiers they have special things they would give monkeys that they tested all these things so I'm looking more for these people who he was never communist this guy for example you know if go and talk to these tough guys are educate and submit any how and you never know who with

BOB: Could we ask that after this interview that you take some time and come up with if you were in my job and had the responsibility to try and identify sources who could be talked to both within the military and your defense council who would have seen the reports and the medical people who might have been involved at a technical level on Vietnam now I'm asking that what I would like you to do is to take some time working with dean and come up with a list of names and titles so that we can initiate some investigative steps Is that okay

Source: Yes

BOB: Uh one of the things another topic that you mentioned

Source: Uh sir I would like to if if will be possible to discuss these things also also with [redacted] cooperation

BOB: Sure yea do your work together on that - that's fine

Source: As I find out these days everything started in October when I send the letters then I go on and congress and because we discussed these things I don't know how many times with him. none officially but let me have lunch over and spend all my ????? but I think cause and as I see this day nobody ask me only forty years nothing and I see it until ?????? is the worse ?????? and as I see it now every thing goes to grill me what is not true what I said what I didn't say I would like to do the ????? okay I can make mistake if you ask me what is posit 6 the following night you understand it has been forty years ago and I'm sixty five years old I'm not ten years old eighteen years old To me better is to find a way to find out what we can discover what is still there what people you know how to prove they did it then a positive act

Bob: I understand, understand

Source: I don't want to make anybody troubles because uh some people say that he make cia mad because their congress ask them now do you make dia made because the congress

ask them to make troubles to anybody

BOB The congress has got nothing to do with this now the important thing is that at this point you are proffering some information that need to be investigated and if the congress was here or the congress wasn't here I'd still be asking you the same questions.

Source: I cannot believe the cia does not know the hospital was there in Korea for example I can not believe that you know it is not outdoors but you it was there the hospital functioned you know for twenty years

Bob: There is one other critical area that we need to get into this morning and that is At THE meeting you had a week or so ago people from the senate i wan;t there but it is my understanding that you also spoke to information that you had on the movement of american prisoners from vietnam to [redacted] and russia. I'd like you to tell - without me prodding with a lot of questions give me your summary of what you know and then we can talk about it

Source: Well then first of all when I was again you ask me if it was twenty or twenty-two in one group i can not tell them but in 19 in ah when I was g-officer for minister of defense i was in charge about all the military buildings, barracks and others through very good hall friends from [redacted] was superior to the counter intelligence bureau for general in [redacted] very good simple soldier . Generally the soviets I don't know if it is also true through other Eastern bloc countries I think maybe also through East Germany because from this point of view the Soviet know there was really good security for Romania and Bulgaria you never know but ah then [redacted] of course so what they did always they tried to cut the way to soviet union with this important operations and stop into [redacted] maybe also somewhere else I don't know ah I understand they also used North Korea, I don't know, so I was in charge about this this building nobody can put anything through the villa or barracks if I don't know because I must given key and immediate access so I remember a few times when the military intelligence and contractors they were in charge

bob: [redacted]

Source: Yea for the security when they were in [redacted] they ask for for ah this house building I just assumed from how many rooms they need how many people there are so it is what I assume

Bob: So it's a room count that you remember

Source: Yea

Bob: The counter intell

Source: I never go to the soldiers

Bob: Did you ever see them

Source: Yes because I was supplied I never meet personally but because I had special department that supplied them with uh food and cook/ chef to cook there themselves you this maybe good for these people who did it are still alive you I think I call last week my my stepson which is ??????? like the rem nights I ask him find the telephone of the receipts cause he signed for them cause if anything to do and he will do that He is a good country boy if these people for example who supplied the uh vietnamese with everybody else with the food and everything they care about uh means all take them to ???? central military hospital ,and gru, and counter intelligent and after gru they continue to Soviet Union

BOB: How many days would they have been in [redacted] normally

Source: Just approximately one week five days only

Bob: So they would have been in contact with the counter intell guys, plus medical personnel

Source: Or gru special medical personnel people who were attached

BOB: Attached to which facility

Source: Special clearance

BOB: What what medical facility do

Source: The central military hospital

Bob: Okay

Source: There the people who had the drugs also

BOB: You you do you remember actually seeing these American prisoners yourself

Source: Sure

Bob: Everytime

Source: Uh I can not say everytime

Bob: How many times do you remember, not that you saw them How how many times do you have information about where American prisoners were moved through [redacted] uh to Russia

Source: Uh I would say three four times

Bob: In groups of how many

Source: 20-22

Bob: And they stayed for about a week each time

Source: Yes

Bob: Anything else besides medical checks done at the central military hospital

Source: No the soviets did everything like interrogating or something we didn't do

Gary: How often did that happen how , when one group came how long before another group came

Source: Uh I would say one time I think it was like three months period but I would say six months period

gary: How long before you came out of [redacted] was the most recent time that you saw a bunch of American pws coming through

Source: Uh you mean the last

Gary: The last time you saw them

Source: Last time I would say 67

Gary: Okay

Source: The spring

Gary: Would you say the three or four groups then went through there 65-67

Source: yes

Gary: Is that reasonable

Source: Yea

Gary: Were there any names associated with these individuals - were there lists of names uh do you remember what kind of pows were they were they officers were they blacks were they enlisted

Source: They were white and black but I never saw the lists because it was strictly controlled by soviets

Gary: But there was a list and the soviets handled it

Source: I say I never saw the list

Gary: Who was the soviet in charge of this program

Source: Uh, General Kruschev but there was the they always flew to the [redacted] from moscow these guys they were in [redacted] they are generally in charge preparing for before they move to [redacted] someone from gru/kgb come in and they

Gary: But they must coordinate with you did they not come to you for housing

Source: As I say those who did this preparation with the guys who were permanently in [redacted] then one two days before this pow come somebody from soviet union would come

Bob: How were the do you remember what kind of transport was used to bring them to [redacted] and take them out of [redacted]

Source: Always from flights to the Soviet Union

Gary: Airplanes

Source: Sure

Bob: And uh do you have any idea I assume when they took them back they took them to Moscow center and did whatever they were going to do with them Is that accurate or would you know

Source: I don't know

Bob: Do you know where the flights came from when they were coming to [redacted]

Gary: You said there were blacks on these flights do you remember how many American blacks were brought in

Source: No I don't I saw them, some of them

Gary: A lot

Bob: A few, many, half

Source: (sigh) Now its all so difference the transport but the I think in 67 there were many blacks

Bob: They were a special interest , you said before they were a special interest

Source: I don't know if ground pol I was in the ground pool

Gary: How would you move them about [redacted] or would you move them about - from the airport

Source: Closed buses

Gary: Closed buses

Bob: And who would be responsible for the security

Source: Counter Intelligence- military counter intelligence which is kgb they don't belong to minister of defense so, the other people involved the gru and military counter intelligence

Gary: Why would they move Vietnam pows from Vietnam to [redacted] to soviet union

Bob: And not just go right to the soviet union

Source: It is what I told you how many times the soviets did this operation they tried to the way they never want it to show it moves directly to soviet union and the second reason was the checkup uh

Bob: But the soviets have good doctors too

Source: Not it was not because they don't have good doctors it was I think since they cut the way used the ??????? to do that and in case they were sick it was in [redacted] not in Moscow

Bob: Sure

Gary: Okay

Bob: The cut out angle I understand that but you balance off on the other side the fact that now so many more people know in [redacted] and it breaks the security factor

Soruce: They did it well the CIA know this was going on no it

is not security like in the United States and I will first time interrogated someone must shoot me but that is foreign psychology loop you think agents from Austria or Latvia they go to [redacted] then to Soviet Union. I don't say everyone but many of them

Bob: Its a common way stop

Source: Many of them and I can tell you again I ??? you done with us and

Gary: Did you ever speak to [redacted] about these ( ) Americans

Source: Sure

Gary: You spoke to him directly you had a conversation with him

Source: Oh many times

Gary: About the Americans in specific what was his estimate

Source: Mostly in Korea after then he was in Korea

Gary: Which was a much earlier time

Source: He was directly in charge

Gary : uhuh

Source: There were many scoundrels which we discuss in difference or concern because the guy who was there before me the General just one name and check I remember why I don't know but he did black market when he was there in Korea he was big scoundrel so we discussed many things all the time with him because we were friends you know but about Vietnam it was different thing because he used generally experience which he had from Korea so he was not bad sitting so many years like in korea

Gary: Would you say this was a state secret this would be classified at the state secret level how many people

Source: The kgb must prove the soviet kgb must prove people were in there

Gary: So they get the ruling on who gets

Source: The come in from Moscow and they who and they say we accept this one and this we do not accept

Gary: uh uh How many [redacted] would you say to your direct knowledge were aware of this program

Bob: The Vietnam program

Gary: How many [redacted] officials you and [redacted] and who else

Source: For Vietnam you must discuss different way if you are talking Vietnamese weapons or food or whatever I do not there were many people

Gary: But our interest is Pws only who would have been aware of the pws program

source: PW how many people well again if you are talking about the test the drug there are more people

Gary: No I am talking only about pws moving through [redacted]

Source: Oh oh okay how many people I would say probably 10

Gary 10 people and you can help us with the names of these people if you can use your notes and memory you can give us a list of these people

Source: Sure

Gary: Would there have been a records kept of the movement of pows through Prague

Source: I don't think so

Gary: No written reports any where

Source: I don't think so there must be record I mean there must be some papers when they checked up but the doctors never had really name - you know Jack Smith or whatever but it must have atleast say number 21 has tuberculosis or something you know because this we must give to the soviets if there are some with copies around that I don't know but for sure this was written you know how it is with each of the soldiers

Gary: But did you ever read any reports that talked about this program of moving pows from Vietnam to

Source: [redacted]

Gary: Right

Source: Would brief the defense council on next weekend when it

was done but for me it was from the how do you call it

Gary: Minutes

Source: I wrote everything that happened in the Defense Council

Gary: Right, the minutes of the meeting, the records

Gary: Did you ever read any reports on the movement of Vietnam pows from Vietnam to anywhere

Source: No, you mean like Germany

Gary: Or Russia or wherever was there anyone other than [redacted] that you talked about the movement of pws through [redacted] with direct conversations

Source: Well lets see like [redacted] who checked them in hospital

Gary: You had conversation with [redacted]

Soruce: Absolutely

Gary: Anybody else

Source: uh the people that would care about them

Gary: You mean the housekeepers , the

Source: The guy that was in charge of my department is different from the ???? department

Gary: What was his name

Source: His name was [redacted] he was later on Assistant of ???? in [redacted] exactly before I defected that they appointed him

Gary: Did you ever talk about this program directly with General Kushchev

Source: No I didn't talk to him directly but I was present when he talked to minister

Gary: He would talk to the minister about the movement of these pows which minister would he talk to

Source: Defense Minister

Gary: The defense minister who was [redacted] General Kushchev who did he work for was he kgb was he gru was

he soviet army

Source: Well he was officially soviet army but he was gru - soviet gru

Gary: Soviet Gru

Source: Course they have special because he was top boss for the soviet advisers that what they called it

Gary: In [redacted]

Source: In [redacted] he was there 12 years only

Gary: Do you know when he was there

Source: When?? sure he was there when I defected and he came there lets see when was the agreement with Austria he come back when Kruschev took power that was in 56 . 56 he was at jail in Siberia they let him go out - went into Bermia for one month then and uh then he come to [redacted] and was there until I defected so I don't know it was the end of 56 or the beginning of - no it was 56 because I know he was there for eleven or twelve years when I defected

Gary: Do you know where he is today

Source: As far I know he is he lives in Minsk Alexander Kushchev

Bob: That will be another trip to Russia for you Colonel

Young: This is a joint effort Bob

Gary: Was there any unusual pows in the mix pws that stand out in your mind - were there any handicapped pws - people like that that were going through [redacted] - people that you would remember - unique people

Source: What I saw I did not see that

Gary: Was there anything unusual that happened when they were being transferred in their five or six days -

Bob: Other than the medical checkup

Gary: That's right

Bob: What were the results of the medical checkups

Gary: Any of them get lost

Source: I hope not

Gary: uhha - we'll hold you accountable I'm sure

Source: I hope not --I think that except contrary to their origins I'm sorry for them they were scared they were very friendly fortunately the people who were there I mean the staff were ????? to talk to them also because they did not speak English but I think psychology clear at least about what the ????? [redacted] who at that time Chief of Counter Intelligence they make a promise because they thought these pow are in a different war than was Vietnam because this was the soviet most some of them lived in United States because I am sorry to say so if you come from Vietnam and you have clean breath and very good food you do the different out of Vietnam you stay there so they were worried I think the russians they are crazy peoples you can not even smile at each other so it was just when things were you somebody fight or

Gary: Nothing unusual Do you remember in specific where the houses were

Source: Sure, in [redacted] (b)(6)

Gary: What addresses were

Source: Can I give it to you later

Gary: Surely

Source: I know

Gary: You know several specific addresses you know the houses

Source: Sure, I know everyone I go there all the time I have [redacted] map I can look at and even show you the streets where it is (b)(6)

Gary: Good

Source: Giving a list of areas (could not understand what he was saying) mumbling

Gary: Was it outside of town, suburbs, in

source: I go there all the time (list of areas) I think one house owned by president of

Bob: Did General Kushchev ever talk to you about what happened to the American prisoners once they were taken

to the Soviet Union what they were going to try to accomplish with them did you ever hear any results come back

Source: Most of it 100% it was to continue their research they mentioned some results they mentioned they were from Vietnam and they were ours

bob: So both kinds were

source: Because it was soviet top secret and if you ask you are in trouble Kushchev and I would go fishing because he was so ????? he was very friendly he was supposed to state peers, and Kushchev and Bresnef give me one more please give me one more because I tell you were were happy with him he was old guy and he didn't control us so much like the younger style guy because he was more friendly especially his wife she was very friendly he would never tell us he was in Siberia but his wife told she speak [redacted] not that well though he never said one word he always spoke to me in Russian but on the other hand what I learned from him he was in Siberia because it is understand he was Alexander to Kroskivski and these guys and he was arrested like spy he go twenty -five years and then the war started they go to Siberia and ask these officers and general to go to work he finished the war in Berlin like chief of staff of one army hero of soviet union under ????? he ask for vacation to go to Minsk where his wife live and they said of course he took the train and at the railroad station the kgb and they said comrade General this bureau make the safe again you have twelve more years for years you were in the war and eight years you were in jail twelve more years and I tell you when I was fishing with him because first meeting ??? nothing unusual we hear it hundred times a day but when I was fishing with him I say comrade GEneral how is it possible in this ????I will hate the party I will hate the country, and he said just once [redacted] you don't understand I am Russian. So I'm just telling you because I was with him everyday case he has you have officer minister next to him was the guy who was like security for the minister next was guy who was ????? for him and there was his officers I was ???? I am meeting him today

(b)(

Bob: We've talked about three general themes today - the medical experimentation that took place in Vietnam - the transfer of some prisoners through Prague back to the USSR - and I guess the third theme that I picked out of this is that information was given to you by General Kushchev that the medical experimentation continued on

American prisoners once they were taken to Soviet Union - I'd like to ask two things - are there any details about any of those three themes that we didn't ask about that you would find significant or that you think we should know about

Source: The experiments in Vietnam and Soviet Union and the movement of prisoners through [redacted]. Well I'm still I think and it is not I talk to the guy what is his name Sasek IF i knew I will not be in position to find our something in the kgb files or gru files I will go mostly to speak to the talking about the tests I would go mostly to the health administration - military health administration and I will go to the Academy of Science because there some top secret room I will go to the Central Military Hospital

Bob: I understand you are recounting for us possible leads for further investigation and from [redacted] interview with you I've seen some of those things and I appreciate you remembering those again What I am after here in your mind - in your remembrance of the those times are there any other pieces of information that you can recall relating to medical experimentation on U.S. prisoners in Vietnam movement of U.S. prisoners from Vietnam to the Soviet Union and thirdly the continuation of those experiments in the Soviet Union. Any other details - any other things you think we should know about that perhaps we weren't smart enough to ask the right questions.

Source: I don't know if it will help you for example the budget for these things money for these things money if it is very important or not but I think it is there possibly also for

Bob: Where is this - where would we look for those records

Source: The budget gru or in the budget for the defense council because for any of these things it was through budget it is one thing which I know wrote - second things of course if the ???? in the records about the meeting of the political and military leaders of the Warsaw Pact. but again I think

Bob: Why the Warsaw Pact - period meetings a subject as sensitive as this one would have been discussed in front of Romanians and Bulgarians

Source: Well uh I can tell you if it was discussed first of all especially Kruschev he was big mouth he said things many things that Brezhnev never said so if he give Koreas or

someone but I don't know if it is in the records but if you are talking about Warsaw Pact I think the military leaders many times the Romanians were not present of course in front of the Romanians there were very careful but if they were not present and at that time Marshal Brezhnev for example saw he was talking about these things not openly with Romanians

Bob: Private meetings perhaps

Source: But he said look we have to go this this this because this doesn't work and so you know it happened but again it was question

Bob: When was Kruschev when did Brezhnev take over

Source: in 64

Bob: in 64, So if Khrushchev would have been talking about experimentation on Americans prisoners in Vietnam it would have had to have been before 64 or before

Source: yes

Bob: And Brezhnev never talked

Source: Brezhnev never

Bob: Closed mouth

Source: Like Bretchkov and Brezhnev when they were drunk they tell you something because they know that he like the liquor from Cuba and Hamansburg and so on and he was drunk he opened his mouth if he was not drunk i always give him three hours in the party if he was nuts three hours he tell me not one word I walked around him like a dog but on the other hand next time when he was drunk he show him american pornographic -

Bob: Let me try one more general question I ask you if you had any other pieces of information about the three themes I talked about the experimentation in Vietnam , the movement to [redacted] and then on to the USSR and experimentation in USSR put those three themes over here not a question anything else about any Americans pws some other theme other than the three we had talked about (b)(

Source: About pws

Bob: Yes American pows from Vietnam

Gary: Or Laos or Cambodia

Bob: From the war - Southeast asia war

Source: I just you know I think maybe I go to lay down

Bob: Okay then when you get with David

Source: One thing I want to tell you is ah what I learned from Khrushchev no I didn't see papers Once we discussed you know the soviets and [redacted] you because the soviets were very bad the Vietnamese didn't let them go in like sending in an official regiment like air force in Santiago and ????? everything ready because they thought the Americans had privilege and trained specialty air force for the war The ground forces not so much the because the Europe they are crazy but especially pilots and ah you know the honorized always the war how it was going how the operation and these things and when Khrushchev told me which from that I understand they used some of the prisoners who were willing to work with them and cooperated with them because of these were the least trouble them, probably better food and better life and Khrushchev told me they have exterapees of some I don't know how many who are very good because they have analyzed operations from the American side but if they were free or fined for I don't know Just because of discussion he make fun about the army so army operated this too heavy complicated army staff and I ask him how we have all this information because I thought we just and he said very useful the United States of some prisoners of war It was one of of them who cannot go home

Bob: So um you try to restate what I think I heard you some of the pilots

Source: I don't say pilots I don't know

Bob: Um alright, okay, some of the prisoners

Source: Some of prisoners had cooperated them

Bob: Yea and gave them very useful information about us

Source: Information they already used before when they interrogated but I think they give them some questions when they analyzed the soviets the operations in Vietnam the military ????they give them some questions or maybe show them I don't know and they held them to analyze the operation.

?????: Excuse me, we are due out of here at 10 o'clock we can go back to my office if you want to.

Gary: I was going to ask, were you aware of any equipment being transferred, any aircraft being transferred from Vietnam.

Source: Oh I think there was

Gary: Weapons

Source: Yea I think there was some being transferred to [redacted] not aircraft but weapons

Gary: What kind of weapons

Soruce: All kind of weapons we go to the different because as they have only - five different places ah research and testing

Gary: They do research testing

Source: Yes one big one was in [redacted] and they were others were ABO, the command in chief, command lets say communication directors they go in , ????? other scientists those were all different

Gary: I have one question can David review the notes with you Can he go over the notes you have to see if there is any information on POWs in there that you may not recall right away um I think that would be a useful exercise.

Source: Sure go ahead I find I know tell you

Bob: I guess in terms of followup of today's meeting, my expectations would be that you and David work together on coming up with a list of names of [redacted] and Soviets who have knowledge of the experimentation program in Vietnam, the transport from Vietnam through [redacted] and onto the Soviet Union and then the continuation of the drug experimentation in the Soviet Union Any of those three themes I'd be interested in names both [redacted] and Russians, Soviets, uh even if you might in looking at your notes you might see even any Vietnamese people mentioned whom we might want to talk

Gary: I'd like a list of safe homes that were used

Bob: And the medical facilities of course that were used and I know you have us those medical facilities already on Korea information which I assume some of them will be the same. If we can revisit the list specifically on

the three Vietnamese themes people, places and institutions and then if you the two of you can go over the notes in there entirety to see if there is anything else in there that pops out any other themes

Gary: A list of the people with whom [redacted] has talked about Vietnam pws going through [redacted]

Bob: Anyone having knowledge, Alan anything more

Alan: No

Bob: Gary

Gary: No

Bob: Appreciate the opportunity, appreciate the time and look forward to getting that information obviously investigations need to be pushed forward and we need to follow up these leads in Europe perhaps we could work together a little on that.

[redacted]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: 10 NOV 1992 (S) 24,317/DIW-3

REPLY TO ATTN OF: DIW-3

SUBJECT: 10 November Meeting with [redacted]

TO: DI (ATTN: David M. Curtin)

1. Meeting was held this morning at the DIAC. Bob Sheetz, [redacted] and LTC Alan Young, USA, participated from POW-MIA. Dean Markussen, Gordon Rocca and I represented DI as observers.

2. During the two-hour meeting, POW/MIA interviewed [redacted] for information pertaining to (1) Drug testing on U.S. POWs in Vietnam. (2) Transport of U.S. POWs from Vietnam through Prague to the former USSR. (3) Continued testing on POWs after arrival in the former USSR.

3. Regarding activities in Vietnam, [redacted] stated that the North Vietnamese used four different drugs developed by the Russians and the Czechs on approximately 220 individuals. [redacted] mentioned that drug testing was also done on South Vietnamese soldiers, so the number 220 could include non-U.S. POWs.) Semi-annually or annually Soviets provided the [redacted] a summary of activities conducted by or with the North Vietnamese, to include drug testing. The last report he saw on the drug testing was in 1967. The North Vietnamese, and in [redacted] view, probably the Soviets, did autopsies on dead U.S. soldiers. [redacted] provided names of [redacted] who should or might be aware of the testing or the reports on the testing.

4. Regarding the transport of U.S. POWs through [redacted] Russia, [redacted] based his information both on personal observation of former U.S. POWs in Prague and also based his numbers assessments on the number of rooms required in barracks controlled by [redacted] Thus, it was a room count vice a head count. The POWs spent approximately 5 days in [redacted] and the information [redacted] gave related to 3 or 4 groups with approximate number of 22-25 POWs in each group. He last observed a group of POWs in the spring of 1967, and he believes the groups traveled through [redacted] between 1965 and 1967. The POWs arrived and departed [redacted] via Soviet Military aircraft. [redacted] has names of [redacted] who were involved and who may be able to confirm his statements. He is willing to provide those names.

5. Regarding continued testing of U.S. POWs, [redacted] was told by the Senior GRU officer in [redacted] that the Russians planned to continue such testing in the former Soviet Union. [redacted] does not know where the former POWs went in the former USSR nor is he aware of the results of any continued testing. [redacted] had no other source of information on continued testing in the USSR--not a topic about which one raised questions to the Russians.

~~UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

[redacted]

6. Based on the discussion, POW/MIA requested the following:

a. Names, titles, positions of people familiar with:

(1) Testing on the U.S. POWs in Vietnam.

(2) Transport of U.S. POWs through [redacted] to Russia.

(3) Continued testing on POWs in Russia.

b. List of medical facilities in Prague.

c. List of addresses of VIP quarters and guest barracks which [redacted] controlled in [redacted]

d. List of people with whom [redacted] discussed presence of U.S. POWs in [redacted]

e. List of maids, cooks, maintenance/people who staffed/supported the VIP quarters or guest barracks.

7. [redacted] has a list of these requirements and is working to compile information. He is also searching his office and home for notes relevant to these issues. [redacted] and I both saw [redacted] act as he had in the past. Discussion of his roles and functions match with what he has told us in the past. Thus, there is a continuity to his information about which [redacted] and I have prior knowledge. However, neither of us discussed POW/MIA issues with [redacted] in the past.

8. POW/MIA continues to have doubts about the information [redacted] is providing concerning U.S. POWs in/from Vietnam. Bob Sheetz thinks that [redacted] is projecting the Russian experience in Korea to Vietnam and thus is constructing a scenario for what could have happened rather than what did happen. Sheetz intends to develop a list of questions and to recommend to the DD that [redacted] be given another polygraph exam.

9. [redacted] expects to make a deposition for the Senate Committee on 19 or 20 November. He has his own lawyer.

10. Our next action is to work with [redacted] (as he requested) to develop the information requested by POW/MIA (para 6).

SIGNED

[redacted]

Chief, DIW-3

1 Enclosure
DIW-3 Memo ([redacted]), 1 Cy

cc:

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

04 NOV 1992

~~S/NF~~-1412/PW

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Possible [redacted] Testimony before SSC 10-11 November 1992 (U)

Reference: POW-MIA document [redacted]-0466, 27 Apr 92, subj: Defense Intelligence Agency Report [redacted]-0418 Information Memorandum.

1. ~~(S/NF)~~ The enclosed reports summarize information provided by [redacted] on U.S. POWs allegedly taken to the Soviet Union from Vietnam. [redacted] is the source of our previous memorandum on possible drug experimentation on U.S. Prisoners of War during the Korean War carried out by Soviet and [redacted] personnel. [redacted] has been requested to give a deposition to the Senate Select Committee for POW-MIA (SSC) on 5 November 1992. This is a follow up to a one hour interview on 21 October by SSC investigators in the Central Documentation Office. We anticipate [redacted] may be requested to testify in open hearings on or about 11 November. Because of the ongoing investigation into [redacted] drug testing allegations, DIA will insist on any hearings with [redacted] as a witness be conducted in closed session.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ Although [redacted] information on the Korean War drug testing program is uncorroborated hearsay information, there were sufficient confirmed corollary elements of his report that compelled the forwarding of this information to policymakers for their consideration [redacted] information on the Korean War drug testing program was used by the to request information from the [redacted] in January 1992. Also, a demarche was made on the Russian Government in September. The response from the [redacted] indicates no knowledge of a drug testing program. The Russians have not yet responded.

3. ~~(S/NF)~~ DIA's Special Office for POW-MIA interviewed on 16 September 1992 regarding information attributed to him by author Joe Douglass in a 15 August 1992 Washington Times article. Douglass had written that Soviet technicians conducted drug

~~CLASSIFIED BY: DIA/DH~~
~~DECLASSIFY: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

experiments on American POWs from Vietnam and Korea. In this interview Sejna claimed that U.S. POWs in Vietnam were transferred to the Soviet Union from 1959 through the early 1960s, at the direction of Khruschev. He could not remember the route of transfer, but said the Soviets were required to "pay" the Vietnamese with aid or military equipment for each POW sent to the USSR. Up to 100 POWs were allegedly transferred.

4. ~~(S/NF)~~ In the 21 October interview with SSC investigators, Sejna expanded his allegations to include that some or all may have passed through [redacted] on their way to the USSR. According to [redacted] latest statement, up to 100 POWs were transferred in groups of 25 before 1968. While in [redacted] the U.S. servicemen stayed in ten special houses and were transported in a closed van or bus to the hospital where they were given medical treatment before being flown to Moscow.

5. (U) On 22 October, DIA was tasked to provide the SSC all records relating to POW information provided by [redacted]. In order to comply, DIA is conducting an exhaustive search of all interview transcripts and tapes to identify what POW-related information was provided to us prior to 1991. Results of that review show that [redacted] never mentioned drug testing on American POWs in either Korea or Vietnam, or their possible transfer to the USSR or elsewhere.

6. ~~(S/NF)~~ Through the bilateral Commission staff here in Washington, we have recommended that State Department make a demarche to the [redacted] and Russian Governments regarding this new information. The [redacted] should also be asked to check their records on [redacted] hospitals for any information regarding U.S. personnel from 1958-1975. The Russians should not only be asked for an answer to our first demarche, their period of search should be expanded to include 1958-1975.

ROBERT R. SHEETZ
Director
Special Office for Prisoners
of War and Missing in Action

[redacted]

cc:
DR, DIA
DD, DIA
COS, DIA
DASD/POW-MIA

16 Sep 92

[redacted]

[redacted]-1414/PW

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD - INTERVIEW WITH [redacted] DEFECTOR, [redacted]

SUMMARY: RO interviewed [redacted] defector, [redacted], regarding information attributed to him by author Joe Douglass (see attached articles). The author has written that Soviet technicians conducted drug experiments on American prisoners of war (POWs) from Vietnam. He claimed that [redacted] was the originator of this information.

DETAILS: On 16 September 1992, RO met with [redacted] for one hour on Bolling AFB. [redacted] began the interview by stating he was tired of talking about POWs. He first reported the drug experiments to the CIA in the early 1970s, and nothing was done at that time. [redacted] expressed surprise that only now was attention being paid to his statements.

[redacted] admitted that he was the source of Douglass' story. [redacted] was knowledgeable of drug experiments conducted on U.S. POWs from the Korean War and has been previously debriefed on his information. [redacted] claimed that he believed the Russians continued some type of drug experimentation on Americans during the Vietnam War. These experiments were the subject of numerous discussions in the [redacted] Defense Council, of which [redacted] was a member.

[redacted] said the Russians were the only ones conducting these experiments. [redacted] involvement consisted only of [redacted] medical personnel providing analysis on the experiment results; this was presumably done in Moscow. [redacted] emphatically stated there was no [redacted] medical presence in Vietnam during the war. (NOTE: The [redacted] Viet Friendship Hospital in Haiphong was in existence prior to July 1968).

[redacted] reported that at least by 1968, the date of his defection, approximately 100 American POWs had been transported from Vietnam to Russia. He had no specific knowledge but was merely expressing his informed opinion [redacted] did not know the route or method of the transfers. He stated that the Russian military was responsible for moving POWs out of Vietnam. [redacted] said the initial transfer of American POWs began under the direction of Kruschev. He believed the first of the 100 POWs were taken to Russia in 1959; others continued to be transferred through the early 60s. [redacted] claimed the Russians were required to "pay" the Vietnamese for each POW, either in aid or military weaponry. The POWs were "eliminated" after the experiments were completed.

Sejna suggested that the following people/organizations would have information on the POW drug testing program:

- Archives of the Defense Council (possibly held in the Central Committee Building, [redacted]
- Central Military Hospital in [redacted]
- Research Institute for the Air Force [redacted]
- Dr [redacted], Chief of the [redacted] Health Administration
- Dr. [redacted] Deputy Chief of the [redacted] Health Administration
- Dr. [redacted], Commander of the Central Military Hospital [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] recommended that the following Russian organizations be queried for information on the POW drug testing program:

- Ministry of Health
- Academy of Sciences

[redacted]
Intelligence Officer

[redacted]

21 Oct 92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

21 October, Mr. [redacted] met with Mr. Bill LeGro and John McCreary of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Also present were Mr. Dean Markussen of DIA, and Mr. Fred Green, Mr. Charles Wells and Ms. Alicia Tompkins of the CDO. The meeting essentially addressed two distinct areas: the treatment of US POWs at a [redacted] hospital in Korea and the movement of US servicemen form there to the Soviet Union; and the movement of US servicemen form Vietnam to the Soviet Union.

Mr. LeGro explained that he was responsible for coordinating the inquiry into WWII, Korea and the Cold War. He brought with him a report labeled "sensitive" prepared by Dr. Joseph Douglass. Mr. LeGro asked [redacted] if he had knowledge of a hospital constructed by the [redacted] for the Soviets in Korea, used to treat US POWs, with treatment including medical/surgical experiments. [redacted] said he did have knowledge of this hospital, although he had never visited it. [redacted] said he was familiar with the document prepared by Dr. Douglass. In response to a statement in the document, [redacted] stated the individual in charge of everything in Korea including the hospital was [redacted] GRU officer, accredited to Korea as ambassador. Mr. LeGro mentioned a [redacted] (sp?) at the hospital. [redacted] said that because this was a hospital to train [redacted] doctors in military medicine, the doctors changed many times, probably every six months. When asked if interrogations were conducted [redacted] said he did not know. Were prisoners sent to the USSR? Yes, some to [redacted] and some to the USSR. In his paper, Douglass alleged the hospital was primarily for intelligence research. [redacted] said no, although he allowed that possibly interrogation may have taken place in the basement. Brain control, he said, was done there. Was it an experimental hospital? Yes, mostly experimental. How many beds? It was small. Was it a permanent facility. Yes, and there were KGB assigned there. They controlled everything. Did they select prisoners to take to the USSR? Absolutely. The document prepared by Douglass stated that there was psychological and physiological testing on US servicemen and Koreans. True. Any experimenting on Soviets? no. [redacted] provided an example of a study: a comparison of autopsies of US servicemen and Koreans found the incidence of heart problems in US servicemen to be 20% and only 2% for the Koreans. Did they test chemical and biological agents. Yes. Mind control? Yes. Is the document prepared by Mr. Douglass essentially true? [redacted] read the document and said it was. Where did [redacted] get his information. He was Secretary of the Defense Council, the body that had major authority for military intelligence. Reports were received every six months. Reports did not just come from [redacted], but also from Chief of rear service, Air Force Medical Research Center. Defense Council approved money for projects. As an aside, [redacted] was deputy Chief of [redacted] GRU before he went to Korea and was Chief of the Dept of Foreign Relations afterward. [redacted] knowledge came from reports received by the Defense

[redacted]

Council or direct briefings from [redacted]. How close did the [redacted] work with the Koreans? Relations were close, good. Still, KGB was everywhere, coordinated everything. There was a problem with the Rumanians, but [redacted] followed Soviets orders closely. [redacted] left in 1968.

Did [redacted] have any information about US servicemen shipped from Vietnam or Laos to the Soviet Union. Sure, absolutely. Some travelled through [redacted]. Numbers? Three or four times, 20-25 people each. Before 1968? Yes. Was there a hospital in Vietnam like in Korea. No, the Vietnamese were difficult to deal with. They were sent to [redacted] to check for disease, then sent to the USSR.

Back to Korea, how many people went to the Czech hospital in Korea. Hundreds of people. [redacted] thought he recalled that one year 600 were treated. Americans and Koreans. Do you think reports still exist? [redacted] said don't trust the KGB or the GRU, but go to [redacted] ask for records from the Defense Council, the Scientific Institute of Military Air Force, the Central Military Hospital in [redacted] In the hospitals, there might have been more people not loyal to Communism who might have saved something. This information was classified STATE Importance--the highest classification and was literally closely guarded. Information may have been destroyed or sent to the Soviet Union. Would records have been shared with Korea? Don't think everything, but some things, yes.

Any information that N. Korea conducted its own experiments? They did have their own hospitals but did not conduct research. What year was the hospital built? It was built during the war. But it was not captured by American Troops? Must have been built after 1950--the Chinese intervention. Would it be useful to check German files. They were all involved in Korea, but not with the hospital, the Soviets trusted the [redacted] the most. The Soviets did not trust the Germans. Would the Germans have information on what happened to Americans. Yeah, sure, I think so. Germany might have more documents because of the way the change over of power took place.

Back to Vietnam and Laos. Information, if available in [redacted] would there be any documents on the transhipment of servicemen to the Soviet Union? Never written reports to the Defense Council. Never saw any document that talked about the number of soldiers transferred or who they were. It was all under Soviet authority. Even in [redacted] Soviets handled everything except for the hospital examination. There might have been related documents such as requests for funding for transportation, etc.

John McCreary says this is interesting because DIA has testified under oath that there has never been any evidence of American Servicemen being moved to the Soviet Union from Indochina. Mr. LeGro asks when you return to your DIA office do you think you will be asked to recant what you have said. [redacted], well my

boss is right here. I was never asked about this 24 years ago. I did tell CIA about the hospital. Also in a book I published with Dr. Douglass, Red Cocaine, there is a chapter that talks about testing drugs on servicemen. Have you talked to DIA people about Vietnam. I have talked to DIA about a lot of things..Korea, Vietnam, drugs. Have you told the PW shop about this (movement of servicemen to the USSR) I don't recall. Did they believe you? Were they surprised? Senja replied it was a friendly discussion. I do not know if they asked.

Where would servicemen go in the Soviet Union? I don't know after Moscow. I can tell you that in [redacted] they stayed in special, 10 different houses and went to the hospital in a closed van or bus. They flew from Prague to Moscow. I don't know where they went after that. They shared some results of tests.

[redacted] requested that if the Committee wants to meet with him again, could they provide the questions in advance so he would be better able to provide names and places. [redacted] was asked to clarify if he had told DIA that US servicemen were taken to the Soviet Union from Vietnam. He first said he did not recall, but then he said yes, but he had not mentioned any transhipment through [redacted]

Alicia K. Tompkins

Alicia K. Tompkins
Legislative Liaison, CDO

[redacted]

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

May 90

[redacted]-0421/POW-MIA

TO: Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
Studies and Analysis Division
ATTN: Mr. Matt, Chief
Fort Detrick, Fredrick, MD

SUBJECT: Request for Information: POW/MIA Requirement (U)

1. (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency's Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action is tasked with providing the fullest possible accounting of Americans who became missing while serving their country during all military conflicts. One element of the Special Office is following up on unaccounted for as a result of the Korean conflict.

[redacted]

4. (U) Point of contact for DIA/POW-MIA is [redacted]

5. (U) Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

ROBERT R. SHEETZ
Chief
Special Office for Prisoners
of War and Missing in Action

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

Ref

[redacted]-0532/POW-MIA

5 JUL 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Request for Information: Defectors with Information Pertaining to U.S. Personnel Unaccounted-for as a Result of the Korean Conflict (U)

1. (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency's Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action is tasked with providing the fullest possible accounting of Americans who became missing while serving their country during all military conflicts. One element of the Special Office is following up on unaccounted-for as a result of the Korean conflict.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

4. (U) Point of contact for the DIA/POW-MIA Special Office is [redacted]

5. (U) Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

DENNIS M. NAGY
Executive Director

[redacted]

Probe into biological experiments on Korean War POWs reported

TACOMA, Wash. (AP) — The Pentagon is investigating claims that biological experiments were conducted on U.S. prisoners during the Korean War, a newspaper reported yesterday.

A Pentagon consultant contends that Soviet officers tested biological weapons on the prisoners before killing them and destroying their bodies in a North Korean crematorium, The Morning News Tribune of Tacoma said in a copyright story.

Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Kerry Gershanezk confirmed that the government is "looking into allegations that medical experiments were conducted at a facility in North Korea."

But Col. Gershanezk declined to confirm the details of the claims by consultant Joseph Douglass Jr., the newspaper said.

Ho Jong, second-ranking ambassador at the North Korean mission to the United Nations, angrily denied the claims, calling them "absolutely groundless rumors," the News Tribune said.

Mr. Douglass contends that more than 100 Americans were the subjects of Soviet biological tests in Korea, and as many were used in similar experiments during the Vietnam war.

His information comes mostly from interviews with former Czechoslovak Maj. Gen. Jan Sejna, who defected to the United States in 1968, the News Tribune said.

Gen. Sejna served on the Czechoslovak Defense Council, which shared intelligence operations and secrets with the Soviet military, the newspaper reported. He was briefed on the North Korean hospital as part of his official duties, according to the report on the issue Mr. Douglass gave recently to the Pentagon and Senate.

Mr. Douglass also alludes to his research in the upcoming September edition of the magazine Armed Forces Journal International.

WASHINGTON TIMES SATURDAY
Pg A4 15 AUG 92

Red Cocaine
by Dr. Joseph Douglass
Clarion House
Box 88304
Atlanta, Georgia 30338
Published 1990

2
THE SOVIET DECISION

When China began waging war with narcotics and drugs in the late 1940s, their actions were quickly identified. Shipments of drugs were seized and intelligence was collected that identified the source, the People's Republic of China, their trafficking routes, techniques, and eventually even the principal organizations behind the production and distribution.

In the case of the Soviet Union, intelligence on their operation was not immediately available, perhaps attesting to the care exercised by the Soviets in developing secure, covert marketing techniques before launching their operation. As will be seen, their operation was designed to be far more extensive than the Chinese operation, and once in place, was intensified on an almost yearly basis. While the distinction of initiating large-scale political war with drugs goes to the Chinese, it is the Soviets who have made the trafficking the effective political warfare and intelligence weapon it has become, and who accomplished this without almost any recognition in the West of their involvement. Not until 1968 was there a source in the West who possessed the detailed knowledge about the Soviet operation. Not until 1986 was any attention directed to his knowledge. The story that follows is the first comprehensive unveiling of his knowledge of Soviet narcotics warfare.

This source of data on the Soviet drug and narcotics operation is Jan Sejna, who defected from Czechoslovakia to the United

States in February 1968.[1] General Major Sejna was a member of the Central Committee, the National Assembly, and the Presidium and its party group. He was also a member of the Main Political Administration, its political bureau, and a member of the Administrative Organs Department.[2] He was first secretary of the party at the Ministry of Defense, where he was also Chief of Staff and a member of the Minister's Kolegium. His most important position was secretary of the powerful Defense Council, which is the top decision-making body in matters of defense, intelligence, foreign policy, and the economy. Sejna was a top-level, decision-making party official. He met regularly with the highest officials in the Soviet Union and other communist countries. He was present during the inception, planning, and implementation of Soviet narcotics trafficking operations.

The Soviet concept of using drugs and narcotics trafficking as a strategic operation, Sejna explains, emerged during the Korean War. During that war, the Chinese and North Koreans used drugs against U.S. military forces to undermine the effectiveness of both officers and enlisted men and to raise revenues in the process.[3] The Soviets were also assisting North Korea in the war, albeit not in so obvious a fashion as the Chinese.

The war provided the Soviets with an opportunity to study the effectiveness of U.S. forces and equipment. Czechoslovak intelligence assisted the Soviets. As part of this intelligence mission, Czechoslovakia constructed a hospital in North Korea. Ostensibly built to treat casualties, the real use of the hospital was as a research facility in which Czechoslovak, Soviet, and North Korean doctors at the hospital experimented on U.S. and South Korean prisoners of war. The Czechoslovak official in charge of the Czechoslovak operations in North Korea was Colonel Rudolf Bobka, of *Zpravdajska sprava* (Zs), the Military Intelligence Administration of the Czechoslovak General Staff. Colonel Professor Dr. Dufek, a heart specialist, was in charge of the hospital. Sejna learned about the hospital and related activities directly from Colonel Bubka, from various reports, and from subsequent briefings that summarized the results of the experi

Where was hospital? N. Korean doctors at hospital?

ments and used the results in studies of the strategic military potential of drug trafficking.[4]

The experiments were justified as preparations for the next war. American and South Korean POWs were used as guinea pigs in chemical and biological warfare experiments, in physiological and psychological endurance tests, and in testing the effectiveness of various mind control drugs, which were used to make U.S. servicemen renounce America and speak of the benefits of the communist system.[5]

To learn more about the biological and chemical make-up of American and South Korean soldiers, autopsies were performed on captured bodies and POWs who did not survive the various experiments. During this activity, the Soviet doctors determined that an unusually high percentage of young U.S. soldiers had suffered cardiovascular damage, which they referred to as "mini heart attacks." At the same time, Soviet intelligence, which was studying the Chinese drug trafficking,[6] determined that the young U.S. servicemen were also the most prominent users of the harder drugs.[7] The Soviet doctors noticed the correlation and hypothesized that one of the factors that likely contributed to the heart damage was drug abuse.[8]

News of the physically debilitating effect of the drugs captured the imagination of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Drug and narcotics trafficking, he reasoned, should be viewed as a strategic operation that would directly weaken the enemy, rather than merely as a financial or intelligence tool. Accordingly, he ordered a joint military-civilian, Soviet-Czechoslovak study to examine the total effects of drug and narcotics trafficking on Western society; this included its effects on labor productivity, education, the military (the ultimate target at that time), and its use in support of Soviet Bloc intelligence operations. This study was not approached as a question of tactics or as simply an opportunity to exploit. The narcotics potential was examined in the context of a long-range strategic operation. Costs and risks, benefits and payoffs, integration and coordination with other operations were all examined. Even the effects of drugs *over several generations*[9] were analyzed by scientists from the Academy of Sciences.

The conclusions of the study were that trafficking would be extremely effective, that the most vulnerable targets were the United States, Canada, France, and West Germany, and that the Soviets should capitalize on the opportunity. The study was approved by the Soviet Defense Council in late 1955 or early 1956. The principal guidance from the Defense Council in approving the action was to direct the planners to speed up the timetable of events, which was possible because of certain operational experience with narcotics that already existed within the Soviet Bloc intelligence services but about which the people who had prepared the basic plan were unaware.[10] The approval of this plan was the formal Soviet decision to begin narcotics trafficking against the bourgeoisie, especially against the U.S. capitalists.

This study came at a most propitious time for the communists because, simultaneously, the Soviets under Khrushchev's direction were working to modernize the world revolutionary movement. Khrushchev believed the movement had grown stagnant under Stalin, and he wanted it rejuvenated, to take advantage of new world conditions.

Soviet strategy for revolutionary war is a global strategy. Soviet narcotics strategy is a sub-component of this global strategy and is best understood in this context. While the major target of this activity is often thought to be the undeveloped world, this is not the case. Soviet strategy and tactics were developed for the whole world, within which the most important sectors were the industrialized nations and the most important target, the United States.

The basic revolutionary strategy took shape in the years 1954 to 1956. As detailed by Sejna, there were five principal thrusts in the modernized strategy. First was the increased training of leaders for the revolutionary movements—the civilian, military, and intelligence cadres. The founding of Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow is an example of one of the early actions taken to modernize the Soviet revolutionary leadership training.

The second step was the actual training of terrorists. Training for international terrorism actually began as "fighters for liberation." The term "national liberation" was coined to replace

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revolutionary war movement as a two-way deception: to provide a nationalistic cover for what was basically an intelligence operation and to provide a label that was semantically separated from the communist revolutionary war movement.

The third step was international drug and narcotics trafficking. Drugs were incorporated into the revolutionary war strategy as a political and intelligence weapon to use against the bourgeois societies and as a mechanism for recruiting agents of influence around the world.

The fourth step was to infiltrate organized crime and, further, to establish Soviet Bloc sponsored and controlled organized crime syndicates throughout the world.

The fifth step was to plan and prepare for sabotage throughout the whole world. The network for this activity was to be in place by 1972.

Because of the close association between organized crime and narcotics, the Soviet entry into organized crime deserves closer scrutiny. The decision on organized crime was made in 1955. It, too, was to be a global operation targeted against all countries, not just the United States, although organized crime in the United States, along with France, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, were primary targets.

The main reason for infiltrating organized crime was the Soviet belief that high-quality information—information on political corruption, money and business, international relations, drug trafficking, and counter-intelligence—was to be found in organized crime. The Soviets reasoned that if they could successfully infiltrate organized crime, they would have unusually good possibilities to control many politicians and would have access to the best information on drugs, money, weapons, and corruption of many kinds. A secondary reason was to use organized crime as a covert mechanism for distributing drugs.

As in the case of narcotics trafficking, the Soviets put together study groups to analyze organized crime, identify the main groups, develop the strategy and tactics for infiltrating the groups, identify what people could be used to help the infiltration, and examine the possibility for organizing or helping to organize new groups. In Czechoslovakia, the studies went on for

six months. These studies were not taken lightly; they were high-level operations involving top officials from military intelligence, counterintelligence, civilian intelligence, and the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee.

The first plan was put into action in 1956. Czechoslovakia was given directions on which operations to undertake as part of the intelligence plan, which was reviewed and approved in the fall. The plan instructed Czechoslovak strategic intelligence to infiltrate seventeen different organized crime groups, as well as the Mafia in France, Italy, Austria, Latin America, and Germany. The Italian Communist Party was used heavily in the infiltration operation. Twenty percent of the Italian police were members of the communist party. These members helped the Soviet Bloc intelligence agents infiltrate the Mafia. War criminals, e.g. Germans, were also coerced into assisting the Soviet Bloc agents in this endeavor, especially throughout Latin America.

The Czechoslovak operation was very successful and did not cost much money. Organized crime operations were developed around information collection and blackmail; it was a two-sided operation. Once inside, the agents were mainly passive; they just collected information. Then, at the right opportunity, information would be released for political reasons, for example, to trigger revolutionary changes, or to create a situation that could be exploited by the Social Democrats. This is why the operation was organized within the unit responsible for strategic intelligence—it was used for strategic advantage.

Narcotics, terrorism, and organized crime were coordinated and used together in a complementary fashion. Narcotics were used to destroy the society. Terrorism was used to destabilize the country and prepare the revolutionary situation. Organized crime was used to control the elite. All three were long-range strategic operations and all three were incorporated into Soviet Bloc planning by 1956.

Before the actual narcotics trafficking could commence, several preparatory actions were required, the two most important of which were the development of a strategy for the covert mar

keting of drugs and narcotics, and the training of intelligence cadres. The Soviets wanted to hide their operation from the Chinese and especially from the West, to avoid upsetting the acceptance by the West of the Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistence.[11] Because the narcotics strategy was new in most of its particulars, the intelligence skills had to be developed and passed to the agents. This training activity involved not only Soviets, but East European intelligence agents as well.

Additionally, during the late 1950s, a research program was undertaken to obtain quantitative data on the actual effects of different drugs on soldiers, which involved the use of Soviet soldiers as guinea pigs. As part of this research, an espionage program was initiated to penetrate Western medical and science centers, especially those of a military nature, to determine how much the West knew about the effects of drugs on people—particularly the effect on military combat-effectiveness and decision-making.

In parallel, Soviet Bloc intelligence services were directed to learn how much Western intelligence services knew about the drug business and which drug groups they had infiltrated. One of the important questions addressed in this study was the nature and effectiveness of the capabilities of Western intelligence services to monitor the production and distribution of drugs.[12] Several years later, Sejna was to learn the results of this study from the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Matvey V. Zakharov. Zakharov said that Soviet intelligence had concluded that U.S. intelligence and counter-intelligence were blind, and that this made the Soviet narcotics operation much easier. The United States intelligence efforts were concentrated, along with those of the British, on the narcotics trafficking through Thailand and Hong Kong, where there was so much narcotics activity and associated corruption that no useful information on Soviet narcotics trafficking could be collected. The "background noise" was simply too great.

During the studies, the use of narcotics and drugs became recognized as a special dimension of chemical warfare. In Czechoslovakia, drugs and narcotics research were formally added to military planning, as part of chemical warfare research. This

research included tests on the effect of drugs on military performance, for example on pilot performance, which was studied at the Health Administration of the Rear Services and at the Health Institutes of the Air Force. Finally, the basic study on the impact of drugs on the West was expanded to identify better the groups and regions to be targeted. This study was the responsibility of the International (Foreign) Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). It was, in effect, a political market-analysis and marketing-techniques study.

One of the last actions to be initiated before the actual mass-trafficking operation began was the establishment of training centers for drug traffickers. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the training centers were joint Soviet-Czechoslovak operations. There were both civilian intelligence-managed training centers, which were jointly planned by KGB (Soviét) officials and Czechoslovak officials from the second administration of the Ministry of Interior (the second administration is the Czechoslovak KGB intelligence counterpart);[13] and military intelligence-managed training centers, which were jointly planned by GRU (Soviet military intelligence) and its Czechoslovak counterpart, Zs. These plans were developed in 1959, as General Sejna recalls, and the Defense Council review of the plans and decision to fund them, following instructions from the Soviet Defense Council, took place in 1959 or 1960.

The Zs (military intelligence) training center was located in a Czechoslovak Zs base at Petrzalka, a suburb of Bratislava, which is situated on the Austrian border. The second administration training center was located next to Liberec, which is on the West German border.

Each course consisted of three months of intense training. While Marxism-Leninism indoctrination was present, the emphasis was strictly on the drug business. The Soviets provided the Czechoslovaks with a copy of the Soviet schedule and lesson plans, which the Czechoslovaks copied. The course included instruction in:

- The nature of the drug business, types and quality;
- Means of production;

- Organization of distribution;
- Drug markets and buyers;
- Security;
- Infiltration of existing production networks;
- How to use the experience of intelligence networks;
- Communications within drug organizations;
- How to pass intelligence information; and,
- How to recruit intelligence sources.

At the Zs centers, there were two different training groups, which alternated. The first group was recruited by the military and civilian intelligence services. This group was strictly for drug "criminals"—the attendees were neither communists nor ideologically motivated. The word criminals is in quotations, because that is what the training was to produce. However, all recruits were carefully screened by military or civilian counterintelligence to make certain that the recruits were clean; that is, that they did not have criminal records or a background in corruption that rendered them susceptible to blackmail by another party. Often, the recruits were sons or daughters of people in positions of power. These people, and the potential risks that would be associated with their recruitment, were often the subject of specific discussions within the Czechoslovak Defense Council.

The second group were people recommended by the First Secretaries of the various foreign communist parties. These were communists who were considered loyal to the cause. They, too, were carefully screened by military or civilian counterintelligence before being admitted to the course. Their training was slightly different, because their trafficking was also intended to serve a local political purpose and because they operated and communicated through different special (Party or intelligence) channels. Their drug trafficking (and training) was heavily oriented to support the First Secretary of the local communist parties; for example, to compromise opposition leaders.

In addition to Czechoslovak instructors, the Soviets often provided two instructors for each course who had practical experience. Most often these were Latin Americans or others who looked the part and spoke fluent Spanish. These instructors

would present seminars dealing with practical problems and real life experiences.

As indicated above, the courses ran three months. Thus, a total of four groups trained each year. The first group to take the Zs course in Czechoslovakia was small—seven future drug criminals consisting of four Latin Americans, two West Germans, and one Italian or French national, as Sejna recalls. By 1964, the group size had expanded to fourteen, and by the end of the 1960s, the capacity, twenty, was reached. Thus a total of approximately thirty students were trained the first year in the Czechoslovakia Zs center, and by 1968 the yearly output of graduates had reached eighty.

The second administration center was of similar size. Additionally, similar drug trafficker training centers that Sejna was aware of were established in Bulgaria, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. And in 1962-1963, Czechoslovakia was directed by the Soviets to assist North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba to establish training centers. Assuming each training center was the minimum size, each operated at or near its capacity, and no other centers existed or were added after Sejna left, the number of graduates today would exceed 25,000.

The students who attended the course in the Czechoslovak centers were mainly from Latin América, Western Europe, parts of the Middle East, Canada, and the United States. Bulgaria's focus was on the Middle East and Southwest Asia—Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Syria. East Germany handled West Europeans and Scandinavians, and all countries assisted with the Far East nationals.

The course was free, all expenses paid. The graduates returned to their respective countries and applied their skills. Some built independent operations, others cooperated with ongoing operations. Those who deviated and attempted to "change sides" were killed.[14] All returned a percentage of their earnings to the Soviet Union directly, which would then reimburse the intelligence services of the satellites that had performed the training. In the case of Czechoslovakia, their cut was thirty percent of the fees the Soviets received back.[15]

The establishment of these training centers completed the preparations for the drug strategy. These activities—strategy development, training, research, espionage, and market analysis—were the principal activities of the beginning Soviet narcotics operation in the late 1950s. Where there were intelligence operations involving actual trafficking, these were more in the nature of limited probes, tests, and continuations of prior intelligence practices. The real trafficking, from Sejna's perspective, did not begin until 1960, by which time the marketing strategy had been worked out, strategic intelligence agents had been trained, and training schools were turning out graduate indigenous drug traffickers.

. Victor Lasky, "Red China's Secret Weapon," in Extension of Remarks of Hon. Norris Poulson, U.S. Congress, House, *Congressional Record—Appendix* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 23, 1953), p. A2176.
. See Candlin, *Psycho-Chemical Warfare*, op. cit., pp. 108-118; Hamburger, *The Peking Bomb*, op. cit., p. 235; and *Communist China and Illicit Narcotic Traffic*, op. cit., p. 16.
. Deacon, *The Chinese Secret Service*, op. cit., p. 447, reports using as many as thirty-seven separate reports from twenty-six individuals who Deacon believed had interviewed as many as fifty to sixty defectors, police officers, secret agents, drug squad officers, and intelligence officers.
. For extensive details and maps of production areas and trafficking routes, see *Psycho-Chemical Warfare*, op. cit., *The Peking Bomb*, op. cit., and various reports to the U.N. filed by the U.S. Commissioner on Narcotics, Harry Anslinger.
. Cag[illegible]; *Psycho-Chemical Warfare: The Chinese Communist Drug Offensive Against the H[illegible]*: cit., p. 195; and Hamburger, *The Peking Bomb*, op. cit., p. 59.
. *Tokyo Sinhun*, January 8, 1953, cited in Richard L. G. Deverall, *Mao Tse-tung: Stop This Dirty Opium Business!* (Tokyo: Toyoh Printing and Bookbinding Co., 1954), pp. 64-66. See also Candlin, *Psycho-Chemical Warfare*, op. cit., pp. 195-197, 454-455.
. Candlin, *Psycho-Chemical Warfare*, op. cit., p. 214.
. Ibid., pp. 215-216.
. Interview with Jan Sejna who was present when Suslov discussed China's narcotics trafficking in detail. This data had come from Soviet intelligence.
. Turnbull, *Chinese Opium Narcotics*, op. cit., p. 15.
. Ibid., p. 15.
. Ibid.
. Ibid., p. 16.

ıapter 2—The Soviet Decision

. Jan Sejna, *We Will Bury You* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1982).
. The Administrative Organs Department is one of the two or three most important departments of the Central Committee. This department has responsibility for [illegible] Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior (KGB), and the Ministry of Ju[illegible]. It is the most important department insofar as defense, intelligence, and deception are concerned.
. In Congressional testimony and in official reports of the Narcotics Division of the Treasury Department, the Korean War is described as having "been financed solely from the sale of illicit narcotics." Lasky, "Red China's Secret Weapon," op. cit., p. A2176.
. The most significant briefing was in 1956, which included Dr. Dufek, Colonel Miroslov Hemalla of the Military Health Administration, who later became a general and head of the Military Health Administration, Colonel Dr. Plzak, whose specialty was the central nervous system and who practiced at the experimental hospital in North Korea, and several other medical specialists.

There was scattered intelligence on certain of the experiments that caused major concern within U.S. intelligence and within the U.S. Army. See, for example, John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 215, and U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Foreign and Military Intelligence: Book I* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 26, 1976), pp. 392-393.

5. CIA concern about Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean use of LSD and other drugs in mind-bending experiments became real during the Korean War. The concern was apparently valid and justified but there was a lack of understanding of the dimensions and objectives of the communist programs. Unfortunately, this concern led to the tragically aberrant experimentation by U.S. intelligence that surfaced during the Congressional hearings of 1975-1976. See, for example, U.S. Senate, *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign Intelligence, Book I* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 392-420.
6. Soviet interest in the use of drugs goes back to the mid-1930s, when they were experimenting with drugs as a revolutionary tool. One particularly interesting example of the use of drugs in this respect is reported by A. H. Stanton Candlin. He reports that in 1934, the Comintern experimented with the use of marijuana in New York City to stimulate student radicals against the New York police. Actions of both drugged and undrugged youths were compared.

"During the melee that resulted it was obvious to the observers that the drugged group were far more effective than the undrugged one. The former were insensible to pain and also continued to struggle and resist vigorously after they had been arrested. As soon as they were in the police station, the ACLU appeared on the scene and bailed them out. All rioters were then taken to the Rand School of Social Science (listed as a Communist-run organization by the Federal Government) where they underwent medical and psychiatric examination. . . . Two days later a conference was held having as its subject the use of marijuana as a conditioning medium for riots and revolutionary violence. It met at the headquarters of the League for Industrial Democracy . . . Leading personalities of the Communist Party . . . participated."

The principal speaker, Rosito Carrillo (an alias), explained that Mexico had been the proving ground for a new mental-conditioning technique, using marijuana, that heightened revolutionary spirit. The elements of fear, apprehension, and indecision could be inhibited and senses partially anesthetized against pain and even irritation of teargas.

Marijuana, or hashish, could be made concentrated enough, Carrillo said, to bring unconsciousness and even permanent brain damage. He explained that it was a valued weapon in the Red arsenal to help undermine and topple the capitalist system. Speakers arose and propounded a long-range campaign to win legal acceptance of marijuana and other similar drugs, using as an argument the right to freedom of individual choice. A. H. Stanton Candlin, *Psycho-Chemical Warfare* (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1973), pp. 45-47.

(The use of drugs by the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists to intensify the attacking spirit has also been reported in recent years. In an article recapturing personal experiences in Vietnam, two examples are presented: "The way the teargas didn't affect the NVA at all leads me to believe they were hopped up on drugs." and "Quite a few of the NVA we killed inside our wire were bandaged—that night. It was obvious that they had sent their wounded back up to fight the battle. That scared me to the point that I could not believe that people who had already been wounded and messed up still wanted to fight. I figured they had a lot more drive than I had. Those people were scary, like they were almost superhuman. We found drugs—syringes and chemicals." Eric Hammel, "Khe Sanh: Attack on Hill 861A," *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 1989, pp. 48, 49.

(Also, on June 4, 1989, a Cable News Network broadcast on the fighting in Beijing in which the Chinese soldiers were especially brutal in their attack on students who were revolting against the Communist regime reported that the presence

of drugs was identified in the blood and urine of soldiers who were hospitalized. The soldiers said they had been given injections or "vaccinations" prior to engaging the students because Tiananmen Square was dirty. Subsequent reports out of Europe stated, in addition, that the soldiers had been given psychological hate conditioning in conjunction with the administration of drugs prior to their assault on the students.

(The first use of synthetic drugs to stimulate attacking soldiers may have been by Germany in World War II. Consider: "When the German armies waged the 'blitzkrieg' or 'lightning war' through France and the Lowlands in 1940, the Allied forces were no match for their stamina and ferocity. The Germans fought like men possessed, and they were. Their pharmacists had synthesized Methedrine, a cheap but powerful energizing drug that allowed their soldiers to fight vigorously for weeks at a time with no sleep and little food." William Glasser, M.D., *Take Effective Control of Your Life* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), p. 138.

(Another related finding is reported by Michael Isikoff in "Users of Crack Cocaine Link Violence to Drug's Influence," *Washington Post*, March 24, 1989, p. A10. Isikoff reports on studies that have clearly linked violent behavior with crack cocaine. Nearly half of the callers to a cocaine hotline reported that they had perpetrated violent crimes, most while under the influence of the drug. There was no perceptible difference between female and male users.)

Additionally, the use of drugs to subdue societies in the same sense that the drugs were used by Mao Tse-tung is also reported to have been first examined by the Comintern in the mid-1930s. Also, the use of drugs as intelligence weapons by Soviet intelligence services to corrupt and extort foreign officials predates the Korean War.

It seems reasonable to hypothesize that this history of Soviet interest in the use of drugs as weapons and revolutionary tools stimulated their efforts to watch with considerable care and study the impact of the Chinese trafficking on the fighting efficiency of the U.S. and South Korean forces, which then led to the decision that drugs were indeed a valuable weapon whose use should be exploited.

7. The use of drugs during the Korean War, while serious, was not as widespread as it was during the Vietnam War. Indeed, many people who served in the war were not aware of the problem, which tended to be most serious in specific locations. For example, one area identified by a former counterintelligence specialist where the use of hard drugs was especially noticeable was in the stevedore battalions in Pusan.
8. U.S. medical personnel also identified cardiovascular damage among young U.S. servicemen. They attributed the cause to diet. The Soviet doctors also recognized the possible contribution of diet, but additionally noted the possible contribution of drug usage among the U.S. servicemen. It was this latter possibility that captured Khrushchev's imagination. While reports on the adverse medical effects of drugs appeared in the 1970s in Western medical literature, these effects did not really receive medical attention until the 1980s. Recent research has tied cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and other drugs to both cardiovascular damage and brain damage. See, for example, Louis L. Cregler, M.D. and Herbert Mark, M.D., "Medical Complications of Cocaine Abuse," *New England Journal of Medicine*, December 4, 1986. In many respects, Soviet science, as it pertains to military and intelligence operations, is far ahead of Western science. Another good example is the results of drug use over successive generations. In 1990, the *Wall Street Journal* reports that "multi-generation use is one of the great unexplored areas in the war against drugs, in part because the phenomenon is so recent." David Shribman, "The '60s Generation, Once High on Drugs, Warns Its Children." *Wall Street Journal*, January 26, 1990, p. 1. Soviet scientists were studying this phenomenon in the mid-1950s.

9. How much the Soviets knew about the effects of drugs in the mid-1950s is not known. It does appear that because of their interest in, for example, mind control and the use of drugs to stimulate revolutionary activity, they might well have known much more than was known in the free world. The Soviet identification of the harmful effects of drugs on the cardiovascular system appears to predate similar recognition in the West by many years. The effects of drugs over successive generations has only recently received attention in the United States; for example, the growing concern over the permanent disabilities and reduced mental capacities of children born to women who are on drugs, even on marijuana. See, for example, Michael Abramowitz, "Pregnant Cocaine Users Reduce Risk by Stopping," *Washington Post*, March 24, 1989, p. A10.
10. This would likely refer to Soviet experience in using drugs to stimulate and otherwise further revolutionary activity and to the experience of their intelligence services in using drugs to extort and bribe foreign officials. Considerable expertise also was gained from the extensive experimentation with drugs for mind control purposes. Additionally, the Soviets were experimenting with and promoting the use of drugs such as LSD to create mental incapacities. This work is described in a Communist textbook, *Communist Manual of Instructions of Psychological Warfare*, that was used in the United States to "capture the minds of a nation through brain-washing and fake mental health," as described by Kenneth Goff, a former Communist turned anti-Communist crusader. The textbook contains an introductory address on psychopolitics by Lavrentiy P. Beria of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs in which he states that "Psychopolitics is a solemn charge. With it you can erase our enemies as insects. You can cripple the efficiency of leaders by striking insanity into their families through the use of drugs." The text itself states that "By making readily available drugs of various kinds, by giving the teenager alcohol, by praising his wildness, by stimulating him with sex literature and advertising to him or her practices as taught at the Sexpol, the psychopolitical operator can create the necessary attitude of chaos, idleness and worthlessness into which can then be cast the solution which will give the teenager complete freedom everywhere—Communism." *Brain-Washing: A Synthesis of the Communist Textbook on Psychopolitics* (Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: New Times Ltd., 1956), pp. 9, 23.
11. A good description of Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence strategy is contained in Sejna, *We Will Bury You*, op. cit., pp. 22-36. See also Raymond S. Sleeper, editor, *Mesmerized By the Bear* (New York: Dodd Mead & Company, 1987), pp. 216-219.
12. Since 1973, at the initiative of U.S. Customs and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the United States has been sharing U.S. narcotics trafficking control techniques and intelligence on trafficking organizations with various Soviet Bloc customs (intelligence) agencies. In 1988, the U.S. State Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration reported that they were negotiating to share drug trafficking intelligence with the Soviet Union, including drug samples possibly keyed to different production and distribution networks. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
13. There is considerable confusion in the West (and in the East, for that matter) about the structure of Soviet Bloc intelligence services. This is only natural, because intelligence is highly classified, and that includes the structure and organization of the intelligence services themselves.

    In Czechoslovakia, probably the best known component of the intelligence service is the StB or State Security (Statni Bezpecnost), which prior to 1967 was

known as the StB or State Secret Security (Statni Tajna Bezpecnost). Its name was changed in 1967 to remove the "secret" in an attempt to improve its image. Notwithstanding the publicity that has been attached to the StB, there are few people, even in Czechoslovakia, and even within the Czechoslovak intelligence service, who understand what the StB is, and how it fits into the overall Czechoslovak intelligence system. Quite often, StB is used generically to describe any activity within the entire civilian intelligence system. But this is incorrect and where the confusion begins.

The civilian intelligence service is organized within the Ministry of Interior. The ministry is functionally organized into separate administrations. The first administration is civilian counterintelligence. This is the StB. This is the organization that is responsible for keeping track of Czechoslovak civilians and for routing out traitors and other enemies of the state.

The second administration is civilian intelligence (as distinct from military intelligence, which is organized within the Military Intelligence Administration of the General Staff). This is the organization responsible for intelligence operations outside Czechoslovakia; that is, foreign intelligence operations such as espionage, political sabotage, deception and disinformation, and technology theft.

A good example of the confusion that exists is an article on the "dread secret police" that was written during the recent upheavals in Eastern Europe: "The StB has been regarded by Western diplomats as the most ruthless and efficient of all the East European security services. . . . Internationally, the Soviet Union's KGB has often used the StB as a surrogate for doing its dirty work. The StB's connection to international terrorist organizations—through the manufacture here of the deadly plastic explosive Sentex [a plastic explosive favored by terrorists because it emits few telltale vapors and is very hard to detect]—is another mystery. Dan Morgan, "Amateurs Probe Dread Secret Police," *Washington Post*, December 14, 1989, p. 41.

Here, the author is mixing up, or combining, the first and second administrations. Both are ruthless and efficient. Western diplomats in Czechoslovakia will have more contact with the StB or first administration than with the second administration, although without their knowledge. The first administration will contact them to learn about spies in Czechoslovakia. The second administration will try to recruit them to spy for Czechoslovakia. Outside Czechoslovakia, almost all contact will be by the second administration. And while both administrations are used as surrogates by the KGB, "internationally," it is the second administration which is the surrogate for KGB intelligence operations, and it is in the second administration and military intelligence where terrorist operations and the support thereto—such as the production of Sentex—are organized. Also, drug trafficking is organized within the second administration and within military intelligence, not in the StB, although the StB does have a counterintelligence task, which is shared with the third administration, military counterintelligence.

There is also often a confusion as to the importance and role of military intelligence. This is likely due to the preponderant number of sources (defectors) from civilian intelligence and relative scarcity of military intelligence sources. Most civilian intelligence officials do not know much about military intelligence operations and, accordingly, tend to downplay the importance of military intelligence.

Another confusion is the notion that the StB "operates as a state within a state, uncontrolled by its alleged superiors at the Interior Ministry of the Communist Party Central Committee." Control is the essence of the communist system. Everything and everybody is controlled. It is the First Secretary who wields most control. Beneath him, there are numerous committees and commissions also exerting control, many of which are, in turn, controlled by the First Secretary. Additionally, within the satellites the Soviet Union has its own control mechanisms. To think that organizations, including the StB, run rampant without control is to miss one of the most important characteristics of the internal structure of the communist system.

In addition to civilian intelligence and counterintelligence, there are a variety of other major subdivisions or administrations within the Ministry of Interior that are important components of the intelligence and security system. These are: military counterintelligence, public security (police), passport control, investigations, jails, interior troops, border troops, customs service, censorship, support for foreign diplomats and embassies, and finance. In comparing the Czechoslovak and Soviet intelligence services, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior is roughly comparable to the Soviet KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security). The principal difference is that the public security (police) in the Soviet Union does not come under the KGB. The Czechoslovak second administration is comparable to that portion of the KGB that handles intelligence, as distinct from counterintelligence, investigations, customs, and so forth.

14. When the intelligence plan was reviewed in 1965 or 1966 by the Czechoslovak Defense Council, one of the members asked how effective the program had been. At that time, the chief of military intelligence explained, only seven graduates had not been successful. Of this number, two had been killed by Czechoslovak intelligence when they attempted to switch sides.
15. General Sejna was present at a discussion with the First Secretary of the Communist Party of El Salvador, who was told directly that in return for the weapons and military supplies, it was their responsibility to help the Czechoslovaks pay for the weapons through drugs. The First Secretary responded that the market in El Salvador was limited, but if it is expanded to include the United States and Canada, none of us would have a money problem. The Czechoslovak official who was in charge then advised him that the United States and Canada *were* the primary targets.

Chapter 3—Building the Latin American Drug Network

1. For a more detailed account, see *We Will Bury You*, op. cit., pp. 45-50.
2. Recent biographies of Fidel Castro describe the problems he had obtaining military equipment in 1959 from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the United States. Some arms and ammunition were obtained from Belgium in early mid-1960. The first Czechoslovak weapons arrived in late 1960. Tad Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1986), p. 498. Peter G. Bourne, *Fidel: A Biography of Fidel Castro* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1986), pp. 188-189.
3. "Revolutionary center" is the formal designation of a region that is selected and then prepared to promote the revolutionary situation throughout the zone in which the center is located and to support the Soviet military effort in the event of war. The basic criteria applied in establishing revolutionary centers are the need for such centers to have political influence throughout the zone, to supply the revolutionary forces in other countries in the zone, to supply sabotage material for use throughout the zone, to be a center for the education of cadres and to be directly useful for Soviet military operations in the case of global war and surrogate forces or neighboring forces in revolutionary wars.

JOURNAL OF
DEFENSE & DIPLOMACY
Vol. 4 No. 12 December 1986 $3.00

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

REPORT ON MEXICO

NBC: REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSE

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING: THE SOVIET CONNECTION

BY JOSEPH D. DOUGLASS JR. AND JAN SEJNA

Since 1982, U.S. law enforcement officials have acquired considerable evidence implicating Cuba and other communist nations in international drug trafficking.

Former Cuban intelligence (DGI) agents have testified that the DGI runs drugs into the United States and uses its agents as drug pushers in the United States. As needed, the DGI is assisted in this business by other Cuban officials such as military officials and diplomats. DGI officials have directed their agents to "load up the United States with drugs."

Former Nicaraguan officials have described how Cuban Gen. Raúl Castro, minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and second secretary of the Cuban politburo, encouraged and assisted Nicaragua to join the drug trafficking business. Former diplomats and intelligence officials who have fled Nicaragua to seek asylum in the United States have testified that the drug business is an official government operation run by Nicaraguan intelligence, which in turn is controlled by Cuban and Soviet advisers.

Drug dealers and operators-turned-informers have provided elaborate detail on Cuban and Nicaraguan production, transshipment and distribution, mainly directed against the United States and increasingly against Europe. Both Cuba and Nicaragua have been linked to numerous Latin American terrorist organizations, predominately pro-Soviet, providing them guns in exchange for drugs that are then delivered to the United States, all of which are controlled by the Soviet intelligence services, and organizing "safe havens" for drug traffickers en route to the United States.

Numerous sources have also tied Bulgarian intelligence and other East European intelligence services to drug trafficking against both U.S. and NATO forces and against all the NATO nations, beginning with the United States.

The objectives of these intertwined drug trafficking operations, as stated by many independent sources, especially former high-level officials, are to use drugs as a political weapon against the United States. Money is an important incentive, they explain, but the real motivation is political, and the main target is the U.S. youth.

The most recent statement is that of the former Nicaraguan minister-counselor, Antonio Farach. He explained how the Nicaraguan officials justified their drug business. "In the first place, drugs did not remain in Nicaragua. The drugs were destined for the United States, the youth of our enemy. Therefore, the drugs were used as a political weapon because in that way we were delivering a blow to our principal enemy."

Carlos Lehder Rivas, the Cuban-supported Colombian drug kingpin, in an interview in 1985 on Colombian television announced, "He who plants coca denounces imperialism," and "Cocaine is the Latin American atomic bomb."

The Politics of Drugs

Unfortunately, the political side of drug trafficking—perhaps its most important dimension—somehow seems to get lost. Attention is focused on the domestic side of the problem. Few people ask how the problem arose and why it has become so severe in the past three decades. Most people simply assume the lure of high profits has caused the rise in narcotics trafficking.



Even the State Department stresses the apolitical, profit-motivated nature of international drug trafficking. At congressional hearings on international terrorism and drug trafficking in May 1985, Clyde D. Taylor, deputy assistant secretary of state, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, emphasized in his opening statement, "Another fact which we would like to establish . . . is that narcotics trafficking in Latin America, in Asia, in the Middle East and in

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Gen. Maj. Jan Sejna was secretary of the Czechoslovak Defense Council and chief of cabinet at the Ministry of Defense prior to his leaving and seeking political asylum in 1968. They also co-authored Decision-Making in Communist Countries: An Inside View.

Europe, is dominated by narcotics traffickers who are governed only by their greed and whose only ideology—if you can call it one—is the pursuit of profit . . . nor do we have evidence of a Communist conspiracy to use drugs to undermine Western democracies or our own society in particular."

However, just based on the types of evidence summarized above, there are good reasons to question the State Department's position. Accepting the notion that politics are not a significant factor and that there is no communist conspiracy may be a serious oversight in light of the magnitude of the drug-associated problems, both in the United States and abroad, and the desire of President Ronald Reagan and the public to wage an effective war on drugs. The motivations, organizations and strategy behind the drug business are critically important. These should be critical targets in the battle. If there is an important dimension—a political plan or conspiracy—that is not recognized, then the United States and its allies may be fighting a losing battle.

"It is important to recognize that the Soviet Union has had a hand in the growth of international narcotics trafficking."

It is important to recognize that the Soviet Union has had a hand in the growth of international narcotics trafficking. There is considerable data, which has gone unreported, that sets forth the origins of Soviet interests, formation of their strategy and management of satellite intelligence services for employing drugs as a political weapon against the West.

Since there is no indication that the Soviet operation has ceased in recent years and numerous telltale indications that it remains a major force, the data deserves serious attention. Whether the Soviet operation is 60 percent of the cause behind the current problem or 90 percent cannot be determined. More research is required to make that judgment. What can be said, however, is that it would be most unwise to ignore or to treat lightly the potential importance of the Soviet narcotics strategy and of the *coordinated* efforts of all the communist satellites and surrogates.

Taking a Cue from the Chinese

The drug problem has its origins in the late 1940s, when the Chinese communists seized control of mainland China and incorporated narcotics trafficking into their strategy to destroy the bourgeois of the world. Their initial targets were the United States and Japan. When the Korean War began, China, acting with the North Koreans, used narcotics, mainly opium and heroin, to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. military forces. These Chinese operations were identified in detail by undercover U.S. Treasury agents, U.S. Army intelligence and subsequently confirmed by Chinese defectors.

During the Korean War, the Soviets, together with the North Koreans and Czechs, studied the tactics and equipment of the U.S. forces. In the process, they became particularly interested in the effect of the Chinese and North Korean drugs on U.S. combat effectiveness. Through autopsies conducted on dead U.S. soldiers, the communists learned that a large number of young U.S. soldiers—up to 22 percent—had suffered heart damage or, as the Soviets called them, "mini-heart attacks." These statistics astounded the communist doctors. The heart damage was not the results of battle or the cause of death. The damage had occurred earlier, and considering the age of the soldiers, 18 to 21 years old, the only possible cause the doctors could identify was the use of hard narcotics, which Soviet intelligence had estimated to be widespread among the U.S. servicemen.

This finding so excited the Soviets that after the war they initiated a detailed study of the use of drugs and narcotics as a strategic weapon that could be used to cripple capitalist societies. This was a joint military-civilian study that involved the Soviets, Czechs and North Koreans. Key participants were military intelligence, civilian intelligence, the Ministry of Health and the Academy of Sciences.

The study team examined the long-term impact of drugs on health, education, economy, labor productivity, intelligence services, security and defense over several generations. The study concluded that the effects would be enormous and that the most vulnerable countries were the United States, Canada, France and West Germany. The Soviet Defense Council approved the study and officially entered the drug business in early 1956.

The Soviets spent the next four years developing production techniques, marketing strategy and tactics and training intelligence cadres for the operation. Former premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed this business as a strategic operation that needed to be carefully prepared, especially so that it could be conducted covertly, without raising the suspicions of the targeted countries, most specifically the United States.

The Soviets went operational against the United States shortly after the Cuban revolution. The opportunity came when Raúl Castro, then deputy prime minister of Cuba, visited Czechoslovakia in the early fall of 1960 in search of military aid and assistance. At that time, the Soviets regarded Fidel Castro as an anarchist rather than communist and did not trust him. Fidel Castro resented the Soviets' lack of trust, and in return, he distrusted the Soviets. This is why the Cubans went to Czechoslovakia seeking aid rather than to the Soviet Union. The Czechs arranged to have Khrushchev invite Raúl Castro to Moscow for discussions, and upon his return to Prague, Khrushchev directed Czechoslovakia to work with the Cubans and pave the way for an eventual Soviet takeover of Cuba.

Czechoslovakia agreed to help the Cubans obtain military equipment, train the Cubans in military operations and set up Cuban intelligence and counterintelligence. In return, Cuba agreed to become a revolutionary center in the West and to allow Czechoslovakia to establish an intelligence station in Cuba. Roughly 50 percent of the Czech advisers and intelligence agents that went to Cuba were actually Soviets operating under Czech cover. Within three years, all Czechs in key positions were replaced by Soviets.

After the first Cubans were trained as intelligence agents, they received their first directions from Moscow: to infiltrate the United States and all Latin American countries and begin the production and distribution of drugs and narcotics into the United States. The Czech advisers helped the Cubans initiate production and set up transportation routes through Canada and Mexico, where the Czechs had good agent networks, into the United States. It is worth noting that in congressional hearings in 1984, U.S. officials identified 1962 as the year when the United States became aware that Cuba was running drugs into the United States.

In late 1961 or early 1962, the Czech Defense Council received instructions from the Soviet Defense Council to direct Cuban intelligence to expand its operation by infiltrating all the Latin American drug production and distribution networks. As part of this

operation, the Cubans were to collect information on the corruption that accompanies the drug trade. Obtaining such information was also one of the main reasons for infiltrating the drug networks. The information would be used to covertly coordinate drug operations and enable the Soviets ultimately to exercise strategic control over presumably independent drug operations. Additionally, the information would be used to blackmail and recruit a near-inexhaustible supply of both willing and unwitting Soviet agents of influence throughout the Americas for strategic operations. The implications of this often-overlooked dimension of the drug trafficking business, in the long run, may be even more serious than the societal and economic disruptions caused by drug pushing itself.

"Khrushchev said, '. . . anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral.'"

The operation to infiltrate and collect data on corruption was organized in Cuba in 1962 during the Second Havana Conference. During the conference, Cuban and Czech intelligence held a secret meeting of Soviet and Soviet-trained intelligence agents who were members of the various Latin American organizations attending the conference. The meeting served to coordinate plans for sabotage and other strategic intelligence operations throughout the Western Hemisphere, including the infiltration of existing drug and narcotics production and distribution networks and the collection of incriminating information on corruption.

Later, in the fall of that year, Khrushchev called the top Warsaw Pact leaders to a secret meeting in Moscow. Attending the meeting were the first secretaries, premier ministers, ministers of defense and their key staff, roughly 15 officials from each country. Jan Sejna attended as part of the Czech delegation. The meeting was called to discuss negative economic tendencies and corrective measures. Midway through the meeting, Khrushchev turned to the subject of drugs. Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese were smart, he said, and he praised their imagination and operativeness. But, he continued, the Warsaw Pact intelligence services were more well developed and better organized and should step in and exploit the drug opportunities as fast as possible.

Khrushchev carefully explained how the business would cripple the democratic societies while simultaneously generating much-needed foreign exchange for intelligence operations. It would undermine the health and morale of U.S. soldiers and weaken the human factor in the defense situation, he said. Further, it would cripple the educational system. U.S. schools were high-priority targets because this is where the future leaders of the bourgeois were to be found. Another high-priority target Khrushchev identified was the U.S. work ethic, pride and loyalty. Finally, drugs and narcotics would lessen the influence of religions and, he added, under certain conditions, could be used to create chaos.

Sejna's recollection of Khrushchev's remarks remains clear, especially his closing words. "When we discuss this strategy," Khrushchev said, "there were some who were concerned that this operation might be immoral. But we must state categorically," he then emphasized, "that anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral."

Later in the day at an informal gathering of the Pact officials, Khrushchev talked further about the importance of the drug business with the Czech delegation. This was when Sejna learned the code name of the operation. Khrushchev grinned, nudged Sejna in the ribs and told him the name of the operation was *Druzba Narobov*, that is, "National Friendship." The name was pure Khrushchev—clever deception but with a clear and obvious meaning: the drugs were friends that would help destroy the enemy.

Following this meeting, the satellite leaders returned home and began to organize the narcotics trafficking. Initially, the most active countries, besides the Soviet Union, were Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary. Within roughly two years, East Germany and Poland were also strong participants.

Tightest Security

In the case of Czechoslovakia, the operations plan was immediately developed under the tightest security. Nine individuals who were to put the plan together were sequestered in an MOD villa for a week. They came from the Administrative Organs Department, International (Foreign) Department, Military Health Administration, GRU (strategic intelligence) and Ministry of Interior (Second Administration). When completed, the plan was presented to the Defense Council by the minister of interior, Rudolf Barak. At that meeting, in response to a question on finances from the first secretary, he estimated that the operation would bring in enough revenues to pay for the entire Czech military intelligence operation. Actually, in 1964, the operation paid for 50 percent of the GRU foreign operations expenses (not including salaries or operations financed by the Soviets). This grew to 70 percent (or about $22 million) in 1966, and at that time, the GRU profit (after all expenses were paid) from just the Cuban portion of the operation totaled about $8 million. Further, in 1966, the GRU estimated that by 1968 the total income from narcotics trafficking would cover all foreign GRU expenses.

Throughout the satellites and the Soviet Union, the drug business was accorded the highest secrecy classification, that of "state importance," which is above the level of top secret. Documentation was extremely guarded. In Czechoslovakia, there were only three copies of the Defense Council's decision and approved plan. These copies were held in the Second Administration of the Ministry of Interior (the civilian secret police), the GRU and the Defense Council Secretariat. All instructions to the heads of participating agencies were oral, and most people working on the various facets of the operation were given deceptive explanations for what they were doing so that even they were unaware of the basic plan. Aside from the Defense Council itself, very few people, even among the top leadership, were aware of operation *Druzba Narobov*.

Almost as soon as the satellite operations had begun, Khrushchev decided that the implementation was not proceeding fast enough. Khrushchev even admitted that he was partially to blame in being too cautious. Accordingly, in 1963 he instructed Gen. Maj. Nikolai Savinkin, the deputy head of the Administrative Organs Department (he became head of the department in 1964 and is still in that position today), to visit all the satellite countries and Cuba and prepare a coordinated plan to speed up the narcotics operation. Savinkin's plan was approved by the Soviet Defense Council, and instructions were sent to all the satellites and Cuba.

The instructions from the Soviet Defense Council following its approval of Savinkin's plan dealt with a wide variety of matters, including 1) which banks in different countries were to be used to handle the income, 2) the cooperation to be provided by the East European intelligence services in assisting in the infiltration of Latin American drug networks and in the collection of corruption data, 3)

the instruction on propaganda and disinformation, 4) the directions for research, development and testing of more effective drugs, which was to be conducted within the military medical services for security reasons, 5) the directions on which satellite countries' operations were to be coordinated and in what countries, 6) the names of people in different countries who would help with the distribution, 7) instructions organizing transportation and logistics support for the trafficking and 8) points of contact for getting advice on additional vulnerabilities (markets) and techniques from experts who were continuing to study the impact of drugs in the different countries.

The instructions on propaganda were of such importance that a special office was established in the Administrative Organs Department to oversee the activities, which were planned in Moscow and implemented mainly by the departments of propaganda of the Central Committee and the GRU departments of special propaganda. The propaganda was intended to make society blame itself for the West's narcotics problem. Moreover, organizations and individuals considered inimical to Soviet policy were to be discredited (for example, by revealing their internal drug-related corruption). Finally, following special instructions received from First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in 1964, the satellites were to publicize the Chinese narcotics operation and, by so doing, distract the world's attention away from the Soviet operation.

During the Vietnam War, the Soviets and Czechs negotiated an agreement with the North Vietnamese to produce narcotics in North Vietnam. This was part of a practice begun in roughly 1963 to produce the drugs locally, in the vicinity of the target audience, rather than ship them in from Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. In the case of the Vietnam War, the products were shipped through Thailand and via the Viet Cong to the U.S. forces in the south. By 1967, the Soviet intelligence services estimated that the use of drugs against the U.S. soldiers had become even more effective than it had been in the Korean War. At that time, the KGB estimated that 90 percent of the U.S. servicemen were using drugs of one variety or another. Seeking to capitalize on this situation and on the antiwar movement of the youth in the United States, which itself was also fueled by Soviet propaganda and deception operations, in the spring of 1967, Savinkin stressed to a visiting delegation of high-level Czech officials the need to increase the drug trade, specifically against U.S. and NATO forces to "corrupt the officers, recruit intelligence agents and impair the functioning of soldiers."

In January 1967, the Soviets finished a study that concluded that the drugs would be an effective weapon to use against a new rising class in the United States, the "technical elite." Drugs and narcotics were to be used to sabotage this important class and to facilitate the Soviet theft of high-tech equipment. At the end of 1967, during a special display of stolen technology, the chief of Czech military intelligence explained to visiting Soviet officials that, by his estimate, 20 to 25 percent of the technology stolen from the West during 1967 was facilitated by the use of drugs.

In a sense, 1967 was another watershed year in the Soviet operation, the first being 1960 and the second, 1962. In 1967, the Soviets directed the further intensification of the narcotics operations—in Cuba and throughout Latin America, in technology theft operations and against the U.S. and NATO military forces. And, in the fall, Moscow again summoned all the satellite intelligence chiefs to a meeting to receive instructions to speed the exploitation of the many opportunities that had become available.

By the end of 1967, Cuba had infiltrated 90 percent of all the Latin American drug operations, and discussions with Raúl Castro had shifted from increasing infiltration to the need to destroy those drug operations that were still independent and "noncooperative." Finally, it was clear during the review of the Czechoslovak intelligence plan in December that Cuban intelligence planning had been fully coordinated with the Warsaw Pact "integrated intelligence system," which itself had been set up in 1964 to give the Soviet intelligence services direct control and supervision of all the satellite intelligence services and operations.

"Evidence relating to Soviet (and Chinese) actions has been ignored, . . . possibly even suppressed."

Folly to Close Our Eyes

Over the past 15 years, international narcotics trafficking has multiplied manyfold. It now has solid roots in all Latin American countries. It has corrupted countless Latin American officials, and one must assume many in the United States as well. It has led to the brutal torture and murder of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency agents and to the ruthless killing of public officials who have attempted to resist the drug dealers, most notably the 24 ministers of justice in Colombia. It has become married to international terrorism, whose links to the Soviet Union the U.S. government also remains reluctant to confront. This, on top of the magnitude of the domestic problems, is why fighting the drug business has become so important.

At the same time, it seems only reasonable not to mislead the public about the prospects for success in this war. That is, it may be quite difficult to combat the drug and narcotics problem effectively if the role of the Soviet Union—its strategy, plans, tactics and organization—is not taken into account. The combination of Western industrial and financial interests, coupled with an overwhelming desire to reach nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviets, has generated considerable pressure for the United States to avoid actions or words that might be considered confrontational or anti-Soviet.

Evidence relating to Soviet (and Chinese) actions has been ignored, often not collected or actively pursued and, in certain cases, possibly even suppressed. The problem is not a lack of evidence, as many bureaucrats would have congress and the public believe. Rather, the problem is a failure to assemble and analyze available evidence. The foregoing material is presented as an example of evidence that is available but not pursued. Moreover, this is only the tip of the iceberg.

The apparent disinclination to collect, assemble and analyze available evidence has resulted in a perception of the drug and narcotics problem that does not include what may be a critical dimension of the problem: the Soviet operation that coordinates its many resources in using drugs and narcotics as a political weapon to cripple Western societies. The drugs are political weapons. In the 1960s, the communists implemented a plan to coordinate resources and use the weapon to its greatest effectiveness. The main target was the United States. There is no reason to our knowledge to believe this is no longer the case.

Until this possibility is recognized and seriously examined, which is not happening now, the war on drugs is not being taken seriously by those responsible for carrying it out, and the prospects for success in the war are significantly diminished.

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84TH CONGRESS, 2d Session } SENATE { REPORT No. 2832

COMMUNIST INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN MILITARY, AND CIVILIAN PRISONERS

DECEMBER 31, 1956.—Filed under authority of the Senate of July 27, 1956, and ordered to be printed

Mr. McCLELLAN, from the Committee on Government Operations, submitted the following

REPORT

MADE BY ITS PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

INTRODUCTION

What is brainwashing? Were the American prisoners of war in North Korea brainwashed? Has the Department of Defense taken any action to prepare American soldiers for such treatment as their Chinese captors inflicted? These were some of the pressing questions confronting this country and which led to an investigation and hearings by the subcommittee.

Brainwashing is a loose term difficult if not impossible to define with exactness. It means many things to many people. It has been interpreted by some to be a mysterious and irresistible type of treatment based on certain psychological knowledge possessed by the Communist countries. To others it is continuous interrogation of prisoners, and to still others brainwashing is a misnomer for certain police practices that have existed for many years. Through the subcommittee hearings we attempted to portray the type of treatment received by our prisoners of war from the Communists which is popularly known as brainwashing. We hope that through these hearings and this report the American public will have a better understanding of the Communist methods of interrogation and indoctrination. How these methods originated, what are the purposes, how they are applied, how much success is achieved, are questions for which the subcommittee has attempted to find some answers. We feel that it is only through an understanding of this problem that we can hope to meet and solve it. Ignoring it, pretending it does not exist because what is revealed may be embarrassing, can lead only to disaster.

During the Korean war which started on June 25, 1950, 7,190 American troops were captured by the Communists. Of this number, 6,556 were Army, 268 were Air Force, 231 were Marine Corps, and 40 were Navy. Only 4,428 of these prisoners were repatriated to the United States. In December 1953 hearings of this subcommittee on Korean war atrocities established that several thousands of American prisoners died or were murdered in prisoner of war camps. The present investigation of the Communist method of interrogation and indoctrination supplements these earlier hearings but relates to an entirely different phase in the lives of prisoners and one which has never been explored.

The armed services of the United States have had various studies made of what happened in Korea to the American prisoners of war and have willingly furnished much of these studies to the subcommittee. We wish to acknowledge the full cooperation of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as the Department of Defense, in furnishing this information and for the help and assistance given to this subcommittee during the investigation and hearings.

CIVILIAN PRISONERS

Dr. Harold G. Wolff, professor of medicine in charge of the department of neurology, Cornell University, who was head of a group of 20 civilian military scientists, has made an exhaustive study of the methods and procedures used by the Communist state police in the interrogation and indoctrination of persons regarded as enemies of the state.[1] He testified that the methods used in Communist countries have their roots in secret-police practices which go back for many years.[2] These practices, commonly referred to as "brainwashing," have become refined and developed in this 20th century as a result of many years of trial and error. Russia by the 19th century had developed a highly organized, effective, and powerful secret police.

Many of the techniques used today came into existence in some form at that time. The method of arrest, the development of the personal dossiers on individuals, the use of repetitive interrogation and the isolation technique find their origins or owe their developments to the Russian secret police.[3]

The 20th century brought forth a development and refinement of these techniques. In many cases there is the abandonment of direct physical violence. We find the use of Communist ideology and logic. We have the development of certain persuasive techniques, specifically the use of intimate prisoner-interrogator relationship.[4]

The system although highly organized was even more fully developed during the famous purge trials in Russia in the late 1930's. Later a good deal of experience was gained by the Russians in dealing with the Germans captured during World War II. About 1949 their methods were communicated to the Chinese who utilized them, but modified and altered some of the Russian techniques.[5] These differences will be discussed in a later section of this report.

Dr. Wolff stated that the term "brainwashing" has gained wide acceptance, but nowhere does there appear a successful scientific definition for this term.[6] Much of the public speculation about brainwashing is not supported by the evidence. The idea of brainwashing and menticide has been fostered by the Communists for the purpose of creating a false impression that their method and manner of conducting interrogations is mysterious to the degree of being irresistible. It is true that the Communists have considerable skill in the extraction of information from prisoners and in making prisoners do their bidding, including signing confessions of crimes they did not commit.

But the subcommittee hearings clearly established that there should be no mystery about the techniques the Communists employed. They are well known and understood. Actually their practices are based on the simple and easily understood idea of progressively weakening an individual's physical and moral strength.

The Communists do not possess new and remarkable techniques of psychological manipulation. Their methods are not based on some weird psychological theory. It was established through the testimony of Dr. Wolff and others that the aura of mystery and fear which has long been associated with Communist methods of interrogation and indoctrination is, in itself, a major factor in their effectiveness.[7] Actually, the Communists are utilizing a highly developed, but completely basic, and easily understood system in an attempt to obtain information from their prisoners and to convert them to beliefs acceptable to their captors.[8] This is a point that was clearly established during the subcommittee hearings.

Dr. Wolff testified that there are two systems in existence, namely, the eastern European, which is the Russian system, and the Asiatic, which is the Chinese system. Both are basically the same, differing only in their employment of certain techniques and in the so-called indoctrination phase.[9]

Eastern European or Russian system

Testimony revealed that a *political* criminal, that is, *any person who is a threat to the Communist Party or to the state*, is subject to the following system in Russia:[10] The KGB, which is the state police, decides who threatens the party or the state. Once a person is arrested, he is deemed to be guilty. There is no hope for acquittal or vindication, as under this system judgment is made as to his guilt prior to his arrest. His case cannot be settled until a confession has been prepared which must be signed by both the prisoner and the interrogating officer.[11]

Dr. Wolff furnished a typical timetable with regard to an individual accused of a political crime:

1. Suspicion.

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[1] Public hearings, Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Prisoners, pp. 3, 21.
[2] P. 32.
[3] P. 6.
[4] P. 6.

NOTE.—All page references in the footnotes refer to the published record of the hearings of this subcommittee on Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Prisoners, June 19, 20, and 27, 1956, except where otherwise noted.

[5] P. 7.
[6] P. 4.
[7] Army publication Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War, p. 27.
[8] P. 4.
[9] Pp. 10, 24.
[10] This is not the procedure followed in nonpolitical crimes.
[11] Pp. 8, 9, 10, 11.

2. Accumulation of evidence by surveillance and informers which takes approximately 4 weeks.
3. Arrest and detention resulting in isolation and interrogation which embraces a period of approximately 7 or 8 weeks.
4. Confession (12th week).
5. Punishment.[12]

Thus, the Russian system generally allocates a period of a few weeks to several months, during which time the interrogator must obtain a confession from the prisoner. The emphasis in Russia is placed on interrogation and not on indoctrination as it is in the Chinese system.

During the first period when the KGB is deciding about an individual he is under suspicion and close surveillance. This period usually lasts about 4 weeks. The party has decided that this man is a political enemy of the state, and it is trying to collect evidence against him. The individual, becoming aware of the investigation and the surveillance, grows anxious and fearful. The suspect becomes worried and filled with apprehension.[13]

When sufficient evidence has been collected by an interrogator, the person is arrested. This is effected quietly, usually in the middle of the night. The subject is not told the reason for his arrest. He is merely informed that he has committed some crime against the state and he knows what he has done. As a matter of fact, during the entire period of his imprisonment he may not be informed of any charges.[14]

For a period of time, usually 3 to 6 weeks, he is detained in complete isolation. This is a very fearful experience. His room is small, being approximately 6 by 10 feet. The light is apt to be burning in the ceiling at all times. He has no contact with anyone other than the guard. He has no opportunities to consult with anyone. Often he may sleep only with his hands exposed outside the covers, lying rigidly on his back and then only at fixed hours. Toilet arrangements are inadequate and are arranged to disgust and embarrass the prisoners. His cell may be purposely a little too cold or a little too hot. Many foreign nationals find the food distasteful, although it is adequate according to Russian standards. The prisoner may be caused to stand in one position for up to 20 or 22 hours in which case he gets very severe joint and muscular pains. He is allowed only a short time for washing up. Sometimes he must eat with no utensils or must sit in a fixed position. If the prisoner has behaved in what is deemed an uncooperative manner, he may be allowed toilet privileges only at arbitrary and fixed times.[15]

What is the effect of all this? The prisoner initially goes through a period of being bewildered, demanding explanations, wanting to see people, and complaining. This lasts for a few days when he becomes more and more depressed and humiliated. He is bothered by anxiety, sleeplessness, boredom, fatigue, and hunger. After about the third week he usually experiences intense fatigue, drowsiness, and craving for companionship. Gradually, his period of isolation develops in him a feeling of despair. Living in the filth of his prison with no activity often creates delusions and hallucinations. He has a great need for companionship, a great need to talk.[16]

[12] P. 11.
[13] Pp. 14, 15.
[14] P. 15.
[15] Pp. 15, 17, 18.
[16] Pp. 15, 17, 18.

Now the work of the interrogator begins. The interrogator is usually a young man in his 20's or 30's who has no special training in psychology, psychiatry, neurophysiology, or any of the so-called scientific mind-study procedures. He has very little formal education beyond high school. However, he has had some formal training in being an interrogator and most importantly he is an individual with strong convictions about communism.

The interrogator has his own problems. He must obtain a confession from the prisoner, and that confession must have certain elements of plausibility. At the same time he realizes that the prisoner is probably not guilty of the severe crimes to which he, the interrogator, is attempting to obtain a confession. However, he rationalizes his own conduct on the ground that he is serving communism and the state.[17]

The first thing the interrogator does is to befriend the prisoner. He reviews the prisoner's life history in great detail, asks about all sorts of personal incidents in his early life. From the beginning he persuades the prisoner that his sole aim is to help him. He tells him they know everything already and if he will cooperate and confess they can close this case. The prisoner is anxious to talk. The interrogator is never completely satisfied with the information that he receives and asks for more and more. Unimportant incidents in the life of the prisoners are gone into in great detail. Any discrepancy in the life story of the prisoner is interpreted as the prisoner being unfriendly and attempting to mislead and lie to his friend the interrogator.[18]

In stage 2 of the interrogation, episodes and incidents of the life history of the individual which the interrogator has now learned are used to harass the prisoner. He becomes upset and disorganized. At this point the interrogator may threaten to withdraw his interest or may use punitive methods against the prisoner. Punishment by the interrogator may be causing him to stand or sit in certain positions. The prisoner strives to please the interrogator and becomes increasingly suggestible. The prisoner then is alternatively rejected and befriended, which over a period of time causes a severe mental strain. It must be borne in mind that during this whole procedure the only contact that the prisoner has with any person is his interrogator.[19] An important and vital personal relationship has been established for the prisoner.

Now starts stage 3. The interrogator continues talking to the prisoner, suggesting half-truths and urging upon him that the only possible and correct solution is for him to confess. This particular technique is repeated until such time as the conversations between the interrogator and the prisoner convinces the latter that he should do as his interrogator suggests. The prisoner has become more and more amenable. He is tired, alone, and has no one to support him. He rationalizes and accepts half-truths. With this rationalization he signs a confession and immediately is allowed rewards. He is permitted to sleep, to rest, and he is given better food. If, after this period of time, he recants on his confession, the case is reopened and he is again subjected to the entire series of treatments.[20]

[17] P. 12.
[18] P. 19.
[19] P. 19.
[20] Pp. 19, 20.

The primary work of the interrogator has been to convince the prisoner that what he has done is a crime. With the advent of a successful confession the subject is now ready for trial and punishment.[21]

Testimony was received that well over 90 percent of the persons subjected to this treatment give confessions. There are those who never get to trial because they do not confess. These individuals are arbitrarily dealt with by the Russians or allowed to remain in detention for an unspecified period.[22]

Asiatic or Chinese methods

Testimony revealed that the Chinese have adopted the methods used by the Russians with some modifications. The most important of these are as follows:

1. Under the Chinese system the timetable is quite different, as there is an attempt to produce a long-lasting change in the basic attitude and behavior of the prisoner. Thus, indoctrination plays a very important part in the Chinese methods.

2. The prolonged isolation as used in Russia is not used in China. The Chinese emphasis is on group interaction as distinct from private isolation. Thus, in China, a prisoner is generally in a cell with 6 to 8 other political prisoners.

3. The Chinese use public self-criticism and group criticism for indoctrination as well as the use of diary writing as distinct from verbal discussions for the prisoner to give his autobiography.[23]

These are the main differences. However, there are some variations in detail. In China, after the period of surveillance and preparation for arrest, the individual is seized under most dramatic circumstances. The arrest is generally made by armed troops with a great amount of furor, and the prisoner is immediately taken before three judges who are also interrogators. At this time the prisoner gives them certain information.[24]

Because of the lack of facilities the prisoner may be subjected to so-called house arrest where he is kept under guard in his own home for weeks. Throughout this period of house arrest he is exposed to a certain amount of Communist indoctrination.[25]

Ultimately, he is taken to a detention house where he generally is placed in a cell with 6 or 8 other political prisoners. This group is intensely competitive in attempting to bring to the newcomer evidences of his inadequacies and defects. He is exposed from morning until night to this hostile group which engages in self-criticism. He must participate. The prisoner has no privacy. The constant pressures leave him feeling defeated, humiliated, mentally dull, with a great need for talk and kindness. While he is rejected, reviled, humiliated, and brutalized by his fellow prisoners, he undergoes feelings of emotional nakedness and helplessness.[26]

During this period of time the prisoner is also subjected to interrogations by an interrogator. The writing of diaries and autobiographic material is one of the methods used by an interrogator in obtaining information. Such writings are rejected numerous times. After a session with the interrogator the attitude of his fellow prisoners might be guided by the prisoner's appearance. Thus, if he is manacled the group bear down on him in an attempt to persuade him to change his attitude and confess. In many cases, the group of fellow prisoners may beat him. There is increasing dejection, fatigue, sleep loss, pain, hunger, weight loss, mental dulling, and confusion. He is subjected to constant reading, discussion, and repetition of Communist material. All during this period of time he has intermittent sessions with one or more interrogators. He loses his capacity for making sharp discriminations.[27]

As a result of this constant treatment the prisoner ultimately prepares a confession. Its preparation to meet the demands of the interrogrator is extremely difficult. On many occasions the confession is rejected by the interrogator. A new confession must be prepared. This might be rejected. Actually, various confessions might be prepared from 3 to 6 times. Finally, by rationalization and partial beliefs he is able to properly prepare a confession which is accepted. During this entire period of time he must continue his study and discussion of Communist materials. He is now tried and punished. His imprisonment may have already lasted for an unusually long period of time, as much as 5 years. Unlike the Russian system, he may be given credit for his pretrial detention when he is officially tried and sentenced.[28]

The timetable as to Chinese prisoners is vastly different from that of the Russians. They are not only interested in getting a satisfactory confession, but they want to produce a different ideological attitude. They, therefore, through this rather long and arduous treatment attempt to convert the prisoner to communism.[29]

The Chinese interrogators are generally far less experienced and less knowledgeable about American and European people than the Russians.[30]

As soon as individual prisoners are released they, rather quickly, fall into a place in society not very different from that which they originally held. The effects of the imprisonment are transient, and the released prisoner nearly always rejects communism and all those connected with it.[31]

Dr. Wolff testified that it was his conviction that knowledge of the process and the steps involved in either the Russian or Chinese system is the most effective weapon against them.

ARMY

In December 1953 this subcommittee held hearings on "Korean war atrocities" wherein testimony was heard from a large number of soldiers who had been prisoners of war. Those prisoners who were not deliberately murdered at the time of capture were beaten, wounded, starved, and tortured. They were humiliated, molested, publicly displayed and ridiculed before the civilian populace. They were forced to march long distances without benefit of adequate food, water,

[21] P. 21.
[22] P. 20.
[23] Pp. 23, 24.
[24] Pp. 25, 26.
[25] P. 26.
[26] P. 26.
[27] P. 27.
[28] Pp. 27, 28.
[29] Pp. 24, 25.
[30] P. 31.
[31] Pp. 30, 34.

shelter, clothing, or medical care. Testimony during those hearings developed the circumstances surrounding the Hill 303 massacre, the Sunchon Tunnel massacre, the Tigon massacre, the Bamboo Spear Cave, the Naedae murders, the Chaplain Medic massacre, the Kaesong massacre, as well as forced marches of prisoners of war.[32]

The present investigation supplements those hearings. It has to do with the treatment afforded American prisoners by the Chinese Communists from the standpoint of interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation.

Testimony was received that 6,656 prisoners of war in the Korean conflict were members of the United States Army.[33] Only 3,323 were repatriated to this country.[34] The rest of the prisoners died, were murdered, or are still prisoners of the Chinese Communists.

It is the official position of the United States Army that the procedures and practices employed by the Chinese captors were not brainwashing. In a pamphlet entitled "Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War," issued by the Department of the Army in May of 1956, the following appears on page 51:

> Reports of the treatment of American prisoners of war in Korea have given rise to several popular misconceptions, of which the most widely publicized is "brainwashing." The term itself has caught the public imagination and is used, very loosely, to describe any act committed against an individual by the Communists. Actual "brainwashing" is a prolonged psychological process, designed to erase an individual's past beliefs and concepts and to substitute new ones. It is a highly coercive practice which is irreconcilable with universally accepted medical ethics. In the process of "brainwashing," the efforts of many are directed against an individual. To be successful, it requires, among other things, that the individual be completely isolated from normal associations and environment. Several celebrated cases of authentic "brainwashing" have been reported during the last decade in Communist Europe and recently in China. However, *it is obvious that such a time-consuming, conditioning process could not be employed against any sizable group, such as a prisoner-of-war group, because of the excessive time and personnel required. In Korea, American prisoners of war were subjected to group indoctrination, not "brainwashing."* Many POW's were put in solitary confinement for various reasons, such as punishment for infractions of camp rules. However, this type of isolation was not used in conjunction with any "brainwashing" process. *The exhaustive efforts of several Government agencies failed to reveal even one conclusively documented case of actual "brainwashing" of an American prisoner of war in Korea.* [Italic supplied.]

Essentially, the Chinese had four goals with regard to their prisoners of war. The first was to secure propaganda materials for psychological warfare efforts.[34] The second goal was to extract valuable military information from the prisoners.[35] A third was to attempt to convert our men to communism as a way of life.[36] The fourth was to undermine the American prisoners' faith and trust in his country, his Government, and his political leaders.[37] In support of their main objectives, there were also other objectives which had more direct effects on the lives of the prisoners. The Chinese Communists attempted to organize a net of informers in order to facilitate control of the prison population. They attempted to recruit collaborators to assist them in implementing their indoctrination program. These collaborators would give propaganda lectures, would write articles, or would attempt to talk other prisoners into signing peace petitions.[38]

The Korean war started in June of 1950. The Chinese assumed control of the Communist military operations soon after they entered the conflict in October of 1950.[39] The technique employed against the prisoners that is described herein came into existence only after the Chinese entered the conflict.

Most of our fighting men in Korea were well aware of the fantastic brutalities committed against American prisoners of war by the North Koreans from July 1950 until October 1950. The Chinese, in setting up their organization, adopted a so-called lenient policy and the organized physical brutalities generally ceased. However, as pointed out elsewhere in this report, there was a deliberate plan on the part of the Communist Chinese whereby poor food, poor clothing, and inadequate medical attention resulted in a tremendously large number of deaths of prisoners for the period ending either in the spring or early summer of 1951. In the main though, where physical brutalities and tortures were used in connection with indoctrination or interrogation, it was the exception rather than the rule.[40]

The techniques used by the Chinese were very similar to those utilized by the Russians in the treatment of German prisoners of war in 1941 and the Japanese prisoners in 1945.[41] In fact it was established at the hearings that although prisoners were handled by the Chinese, the treatment of prisoners was directed by the Russians.

The hearings established that Soviet Russia had key personnel in every major section of the Communist prison command. There was a Russian who served as liaison for interrogation and indoctrination. Several Soviet propaganda experts actively supported the Chinese in this phase. One such expert was from the Moscow Academy of Propaganda where career Communist propagandists are especially trained.[42]

In addition to the Soviets serving on the propaganda staff, two western newspapermen served as advisers to the Communist propaganda chief. These were Allen Winnington, a foreign correspondent for the London Daily Worker, and Wilfred Burchett, an Australian newspapermen. They were primarily responsible for the preparation

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[32] P. 8, "POW" The Fight Continues After the Battle, published by Department of Defense, August 1955.
[33] P. 86.
[34] P. 88.
[35] P. 93.
[36] P. 89.
[37] Army pamphlet Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War, p. 36.
[38] Ibid., p. 37.
[39] Ibid., p. 20.
[40] Pp. 46, 57, 58.
[41] Army pamphlet Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War, pp. 10–14.
[42] P. 39; Army pamphlet Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War, p. 53.

of propaganda in a manner that would be most acceptable to the Western World.[43]

It was these two western newspapermen who were primarily responsible for the preparation of the Chinese propaganda for the United Nations prisoners and worked actively with English-speaking prisoners in order to try to persuade them to accept communism and betray their own countries.

A major command was set up by the Chinese Communists under a full general for the interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation through propaganda of the American prisoner. This unit was known as the educational and training section.[44]

The Chinese established a very rigid system of segregation. Prisoners were segregated according to rank, according to race, and according to nationality. Officers were segregated from the enlisted men in an attempt to destroy any positive leadership in the enlisted men's camps. Segregation served two other purposes. First, for control of the prisoners, and second, to achieve their objective, that is, to make a direct appeal to certain national groups and racial groups. Indoctrination material was tailored to fit the particular group.[45]

Shortly after capture, prisoners were marched to areas called collecting points. There the prisoners were assembled, briefed, and then assigned to permanent compounds. An English-speaking Chinese Communist officer would give a so-called welcome address, which consisted of an accusation against the United States for its participation in the war. While there, the prisoner was subjected to his first interrogation and he generally executed a form on which he listed his unit, his next of kin, his social and economic status, and the name of his commanding officer.[46]

After he was placed in a permanent camp, the interrogations continued and were more or less constant, being intermingled with the courses on indoctrination. The purpose of the interrogations was to obtain valuable military information. Harassment, deception, repetition, walking conferences, and writing essays and personal histories, were some of the techniques used. Thus, the prisoner might be called for an interview at odd hours of the day and night, might be awakened from his sleep or summoned during meals. He might be approached by individual interrogators on a friendly basis and invited to go for a walk around the compound. One of the most widely used methods in obtaining information was the writing of long, comprehensive essays on any phase of American life. Many of these documents gave information about other prisoners. The enemy studied these essays and always called the prisoner back for clarification which automatically gave more information to the enemy.[47]

Indoctrination was conducted by trained, skilled, and dedicated Communists. It consisted of two phases, the first characterized by violent attacks on the United States and our economic system, and the second characterized by the technique of comparison. During the first phase, they attacked the political and military leadership of the United States. They said that General MacArthur had resigned to

[43] Pp. 39, 40, 54.
[44] P. 39.
[45] P. 60.
[46] Pp. 46, 47.
[47] P. 48; Army pamphlet Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War, pp. 31–33.

become chairman of Remington-Rand to make rifles to kill innocent Koreans. They said that Glenn L. Martin does not make aircraft for civilian use, but makes bombers. They claimed that the United States had violated the U. N. Charter. These are but a few examples.[48]

Throughout the second phase, which took place in the permanent compound, we have again harassment, repetition, and humiliation of the prisoner. These indoctrination courses were compulsory and lasted for a period of approximately 1 year, during which period of time interrogations were in progress. The courses were given under the following titles: "Cause of the Korean War," "The 60 Big Families in the United States," "The U. N. Charter and the U. N. Organization," "Admission of the New China to the U. N.," "Profits by Wall Street," "Illegality of Truman's Order Moving Troops into Korea," "Capitalism," "Capitalism At Its Highest Stage," "Decline of Capitalism," "Socialism," "Construction of the New China," and "Capitalists of World War II." They were aimed at exploiting the system in the United States and fostering the Communist cause.[49]

The indoctrination program also contained a very heavy diet of Communist news. Among the publications which were available for reading was the New York Daily Worker and a number of other Communist American publications.[50]

After these compulsory courses were discontinued, lectures continued on a voluntary basis. The degree of success of the Communist program is indicated by the fact that approximately one-third of the Army prisoners continued attending the lectures voluntarily.[51]

Several organizations were in existence in support of the political indoctrination. The so-called central peace committee was composed of prisoners, and it assisted in the preparation of material for the courses given. The indoctrination material was forwarded to this committee for modification prior to prisoner consumption. This gave the impression that the prisoners conceived and prepared most of the program. This committee was in charge of activities in all camps. In addition, there were other committees which supplemented the work of the central peace committee and were known as the camp peace committee, the company peace committee and the squad peace committee.[52]

The central peace committee also had charge of propaganda. It was, therefore, a two-pronged committee. Lt. Col. Paul Von S. Liles, an American officer, was in charge of indoctrination. Since his return to the United States, he has been court-martialed and convicted but has been permitted to stay on active duty with the military. Maj. Ambrose Nugent, an American officer, was in charge of the propaganda activities. Upon his return to the United States he was tried but acquitted.[53]

Throughout the entire period of time the indoctrination and interrogation techniques were being used, propaganda activities were being carried out. Major Nugent and his men took instructions from the Communists, who in turn took their orders from Russian and Chinese officers. Under the direction of the committee, there was an elaborate Communist propaganda workshop staffed by approximately 30 pris-

[48] Pp. 50, 51.
[49] P. 52; Army pamphlet Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War, pp. 42, 43, 45.
[50] Pp. 60–61, 91.
[51] Pp. 52, 53.
[52] Pp. 41–42; Army pamphlet Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War, p. 54.
[53] Pp. 41–43, 45.

oners. This workshop, which was located at camp 12 in an area a couple of blocks long and wide, had a modern swimming pool, tennis courts, and recreation activities of various sorts. The principal duty of the prisoners stationed there was to pose for propaganda shots. Ten men playing basketball would be photographed, and this would subsequently be published in various newspapers. Its purpose was to create the impression that prison life in North Korea was not much different from life in the United States.[54]

In the propaganda setup there was a Communist newspaper published by the prisoners, called Toward Truth and Peace. The central theme of this newspaper was accusing the United States of starting the war in Korea. Every week it was disseminated to each prisoner. Other propaganda activities included a Stalin Dramatic Society, a Lenin Debating Society, and various oratorical contests. Attendance at the functions of these groups was mandatory. The debating society, for example, would have for its theme, "Resolved that the United States started the war in Korea." The side which took the position that the United States did not start the war was presented by known collaborators who would give weak arguments with the result that the other side would always win.[55]

The Communist captors used a simple system of reward and punishment to gain the cooperation of some prisoners. Thus more and better food, cigarettes, candy, alcohol, parties, sleeping late, and freedom from physical labor were used to gain some objectives.[56]

The Communists attempted to develop informers among the prisoners. The system has been described by many as the most destructive single factor against organized resistance to the enemy. Again the success of their efforts is indicated by the fact that testimony before the subcommittee revealed that 1 out of 10 prisoners were informers on at least 1 occasion.[57]

Mail has always been a tremendous moral factor to the prisoners. The Communists established a system of releasing only letters whose contents reflected bad news. Letters bearing good news from home generally were not delivered. This created worries and loneliness on the part of the prisoner.[58]

Dr. Julius Segal, a research psychologist at the human resources research office of George Washington University, Washington, D. C., conducted an analytical study of the prisoner-of-war situation for the United States Army. He testified that 15 percent of all Army prisoners were classified as collaborators with their Chinese captors; 80 percent were classified as neither collaborators nor resistors, and 5 percent were deemed to be resistors. The 15 percent consisted of prisoners who were either recommended for court-martial at the time research was done, or who had already been court-martialed or who had been suggested for other than honorable discharge. It also included men against whom some administrative action would have been taken if they had not already been discharged from the military service. This 15 percent means that about 500 Army prisoners of war were deemed to be active collaborators.[59]

[54] Pp. 44–45.
[55] P. 49; Army pamphlet Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War, pp. 57–60.
[56] Pp. 95, 99.
[57] P. 95.
[58] Pp. 50, 91.
[59] Pp. 82, 84.

The Department of Defense in its publication of August 1955 for all branches of the service, Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy, stated that there were only 192 collaborator suspects in all 3 services. Of this number, 68 were separated from the service, 3 resigned, 1 was reprimanded, 2 were given restricted assignments, and 6 were convicted by court-martial. As of July 20, 1955, 112 cases were pending. It is interesting to note that the Department of Defense publication was in July 1955, but that Dr. Segal's research was not furnished to the Department until about the first of June 1956.[60]

As a matter of fact, Dr. Segal testified that 70 percent of Army prisoners contributed in some degree to Communist psychological efforts in that they committed at least 1 act of collaboration. This percentage figure is an astonishingly large one, although it is recognized that many of the individuals signed a petition or confession or made a recording on only one occasion.[61]

The 80 percent middle group consisted of those who were neither collaborators nor resistors. Neutrality best describes their position. Like the collaborators, they were seldom the objects of physical pressure. Like the resistors, they were seldom the recipients of preferential treatment. They received less of the captor's rewards.[62]

One of the aims of the Chinese Communists, handling the American prisoners, was to make them accept communism as a social and economic system above and beyond their prior beliefs. Basically all of the American prisoners were subjected to this indoctrination program. Only 7 percent gave any indication of accepting any part of the ideology of their captors, and only 1 percent could be regarded as being converted to communism to any extent.[63]

There was no pattern established as to geographical location, religious conviction, education, or the like on the part of the American prisoner.[64]

It is important to note that the type of behavior, of accepting a reward in return for cooperation with the enemy, of collapsing in the face of the enemy's blandishments and coercion, did not take place in the middle of a metropolis like Washington, but in the environment of deprived, physically and psychologically sick conditions which existed in the Korean prison compounds.[65]

MEDICAL TREATMENT

Maj. Clarence L. Anderson, who was a prisoner of war in Korea for 34 months, and 4 other American physicians, who were prisoners, made a comprehensive study of their experiences along medical lines. He testified that from the start of the Korean war until the spring or summer of 1951, 38 percent of all prisoners of war died. These deaths were to a great extent attributable directly to the treatment by Chinese Communists.[66]

Food consisted mainly of corn or millet resulting in the average prisoner losing 40 to 50 percent of his body weight. There was much

[60] P. 83.
[61] Pp. 88–89.
[62] P. 102.
[63] P. 92.
[64] P. 96.
[65] P. 98.
[66] Pp. 110, 111.

illness associated with this malnutrition; in fact, many prisoners died of starvation.[67]

Stephen S. Jackson, Assistant General Counsel of the Defense Department, testified that the total personnel imprisoned by the United Nations Command in Korea was 173,219. The total number who died while in United Nations Command custody was 3,432. This percentage of death of prisoners in our custody is slightly less than 2 percent as opposed to the 38 percent who died in the hands of the North Koreans and Chinese Communists. The prisoner-of-war food ration established by the United Nations Command was designed to take into account the national diet of the prisoner and to be of such quality and quantity as to maintain the prisoner's weight and health. Approximately 2½ pounds of food was issued to each prisoner per day and consisted of rice, barley and wheat, vegetables, fish, meat substitute for fish, dried beans or lentiles, and condiments.[68]

Major Anderson said that no supplementary clothing was issued to American prisoners captured in the summer of 1950. Housing for the most part consisted of typical small Korean farm buildings constructed of mud with a thatched straw roof. These houses had been abandoned by the North Koreans and were in an extremely poor state of repair. As a result, a number of prisoners froze to death during the winter when temperatures got down to 30° below zero.[69]

American prisoners who were doctors were allowed to practice medicine during the first several months of their imprisonment, but only under the auspices of their captors. The medicine issued to them was totally inadequate. As an example, in one case enough penicillin was issued to treat only 1 individual for pneumonia, when in fact, there were 300 cases. Anesthetic equipment and surgical equipment was available rarely and then only for brief periods of time. As a result, operations were performed by American doctors in many cases without anesthesia. Surgery was usually done in a mud hut with no adequate preparation for the sanitation of the room. The medications that were available were never of sufficient quantity to be of any particular importance.[70]

The hospital compounds were totally inadequate. There was no provision for nursing of the men who were hospitalized. Cold air entering the hospital from spaces between boards resulted in an unhealthy situation. For all practical purposes, the hospital was the death house.[71]

In the spring of 1951 the American physicians were prohibited from practicing medicine and were subjected to indoctrination. The Chinese felt that they were not properly indoctrinated on how to cure illness and specifically, they did not know what types of people on whom they should practice medicine and try to save.[72]

The Chinese doctors were not properly trained for their job. On the average, their medical training consisted of from no formal training whatever to approximately 6 months in a hurry-up aid-man course designed for bandaging, which is somewhat similar to the course we give to our aid men. Many experimental operations which are not recognized by the medical profession were performed.

[67] P. 107.
[68] Pp. 139, 140.
[69] Pp. 107, 108.
[70] Pp. 108, 109.
[71] Pp. 108, 109.
[72] Pp. 110, 111, 113.

Many persons who would come to sick call complaining of a pain in any part of his body was treated by the so-called needle doctor. This treatment consisted of a short, rather blunt needle connected to a spring device and handle which was placed under the skin in various parts of the head of the patient. After the needles were so placed, the doctor would thump the handle of the needle so that the spring would cause a vibration. This treatment was expected to cure almost any ailment. It had the practical result of keeping prisoners from reporting sick to Chinese doctors.

Another practice was the administration of chicken liver. In this case a piece of chicken liver, approximately the size of a 25-cent piece, was implanted in the prisoner under the skin on the right side of his chest. Allegedly, this treatment was designed as a cure-all. Prisoners selected for this treatment were men suffering for the most part from malnutrition and various diseases associated with malnutrition. The treatment was purely voluntary but many prisoners took it, even though the chicken liver might cause infection because the Communists increased the diets and the caloric and vitamin content of the food for those who would volunteer and to these soldiers who were virtually starving to death, it was worthwhile.[73]

AIR FORCE

Dr. Herman J. Sander, Director of the Maxwell Field Research Unit of the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, was in charge of a study of the nature of Communist exploitation techniques experienced by Air Force prisoners. Of 263 Air Force personnel who were captured, 235 were repatriated to the United States.[74]

Dr. Sander testified that most of the Air Force prisoners were not subjected to the same group indoctrination that the Army was. Practically all of the Air Force personnel were considered by the Communists as useful subjects for special attention. The primary objective of the Chinese was to use them for propaganda purposes, particularly in connection with germ-warfare confessions. However, they were also selected for a very thorough interrogation for military information.[75]

The reasons for the special emphasis placed by the Chinese appears to be threefold: (1) Air Force personnel would logically be selected as susceptible to charges of having dropped germ warfare, (2) amongst captured Air Force personnel there would be a higher percentage of officers and therefore a greater potential for propaganda purposes and for intelligence, and (3) Air Force personnel generally are more knowledgeable as to the military situation than ground force personnel and have a higher degree of training and technical skill. For these reasons Air Force personnel were subjected to special treatment.[76]

During the early period of the Korean war, prior to the entry of the Chinese, Air Force personnel generally were placed in solitary confinement in crude shacks, holes, caves. The holes were often half

[73] Pp. 111, 112.
[74] P. 8, Department of Defense pamphlet POW August 1955; p. 141.
[75] P. 141.
[76] Pp. 141, 142.

filled with water. Neglect, malnutrition, and failure to provide medical treatment for wounds caused a large number of deaths.[77]

With the advent of the Chinese into the conflict and their assuming control, the interrogations became more thorough, calculating, and rational. Each prisoner would have one interrogator virtually living with him. There was a tremendous emphasis on getting detailed background information on the individual. The Communists desired to know to what organization or clubs the prisoner belonged, what his parents did, how much property he owned, and the kinds of recreational activities in which he participated.[78]

The effects of political indoctrination as contrasted to interrogation upon Air Force personnel was practically negligible because so few were kept in the mass camps where it went on.[79]

Because the Communists wished to give them special intensive interrogation, most of the Air Force prisoners, both officers and enlisted men, were placed in a special officers' camp about October 1951. Here while being interrogated the prisoner would be placed in a hut with no contacts except his guard or interrogator. Interrogation sessions ran for as long as 61 hours without relief.[80]

Dr. Sander said that on February 21, 1952, the Communists' worldwide germ-warfare campaign went into high gear. Air Force prisoners, captured after January 1952, underwent a very severe treatment. Solitary confinement in small huts and caves, lack of medical attention, inadequate food existed, but the pressure from the standpoint of interrogation was constant.[81]

Forty-eight Air Force personnel were subject to this coercive interrogation after January 1952, primarily with a view to obtaining false confessions on germ warfare. A total number of 59 Air Force prisoners were subjected to some pressure; 38 actually made some kind of confession, and the Communists used 23 for propaganda purposes, publicizing them throughout the world. Films of statements of six were shown as part of their major propaganda effort.[82]

Fifteen percent of those pressured agreed to confess after 1 month or less. Others held out for an extremely long period of time, and many refused to give the Communists any kind of statement even after 24 weeks of interrogation.[83]

Dr. Sander testified that the methods were so severe that if any blame was to be assessed upon the returnees it should be placed upon the Communists rather than upon the personnel who returned. He stated that the use of the word "brainwashing" has been greatly misinterpreted. He testified that the system used by the Communists in Korea was neither mysterious nor irresistible.[84]

An example that even the worst of Communist treatment could be resisted is the case of Capt. Theodore Harris who testified before this subcommittee.

On July 4, 1952, Harris' aircraft was shot down. As a result, Harris was in a severe state of shock and was very badly burned around the face, hands, mouth, throat, and back. The skin on his face was burned off. Within a short time he was captured by the Chinese Communists.[85]

For a period of several days until he reached the hospital compound in Pyongyang, Korea, he was in extreme pain because of virtually no medical attention. Maggots infested his burns and entered his ears and nose until his mental processes were being affected. Ultimately he was treated by a Chinese doctor. He remained in the hospital for approximately 5½ weeks before his captors felt he was strong enough to be interrogated.[86]

He was then taken out and placed in a trench, dug on the side of a hill about 2½ to 3 feet wide, and about 6½ feet long. His interrogations now began and were virtually constant. The first interrogation ended after 5 weeks when the interrogator became angry and struck Harris on the side of the head with a board. Harris lost his temper and struck the interrogator, and as a result was put in handcuffs the rest of the day. The next morning he was taken out and instructed to dig a hole in the ground about 3 feet deep, the size of a grave. They then told him he had a choice of either signing a confession that he had been dropping bacteriological bombs on North Korea and agreeing not to strike any officers, for which they would let him go, or otherwise they would shoot him. He agreed not to strike any of their officers provided they didn't abuse him, but refused to sign a confession. They then put him before a firing squad but when they pulled the triggers their weapons were empty.[87]

A new interrogator appeared on the scene, and he lasted approximately 2 months, at which time he flew into a rage and had Harris put in handcuffs. During one period of time Harris was shackled for 30 days. On another occasion he was handcuffed behind his back for a period of 2 or 3 weeks. It should also be noted that during the entire period of time he was a prisoner of war, namely, 14 months, he was in solitary confinement. Except for the initial period that he was hospitalized he received no medical attention other than that administered by a corpsman who would come around once a week and take off his old bandages and replace them with fresh ones. While the interrogations were going on in the trenches, Captain Harris was forced to sit on the floor with his feet in front of him constantly. The only time he was allowed to walk was to go to the latrine.[88]

On one occasion during the winter he was moved to a lean-to outside a Korean house. The temperature was 20 or 30 below zero. He had been furnished with a regular POW Chinese winter uniform, but this was not sufficiently warm against the intense cold. His toes and fingers became frostbitten, and no adequate medical attention was afforded him.[89]

The food was rotten, and, in fact, often inedible. On one occasion Harris, because he resented the type of questions he was being asked, went on a hunger strike which lasted for 12 or 13 days. His Chinese captors ended the strike by agreeing not to ask him any more bacteriological questions. This agreement the Communists honored for 1 month.[90]

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[77] P. 145.
[78] P. 146.
[79] P. 144.
[80] P. 148.
[81] P. 148.
[82] Pp. 148–150.
[83] P. 150.
[84] Pp. 151–153.

[85] Pp. 155, 156.
[86] Pp. 162, 163.
[87] Pp. 163–164.
[88] Pp. 164, 165, 166.
[89] P. 166.
[90] P. 168.

In January he was blindfolded, handcuffed, and taken on a long trip. He later learned that he had been transferred across the Yalu into Manchuria. After arriving at their destination, Harris was placed in a prison which was quite different from that in which he had been. He was given bedding, placed in a large cell, 20 by 30 feet, and was cleaned up. For the next 6 weeks he was interrogated daily, but more on a formal basis with a recording clerk present. The questions didn't vary from those previously asked, but the food and quarters were better. Occasionally they would vary the heat in his cell from over 100° down to about 30° below zero.

On one occasion, after a Chinese guard had wiped his feet on Harris' clothes, Harris struck him. For this Harris was handcuffed and placed in a box which was about 30 inches square. He was forced to sit in it for approximately 9 hours, and was temporarily paralyzed when he was removed. They then took him out of the box and handcuffed his arms to his ankles where they left him for 3 or 4 days, following which they handcuffed him in a conventional manner for about 6 weeks.[92]

About the latter part of March he was transferred into an old prison where the cell was very small. He was informed that he was to stand trial for his criminal activities. The so-called trial lasted about 6 weeks. Actually the trial was very little more than normal interrogation. He was allowed no counsel. He had no witnesses appear against him. They finally told Harris he had been found guilty and would be sentenced at a later date.[93]

While in this particular cell after a guard had been goading him, Harris punched him in his nose and broke it. This time he was placed in the same box for approximately 16 hours. While so imprisoned, they pounded on the lid all of the time. When they finally took him out, he could not walk and his mind was dazed.[94]

Afterward he was returned to his original prison, where conditions improved. He was furnished a grass mattress, clean clothes, and given smoking material. The food was comparatively good, much better than it had been. He was furnished much literature. During this period, about every 2 weeks he was permitted to take a bath, and once a week he was allowed to wash his clothes.[95]

When he was informed that he was to be repatriated, he recognized voices of his crew who were apparently in the same prison. He had not seen or conversed with any of his crew members during the entire time of his ordeal. They were placed on a train and taken to Kaesong. There he not only refused to sign a document that they read wherein he admitted to engaging in bacteriological warfare, but he demanded a copy of it, which they refused to give him. The next morning the trucks arrived to take the prisoners to Panmunjong. Harris at this time informed his interpreter that he was not leaving until he got a copy of the statement with which the Chinese confronted him. The other prisoners left, but Harris just stayed where he was. After some time and after breaking the windshield of a jeep into which the Communists were trying to force him to take him back to the United States lines, he was bodily removed in a truck where five Communist soldiers sat on him and finally dumped him into the United States zone.[96]

[92] Pp. 169–170.
[93] Pp. 170–171.
[94] Pp. 172–173.
[95] Pp. 171–172.

MARINE CORPS

Col. William N. Frash, United States Marine Corps, testified that 227 marines were captured during the Korean war, and 196 were repatriated to the United States. Marine prisoners were segregated as to officers and enlisted men and were billeted in the same compounds as Army prisoners. They were subjected to the same treatment as Army prisoners insofar as indoctrination, interrogation, and exploitation were concerned.[97]

Three marines were subjected to action by the military for their collaboration. Two went through a court of inquiry and were cleared subject to restricted assignments, and the third was given a letter of reprimand and released from the Marine Corps.[98]

Colonel Frash said that none of the other marines who were prisoners are known to have collaborated with the Chinese Communists or North Koreans. None, in fact, participated in the Central Peace Committee, the Communist publication Toward Truth and Peace, in Communist-sponsored oratorical contests, in Communist debating societies, or in Communist-sponsored plays. Fourteen marines admitted signing petitions, but a thorough investigation satisfied the Marine Corps that these men had not degraded themselves or their country.[99]

During the period of their captivity, the marines assisted each other and maintained their military organization within the prison camp. For the most part they took an interest and cared for their fellow marines who were in difficulty. The existence of a strong discipline, a well-organized chain of esprit de corps and faith were given credit for the very commendable showing of the Marine prisoners of war.[1]

PRISONERS OF WAR OTHER THAN AMERICAN

Prisoners of war who were not American or British were interrogated by a joint board of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in Japan; 313 Turks, 40 Filipinos, 22 Colombians, 12 French, 2 Greeks, 2 Netherlands, and 1 Belgian, were processed by this board. All of these prisoners were subjected to the same basic treatment as United States Army prisoners.[2]

Maj. Marion R. Panell, who served on this joint board and who had reviewed their records, testified that there were two groups who were particularly outstanding, namely, the Turks and Colombians. Approximately one-half of the Turks were captured in 1950 and the second half in April of 1951. A large majority of them were wounded. They were on so-called death marches and were imprisoned with American troops during the period of the very high death rate. During this time, because of the great care they took of one another no Turk died. During this same period there was a relatively high per-

[96] Pp. 173–175.
[97] P. 181.
[98] Pp. 181, 185–186.
[99] P. 182.
[1] Pp. 182–183.
[2] P. 133.

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centage of deaths among the Americans. In addition, there were only two Turkish prisoners accused of having cooperated with the Chinese Communists, and these for the relatively minor offense of having signed a petition.[3]

None of the other Turks in any way collaborated or cooperated with the enemy. The Turks attended forced Communist indoctrination lectures, but partially because of the language barrier, the attempted communistic lectures accomplished very little. Testimony established that the discipline and esprit de corps of the Turkish troops were very important factors in their resistance to the Communist enemy. They lived under a rigid disciplinary system whereby the line of authority goes from the top down to the last man. They stuck together as a group in caring for their ill and wounded. Their native life is more primitive generally than ours and as a result they were able to better adjust to the Chinese diet. Their closeness to the Communist world and their hatred for communism were an important factor. They broke rules and refused to obey even reasonable requests of the Chinese Communists just because it was a request by a Communist.[4]

The Colombians also did not succumb to the Communist teaching and did not collaborate with the enemy. Their record of resistance was comparable to the Turks. Major Panell attributed their outstanding performance to the strong religious convictions of the Colombians.[5]

GENEVA CONVENTION VIOLATIONS

Testimony was given by Lt. Col. Robert F. Grabb, International Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the United States Army, that at the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the North Korean and South Korean governments and Communist China had not been signatories to the Geneva Convention of 1949, and, therefore, were not bound by it. The United States, which was a signatory, did not have the United States Senate's consent to its ratification and therefore was also not bound. The International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, Switzerland, however, urged upon the participants in the conflict the acceptance of the provisions of the convention.[6]

On July 4, 1950, Syngman Rhee of South Korea announced that his Government would recognize the convention. On July 5, 1950, the United States Government announced its intention to abide by the terms of the convention. On July 13, 1950, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, which was the North Korean Government, informed the Secretary General of the United Nations that the principles of the Geneva Convention were being followed. The Swiss Government on July 16, 1952, was advised by the Foreign Minister of the Central Peoples Republic of China that the Geneva convention was being recognized with certain reservations. The reservations ran to article 85 which deals with prisoners of war becoming war criminals.[7]

[3] Pp. 183–186.
[4] Pp. 184–185.
[5] P. 186.
[6] P. 187.
[7] Pp. 188–192.

Lieutenant Colonel Grabb felt that the pertinent articles of the convention with respect to prisoners of war which have been violated by the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans were articles 13, 14, 16, 17, and 38. These articles generally deal with the following specific violations: Solitary confinement may not be imposed except in most rare instances and then for the shortest period of time; prisoners should not be shackled; they shall not be exposed to the curiosity and insults of the local populace; they shall receive adequate medical attention; their clothing must be marked; prisoner-of-war camps and hospital facilities must be marked; clothing must be adequate; they must be free from mental torment; officers may not be forced to work; and they must be free from physical maltreatment. One of the most important failures of the Communists was to provide a protecting power. The Geneva convention is very specific that a prisoner must at all times have ready access to a representative of a protecting power who has been appointed to watch out for his interest. Although the International Committee of the Red Cross made repeated attempts to obtain recognition, it never was successful in getting anyone into North Korea.[8]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTION

Gen. Graves B. Erskine, United States Marine Corps, retired, now assistant to the Secretary of Defense as Director of Special Operations, testified that the Defense Department is taking positive action in an attempt to deal with the prisoner-of-war problems that since the Korean war are known to be facing us. The Secretary of Defense appointed a committee to look into all aspects of the prisoner-of-war problem and a report was submitted on July 29, 1955. On August 17, 1955, the President issued an Executive order which established a code of conduct for servicemen.[9]

The Department has developed a three-phase training program which has been in effect for more than 1 year and which places great emphasis on military discipline, esprit de corps and morale. The first phase includes a training program to develop a resistance to Communist political and economic indoctrination, a knowledge and appreciation of our American heritage, a familiarity with our world program aims, and character guidance including encouragement of religious beliefs. The second phase is designed for all units and individuals in preparation of combat. It stresses means to evade capture, and then escape and survival. The serviceman is taught how to combat and survive the physical and mental conditions which he might face under Communist control. He is taught how to deal with informers and collaborators. He is trained to combat interrogation and indoctrination techniques. The third phase is designed for especially selected units and individuals. It generally deals with bringing aid and support of the United States to prisoners.[10]

The training is aimed at the positive approach to the problem, namely, how our men can evade capture, escape where possible, and if captured, how to cope with the techniques employed by the Communists.[11]

[8] Pp. 192–194.
[9] P. 196.
[10] Pp. 196–197.
[11] P. 196.

The Department of Defense has been assisted by representatives from labor, industry and patriotic organizations in extending training in character and patriotism in the home, church and school prior to an individual entering into the service.[12]

General Eskine emphasized that military training and education is not the complete solution to this problem.[13] Certainly the building of character and a knowledge of the moral and mental distructiveness of communism cannot begin when a boy enters the Army. It has its responsibilities, but so also do the homes, schools, and churches of America.

The following is the new code of conduct for the various armed services:

I. I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

II. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

III. If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

IV. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

V. When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

VI. I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.[14]

CONCLUSIONS

The popular conception of "brainwashing" is not supported by the evidence. In fact, the popular idea of Russian "brainwashing" and "menticide" is given encouragement by the Communists for the sole purpose of creating false impressions that their method and manner of conducting interrogations is mysterious to the degree of being irresistible. The subcommittee feels that the aura of mystery and fear which has long been associated with Communist methods of interrogations and indoctrination is in itself a major factor in their effectiveness.

It is true that the Communists have considerable skill in the extraction of information from prisoners and in making prisoners do their bidding, including signing confessions to crimes they did not commit. But the subcommittee hearings clearly established that there should be no mystery about the techniques that the Communists employed. They are well known and understood. Actually their practices are based on the simply and easily understood idea of progressively weakening an individual's physical and moral strength.

The Communists do not possess new and remarkable techniques of psychology manipulation. Their methods are not based on some weird psychological theory. The Communists are utilizing a highly developed but completely basic system in an attempt to obtain information from their prisoners and to convert them to beliefs acceptable to their captors. This subcommittee feels that a realization of this should place us in a far better position than we were in June 1950 at the beginning of the Korean war.

The Chinese Communists and North Koreans violated articles 13, 14, 16, 17, and 38 of the Geneva Convention with their use of isolation techniques, their shackling of prisoners, their exposure of prisoners to the curiosity of the local populace, their inadequate medical attention, poor clothing, gross inadequacy of foods, improper hospital facilities, the inadequacy of Chinese doctors, and physical mistreatment of American prisoners.

Certain Air Force personnel were subjected to intense coercive interrogation in order to obtain military information and false confessions. Individuals, such as Captain Harris, who were able to withstand the inhuman treatment of the Communists, deserve the gratitude and admiration of the people of this country.

The United States Marine Corps, the Turkish troops, and the Colombians, as groups, did not succumb to the pressures exerted upon them by the Communists and did not cooperate or collaborate with the enemy. For this they deserve greatest admiration and credit.

Although some Army prisoners exhibited a high degree of cooperation and collaboration with their Chinese captors, the subcommittee recognizes that this is not solely the Army's fault or responsibility.

We do feel that the military services are to be criticized for not having fully adapted their training programs to prepare troops to be familiar with methods used by the Communists, particularly where similar techniques were used by Russians in the treatment of German prisoners of war in 1941, and Japanese prisoners of war in 1945. The subcommittee recognizes that the military services have manpower problems over which they have very little if any control and that on parents, churches, and schools rests the primary and basic responsibility—a responsibility which cannot be delegated. Survival is not possible without family and religious training and a thorough understanding of the principles on which this country was founded and now exists. If we fail in these fields, no army, navy, or air force, however strong, can protect us.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The subcommittee makes the following recommendations:

1. That a resolution be offered in the Senate of the United States proposing that the Senate express its great concern over the methods of interrogation, and indoctrination of American prisoners of war used by the Chinese Communists in Korea. This resolution should also recommend that the United States delegation to the United Nations be instructed to present to the United Nations the facts concerning the techniques and methods used by the Communists against American prisoners of war, together with the resulting violations of the Geneva Convention.

[12] P. 197.
[13] P. 197.
[14] Pp. 131–132.

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Sen investigation on Korean War atrocities 1954

Lieutenant SMITH. Practically every one in the group was wounded someplace. They each had straggled blindly, and he had shot them. One of the guards shot another man who had not even straggled. He had fallen out of line. He had dysentery. If you had to relieve yourself, you had to run up to the head of the column or get someplace where the column's end would come past you. If the column's end got to you and you were not finished you had to get up and run further. This man had made the attempt and was getting up to run forward and this guard came up and he shot him right through the head.

I saw that because the major in charge of the group, the senior officer——

Senator POTTER. The American?

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, sir. He had various officers get to the end of the column every now and then to try to keep down that type of thing by trying to ask the men to keep up in line, and also to give him reports on what went on there. He had officers at the end of the line and the front of the line, and in each group. Also, the men were so hungry that they would try and dart out of the column to pick squash and cucumbers and things like that, and corn, out of the field. Every time they did that, the guards would shoot at them or throw rocks at them or run up with a stick, to get them back in line. They said all of that food belonged to the people of North Korea and we weren't to touch it.

On most of the march we got a rice ball, which was about the size of a golfball or sometimes a little larger, usually twice a day and sometimes once a day. Several men died on the way there from, I would imagine, dysentery or wounds, or exposure or malnutrition. We were able to walk during the day for a long period until a group was strafed one day and one of the North Korean guards got a scratch from a rock. It was flung up by one of the bullets. Then they were going to make us march at night again, but finally the senior officer was able to get them to allow us to continue marching during the day. None of us would have survived if we marched at night.

Senator POTTER. Were you still barefooted?

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, sir; still barefooted.

Senator POTTER. How long did it take you to make that march?

Lieutenant SMITH. From September 20 and we got to Pyongyang on the 8th of October, on a Sunday.

Senator POTTER. What happened when you got to Pyongyang?

Lieutenant SMITH. When we got to Pyongyang, we went to a compound there, well, another school, and it had a brick wall around it, and we saw Russian officers as we came into Pyongyang. It was the first time we saw them actually in uniform.

Senator POTTER. A Russian officer?

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, sir. And the people, the North Koreans would swear at you. We got into this schoolhouse and the ration there changed. They said that they would give us bread and a liquid soup along with it. The bread was about half a bun, I would say. You got that twice a day. It was a little better, as far as the Americans were concerned, than the rice diet that we had. The major had me in charge of the sick up there in Pyongyang, the sickroom. Each officer was assigned a room, one of the schoolrooms, with a group of men. The men were dying pretty fast there, and he asked me to go

along with them and see that they were decently buried as much as possible, under the supervision of the North Korean guards, and also to make a record of where they were buried and to see that they always prepared a bottle with the man's name, rank, and serial number and other data that we could gather placed in this bottle in the graves.

Senator POTTER. How many men did you bury?

Lieutenant SMITH. I buried about 20 men at Pyongyang.

Senator POTTER. Did they have other burying details, too?

Lieutenant SMITH. Not in Pyongyang, no, sir. They did along the road, though. After we buried about three men, some of the North Korean civilians seemed to be in sympathy with us, we noticed. They would come up and give us apples, and a kind of a cake, a grape sugar flavored cake, and chestnuts, and corn. We would carry this back and divide it mostly with the sick men or some one that was in need, and then we would eat some of it ourselves. We had almost a permanent burial detail and used the strongest men.

Senator POTTER. How were the men buried? Did they have a deep grave?

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, the grave was pretty deep. We would dig down about 4 or 5 feet. We were only able to do that because quite often the civilian North Koreans would jump up and help us dig the graves. This was done only because they were friendly to us.

Senator POTTER. In other words, you had some North Koreans that, while they were still under Communist control, were still sympathetic toward the Americans and some South Koreans, is that correct?

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator POTTER. How long were you in charge of this detail there at Pyongyang?

Lieutenant SMITH. We got there the 8th of October. I think we buried our first man about the next day. Up until the time we moved out from Pyongyang——

Senator POTTER. What time did you move out of Pyongyang?

Lieutenant SMITH. We moved out of there about October 21, I would say, that the column started out again.

Senator POTTER. Were you interrogated at Pyongyang?

Lieutenant SMITH. No, sir.

Senator POTTER. Where did you go from there?

Lieutenant SMITH. From there, well, that is where I made my escape, I and four other men. Before I tell you about the escape part, I would like to bring in another thing. While we were working during the day, every now and then we would get a pamphlet from one of the civilians, pamphlets that had been dropped from airplanes.

Senator POTTER. From our planes?

Lieutenant SMITH. From our planes, yes. It said, "Do not harm the prisoners of war"—It was signed by General MacArthur—"or you will be brought to task for it. The war is lost. Surrender and treat our prisoners well."

We would carry these back and show them to the major. We would try to figure out what was going on. We figured maybe our forces were coming north, or maybe going to plan another end sweep. We found out they had landed at Inchon because three marines were added to our group as we traveled north and they told us about the landing at Inchon. About this time the men started making plans and

trying to escape. They all concluded they would not travel north that they couldn't make it. The major said that was fine, that they had his blessing, but that he would stick with the main group so that he could try and see them through. We also asked for medical supplies from these civilians, and they were able to get us some mercurochrome and some bandages which we used for the sick; quite a few bandages. Four of us in the burial detail figured if we could move out at night we could bolt out of the column as they passed an alley, the alley being one adjacent to the school compound.

We figured it would be dark on the night we moved out, so we got out of the column and the column and the guards at the rear passed by us and didn't see us. We ran our way through the town, and ran into some soldiers once and got away from them, and then ran into a roadblock and had to run through it, and got away from the guards in the roadblock. We figured we couldn't get out of the city which we had planned to do, so we holed up in a house which had been boarded up. We replaced the boards on the outside of the doorway, so it appeared no one had gone through there. We got into the house, and we found a big Korean jar about half full of water, some flour, and about a handful of rice. We took the flour and made a paste out of it, and lived off of that for about 5 days, or 4 days.

On the fifth day as we were out of food, we figured we had better leave those quarters because they were fighting all around us all the time, and we were afraid either a shell was going to come into the house or some Korean was going to come in there and try to use it for quarters, and we would be discovered. We figured we better get out where we could see what was going on.

We couldn't see much in the house. For some reason or other we did move out the fifth night, which was a good night. On the next day, the sixth day, one of the men noticed South Korean flags flying in the city. He called me over to peep through the crack and I saw it, and he asked what I made of it. I told him I couldn't figure it out. I said, "The city has not fallen, because I can still see North Korean troops." I said, "Evidently it is about to fall, and they are just turning sides again."

They always had two flags, a North Korean and South Korean flag, every Korean. Whichever flag was winning, he would put the flag up. "So evidently," I said, "The South Koreans are about ready to come into the town."

That is, the American forces. After a while we got a little bit bolder. We didn't see any more troops. We called to a South Korean old man, "papasan," called him over, and I stayed in the background. There was a nisei fellow there, myself, and three American GI's, caucasians, and all of them had heavy beards. One of them had a big black beard. This man came up to this civilian and said, "Rusky, Rusky," and he said "No, not Russian. American." He said, "American? Americans are down the road." He let us know the Americans were down that way.

He said "I will get you to the Yaego." He thought we were still Russians. We were to hide there during the day and that night he was going to slip us up toward Manchuria. Finally, we got it through his head that we were Americans and wanted to meet the Americans and also we were hungry. He said, "Wait a minute," he would go get food. He started out. Then we got worrying whether

he was going to get food or some guards. We kept watching to see the direction he went to see if he was going to bring anybody back with him, and pretty soon we saw him coming by himself with a bowl, and he brought back a bunch of crackers which we ate. Meanwhile, we kept noticing troops going down a railroad embankment which was near us, not too far away, and they appeared to be in khaki, but we weren't sure. The brown North Korean uniform was very deceiving. They had brown faces. None of us bothered to think they might be South Koreans. So we were a little bit reluctant to come out of the house.

Finally we came out and figured we better get out while we could break away from there because we weren't going to be captured. Each one had sworn to that. We were going to fight to the finish anybody that tried to take us. Pretty soon the people on the embankment started waving at us. Then they started down the hill. As they got down this embankment a little bit, we noticed that they were wearing GI clothing and carrying M-1's, all of them. Finally somebody said they were South Korean, ROK troops. They came over and hugged us, and they had one can of salmon and gave us that, and then they took up down to the Second Division CP.

Senator POTTER. You were glad to see them, too?

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, sir; very glad to see them. It was the happiest time of our lives.

Senator POTTER. Were you hospitalized as a result of your experiences?

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, sir; I was. I went down to 114 pounds.

Senator POTTER. 114?

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, sir; from 165.

Senator POTTER. Any questions?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get a quick recap, if I may.

Actually, how many American PW's during the march did you see killed?

Lieutenant SMITH. That I personally saw, was three, sir.

Mr. O'DONNELL. How many do you know of that were actually killed?

Lieutenant SMITH. I got reports from the men in the group that I was with, in the back, that would total 20 men.

Mr. O'DONNELL. From the time you were captured and started your march until you escaped, how many American PW's did you assist in their burials?

Lieutenant SMITH. From the time that they started the march? From the time we started the march, I have accurate notation on that.

Mr. O'DONNELL. What I would like to get is a summation, if I could.

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, sir. I made notes of everything that went on on a piece of paper I had which was turned in when I got back to American hands.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Take your time, now, in looking at your notes.

Lieutenant SMITH. Eighteen, sir.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Eighteen?

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Thank you very much.

Senator POTTER. Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. No questions.

Senator POTTER. Mr. Jones?

Mr. JONES. No questions.

Senator POTTER. Lieutenant, I wish to thank you for giving us the benefit of your experiences. I would like to say this, as I said before today, that it makes you proud to be an American when you hear the valor of the men who have testified here today.

I think probably the history of Korea when it is written will go down as having some of the most courageous action of any military experience that American troops have participated in. I think that you who have been fighting the war in Korea, whether you are Irish, Jewish, Negro, or whatever race you might be, are a great credit to us as Americans. We are all a mixed race. I know that the Communists put on a great effort, made a great effort, to incite race hatred, to pit one group against another. I am proud of the record of American soldiers of all races, and the Negro race. The Negro soldiers that are fighting in Korea can hold their head very high. You are a credit not only to your race but you are a credit to our country. To you, Lieutenant Smith, who testified here today, I am saying this to you, but I mean it for all Negro troops.

Lieutenant SMITH. Thank you, sir.

Senator POTTER. I would like to ask you one question before you are released, a question that I have asked others. Did the Communists endeavor to indoctrinate you when you went through their propaganda mill?

Lieutenant SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator POTTER. What do you think of communism as a way of life?

Lieutenant SMITH. Sir, personally I hate communism and anything communistic. As a way of life, I believe that they are totally wrong. I personally would relish fighting against it any place at any time.

Senator POTTER. Thank you.

The committee will recess for today. We will begin tomorrow at 10:30 with Lt. Col. Jack Todd. Colonel Todd worked with Colonel Wolfe, with the War Crimes Investigating Committee. We will hear testimony also from Sergeant Treffery, Sgt. Wendell Treffery, Sgt. Barry F. Rhode, Sgt. George Matta, Capt. Linton Buttrey, Pvt. Willie Daniels, and Charles Canard.

Those will be the witnesses, probably, for tomorrow.

The committee will be recessed until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m. the committee was recessed to reconvene at 10:30 a. m. Thursday, December 3, 1953.)

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT No. 3

Bodies of U. S. and South Korean troops, forced to dig their own graves, and then shot by fleeing Communist-led North Korean forces, near Taejon, Korea. September 29, 1950.

Sergeant, do you swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Sergeant TREFFERY. I do, sir.

TESTIMONY OF SGT. WENDELL TREFFERY, PATIENT IN MURPHY ARMY HOSPITAL, WALTHAM, MASS.

Senator POTTER. Sergeant, will you be seated please?

Sergeant, will you identify yourself for the record, your full name and present assignment?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Sir, my name is Sgt. Wendell Treffery, RA-115660, presently stationed as a patient in Murphy Army Hospital in Waltham, Mass. My hometown is Terryville, Conn.

Senator POTTER. Sergeant, would you tell the committee when you went to Korea and what outfit you were with at the time?

Sergeant TREFFERY. I went over as an aid man, sir; with the 7th Division, landed at Inchon September 18.

Senator POTTER. I think it would be a little easier if you spoke a little more slowly. Would you briefly tell the committee the circumstances under which you were captured?

Sergeant TREFFERY. We was ambushed. We was headed for the Chosen Reservoir, was attached to the 1st Marine Division at the time. We was ambushed one night about 7 o'clock.

Senator POTTER. You were what?

Sergeant TREFFERY. We was attached to the 1st Marine Division, headed for the Chosen Reservoir. A lot of our troops were surrounded by Chinese forces the other way there. About 7 o'clock in the evening we was ambushed by Chinese forces. After fighting all night we was forced to surrender in the morning. A Chinese interpreter hollered from the mountainside and told us to surrender or we would be all wiped out and if we surrendered they would take all the wounded back on to our frontlines. The senior officer in charge went down the road and talked terms to the Chinese interpreter. He came back and told us we were forced to surrender, we had no other alternative. After telling us that, we just ruined everything possible to save the enemy from getting hold of it.

Senator POTTER. You mean you destroyed your weapons and things of that kind?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Everything that would do them any good. After the Chinese moved in on us they put us all in two files, marched us up the side of the mountain to three log cabins on the mountain. There they took most of our heavy clothing, outer garments, and left most of us a pair of fatigues. At the time it was about 20 below zero.

Senator POTTER. About 20 below zero. Did they take your shoes?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes; they got my boots. We stayed there until the 1st day of December.

Senator POTTER. Sergeant, did the Communists send the wounded prisoners back to our lines as they agreed to?

Sergeant TREFFERY. We found out, sir, after starting out on the march again, starting the 1st of December, they backtracked down by our convoy that had been ambushed and our wounded were still laying there, but they were frozen.

Senator POTTER. The wounded had been left. They took the able-bodied men and left the wounded there, stating that they would have them sent to our lines?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes. The wounded had frozen laying there, frozen stiff. We marched by them. We marched 8 days. The first night we got some hay and we slept in the hay cuddling together to keep warm. The second night we slept in pigpens, about 6 inches space between the logs. That night I froze my feet.

Starting out again the next morning after bypassing the convoy I picked up two rubber boots, what we call snow packs. They was both for the left foot. I put those on. After starting out the second morning, I didn't have time to massage my feet to get them thawed out. I got marching the next 16 days after that. During that march all the meat had worn off my feet, all the skin had dropped off, nothing but the bones showing. After arriving in Kanggye they put us up there in mud huts, Korean mud huts. We stayed there—all sick and wounded most of us was—stayed there in the first part of January 1951. Then the Chinese come around in the night about 12 o'clock and told us those who was sick and wounded they was going to move us out to the hospital, which we knew better. There could have been such a thing but we didn't think so.

They moved us all night on oxcarts. We moved then about 10 miles south of Kanggye, where they isolated us in a small Korean valley with the Koreans, no Chinese around. We stayed there until April 25. During that time the Chinese nurse, what we called a nurse, but I don't think she was—she come around to take care of the wounded for the first 3 days we was there. She gave us medical attention.

Senator POTTER. What did that medical attention consist of?

Sergeant TREFFERY. She had a bag on her side, stuffed full of newspapers and she had a big pair of shears that I cut hedges around the house with. She had those in her hands. This afternoon she come in the hut I was in. Me and three other men was there. She said, "What is wrong with you?" So I stuck my feet out from under the blankets and showed her the bones of my feet. She told me to lay down on my back so I slid down. She started to clip them. She missed the joint about sixteenth of an inch and hit the solid bone. She crunched them off, took them all off except two big toes. After doing that she took that dirty newspaper she had in that bag and she wrapped it over the blood and pus and stuff that come out of the foot and tied it on with a piece of string. Then she went out.

I said, "How do you like that. That's pretty stupid." I tore the newspaper off and the comforter that the Chinese had gave us was full of cotton. I tore the comforter open and administered the cotton to the nub, and had a pair of fatigues. I ripped them up into bandages. I took care of my feet all winter long. If I hadn't, the poison from my feet would backtrack up into the system and probably would have killed me. Those other three men who was with me, they died. They died by April 25. They was all dead but myself.

Mr. JONES. Sergeant, did you have any anesthesia when she cut off your toes?

Sergeant TREFFERY. No sir; no anesthesia.

On April 25 they moved what was left of us in that valley out to camp 1, Changsong. They moved us by truck. After arriving there

sh them into the table. For anybody in the United States to
communism, they are either crazy or out of their head, either
think they should all be shipped to Siberia and let them live
r the next 20 years and feed them strictly a rice diet. Then
want to stay there, okay. But if they want to come back
like a citizen of the United States should live, and be proud
itizen of the United States, bring them back. Otherwise keep
er there.

O'DONNELL. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I have before me here
zine which is captioned "United Nations POW's in Korea,"
d by the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace,
China, 1953, consisting of 92 pages.

ant, I would like to have you look at this—and, Mr. Chair-
would like to have it marked for identification at this time
oduced as an exhibit.

or PORTER. It will be so marked in the record.

magazine referred to above was marked "Exhibit 9," and
found in the files of the subcommittee.)

O'DONNELL. I would like to have you examine this to see if
true picture of the purported treatment that was received
PW's in camp No. 1. This particular pamphlet purports to
that all of our prisoners received excellent treatment. I
ke to have you pay particular attention to page No. 47, to
at is the particular play that you mentioned a few minutes
use it is used here as positive propaganda of good treatment.
ou care to look at this, please?

ant TREFFERY. Yes.

or PORTER. This is a publication put out by the Communists
Korea and China.

ant TREFFERY. That picture on 47, sir, is part of that play; yes.

DONNELL. That is the actual play where they threw them off
e for making disparaging jokes about the Communists and
y are using that to show that the boys are getting good
t.

ant TREFFERY. Yes, sir; I can see that.

DONNELL. Would you glance through some of those photo-
nd give us a general comment as to whether or not you agree
particular statements that are portrayed there as to the treat-
al or bad treatment that our boys were receiving?

n TREFFERY. Well, sir, here you see you have not more than
mall minority of the prisoners of war in a group at a time.
en, I would say, are picked men to go along with them.
l such a group as that. They had one group they picked to
se pictures. And these other ones here, as you can see, a big
ost of the men don't even know they are being taken.
d say the biggest majority of these are strictly picked, picked
se for the picture.

DONNELL. While at camp No. 1 did you know of any in-
here a group of American PW's would be taken out on a
y and given excellent treatment such as an unusually good
food or taken out to participate in sports which would be
al event for a 1-day proposition which would permit them to
ographs and use them as a propaganda at a later date?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir, I have heard of such a group of men, which then was the 7th Company. We called them the movie platoon, the movie stars. But I never got their names, for some reason, never could find out who they were. But the Chinese would take them out, feed them like a king, with wine and beer and feast them up, and then play along with them without really realizing what trouble they was getting into, the wrong they was doing.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Could you give us a general comment as to whether that particular magazine indicates the actual treatment that was received by American PW's?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Here is a picture, for example, with men sitting at a table, with apples on there and eating chicken. That is a good picture referring to these picked boys.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Sergeant, I would like to get a general statement, if you will, as to whether or not these photographs actually portray the actual treatment being received by PW's at Camp 1 over a period of time.

Sergeant TREFFERY. Nothing like this ever happened at Camp 1 while I was there. At Camp 5, I would bet my life on it.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Sergeant, one other question: You were actually captured by the Chinese troops, correct?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'DONNELL. And the prison camp, Camp 1, was under the jurisdiction and operated by the Chinese Communists?

Sergeant TREFFERY. True; yes.

Mr. O'DONNELL. You subsequently went to Camp 4, is that correct?

Sergeant TREFFERY. From Camp 1 to Camp 4. In August 1952 we moved to Camp 4.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Camp 4 was under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Communists?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Everything you have related this morning were offenses, inhuman acts, perpetrated by the Chinese?

Sergeant TREFFERY. The Chinese; yes, sir.

Senator PORTER. Mr. Jones?

Mr. JONES. Sergeant, you mentioned earlier that you attended these Communist indoctrination classes, is that correct?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir. Certain ones, sir, just the ones held within the mud hut. The other ones I couldn't make because I couldn't walk then.

Mr. JONES. Was it the civilian who was the chief of these indoctrination classes?

Sergeant TREFFERY. No, sir; he was in a Chinese uniform.

Mr. JONES. He was in a Chinese uniform?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir.

Mr. JONES. He wasn't the Russian Commissar type?

Sergeant TREFFERY. No, sir. I never seen a Russian civilian while I was there.

Mr. JONES. You did not see a Russian civilian?

Sergeant TREFFERY. I seen pilots and Russian ack-ack, but no civilians.

Senator PORTER. Mr. Carr?

Mr. CARR. Sergeant, while you were a prisoner, did you observe any of the prisoners of war being used for medical experiments by your captors?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir; I did. I witnessed quite a few of those certain incidents, where they would cut them in the side, put in what we call a monkey gland, actually it was a chicken liver, I believe.

Senator POTTER. What did you call it, a monkey gland?

Sergeant TREFFERY. We called it a monkey gland, but actually it was a chicken liver. They would put that in there and sew it up, and they said that it would increase your appetite for maize, I believe, but they said it would increase appetite, make you more sprier, stronger, make you healthier, and everything else would increase.

Mr. CARR. Did you observe the results of any of these experiments?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir; I did. This one certain man in my squad at that time, he took his coat off, and when he was taking his coat off he stretched a little too much and that broke open. When it broke open it was festered so bad that the stuff just run down his side.

Mr. CARR. Did you know if any of the men were killed as a result of this?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Not to my knowledge; no, sir.

Senator POTTER. They claimed it was for the purpose of getting a better appetite?

Sergeant TREFFERY. That was the purpose, so they told us. They said it would make you more sprier, stronger, and healthier and everything.

Senator POTTER. Did the men volunteer for this experiment?

Sergeant TREFFERY. I don't believe so; no, sir. The doctor just said you were going to have it done, and that is it.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Sergeant, you were repatriated when?

Sergeant TREFFERY. April 25 I came across to freedom at Panmunjon.

Mr. O'DONNELL. That was operation known as Little Switch?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'DONNELL. You were repatriated because of your particular condition?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir; physically.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Would you tell us your weight situation from the time you were captured until the time you were released?

Sergeant TREFFERY. I would say I weighed at least 155 when I was captured. In May 1951 I was down to 70 catty. That would be less than 70 pounds on American scales.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Less than 70.

Sergeant TREFFERY. When I was released, I weighed 132, around there.

Mr. O'DONNELL. You are still undergoing hospitalization?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir.

Senator POTTER. As the peace talks got under way, did your treatment improve?

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, sir. It improved slowly, very slowly. As soon as the peace talks started up, I believe on July 10 they brought pigs in, they looked like wild boars. They butchered those and gave us just a small amount of meat. You were lucky if you got a piece of meat as round as a quarter. Then they started giving us rice now and then. It increased a little bit as time went on.

Senator POTTER. Sergeant, in the Little Switch operation, the Communists were to return all wounded prisoners of war. Do you have any knowledge as to whether they left any of the wounded back in camp? That is, in the prison camp you were in? Or did they send all the wounded back on Little Switch?

Sergeant TREFFERY. In my compound, in my platoon, or shall I say—yes, platoon—the ones that came out of there to come home was just about, I would say, the worst ones. There were some minor cases, but the ones that came out of my platoon were the worst ones. But I read of some cases that come out of Big Switch from Camp 5 and Camp 1 that certainly should have come out in Little Switch.

In some cases that come out in Little Switch they certainly shouldn't have come out until Big Switch.

Senator POTTER. Are there further questions?

Sergeant, I want to thank you for appearing before the committee. I know you have been through an experience that you would like to forget.

Sergeant TREFFERY. Yes, I would.

Senator POTTER. But you will have to keep going through the rest of your life with a constant reminder which will probably keep you from forgetting it in its entirety. Many men demonstrate great feats of heroism on the battlefields. I think that you and these other men that have been before the committee exemplify the same type of heroism in the prisoner of war camps. You are a credit to our great country.

Thank you.

Mr. Kinard? Would you raise your hand and be sworn. Do you swear that the testimony you shall give before this committee will be the truth, the whole thruth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KINARD. I do.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES EDWARD KINARD, QUINCY, FLA.

Senator POTTER. When did you go to Korea, and with what outfit were you with at the time?

Mr. KINARD. I arrived in Korea on July 4, 1950, with the 24th Division, the 21st Infantry Regiment.

Senator POTTER. Would you briefly tell the committee the circumstances under which you were captured?

Mr. KINARD. I moved up to the lines. We were fighting a delaying action with the 21st Infantry Regiment.

Senator POTTER. What was your duty at that time?

Mr. KINARD. At that time I was leading a squad in my company. We had been fighting very fiercely for several days, from the 4th until the 10th, and at that time our supplies and our men had been almost exhausted. I was ordered by one of the officers of the company to take a few stragglers and myself and try and relieve some of the pressure off of one of our other battalions. As far as I know, I was the only one to get there in that particular area, and in doing so as I say, I found myself there without any help. So I started

DESTROYING AMERICAN MINDS—RUSSIANS MADE IT A SCIENCE

World Gets Horrible Truth on Germ-War 'Confessions'

Why did intelligent, loyal American fliers, trained to face death, succumb to enemy pressure and write anti-U. S. propaganda?

Here, in detail, is the first scientific explanation of the Russians' new techniques of persuasion, used on these captured fliers.

It tells just how the "treatment" worked in Korean and Manchurian torture centers. Documented by the sworn statements of survivors, it is the report to the U. N. by a medical authority and U. S. delegate to the United Nations, Dr. Charles W. Mayo.

Full text of Dr. Mayo's analysis of new Communist torture methods is given here.

Following is the text of what Dr. Charles W. Mayo told the Political Committee of the United Nations about methods of torture used by Communists on American prisoners:

Mr. CHAIRMAN,

The question before us—the charge that the United States forces engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea—plainly involves the honor and integrity not only of my country and her soldiers, but also of the United Nations itself, under whose banner 16 member nations fought in Korea. It is therefore a subject which my country in particular, but in a larger sense all of us here, must treat in the most serious way. We cannot allow this whole distorted story to slide away like water off a duck's back.

It is not a pretty story that confronts us. It is a story of terrible physical and moral degradation. It concerns men shaken loose from their foundations of moral value—men beaten down by the conditioning which the science of Pavlov reserves for dog and rats—all in vicious attempt to make them accomplices to a frightful lie.

In an even deeper sense, the story we have to tell reflects a Communist system which deliberately flouts every principle of morality and truth, devoting itself to one sole object, the progress of Communism by any effective means, no matter how evil . . .

—United Press

DR. CHARLES W. MAYO
"It is not a pretty story"

Confessions of Six American Fliers

[An] important development since last April followed upon the repatriation of most of our captured fliers after the armistice, and thus relates to the so-called confessions by some of these fliers that they had waged bacteriological warfare in North Korea. These so-called confessions, you will recall, were perhaps the most important and publicized feature of the Communist case.

The operation which produced these confessions played a much larger role than some of us have imagined. It victimized far more prisoners of war than the handful of whose so-called confessions I am about to speak. In turn, this whole campaign of falsehood was a key phase of a still larger political and propaganda campaign mounted by the Communists as an integral part of their aggression in Korea. I shall return to this wider context in some detail later in my remarks. At this moment I shall concentrate on six individual cases, the so-called "confessions" of six American officers—two Marines and four Air Force officers—on which the Soviet Union built its case in the United Nations.

You will recall that on Oct. 1, 1952, the Delegate of the Soviet Union transmitted to the United Nations, for circulation to all delegates, a document entitled "Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China." The report of this commission, which was composed mainly of well-known collaborators with Communist organizations like the "World Peace Council," placed great emphasis upon the four United States Air Force officers—Lieutenants Quinn, O'Neal, Enoch and Kniss—whose purported handwritten confessions were attached as annexes to the main report. I may add that the appearance of these four officers before this so-called "scientific commission" was made the emotional climax of a Communist propaganda film, issued in several languages including English, French and Spanish, and given world-wide distribution.

Later, on March 12, 1953, during the second half of the reconvened General Assembly, the representative of the Soviet Union introduced in the United Nations, for circulation among all delegations, two additional so-called confessions obtained from two officers of the United States Marine Corps—Col. Frank H. Schwable and Maj. Roy Bley. The statements of members of the Soviet bloc placed great stress upon all of these so-called confessions, and in particular those of Colonel Schwable and Major Bley.

All six of these officers, having served their purpose as far as the Communists were concerned, were released after the

armistice and have returned to the United States. Among the sworn statements we are submitting to this Committee are those made by these six officers after their return to freedom. They all state categorically that they never waged bacteriological warfare and that their so-called confessions were false and were extracted by coercive Communist methods which have become very familiar to the world. I shall not read these sworn statements at this meeting, nor discuss them in detail—they speak eloquently for themselves, and I shall offer them to this Committee as a part of the official record of this debate.

I should like, however, to call your attention to a circumstance which you might overlook in a more cursory reading of these sworn statements, in particular those of Colonel Schwable and Major Bley. These two sworn statements show the dates when—after interrogation and physical and mental torture in solitary confinement, lasting over three months and nearly five months respectively—they finally broke down and agreed to "confess," and when their so-called confessions were finally accepted by the Communists. Major Bley's sworn statement states:

"One night around midnight, my interrogator and guard escorted me to the POW camp commander's office where, through an interpreter, I was told they had concrete evidence that I had participated in germ warfare, showed me for the second time a part of another POW's confession on germ warfare (which I believed was a fake) and then gave me a written 48-hour ultimatum. It was written in English, signed by some Chinese general. It stated in effect that after the 48-hour period if I had not told them what I knew about germ warfare and the part I played in it, I would be made a war criminal . . .

"The interrogator came again at the end of the ultimatum period and I told him I would go along with the lie. He had all the information he wanted me to write down and within a few hours I had it all rewritten and signed. I believe the date of my deposition was 25 January 1953. However, it was rewritten several times to get it exactly as they wanted it . . .

After the Chinese had edited my false statement, I was required to write it out once again on smooth paper and record it on a tape-recording machine. This was sometime around the last of February, 1953 . . ."

Colonel Schwable, in his statement, says:

". . . After applying all manner of means to break me down mentally, morally and physically, to confuse me, and to convince me that there was no alternative in the matter, I succumbed to their demands verbally the end of November, 1952, and from then until near the end of February, 1953, I was involved in many, many rewrites of the fraudulent information submitted, making wire recordings and being photographed both in motion pictures and stills while reading this false 'confession,' all under protest . . ."

You will note that with both Colonel Schwable and Major Bley the significant date when the Communists accepted their so-called confessions as satisfactory was the end of February, 1953. The reason for this date is obvious—the General Assembly reconvened on Feb. 24, 1953. The so-called confessions were circulated among the delegations on March 12, 1953. In other words, the tortures of Colonel Schwable and Major Bley evidently were an integral and essential part of Soviet preparations for the General Assembly.

Other Victims of the 'Confession' Campaign

I have already referred to the fact that the six famous "confessions" which the Soviet Union exploited in the United Nations represent only a small fraction of the total Communist effort to turn American prisoners into accomplices of their fraudulent charge. We do not yet know the full story, and since many victims are dead we shall never have it all. However, we already have some minimum figures. We know that the Communists accused at least 107 of our captured fliers of engaging in bacteriological warfare. Of these we know that 40 refused to sign any confession. Of the 36 who did sign, all under duress, some 20 were subjected to what can fairly be called extreme and prolonged physical and mental torture. This leaves a remainder of 31 who have not returned, and, of these, 14 are confirmed as dead and the other 17 are listed as missing. It appears that all of these men were told by the Communists that they were not prisoners of war but "war criminals," and thus without any rights under the Geneva Convention.

It should be noted that many of these prisoners, and others too—infantrymen as well as airmen—were victimized not only for the germ-warfare propaganda but also for the sake of "confessions" on other subjects which the Communists called "war crimes" and "atrocities."

Now let me refer briefly to the experience of a few of these men. In some of these cases their tormentors succeeded in extracting the signed papers they wanted; and in other cases they failed. The first three cases I shall mention are taken from among the sworn statements we are submitting to this Committee.



GERM-WARFARE 'CONFESSION'
"It was rewritten several times . . ."

Col. Walker Mahurin of the Air Force, a famous ace in the European theater in World War II, finally wrote and signed a confession after extreme and prolonged duress in solitary confinement, lasting nearly eight months. After the first two or three weeks of interrogation and torment he was driven to attempt suicide. In the first three months of his confinement he refused on at least six different occasions to break down. After his last refusal he was kept in solitary confinement for over three months more, threatened daily with death, roused almost nightly by guards who seemed ready to kill him. Then followed some six weeks of a new approach, seemingly friendly but constantly carrying the threat of death or life imprisonment. In this period he was shown four purported confessions implicating him by name. From the time that he broke down late in May of this year, until the very day of his repatriation five weeks after the armistice, he was engaged in writing and rewriting statements about germ warfare which his captors themselves admitted to him had no basis in fact.

First Lieut. James L. Stanley of the Air Force, after being classified as a war criminal, was interrogated and tortured for four months by the Chinese Communists. Eight times he

was commanded to "confess," offered relief if he did and offered death if he did not. Eight times he refused. He was stood at attention for five hours at a time; confined eight days in a doorless cell less than 6 feet long; held to the ground by two guards while a third kicked and slapped him; stood at attention 22 hours until he fell, then hit while lying down with the side of a hatchet and stood up two more hours; interrogated three hours with a spotlight six inches from his face; ordered to confess while a pistol was held at the back of his head; placed under a roof drain all night during a rainstorm; left without food three days and without water eight days; tempted with promises of good treatment and letters from home; put before a firing squad and given a last chance; hung by hands and feet from the rafters of a house. When he still refused, the Chinese Communists let him alone. They had apparently given him up as an impossible case.

First Lieut. Francis A. Strieby of the Air Force was interrogated for 10 days while in handcuffs in a Korean interrogation center. He refused to yield and was taken to Mukden, Manchuria. There his legs were shackled with chains, the chains kicked into his shins by guards, and the wounds in his

MAJOR ROY BLEY
. . . 48 hours to "confess"

shins left to fester with no medical aid. Three separate times he was dragged about the floor, kicked in the legs and back, and almost lifted from the floor by his hair and ears. Once in an effort to open his clasped hands, five guards pinned him to his cell wall, hit him repeatedly in the body, and forced open his fingers and thumb one by one; whereupon he struck back at them. After that he had no more mistreatment. No confession of any kind was ever extorted from him.

The cases I have just mentioned are related in greater detail in the sworn statements which these officers have submitted. Now here are a few other cases taken from personal histories of other returned United States fliers:

First Lieut. Robert C. Lurie was interrogated over 50 times; was tried four times for being a "war criminal", and sentenced to death three times. The charges were engaging in germ warfare, being an "enemy of the people," and failing "to make amends to the people." He was told repeatedly: "Tell the truth, confess, we have already proved you are a liar." The Chinese Communists repeatedly told him he could avoid all these trials and pressures by a simple "confession." He resisted all efforts and never signed a confession.

First Lieut. Joseph E. Moreland was interrogated for over 1,800 hours. He observed Soviet personnel guiding the interrogations. He was taken to Mukden, Manchuria. He was tried twice for refusing to confess to germ warfare. The first trial ended in a sentence to death by firing squad. The second trial ended in a sentence to a corrective labor camp—and a sentence of execution against his daughter in the United States. At all times he was in solitary confinement. He never wrote a confession.

Second Lieut. Edward G. Izbicky was interrogated 8½ hours a day for 60 days and 4 hours a day for 54 days. On May 25, 1953, he was sentenced to solitary confinement for 100 years—or until he accepted the germ-warfare charges. He was then thrown into a hole 5 feet long, 4 feet wide, and 4 feet high, where he was left for a week without food or water. He never wrote a confession.

The case histories in our hands raise a number of interesting points.

First: The Communist assault on these men was so intense and determined that it actually continued beyond the armistice. As a prime example I refer to the case of Col. Andrew J. Evans, Jr., whose sworn statement we are submitting to this Committee. Toward the end of his interrogation he was told that the war was over, that all other prisoners had been repatriated, and that he would never see the United States again unless he signed. In the face of this threat, and after months of treatment which he describes as "that accorded to a low-type animal"—the full details of this treatment can be found in his sworn statement—he agreed to sign a "confession" to having waged bacteriological warfare. The date of this agreement by Colonel Evans was Aug. 17, 1953. Then followed the usual writing, rewriting, and editing of the so-called "confession." Colonel Evans signed the final accepted version on Sept. 2, 1953. Then he was ordered to predate his "confession" to the month of May, 1953. After his persistent refusal to do this, his interrogators accepted his agreement to predate it only to August 17, the day of his first agreement to sign. At last, on September 3, he was released.

Note these dates: August 17 and September 3 several weeks after the armistice was signed. The same startling fact emerges in the sworn statement of Col. Walker Mahurin, whose final "confession" was accepted the same day as he was repatriated—September 3. Does not this raise a question in our minds? How seriously do the Communists take the armistice agreement? Their guns cease firing, but still to the very moment of repatriation—they torture the bodies and minds of prisoners to get ammunition for their spurious propaganda war.

Secondly, the sworn statements as a whole show that the worst tortures were reserved for those who refused to "cooperate." Generally, when a man broke down he was given what the Communists called their "lenient treatment"—lenient, I may say, only by comparison with something worse. It was for those who persisted in their refusal to break that the Communists reserved their full fury, but often without success.

Thirdly, we find in this consecutive record an indication of the vast organization and elaborate method used to extract the statements which the Communists were seeking. Living personnel, whether Air Force, Navy or Marine, were separated and for most of the time sent to a place near Pyongyang which came to be known among the prisoners as "Pak's palace." This was a combined interrogation center staffed by Chinese and North Koreans but directed by Soviet personnel. Many of our fliers were interrogated there by Soviet personnel. The Chinese interrogators, one of our prisoners was told, were trained in an 18-month course in Peiping, China, directed by Soviet instructors. One Air Force officer, Colonel Mahurin, had a team of 15 interrogators working on him alone. We know too that Mukden, Manchuria, was another center for the interrogation of so called "war criminals."

Fourthly, it is noteworthy that in spite of the alertness of

the interrogators, and their constant insistence on rewriting of the so-called "confessions," many deliberate misstatements of fact were not caught and remained in them. The sworn statements of Colonels Evans and Mahurin, both of which we are submitting to this Committee, refer to factual discrepancies of this sort. The Committee will remember that my Government pointed out just such inconsistencies in the "confessions" of Colonel Schwable and Major Bley last year, after these statements were introduced in the Assembly by the representative of the Soviet Union.

From these few instances, it becomes clear that the so-called "germ warfare" confessions were not simply a sudden bright idea on the part of the Communists, but were an integral part of a tremendous and calculated campaign of lies; and that in this campaign of lies, the Communists used carefully worked-out techniques and a considerable body of trained personnel in order to break the bodies and souls of men and thus fulfill their plan.

The Technique of Extorting 'Confessions'

Now I should like to go a little further into the question of how the false confessions were obtained by the Communists. The portions I have quoted illustrate reasonably well the

—Footlate

AMERICAN FLIERS WERE INTERROGATED
"... many by Soviet personnel"

techniques used. Now let us go into this matter in a somewhat more analytical fashion.

At the outset we should notice that the tortures used in these cases, although they include many brutal physical injuries, are not like the medieval tortures of the rack and the thumbscrew. They are subtler, more prolonged, and intended to be more terrible in their effect. They are calculated to disintegrate the mind of an intelligent victim, to distort his sense of values, to a point where he will not simply cry out "I did it!" but will become a seemingly willing accomplice to the complete destruction of his integrity and the production of an elaborate fiction.

The testimony in our hands, from American prisoners, reveals the use of a detailed method designed to mold prisoners into the desired condition where they can be exploited to the maximum. It is a method obviously calculated by the Communists to bring a man to the point where a dry crust of bread or a few hours' uninterrupted sleep is a great event in his life. All the prisoners victimized were subjected to the same pattern of intimidation, deprivation of basic physical needs, isolation, and physical and mental torture. The techniques varied only in detail, except that the extent of their use depended on the degree of resistance shown by the individual prisoners. The total picture presented is one of human beings reduced to a status lower than that of animals: filthy, full of lice; festered wounds full of maggots; their sickness regulated to a point just short of death; unshaven, without haircuts or baths for as much as a year; men in rags, exposed to the elements; fed with carefully measured minimum quantities and lowest quality of food and unsanitary water, served often in rusty cans; isolated, faced with squads of trained interrogators, bullied incessantly, deprived of sleep and brow-beaten into mental anguish.

Imagine a human being in this condition. It is a tragic picture but it is true, and supported by hundreds of eyewitness reports. Many other individuals died in this process and cannot add to the testimony. We must remember that all this was not done as mere senseless brutality; it was done for one single purpose: to make free men serve Communist ambitions.

All this testimony on Communist methods of extorting "confessions" in Korea suggests a frightening pattern.

It suggests that the Communists were deliberately perverting to their ends essentially the same technique which the famous Soviet biologist Pavlov used in his experiments on dogs and rats. This technique, as you all know, is called the "conditioned reflex." When a rat goes through the wrong door, he gets an electric shock. When he goes through the right door, he gets a bit of cheese. Before long, you can dispense with the shock and the cheese, because the rat has been conditioned to enter the door you want him to enter. The Soviet regime has used this same technique against its own people in efforts to dislodge them from their traditional reverence for the Almighty and from their aspirations toward freedom; and to force them willy-nilly into the Communist slave pattern.

This is the very technique which the Communists appear to have used on their intended "germ warfare" victims. Resistance was punished with kicks and slaps in the face, with worsened living conditions, with food rations lowered still further, with threats of death. This tightened grip was sometimes relaxed briefly when the unyielding victim seemed in danger of dying. Signs of co-operation, on the other hand, were rewarded with slight increases in rations, with promises of better treatment soon. No wonder that some of our prisoners, miserably weakened with weeks and months of mistreatment, were brought down to that animal level of response where resistance was associated with death, where yielding was associated with survival, and where survival on any terms seemed more important than the moral principles that distinguish men from beasts. If anything is surprising to me it is that so many of our soldiers—both those who confessed and those who did not—although for months they were treated like animals or worse, somehow continued throughout to act like men.

Consider the evidence on those who did not yield. A prisoner who the Communists assume is already acting like an animal is offered in sharp terms a purely animal stimulus food or death. The obvious animal response is expected. Yet in one case, a man was sentenced to death 12 times, and he refused to yield. Another man was made to dig his own grave, was taken before a firing squad, heard the command to fire and heard the pistols click on empty chambers, and he refused to yield. Such testimony as this seems to teach us that the spirit of man can run deeper than the reflexes of Pavlov.

Wider Implications of the Bacteriological-Warfare Propaganda Campaign

Just as the extorted confessions were a small part of the larger bacteriological warfare plan, so the entire bacteriological warfare campaign was part of a larger political program

of Communist imperialism. Let me refer now to certain facts of a different kind—facts which provide a context for our consideration of the entire bacteriological-warfare campaign. These facts show what the purpose of that propaganda campaign really was and how it relates to the total Communist system of thought and action which gave it birth.

First, it now clearly appears that the entire "germ warfare" propaganda drive was developed to give expression to a broad Communist policy governing the conduct of the Korean aggression. Among other things, this policy called for giving wide publicity to what the aggressors called "evidence" that American forces in Korea had committed atrocities and so forth, the purpose being to discredit the United States in the eyes of the free world and thus to help isolate it from its allies.

If we examine the history of the "germ war" propaganda campaign from its beginning in May, 1951, we find that it conforms faithfully to this broad policy of the Communists. The so-called "plot" was laid entirely to the United States Government, the only individuals marked for "confession" were American prisoners; the resulting propaganda, especially of the report of the so-called "International Scientific Commission," was dressed up to look like "evidence" in a manner that was as elaborate as it was specious; and the world-wide publicity given to this "germ warfare" theme was at a very high level for several months.

Thus, it is fair to conclude that the "germ warfare" propaganda campaign, far from being a sudden inspiration, was the chief means of implementing the propaganda aspects of a broad Communist plan concerning the Korean war.

Second, this false-propaganda campaign is entirely consistent with Communist practices concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, and indeed of all foreigners who fall into their hands. I shall not go into detail on this subject. Suffice it to say that Communist treatment of prisoners both in World War II and in the Korean war has consistently followed a policy of using these prisoners to advance the military, economic, and especially the political objectives of Soviet Communist policy. Under this policy no prisoner has any rights; those marked for political use are told that as "war criminals" they fall outside the protection of the Geneva Convention. In World War II the most intensive effort by the Soviets against prisoners in their hands was directed to the political indoctrination and propaganda exploitation of a minority which was assigned the postwar task of helping to communize Germany and other countries. As members of the United Nations know to their sorrow, hundreds of thousands of prisoners captured by the Soviet Union in that war have never been repatriated or accounted for despite the requirements of international law.

Although the pattern of treatment in Korea has been perhaps less elaborate and ambitious than that in World War II, it has followed much the same lines. I suggest that we should consider the "germ-warfare confessions" of American prisoners also in this context—that is to say, as one aspect of the ruthless exploitation of *all* prisoners of war and other captives to advance the aims of world Communism.

Third, we know well that the Communist authorities who obtained and exploited these so-called "confessions" are past masters at the business of "getting" the kind of confessions they want. Certainly the chief of the Soviet Delegation is an authority on this subject. In the practice of Moscow and her allies, the "confession" is a prime propaganda instrument to support the policy objectives of the moment. The examples of this technique since World War II are legion. They include not only Communists in disgrace, such as Slánsky in Czechoslovakia and Rajk in Hungary, but also non-Communists who fall into the hands of the authorities, like Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary and William Oatis in Czechoslovakia. I need not belabor this point. The evidence of the falsity of such alleged confessions, and of the methods of duress and threat and wearing down by which they are always obtained, is too well known. This is the picture of Communist "justice." It reminds me of the editorial statement in a Communist newspaper in East Germany, which said in effect: "The people demand a fair trial and a speedy execution."

Fourth, I should like to suggest that the "germ warfare" propaganda campaign is the very type of activity that stems from the essential doctrines of Soviet Leninism and Stalinism concerning truth and morality. What are these doctrines? It is a strange thing that the Communists have repeated them so often and yet some of us in the free world have taken so little note of them.

As to the truth, the Communists in the U.S.S.R. have elaborated the Marxian doctrine to a point where no non-Communist can possibly perceive the "truth," and indeed truth is whatever the Communists decide it is. On this basis, they have rewritten the entire history of man, from the beginnings to the present day, and when their policies change, the history is rewritten again to conform to the policy. Thus truth in their doctrine has come to be an instrument of policy, to be altered whenever convenient. The ancient belief that man has the God-given ability to distinguish rationally between fact and fiction has no place in Communist thought.

As to morality, Lenin put it very succinctly when he wrote:

RUSSIA'S IVAN PAVLOV IN 1935
". . . essentially the same technique"

> "We do not believe in eternal morality, and we expose all the fables about morality . . . At the basis of Communist morality lies the struggle for the consolidation and consummation of Communism."

Let no one think that this doctrine of Lenin's on morality is outdated. As recently as March 18, 1952, after the "germ war" propaganda had already begun, Moscow Radio broadcast a lecture by a man named Filaopvich, who said:

> "The basis of Communist morality, Lenin taught, is the struggle for strengthening and achieving Communism. For the Soviet people everything is moral that serves the victory of the Communist order."

Thus we can surely say that in Communist doctrine and practice, behind the Iron Curtain, now and in the past, the concepts of truth and morality which are sacred to the tradition of free men are totally subjected to the success of the Communist movement. Any means, any deceit, any brutality, is justified by the Communists if they think it contributes to the victory of Communism.