

## BACKGROUND QUOTATIONS

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Statement on Disarmament,  
29 January 1992

"Russia will reduce the number of strategic offensive weapons on operational readiness to the agreed number within a three-year period instead of seven years.

Thus, we will arrive four years earlier at the level that is envisaged by the relevant treaty. Given that there is mutual understanding with the United States, we could proceed in this direction even faster. We are in favor of the strategic offensive weapons retained by the United States and Russia after the reduction not being aimed at Russian and U.S. targets, respectively."

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Washington Post,  
30 January 1992

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev told reporters that a recent promise by Yeltsin to stop aiming nuclear weapons at American cities also applied to U.S. military targets. But he also made clear that the political decision would take some time to implement in practice, saying that "scientific, technical and military people" would have to be consulted.

US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, Press Conference,  
30 January 1992

"From a conceptual standpoint it's easy to say we no longer are targeting the other side. From the standpoint of knowing that has in fact happened, it's almost impossible. There's no way to independently verify that a missile in a silo is or is not aimed at Washington. The key, I think, is for us to move aggressively to implement the START treaty, move aggressively to follow up on the President's initiatives which the Russians have responded favorably to, to move towards de-MIRVing the force, taking down those most dangerous and destabilizing systems, the multiple warhead land-based systems, and shrink the total size of the force on both sides. But we're still going to end up with some nuclear deterrent. We're going to require that just to safeguard the United States, and to guarantee that no adversaries attempted ever to launch an attack against us. But we can clearly do it with fewer missiles, fewer warheads than we have in the past, especially in light of developments in the former Soviet Union."

Tab A

Secretary Cheney's Testimony on the  
DoD Budget

- Purchases of the Advanced Cruise Missile beyond those already authorized will cease.

Together, the President's unilateral initiatives of the State of the Union and of last September have important implications for the Base Force. Immediately and unilaterally, the Base Force now includes 20 percent fewer bombers. With cancellation of the Small ICBM, the Base Force will include 500 Minuteman III ICBMs for the foreseeable future. We will retain 19 Trident submarines, though their ratio of high-yield W-88 to lower-yield W-76 warheads will be much lower than previously planned.

The President also called upon the leaders of the four republics with nuclear forces on their territory to join the United States in even faster-reaching bilateral strategic arms reductions. He reiterated his proposal from last September that the former Soviet Union should eliminate all SSXMs with multiple warheads, the most destabilizing weapons systems, and promised in return to reduce significantly the number of our nuclear warheads at sea and on bombers.

If the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union agree to the President's bilateral proposals, we will make even more dramatic changes to the Base Force. Our 50 multiple-warhead Peacekeeper missiles would be eliminated, and all 500 Minuteman ICBMs would be downgraded to a single-warhead configuration. The 1,455 warheads attributable to our 19-submarine Trident force would be reduced approximately one third by downloading reentry vehicles from missiles or by removing missiles from submarines. This would cause the level of accountable warheads in our Base Force to decrease by 40 percent. In addition, a substantial number of bombers would be oriented primarily toward conventional missions, causing the actual number of warheads to be roughly half of what we planned to have under START.

The reform leaders of the newly independent states have clearly voiced their interest in reducing strategic forces inherited from the Soviet Union. They recognize we are not a threat and rightly view these forces as diverting scarce resources from rebuilding their troubled economies and complicating the improvement of relations with the West. We hope to give the new Commonwealth leaders impetus to make substantial reductions in these strategic forces to a level consistent with the absence of any threat from the West. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and a substantial reduction in its strategic forces, General Powell and I are confident that a strategic force that carries only half of the nuclear weapons of our previous Base Force would meet the security requirements of the United States and its allies.

We can foresee the possibility of a time when Russian nuclear weapons no longer pose a threat to the United States and its Allies, and we no longer need to hold at risk what future Russian leaders hold dear. This would require unambiguous evidence of

fundamental reorientation of the Russian government:  
institutionalization of democracy, positive ties to the West,  
compliance with existing arms reduction agreements, possession of  
a nuclear force that is non-threatening to the West (with low  
numbers of weapons, non-MIRVed, and not on high alert status), and  
possession of conventional capabilities nonthreatening to  
neighbors.

A transformation of Russia along these lines should clearly  
be our goal. But we are not there yet, and whether this will be  
the outcome is far from clear. Our pursuit of this goal must  
recognize the as yet robust strategic nuclear force facing us, the  
fragility of democracy in the new states of the former Soviet  
Union, and the possibility that they might revert to closed,  
authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal  
must, therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to  
unanticipated reversals in our relations.

The new technology embodied in the SDI program has made  
missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable  
concept. Furthermore, a significant number of nations are now  
developing both ballistic missile capabilities and weapons of mass  
destruction. We need to deploy missile defenses not only to  
protect ourselves but also to have the ability to extend  
protection to all nations that are part of the broader community  
of democratic values. Like "extended deterrence" provided by our  
nuclear forces, defenses can contribute to a regime of "extended  
protection" for friends and allies. This is why, with the support  
of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, we  
are seeking to move beyond the ASM Treaty toward the day when  
defenses will protect the community of nations embracing liberal  
democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic  
missiles.

There are other steps we are taking as well to mitigate  
nuclear risk. As the threat of superpower nuclear confrontation  
recedes, we are considering how best to recalibrate the balance  
between military effectiveness and nuclear safety, security, and  
control. We also are considering how to adapt risk reduction  
measures, previously focused on the old Soviet Union, to cope with  
a more multipolar world in which nuclear capabilities are  
proliferating. President Bush's two initiatives have removed  
weapons which have caused the most safety and security concerns  
and created an environment amenable to further risk reduction  
initiatives. The Fallsafe and Risk Reduction Review, chaired by  
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, is considering what other steps can be  
taken.

Strategic nuclear forces will continue to play an essential  
role with respect to countries other than the Soviet Union.  
Nuclear weapons cannot be disinventured. Other countries -- some of  
them, like Iraq, hostile and irresponsible -- threaten to acquire  
them. This requires us to maintain a secure retaliatory  
capability to deter their use. Strategic forces will also

continue to support our global role and international commitments, including our trans-Atlantic links to NATO.

With the major reductions we have made and are prepared to make in our Base Force, it is critical that we ensure the effectiveness of our remaining systems. This entails completing procurement of 20 B-2 bombers -- a limited force for specialized missions, particularly in conventional operations--and continued upgrades to our B-1B fleet, to ensure safety of operations, to design effective countermeasures, and to increase its conventional capabilities. It entails extending the service life of our Minuteman III force and planning for future upgrades as it transitions to a single-warhead system. And it entails outfitting the last Trident submarines while planning how best to sustain the nuclear force well into the next century. In addition to these important investments, we must adequately support the operation and training of these forces, the airmen and sailors who operate them, and the readiness posture which is appropriate to the reduced threat, but does not put our deterrent at risk in a tumultuous world. Finally, the Department is working to develop GPALS, and we urge the Congress to continue its strong support for these efforts.

The total size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is shrinking significantly as a result of arms control agreements with the former Soviet Union and the historic unilateral initiatives announced by President Bush last September. But we believe that the remaining force will be sufficiently capable to deter future aggression and to demonstrate our commitment to protect our vital interests.

#### FORWARD PRESENCE

We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. commitment and lend credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote U.S. influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability. Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the U.S. has been able to work with our friends and allies to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending and of unnecessary arms competition.

Forward presence often involves overseas basing of forces, but it also can take the form of periodic deployments, exercises, exchanges and visits. Important too are arrangements to provide the infrastructure and logistical support to allow for the forward deployment of forces when necessary. Our maritime and long-range aviation forces enable us to exert a presence in areas where we have no land-based forces.

As we adjust to the changing security environment, we are reducing our forward presence in Europe and Asia. The end of the Cold War has made it possible for the United States, in close