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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-159-68  
15 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Augmentation Forces for MACV (U)

1. (S) Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 14 March 1968, subject: "Southeast Asia Deployments."
2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the above memorandum identifies only forces to be deployed in Program 6 and that it does not address the problem of sustaining these deployments. Neither does it address nor provide required supporting forces for the already deployed brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and RLT 27 or its replacement.
3. (S) Concurrently with an initial callup, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that we make provision to sustain these deployments and begin the process of improving the CONUS strategic reserve and non-forward deployed naval forces. To this end, other Reserve units and individuals should be alerted for callup at a later date. However, with regard to initial improvement of readiness of non-forward deployed naval forces, this can only be done by authorizing callup of individual reserves and extension of terms of service. Tab C indicates a suitable schedule for the callup of Reserve units only.
4. (S) Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that certain actions be taken immediately to restore existing Active forces to full combat readiness. These are:
  - a. Obtain authority to call up individual reserves.
  - b. Obtain authority to retain personnel of all components of the Armed Forces beyond their periods of obligated service (ETS).

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c. Authorize increases in end strength to provide trained personnel for the future and to preclude early releases and other destabilizing personnel measures.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

- Tab A - Immediate Unit Callup for 30,000 Package
- Tab B - Immediate Unit Callup Required to Support the Already Deployed Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and the Replacement Army Brigade for RLT 27
- Tab C - Units to be Alerted for Callup in Order to Start Reconstitution of the Strategic Reserve Posture.

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TAB A

Immediate Unit Callup for 30,000 Package  
(Additional to Program #5)

Army -                   3 Bdes (1 Mech)  
                          1 Armd Cav Sq  
                          1 Air Defense Battalion  
                          4 Engineer Battalions  
                          3 Field Artillery Battalions  
                          Support Units

Army Callup - 31,563

Navy -                   2 NMCB Bns           1,524

Air Force -             6 TFS  
                          1 TAG  
                          1 Aero Med Airlift Gp  
                          2 Aero Evac/Med Gp  
                          1 Aero Evac Sq  
                          2 Aerial Port Sq  
                          1 Postal Gp

Air Force Callup - 6,590\*

TOTAL CALLUP - 39,677

\* This does not include 1,505 Air Force Personnel for achieving operational status at Nam Phong Air Base, Thailand

TAB B

Immediate Unit Callup Required To Support The Already  
Deployed Brigade Of The 82nd Airborne Div. And  
The Replacement Army Brigade For RLT-27

Army - 3 Engineer Battalions

3 Field Artillery Battalions

Support Units

TOTAL 13,437

TAB C

Units to be alerted for callup in order to start reconstitution of the strategic reserve posture.

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Alert</u>	<u>Callup</u>
(1) Army	1 Div w/ISI	32,000	15 Mar	15 Apr
	1 Brigade	4,000	15 Mar	15 Apr
	Station Complement	<u>5,000</u>	15 Mar	15 Apr
	TOTAL	41,000		
(2) Air Force	7 TFG	6,300	15 Mar	after 15 May
	4 TAG	2,680	15 Mar	after 15 May
	Aerial port, aeromed, etc.	<u>1,099</u>	15 Mar	after 15 May
	TOTAL	10,079		
(3) Navy	None. The Navy can make no progress toward restoring the posture of non-forward deployed naval forces without authority for selective callup of individual reserves and extension of terms of service. In addition, without authority for such action, the Navy deployment in Program 6 cannot be fully provided and sustained without a drawdown of personnel in other active fleet forces with accompanying further degradation in combat readiness.			
(4) Marine Corps	None.			