

OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE

From The

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

OF

DEFENSE

And The

MILITARY SERVICES

To The

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE

AND

REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Documents O-073 thru O-105

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Production and Logistics

#374

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ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
DEFENSE AND GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE
MILITARY OPERATIONS AND
RESERVE FORCES
COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF
WOMEN'S SERVICE RECORDS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

May 20, 1991

James A. Courter, Chairman
Defense Base Closing Commission
1025 K Street N.W. Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Courter:

The commanding general of the Air Training Command ordered his staff to deliberately underestimate the closure costs associated with Lowry Air Force Base, informed sources told me. I would appreciate an investigation to confirm this allegation. If true, it raises doubts about the integrity of the ATC's involvement in the decision process to close Lowry.

Lt. General Joseph W. Ashy, stationed at Randolph AFB, Texas, last month ordered his staff to prepare the site survey of Lowry TPO. This survey begins the base closure process, even though the commission has yet to make its final base closing determination.

According to sources who wish to remain unnamed, Gen. Ashy was presented with preliminary closure costs at 8:00 p.m. on Friday April 26th, 1991. Gen. Ashy reportedly told his staff that the cost estimates were too high and to present him with lower figures. At 3:00 a.m. April 27th and again at 8:00 a.m. April 28th Gen. Ashy was presented with revised figures and both times he ordered them adjusted downward.

The specific figures deal with student/instructor ratios. For courses at air training command bases, military regulations specify minimum floor space requirements as a student/instructor ratio. The lower the ratio (i.e. the fewer students per instructor), the smaller the facility size, therefore the smaller the closure cost. According to these sources, it was this ratio that Gen. Ashy ordered reduced.

These orders were given to members of Gen. Ashy's site survey team, the roster of which is enclosed. One or more members of that team passed this story to the sources who contacted my office.

This claim needs checking. If true, it sounds two alarms. First, underestimated closure costs now means requests for supplemental appropriations later, a poor way to run an Air Force. But more urgently, it shows a bias by the Air Training Command against Lowry that taints any ATC analysis done prior to the Air Force base closure decision. The Pentagon, your commission, the DAO, and Congress are being duped.

Sincerely,

Patricia Schroeder
Congresswoman



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330-1000

MAY 24, 1991

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

James A. Courter, Chairman
Defense Base Closure Commission
1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20066

Dear Mr Courter:

The Air Force has been provided a copy of the letter signed by Congresswoman Schroeder regarding the role Air Training Command (ATC) played with respect to the Air Force recommendation to close Lowry AFB.

While you have not tasked the Air Force to respond directly, the nature and tone of the letter, particularly with respect to allegations made about Lt Gen Ashy, warrant an immediate response. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Installations and a member of the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), I have chosen to respond to you directly.

It is regrettable that neither Congresswoman Schroeder nor any member of her staff elected to contact either the Air Staff or ATC prior to the public release of this letter. Unfortunately, the Air Force base closure process, which has been independently validated by the GAO as well as a member of the Air Force Audit Agency, has now been unnecessarily impugned.


I would like to set the record straight. Early on, during the deliberations of the BCEG, we recognized that there was sufficient excess capacity to warrant the examination of all Technical Training Centers (TTCs) for closure. Initially, cost estimates were significantly higher than the group felt was reasonable, considering reductions in overall Air Force manpower accessions and known excess capacity.

With this in mind, in mid-March, ATC was tasked by the Air Staff to again review its analysis of the costs associated with the closure of all TTCs including Chanute, a 1988 Commission closure. To assist in this analysis, Brig Gen McCarthy, the Air Force Deputy Civil Engineer and a member of the BCEG, went to ATC Headquarters at Randolph AFB, TX. This effort examined all of the TTCs and proceeded throughout a weekend and into the following week. There were no meetings on April 26-28. At no time did General Ashy address the site survey team or issue any orders regarding lower student-to-instructor ratios or any other factors.

As a result of this analysis, the costs to close four (including Lowry) of the five TTCs were reduced. This analysis also resulted in reducing the costs associated with closing Chanute. These costs were reviewed by the BCEG and approved by the Secretary of the Air Force prior to his decision to recommend Lowry AFB for closure.

Throughout this process, General Ashy and his staff provided objective, timely, and professional inputs to the BCEG. The unfortunate and unfounded assertion that there was a biased approach regarding Lowry AFB is simply not borne out by the facts. The data supporting that analysis is part of the data submitted to the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and to the GAO. We welcome any review of this process and data by you or any member of your staff.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James F. Boatright". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "J" and a stylized "B".

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330

PRPJM
O-5-4

MAY 30 1991

The Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20300-1000

Dear Mr. Courter:

This is in response to your May 16, 1991, request for additional information regarding Air Force Close Air Support (CAS) and C-17 acquisition.

The Air Force supports joint efforts and continues to train daily with sister services. Currently the Air Force supports Army CAS training requirements from home base or in some cases via deployments, e.g., Joint Regional Training Center and Air Warrior Exercises. The attachment identifies major Army units and the appropriate Air Force CAS capable units which support them. Please note that this listing includes Air Force recommendations before the Commission which will enhance the Air Force's ability to train and potentially fight with the Army.

In regard to your question on the C-17, the Air Force has programmed to acquire 120 aircraft with the last aircraft delivered in FY 2001. By the end of the Future Year Defense Plan in FY 97, a total of 61 C-17s are projected to have been delivered. At the end of FY 97 planned C-17 training will be accomplished at Altus AFB, OK, with 9 aircraft while Charleston AFB, SC, will host the first operational C-17 wing, with 52 aircraft.

Hopefully this information will help you. Feel free to contact me, if additional information is required.

Sincerely,

James F. Boatright
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Installations

1 Atch
Army Units/Air Force CAS Capable
Support Units

POST 1991 BC&RA
ARMY UNITS/AIR FORCE CAS CAPABLE SUPPORT UNITS

<u>ARMY UNIT</u>	<u>AIR FORCE CAS UNITS*</u>
Ft Bragg	Pope AFB (24 A-10s), Shaw AFB (24 A-10s & 72 F-16s)
Ft Campbell	Pope AFB (24 A-10s), Shaw AFB (24 A-10s & 72 F-16s)
Ft Carson	Buckley (24 A-7s)
Ft Drum	Hancock Field (18 F-16s)
Ft Hood	Kelly AFB (18 F-16s), Carswell AFB (24 F-16s)
Ft Irwin	TDY Air Warrior at Nellis AFB
Ft Lewis	McChord AFB (24 A-10s)
Ft Ord	Recommended Army Closure
Ft Polk	Ft Smith (18 F-16s), NAS New Orleans (18 A-10s), Barksdale AFB (30 A-10s)
Ft Richardson	Eielson AFB (24 F-16s & 6 A-10s)
Ft Riley	Whiteman AFB (18 A-10s)
Ft Stewart	Shaw AFB (72 F-16s & 24 A-10s)
Ft Wainwright	Eielson AFB (24 F-16s & 6 A-10s)
Air Ground Operations School	Eglin AFB (18 A-10s)

* Includes active and Air Reserve Component CAS units

0-075



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

May 30, 1991



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 "K" Street, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Courter:

We have reviewed your staff's analysis of the Army's construction costs. The estimates included in our submission to the Commission were the best that could be developed in the time available. We are continuing to review these requirements as we begin our implementation planning process. Should current requirements change after detailed validation by the Major Commands and the Army Staff, those changes will be included in our Base Closure Budget submission after final recommendations become law. It is important to note that none of these differences would result in changes to our recommendations. In general, we agree with the analysis, with the following exceptions.

We have two concerns with the Fort Ord analysis. First, it is inappropriate to assume \$12 million in non-appropriated fund (NAF) projects as cost avoidances. Construction projects in the NAF arena were not included in our analysis as cost avoidances, since OSD policy guidance directed the use of military construction and family housing projects only.

Secondly, we do not accept the \$49 million estimate for construction at Fort Lewis. The installation currently has excesses in permanent brigade, company, and general purpose administrative space and maintenance facilities that, coupled with the facilities vacated by the 199th Separate Infantry Brigade, will support the 7th ID and its non-divisional units. While an initial requirement for battalion administrative space was identified, it was the judgment of our Program Budget Committee that since this was a "swap out" of the 7th ID for the 9th ID and our resources were constrained, this requirement could be accommodated through the use of other facilities. We will review this issue again as a part of implementation planning.

We also disagree that there is a requirement to upgrade substandard barracks at Fort Lewis as a result of the realignment of the 7th ID. Taking the July 1989 Army Stationing and Installation Plan (ASIP) FY 90 military population of 21,986 as a baseline for comparison, and adjusting the FY 93 population of 15,061 to reflect the realignment of the 199th SIB and the arrival of the 7th ID for an end state of 22,341, gives a difference of approximately 400 military. The Army felt that other force structure actions not yet finalized could easily change the military population at Fort Lewis by that much before the movement of the 7th ID is completed, and that the potential requirement was not significant. The Army has an ongoing barracks modernization effort in its MCA program, and intends to modernize the barracks at Fort Lewis through that program.

The construction savings proposed by the Commission for Fort Polk are overstated. One of the FY 92 maintenance projects referred to is the Central Washrack Facility Upgrade (\$.930 million), which will improve security and wheeled vehicle washing. The project supports the installation's environmental compliance program for removal and disposal of contaminated soils from tactical vehicles and equipment, and is still required. After an extensive review which is in its final stages, it appears that the remaining two maintenance projects may no longer be required and could be counted as cost avoidances. The aviation hangar project in FY 93 will be rescoped to retain the flight operation and fire crash rescue portions for JRTC operations. Revised project cost is not yet available.

There are three issues relating to the closure of Fort McClellan. First, the Commission's estimated requirement for barracks construction at Fort Leonard Wood to support the closure of Fort McClellan is overstated. The Army did not include a barracks requirement based upon the assumption that the student load for Initial Entry Training could be reduced to vacate barracks space for the incoming schools. However, air conditioning may have to be added to bring substandard barracks to the current standard for trainees, but at a cost much lower than the \$24.9 million shown. We are still working on this issue with the Training and Doctrine Command and will keep the Commission informed.

Secondly, the Commission's cost estimate for facilities at Pelham Range is overstated. The Army's estimate of \$13.2 million is based upon input by the Alabama National Guard, using an average square foot cost of \$50.00. The Commission's analysis assumes that all facilities are administrative and therefore cost \$82.00 per square foot. Finally, the Army stands by its phased construction program in the COBRA analysis. If all facilities are programmed for FY 94, they will be completed and available well before the people will be ready to move. The Chemical and Military Police School moves will be phased to maintain training availability throughout the process.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this analysis. We will use it during our implementation planning process.

Sincerely,



Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics, & Environment)

Copy furnished:

Mr. Colin McMillan
Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Production &
Logistics)
Washington, D. C. 20301-8000

0-070



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103



May 30, 1991

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

Mr. James A. Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Courter:

In accordance with your request made on May 17, 1991, I am providing answers to your questions regarding the Army's Chemical Decontamination Training Facility at Fort McClellan (attachment). At Mr. McMillan's request, I am also replying to questions on the same subject in your memorandum of May 17, 1991, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics).

I am furnishing the classified information that you asked for separately.

Sincerely,

Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics and Environment)

Attachment

cf:
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Production & Logistics)

1. QUESTION: How did the decontamination training facility (CDTF) play in the Army's decision making process?

ANSWER: The decision to close Ft. McClellan and its tenant activities was made by the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense. The decision was made in coordination with Training and Doctrine Command, upon extensive analysis, and with careful consideration of various alternatives in light of force reductions and budgetary reductions.

In evaluating the proposal to close Fort McClellan and relocate its schools to Fort Leonard Wood, the Army's senior leaders evaluated the resource implications together with the value offered by the live-agent training and applied their judgment to the necessity and priority of replicating the facility elsewhere. The Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army, in consultation with senior staff officials, decided not to replicate the CDTF. If it were to have been included, additional costs would be incurred to construct a new facility, thereby increasing the return on investment period by approximately two years.

2. QUESTION: What is the value added of live agent training?

ANSWER: There is, of course, value added resulting from live agent training. It not only benefits the relatively small group of chemical specialty soldiers participating in the training, but gives them credibility when instructing other soldiers on doctrinal decontamination procedures and the use of Army nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) equipment. An instructor who has undergone this training is living proof of the reliability of the equipment and procedures and can provide more compelling arguments for learning NBC preparedness than one who hasn't. It should be noted that senior Army leaders have also participated in training at this facility. The real question, however, is whether the value added presents an overwhelming case for the retention of the CDTF in light of congressionally mandated fiscal constraints, base closures and reductions in force. The Army believes the answer is no.

Although closing Fort McClellan would result in losing the use of the CDTF, the Army feels this does not constitute a major impact to the chemical training and preparedness of its forces. Only 5,400 soldiers, primarily NBC-specific MOS's, train at this facility annually. The duration of the live agent training is approximately 4 to 5 1/2 hours apiece. The majority of NBC training for all other soldiers is accomplished during basic training, in service schools, within their units, during training exercises, and at the combat training centers.

3. QUESTION: What is the known and perceived chemical threat from Third World nations?

ANSWER: Classified document will be provided separately.

4. QUESTION: If field commanders from Desert Storm were asked, "What is the value added from CDTF?", what would be their response?

ANSWER: Rep. Browder (D-AL) has stated that GEN Schwarzkopf told him it was essential for the armed forces to maintain a high level of chemical defense preparedness. One should not imply from this statement that the CDTF is the only or primary means to achieve this objective.

Experience during Operation Desert Storm does not validate the benefit of live-agent training for the 2% of the Army trained at the CDTF, since no live agents were employed by Iraq. Desert Shield did, however, demonstrate the discipline achieved through routine unit training which prepared soldiers to perform their duties efficiently for extended periods of time in cumbersome protective gear.

5. QUESTION: If the CDTF were closed, can it be reopened in light of the chemical treaty implications? Can it be replicated at Fort Leonard Wood? That is, is it environmentally feasible?

ANSWER: Yes, it could be reopened. There are two pending treaties/agreements, neither of which require the Army to tear down the CDTF or prohibit its reopening after being placed in an inactive status.

Map reconnaissance of Fort Leonard Wood indicates that there are several suitable areas to construct a CDTF.

There are no known environmental impediments to replicating the CDTF at Ft Leonard Wood. The Army would, of course, need to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act and comply with applicable state and local laws.

6. QUESTION: What is implied by the term "mothball"? What are the one-time costs? What are the recurring costs and how are they calculated? What would be the costs to bring the CDTF from a "mothball" status up to a fully operational facility once it has been placed in a "mothball" status?

ANSWER: The CDTF will become an inactive (non-operating) facility. The objective will be to ensure economical administration and protection of government property during the inactive period to the extent that it may, at some future date, be reactivated for use. A minimum of personnel will be required to safeguard against fire, theft, and damage from the elements.

The one-time cost to inactivate ("mothball") the facility ranges from \$0.5 to \$1.0 million, based on estimates provided by the U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency. This would cover the cost to clean the CDTF to level 3X, negating the need for further monitoring and requirement for full protective gear.

Annual recurring costs will be determined during the implementation planning process. The Army is trying to better define this figure and will provide it to the Commission as soon as it is available.

New environmental permits may be required to reactivate the facility. Arrangements would need to be made for a quick-reaction force and medical care. The costs to return the CDTF to a fully operational facility after being placed in an inactive status are yet to be determined.

7. QUESTION: How will the Chemical School (and the Military Police School) be incorporated into the Maneuver Support Warfighting Center?

- a. Will the school(s) lose its general officer positions?
- b. How will the merger be any different from previous failed attempts to merge schools into a single center?

ANSWER: The Maneuver Support War Fighting Center will be formed by collocating three schools - Engineer, Military Police and Chemical. While the detailed plans are still under development, the concept calls for merging of common functions, such as school libraries, and of management elements such as academic records. Within the center, there will be three identifiable schools, with branch-related teaching departments. Mutual support among the schools will be emphasized; for instance, it is envisioned that there will be only one combined arms instruction element, supporting all three schools. There will be a single NCO academy, with branch-related courses. Initially, the combat and training developers will work along branch lines, but are expected to merge over time as they address battlefield deficiencies and needs in an integrated maneuver support mode.

- a. Each branch will be represented by a general officer.
- b. The War Fighting Center is a new concept. It is the fundamental building block for the Army's vision for the future of its school system. While there are examples of past collocation (Military Police and Chemical Schools) and of school staff integration (Adjutant General and Finance Schools), never before has there been an overall strategy for integration of battlefield operating systems at the school level. Our vision for the future, the evolution of war fighting doctrine and the need to conserve resources will drive the Army's organizational concept to fruition.

8. QUESTION: The chemical decontamination training facility (CDTF) is used to train other services (Air Force, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard and Merchant Marines), members of other government agencies and members of 24 foreign governments.

- a. Have the other affected organizations been informed that the CDTF will be placed in mothball status?
- b. What provisions have been made for training the other affected organizations?

ANSWER:

a. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other Services were aware that the CDTF would be placed in an inactive status. The Army has not made any official notifications to other government agencies or foreign governments. The Army is not aware of whether the Office of Secretary of Defense has made any such notification.

b. Other Services, federal agencies and foreign governments will continue to have access to chemical decontamination training. However, this training would no longer use live chemical agents. Agencies desiring this training will follow the processes currently used.



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

May 31, 1991

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0-077



Mr. James A. Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Courter:

In accordance with your request of May 21, 1991, I
am providing answers to your follow-up questions from
the May 10, 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission hearing (attachment).

Sincerely,

Paul W. Johnson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Housing)
OASA (I,L&E)

Attachment

cf:
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Production & Logistics)

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING - 10 MAY 91
ECONOMIC IMPACTS

QUESTION: In your experience with base closures and realignments, what factors do you think lead to a successful community recovery?

ANSWER: A number of factors are involved. First, there must exist, or be created, a broad-based organization reflecting all major community interests. This organization must be fully responsible for the planning and implementation of an economic reuse/recovery program that includes the former base facilities. Second, there must be an agreed-upon definition and measurement of the economic problem. Third, there must be a reuse plan of the facility reflecting a consensus of community needs and opportunities. Fourth, the proper resources must be devoted to solving the problem.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING - 10 MAY 91
ECONOMIC IMPACTS

QUESTION: Are there improvements to the infrastructure on any of the installations proposed for closure -- such as roads, rail access, aircraft runways, etc. -- made by DOD that might assist in economic recovery?

ANSWER: The Army installations proposed for closure have a range of permanent facilities and infrastructure (roads and utilities) that would support a variety of reuse options such as administrative, industrial, or educational. Facilities available span the gamut from barracks, dining halls, and maintenance areas to housing, schools, and commissaries. In addition, Forts Ord and McClellan have airfields which may support light commercial use. The property proposed for disposal will be maintained in a fully usable state. Maintenance of facilities will continue, and no actions will be taken which would reduce reuse options.

The return on investment analysis for Fort Dix includes the cost to expand the currently programmed waste water treatment facility to support all of the facilities which may be excessed. Our initial intent was to support only those facilities that would be in use under the BRAC I realignment, and seal off those facilities in "mothballs". However, under our proposal, there will be sufficient capacity and connections for the future user to purchase services from the plant and remain in compliance with Clean Water Act regulations.

Fort Ord, along with the surrounding area, suffers from degradation of its water supply due to sea water intrusion. The project is not currently funded in the regular MCA program; however, our proposal includes these funds as an environmental mitigation which should be completed. Without it, reuse may be limited.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING - 10 MAY 91
ECONOMIC IMPACTS

QUESTION: In developing estimates of the economic impact of base closures and realignments, it is critical to have accurate estimates of the numbers of personnel on specific bases. How accurate are the estimates used by the Army? Please describe your methods of collection/estimation and highlight any problems which your staffs might have encountered in putting together these estimates.

ANSWER: Our personnel strength estimates were the best available at the time of our analysis. The Army maintains a document called the Army Stationing and Installation Plan (ASIP) which lists all organizations, military and civilian, for each installation. This document was our initial baseline for installation populations and organizational strength. We used FY 94 as our base year, as it reflected a more likely future strength of organizations as force structure declines.

From that point, we made additions or reductions based upon known changes that had not yet been posted to the ASIP. Our intent was to reflect installations and organizations as they will be at the time of the proposed realignment, not today's size. We also made modifications to ensure that all bases would be treated equally for our return on investment calculations. If cuts had been taken to FY 94 due to BRAC II or Defense Management Review actions, we added those personnel "back in" for purposes of analysis.

Data base updates inevitably lag behind decisions which affect budget and personnel levels. There is also a delay in the spread of reductions to the installation level of detail which also complicates analysis of this type. The complexity and rapidity of change due to the deep budget and force structure cuts are the greatest challenge, both for our analysis and for implementation. There will be additional reductions between this estimate and the day these proposals are actually implemented.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING - 10 MAY 91
ECONOMIC IMPACTS

QUESTION: In developing estimates of the economic impact of base closures and realignments, it is critical to have accurate estimates of the numbers of personnel on specific bases. How accurate are the estimates used by the Army? Please describe your methods of collection/estimation and highlight any problems which your staffs might have encountered in putting together these estimates.

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BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING - 10 MAY 91
ECONOMIC IMPACTS

QUESTION: Are your estimates of direct and indirect job losses worst case estimates or is there a significant chance that job losses could be much higher?

ANSWER: The numbers of direct job losses at Army installations should not change significantly. The estimates of indirect job losses, derived through use of a model developed by the Office of Economic Adjustment, were based upon the best available data at the time of computation. While no model is perfect, the economic impacts computed by the model appear to be reasonable.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING - 10 MAY 91
LAND VALUATION

QUESTION : The estimated values submitted for Army installations range from \$25 million at Sacramento Army Depot to \$400 million at Fort Ord. Additionally, in many instances, your estimates for a single base have a range of value of tens of millions of dollars. How confident are you in these estimates of value?

ANSWER: We are fairly confident in an economic sense. The Army relied upon the best information available for planning purposes.

The estimates do not consider, however, that large parts of the installations may be available to other governmental agencies at little or no cost. For example, at Fort Ord no deduction was made for the possibility that the hospital, beach front, and airfield might be transferred to others free of charge. If the estimated value of these items were deducted, the estimate for Ft. Ord could be reduced by at least a third.

Another uncertainty is the type of zoning that might be achieved at each site. While our staff took a realistic view of land uses that would be allowed, there is no assurance that the land can be used as we contemplated in these estimates.

No consideration was given to potential environmental hazards.

Due to the sensitive nature of the estimates, our appraisers did not gather market data and make inspections as they usually would. They relied upon good existing information on file and a good understanding of local values for different types of real estate.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING - 10 MAY 91
LAND VALUATION

QUESTION: You included your estimated land values in the COBRA model to calculate return on investment. Given the questionable validity of your estimates, what effect did your land value estimates have on your recommendations to close or realign bases?

ANSWER: These estimates made the Army's proposals, which already made economic sense and had a good return on investment, look even more attractive.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING - 10 MAY 91
LAND VALUATION

QUESTION: The DoD guidance to the services required including the sale proceeds of closed bases in its economic analysis. However, the same guidance excluded the anticipated costs of environmental restoration from this analysis. What is your position on the wisdom of this?

ANSWER: DoD has an obligation for environmental restoration at all DoD hazardous sites, regardless of a decision to close a base. Consequently, environmental restoration costs were not considered in the Army's cost calculations. However, environmental restoration problems can affect near-term community reuse of a closing base and hence land value as well.

Although the estimates for environmental restoration were not part of the return on investment calculations, they were highlighted as senior decision-makers weighed the merits of each proposal being considered for recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING - 10 MAY 91
LAND VALUATION

QUESTION: How should the Commission consider the potential reuses of bases in its review of the DoD list of recommended closures?

ANSWER: A wide variety of potential reuses of closed military bases exists. Among the possibilities are airports, schools and industries. However, considerable study must be done. DoD facilitates this study process with its Defense Economic Adjustment Program. This program helps communities help themselves through appropriate local and intergovernmental organizations which plan, coordinate and implement adjustment efforts.

0-073



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

31 MAY 1991

Mr. Matt Behrmann
Staff Director, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W.
Washington DC 20006

Dear Mr. Behrmann:

Enclosed, please find an issue paper discussing the impact of base closures on military retirees. I provided points of contact on this subject by letter of May 15, 1991. This completes our response to Chairman Courter's letter of April 30, 1991.

If I can be of further assistance, please feel free to call.

Douglas B. Hansen
Director
Base Closure and Utilization

Enclosure

Impact of Base Closures on Military Retirees

There are four benefits that retirees receive that are dependent on their access to a military installation:

1. exchange privileges;
2. commissary privileges;
3. access to morale, welfare and recreation activities; and
4. access to military medical facilities.

Military beneficiaries who use the commissaries can save an average of 25 percent on their food purchases. Savings can amount to well over \$1,000 per year for families who use the commissaries. The use of base exchanges can result in savings of 20 to 25 percent on purchases. Since the availability of items varies significantly across exchanges, it is difficult to estimate savings for individuals. Use of military clinics and hospitals can result in significant savings to beneficiaries who do not have insurance other than the Civilian Health and Medical Program for Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). CHAMPUS co-payments are 25 percent of medical bills in addition to the deductible which is \$150 per individual (\$300 maximum per family) per year for retirees.

The costs to the retiree families of the closings of the specific bases are, of course, dependent on the extent to which they currently use services at the bases. Table 1 provides an overview of the services offered at each of the bases on the list. As is evident, many of the bases are installations which offer a full range of services. Absent these bases, military retirees can use services at other bases, although in many cases distances may be prohibitive. The notes which follow Table 1 identify major nearby bases which are available.

Data are not available on the extent to which retirees and their families use the commissaries, exchanges, and recreation facilities at these bases. Table 2 provides information on the retiree family populations residing within forty miles of each of the major bases. Medical care in military facilities is available to retirees and their dependents on a space-available basis. Table 2 also provides information on the number of admissions of retirees and their dependents to each of the military hospitals at the bases.

There are many retirees who will view base closure as having a significant effect on their benefits. Many retiree families have selected their homes based on the expected availability of military facilities.

Table 1 -- Availability of Services

Base	Comm	Exch	MWR	Hosp	Clinic
Army					
Ft Ben Harrison, IN	X	X	X	X	X
Ft Chaffe, AR	X	X	X	-	X
Ft Devens, MA	X	X	X	X	X
Ft Dix, NJ	X	X	X	X	X
Ft McClellan, AL	X	X	X	X	X
Ft Ord, CA	X	X	X	X	X
Sacramento Army Dep, CA	-	X	-	-	X
Harry Diamond Lab, VA					
Navy					
Chase Field NAS, TX	X	X	-	-	X
Hunters Point, CA	-	-	-	-	-
Long Beach NAS, CA	X	X	-	-	X
Long Beach NS, CA	X	X	-	X	X
Moffett Field NAS, CA	X	X	-	-	X
Orlando Naval TC, FL	-	X	X	X	X
Philadelphia, PA	X	X	X	X	X
Sand Point (Puget Sound), WA	X	X	-	-	X
Tustin Marine Corps AS, CA	-	X	-	-	-
Whidbey Island NAS, WA	X	X	X	X	X
Davisville Const, RI	-	-	-	-	-
Air Force					
Bergstrom AFB, TX	X	X	-	X	X
Carswell AFB, TX	X	X	X	X	X
Castle AFB, CA	X	X	X	X	X
Eaker AFB, AR	X	X	-	-	X
England AFB, LA	X	X	-	X	X
Grissom AFB, IN	X	X	-	-	X
Loring AFB, ME	X	X	X	X	X
Lowry AFB, CO	X	X	X	-	X
Moody AFB, GA	X	X	-	X	X
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC	X	X	X	X	X
Richards-Gebaur ARS, MO	-	X	-	-	X
Rickenbacker AGB, OH	-	X	-	-	X
Williams AFB, AZ	X	X	-	X	X
Wurtsmith AFB, MI	X	X	-	X	X

Table 2 - Retiree and Dependent Population
and Military Hospital Admissions

	Retiree and Dependent Population (Sep 1990)	Retiree and Dependent Military Hospital Admissions (FY 1989)
Army		
Ft Benjamin Harrison, IN	14,128	251
Ft Devens, MA	33,134	533
Ft Dix, NJ	21,744	810
Ft McClellan, AL	12,320	1,685
Ft Ord, CA	18,684	2,361
Navy		
Long Beach Naval Station, CA	73,194	308
Orlando Naval Training Ctr, FL	45,368	1,004
Philadelphia, PA	33,118	502
Whidbey Island NAS, WA	7,840	115
Air Force		
Bergstrom AFB, TX	26,739	462
Carswell AFB, TX	49,919	2,855
Castle AFB, CA	12,377	385
England AFB, LA	6,903	397
Loring AFB, ME	1,772	170
Moody AFB, GA	6,436	459
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC	8,104	319
Williams AFB, AZ	22,976	313
Wurtsmith AFB, MI	2,348	165

Notes

1. Beneficiaries using services clinic at Sacramento Army Depot will still have access to services available at Mather AFB.
2. Beneficiaries currently using services at Moffett Field will still have access to services available at other Bay Area bases.
3. Beneficiaries currently using services at Tustin MCAS may have access to services available at March AFB.
4. Beneficiaries using services at England AFB may have access to services available at Ft. Polk.
5. Beneficiaries currently using services at Lowry AFB will have access to services available at Fitzsimmons AMC.
6. Beneficiaries using services at Richards-Gebaur may have access to services available at Ft. Leavenworth.
7. Beneficiaries using services at Williams AFB may have access to services available at Luke AFB.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

0-002

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Ser 44C/1U597824
3 June 91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Multiple telecons between BCRC Mr. Patrick/OP-441D
CDR Ching

Encl: (1) Information regarding berthing capacity at Naval
Station New York (Staten Island)

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in response to your request of reference (a). Please note that the corrected amount of berthing for NAVSTA Staten Island reduces the amount of berthing in the Navy's inventory, as well as the notional amount of excess berthing capacity, by 4.0 KFB.

P. W. Brennan
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

The Master Plan for NAVSTA Staten Island shows a total of 6.8KFB of pier, broken down as:

4.8KFB general berthing
1.9KFB small craft
0.1KFB fleet landing

total = 6.8 KFB

The 4.8KFB general berthing figure was predicated on the Master Plan calling for two piers of 2.4KFB each. Section 6 of the Master Plan however states that the second pier was unscoped as to length, and would be finalized after the ship mix was determined. This was missed by OPNAV staff, because the NAVFAC Data base also had listed a requirement for 6.8KFB, and in Spring 1990 COMNAVSURFLANT had verified the 6.8KFB figure. In short, OPNAV and other staffs missed the fact that the second pier was "soft" in terms of ultimate requirement. Removal of the second pier, and discounting of the small craft/fleet landing piers and wharves leaves 2.8KFB currently available in Staten Island for homeporting ships.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

0-033

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Ser 44C/1U597823
3 June 91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Handwritten request for additional information
received during meeting of 24 May 1991

Encl: (1) Base Closure and Realignment Commission Preliminary
Navy Data Report dated 3 June 1991
(2) Base Closure and Realignment Commission Installations
Proposed for Closure or Realignment Data Report dated
3 June 1991

1. Enclosures (1) and (2) are provided in response to your
request of reference (a).

P.W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

3 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR TOM SNYDER, DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Answer to Commissioner Levitt

1. During the 31 May 1991 site visit to Fort Devens, Commissioner Levitt asked if the lack of adequate training facilities for the 10th Special Forces Group was a factor in the decision to propose closure of Fort Devens. I told the Commissioner we would have to get back to him with an answer.

2. The answer is that the lack of adequate facilities for the 10 SFG was a factor in the decision to propose closure of Fort Devens. Training for 10 SFG is limited at Fort Devens due to insufficient maneuver space, small drop zone, limits on demolitions, and limits on weapons firing. Also, the close proximity to major civilian airports makes High Altitude, Low Opening (HALO) operations difficult. Fort Carson has the climate, terrain, and facilities to fully support the 10 SFG. Relocation to Fort Carson would allow far more extensive training opportunities for the 10 SFG.

3. Request relay of this information to Commissioner Levitt.



ROBERT S. DASKI
Total Army Basing Study

0-092



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

4 June 1991

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Courter,

Thank you for your letter of May 23, 1991, to Mrs Livingstone requesting the Army to review your staff's analysis of Military Value.

The Army's Military Value Rankings were not rerun after the AAA findings were published for the Industrial installations since the ranking changes were not significant nor did they affect any of the approved recommendations. For the record, however, these rankings are being rerun and the commission will be provided a copy as soon as possible.

Differences in attribute values, sometimes significant differences, were found in some Army data bases. For that reason, the Army staff had data calls with the appropriate MACOM and installation and normally deferred to the installations data whenever a significant discrepancy existed. This methodology was used to avoid recurrence of the criticism of the 1988 Commission process that relied on errors in central data bases that were not verified at installation level. Although the AAA and GAO audits of our data discovered some errors which were corrected, it also showed that relying on local data sources when discrepancies existed in Army central data sources was prudent methodology. Investigating the reasons for the discrepancies between local and Army central data sources was beyond the charter of the Total Army Basing Study and not doable by the Data Base managers with the time constraints involved.

The Army accepts the AAA validated values for the attribute values whenever they differed from the original MACOM provided values.

If we can be of further assistance, please feel free to contact me personally or Lieutenant Colonel Chip Larouche at (703) 693-7556.

Sincerely,



John B. Nerger
Acting Director, Total
Army Basing Study

cc: The Honorable Colin McMillan
The Honorable Susan Livingstone

J. B. Nerger
Acting Director, Total
Army Basing Study

0-033



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200



4 June 1991

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Courter,

Thank you for your letter of May 24, 1991, to Mrs Livingstone requesting cost analysis and migration charts for several options considered under AMC Vision 2000.

Attached at the enclosure are the cost analysis and migration charts for the 12 basing alternatives for the Army's LAB 21 proposal. The Army's recommended alternative (option I) was included in the 12 April 1991 OSD submission.

There were 50 alternatives considered as part of AMC's Vision 2000. Although COBRA files exists for those alternatives that were not recommended to OSD, these files were not updated or maintained after any alternative was eliminated from consideration. If a specific excursion or alternative is desired by your staff, we will be glad to run it on request, using the correct current standard factors and verified installation capacity values.

Sincerely,

John B. Nerger
Acting Director, Total
Army Basing Study

cc: The Honorable Colin McMillan
The Honorable Susan Livingstone



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

0-094

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Ser 441D/1U597827
5 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission letter
of May 30, 1991

1. I am responding on behalf of Ms. Schafer and providing, as requested by reference (a), the following points of contact for bases which will be visited by GAO representatives:

NSY Mare Island:	CDR Large Code 101 (707) 646-4405/2247
NSY Long Beach:	Mr. John Pfeiffer (213) 547-7323
NS Treasure Island:	CDR Hancock Executive Officer (415) 395-5001
NS Long Beach:	LCDR Steve Chase Code 005 (213) 831-8729
NS Mayport:	CDR Chet Smith Executive Officer (904) 246-5201
NS Puget Sound:	CDR Lowell Executive Officer (206) 526-3325
MCAS Tustin:	COL Paul S. Johnson Commanding Officer (714) 726-7301
NAS Meridian:	CAPT William Beaty Commander, Training Wing One (601) 679-2148
NAS Chase Field:	CAPT Mike Scott Commanding Officer (512) 354-5213

NAS Moffett Field:

Captain Stephen Quigley
Commanding Officer
(415) 966-5746

NAS Whiting Field:

Captain Kenneth Johnson
Commanding Officer
(904) 623-7121

NTC Orlando:

Mike Shimmer
Planner
(407) 646-4824

NTC Great Lakes:

Bill Masterson
Planner
(708) 688-3400

NTC San Diego:

Ralph Simpson
Planner
(619) 524-1026

2. For information, Ms. Schafer's office is sending advisory letters to the Commanding Officers of the bases listed above and informing them of the upcoming GAO visits.


P.W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to OASD (P&L)



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-8000

June 6, 1991

PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in reply to your letter of May 17 asking for information on land sales and the Base Closure Account. You were especially interested in the fact that the Army and Air Force did not rely on land sale revenues to "enhance" return on investment or net present value savings. With the exception of MCAS Tustin, the Navy did not use land sale revenues to offset one-time costs.

The Services' experience with land sales resulting from the 1988 Base Closure Commission recommendations is less than encouraging. Since the FY91 budget request, parcels of land have been transferred, without compensation to the Department, significantly reducing projected revenue and the associated savings. Fort Meade, Maryland, is a case in point. Section 126 of the Military Construction Act for FY91, Public Law 101-519, transferred 7,600 acres of this installation, without compensation, to the Department of Interior. This reduced our projected revenue for that property by more than 60 percent and projected income and savings by \$302 million.

Land values and transfers may also be impacted by environmental cleanup requirements, making it difficult to estimate land sale revenues until environmental studies are completed.

You also asked about our budget process for land sale revenues. The Department will not complete budget actions on the 1991 recommendations until this fall. However, I anticipate DoD will follow the Services' lead and also be very cautious. Hence, potential shortfalls in the outyears should be minimized from the outset.

I've enclosed a copy of the DoD Base Closure Account operating policy, and detailed instructions for the disposition of proceeds from the sale of assets. These instructions were issued for the first Base Closure Account. I would anticipate similar instructions will be issued for the new Base Closure Account.

Sincerely,

David J. Berteau
David J. Berteau
Principal Deputy

Enclosures

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BASE CLOSURE ACCOUNT POLICY AND RESPONSIBILITIES

I. MISSION:

To execute the Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526) within budget and on schedule, and to ensure that base closure fiscal assets are available, accountable, reportable and properly utilized.

II. POLICY:

A. The DoD Base Closure Account will be administered by the Secretary of Defense as a single account in accordance with the Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526).

B. The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Production and Logistics (ASD(P&L)) will provide policy and guidance on base closure issues, and will determine the Military Departments allocation of the Base Closure Account.

C. Base Closure Account funds will only be used to implement those closures and realignments identified by the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure.

D. Funds resulting from property sales will be deposited into the Base Closure Account. Proceeds from property sales (including land and facilities) deposited by a particular Military Department will generally be allocated to the closure effort of that Military Department. ASD(P&L) retains the authority to realign proceeds to other Military Departments on a case-by-case basis.

E. Base Closure Account funds, to the extent of their availability, will be allocated to the three Military Departments by the DoD Comptroller based on the funding allocation determined by the ASD(P&L). Tenant realignments will be funded by the host Military Department of the closing or realigning (losing) installation. Host Military Departments are responsible for coordination with all affected tenant activities, including Defense Agencies, Defense Medical Facilities Office (DMFO), Reserves, and Non-Appropriated Fund Activities (NAF). Tenant activities will identify specific base closure program requirements to their host Military Department.

F. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) offices of Economic Adjustment, Health Affairs, and Reserve Affairs will identify specific base closure program requirements and forward those to the respective Military Departments. The funds to support these programs will come from the Military Department's Base Closure allocation.

G. The Homeowners Assistance Program, managed by the Department of the Army, may be supplementally funded by transfers during FY 1990 and 1991 from the Base Closure Account before the Military Departments receive their allocation. Public Law 101-89 provides authority to transfer up to \$31 million during FY 90-91. After FY 1991, Homeowners Assistance funds will be directly budgeted and appropriated to the Homeowners Assistance Account.

H. Sections 2662 (Real Property Transactions) and 2687 (Base Closures and Realignments) of title 10, United States Code are waived by P.L. 100-526.

I. Construction may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code.

J. Phased military construction financing shall be accomplished in accordance with applicable statutes.

K. The use of two or more appropriations to fund a military construction project is permitted and encouraged. Separate DD-1391s, with proper cross referencing to other affected appropriations, must be prepared for each appropriation used and justification provided for the determination of funding shares. For example, a project could receive funds from the Base Closure Account and the Military Department's Military Construction Account. Funds to be used from each account must be properly authorized and appropriated.

L. Costs to relocate an activity will be charged to the Base Closure Account as they occur. Normal operating costs of activities being relocated will not be charged to the Base Closure Account. Net savings associated with base closures/realignments in normal operating costs of activities will be identified during annual budget reviews.

M. The use of appropriated funds for non-appropriated funded Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) projects is limited to replacement or expansion of commissaries and exchanges caused by base realignments and closures.

N. The DMFO will evaluate requirements, plan, and design all medical facilities. Funds for the design of medical projects planned by the DMFO will be provided from the allocation of the Service which will operate the facility. The Military Departments will schedule and fund the construction of medical facilities.

O. The Military Departments shall prepare appropriate environmental documents, records of decision and related requirements in accordance with 40 CFR 1500-1508 (National Environmental Policy Act regulations.)

III. PROCESS:

A. The Military Departments will annually submit an updated implementation and financial plan, for base closure actions through September 30, 1995, to the DoD Comptroller and ASD(P&L) not later than September 15. Data will be displayed by decision packages identified to the closing or realigning installations. Financial plans will reflect how the Military Departments expect to spend their allocation of the account, their savings and their property sale proceeds. A schedule will be prepared for Military Construction, Family Housing, Operations & Maintenance (O&M), Military Personnel, and other costs and savings. The plan will also include a Schedule of Manpower Changes, Environmental Costs and Anticipated Revenues from the Disposal of Assets. FY 1989 expenditures will be included in the plan. Plans will follow current DoD Budget preparation guidance and will include an implementation schedule indicating the dates significant events are planned, including realignment of major units and/or tenants. In addition, the Military Departments will submit MWR appropriated/non-appropriated fund cost-sharing evaluations with their budget submissions.

B. DoD Comptroller and ASD(P&L) will review financial and implementation plans, and work for SecDef and Congressional approval of funding requests.

C. ASD(P&L) will redetermine Military Departments' allocations if either DoD or Congress does not approve the full funding request.

D. ASD(FM&P) will review civilian and military manpower implementation plans for accuracy and completeness.

E. The DoD Comptroller through Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) will allocate Base Closure Account Funds, to the extent of their availability, to the Military Departments according to the amounts prescribed by the ASD(P&L). The Military Departments will deposit proceeds from property sales into the Base Closure Account. Military Departments will execute their budgets and report in accordance with DoD Comptroller accounting and financial guidance dated January 3, 1990.

F. Military Departments will provide WHS with projects and standard accounting reports. WHS will compile accounting data and forward to the DoD Comptroller and the ASD(P&L). Significant deviations from planned expenditures must be explained by the Military Departments in a report to ASD(P&L) within 45 days of the end of the fiscal year to allow for inclusion in the Annual Report to Congress.

C. WHS:

1. Allocate Base Closure Account funds to Military Departments.
2. Administer departmental accounting for the base closure effort.
3. Prepare monthly 1176 and 1002 reports, as required by DoD 7220.9M.
4. In conjunction with DoD Comptroller, provide detailed accounting and reporting instructions.
5. Summarize Military Department's reports into one consolidated report to DASD(I) and DoD Comptroller.

D. MILITARY DEPARTMENTS:

1. Implement all base closure and realignment actions including obligation of funds.
2. Distribute funds to appropriate activities.
3. Deposit funds resulting from property sales into the Base Closure Account.
4. Prepare and manage their respective implementation plans.
5. Reprogram, to the extent authorized and required, FY 1990 base closure savings included in Service appropriations to cover one-time base closure costs.
6. Submit all annual and special reports to WHS or DASD(I), as appropriate.
7. Submit annual budgets and financial plans (including costs and savings) to DoD Comptroller.
8. Prepare appropriate environmental documents and records of decisions.
9. Prepare and submit to ASD(P&L), after ASD(FM&P) review, military and civilian manpower implementation plans.

E. ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS):

1. Evaluate, plan, program, design and coordinate medical facilities.
2. Prepare all medical justification documentation, to include DD-1391s.
3. Prepare initial CHAMPUS cost distributions.
4. Coordinate medical memoranda of understanding.

G. Military Departments will provide ASD(P&L) with an annual summary of Environmental Assessments or Environmental Impact Statements completed during the preceding year. Such summaries shall be provided within 45 days of the end of the fiscal year to allow for inclusion in the annual report to Congress.

H. Not later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which the Department of Defense carries out activities under the Base Closure and Realignment Act, the ASD(P&L) shall forward a report to the appropriate committees of Congress of the amount and nature of deposits into and the expenditures from the Account during such fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant section 204(a) Base Closure Act.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES:

A. ASD (PRODUCTION and LOGISTICS):

1. Establish and control overall base closure and realignment planning and organization.
2. Establish apportionment policy and allocation of funds, to include property sale proceeds.
3. Coordinate annual and special reports within OSD.
4. Provide required base closure annual and special reports to Congress.
5. Insure compliance with P.L. 100-526.
6. Determine lead action offices for special Congressional reports.
7. Establish Defense Environment Restoration Program (DERP) base closure policy.
8. Provide oversight of all environmental issues.
9. Review Military Departments environmental restoration plans.

B. DoD COMPTROLLER:

1. Establish fiscal policy, procedures and reporting instructions.
2. Ensure accounting procedures adhere to public law and existing DoD regulations.
3. Provide oversight of WHS effort.
4. Reprogram funds when required and authorized to support the base closure effort.
5. Provide Continuing Resolution guidance.
6. Adjust budgeted funding levels to reflect revised costs and savings associated with base realignments and closures.

F. ASD (FORCE MANAGEMENT & PERSONNEL):

1. Oversee transfer, placement, reassignment, and separation of civilian employees affected by closures and realignments.
2. Review civilian and military manpower implementation plans for accuracy and completeness.
3. Oversee transfer of training activities within Military Department closures and realignments.
4. Coordinate funding of recruiting program and facilities changes with Military Department closures and realignments.
5. Exercise oversight for the use of appropriated funds for Non-Appropriated Funds activities affected by base closures and realignments.
6. Consolidate MWR requirements and integrate with Military Department closures and realignments.
7. Integrate community base reuse plans with Military Department closure and disposal actions.
8. Establish and justify community economic adjustment funding priorities.



OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

RECEIVED
1501 MAY 14 AM 11:37
MAY 9 1991

(Management Systems)

BUU-I
JH May
#515

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE

SUBJECT: Disposition of Proceeds from the Sale of Assets
Resulting from DoD Base Closures

Attached are detailed instructions for the disposition of
proceeds from the sale of assets resulting from DoD base
closures. These instructions are effective immediately.

Questions relative to this guidance may be directed to
Mr. Walter Fisch, on extension 73135.

Alvin Tucker
Deputy Comptroller
(Management Systems)

Attachment

009747
SAFM BCT
CF: COA
BU
XD

DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF ASSETS
RESULTING FROM DOD BASE CLOSURES

Funds received from transfer or disposal of facilities resulting from the DoD Base Closure and Realignment Act, Public Law 100-526, October 24, 1988 are to be treated as follows:

A. OVERVIEW

The Military Departments are responsible for implementing all base closure and realignment actions and administering their allocation of base closure funds.

B. GUIDANCE

1. The fund distribution and accounting procedures attached to the Principal Deputy Comptroller's memorandum of January 3, 1990, subject "DoD Base Closure Account" with the accompanying pen change issued on January 24, 1990 remain in effect.

2. Paragraph 7 of the cited procedures states that proceeds resulting from the transfer or disposal of property or facilities (including buildings and structures) shall be deposited as reimbursements into the DoD Base Closure Account 97-0103 and subsequently reissued as direct funds. Examples of these transactions include:

- Funds derived from temporary leases of Government property.
- Property upon which settlement has occurred and title has been passed to the new owners. "Good faith" deposits or earnest funds should not be transferred until finalization of the sale (settlement) takes place.

3. If funds from previously completed transactions were deposited to a suspense account or other interim accounts, a transfer to the DoD Base Closure Account may be accomplished using SF 1080, "Voucher for Transfers Between Appropriations and/or Funds."

4. Funds deposited into the DoD Base Closure Account shall be reprogrammed through a request to OMB and received on Form 1105, "Apportionment and Reapportionment Schedule" from OMB. Funds shall be reported as unobligated balances and may be withdrawn in accordance with an approved Military Department financial plan.

5. Funds expended from the base closure account shall be in accordance with, and meet the requirements of, the provisions of Public law 100-526, Section 204.

6. Accounting Entries.

a. Defense Finance and Accounting Service entries required before the asset sale takes place at the installation level.

ENTRY NO. 1

Dr. 4211 - Anticipated Reimbursements - Specific Apportionment
Cr. 4450 - Authority Available for Apportionment

To record anticipated reimbursement from asset sale.

ENTRY NO. 2

Dr. 4450 - Authority Available for Apportionment
Cr. 4514 - Unallocated Apportionment - Reimbursable
Program - Current Period

To record apportionment of anticipated asset sale as reflected on the DD form 1105, "Apportionment and Reapportionment Schedule."

b. The following entries reflect the accounting treatment for installations to follow in transferring assets from the performing installation to the DoD Base Closure account prior to sale.

ENTRY NO. 3

Dr. 3231 - Transfers Out to Government Agencies Without
Reimbursement
Dr. 1739 - Accumulated Depreciation on Buildings
Dr. 1749 - Accumulated Depreciation on Other Structures and
Facilities
Cr. 1730 - Building
Cr. 1710 - Land
Cr. 1740 - Other Structures and Facilities

Installation account entry.

ENTRY NO. 4

Dr. 1730 - Building
Dr. 1710 - Land
Dr. 1740 - Other Structures and Facilities
Cr. 3220 - Transfers In from Others Without Reimbursement
Cr. 1739 - Accumulated Depreciation on Buildings
Cr. 1749 - Accumulated Depreciation on Other Structures
and Facilities

Installation DoD Base Closure account entry.

c. Entry for use in recording sale or disposal of installation assets in the DoD Base Closure Account books.

ENTRY NO. 5

Dr. 1011 - Funds Collected
Dr. 1739 - Accumulated Depreciation on Buildings
Dr. 1740 - Other Structures and Facilities
Dr. 1749 - Accumulated Depreciation on Other
Structures and Facilities
Dr. 7210 - Loss on Disposition of Assets
(Sale less than "book" value)
or
Cr. 7110 - Gain on Disposition of Assets
(Sale more than "book" value)
Cr. 1710 - Land
Cr. 1730 - Building
Cr. 1740 - Other Structures & Facilities

To record the sale or disposal of assets.

ENTRY NO. 6

Dr. 4254 - Reimbursements Earned - Collected - Specific
Apportionment
Cr. 4222 - Customer Orders Accepted - Specific
Apportionment

To record the budgetary effect of the sale.

d. Follow-on entry by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service upon receipt of the consolidated monthly budget execution reports showing account no. 4222, Customer Orders Accepted-Specific Apportionment.

ENTRY NO. 7

Dr. 4514 - Unallocated Apportionment - Reimbursable Program -
Current Period
Cr. 4511 - Unallocated Apportionment - Direct Program -
Current Period

To record reprogramming of collections received for asset sales from reimbursable to the direct program.

6: McMillan



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1625 K STREET, N.W. SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006-1604
202-653-0823

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN
COMMISSIONERS:
WILLIAM L. BALL, III
HOWARD H. CALLAWAY
GEN. DUANE H. CASSIDY, USAF (RET)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
JAMES SMITH H. P.E.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.
ALEXANDER B. TROWBRIDGE

May 17, 1991

The Honorable Colin McMillan
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Production and Logistics
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. McMillan:

In the conduct of our ongoing review of the department's proposals for closure and realignment, the staff has noticed inconsistencies in the Service methodologies as relates to the computation of savings. The Navy tended to recognize land sales as a source of revenue into the base closure account and used this anticipated revenue to offset one-time costs. The proposed closure of MCAS Tustin is an example of an action highly dependent upon land sale revenues. The Army and the Air Force did not rely on land sale revenues to enhance return on investment or net present value savings.

Since proceeds from the sale of excess land cannot be assumed, the Commission would like to know how shortfalls from the anticipated land sales are factored into the base closure account. Specifically, we want to know how the Department of Defense will budget for the actions, how the money is passed to the Services, and how accountability is maintained. Should costs be underestimated or revenues overstated, the Commission would like to know how the deficits will be accommodated in the DoD budget.

Please provide a detailed analysis of these base closure account issues by May 25, 1991. If you have any questions or require any clarification, contact Mr. Paul J. Hirsch, Director for Review and Analysis at 202-653-0823.

Sincerely,

Jim Courter
Chairman

tgm

cc: The Honorable Susan Livingstone
The Honorable Jacqueline Schafer
The Honorable James Boatright



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-8000

January 18, 1990

PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (FORCE MANAGEMENT
AND PERSONNEL)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
COMPTROLLER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(INSTALLATIONS, LOGISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (SHIPBUILDING AND
LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (MANPOWER,
RESERVE AFFAIRS, INSTALLATIONS, AND LOGISTICS)
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ENVIRONMENT)

SUBJECT: Department of Defense (DoD) Base Closure Account

Attached are the DoD Base Closure Account operating policy,
process and responsibilities the Department will be using for the
Account established by Public Law 100-526. Detailed accounting
and financial management procedures were published by the DoD
Comptroller on January 3, 1990.


David J. Berteau
Principal Deputy

Attachment

0-930



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

June 7, 1991

PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS

Mr. Dave Hadwiger
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W. Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Hadwiger:

This is in response to your request for information on the status of the Department's implementation of the 1988 Base Closure Commission's recommendations. As you know, the Commission's recommendations affect 145 installations. Of this number, 86 are to be closed, 13 will be realigned and 46 will receive units and activities from closing or realigning installations.

The Department is following the plans it developed to implement the Commission's recommendations. The first scheduled major base closure, Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire, occurred on March 31, 1991. I've enclosed a schedule of the remaining closures and realignments for your use.

Forty-eight family housing units scheduled for closure have been leased under provisions of the McKinney Act to shelter and feed the homeless. Lease negotiations are currently under way for 61 additional units and another 48 will become available in September, 1991.


The Congress has fully supported DoD's requests for 1988 Base Closure Account funding beginning with \$500 million in FY90, and \$916 million for FY91. House Subcommittees have also supported our FY 92/93 budget request for \$634 million in FY92 and \$441 million in FY93, and added \$25 million for FY92 and \$1 billion for FY93, for environmental restoration at the closing bases.

The Department still anticipates annual savings of approximately \$700 million upon full implementation of all these actions.

The Department also intends to fulfill its environmental obligations at vacated bases. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 includes several provisions that enhance the Department's ability to meet this obligation. Specifically, it authorized the appropriation of funds into the Base Closure Account to be used for environmental restoration at bases identified by the 1988 Base Closure Commission, and made the Base Closure Account the exclusive source of funding for environmental restoration at those bases. The Act also directed the formation of an environmental response task force, chaired by the Secretary of Defense, to report on ways to improve interagency coordination of environmental response actions, and streamline and consolidate regulations, practices and policies.

Please call me if you have any further questions.

Sincerely,



Douglas B. Hansen
Director

Base Closure and Realignment

Enclosure

BRAC I Base Closures and Realignment - Completion Dates

<u>Base</u>	<u>Date (FY/Qtr)</u>
Pease Air Force Base, NH	Closed 31 Mar 91
George Air Force Base, CA	93/1
Chanute Air Force Base, IL	93/4
Mather Air Force Base, CA	93/4
Norton Air Force Base, CA	94/3
Naval Station New York, NY (Brooklyn)	95
Naval Station Puget Sound, WA (Sand Point)	95
Naval Hospital Philadelphia, PA	95
Stand Alone Family Housing Areas, (7)	91 (2 closed)
Stand Alone Family Housing Areas, (15)	92
Stand Alone Family Housing Areas, (31)	93
Fort Dix, NJ (Semi-Active)	93/4
Pontiac Storage Facility, MI	93/4
Kapalama Military Reservation Phase III, HI	93/4
Tacony Warehouse, PA	93/4
Fort Sheridan, IL	94/4
Coosa River Annex, AL	94/4
Hamilton Army Airfield, CA	94/2
Indiana Ammunition Plant, IN(Partial)	95/2
Cape St. George, FL	94/4
Pueblo Army Depot, CO (Realignment)	95/3
Navajo Depot Activity, AZ	94/4
Presidio of San Francisco, CA	94/4
Former Nike Site, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD	94/4
Fort Devens, MA, etc. (Includes Forts Huachuca, Holabird and Meade) - (Partial Closure/Realignment)	95/4
Fort Douglas, UT	92/1
Army Material Technology Laboratory (AMTL), MA	95/4
Fort Des Moines, IA (Partial)	95/4
Fort Wingate Ammunition Storage Depot, NM	95/4
Jefferson Proving Ground, IN	95/4
Lexington Army Depot, KY	95/4
New Orleans Military Ocean Terminal, LA	95/4
Alabama Ammunition Plant, AL	93/2
Cameron Station, VA	95/4
Bennett ANG, CO	95/3
Nike Kansas City 30, MO	95/4
Umatilla Army Depot, OR (Realignment)	95/4
USARC Gaithersburg, MD	95/4

As of June 1991



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

O-097 → (4)

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

31 MAY 1991

DEFENSE I-04

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
Suite 400
1625 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 2006-1604

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Reference is made to your letter of May 21, 1991,
with Follow-up Questions to the Services' testimony at
the May 10th Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission hearing.

Attached for your use are answers to the follow-up
questions as requested.

Sincerely,

Lewis D. Walker
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Environment, Safety and Occupational Health)
OASA(I,L&E)

Attachments



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1625 K STREET, N.W. SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006-1604
202-653-0823

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
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ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
JAMES SMITH II, P.E.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.
ALEXANDER S. TROWBRIDGE

May 21, 1991


Mr. Lewis Walker
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Environment, Safety and
Occupational Health
The Pentagon, Room 2E614
Washington, D.C. 20310-0110

Dear Mr. Walker:

The attached questions are being provided to you as follow-up questions from the May 10, 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission hearing. We ask that written responses be submitted to the Commission by May 28, 1991.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,


JIM COURTER
Chairman

encl.

cc: The Honorable Colin McMillan

FOLLOW-UP ENVIRONMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR MAY 10 HEARING

SERVICE WITNESSES:

Rear Admiral Patrick Drennon, Director of Shore Activities Division, Chief of Naval Operations

Mr. Gary Vest, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Occupational Health, DASAF/MIQ

Mr. Louis Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Occupational Health

FOR ALL SERVICE WITNESSES:

The Services were required to apply eight criteria, in addition to the DoD force structure plan, when selecting recommended bases for closure or realignment. The Services were to make those selections giving priority to the first four criteria dealing with military value. Environmental impacts was one of the last four criteria which did not receive priority consideration, although they were required to be considered. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance required, as a minimum, that environmental consequences of a closure or realignment be considered in the following areas: threatened or endangered species, wetlands, historic or archaeological sites, pollution control, hazardous material/wastes, land and air uses, programmed environmental costs/cost avoidances. While Installation Restoration Program (IRP) costs were not considered in the selection process, OSD required consideration of the impact that clean-up activities could have on land value calculations. One of the concerns expressed in press releases by various individuals trying to save bases from closure has been the cost of clean-up.

- a. Were environmental impacts ever used as a tie breaker in your process? Should they have been?
- b. Do you believe the environmental impacts should have been considered with a higher degree of emphasis?
- c. What were your environmental compliance costs and how were they considered in your process?
- d. What environmental costs were you able to avoid and how were they considered in your process?

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

QUESTION: Were environmental impacts ever used as a tie breaker in your process? Should they have been?

ANSWER: No, to the first question. The second question is moot since there were no instances where all other considerations were equal, thereby inviting the use of environmental impact as a tie breaker.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

QUESTION: Do you believe the environmental impacts should have been considered with a higher degree of emphasis?

ANSWER: No. They were considered as each recommendation was discussed; environmental concerns played an appropriate role. The DOD selection criteria required the Services to give priority consideration to "military value." The Army supports this emphasis.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

QUESTION: What were your environmental compliance costs and how were they considered in your process?

ANSWER: Environmental compliance costs did not play a role in our process. In many cases, compliance costs will be incurred before closure could take place. Our emphasis was upon environmental impact and restoration costs. By continuing to work toward compliance at proposed closure sites, we potentially lessened our restoration requirements. Compliance costs currently budgeted in FY 92/93 as a part of the Environmental Compliance Achievement Program (ECAP) for proposed closures are:

- Fort Devens	\$18.5 M
- Fort Dix	34.1 M
- Fort Benjamin Harrison	3.1 M
- Fort McClellan	9.7 M
- Fort Ord	41.9 M
- Sacramento Army Depot	10.8 M

ECAP funds for a proposed closure would likely be transferred to restoration for that installation.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION HEARING
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

QUESTION: What environmental costs were you able to avoid and how were they considered in your process?

ANSWER: We did not avoid any environmental costs in our analysis, and environmental compliance costs did not play a role in our process.

In general, by continuing to work toward compliance at proposed closure sites, we potentially lessened our restoration requirements.

O-093
DBA
Pete
Dom



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20360-5000

June 3, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DOUG HANSEN, DIRECTOR OF BASE CLOSURE
AND UTILIZATION, OASD(P&L)

Subj: INTERACTION WITH BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Encl: (1) Report on Interaction with the Base Closure and
Realignment Commission

In your memo of April 19, 1991, you asked for a weekly report on interaction with the Base Closure Commission. Enclosure (1) is the combined logs of ASN(I&E), OP-44, and HQ MarCorps (Code LF) for the period May 13 through 31.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ben Rose".

Ben Rose
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Installations and Environment)

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT

May
7

A Marine Corps briefing on base closure selection process was provided to Base Closure and Realignment Commission Staff at their request. The brief appeared to be well received. There was no request for follow-on briefings or additional information.

13

Mr. Jim Courter, Chairman, BC&RC, wrote Secretary Schafer requesting list of all leased space exceeding 10,000 square feet occupied by Navy functions.

20

RADM Drennen, OP-44, sent memo to BCC in response to Commission's letter to Secretary Schafer of 6 May 1991 providing analysis of requested data.

20

The Base Closure and Realignment Commission faxed copy of their press statement on GAO report and Navy base closure process.

20

Meeting with Navy Base Structure Committee and Base Closure and Realignment Commission Staff was held in Secretary Schafer's office to brief Commission Staffers on Navy base closure process.

22

Meeting of Navy Base Structure Committee and Base Closure and Realignment Commission Staff. The BC&RC gave further details of information and documents they needed, and BSC discussed their decision process.

23

Mr. Jim Courter, Chairman, BC&RC, wrote Secretary Schafer requesting information on the evaluation process used to verify selected data items in arriving at proposals to close or realign military installations.

24

Mr. Rose, Principal Deputy ASN(I&E) sent/faxed memo to Mr. Paul Hirsch, BC&RC Staffer, to tell him of location change of 24 May, 3:00pm meeting with Navy BSC & BC&RC staff.

24

Members of the Navy Base Structure Committee met with BC&RC Staffers. BSC document given to BCC staff and discussed.

24

Letter from Chairman, BC&RC to Secretary Schafer requesting further analyses of each category where excess capacity is identified.

29

Meeting of Navy Base Structure Committee and Base Closure and Reslignment Committee to provide requested data and discuss further base closure data issues.

30 Letter signed by Mr. F. S. Sterns, DIR I&F, OASN((I&E), to the Chairman, BC&RC, providing information on leased space exceeding 10,000 (outside NCR only) in answer to the Commissions' letter of 13 May 1991.

30 Chairman, BC&RC, faxed letter to Secretary Schafer to inform Navy that GAO reps, assigned to the Commission, will be visiting a number of military installations. Requested Navy provide a point of contact to assist Commission with these visits.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
WASHINGTON, DC 20360-3000

O-339 JKH
DAM

3 June 1991

The Honorable James A. Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Chairman Courter,

Your letter of May 23, 1991 requested a point of contact and phone number for the following bases:

Naval Air Station Lemoore, California
Naval Training Center Great Lakes, Illinois
Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center 29 Palms, CA

In response to your request, the following information is provided:

NAS Lemoore: Capt. Joe Hart, Commanding Officer
209-998-3344

NTC Great Lakes: Mr. Bill Masterson, Facility Planner
708-688-4818/4847/4849

Air Grnd Combat Ctr: Col. Cisneros, Director of
Installations and Logistics
619-368-6100/7472

Each have been notified of the proposed visit by GAO.

F. S. Sterns
F. S. Sterns
Deputy

Copy to: OSD (P&L)

F. S. Sterns



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
 1625 K STREET, N.W. SUITE 400
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006-1604
 202-453-0623

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
 WILLIAM L. BALL, III
 HOWARD M. GALLAWAY
 GEN. DUANE M. CASBIDY, USAF (RET)
 ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
 JAMES SMITH II, P.E.
 ROBERT D. STUART, JR.
 ALEXANDER S. TROWBRIDGE

May 23, 1991

The Honorable Jacqueline Schafer
 Assistant Secretary of the Navy
 for Installations
 The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20350

Dear Miss Schafer:

As part of its evaluation process, the Commission is independently verifying selected data items used by the services in arriving at proposals to close or realign military installations. We appreciate the assistance you have already given us and request your further help in facilitating this verification.

The focus of this verification effort is military construction cost estimates, including the related physical and financial factors used to determine these estimates. We are planning to start gathering data for selected losing and gaining bases, on May 28, 1991, at the Navy's Office of Installations and Facilities. We then envision a one or two day visit by General Accounting Office representatives assigned to the Commission at each of the following installations which are associated, respectively, with closure proposals for NAS Whidbey Island, NTC Orlando, and MCAS Tustin.


Naval Air Station Lemoore, California
 Naval Training Center Great Lakes, Illinois
 Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center 29 Palms, California

We ask that you advise each installation, as soon as possible, of the upcoming visit and provide Mr. Paul Hirsch, Director of Review and Analysis at the Commission, with a point of contact and phone number for each base. With your approval, GAO representatives will arrange base visits through the base commander, providing all necessary clearances, scheduling, and details of information to be obtained.

The Honorable Jacqueline Schafer
Page Two

Thank you very much for your continuing help and
cooperation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jim Courter". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "J".

JIM COURTER
Chairman

cc: The Honorable Colin McMillan

TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER BASES
Facility Comparison in Square Feet

	Goodfellow	Keesler	Lackland	Lowry	Sheppard
Primary Mission	508K	1413K	1520K	1285K	2291K
Support Mission	<u>1285K</u>	<u>5562K</u>	<u>8848K</u>	<u>3840K</u>	<u>3431K</u>
SUBTOTAL	1793K	6975K	10368K	5125K	5722K
GRAND TOTAL (Square Footage) =	29983K				
Percent of Total	6%	23%	35%	17%	19%
FY91 Real Property Maintenance (RPM)	\$5.2M	\$15.8M	\$21.2M	\$10.7M	\$12.6M

RPM Delta (Lowry AFB vs Goodfellow AFB)

Lowry AFB = \$10.7M

Goodfellow AFB = \$5.2M

* Delta = \$5.5M annual (Based on FY91)

(*This \$5.5M annual savings does not reflect an additional savings of up to \$2.2M annually in the areas of communications and base operating support resulting from efficiencies associated with reduced excess capacity.)

Manpower Savings by Closure
Lowry AFB vs Goodfellow AFB

Lowry AFB = 900
 Goodfellow AFB = 808
 Delta = 92 or 11%
 = \$5.7M annual

*Prepared By PEPDM
 For Col. Lamont's
 6 JUNE PRESENTATION
 TO THE COMM. ON*

0-020

4 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. MARV CASTERLINE OF THE
DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION STAFF

1. Mr. Casterline called with the following questions:

- Has the Navy looked into implementing a scaled down version of the consolidation plan if the laboratories are removed from the Base Closure and Realignment list?

- Did the Navy ever determine whether or not the closure of NESEC San Diego breaches the thresholds of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act?

Very Respectfully,



Bradley P. Smith
CDR, USN

QUESTIONS FOR THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

4 June 1991

QUESTION:

Has the Navy looked into implementing a scaled down version of the consolidation plan if the laboratories are removed from the Base Closure and Realignment list?

ANSWER:

The Navy has not developed specific plans for implementing a scaled down version of the consolidation plan. However, the Navy intends to implement as much of the plan as possible within the constraints of the law. This action will introduce inefficiencies within our shore infrastructure. The mandate to reduce the personnel in the acquisition workforce and to operate within diminishing resources remain. The Navy will be forced to downsize without being permitted to consolidate. As a result, the cost of overhead will consume a larger portion of our limited budget and there will be fewer resources available to support research and development as well as for our operating forces. Accommodating the mandated reductions in the workforce without consolidation will increase the probability of having to use a Reduction in Force to meet the goals. In short, being forced to wait until the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission will be unnecessarily costly to the Navy in terms of the research and development as well as warfighting capability that will be lost in order to maintain a larger shore infrastructure.

QUESTION:

Did the Navy ever determine whether or not the closure of NESEC San Diego breaches the thresholds of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act?

ANSWER:

NESEC San Diego is recommended for closure. There are 619 civilian positions assigned. The bulk of these positions will be transferred to NCCOSC in San Diego. The distance that these positions will be moved is less than 9 miles. Before the decision was made to submit the entire consolidation plan to the BCRC, the technical advice that the Navy's Base Structure Committee received from the Office of Chief of Naval Operations was that NESEC San Diego did not breach the thresholds of the BCRC because the distance involved was less than that which entitles a military member to moving expenses. Based on that advice, the initial determination was that NESEC San Diego would not be forwarded to the BCRC. The decision to incorporate the entire consolidation plan into the BCRC submission precluded the need for a formal legal determination on NESEC San Diego.



Pete 0-092

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION)

TELEPHONE: COMM: 703-695-6370 AUTOVON: 225-6370
FAX: COMM: 703-697-0172 AUTOVON: 227-0172

TO: ASD (P&L)

PASS TO: Mr. Doug Hansen

PHONE NO: 4-5356 FAX NO: 5-1493

SUBJECT BCRC REQUEST

COMMENTS AS DISCUSSED YESTERDAY,
HERE ARE THE MIGRATION CHARTS WE
ARE PROVIDING TO THE BCRC.
THERE IS NO NEW INFORMATION HERE

COVER PAGE AND 10 PAGES

NOS INDIAN HEAD			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	42	2815	2857
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM (CONSOL)	2	30	32
WVK RED	0	582	582
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	40	2203	2243

NWSC CRANE			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	16	4057	4073
TRANS OUT	0	150	150
ELIM (CONSOL)	0	0	0
WVK RED	0	911	911
TRANS IN	0	75	75
AFTER	16	3071	3087

NOS LOUISVILLE			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	8	2477	2485
TRANS OUT	0	105	105
ELIM (CONSOL)	2	130	132
WVK RED	0	415	415
TRANS IN	0	50	50
AFTER	6	1877	1883

NUSC NEWPORT			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT			
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WVK RED			
TRANS IN	0	100	100
AFTER			

NSWSES PORT HUENEME			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT			
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WVK RED			
TRANS IN	0	30	30
AFTER			

←--- FUNCTIONAL & PERSONNEL TRANSFERS

←--- ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ONLY

←--- ORGANIZATIONAL & PERSONNEL TRANSFERS

JUN 05 '91 07:24

JUN 05 '51 07:25

ICSTF SAN DIEGO			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	21	46	67
TRANS OUT	18	20	57
ELIM (CONSOL)	3	7	10
WAK RED	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0


NSNSSES PORT HUENEME			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	80	2289	2369
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM (CONSOL)	0	50	50
WAK RED	0	408	408
TRANS IN	78	64	82
AFTER	98	1895	1993

NMWEA YORKTOWN			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	12	232	244
TRANS OUT	10	186	196
ELIM (CONSOL)	2	20	22
WAK RED	0	26	26
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NOS LOUISVILLE			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT	0	30	30
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WAK RED			
TRANS IN			
AFTER			

FCOSSA DAM DECK			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	118	254	372
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM (CONSOL)	5	20	25
WAK RED	0	31	51
TRANS IN	10	376	386
AFTER	123	579	702

NSCSSES NORFOLK			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT	0	190	190
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WAK RED			
TRANS IN			
AFTER			



MSMC DAHLGREN			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	99	3208	3307
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM (CONSOL)	0	64	64
WAK RED	0	555	555
TRANS IN	4	1182	1186
AFTER	103	3681	3784

NUSC NEW LONDON			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT	0	50	50
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WAK RED			
TRANS IN			
AFTER			

MSWC WHITE OAK			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	7	1803	1810
TRANS OUT	4	882	886
ELIM (CONSOL)	0	114	114
WAK RED	0	247	247
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	3	560	563

NOSC SAN DIEGO			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT	0	100	100
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WAK RED			
TRANS IN			
AFTER			

NUSC NEWPORT			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT			
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WAK RED			
TRANS IN	1	200	200
AFTER			

NCSC PANAMA CITY			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	135	1282	1417
TRANS OUT	1	250	251
ELIM (CONSOL)	3	24	27
WAK RED	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	131	1008	1139

 FUNCTIONAL & PERSONNEL TRANSFERS
 ORGANIZATIONAL & PERSONNEL TRANSFERS

JUN 05 '91 07:25

NSWC REALIGNMENTS - HIRING PLAN

L.O

DTRC ANNAPOLIS			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	6	954	960
TRANS OUT	0	463	463
ELIM (CONSOL)	5	85	90
WIK RED	0	106	106
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	1	300	301

DTRC CARDEROCK			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	15	1598	1613
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM (CONSOL)	0	22	22
WIK RED	0	298	298
TRANS IN	0	423	423
AFTER	15	1781	1716

NSCSES NORFOLK			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT	0	60	60
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WIK RED			
TRANS IN			
AFTER			

NAVSSSES PHILADELPHIA			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	13	1771	1784
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM (CONSOL)	3	30	33
WIK RED	0	324	324
TRANS IN	0	100	100
AFTER	10	1517	1527

← - - - FUNCTIONAL & PERSONNEL TRANSFERS

← - - - ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ONLY

JUN 05 '91 07:26

- ← FUNCTIONAL & PERSONNEL TRANSFERS
- ← ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES ONLY
- ← ORGANIZATIONAL & PERSONNEL TRANSFERS

NSWC DAHGREN			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT			
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WIK RED			
TRANS IN	0	50	50
AFTER			

NUSC NEWPORT			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	43	1980	2023
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM (CONSOL)	0	80	80
WIK RED	0	262	262
TRANS IN	25	1477	1502
AFTER	68	3115	3183

NWSC CRANE			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT			
ELIM (CONSOL)	0	100	100
WIK RED			
TRANS IN			
AFTER			

NSWSES PORT HUENEME			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT			
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WIK RED			
TRANS IN	0	180	180
AFTER			

NUSC NEW LONDON			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	19	1468	1487
TRANS OUT	815	774	782
ELIM (CONSOL)	7	110	117
WIK RED	0	184	184
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	4	400	400

NOSC SAN DIEGO			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT			
ELIM (CONSOL)	0	300	300
WIK RED			
TRANS IN			
AFTER			

DTRC CARDEROCK			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT			
ELIM (CONSOL)			
WIK RED			
TRANS IN	0	60	60
AFTER			


NCSSES NORFOLK			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	6	830	836
TRANS OUT	0	250	250
ELIM (CONSOL)	1	30	31
WIK RED	0	250	250
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	5	300	305

NCSC PANAMA CITY			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE			
TRANS OUT			
ELIM (CONSOL)	1	200	200
WIK RED			
TRANS IN			
AFTER			

TRICCSMA NEWPORT			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	16	191	209
TRANS OUT	16	153	169
ELIM (CONSOL)	2	20	22
WIK RED	0	18	18
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NUWES KEYPORT WA			
	MIL	CM	TOT
BEFORE	308	3505	3811
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM (CONSOL)	0	10	0
W&K FED	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	308	3495	3801

JUN 05 '91 07:27



NCCOSC EAST COAST ISE DIRECTIONAL PORTSMOUTH, VA


NESEC PORTSMOUTH, VA			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	11	437	448
TRANS OUT	11	331	342
ELIM	0	0	0
WORK REDUC	0	108	108
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NCCOSC PORTSMOUTH, VA			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	0	0	0
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
WORK REDUC	0	0	0
TRANS IN	55	1062	1112
AFTER	55	1062	1112

NESEC CHARLESTON, SC			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	4	363	367
TRANS OUT	0	305	305
ELIM	4	38	42
WORK REDUC	0	20	20
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NESEA ST. INIGOES, MD			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	32	372	409
TRANS OUT	5	297	302
ELIM	27	38	65
WORK REDUC	0	37	37
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NESSEC WASHINGTON DC			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	41	153	194
TRANS OUT	39	129	168
ELIM	2	18	20
WORK REDUC	0	6	6
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0



JUN 05 '91 07:27

NCCOSC WEST COAST ISE DIRECTIONAL

SAN DIEGO, CA

NESEC SAN DIEGO, CA			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	6	625	631
TRANS OUT	0	525	525
ELIM	6	40	46
WORK REDUC	0	60	60
TRANS IN	0	8	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NCCOSC SAN DIEGO, CA			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	0	0	0
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	15	15
WORK REDUC	0	10	10
TRANS IN	0	776	776
AFTER	1	751	752

NESEC VALLEJO, CA			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	8	314	322
TRANS OUT	0	251	251
ELIM	8	32	40
WORK REDUC	0	31	31
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

**NOSC DET KANEOHE,
HI - 21 Civilians**

NEEACTPAC PEARL HARBOR, HI			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	4	207	211
TRANS OUT	4	162	166
ELIM	0	0	0
WORK REDUC	0	45	45
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NCCOSC DET PEARL HARBOR, HI			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	0	0	0
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
WORK REDUC	0	0	0
TRANS IN	4	183	187
AFTER	4	183	187

JUN 05 '91 07:28

NCCOSC RDT&E DIRECTORATE - SAN DIEGO, CA

NOSC SAN DIEGO, CA			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	244	2907	3151
TRANS OUT	244	2255	2499
ELIM	0	15	15
WORK REDUC	0	637	637
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0


NCCOSC SAN DIEGO, CA			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	0	8	0
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
WORK REDUC	0	0	0
TRANS IN	429	2620	3049
AFTER	429	2620	3049

Mission purification will occur between NCCOSC, the three other Warfare Centers and the Corporate Lab. The following work will transfer from NCCOSC: lightweight torpedoes, torpedo simulation, mobile sonar simulators, ASW fire control, surface ASW control, VLA/ASROC, other ASW efforts, arctic warfare and autonomous underwater systems. Various navigation support and C3 work will transfer to NCCOSC.

FCDSSA SAN DIEGO, CA			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	164	229	393
TRANS OUT	163	211	374
ELIM	1	5	6
WORK REDUC	0	13	13
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NOSC DET KANEOHE, HI			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	9	171	180
TRANS OUT	7	151	158
ELIM	2	20	22
WORK REDUC	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NSSA LOS ANGELES, CA			
	MIL	CIV	TOT
BEFORE	18	29	47
TRANS OUT	15	24	39
ELIM	3	4	7
WORK REDUC	0	1	1
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0



21 to NCCOSC West Coast ISE Directorate Det Pearl Harbor, HI

NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER REALIGNMENTS

NAWC AIRCRAFT DIV. PAK BIRTH			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	212	2,400	2,612
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	212	2,400	2,612

NAWC AIRCRAFT DIV. BIRMINGHAM			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	217	2,567	2,784
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	217	2,567	2,784

NAWC AIRCRAFT DIV. TRENTON			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	7	746	753
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	7	746	753

NAWC AIRCRAFT DIV. INDIANAPOLIS			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	74	3,453	3,527
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	74	3,453	3,527

NAWC AIRCRAFT DIV. LEMONT			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	200	2,388	2,588
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	200	2,388	2,588

NAWC AIRCRAFT DIVISION			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	1,257	11,542	12,799
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	1,257	11,542	12,799

NAWC, WEAPONS DIVISION			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	1,765	9,814	11,579
TRANS OUT	-81	-224	-305
ELIM	-127	-448	-575
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	-174	-1,547	-1,721
TRANS IN	3	68	71
AFTER	1,386	7,663	9,049

NAWC, WEAPONS DIVISION FT. BRUG			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	1,103	4,332	5,435
TRANS OUT	-78	-200	-278
ELIM	-21	-190	-211
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	-131	-653	-784
TRANS IN	0	25	25
AFTER	873	3,314	4,187

NAWC, WEAPONS DIVISION, CHINA LAKE			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	488	5,278	5,766
TRANS OUT	0	-2	-2
ELIM	0	-158	-158
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	-28	-880	-908
TRANS IN	3	43	46
AFTER	463	4,281	4,744

NAWC, WEAPONS DIVISION, ALBUQUERQUE			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	109	122	231
TRANS OUT	-3	-22	-25
ELIM	-106	-100	-206
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	0	0	0
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	0	0	0

NAWC, WEAPONS DIVISION, WHITE SANDS			
	MIL	CV	TOT
BEFORE	65	82	147
TRANS OUT	0	0	0
ELIM	0	0	0
WORKLOAD REDUCTIONS	-15	-14	-29
TRANS IN	0	0	0
AFTER	50	68	118



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0103

0-093

June 7, 1991

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

Mr. James A. Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 "K" Street, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Courter:

This is in response to your letter of May 22, 1991, requesting review of the Commission's assessment of the Army's costs for the proposed base closures and realignments. The estimates included in our submission to the Commission were the best that could be developed in the time available. We are continuing to review these requirements through the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System as we begin our implementation planning process. Should current requirements change after detailed validation by the major Army commands and the Army Staff, those changes will be included in our Base Closure Budget submission after final recommendations become law. It is important to note that none of these differences would result in changes to our recommendations. In general, we agree with the analysis with the following exceptions.

The Army included potential land sale revenues and excluded environmental restoration costs as a result of OSD policy guidance. We cannot concur with your proposed changes unless that guidance is revised.

In the case of Fort Ord, we stand by our inclusion of the Army's share of the local Seawater Intrusion project. The excessed facilities will have limited reuse potential without the Army's participation. In addition, the increase in information mission area requirements should not be included. It is based upon construction at Fort Lewis which is unvalidated.

There are no Homeowners Assistance Program savings associated with the realignment of the 5th Infantry Division to Fort Hood. While the Corps of Engineers is attempting to initiate a program as a

result of the inactivation of the 2d Armored Division, no money is currently budgeted. Should a program be approved, its duration would likely be limited due to the potential influx of a new population.

Sincerely



Susan Livingstone
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations, Logistics, and Environment)

Copy Furnished:

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Production and Logistics)

MANPOWER FIGURES REQUESTED
 BY BEN BORDEN.
 FAXED 12 JUN. 91. D.M

O-694

DOD PERSONNEL
 (End strength in thousands)

	FY90		FY93	FY95
ACTIVE DUTY				
Army	751		618	536
Navy	583		536	510
Marine Corps	197		182	171
<u>Air Force</u>	<u>539</u>		<u>458</u>	<u>437</u>
Total	2,070		1,794	1,654
RESERVES				
	1,128	1,154*	989	906
CIVILIANS	1,073		976	940
	FYDP	*	FYDP	FYDP
	FY90		FY93	FY95
ARMY				
Reserves	736	754	621	551
Civilians	380		315	303
NAVY				
Reserves	149	153	127	118
Civilians	322		285	269
MARINE CORPS				
Reserves	45	45	40	35
Civilians	19		17	16
AIR FORCE				
Reserves	198	202	202	202
Civilians	250		221	216
DEFENSE AGENCY CIVILIANS	102		137	135

* Numbers reported in FY90 Selected Manpower Statistics - includes IRR on Active Duty for DESERT SHIELD - not included in FYDP numbers.

POC: Dom Miglionico, OASD(P&L)I/BCU, Room 3D780, 697-8050



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

0-095

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 44CL/54
7 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Assistant Secretary of Defense memo of June 5, 1991

Encl: (1) Response to items 1, 2, 7, 13, 14, 17, and 18

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in partial response to the request for additional information forwarded by reference (a).


R. W. Drennon
RADM, CEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)

JUN 07 '91 15:24

0-07



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION)

TELEPHONE: COMM: 703-695-6370 AUTOVON: 225-6370
FAX: COMM: 703-697-0172 AUTOVON: 227-0172

TO: ASD (P&L)

PASS TO: Mr. Doug Hansen

PHONE NO: 4-5356 FAX NO: 5-1493

SUBJECT BCRC Request

COMMENTS Attached is data
requested by Marc Casterline of the
BCRC staff.

COVER PAGE AND 11 PAGES

INFORMATION NEEDED REGARDING RDT&E CLOSURES/REALIGNMENTS

1. QUESTION: Why so many closures in the CCOSC versus other warfare centers?

ANSWER: There are two basic reasons for the large number of closures in the formation of the NCCOSC. The first is that the facilities which are closing are small. The exception to this is NESEC San Diego which is more of an organizational realignment because the personnel are moving less than 10 miles. The second reason is that there are no unique facilities at any of these locations. The functions can be performed anywhere.

2. QUESTION: Please provide a list of members of the RDT&E working group and the organizations they represent.

Attached

3. QUESTION: Please provide information on the incentive program. What incentives? How much will they cost? How will they be budgeted?

There are a number of normal incentives to relocate. Those incentives are:

- House Hunting trip
- Travel to new duty station
- Household goods shipment
- Household good temporary storage
- Temporary quarters subsistence allowance
- Real Estate expenses (both selling and buying)
- Relocation income tax allowance
- Estimated average cost is \$34,000 per person
(This cost estimate is site independent and was developed separately from the COBRA model)

Additional incentives which can be offered:

- Relocation Bonus of up to 25% of a year's basic pay
 - * Cost averages about \$10,000 per person
 - * Is targetted to individuals
- Relocation services contract
 - * Guaranteed home purchase
 - * Property management
 - * Mortgage finding assistance
 - * Spouse counselling and job search
 - * Cost averages \$28,000 per person
- DoD Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP)
 - * Must be approved by Secretary of Defense
 - * For areas where the real estate market has collapsed
 - * Funding is provided to DoD from a special fund in the Treasury Department

The method for budgeting the additional incentives has not yet been determined.

4. QUESTION: Resolve the following position information inconsistencies:

	<u>Detailed Analysis</u>	<u>Supporting Paper</u>
NADC Warminster	0 xfers to NCCOSC	244 xfers to NCCOSC
244 personnel will remain at Warminster to operate the unique navigation facilities there. The will organizationally report to NCCOSC.		
NESEC San Diego	40 elm,;579 xferred	619 transferred
The correct numbers are 40 eliminated, 525 transferred, and 40 workload reduction. It reflects the proper breakout between eliminations, workload reductions and transfers as well as a correction in onboard count.		
NOSC Kaneohe	190 transferred	171 transferred
Correction in onboard count.		
FCSSA San Diego	6 eliminated	229 transferred
The correct numbers are 5 eliminated by consolidation, 13 to workload reduction and 211 transferred. The transfers are organizational in nature as the personnel do not move.		
NEEACTPAC	14 gained	21 gained
21 gained is the correct number.		
NSWSES Port Hueneme	-25 in total	50 eliminated 408 Workload
The correct numbers are 50 eliminated, 408 workload reduction and 64 gained for a total of -394. There was an error in calculation.		
NMWEA Yorktown	-230 in total	-232 in total
-232 is the correct number		
NAVSSSES Phila	-230 in total	-254 in total
-254 is the correct number		

TRICCMSA Newport 153 transferred 0 transferred

The 153 civilian personnel will organizationally transfer from TRICCMSA to the Undersea Warfare Center. They will not physically move.

NCSC Panama City 285 transferred 200 trans; 24 red

200 positions will transfer to Undersea Center, 60 positions will transfer to the Warfare Center at Dahlgren and 24 positions will be eliminated for a total of 284 positions.

5. Regarding NOS Louisville, p. 125 of detailed analysis says 0 impact while p. 132 says 2. Which is correct? Transfers?

There will be 1 military billet transferred and 1 billet eliminated.

6. Do all military personnel transfer at Vallejo, Charleston, St. Inigoes, Washington, D.C., San Diego, Kaneche, NSSA?

No. Some billets will be eliminated.

	<u>Population</u>	<u>Transfer</u>	<u>Eliminate</u>
Vallejo	8	0	8
Charleston	4	0	4
St. Inigoes	37	10	27
Wash, D.C.	41	39	2
San Diego	6	0	6
Kaneche	9	7	2
NSSA	14	11	3

7. Please provide a copy of 1988 Warminster closure cost estimate.

Provided.

8. For NCSC Panama City,
 -- p. 77 of detailed analysis says 285 transferred or eliminated
 -- p. 85 of detailed analysis says loss of 4 mil and 281 civ.
 -- support says 200 civ transfers, 24 reduction

The correct numbers are:

- 200 civilian positions transfer to Undersea Warfare Center
- 60 civilian positions transfer to Surface Warfare Center at Dahlgren
- 24 civilian positions eliminated

9. For ICSTF, on p. 116, are there 21 mil and 46 civ positions transfers, eliminations, or combination?

There are 39 civilian positions transferring, 7 civilian positions eliminated and 21 military positions transferred.

10. For NMWEA, Yorktown, explain the loss of 12 military and 230 civilians (p. 117 of detailed analysis).

There are 232 civilian and 12 military positions at NMWEA.

The following describes where they go:

- 20 civilian positions are eliminated
- 186 civilian positions are transferred
- 26 civilian positions go to workload reduction
- 2 military billets are eliminated
- 10 military billets are transferred

11. Figures on NSWC Crane--

-- p.125 says 1065 civilians, 0 military impacted

-- p.132 says 150 civilian positions lost, not including workload and 75 additions

-- in backup data, -75+1911-986, not 1065

The correct number is 986. There was an error in calculating the workload reduction which came out 991 vice the correct number of 911.

12. DTRC Annapolis: p 140 shows 46, but narrative says 655, which is supported by backup. Is 46 a misprint?

The 46 must be a misprint in an earlier version. The copy of the detailed analysis I have does not show the 46 number.

13. Please provide info on incentive plan being formulated to encourage scientists/engrs. to relocate, including estimated cost.

The incentives available are covered in question 3 above. At this time there are no definitive plans or programs developed or costed for to provide additional incentives above those routinely provided for relocation, with the exception of NADC. The data for NADC is attached.

14. Please provide organizational chart(s) reflecting the current organizational setup for the activities involved--RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet Support.

Provided.

PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION

RDT&E and administrative space currently occupied

NESEA	406,801 SF
NATC	<u>1,748,625 SF</u>
TOTAL	2,155,426 SF

Current Population

NESEA	*1,036
NATC	<u>4,220</u>
TOTAL	5,258

Space per person = $\frac{2,155,426}{5,258} = 410$ SF

* includes estimate of 707 contractor personnel occupying government spaces

AFTER CONSOLIDATION

RDT&E and administrative space requirements

NESEA	406,801 SF
NATC	1,748,625 SF
NEW CONSTRUCTION	<u>363,784 SF</u>
TOTAL	2,519,210

POPULATION AFTER REALIGNMENT

NATC	(4,220 - 714)	=	3,506
NADC Positions Transferred		=	<u>1,799</u>
			5,305

Space per person = $\frac{2,519,210}{5,305} = 475$ SF

The increase in space per person resulting from the consolidation is primarily the result of the non-proportional nature of laboratory space requirements. The size of the individual laboratories is determined by the function of the laboratory and its equipment requirements--not by the number of equipment operators or scientist/engineers. As a consequence, for the purpose of the consolidation analysis the only adjustment made in RDT&E and admin requirements was a reduction of 150 SF/person for the number of positions eliminated. Additionally, the nature of work performed at NESEA will change which results in a lower population utilizing the same amount of space and consequently a higher SF/person ratio.

QUESTIONS FROM BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMITTEE

1. Q. How many people are moving from NADC to any location?

*A. The number of positions moved are

• Moving to Patuxent River/St. Inigoes -	1799
• Moving to NWC China Lake -	21
• Moving to PMTC Point Mugu -	25

Total	1845

* The number of people moved are provided below.

2. Q. How many \$ per person have been allocated for the relocation?

A. The estimates provided by the COSRA analysis for personnel (military and civilian) that will relocate are as follows:

* • Moving costs -	\$27.1M
Estimated number of civilians moved =	1035
Estimated number of military moved =	52
Total estimated moves	= 1087
Average cost per person	= \$24.9K

*Not included is the cost of planning and implementing the realignment and other facility/equipment and civilian personnel costs.

3. Q. How much office space is presently allocated per person at NATC and how much will be allocated after consolidation?

A. In the Navy Facility Planning System office space is identified either as general administrative space or is included in the function that it is supporting i.e. supply, training etc. The RDT&E category of space includes office space as well as laboratory space and the requirements are intermingled. Consequently, it is not possible without a baseline requirements analysis to breakout the office space uniquely associated with the RDT&E laboratory space. The following analysis attempts as best possible to respond to the question of office space allocation.

For the purpose of this analysis only general office space and RDT&E space were considered. There may be some office space associated with other functional categories, however, they are considered minor. Space per person calculation was developed by dividing total RDT&E + general admin space by the on-board population before and after consolidation. The calculation includes the space to be utilized at NESEA, St. Inigoes as well as the NATC.

QUESTION: Explain what is in the \$32M in one time costs in the COBRA model for NADC

ANSWER: The \$32M is composed of two basic cost elements. They are administrative costs to support the relocation estimated at \$11.6M and other equipment/facility costs not identified elsewhere, estimated at \$20.4M.

The administrative costs are a statistical cost estimated by the COBRA model to capture the miscellaneous cost associated with planning and implementing the relocation. These costs include items such as staff effort on implementation teams, additional travel, facilities planning, establishment of new administrative procedures and directives, etc. The model calculates this figure by taking 10% of the losing activity's OBOS budget as the first year's administrative planning and support costs and then subsequently decreases the annual cost by 25% in each of the following five years.

The other one-time costs are composed primarily of those extraordinary costs associated with disassembly, moving, reassembly and certification of major technical equipment. These costs are offset by one-time savings resulting from equipment and furniture cost avoidances resulting from the consolidation. These savings have been estimated by calculating the depreciated salvage value of equipment/furniture that become redundant or excess and not required to be moved. A summary of the costs and savings is provided below:

SUMMARY OF ONE TIME COSTS

-A. Disassembly/assembly of ejection tower facility	\$ 0.4M
-B. Instrumentation/certification of ejection tower	\$ 1.0M
-C. Exhaust/scrubbers for fuel fire test facility	\$ 1.0M
-D. Disassembly/assembly of horizontal accelerator	\$ 0.5M
-E. Relocation of aircraft structures facility	\$ 1.0M
-F. Relocation of anechoic chambers #1 through #4	\$ 3.7M
-G. Relocation and certification of lab equipment	\$10.5M
-H. Relocation of central computer system	\$ 5.5M
-I. Industrial Waste Treatment Plant at NATC	\$ 1.0M
Total	<u>\$24.6M</u>

SUMMARY OF ONE-TIME COST AVOIDANCE

	<u>Salvage Value</u>
A. Equipment in support codes that would not relocate (e.g. snow removal equip, repair trucks, generators, comm equip etc.)	\$ 1.2M
B. Computer and office equipment that would not relocate	.2M
C. Technical equipment overlaps	<u>2.8M</u>
Total	<u>-4.2M</u>
<u>Total Other One-Time Costs</u>	<u>\$20.4M</u>

QUESTION: PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE INCENTIVE PLAN BEING FORMULATED TO ENCOURAGE SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS TO RELOCATE, INCLUDING COST ESTIMATES.

ANSWER: The program outlined in Tab A is in place, however there has been progress in the program as outlined in Tab B. In general, it is still too early to tell if the Naval Air Warfare Center will have to use a monetary incentive program to get the additional scientists and engineers to relocate to Patuxent River. However, these options are available. The decision to use cash incentives will be reevaluated periodically as more information about the closure/relocation become known.

TAB A

QUESTION: WHY DOES THE NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER EXPECT UP TO 80% OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING (S&E) PERSONNEL FROM THE NAVAL AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER (NADC), WARMINSTER, PA TO RELOCATE TO AIRCRAFT DIVISION AT PATUXENT RIVER, MD?

ANSWER: (1) NAVAIR indicated that "up to 80%" of the NADC S&E workforce would relocate to Patuxent River. A committee chaired by Ms. D Melitzke, Deputy Assistant Secretary (CPP/EEO), determined that 50% of the people offered jobs would relocate

- (2) A variety of methods would be employed to entice up to 30% of the remaining S&E's to relocate. Among the options available are:
- Promulgation of information on the Southern Maryland area including: videos of the local area, flyers and brochures, articles in the NADC Reflector, lunchtime presentations by invited speakers from Southern Maryland (e.g. real estate professionals, tax experts, community leaders)
 - Organizational Structure Information. Definition of the R&D organization fit with other functions at Patuxent River to include: definition of functions, design of the organization, identification of positions, alignment of employees with positions. Ongoing organizational information will also be provided to alleviate employee concerns.
 - Relocation benefits:
 - Coverage of real estate expenses including relocation services (optional to employee) or reimbursement of expenses on old and new residence, house hunting trips, travel expenses for the employee and dependents, transportation of household goods, temporary storage of household goods, temporary quarters subsistence expenses, miscellaneous expenses, relocation income tax payment).
 - Relocation Bonuses:
 - A lump sum payment of up to 25% of basic pay may be paid to a current employee (i.e. GS, GM, SES) who must relocate to accept a federal position in a different commuting area, where there is difficulty in filling the position with a high quality candidate.
 - A retention allowance of up to 25% of basic pay may be paid to a current employee as continuous pay in the employee's biweekly paycheck. This incentive applies to current employees with unusually high qualifications where there is a special need for his/her services and is reviewed annually to determine if the payment is still warranted.
 - Spousal Employment Assistance for trailing spouses can be provided through workshops (i.e. job hunting skills, resume writing, interviewing), a contract with employment firms in Maryland for placement assistance, information on employment opportunities, and training information to help qualify for shortage skills. This benefit will be a critical factor in many employees decision to relocate to Patuxent River.

TAB B

1. The following information is offered regarding the status of those efforts which support the subject relocation.

2. Specific actions which are ongoing:

a. NADC has promulgated a variety of factual information to their employees on the Southern Maryland area including data on county resumes, history, organizations and community services, educational opportunities, public schools, recreational facilities, etc. They have planned milestones in place to provide additional and more detailed data on each of the specific counties comprising the Southern Maryland area.

b. They have a short video promoting the attractiveness of living and working in Southern Maryland.

c. They have had several status meetings with employees to keep them informed on consolidation activities.

d. Working with the Board of Directors, they have developed organizational constructs which explicitly define the role of R&D in the new NAWC Aircraft Division organizational structure. They will be briefing employees on the agreed upon structure in the near future.

e. They are currently working the facility plan to provide for attractive laboratory spaces within the planned cost of refurbishment and new construction.

QUESTIONS FOR THE BCRC

1. How many people are moving from NESEC Vallejo and to where?

Of the 314 positions currently at NESEC Vallejo, 251 will be moved to the Naval Command Control and Ocean Surveillance Center San Diego, 32 positions will be eliminated as a result of consolidation, and 31 positions eliminated as a result of workload reductions.

2. How much will it cost, per person, to move?

As stated above, 251 positions will move from NESEC Vallejo to the Naval Command Control and Ocean Surveillance Center San Diego. Total personnel moving costs (relocation costs, severance costs, etc.) average to \$11,521 per person.

3. How much office space is presently available, per person, at both the losing and receiving sites? For the receiving site, what is the space, per person, before and after consolidation?

Office space at losing site (NESEC Vallejo) - 165 SF/person

Office space currently at gaining site
(NOSC San Diego) before consolidation - 172 SF/person

Office space at gaining site (NCCOSC
San Diego) after consolidation - 164 SF/person

4. Describe what is included in the "Other" category of the one-time costs shown on the attached sheet. This sheet is extracted from the GAO report on Base Closure.

The "Other" category includes administrative support costs and one-time unique costs such as equipment packing and crating.

O-097
DJB
Dom



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20360-5000

June 10, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DOUG HANSEN, DIRECTOR OF BASE CLOSURE
AND UTILIZATION, OASD(P&L)

Subj: INTERACTION WITH BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Encl: (1) Logs of Phone Calls and Correspondence with the Base
Closure and Realignment Commission

In your memo of April 19, 1991, you asked for a weekly report on interaction with the Base Closure Commission. Enclosure (1) is the combined logs of ASN(I&E), OP-44, and HQ MarCorps (Code LF) for the period June 3 - 7, 1991.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ben Rose", is centered on the page.

Ben Rose
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Installations and Environment)

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION STAFF

PHONE LOG - 3 - 7 June 1991

June

- 4 PDASN(R&DA) was called by Mr. Merv Casterline, BCC staffer, with questions relating to laboratory consolidations.
- 5 1615 Capt Jerry Vernon, BCC staffer, called Capt Rice, EA, ASN(I&E), in response to a request to OP-04 for VADM Heckman to speak with the BCC staff. Capt Rice told Capt Vernon that he could pass on his request through Scott Gray at NAVSEA.
- 5 1640 Capt Vernon was told by Mr. Dave Herron, OASN(I&E), that VADM Heckman is out of town on leave until 10 June. (NavSea provided info to Mr. Herron)

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT

May
22

Meeting of Navy reps (Ms. McBurnett, PDASN(RD&A), ADM Oliver, Cdr Smith, and Cdr Newman) and Base Closure & Realignment Commission Staff (Marvin Caterline & Jerry Vernon) was held to obtain information on the Navy RDT&E consolidation effort.

29

Chairman, BC&RC, sent letter to Secretary Schafer requesting specific data and rationale for changes to the 1988 ranking and rating of five categories of bases.

June

3

OP-44 sent to BC&RC supplemental data regarding facilities, personnel, housing, acreage, and operating costs at 140 USN/USMC installations.

3

OP-44 provided the BC&RC with requested information on recommendations for expediting environmental remediation at closed Navy installations.

3

OP-44 provided information regarding berthing capacity at NAVSTA New York (Staten Island) to the BC&RC.

3

Letter sent to Chairman, BC&RC, signed by Mr. Sterns, in answer to the Commission's inquiry of 23 May regarding Navy point of contact at three installations.

4

Meeting with Senator Spector, BC&RC members, Navy BSC members, and OPNAV staff to discuss Philadelphia. Base Closure Commission staffers generally defended the Navy's process, based upon what they had learned at previous meetings.

4

OP-44 responded to various BC&RC initiatives regarding excess ship berthing, options to closure of NTC Orlando, options to closure of NAS Chase Field, and additional information about the NAS Whidbey Island closure.

4

Letter sent to Chairman, BC&RC, signed by Mr. Sterns, in further answer to the Commission's letter of 3 May regarding DON leases exceeding 10,000 square feet.

4

Memo sent to BC&R Commission by RADM Drennon in answer to Commission's inquiry of 24 May 1991 regarding evaluation of alternative closures and realignments.

4

The BC&RC met with VADM Kihune and VADM Boorda

Jun

5

Senator Spector met with Navy BSC members, OPNAV staff, Base Closure Commission staff, and the Under Secretary of the Navy.

5

The BC&RC met with VADM Dunleavy

5

Memo sent to BC&R Commission by RADM Drennon in answer to the Commission's letter of May 30, 1991, requesting points of contact for based which will be visited by GAO representatives.

6

OP-44 provided the BC&RC supplemental information regarding Naval Shipyard Philadelphia.

6

OP-44 provided the BC&RC with information regarding berthing at New Orleans and WPNSTA Charleston, NAVHOSP Lemoore and jet pilot training rates.

7

Miss Schafer, ASN(I&E) sent letter to Mr. Courter, Chairman, BC&RC, in answer to his letter to May 29, 1991. (See May 29 above)

0-099

June 10, 1991

Ms. Jackie Bossart:

Here is the letter we discussed earlier this morning regarding Appendix G data and your difficulty in reconciling its numbers against Army-provided data.

The Appendix G data for Fort Devens reflects the latest information provided me by the Army. I can only speculate that the figures you mention in your letter include other actions such as DMRs or other realignments not a part of the base closure process.

If you have any further questions please give me a call.


Dom Miglionico
OASD(P&L)/I-BCU
697-8050

FAXED
10 JUNE 91
11AM.

RESPONSE TO I-062



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

0-099

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 44C1/57
10 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Assistant Secretary of Defense memo of June 5, 1991
(b) Telecon between BCRC (Mr. Patrick)/OP-441D (CDR Ching)
of 10 June 1991

Encl: (1) Response to items 3, 4, 5, 6, and 12

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in partial response to the request for additional information forwarded by reference (a).

2. Confirming reference (b), the COBRA analyses for NAVSTA Everett, NAVSTA Ingleside, and NAS Agana are no longer required. This resulted from BCRC decisions at the hearing on 7 June 1991.



R. W. Drennon
RAOM, CRC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

0-099

IN REPLY REFER TO
11000
Memo 441D/58
10 June 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Subj: BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

Ref: (a) Telecon btwn BCRC Mr. Patrick/OP-441C CDR Kendall of
7 Jun 1991

Encl: (1) Information regarding hypothetical port loading if
inport ratio increases to 75 percent

1. Enclosure (1) is provided in response to your request of
reference (a).


G. C. Brennan
RADM, OEC, USN
Director, Shore
Activities Division

Copy to: OASD (P&L)



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & ACQUISITION)

TELEPHONE: COMM: 703-695-6370 AUTOVON: 225-6370
FAX: COMM: 703-697-0172 AUTOVON: 227-0172

TO: ASD (P&L)

PASS TO: Mr. Doug Hansen

PHONE NO: _____ FAX NO: 5-1493

SUBJECT BCEZ REQUESTS.

COMMENTS Attached are copies
of material requested by Mary
Masterline of the BCEZ staff.

1/2. Brad Smith
CDR USN

COVER PAGE AND 8 PAGES

Pete
Anything in file
needs to know

for a file
then

10 JUN. 1991

NUSC-NEW LONDON COBRA DATA

1. MOVEMENTS FROM NEW LONDON TO NEWPORT

150 BILLETS MOVE WITH THE SUBMARINE SONAR
DEVELOPMENT/EVALUATION COMPLEX

Requires 32,100 sq ft of which 32,100 is new RDT&E
space

Movement of equipment:

80 short tons Mission Equipment

\$1.5M to disassemble/reassemble

5 short tons of Support Equipment

Mission equipment moved consists of specialized computing assets, one of a kind signal conditioners, beamformers, signal processors, displays, general purpose computers and recording and playback facilities. Support equipment includes general purpose stand-alone work stations, office equipment, test instrumentation, storage cabinets and work benches.

35 BILLETS MOVE WITH THE LAND BASED SUBMARINE RADIO ROOM

Requires 6,250 sq ft of which 6,250 is new RDT&E
space

Movement of equipment:

15 short tons Mission Equipment

\$0.75M to disassemble/reassemble

2 short tons of Support Equipment

Mission equipment moved consists of a replica of a portion of the interior of the SSN-751 attack submarine, and all communications, encryption and interface equipment found in the operational SSN-751 radio room. Support equipment includes general purpose stand-alone work stations, office equipment, test instrumentation, storage cabinets and work benches.

25 BILLETS MOVE WITH THE ELF SIMULATION LABORATORY

Requires 4,750 sq ft of which 4,750 is new RDT&E
space

Movement of equipment:

10 short tone Mission Equipment

\$0.175M to disassemble/reassemble

2 short tons of Support Equipment

Mission equipment moved consists of specialized extremely low frequency submarine communications equipment and emulation equipment, and associated specialized test and analysis equipment. Support equipment includes general purpose stand-alone work stations, office equipment, test instrumentation, storage cabinets and work benches.

16 BILLETS MOVE WITH THE MAN-MACHINE SONAR TEST BED
 Requires 3,600 sq ft of which 3,600 is new RDT&E space

Movement of equipment:

- 15 short tons Mission Equipment
- \$0.1M to disassemble/reassemble
- 2 short tons of Support Equipment

Mission equipment moved consists of specialized state of the art computer graphics equipment, voice recognition and synthesis equipment, image capture units and interactive input devices. Support equipment includes general purpose test instrumentation, work stations, printers, storage cabinets, work benches and office equipment.

270 BILLETS MOVE WITH OTHER RDT&E FACILITIES

Requires 109,400 sq ft of which 79,400 is new RDT&E space, 30,000 is existing RDT&E space of which 25,000 must be refurbished.

Movement of equipment:

- 665 short tons Mission Equipment
- \$5.0M to disassemble/reassemble
- 39 short tons of Support Equipment

Includes multiple additional mission unique and general purpose laboratories involving move costs less than \$100K each. Mission equipment moved consists of specialized mechanical and electrical equipments associated with submarine and surface ship active and passive sonars and submarine electromagnetic systems and research facilities. Support equipment includes general purpose test instrumentation, work stations, printers, storage cabinets, work benches and office equipment.

238 TECHNICAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT BILLETS NOT DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH RDT&E FACILITIES MOVE

Requires 31,900 sq ft of which 5000 is new Administrative support space and 26,900 is existing space.

Movement of equipment: none

Includes systems analysts, technical writers, graphics specialists, accountants, contract specialists and other support personnel whose functions do not require laboratory space.

2. MOVEMENT FROM NEW LONDON TO DARLGREN

50 BILLETS MOVE WITH SURFACE ASW COMBAT SYSTEM INTEGRATION FUNCTION

Requires 7,200 sq ft of which 1,200 is new RDT&E space and 6,000 is new Administrative Support space

Movement of equipment: none

One time \$1.6M cost of transferring the surface ASW combat system integration function to NSWC Dahlgren is required for establishment of a sonar simulation capability.

3. OTHER ONE TIME COSTS

Other one-time costs total \$9.9M, which consists of the following elements:

- \$7.5M disassembly/reassembly of facilities as detailed above
- \$1.6M cost of sonar simulator at Dahlgren
- \$0.3M moving of office contents
- \$0.5M cost of closing down vacated New London buildings

4. OTHER ONE TIME COST AVOIDANCE

MILCON P-105, Submarine Electromagnetic Systems Laboratory, FY-90 authorization of \$12.6M is not needed due to functional transfer to Newport.

5. SPACE PER PERSON AT GAINING ACTIVITIES:

- At Newport before consolidation moves: 267.8 sq ft per person
- after consolidation moves: 249.2 sq ft per person

General Notes:

(1) Cost of equipment and cost per person to move/relocate is part of the total moving cost produced by COBRA. It is an internal calculation to COBRA based on mileage, shipping, etc. It is driven by the number of billets to be transferred.

(2) Military construction (MCON) costs are calculated and summarized internally to COBRA. These costs are based upon validated requirements for type of space and square footage by the field activities utilizing NAVFAC criteria.

10 JUN. 1993

DTRC-ANNAPOLIS COBRA DATA

1. MOVEMENTS FROM ANNAPOLIS TO CARDEROCK

32 BILLETS MOVE WITH THE
ELECTRIC POWER TECHNOLOGY LABRequires 65,130 sq ft of which 33,430 is new RDT&E space
and 8,000 is new supply/storage space

Movement of Equipment:

150 short tons Mission Equipment
20 short tons Support Equipment

One time other costs:

\$2.627M to disassemble/reassemble mission equipment

(Mission equipment moved consists of specialized electrical power generating, conditioning, monitoring and analysis equipment and instrumentation and associated computers, analyzers and synthesizers. Support equipment includes general purpose computers, work stations, printers and office equipment.)

AN ADDITIONAL 319 BILLETS MOVE in support of multiple additional mission unique and general purpose laboratories and support functions.

No new space required.

Movement of Equipment:

20 short tons of mission equipment (special purpose instruments, computers and associated peripheral equipment).

80 short tons of support equipment (general purpose instruments, computers, associated peripheral equipment and office equipment).

One time other costs: None

2. MOVEMENTS FROM ANNAPOLIS TO PHILADELPHIA

31 BILLETS MOVE WITH THE
ADVANCED ELECTRIC PROPULSION MACHINERY DEVELOPMENT FACILITY

Requires 83,240 sq ft of which 41,000 is new RDT&E space.

Movement of Equipment:

68 short tons Mission Equipment
32 short tons Support Equipment

One time other costs:

\$2.784M to disassemble/reassemble mission equipment.

(Mission equipment moved consists of prime movers, generators, load systems (electrical and mechanical), liquid metal lab, current collectors, cryogenic systems and associated computers, analyzers and synthesizers. Support equipment includes general purpose computers work stations, printers and office equipment.)

71 BILLETS MOVE WITH THE
 ADVANCED SHIPBOARD MACHINERY DEVELOPMENT FACILITY
 Requires 83,240 sq ft of which 40,000 is new RDT&E space.
 Movement of Equipment:
 70 short tons Mission Equipment
 60 short tons Support Equipment
 One time other costs:
 \$2.500M to disassemble/reassemble mission equipment.

(Mission equipment moved consists of specialized devices for testing of submarine shaft seals, thrust bearings, ventilation fans, air conditioning, steering and diving gear, including precise measurements of vibration and noise characteristics, plus associated computers, analyzers and synthesizers. Support equipment includes general purpose computers, work stations, printers and office equipment.)

3. OTHER ONE TIME COSTS

The COBRA input included the following costs in this category:

Mission Equipment Disassembly/Assembly:	\$7.881M
(This is broken out to the 3 facilities above.)	
Special Construction Features:	\$0.215M
Heating/AC Expansion:	\$2.000M
(The latter two become part of the MILCON costs.)	

4. OTHER ONE TIME COST AVOIDANCES

The COBRA input included a \$0.5M credit for excess Class 3 property which will not be transferred to Carderock or Philadelphia, and can be made available to meet requirements of other Navy/DOD activities.

5. MILCON COST AVOIDANCE

FY94 MILCON Project P-143, "Shipboard Integrated Machinery Systems Lab", programmed for \$10.3M, is being cancelled due to availability of space opened up by movements out of Annapolis.

6. SPACE PER PERSON AT GAINING ACTIVITIES

AT CARDEROCK BEFORE CONSOLIDATION MOVES: 933 SQ FT PER PERSON
 AFTER " " : 900 " "

AT PHILA. BEFORE CONSOLIDATION MOVES: 518 SQ FT PER PERSON
 AFTER " " : 646 " "

The large magnitude of these numbers both before and after consolidation reflects the nature of HM&E research and testing which requires very large enclosed test spaces and is more nearly related to the number and type of functions than to the number of people involved. The increase in SQ FT PER PERSON at Philadelphia is also the result of the increased direct-to-support staff ratio achieved by consolidation.

General Notes:

(1) Cost of equipment and cost per person to move/relocate is part of the total moving cost produced by COBRA. It is an internal calculation to COBRA based on mileage, shipping, etc. It is driven by the number of billets to be transferred.

(2) Military construction (MCON) costs are based upon validated requirements for type of space and square footage by the field activities utilizing NAVFAC criteria.

10 JUN. 1991

NAVSVC WHITE OAK COBRA DATA

1. MOVE FROM WHITE OAK TO DAHLGREN

50 BILLETS MOVE WITH THE ASW FACILITY

Requires 10,000 sq ft RDT&E space

Movement of equipment:

48 short tons Mission Equipment (215 pieces of tactical sets, simulators, development tools, work stations, displays, and computers (with 1000 cables and other items)

OTHER ONE TIME COSTS:

\$3.0M to disassemble, mark for reassembly, reassemble, install, checkout, and prior preparation of space. (Mission + Support)

842 BILLETS MOVE WITH VARIOUS FUNCTIONS (such as other Surface ASW, Mine Systems, Surface Systems, Surface Weapons, and other RDT&E & technical support) Requires 95,986 sq ft additional, of which 40,180 sq ft is new RDT&E space, and 38,586 is new covered storage.

Movement of Equipment:

188 short tons Mission Equipment, and
54 short tons Support Equipment, a total of 22,000 items now a part of or built into special purpose research and evaluation systems, often in unique and computer-driven configurations of both mission and support items, to maximize productivity of small R&D teams; across entire program base of functions being transferred. Equipment includes wide range of physical, chemical, electrical, electronic, computer, network, display, control, conditioning, design tool, and recording items.

OTHER ONE TIME COSTS:

\$5.8M to disassemble, mark for reassembly, reassemble, install, checkout, and prior preparation of space. (Mission + Support).

2. OTHER ONE TIME COSTS

\$30.0M Sewage Treatment Plant
\$ 7.0M Power Substation

3. OTHER ONE TIME COST AVOIDANCE:

None

4. SPACE PER PERSON AT GAINING ACTIVITY:

At Dahlgren before consolidation moves: 242 sq ft per person
At Dahlgren after consolidation moves: 250 sq ft per person

Note: Increase results from reduced ratio of support to technical personnel that resulted from consolidation.

General Notes:

(1) Cost of equipment and cost per person to move/relocate is part of the total moving cost produced by COBRA. It is an internal calculation to COBRA based on mileage, shipping, etc. It is driven by the number of billets to be transferred.

(2) Military construction (MCON) costs are calculated and summarized internally to COBRA. These costs are based upon validated requirements for type of space and square footage by the field activities utilizing NAVFAC criteria.



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

0-101



11 June 1991

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Courter,

Thank you for your letter of May 28, 1991, to Mrs Livingstone requesting detailed analysis of the Quad Cities proposal.

Attached at the enclosure is a very quick analysis of the proposal. In summary, as a production facility, Rock Island was rated best. As a commodity oriented facility, it would have rated in the top third. In either case, these ratings would have had no effect on the operationally sound decisions to merge two management commands into one at Rock Island Arsenal and to merge two inventory control points into one at Redstone Arsenal. Merging all four elements at Rock Island is not feasible.

If we can be of further assistance, please feel free to contact me personally or Lieutenant Colonel Chip Larouche at (703) 693-7556.

Sincerely,

John B. Nerger
Acting Director, Total
Army Basing Study

Attachment

cc: The Honorable Colin McMillan
The Honorable Susan Livingstone

RESPONSE TO ROCK ISLAND PROPOSAL

1. QUESTION: Why was Rock Island Arsenal (RIA) considered in the Production category and not in Commodities?

ANSWER: RIA has two very distinct missions that provide the potential to be placed in either of the categories. After reviewing the input and running the model, it was decided to place RIA in Production for the following reasons:

- it came out better in the Production category
- it would have been very difficult to divide the assets into the different categories
- the purpose of RIA is the production and manufacturing of artillery components
- creation of an Industrial Operations Command favors RIA in the Production category.

2. Review of the Quad City Development Group Proposal

Acres. RIA is a 950 acre island of which about 25% could be developed. Redstone has over 31,000 acres of which 3,000 acres could be developed.

Office Space. Even when the 130,000 SF of unused office space is considered, there is still a requirement of over 600,000 SF of new office space. There would still be some cost to use the vacant space.

Production Space. The renovation of production facilities into modern office facilities may cost the same as new facilities. Many of the buildings are extremely old. Production space should be kept for production or like purposes.

Other Facilities. In the review of all other facilities such as utilities, parking, morale and welfare, health, computer or child development centers, Redstone was found to have equal to in quality and greater quantity.

Concurrent Engineering. The type of weapon system which the Army is moving towards calls for a different type of delivery systems. The synergism which can be obtained by locating the management of armaments weapon systems with missiles far outweighs what may be lost by the separation.

Community. The Places Rated Almanac was used in our comparison of the two geographical areas. However since there is no Federally sponsored Cost of Living Index, a report from the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association was used and the areas were the same.

Workforce. The Army's Comparison was based on a different geographical make up than the Metropolitan Statistical Area. As for the labor rates, the Army must base their analysis on the government workforce not the local community. The Huntsville average pay was less than the RIA workforce.

Infrastructure. In our comparison of the two geographical areas the only major difference was that RIA had access to waterways.

Economic Impact. The Army must base their recommendations on mission impacts, readiness and economics to the Federal Government. We are deeply concerned about our workforce and impacts on the local communities. This proposal has a one-time cost of less than \$77 million, an annual savings greater than \$38 million and breaks even within six years. We will make every possible effort if this proposal is approved to minimize the turmoil on the workforce and their families.



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

0-102



11 June 1991

Mr. Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

Dear Mr. Courter,

Thank you for your letter of May 22, 1991, to Mrs Livingstone requesting the Army to review the independent proposal for retaining the Land Combat Missile Systems maintenance mission at Anniston Army Depot.

Attached is a copy of the comments prepared by Headquarters, AMC in response to what appears to be the same proposal submitted by the Alabama delegation on behalf of Anniston Army Depot. The last page of the attachment is the requested COBRA summary.

The economic challenges made in the proposal overstate the equipment that would actually be moved to Letterkenny Army Depot and fail to consider the savings in overhead identified in the DDMC study. The environmental concerns are totally unfounded and the evidence shows that environmental compliance will improve at both Anniston and Letterkenny Army Depots.

If we can be of further assistance, please feel free to contact me personally or Lieutenant Colonel Chip Larouche at (703) 693-7556.

Sincerely,

John B. Nerger
Acting Director, Total
Army Basing Study

Attachment

cc: The Honorable Colin McMillan
The Honorable Susan Livingstone

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After reviewing the information provided by the delegation from Alabama on behalf of Anniston Army Depot, we find that none of the considerations provided warranted incorporation or approval into the Tactical Missiles Study.

Combat Readiness will not be detrimentally impacted by the consolidation of all DoD missiles at Letterkenny Army Depot.

Environmental Compliance will not only be met, but will be exceeded, due mostly to the change in workload mix at Letterkenny.

The Tactical Missiles Study report issued in January 1991 projected total cost savings of \$87.194 million from the movement of all Services' workload to Letterkenny, less a total cost for facilities renovation to accept the additional equipment plus the cost to move equipment of \$29.200 million for a net savings associated with the consolidation of \$57.994 million.

Of the total \$87.194 to be saved, \$23.4 (Table 1) is applicable to the workload to be moved from Anniston Army Depot. Military construction avoidance at Anniston is \$7.25 million for the ATACMS and Inertial Guide projects. Increased travel cost for personnel from MICOM to Letterkenny vs. Anniston is \$368,445. Cost to move the equipment unique to the Land Combat Missile Systems is \$102,232. Although personnel costs were not calculated at the time of the original study those costs applicable to the move of ANAD workload are projected to be about 1/3 of the total \$5.4 million for all Army workload change -- \$1.8 million. This results in a net savings projected to be \$28.3 million. (\$23.4 mil + \$7.25 mil - \$368K - \$102 K - \$1.8 mil = \$28.3 mil)

This projected savings of \$28.3 million is contrary to the Alabama projection. Their projection was a cost of \$38,508,919.78 plus \$7,283,325.21 per year for 5 years (\$36,416,626) or a total cost of approximately \$75 million.

The Tactical Missiles Study offers a cost savings projection to DoD by consolidating workload at LEAD. The material provided by Alabama offered no savings to keep the workload at ANAD.

The consolidation of Tactical Missiles from ANAD to LEAD is consistent with the policy of Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) and is consistent with the Joint Service Business Plan endorsed by Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force dated Feb. 28, 1991, to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics).

The following is an excerpt from the Army's Business Plan relative to the Tactical Missiles Study that also supports our position.

3.8.8. LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT (LEAD) - STRATEGY. LEAD will be postured as the DoD missile and missile support equipment CTX (Center for Technical Excellence) and integrated depot-level maintenance facility. This consolidates guidance and control section repair for all current and future air, ground, and surface launched missiles. The missile support equipment includes Army-only launchers, radars, associated ancillary equipment, and subsystem repair of missile platforms mounted on track or wheeled vehicles for which system integrity is not impacted by their removal and repair at LEAD. All artillery workload will be consolidated at RRAD consistent with DDMC study recommendations. The short-term savings plan consolidated the automotive workload at TEAD.

REVIEW OF LEAD VS. ANAD PERFORMING LAND COMBAT MISSILE SYSTEMS
WORKLOAD

We have addressed the issues in the same order as the material provided by the delegation from Alabama. Our position was NOT to refute the position taken by Alabama, but rather to effectively deal strictly with the facts associated with the movement of the workload from ANAD to LEAD. Listed below is the projection made by the Tactical Missiles Study Team.

In the areas addressed below, some of the projections address the total Services' workload change when it was too intermeshed with the Alabama workload to differentiate.

A. COMBAT READINESS -

Impact to readiness is a most important consideration in the decision making process to relocate a Source of Repair (SOR). To minimize the impact to a change in SOR a detailed implementation plan is required. The implementation plan includes phasing of workload, facilities requirements, equipment requirements, people (skill levels, training, relocation, learning curve, availability, etc.), and inventory availability.

With the decline in world hostilities and the low probability of a global land based war scenario, less demand is being placed on existing inventory and turn-around-time.

With the utmost concern for combat readiness, there is negligible impact to our ability to support the existing force structure and to readily dispatch the operating forces to meet any emergent demand during the transition of SORs. The orderly transition of the Tactical Missiles took into consideration the weapons requirements of the present force structures and conflict scenarios as major factors. The responsibility for this transition process has been directed by Commander Depot Systems Command to each depot, to be executed as the priority of the Business Offices. Transition plans will be patterned to the specific missile systems. Where duplication of support equipment exists, equipment will be moved and a dual capability will be established allowing for the timely transition while maintaining readiness.

As an example, the Airborne TOW equipment has been reviewed and it has been determined that dual capability exists within the depot system. This duplicate capability is presently housed in Mainz Army Depot. Based on the recommendations from the DDMC study concerning Mainz, the TOW mission would be transferred to LEAD in FY93. This dual capability allows for the timely equipment transfer from Mainz prior to the movement of Anniston's

support equipment. Thus allowing for no maintenance downtime for TOW and making it one of the systems providing the best transition options with the lowest risk factor to impact readiness.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS -

Environmental compliance was considered in the Defense Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC) study. It is acknowledged that environmental regulations are not consistently restrictive across the country. However, as stewards of our national resources it is incumbent upon the Department of Defense to reduce environmental pollutants from its industrial operations rather than seeking means to circumvent the words and spirit of these regulations. The Clean Air Act of 1990 will likely redefine pollutant categories and monitoring requirements such that engineering controls will be required to reduce emissions from all large industrial facilities within DESCOM. The LEAD is involved in advanced planning to install control equipment for Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) emissions which will maintain compliance during expanded mission workload in support of unplanned surge events such as Desert Storm. This technology is also under analysis to maximize its application under the new Clean Air Act of 1990 requirements.

The DDMC study proposal regarding missile consolidation will ease the LEAD compliance posture with regard to VOC emissions specifically, and all environmental media generally. Consolidation of tactical missiles at LEAD coupled with the planned movement of artillery and truck workload from LEAD will significantly reduce the emissions of VOC and improve the LEAD compliance posture in this regard. Annually, an estimated reduction of 75-80% of VOC emissions from LEAD may result from implementation of the study recommendations. The influx of new missile systems will replace the current VOC-intensive workload with a much cleaner type of work. The eleven missile systems recommended to be transferred to LEAD will be electronic missile component work requiring minimal painting.

Environmental impacts and compliance are issues which receive significant consideration in every level of DoD planning. However, consolidation of tactical missile workload at LEAD and the transfer of artillery and trucks will result in decreased levels of VOC output in relation to present output. Compliance will be achieved and maintained in accordance with statute and policy.

C. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS -

1. RELATIVE LOCATION OF ANNISTON AND LETTERKENNY TO THE ARMY MISSILE COMMAND (MICOM) AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS ON OPERATING COSTS

We accept the position offered on behalf of Anniston. We expect travel costs to increase when workload is moved from Anniston to Letterkenny. We offer no opposing position.

2. COSTS OF DOING BUSINESS, ANNISTON VS. LETTERKENNY

No attempt was made to differentiate the costs per commodity other than the savings calculations made in the original Tactical Missiles Study. Therefore, bid rates do not serve as a comparison until all workload changes stabilize.

3. COSTS OF FACILITIZATION

Land Combat Missile Systems relocated from ANAD to LEAD require similar facilities which are used for maintenance support that exist throughout the DoD Tactical Missile community. Existing clean rooms within DoD are of a higher quality modular design than the ones located at ANAD and will be relocated to provide the necessary capacity/capability at the LEAD Consolidated Tactical Missile Facility.

A major objective of the Tactical Missiles Study was to optimize an existing facility's use through consolidation with no Military Construction expenditures. LEAD was determined to be the only site that could be dedicated as a Tactical Missile Facility for the following reasons: (a) the current mission as CTX for HAWK/PATRIOT air defense missile systems; (b) concurrent DDMC studies on trucks, and towed/self propelled Howitzers recommended the consolidation of these systems at other activities thus availing an additional 317,000 square feet facility to be renovated with no Military Construction costs at LEAD; and additionally, (c) LEAD has other facilities which contain physical and electronic surveillance security for service systems identified in the study. These facilities include tri-level security systems with ample security/safety/ammunition operations and conforming earth covered storage space.

4. RELOCATION OF EQUIPMENT FROM ANNISTON TO LETTERKENNY

This analysis included the following:

Only those cost centers involving direct missile support were analyzed;

Support activities such as machine shops, paint facilities, and cleaning operations were not considered because they already exist at LEAD;

Equipment required to support relocated workload was taken from the Capability/Capacity Engineering Data Reporting System (CEDRS). The CEDRS file only lists equipment over \$1,000.00. Only major test consoles in the missile cost centers, which are uniquely dedicated, transfer with the mission. The weight of a typical major test console is estimated at 2,000 lbs.

Estimated workhours for labor and the cost per workhour were derived from a similar study performed in 1990.

For the purpose of this analysis, it is expected that current prices at ANAD are within plus or minus 10 percent of the 1990 figures.

Based on the CEDRS file, the equipment listed for direct missile support cost centers equals 182 items at a total cost of \$20,577,000.00. Only 47 of the 182 items listed represent test consoles. The remainder are mostly peripheral support equipment such as oscilloscopes, multimeters, power supply generators, fixtures, etc. A cost breakdown for disassembly, crating, shipping, uncrating, and reassembly at LEAD is as follows:

	Est Workhours per unit	Est cost per work hr	Est crating cost per unit	Number of units	cost
Disassemble and move to shipping area	8	\$42.50	na	47	\$15,980
Crating	na	na	\$300	47	\$14,100
Uncrate	na	na	\$ 50	47	\$2,350
Move to new location and reinstall	8	\$42.50	na	47	\$15,980
			Sub total		\$48,410
Estimated transportation cost for 47 consoles at 2,000 lbs each					\$3,822
(Disassemble, crate, uncrate, reinstall) est cost to move remaining equipment					\$50,000
Estimated cost to move all direct support missile equipment from ANAD to LEAD					\$102,232

Consideration was given to the vast quantities of support equipment existing within the Tactical Missile arena. Through consolidation, specialized support equipment will be moved to the selected location and the common support equipment will be screened for application across all services, thereby reducing overall common support equipment transitioned to the selected site.

REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA Ver 1.20)

tion NPV20	(\$K) :	-64801	Losing Base	:	ANAD
al One-Time Cost	(\$K) :	7184	Group	:	AMC
ars to Break Even	:	1	Service	:	US Army
I Years	:	0	Option Package	:	ANAD-LEAD

Net Cost (\$K) Constant Dollars

	Year1 1992	Year2 1993	Year3 1994	Year4 1995	Year5 1996	Year6 1997	Beyond
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
ision	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
sonnel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
erhead	0	-4672	-9355	-9355	-9355	-9355	-9355
nstruct	323	0	2081	2254	0	0	0
ving	0	2135	0	0	0	0	0
ner	0	391	0	0	0	0	0
T	323	-2146	-7274	-7101	-9355	-9355	-9355
f Elim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
l Elim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Elim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T ELIM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TELETYPE

Consolidation Cost Analysis Study

"This document contains work in process. It is preliminary in nature and represents a series of data which was generated by the Naval Underwater Systems Center in the course of responding over an extended period of time to multiple requests for consolidation information and data based on changing assumptions. The information is not official and does not necessarily represent the official position of either the Naval Underwater Systems Center or the Department of the Navy. In addition, because of its nature as a collection of work in process, this document reflects changing assumptions and still contains typographical errors.

"Volume 1 table of 12, and Volume 2 2/15/91 13 refer to the "SPAWAR "SPAWAR" model and should "Alternative Model." The and the change dated."



contents, and pages 2, 7, 8, section title, and pages 1, Model"; this model is not a be identified as the affected pages are annotated

This document contains information EXEMPT FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE under FOIA. Exemption (b) (5) applies.

9 May 1991

Handwritten signature of R.W. Russell.

R.W. RUSSELL

Handwritten signature of R.E. Miller.

R.E. MILLER

Prepared by:
PLANS & RESOURCES STAFF
CODE 011

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0-143

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION)

12 June 1991

MEMORANDUM for Mr. Doug Hansen, ASD (P&L)

Principal Deputy

As requested by Mr. Marv Casterline of the BCRC staff I am providing a copy of the NUSC "Consolidation Cost Analysis Study". Due to the size of the document, I am forwarding a copy of the cover sheet to you. If you need a copy of the entire document, please contact me.

Genie McBurnett

O-104



PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

JUN 12 1991

Honorable Jim Courter
Chairman, Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006

Response

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The enclosure replies to your letter of May 30 asking for a statement reflecting the Department's policy on the construction and operation of military hospitals.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Colin McMillan".

Colin McMillan

Enclosure



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

12 JUN 1991

HEALTH AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PRODUCTION
AND LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Closing Military Hospitals

This is in reply to your memorandum of May 10 and subsequent discussions with your office seeking a statement reflecting the Department's policy on the construction and operation of military hospitals. I understand the Base Closure Commission is specifically interested in the policy implications of maintaining military hospitals in the communities solely for the benefit of retired military personnel.

Military hospitals are operated primarily to support active duty personnel. All other beneficiaries are treated in Military Hospitals on a space-available basis.

Congress, in recognition of this fact, created the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) to cover the health care needs of all non-active duty beneficiaries until they become eligible for Medicare. Active duty Service members contribute to Social Security and are, therefore, entitled to Medicare benefits.

In general, I would support the sale or transfer of closing military hospitals to community health care providers, especially to any who would agree to provide care to CHAMPUS program beneficiaries at preferred rates. However, while each community is different in terms of availability of health care resources, the country as a whole is experiencing a surplus of inpatient hospital beds. Therefore, we must be careful not to contribute to this surplus as that would only lead to higher costs for all payors. The health care industry has also found that operating small-bed hospitals is not generally cost effective.

Many of the objections to closing military hospitals, came from retirees who, although eligible to receive care from a military hospitals, lost their CHAMPUS coverage when they became eligible for Medicare. I believe that any effort to negotiate care for this population would be counter to national defense priorities.

In conclusion, military hospitals should be closed along with the base they support, unless a significant active duty presence will remain in the area. Decisions on transfer or sale of closing hospitals can and should be left for the property disposal process. Enclosed is an information paper on the impact of base hospital closures on retirees.

If I can be of any further assistance, please don't hesitate to call. The DoD Health Affairs point of contact on this matter is RADM Harold Koenig, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Services Operations. He can be reached at (703) 697-8973.

Sincerely,


Enrique Mendez, Jr., M.D.

Enclosure:
As Stated

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Impact of Base Closures on Military Retirees

BACKGROUND:

- On April 12, 1991 the Secretary of Defense released the list of bases proposed for closure and realignment. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is now reviewing that list. This information paper is in response to a request by Mr. Courter, Chairman of the Commission for the impact of base closings on military retirees.

DISCUSSION:

- The impact of base closure and realignment on the military retired beneficiaries will be significant. CHAMPUS deductibles and co-payments rates will not increase. The number of military retirees and beneficiaries using CHAMPUS and Medicare will increase in areas where direct care facilities previously provided readily available medical services to retirees and their dependents.
- The number of retired and retired beneficiaries using CHAMPUS and Medicare could decrease on bases where medical personnel increase as a result of relocation of medical personnel from closed bases. Increased availability of care at receiving bases may offset some of the increase in CHAMPUS and Medicare use.
- The number of retired and retired beneficiaries required to use CHAMPUS and Medicare will not significantly increase in areas where retiree access to direct care system health services is limited because of staffing or facility limitations.
- In locations served by more than one military base with medical treatment facilities, the result of the closure of one of the facilities on the retiree population will be less dramatic. Some accommodation for the retired population could be provided at the remaining facilities.
- The effect of base closure will be more dramatic in rural areas where the residual population of CHAMPUS and Medicare eligible retired beneficiaries is significant and the availability of civilian care is limited or non-existent. Opportunities for managed care and contracting will certainly increase.

**ATTACHMENT
RESIDUAL POPULATIONS AT CLOSING INSTALLATIONS**

**RETIREES, DEPENDENTS
OF RETIREES, SURVIVORS**

INSTALLATION	Age 65 (OR OVER)	Age 64 (OR LESS)	ACTIVE DUTY & DEPENDENTS OF OTHER SERVICES
<u>Base Realignment/Closure - FY 91</u>			
Ft. Ben Harrison, IN	2806	11382	2364
Ft. Ord, CA	6232	13190	7543
Ft. McClellan, AL	1864	10017	859
Ft. Devens, MA	9929	23068	10643
Oak Harbor, WA	1584	5723	8553
Long Beach, CA	24914	52305	55202 **
Orlando, FL	13833	34245	5091
Bergstrom AFB, TX	5046	21576	2365
Carswell AFB, TX	10507	38879	5915
England AFB, LA	1115	5784	684
Loring AFB, ME	130	1651	140
Moody AFB, GA	883	5579	746
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC	1654	6401	752
Williams AFB, AZ	6260	16701	2192 *
Wurtsmith AFB, MI	<u>316</u>	<u>2267</u>	<u>181</u>
TOTAL	89867	261632	104610

NOTES

- * Denotes significant overlap with remaining military MTF.
- ** Denotes overlap with MCAS Tustin, also recommended for closure.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

0-105

IN REPLY REFER TO
24 May 1991

The Honorable James A. Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1625 K Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Chairman Courter,

On 22 May 1991 the Navy Base Structure Committee (BSC) met with the staff of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC) to discuss the plan of action for mapping differences between the "OPNAV Study" and the BSC recommendations. I am responding for Ms. Schafer.

Enclosed is a report that illustrates the relationship between the "OPNAV Study" evaluation factors and the BSC/DOD criteria. The relationship between the two sets of factors is complex. This mapping relationship, just like the Army's mapping diagram, is not a simple one to one relationship. The BSC has provided remarks to explain the differences in color coding between the two sets of factors. The overall BSC color coding by activity is also explained, including "Step 5" bases.

We believe the enclosed report is responsive to the first three tasks/milestones in your plan of action.

Enclosure

S. F. Loftus
Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Logistics)

INDEX OF 24 MAY 1991 DATA

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- X. U.S. MARINE CORPS

I. OVERVIEW

The Base Structure Committee (BSC) commenced their review with the Naval Station category of the "OPNAV Study" which had been provided the BSC. The "OPNAV Study" had been prepared in response to an earlier Vice Chief of Naval Operations tasking. The BSC soon discovered that some evaluation criteria were not useful to a differentiation process in which installations could be evaluated and subsequently identified for closure. Criteria that had been used by the "OPNAV Study" had either not been discriminating (for example, each base was rated the same for a particular description), or a key discrimination highlighted non-essential elements. (For example, a naval station had to be in a "temperate" climate to receive a high (or "green") rating -- yet the Navy needs to train in the environment in which it will fight, and many critical oceans and world areas are in non-temperate zones. Therefore, the BSC believed a "temperate" weather criterion was not meaningful.) In other cases, such as ratings for shipyards, the shipyard being close to unrestricted waters is not a useful discriminator, as ships go to shipyards for relatively long periods. Therefore, whether the one-way water travel takes an hour or a day, when considering that the ship is going to the shipyard for an overhaul lasting between six-months to a few years, the length of time required for one-way travel is relatively unimportant. In general, the BSC was not satisfied with the total utility of the data in the "OPNAV Study."

After spending one to two days reviewing naval station data from the "OPNAV Study," the BSC concluded that it could not base its decisions solely on the analyses in the "OPNAV Study." The "OPNAV Study" contained inappropriate criteria and adjudged values which the BSC knew from its own experience to be incomplete or not entirely accurate.

The BSC next looked at the shipyard "OPNAV Study" data base and also found questionable data. Questions about the data could not be answered by the available staff who had been involved in the "OPNAV Study." The BSC also noted that the shipyard evaluation criteria did not clearly address the important discriminatory capabilities a shipyard must have to do its mission.

During the naval station and shipyard reviews, the BSC also looked at the weighting values which had been assigned to each evaluation factor used in the "OPNAV Study" in each category. The BSC felt that, in general, the value assigned did not adequately reflect the mission suitability and value of a particular installation and, in general, tended to

over-evaluate the staff review of a facility (e.g., the quantity and condition of the facilities) rather than the military value of a facility. As a result of this review, the BSC decided not to assign numerical weights to evaluation criteria.

After much discussion, the BSC concluded that the "OPNAV Study" data was biased toward supporting an infrastructure appropriate to a much larger force structure planned for an earlier period. The BSC did not have the "OPNAV Study" evaluations redone, as we adjudged there was insufficient time to restart this process of data collection, and complete the sensitivity analysis of any new data to determine if sub-optimization had occurred.

To work from the existing situation, the BSC elected to use the "OPNAV Study" data as a reference and starting point but then to re-evaluate each base/shipyard/station, etc., as modified by the BSC's "hearing" procedure. It was the committee's view that it was imperative to verify that the Navy's judgments were accurate and consistently applied. In order to do this it was important to seek clarification from senior navy officials who had both ownership responsibilities but who also had program responsibilities. We asked these senior Navy officials to prepare and present factual, narrative accounts of their perspectives on the activities which fell under their area of responsibility. It was clear that the Navy had significant excess capacity. It was not clear whether that capacity was required for reconstitution, surge, or mobilization reasons, or if a particular excess could be sufficiently consolidated for economic closure. The challenge for the committee was to develop sufficient data that could be applied to arrive at fair and consistent judgments even though those judgments might deviate in some cases from the assessments of the raw data contained in the "OPNAV Study." To ensure the BSC did not itself stray into parochial decisions, the BSC adopted the rule of making each of its facility evaluations by unanimous decision. The BSC called senior individuals to testify about their area and discuss the evaluations and other factors which were of import (e.g., Vice Admiral Kihune, the Assistant CNO for Surface Warfare, testified about naval stations after a recent assignment as Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet where he was in command of naval stations throughout the Pacific).


In summary, the BSC looked at the "OPNAV Study" data for the first two categories and found some data deficient. In order to acquire the necessary data within the available time, the BSC questioned, in an open forum, senior officials from the areas in question. The following pages discuss representative problems identified in evaluation criteria and grades in the

"OPNAV Study," as well as a map and individual comments as to how the BSC bridged the "OPNAV Study" input to evaluate bases in accordance with the DOD criteria, with appropriate short comments as to the BSC evaluation process.

This information is intended to address questions asked by the Base Closure Committee staff and therefore supplements, and does not try to duplicate, the excellent data provided in the Navy's April 1991 report.

II. MAPPING - EVALUATION FACTORS TO BSC/DOD CRITERIA

The evaluation factors were heavily weighted to favor facility criteria instead of mission/operational factors. Accordingly, the BSC decided that the first four published DOD criteria would be more effective in evaluating candidates for closure. The relationship between the factors and the BSC/DOD criteria are shown in the table that follows. It should be noted that mission suitability as defined in the "OPNAV Study" was considered inappropriate (as is discussed in the appropriate section) and is not mapped into the BSC/DOD criteria for shipyards and naval stations. Nuclear capability is only mapped for shipyards.



III. SHIPYARDS

A. BSC COMMENTS ON "OPNAV STUDY" EVALUATION FACTORS

1. Mission Suitability

a. Site Specific. The "OPNAV Study" used OPNAVINST 3050.22 as the gauge for evaluating whether or not excess shipyard capacity was available. The committee reviewed OPNAVINST 3050.22 and realized the instruction, developed in the era of a 600-ship Navy, had been written to justify the status quo (the assumption is that we will always need eight public shipyards and they will be located where they currently exist). Therefore, accepting that instruction as an evaluation criteria was adjudged not helpful to the process. One of the BSC members is the current responsible OPNAV official for the instruction and confirmed that the instruction was not helpful.

b. Deployment. The BSC concluded the criterion of whether X-percent of the fleet was located within 50 NM of the shipyard is a non-useful indicator. The BSC did not have the time to evaluate if the criteria values of what percent of the fleet was within 50 NM of the shipyard were valuable indicators or had been developed to drive a conclusion. ("OPNAV Study" used green: 10 percent within 50 NM; yellow: 3-9 percent; and red: 2 percent.) The BSC did believe that a shipyard located near a major fleet concentration was inherently more useful than a shipyard not collocated with the fleet.

c. Relationship. The BSC believed this criteria was simply duplicative of the previous criteria (e.g., there is a relationship between the percentage of the fleet within 50 NM of the shipyard and homeport availability) but not critical to any conclusion since the Navy pays to move individuals who are aboard ships who officially change homeports (overhaul of greater than 6 months).

d. Weather. Lost work days appears an objective criterion, but the rating discrepancy between Charleston (Y) and Norfolk (G) was not explained. The "OPNAV Study" staff's answer was that Charleston was subject to hurricanes and Norfolk was not. The BSC did not agree, was not presented with any supporting statistical evidence, and believed the "weather" factor not discriminating.

e. Survivability. The BSC felt this category, which was essentially whether the facility would suffer damage from a collateral attack on another Navy facility, was not useful even in a nuclear warfighting aspect given the anticipated relationship between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and increased warning times. The BSC noted that Philadelphia grade in this area was inconsistent with the criteria (should be G not Y).

2. Availability of facility and quality of facilities were felt to be generally accurate except that evaluations appeared to have been made simply on the physical age of the facility rather than the current condition or the quality and modern capability of the equipment that the building might contain. Some other minor errors (e.g. the existence of another usable nuclear drydock in Mare Island) were found. The BSC noted that the naval shipyard area is one in which the existence of facilities (e.g. dry-docks capable of docking a nuclear carrier, ocean engineering capability, nuclear capability, etc.) is of primary importance, but in this area the numerical weight given in the initial facilities evaluation was less than the weight given the generally-less-useful factors which had been identified for "mission suitability."

3. Quality of Life. Major errors were found in each factor (facility housing units available, bachelor housing units available, recreation/amenities, and medical facilities). For example, there are more housing units available near Mare Island than possibly any other Navy base. There is a relatively new regional hospital near Puget Sound (but listed in the data base as in Bremerton). These areas were all graded as unsatisfactorily on the data that the BSC received 13 February as opposed to the new data provided on 14 February. The BSC believed that the original evaluation had apparently been done by individuals not very familiar with the existing shipyards or the surrounding areas, but rather by staff working from centralized data bases.

4. Community Support. The BSC believed none of these factors were discriminating in this category. With respect to the assigned grades, the BSC did not accept the rationale that skills were listed as deficient in the local areas of Portsmouth, New Hampshire (Y) (where a naval shipyard and Bath Iron Works have existed for decades) and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, (Y) where one of our principal shipyards is located.

5. Validity of Criteria. After BSC initial questioning, staffs from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Naval Sea Systems Command then combined to redo the shipyard evaluation form after the BSC's probing questions highlighted errors. The BSC noted that many of the grades assigned to shipyards had changed, and that many of the grades changed all the way from unsatisfactory (red) to highly satisfactory (green). There also remained errors of fact.

B. BSC REVIEW PROCESS

1. Testimony. The BSC discussed shipyards and shipyard capability with several senior officials, including the admiral responsible for supervising all naval shipyards and the admiral in charge of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). Although both identified Philadelphia as the shipyard needed least, neither were helpful in providing a picture of where additional closures could be made. In view of a smaller Navy, the NAVSEA plan appears to be to reduce production workers at each shipyard while retaining nearly all overhead. Since the BSC was assured that the future nuclear refueling workload would not permit closing a nuclear yard, the BSC focused on the non-nuclear shipyards and spent a great deal of time reviewing information it was provided as to the status of land leases in Long Beach and capabilities in Philadelphia and elsewhere on the East Coast.

2. At the conclusion of the hearings, the BSC believed that the key factors in the shipyard area were:

a. Navy carrier forces in the next 10-20 years, given planned retirements and deliveries of authorized and appropriated ships, will be largely composed of nuclear carriers (9 of 12 will be nuclear). Shipyards that cannot do nuclear carrier overhauls will be of less future value.

b. More than half of the work in naval shipyards is nuclear ship work. Since non-nuclear ship work can more easily be contracted out to private yards, non-nuclear public shipyards are not as flexible nor useful to the Navy as are the nuclear-capable public shipyards.

c. We are reducing ships in our Navy. The shipyard workload will eventually decrease.

3. At the conclusion of a probing review of the entire shipyard category, the BSC concluded that in view of the apparent continued need for nuclear capable shipyards into the next century, all nuclear yards provided a unique capability and strategic asset to the Nation. They were then excused under Step 5 of the BSC procedure.

C. BSC EVALUATIONS

1. NSY CHARLESTON

a. Mission. Yellow. Because of the problems previously described, this criteria does not crosswalk to the "OPNAV Study." This shipyard was assigned a grade of yellow for mission because of the inability to get a carrier under the bridge, the absence of a CV-size nuclear dock, and the anticipated reduction in nuclear submarines with the smaller Navy. This is yellow tinted green because we have a significant nuclear workload throughout the period of time (two years to start closure and six years to complete), the BSC was evaluating, and Charleston is a nuclear shipyard.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, consistent with "OPNAV Study" and BSC experience.

c. Contingency/Mobilization. Green. Each shipyard was rated green as each would be useful in the event of reconstitution of forces. This was not a discriminatory factor and will not be discussed with respect to the other yards.

d. Cost/Manpower. Green. This category reflects the relatively low cost of living in the Charleston area and the available housing facilities.

e. Overall. Yellow tinted green because of mission evaluation. Considered a unique national asset due to nuclear capability.

2. NSY LONG BEACH

a. Mission. Yellow, because it is not nuclear capable. The yellow is tinted green as Long Beach has a CVN-capable large dock, is one of only three major private or public shipyards on the West Coast, and is close to the major fleet concentration in San Diego which, unlike Norfolk, does not have a major collocated shipyard.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, because of encroachment from the city.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow, because all coastal facilities in Southern California are very expensive locations for our sailors to live.

d. Other Factors. Same as Long Beach Naval Station.

e. Overall. Yellow. Tinted green for the rationale given under mission.

3. NSY MARE ISLAND

a. Mission. Green, because of paucity of nuclear-capable shipyards on the West Coast and the shipyard's ocean engineering capability.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. Reflects "OPNAV Study" evaluation.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow tinted green. There is adequate housing for individuals, and conditions are not as expensive as other locations in California.

d. Overall. Green. Nuclear capable shipyard.

4. NSY NORFOLK

a. Mission. Green. Nuclear shipyard collocated with major fleet concentration.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow in accordance with "OPNAV Study" evaluation.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Relatively inexpensive. Good infrastructure facilities due to fleet concentration.

d. Overall. Green. Nuclear capable shipyard.

5. NSY PEARL HARBOR

a. Mission. Green. Facilities located in Hawaii were accorded special treatment by the BSC due to the geographical location of Hawaii as a military bridge to the Far East and as a possible relocation area for forces currently homeported at other overseas locations. In addition, the NSY supports deployed ships, ships located in Pearl Harbor, does nuclear ship work, and is the closest American shipyard to much of the Pacific.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. Generally better than other yards.

c. Cost/Manpower. Red. Hawaii is expensive.

d. Overall. Green. Nuclear capable shipyard in a forward location.

6. NSY PHILADELPHIA

a. Mission. Yellow. Low yellow as the conventional carrier service life extension program is completing as Navy transitions to a nuclear carrier force. Philadelphia is a non-nuclear yard and thus cannot compete with other shipyards for nuclear work.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, consistent with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Driven by the cost of shipyard work in carrier service life extension program. Tinted with yellow for the living area costs are high and the quality of life facilities at the shipyard and base for the sailors are sub-par (see "OPNAV Study").

d. Overall. Yellow. The decreasing need for conventional-only shipyards, the reduced number of conventional ships needing berthing at the Philadelphia Naval Station, and the available other shipyards on the East Coast make this yard the prime candidate for closure.

7. NSY PORTSMOUTH

a. Mission. Yellow. Nearly green due to the predicted submarine refueling workload in the time frame (1993-1997, and the shipyard's nuclear capability.

b. Local/Facilities. Yellow in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green as it is in a low-cost living area.

d. Overall. Yellow. Nearly green due to the need for nuclear capable shipyards.

8. NSY PUGET SOUND

a. Mission. Green. Shipyard has exceptional capabilities and does both nuclear carrier and nuclear submarine overhauls.

b. Land/Facilities. Green in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Area is low cost and has many available housing and other quality of life facilities.

d. Overall. Green. Nuclear capable shipyard with exceptional capabilities.

IV. NAVAL STATIONS

A. BSC COMMENTS ON "OPNAV STUDY" EVALUATION FACTORS

1. Mission Suitability

a. Site Specific. Access to navigable water is certainly important to a base; but the evaluation should be non-discriminatory, since all naval stations being evaluated in this category are accessible to the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean or Gulf. The BSC viewed the yellow grades assigned to Philadelphia, Pascagoula, Everett, Ingleside, Mobile and Sand Point as highly questionable.

b. Deployment. The BSC believed that surface ship and submarine training opportunities occur anytime while underway and could not understand the yellow grades again assigned the same above ports plus Staten Island. Distance to training site appeared to the BSC as particularly difficult to evaluate since all East Coast ports are a significant distance from the major training ranges in the Caribbean Operating Area.

c. Weather. As previously discussed, the BSC felt that it was important that ships train in weather similar to that in which it might have to operate during hostilities. The evaluated factors were not useful and to the BSC appeared to be applied inconsistently. The BSC was told that, for example, the yellow grades which had been assigned Sand Point and Everett were assigned because it rained frequently in Western Washington while the other areas assigned yellow were subjected to hurricane weather--the BSC noted that Hawaii had been graded green, even though it is subject to typhoons.

d. Survivability. See previous "shipyard" discussion as to usefulness of this measure of the naval stations survivability from collateral damage from nuclear attack.

e. Maneuver Space. "No overland obstruction" was presented as the potential evaluation factor, but "ESQD" (explosive safety quantity distance), which essentially describes the ability of an ammunition ship to moor without unloading was listed as the unit of measure. Whatever the intent, the BSC was unable to correlate the assigned values with the BSC board members' knowledge of the ports.

The BSC was generally satisfied with the rest of the evaluation units except for specific errors of fact and knowledge:

a. The BSC noted that giving Coronado a yellow for a lack of berth capacity does not recognize that Coronado is a unique amphibious base and her ships are moored across the bay at Naval Station San Diego.

b. The BSC discussed the grades assigned Pascagoula for community support (e.g., adequate base of skills, industrial base substantial, local services and access to transportation links), and noted that, given the location of two shipyards in the immediate area, all the yellow grades should be considered as green.

c. The BSC noted that Treasure Island was rated red for recreation/amenities and actually has both a commissary and gym (mark should be green), and was marked down for housing (which is one of Treasure Island's strong points) and for not being within an hour of access to transportation links. The BSC did not understand the evaluation of Treasure Island.

d. The BSC also noted that the quality of life and community support criteria, as formulated, heavily weighted the existence of housing and other facilities aboard the naval station. Since Navy seldom has sufficient base housing on any naval station, this criteria neglected the fact-of-life Navy interest in the availability of low-cost housing in the immediate area and the accessibility of off-base entertainment and retail facilities. The BSC noted that Ingleside, Mobile, Pascagoula and Everett had been particularly adversely affected by this grading in the quality of life and community support areas of the "OPNAV Study," yet the inexpensive and extensive community infrastructure are some of the strongest aspects of those ports--the sailor can afford to live there and become a part of the community. The BSC considered all the yellow grades in those particular naval stations in those two evaluation areas as green.

B. BSC REVIEW PROCESS

1. After reviewing the "OPNAV Study," the BSC reviewed all naval bases with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare (OP-03) and the Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare (OP-02B) and members of their staffs. All of the individuals were very cooperative.

2. The BSC also reviewed presentations on the impact of the smaller future Navy on the strategic and tactical submarine forces. Submarine information was evaluated since they are a major user of pier space at several of the naval stations.

C. BSC EVALUATIONS

1. NAVSTA CHARLESTON

a. Mission. Yellow, because of the decreasing number of ships in the force. The remaining surface ships and submarines could be located at another port at some time in the future. This is a yellow tinted green because the Navy will continue to need the Charleston C-4 missile training and handling facilities through the time period (start in two years, complete in six) the BSC was considering.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. In the event a new class of submarine is placed in Charleston, the station will require extensive pier modifications. Larger, deeper draft ships will also require deeper and more frequent dredging of the Cooper River.

c. Contingency/Mobilization. Green. Nearly every Naval Station would be of use during a surge or reconstitution period. In most cases, this is a non-discriminating criteria and will only be discussed for the naval stations not graded green.

d. Cost/Manpower. Green. Charleston is a relatively inexpensive place to live and has excellent quality of life facilities.

d. Overall. Yellow. This yellow is driven by a decreasing mission, and thus is a yellow tinted green, as the station is required with the Navy force structure that will exist through 1997.

2. NAB CORONADO/NAB LITTLE CREEK

a. Mission. Green. Continual need for amphibious forces and training areas. The force structure and Navy plan retain one amphibious force on each coast.

b. Land/Facilities. Green for Coronado; yellow for Little Creek reflecting the difference in encroachment of non-military activities on the two bases.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow for Coronado and green for Little Creek in accordance with the difference in the areas' cost of living.

d. Overall. Green. Both were considered unique assets (only amphibious bases on each coast) and were excluded from further review under Step 5.

3. NAVSTA GUAM/NAVSTA PEARL HARBOR

a. Mission. Green. Both naval stations are critical strategic stepping stones to the Far East. They are also possible relocation sites for forces currently homeported overseas, and are collocated with either ship repairs (Guam) or ship overhaul (Pearl Harbor) facilities.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. Both naval stations are expensive to maintain.

d. Overall. Green. Both naval stations are unique geographic assets. They were excluded under Step 5.

4. NAVSTA INGLESIDE

a. Mission. Yellow. The station is not yet open and the CNO had not decided on the ship mix or mission for Ingleside.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. The facilities are all new, and the piers are state of the art.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. The cost of living is relatively inexpensive, and there are excellent support facilities available (underutilized hospital, etc.).

d. Overall. Green. When/if the station opens, Navy ships would have an excellent symbiotic relationship with the Corpus Christi air field.

5. NAVSTA LONG BEACH

a. Mission. Green with a very yellow tint as the number of ships that will be homeported in Long Beach in 1997 will be less than the number of ships decommissioned from San Diego and Hawaii.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. Access to the port is threatened by a container ship facility planned for the future.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. High cost of living.

d. Overall. Yellow. Given a smaller Navy, by 1997 it will be feasible to homeport all assigned surface ships in other, more essential to the Navy mission, West Coast ports.

6. NAVSTA MAYPORT

a. Mission. Green. Navy intends to upgrade the berths to nuclear carrier berths at Mayport and to continue the homeporting of surface ships in this port.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study" and considering limited pier space.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Relatively inexpensive homeport for sailors.

d. Overall. Green. As the Navy transitions to an all-nuclear carrier force, we require the berthing uses.

7. NAVSTA MOBILE/NAVSTA PASCAGOULA

a. Mission. Yellow. Neither naval station is yet officially open, and the CNO had not decided on the ship mix or mission for the bases.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. The facilities are new and excellent.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Both areas are inexpensive for sailors and have a shipyard in the immediate area.

d. Overall. Green.

8. NAVSTA NEW YORK

a. Mission. Green. In the 1997 force structure Navy requires the New York berthing.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. Excellent. New.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. Relatively high cost of living mitigated by the ready availability of Navy housing.

d. Overall. Green.

9. NAVSTA NORFOLK/NAVSTA SAN DIEGO

a. Mission. Green. A fleet concentration with all operational components of the Navy.

b. Land/Evaluation. Yellow for Norfolk; green for San Diego in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green for Norfolk and yellow for San Diego reflecting the "OPNAV Study" and the relative differences in cost of living.

d. Overall. Green. Both naval stations are impossible to replace.

10. NAVSTA PHILADELPHIA

a. Mission. Yellow. With the decreasing force level, Philadelphia Naval Station is no longer required.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. Reflecting "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. Relatively high cost of living accentuates "OPNAV Study" comments.

d. Overall. Yellow. There are no longer sufficient surface ships to require this NAVSTA.

11. NAVSTA PUGET SOUND (Everett)

a. Mission. Green. While not yet open, this nuclear carrier capable port is essential to our transition to an all-nuclear carrier fleet.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. All new.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Relatively inexpensive cost-of-living West Coast port.

d. Overall. Green.

12. NAVSTA PUGET SOUND (Sand Point)

a. Mission. Red. No longer needed.

b. Land/Facilities. Red. Closed in by the city. Facilities uneconomical to operate as they are no longer collocated with the sailors.

c. Contingency/Mobilization. Red. The BSC did not anticipate a surge or mobilization large enough to require reopening this facility.

d. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. Seattle area is becoming a high cost area.

e. Overall. Red. Station no longer required.

13. NAVSTA TREASURE ISLAND

a. Mission. Yellow. We have reduced the number of surface ships in the Navy and no longer need the available piers space for warships. The yellow is tinted green because the naval station is a unique position to provide pier space for the tugs handling the San Francisco Bay traffic for submarines to Mare Island, carriers to Alameda, and traffic to Concord.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. New West Coast fire fighting trainer (extensively used by carrier crews) located there and the housing helps solve the Alameda carrier crew housing problem.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. High cost living area.

d. Overall. Yellow tinted green because of relationship with Alameda carrier berthing.

14. NAVSTA TREASURE ISLAND (Hunters Point Annex)

a. Mission. Red. Navy has no continuing need for the annex.

b. Land/Facilities. Red. Large drydock would require repairs which Navy cannot fund. Current Navy tenants can either relocate or remain under lease-back provision.

c. Contingency/Mobilization. Yellow. Practically speaking, Navy would be unable to move back in and displace civilian encroaching interests, especially in view of legislative leasing directive.

d. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. Expensive area in which to live.

e. Overall. Red. No longer needed.

V. NAVAL AIR STATION

A. BSC COMMENTS ON "OPNAV STUDY" EVALUATION FACTORS

1. The BSC reviewed the unique discussion paragraph of the naval air station section of the "OPNAV Study" and noted that it is possible for an airfield to support different types of aircraft (and some Navy airfields currently do so), as long as each type of aircraft's unique maintenance, test, and trainer facilities were provided. For example, in discussing Navy and Marine Air Stations, there was considerable discussion and information was presented dealing with the ability to collocate Navy and Marine aircraft. In this particular instance, given USMC training areas, collocation to absorb any excess Navy capacity would conflict with the Marine Corps training mission adversely impacting operational readiness.
2. The BSC also reviewed with concern the site specific criteria in which an airfield was green only if the "activity cannot exist elsewhere." The BSC believed that most of the evaluations made were unnecessarily conservative (e.g. base could well exist elsewhere, but was nevertheless evaluated in the "OPNAV Study" as "green" in this category).
3. It was also noted that the OPNAV mission suitability factors were very non-discriminatory from station to station, e.g., 25 of 27 air stations received green ratings for proximity to training sites. This lack of differentiation between sites make comparisons difficult.

B. BSC REVIEW PROCESS

1. The BSC received clarification testimony about the "OPNAV Study" from the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare (OP-05) and his staff, as well as senior officers and civilians from the Naval Air Systems Command.
2. The map in Section II illustrates the relationships between the OPNAV evaluation factors and the BSC military value criteria.

C. BSC EVALUATIONS

1. NAS ADAK/NAS AGANA

a. Mission. Green. Both stations act as essential contingency airfields for U.S. military presence in the Pacific.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with the "OPNAV Study."

c. Contingency/Mobilization. Green. Nearly every airfield has surge/mobilization value. In practically every case, this factor is not a discriminatory criterion. Exceptions will be noted.

d. Cost/Manpower. Red. In accordance with the "OPNAV Study."

e. Overall. Yellow. Both airfields were evaluated as essential contingency assets and not considered further for closure.

2. NAS ALAMEDA

a. Mission. Green, in accordance with the "OPNAV Study." This air station provides necessary berthing for nuclear carriers on the West Coast.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with the "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. While an expensive area in which to live, the BSC received extensive testimony about plans to size the ship loading in Alameda, thus providing sufficient housing for the carrier crew members.

d. Overall. Yellow, tinted with green due to the station's essentiality as the Navy largely nuclear carrier force.

3. NAS BARBERS POINT/NAS BRUNSWICK

a. Mission. Both are green. Hawaii facilities were generally considered nearly unique based on their location (see discussion on Hawaii's shipyard and naval station) in the mid-Pacific. As a result of decisions already announced, there were already four fewer VP squadrons available for transfer and another two squadrons planned for decommissioning. Since Barbers Point and Brunswick are the VP bases on each coast

most strategically located near potential areas of ASW operations, Barbers Point thus became the prime location for VP aircraft in the Pacific and Brunswick occupies the same position in the Atlantic.

b. Land/Facilities. Both yellow in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Both yellow. In addition to factors noted in "OPNAV Study," all Hawaii's facilities were downgraded for the expensive cost of living in the area. Brunswick has a less expensive cost of living rate, but the "OPNAV Study" noted deficiencies in quality of life aspects.

d. Overall. Green for Barbers Point. A highly desirable location for VP assets given the planned force structure. Yellow, tinted with green for Brunswick due to its location nearer to the probable area of operations.

4. NAS CECIL FIELD

a. Mission. Green, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Green. One of the two East Coast major jet bases.

5. NAS CHASE FIELD

a. Mission. Yellow. The BSC received testimony that with the reduction in carrier air wings, given the concomitant future pilot training rates, one of the three jet training bases would not be required. Given the collocation of naval air "A" schools at the Meridian base, these activities would have to be relocated to achieve closure. When considering the runway structure at each of the three bases and the proximity of Chase Field to Kingsville (providing an ability to maintain and operate Chase Field as an "outlying field" to Kingsville, thus saving significant unnecessary and redundant infrastructure) and the existing plans to put the new jet trainer into Kingsville in FY-92 and into Chase in FY-97, the BSC evaluated the Chase Field mission as yellow.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Contingency/Mobilization. Yellow. Since the field will be maintained as an "outlying field," it can be used to accommodate any surge in requirements.

d. Cost/Manpower. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

e. Overall. Yellow, tinted red when considering its ability to be shutdown yet still serve as an "outlying field" for Kingsville.

6. NAS KINGSVILLE/NAS MERIDIAN

a. Mission. Green. See discussion for Chase Field.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Green, based primarily on mission evaluation.

7. NAS CORPUS CHRISTI

a. Mission. Green. One of the two major aviation training bases utilized for undergraduate flight training. In addition to the "OPNAV Study," the BSC was aware of plans to make Ingleside a major center for mine countermeasure activities. Therefore, the location of this airfield, for potential use by airborne mine clearing assets, is particularly valuable.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Same as Ingleside Naval Station.

d. Overall. Green.

8. NAF EL CENTRO

a. Mission. Green in accordance with "OPNAV Study." Very green due to its use as a facility to which we deploy Navy and USMC units in order to use SOCAL ranges in year-round clear weather.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow, based on desert location and resultant expense of operations in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Green, due to strong mission need.

9. NAS FALLON

a. Mission. Green. A particularly unique facility. See "OPNAV Study."

b. Land/Facilities. Green. See "OPNAV Study." Many new facilities.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Green. Nearly unique mission and capabilities.

10. NAS JACKSONVILLE

a. Mission. Green. Multi-purpose base supporting several types of flight aircraft. Note the new large unique engine test facility located at Jacksonville NADEP and recognize that given practically any future force level, Jacksonville will be required.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study." Note that bachelor housing is a particular problem.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Green.

11. NAS KEY WEST

a. Mission. Green. This base is key to drug operations and is also collocated with critical air-to-air training ranges. A fighter RAG is homeported in Key West for this purpose.

b. Land/Facilities. Green, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow, based on "OPNAV Study" quality of life evaluations.

d. Overall. Green, based on mission.

12. NAS LEMOORE

a. Mission. Green. One of the three West Coast master jet bases. As can be seen from the "OPNAV Study" probably the best air base we have, certainly the newest and one with best runway design, least potential air installation compatibility use zone (AICUZ) conflicts, and most room for expansion.

b. Land/Facilities. Green, in accordance with "OPNAV Study." Note that given the surplus of facilities available, as well as the above features, Lemoore was considered the primary air station consolidation site.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Inexpensive living.

d. Overall. Green.

13. NAF MAYPORT

a. Mission. Yellow, tinted with green due to the convenience of the airhead to the surface ship piers and the plans to move nuclear carriers to Mayport.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study" tinted with green because of the new LAMPS III facilities.

c. Contingency/Mobilization. Yellow. The airfield cannot be significantly expanded in the event of a surge/contingency.

d. Cost/Manpower. Green, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

e. Overall. Yellow. Strongly tinted with green.

14. NAS MEMPHIS

a. Mission. Green. Airfield collocated with aviation schools.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Green.

15. NAF MIDWAY

a. Mission. Yellow. The mission has decreased with changes in world political interests. The Navy no longer requires the field to be kept open continuously.

b. Land/Facilities. Red, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Red, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Red. See mission.

16. NAS MIRAMAR

a. Mission. Green. One of the three West Coast major jet bases. Close proximity to ranges (air space) particularly well suited to AAW mission training.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. There are significant potential AICUZ problems.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study." Coastal Southern California costly living conditions.

d. Overall. Yellow. Strongly tinged with green based on the extraordinary large cost of relocating this very extensive facility and proximity to training ranges.

17. NAS MOFFETT FIELD

a. Mission. Yellow. In reviewing the 1997 force profile, there will be an excess capacity of about one full VP base due to the planned 25 percent Navy force structure reduction. In the BSC review, it was noted that of all the VP bases, NAS Moffett is the most congested and difficult from which to operate.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Yellow. Mission related. See Barbers Point/Brunswick discussion. Note that this area is the most expensive area for our sailors to live.

18. NAS NORFOLK/NAS NORTH ISLAND

a. Mission. Green. Airhead for major fleet concentration and collocation of NADEPS.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green for Norfolk. Yellow for North Island based on the difference in cost of living between the two areas.

d. Overall. Green.

19. NAS OCEANA

a. Mission. Green. One of the two East Coast major jet bases.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Green. Necessary base when considering the F-14 force level planned for the out years.

20. NAS PENSACOLA

a. Mission. Green. One of the two major aviation training bases utilized for undergraduate flight training.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Relatively inexpensive area. See "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Green. Mission is essential.

21. NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND

a. Mission. Yellow. With three major jet bases on the West Coast, given the reduction of air wings, squadrons, and in some cases, aircraft per squadron, the BSC found no rationalization for maintaining all three of these jet bases on the West Coast. The BSC then looked at which bases had the capacity (physical and air space) to receive more aircraft, which bases have a similarity of mission (fighter, strike, etc.), and the extent of the facilities which would have to be relocated. Whidbey Island, which is primarily an A-6 base, could fit into a slightly expanded Lemoore facility, which also currently hosts strike aircraft. Whatever airplane replaces the A-6 will then be sited at the most modern air facility available.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. Especially noting the noise AICUZ problem and the older facilities at Whidbey Island. Limited room for expansion.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green, in accordance with the "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Yellow. Given the reduced force structure as discussed before, the third master jet base on the West Coast is no longer required. Also see discussion of Lemoore.

22. NAS WHITING FIELD

a. Mission. Green. It is the primary flight training base.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

c. Cost/Manpower. Green, in accordance with "OPNAV Study."

d. Overall. Green.

VI. TRAINING ACTIVITIES

A. BSC COMMENTS ON "OPNAV STUDY" EVALUATION FACTORS

1. The evaluation of the training facilities in the "OPNAV Study" was inconsistent. However, the BSC did concur with the premise that the most important aspect was "geographical location and the specific relationship (of the training site) with other units." The BSC also concurred that the important criteria was whether or not a training site was in the optimum location.

2. However, while the BSC did not disagree with the evaluation factor or the criteria, the BSC was surprised to see that NTCs Orlando, Great Lakes and RTCs Great Lakes and Orlando were evaluated as green using this criteria. The BSC believed, and later received confirmation from the Navy Director of Training, that it would be preferable if the training centers were collocated with the fleet, as is NTC San Diego, and that recruit training centers should be collocated with NTCs, both for synergism and to reduce change of station travel costs.

3. The BSC was also surprised that RTC and NTC Great Lakes were adjudged as unable to meet mobilization requirements and that NTC Orlando and NTC San Diego had not been graded on this category which the BSC considered critical to the issue of whether or not a training/recruit center can be closed.

B. BSC REVIEW PROCESS

1. The map in Section II shows the relationships between the OPNAV evaluation factors and the BSC/DOD criteria.

2. The BSC knew that Navy manpower requirements were reducing by nearly 100,000 by 1997 and that a much larger Navy had handled the manpower requirement with two recruit training centers (San Diego and Great Lakes). Given a 450-ship Navy of the future, it was difficult to see how three recruit training centers were now required.

3. The BSC then received testimony from the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Training and his staff. Different members of his staff provided several briefings on the recruit needs for the future, the recruit and training centers themselves, and possible different training alignments. The BSC determined that Great Lakes had the necessary room to accommodate any foreseeable surge or mobilization.

4. The BSC also learned that if recruit training centers could be reduced from two to three, Orlando was the one that should be closed, as:

a. It was not synergistically collocated with a fleet concentration,

b. The facilities were primarily classrooms (as compared to the expensive hot plant facilities in Great Lakes), and

c. Orlando facilities could be accommodated elsewhere, but Orlando could not accommodate either San Diego or Great Lakes.

5. The BSC also determined that, given the manpower numbers in 1997, with prudent management, the recruit flow could be handled with two recruit training centers.

C. BSC EVALUATION

1. NTC GREAT LAKES

a. Mission. Green, because virtually all of the Navy's steam propulsion, gas turbine and heavy equipment-intensive training is conducted at Great Lakes. The investment in technical facilities and equipment is tremendously expensive. This investment would have to be replicated if Great Lakes were closed. The Navy must have facilities to train personnel in steam and gas turbine propulsion systems.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. Reflects summary of "OPNAV Study" evaluation.

c. Contingency/Mobilization. Green. The BSC received briefings that indicated that Great Lakes training thru put could be significantly surged and expanded to accommodate a mobilization. Most of the training facilities were rated green by the BSC under contingency/mobilization. Unless a training facility is rated other than green, it will not be further discussed for contingency/mobilization.

d. Cost/Manpower. Green. The cost of living at Great Lakes is less expensive than the coastal California area.

e. Overall. Green because of its unique propulsion training assets, unique mobilization capability, and ability to grow.

2. NTC ORLANDO

a. Mission. Green but tinged with yellow. The near-term training workload is adequate; but with a manpower reduction of 100,000 by 1997, one of the RTC/NTCs could be eliminated. Since Orlando's mission involves primarily classroom-type training, its mission requirement is more flexible with regard to relocation.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. Reflects summary of "OPNAV Study" evaluation. Testimony of various officials highlighted that while some Orlando training facilities are new (primarily the Nuclear and "A" School buildings), the base is an ex-USAF base, and most of the facilities at the NTC/RTC complex are older ones. Additionally, the training space at Orlando is comprised primarily of easily and relatively inexpensively duplicated classrooms for training rather than the sophisticated training space at Great Lakes which houses the Navy's ship propulsion simulators/trainers.

c. Contingency/Mobilization. Yellow. The BSC found that the Navy could surge sufficiently with the capability at San Diego and Great Lakes. The surge/expansion capability at Orlando was limited (as it is in San Diego) because of the encroachment of the surrounding municipalities.

d. Cost/Manpower. Green. The cost of living in central Florida is relatively low compared to some East and West Coast ports.

e. Overall. Yellow because of the reduced mission requirement.

3. NTC SAN DIEGO

a. Mission. Green because of its unique collocation with units of the Pacific Fleet. This collocation significantly reduce the time spent traveling between the RTC, NTC, and ships in the fleet and is the ideal physical site for an RTC/NTC. Norfolk would be an equivalent site on the East Coast (if we had an RTC/NTC there).

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. Reflects summary of "OPNAV Study" evaluation.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. Southern California is a high cost-of-living area.

d. Overall. Green. Collocation of San Diego NTC/RTC with ships of the fleet has proved very effective and efficient over the years.

4. AEGIS CSEDS MOORESTOWN

a. Mission. Yellow. This facility could possibly be collocated with other AEGIS training facilities at NSWC Dahlgren.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. Reflects summary of "OPNAV Study" evaluation.

c. Contingency/Mobilization. Yellow. In the event of a mobilization, the Navy would probably expand Dahlgren to capture the synergism of collocation with other AEGIS training.

d. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. This is a relatively high cost-of-living area.

e. Overall. Yellow. Tinged green as the facility provides a fit-up facility while we are building and modifying AEGIS platforms.

5. NAVTECTRACEN PENSACOLA. An overall rating of green with a green in each grading factor which reflects the "OPNAV Study" evaluation.

6. TRITRAFAC BANGOR/TRITRAFAC KINGS BAY. An overall rating of green with a green in each grading factor. This completely agrees with the "OPNAV Study" evaluation except for the OPNAV yellow rating on family housing. The TRITRAFACs are unique to the bases and strategic missions they serve. Each TRITRAFAC houses over \$.5 billion in training equipment for the TRIDENT missile/submarine. These are clearly Step 5 facilities.

7. FLEMINEWARTRACEN CHARLESTON

a. Mission. Yellow. Many of the Navy's mine warfare units will be homeported in Ingleside in the future. This may augur a future relocation of FLEMINEWARTRACEN to Ingleside to capture the synergism of collocation of the training with mine warfare platforms and personnel.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. The "OPNAV Study" evaluation indicates that inadequate facilities resulted in a 10 to 20 percent loss or degradation in training man-days.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Charleston is a relatively low cost-of-living area.

d. Overall. Yellow.

8. SUBTRAFAC CHARLESTON

a. Mission. Yellow. Number of submarines at Charleston significantly decreases by the end of the decade.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. Submarine class supported by these facilities are scheduled to be decommissioned by the end of this decade. These facilities would have to be modified in the future for any potential new mission.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Charleston is a relatively low cost-of-living area.

d. Overall. Yellow, because of the future loss of mission.

9. FCTCLANT DAM NECK

a. Mission. Green. Collocated with the fleet for efficient use of manpower/travel.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. Many new facilities have been constructed at this base in recent years.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Cost of living in the Norfolk area is relatively low.

d. Overall. Green in all categories. Green overall.

10. FCTCPAC SAN DIEGO

a. Mission. Green. Collocated with the fleet for efficient use of manpower/travel.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. Excellent facilities with many new buildings.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. Cost of living is relatively high in San Diego.

d. Overall. Green, because of high mission rating for collocation with fleet.

11. NETC NEWPORT

a. Mission. Green. Good long-term requirement for the mission. Consistent with summary of "OPNAV Study" ratings.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. There is a shortage of family and bachelor housing. An expansion of sewage treatment facilities is also required.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Relatively low cost of living in Newport area.

d. Overall. Green. Mission driven.

12. NETPMSA SAUFLEY FIELD

a. Mission. Yellow. Aviation training is no longer performed here. The mission is not tied to this area.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. Rating consistent with summary of "OPNAV Study" rating factors.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Relatively low cost of living in this area.

d. Overall. Yellow, because the mission could be relocated.

13. NAVSCSCOL ATHENS

a. Mission. Yellow. The school is not tied to this location. It could be relocated to a naval complex elsewhere.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. Rating consistent with the "OPNAV Study" rating factors.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Relatively low cost of living in the Athens area.

d. Overall. Yellow. Tinged green due to a decision to continue to maintain this highly visible and well-known source of our high quality supply officers.

14. NAVDAMCONTRACEN PHILADELPHIA

a. Mission. Yellow. This activity is a tenant at NAVSTA Philadelphia which is recommended for closure elsewhere in the report. Prior to this study, plans were already underway to consolidate damage control training at Great Lakes. The closure of NAVSTA Philadelphia would make it inefficient to keep the NAVDAMCONTRACEN enclave open.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow. Poor facility conditions contribute to the loss or degradation of 10 to 20 percent of training man-hours.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. The BSC report originally showed this rating as green. That rating is incorrect. The rating should be yellow, the same as NAVSTA Philadelphia because the cost of living is high in Philadelphia.

d. Overall. Yellow. This tenant activity needs to be consolidated because of the closure of the host command and the Philadelphia naval complex.

15. FLTASWTRACEN NORFOLK

a. Mission. Green. Vital ASW training mission collocated with fleet units.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. Rating consistent with summary of "OPNAV Study" rating factors.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Cost of living in Norfolk area is relatively low.

d. Overall. Green in all categories. Green overall.

16. FLTASWTRACEN SAN DIEGO

a. Mission. Green. Vital ASW training mission collocated with fleet units.

b. Land/Facilities. Green. Rating consistent with summary of "OPNAV Study" rating factors.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. Cost of living in San Diego is relatively high.

d. Overall. Green overall because of the importance of its mission to local fleet units.

17. FLETRACENLANT NORFOLK

a. Mission. Green. Vital fleet training center in direct day-to-day support of fleet units.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow.

c. Cost/Manpower. Green. Cost of living in Norfolk is relatively low.

d. Overall. Green overall because of local support to the fleet.

18. FLETRACENPAC SAN DIEGO

a. Mission. Green. Vital fleet training center in direct day-to-day support of fleet units.

b. Land/Facilities. Yellow.

c. Cost/Manpower. Yellow. Cost of living in San Diego is relatively high.

d. Overall. Green overall because of local support to the fleet.

VII. MEDICAL

A. BSC COMMENTS ON "OPNAV STUDY" EVALUATION FACTORS

1. The "OPNAV Study" showed that the Navy's 1997 requirement for medical support does not decrease despite declines in military end-strength. This decline is more than offset by increases in dependency rates and military retirees. Additionally the contingency need for hospitals provided no based to seek hospital closures as a category. Closures, however, of the base or complex served by a hospital could result in a hospital closure as a "follower activity" as described in the Navy's report. The "OPNAV Study" evaluated all the Navy hospitals without knowing where future base closures would occur. This evaluation showed no shift in patient loading and offered no indicator as to which hospitals would be in excess.

B. BSC REVIEW PROCESS

1. The map in Section II shows the relationships between the OPNAV evaluation factors and the BSC/DOD criteria. Since hospitals were not evaluated for closure as a category, the military value criteria were not evaluated by the BSC.

C. BSC EVALUATIONS

1. The BSC evaluated the requirement for hospitals after all other potential base closure candidates had been determined. The BSC then considered the support role relationship between Navy hospitals and the active duty military population for major bases proposed for closure. The large military reductions proposed for NAS Whidbey Island, NAVSTA Long Beach, and NTC Orlando make it advantageous to close the hospitals at those bases and to reassign the medical personnel thus freed up to other naval hospitals where shortages exist.. These transfers of medical personnel will permit the Navy to reduce CHAMPUS costs/improve medical treatment at receiver locations.

VIII. CONSTRUCTION BATTALION CENTERS

A. BSC COMMENTS ON "OPNAV STUDY" EVALUATION FACTORS

1. The "OPNAV Study" showed all three Navy Construction Centers with essentially all evaluation factors "green." If one merely counted the grades, there are three yellow facility rating factors at Port Hueneme and four at Davisville. This would indicate that the two sites are comparable in facilities. However, nothing could be further from the truth. Davisville has been in a virtual moth-ball status for over 15 years with very little investment in facilities made at Davisville in that time period. On the other hand, throughout the 1980's, facilities at Port Hueneme have been modernized and upgraded, especially with funds resulting from our commercial lease of Port Hueneme base port facilities.

B. BSC REVIEW PROCESS

1. The map in Section II illustrates the relationships between the OPNAV evaluation factors and the BSC military value criteria.

C. BSC EVALUATIONS

1. The BSC evaluations assigned a red rating to Davisville in mission because the SEABEE battalions it was built to support have been decommissioned. Davisville's mobilization mission can be easily absorbed by Port Hueneme and Gulfport. Conversely, facilities at Davisville could not accommodate the Port Hueneme/Gulfport missions without tremendous modernization, upgrading, and expansion. Accordingly there is no continued need for Davisville.

IX. RDT&E/TECHNICAL PRODUCTION/ORDNANCE PRODUCTS

The RDT&E Facility Consolidation Working Group evaluated all Navy laboratories for potential closure/consolidation. When this study was presented to the BSC, the BSC requested that the RDT&E working group put their evaluation in the same format (red, yellow and green ratings) as all the other categories had been presented. After this was done by the RDT&E working group, the BSC used the first four DOD criteria to evaluate RDT&E facilities. The map in Section II compares the OPNAV Evaluation Factors with the first four DOD BSC criteria. The OPNAV ratings and the BSC ratings were consistent and supported the conclusions of the RDT&E Facility Consolidation Work Group Study.

When the return on investment (Cobra Data) of these consolidations was calculated, the BSC found that a few RDT&E working group recommendations were not fiscally logical (move NAVSSES, Philadelphia; move all of DTRC, Annapolis, etc.). The RDT&E working group revised their recommendations for the BSC to move fewer facilities, and the BSC evaluated the revised proposals.

X

AIR

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION, EL TORO, CALIFORNIAMISSION

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California, provides facilities for the training and support of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific aviation units. The mission of these units is to conduct air operations in support of the Fleet Marine Force, to include offensive air support, anti-air warfare, assault support, aerial reconnaissance (including active and passive electronic counter-measures), and control of aircraft and missiles.

El Toro is the headquarters of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), with Marine Air Group (MAG)-11, MAG-46 (Reserves), Marine Air Control Group (MACG)-38, and Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG)-37 units assigned. These units utilize F/A-18, KC-130, C-12, UH-1 and T-39 aircraft. Other 3d MAW units are stationed at MCAS's Tustin, Camp Pendleton and Yuma. The 3d MAW forms the aviation combat element of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). El Toro is also home to a Staff Non-Commissioned Officer Academy.

BASE LOADING (FY97)

	USMC	Other Service	Civilians	Total
Station	617	9392	867	1,577
Students	126			
Supported	4,849	215	963	6,027
Subtotal	5,592	308	1,820	7,730
Dependents				7,700
Retirees				16,621
Total Using Base Facilities				32,051

EVALUATIONMISSION SUITABILITYSite Specific - GREEN

Air station ideally located since it is required to provide the aviation support for the ground and logistics elements of the MEF, which mandates close proximity to Camp Pendleton, ranges, and maneuver areas.

Deployment - GREEN

Less than 50% of flight time is spent in transit to training and operating areas.

Relationship - YELLOW

The AICUZ has been adopted by the local community, which provides significant protection from encroachment. There are some serious encroachment concerns, primarily stemming from major land owners desires to minimize AICUZ restrictions.

Weather - GREEN

Less than 10% of annual missions are degraded by weather. Location provides maximum number of available flying days.

Survivability - GREEN

Located away from areas of foreign national concentration.

Maneuver Space - GREEN

Airspace associated with MCAS El Toro is congested because of close proximity of MCAS Tustin, two major commercial airports and air traffic congestion associated with the southwestern United States. However, delays in arrival/departure clearance are under 10%. El Toro aircraft have easy access to some of the best air to air and air to ground ranges in the country. Over water ranges along with those located at MCB Camp Pendleton, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, and MCAS Yuma are routinely exercised by El Toro aircraft.

AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES

Operations - GREEN

Parking Apron 707,000 square feet, providing a surplus of 172,000 square feet (of which 86,000 square feet is unusable inadequate). Runways and taxiways are adequate.

Support - GREEN

Maintenance facilities: 902,000 square feet, providing a minor surplus of 56,000 square feet. Four state of the art maintenance hangers are planned for FY94/95 for \$10 M. Storage: 818,000 square feet, providing a very minor surplus of 8,000 square feet. A HAZ/FLAM storage facility is planned for FY95 at \$2.3 M.

Infrastructure - GREEN

In general, facilities are adequate. Two waste disposal projects are planned for FY92/93 at a cost of .88 M. All environmental problems are being adequately addressed in the program.

Administrative - GREEN

Administrative: 443,000 square feet, providing a minor deficiency of 3,000 square feet, well above 84% of P-80 criteria.

QUALITY OF FACILITIES

Condition/Technology - GREEN/YELLOW

Facilities are adequate condition and support mission accomplishment with difficulty because of current backlog of repair valued at \$81.43 million, encompassing a concerted program to

effect repairs/replacements that would upgrade numerous older facilities to better support current uses and standards. Some technological deficiencies will require facility replacement, such as the 4 maintenance hangers under operational facilities. Two tank repair projects are planned for FY93, at a total cost of \$.72 M.

Configuration - GREEN

The Air Station is well configured to support the operational mission. The only configuration shortfall arises from a portion of the Family Housing assets being within high noise areas. All recent housing has been developed at nearby MCAS Tustin in order to minimize this difficulty.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Housing - The Marine Corps relies on the local community to provide adequate, affordable housing for married military personnel, bachelor officers and senior grade enlisted personnel. In those areas where suitable housing is not available, we request Congressional authority to build housing on base. Junior grade enlisted bachelors (E1-E4) are all housed on base.

Family Housing - YELLOW

Consists of 2,609 homes. The 1,506 unit deficiency is being addressed through numerous actions, including appropriated funds, use of litigation settlement proceeds and sale of land for family housing construction. The high costs of real estate in the Southern California area creates many hardships on military families. Goal of eliminating the deficiency is being aggressively pursued. Whole house rehabilitation is planned for 389 units of Wherry Housing in FY93/94.

Bachelor Housing - GREEN

BEQ - There are existing adequate BEQ's to accommodate all enlisted personnel.

BOQ - There is a requirement for 137 units, with 141 units in inventory (of which 105 are inadequate).

Recreational/Amenities - GREEN

Overall the Base has adequate facilities. Civil opportunities in the region are excellent.

Medical - GREEN

Inpatient care is available at MCB Camp Pendleton. The Base medical clinic provides adequate outpatient care.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Workforce - YELLOW

Most skills are available in local community. However, high cost of living and competitive job market in southern California area makes it difficult for the Station to attract and/or retain talented individuals.

Transportation - GREEN

Excellent road networks; may become crowded during peak hours. Commercial airports are available at John Wayne Airport (15 minutes away), in Newport Beach (half-hour drive) and Los Angeles International Airport (1-1/2 hour drive). MCAS El Toro is within one hour drive to ocean deep-water transportation.

Infrastructure - YELLOW

Local utilities adequate. Severe lack of affordable housing within a one-hour commute.

Industry - GREEN

The southern California area has representatives from nearly every major defense contractor available within a short commute to the Air Station.

AIR

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION, TUSTIN, CALIFORNIA

MISSION

Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California, is one of two Marine Corps' rotary-wing aircraft bases supporting I MEF. Its mission is to provide services, material, and training in support of units of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), and other activities and units as designated by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The major unit at Tustin is Marine Air Group (MAG)-16, which provides helicopter-borne support operations for the Fleet Marine Force, particularly the ground elements located at MCB Camp Pendleton and MCAGCC Twentynine Palms. This unit utilizes CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters. With the 3d MAW units at MCAS El Toro, MCAS Yuma and MCAS Camp Pendleton, the elements at Tustin form the aviation combat element of a Marine Expeditionary Force. Tustin is also home to a Naval Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment (NAMTRADET), a Mobile Calibration Complex Three (MCC-3), and an Armed Services Reserve Center administered by the Army.

BASE LOADING (FY97)

	USMC	Other Service	Civilians	Total
Station	227	32	37	296
Students	219			219
Supported	4,021	58	63	4,142
Subtotal	4,467	90	100	4,657
Dependents				3,000
Retirees (USMC)				1,230
Total Using Base Facilities				8,887

EVALUATION

MISSION SUITABILITY

Site Specific - GREEN

Air station ideally located since it is located in proximity to the I MEF ground components for which it provides aviation support. Its location near MCAS El Toro permits sharing of logistic and personnel support functions, which achieves significant efficiencies.

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Deployment - GREEN
Less than 50% of flight time is spent in transit from/to training and operating areas.

Relationship - YELLOW
The civil community has adopted the AICUZ. There are some serious encroachment concerns, primarily stemming from the efforts of major land owners to minimize restrictions under the AICUZ.

Weather - GREEN
Location provides maximum number of flying days. Less than 10% of missions adversely affected by weather.

Survivability - GREEN
The activity is located away from foreign embassies, consulates, and areas of foreign national concentration.

Maneuver Space - GREEN
Airspace associated with MCAS Tustin is congested due to close proximity of MCAS El Toro and two major commercial airports, as well as the air traffic congestion associated with the southwestern United States. However, less than 10% of arrivals/ departures are delayed.

AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES

Operations - GREEN
Parking apron: 572,000 square yards, providing a surplus of 84,000 square yards. Runways and taxiways are fully adequate.

Support - YELLOW
Maintenance facilities: 870,000 square feet, which has a surplus of 372,000 square feet. However, much of the maintenance space is within the two antiquated blimp hangers, which does not allow for efficient use of available space. Storage: 195,000 square feet (including 50,000 square feet of inadequate), with a deficiency of 58,000 square feet.

Infrastructure - GREEN
No major deficiencies. Most utilities are provided through connections with civil systems. All significant environmental problems are being addressed within the program.

Administrative - YELLOW
Administrative: 64,000 square feet of which 31,000 square feet is inadequate. Requirement is 57,000 square feet.

QUALITY OF FACILITIES

Condition/Technology - GREEN/YELLOW
Facilities are in adequate condition and support mission accomplishment with minor difficulties with current backlog of repair valued at slightly less than \$3 million. The two antiquated blimp hangers represent the major deficiencies in technology.

Configuration - GREEN

The Air Station is well configured to meet mission requirements.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Housing - The Marine Corps relies on the local community

to provide adequate, affordable housing for married military personnel, bachelor officers and senior grade enlisted personnel. In those areas where suitable housing is not available, we request Congressional authority to build housing on base. Junior grade enlisted bachelors (E1-E4) are all housed on base.

Family Housing - YELLOW

Is part of the MCAS El Toro requirement. Consists of 2,609 homes. The 1,506 unit deficiency is being addressed through numerous actions, including appropriated funding, use of litigation proceeds and sale of land for family housing construction. The high costs of real estate in the Southern California area creates many hardships on military families. Goal of eliminating the deficiency is being aggressively pursued.

Bachelor Housing - GREEN

BEQ - There are existing BEQs to accommodate all personnel.

BOQ - Existing deficiencies are not significant.

Recreation/Amenities - GREEN

Overall the Base has adequate facilities, with excellent civil community opportunities.

Medical - GREEN

Inpatient care is available at MCB Camp Pendleton. The Air Station medical clinic provides adequate outpatient care.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Workforce - YELLOW

Most skills are available in local community. However, high cost of living and competitive job market in Orange County makes it difficult for the Station to attract and retain talented individuals.

Transportation - GREEN

Excellent road networks may become crowded during peak hours. Commercial airports are available at John Wayne Airport (15 minutes away), in Newport Beach (half-hour drive) and Los Angeles International Airport (1-1/2 hour drive). MCAS Tustin is within one hour drive to ocean deep-water transportation.

Infrastructure - YELLOW

Local utilities adequate. Severe lack of affordable housing within one-hour commute.

MAR 1 195

Industry - GREEN

The southern California area has representatives from nearly every major defense contractor available within a short commute to the Air Station.

AIR

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA

MISSION

Marine Corps Air Station, Camp Pendleton, California, is one of two Marine Corps' rotary-wing aircraft bases supporting I MEF. Its mission is to provide services, material, and training in support of units of the 3d Marine aircraft Wing (MAW), and other activities and units as designated by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The major unit at MCAS Camp Pendleton is Marine Air Group (MAG)-39, which provides utility helicopter, aerial reconnaissance, and air control support for the Fleet Marine Force, particularly the ground elements located at MCB Camp Pendleton. This unit utilizes a mix of helicopter gunships (AH-1), passenger carrying light helicopters (UH-1), and armed reconnaissance aircraft (OV-10). The 3d MAW units at MCAS El Toro, MCAS Yuma and MCAS Tustin, plus the elements at MCAS Camp Pendleton, form the aviation combat element of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). MCAS Camp Pendleton is also home to a Naval Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment (NAMTRADET).

BASE LOADING (FY97)

	USMC	Other Service	Civilians	Total
Station	162		14	176
Students	155			155
3d MAW units	3,040	31	6	3,077
Total Using Base Facilities				3,408

EVALUATION

MISSION SUITABILITY

Site Specific - GREEN

Air station ideally located since it is collocated with the I MEF ground components aboard MCB Camp Pendleton for which it provides aviation support.

Deployment - GREEN

Could not be better, since the Air Station is interior to its major training area.

Relationship - GREEN

The AICUZ is totally internal to MCB Camp Pendleton. No conflicts.

Weather - GREEN

Location provides adequate number of flying days. Less than 10% of missions are degraded by weather.

Survivability - GREEN

Activity is located away from foreign embassies, consulates, and areas of concentration of foreign nationals.

Maneuver Space - GREEN

Under 10% of arrival/departure clearances are delayed.

AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES

Operations - GREEN

Parking apron: 186,000 square yards (including 26,000 square yards of inadequate), with a sizable deficiency of 106,000 square yards. No significant runway or taxiway deficiencies.

Support - RED

Maintenance facilities: 302,000 square feet with a sizable deficiency of 130,000 square feet. Storage: 72,000 square feet, with a significant deficiency of 177,000 square feet. However, much of these deficiencies are currently addressed through use of the contiguous MCB Camp Pendleton facility assets.

Infrastructure - YELLOW

Significant deficiencies in potable water, waste water treatment, and electrical distribution systems are present at MCB Camp Pendleton, on which the MCAS relies for support. A transportation project of \$3.1 M is planned for FY94. An airfield communication and electrical infrastructure project of \$3.9 M. is planned for FY95.

Administrative - RED

Administrative: 11,000 square feet, with the significant deficiency of 23,000 square feet. However, much of the deficiency is currently addressed through use of the contiguous MCB Camp Pendleton facility assets.

QUALITY OF FACILITIES

Condition/Technology - YELLOW/GREEN

Facilities are in adequate condition and support mission accomplishment with minor difficulties with current backlog of repair estimated at less than \$3.0 million. The biggest detriment to state of the art upgrade is the requirement for new military construction to replace abundant temporary facilities. Aircraft fire/rescue station modifications are planned for FY92 at a cost of \$.65 M.

Configuration - YELLOW

The Air Station is adequately configured to meet its operational mission. The inherent limitations of being in a flood prone

valley adjacent to the main road and railway ingress and egress for MCB Camp Pendleton has resulted in a more compact operation than ideal. At present this is more of a limitation on future flexibility than performance of current mission.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Housing - The Marine Corps relies on the local community to provide adequate, affordable housing for married military personnel, bachelor officers and senior grade enlisted personnel. In those areas where suitable housing is not available, we request Congressional authority to build housing on base. Junior grade enlisted bachelors (E1-E4) are all housed on base.

Family Housing - YELLOW
MCB Camp Pendleton has a significant shortage of family housing units, which is aggravated by the extreme high cost of civil units available. Multiple appropriated fund and third party financing projects are being pursued to address this deficiency.

Bachelor Housing - GREEN
Adequate bachelor quarters are available.

Recreational/Amenities - GREEN
Supported by MCB Camp Pendleton. Existing facilities are adequate, with excellent civil community opportunities.

Medical - GREEN
Supported by Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Workforce - Green
Most required skills are readily available.

Transportation - GREEN
Transportation networks which serve the area include roads and highways (I-5 and I-15), railway (Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe), commercial and general aviation and regional fuel pipelines. Deep water ports exist in San Diego and Long Beach, making sea-borne transportation readily accessible.

Infrastructure - YELLOW
Off-base affordable rentals are rare. Little or no construction is directed towards the military family. There is a critical housing shortage in the entire region due to slow or controlled growth policies. There are adequate local utilities except for water. Purchase of imported water would be required in order to support any additional commands.

Industry - GREEN
Local industry is compatible with the Air Station's needs.

AIR

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION, KANEOHE BAY, HAWAII

MISSION

Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, maintains and operates facilities and provides services and material to support operations of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and other activities and units designated by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Kaneohe Bay is also home to the Naval Ocean Systems Center Hawaii Lab (NOSC).

The 1st MEB consists of a ground combat element, air combat element and combat service support element. The ground combat element consists of three battalions of the 3rd Marine Regiment reinforced by one battalion of the 12th Marines. The Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) provides combat service support. The air combat element, Marine Air Group (MAG)-24, is a composite fixed-wing/rotary-wing group, utilizing CH-46, CH-53, HH-46, UC-12, and F/A-18 aircraft. 1st MEB provides units for WESTPAC deployment; at any given time, a contingent made up of air, ground, and service support elements is afloat, one is preparing to deploy, and one has recently returned.

BASE LOADING (FY97)

	USMC	Other Service	Civilians	Total
Station	479	103	1,276	1,858
Supported	8,660	463	1,089	10,212
Subtotal	9,139	566	2,365	12,070
Dependents				7,000
Retirees				3,000
Total Using Base Facilities				22,070

EVALUATION

MISSION SUITABILITY

Site Specific - GREEN

Site ideally suited to provide domestic location for forward based Pacific Marine combat elements. This site offers best ultimate "fallback" position if Western Pacific withdrawal is effected.

Deployment - GREEN

Less than 50% of flight time is required for transit to/from training and operating areas.

Relationship - GREEN

The AICUZ has been adopted by the local community. There are no serious encroachment concerns on air operations.

Weather - GREEN

Though largely subtropical, weather permits maximum number of available training days, while providing opportunities for training in adverse conditions. Less than 10% of missions are adversely affected by weather.

Survivability - GREEN

Activity is located away from foreign embassies, consulates, and areas of foreign national concentration.

Maneuver Space - GREEN

There are less than 10% delays in arrival/departure clearances.

AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES

Operations - GREEN

Apron space of 164,000 square feet with a minor surplus at projected FY97 reduced loadings. No significant deficiencies with runway or taxiways.

Support - YELLOW

Maintenance facilities: 923,000 square feet with minor deficiencies. Storage: 752,603 square feet, of which 40% is inadequate, but approved for replacement through the pending Pearl City Annex land sale.

Infrastructure - GREEN

No major deficiencies. A recent upgrade of waste water treatment facilities has brought the facility into compliance with Clean Water Act standards. No significant environmental problems.

Administrative - GREEN

Administrative: 456,000 square feet, with an approximate 91,000 square-foot surplus.

QUALITY OF FACILITIES

Condition/Technology - GREEN/YELLOW

Facilities are in better than adequate condition, and mission accomplishment is attained with little reservation with current backlog of repair being relatively minor at \$12.2 million. Technology deficiencies stem from the age and functional design of facilities, many of which have been adapted to their current use over the years.

Configuration - GREEN

The Air Station is well configured to meet mission assignments.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Housing - The Marine Corps relies on the local community to provide adequate, affordable housing for married military personnel, bachelor officers and senior grade enlisted personnel. In those areas where suitable housing is not available, Congressional authority is pursued to obtain housing on base.

Family Housing - YELLOW
Family housing on Oahu is centrally managed by the Army. In general, all Services on Oahu have significant shortages, which is increasingly aggravated by the continued upward spiral of the already very high cost housing market.

Bachelor Housing - GREEN

BEQ - At projected FY97 loadings, there will be less than a 7% deficiency in adequate troop housing.

BOQ- There is no deficit of adequate BOQ spaces at MCAS, Kaneohe Bay.

Recreational/Amenities - GREEN

Overall the Base has adequate facilities.

Medical - GREEN

There is no hospital on-station; the Air Station is serviced by the Tripler Army Hospital, which is located approximately 30 minutes away. Outpatient care is provided through the Station Medical Clinic.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Workforce - GREEN

There is little difficulty attracting and retaining qualified personnel, due to the relative lack of outside competition for these skills and the highly desirable job location. The Air Station is a major employer of technically skilled personnel.

Transportation - GREEN

Road network is adequate. Deep-water ocean ports are within a 45-minute drive. Honolulu International Airport is also within a 45-minute drive from the Air Station.

Infrastructure - YELLOW

Utilities are limited but adequate. Housing is expensive, due to the proximity of the Station to popular vacation areas and Oahu's continuing real estate boom.

Industry - GREEN

Local industry is compatible with the Air Station and meets all of its needs.

AIR

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA

MISSION

The mission of Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina, is to provide services, material, and training in support of units of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), and other activities and units as designated by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The major unit at Beaufort is Marine Air Group (MAG)-31, which provides fixed wing assault, training, and support operations for the Fleet Marine Force. Assigned aircraft include the F/A-18, CH-46, and C-12, and, with the 2d MAW units at MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS New River, form the aviation combat element of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).

BASE LOADING (FY97)

	USMC	Other Service	Civilians	Total
Station	359	68	448	875
Students	30			30
Supported	2,520	68	271	2,859
Subtotal	2,909	136	719	3,764
Dependents				4,090
Retirees				916
Total Using Base Facilities				8,770

EVALUATION

MISSION SUITABILITY

Site Specific - GREEN

Site provides excellent access to special use air space, including the Military Operating Area overlying the Air Station that enables airfield defense training.

Deployment - GREEN

Less than 50% of flight time is used in transit from/to most frequently used training and operating areas.

Relationship - GREEN

The local community is in the process of adopting the AICUZ, which is now in update. No significant encroachment concerns.

Weather - GREEN

Location provides adequate diversity of weather for well-rounded all-weather training. Less than 10% of the missions are adversely affected by weather.

Survivability - GREEN

Facility is located away from foreign embassies, consulates, or areas of foreign national concentrations.

Maneuver Space - GREEN

Airspace associated with MCAS Beaufort is abundant and easily accessed. Air-to-air and air-to-ground training opportunities are numerous and low altitude training routes facilitate ranges. Delays in arrival/departure clearances are below 10%.

AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES

Operations - GREEN

Apron space currently reflects a some deficiencies, but will be significantly improved upon completion (MILCON moratorium) of the FY90 aviation armament project, which eliminates current conflicts and provides approximately \$1.0 M in additional apron. Runways and taxiways are adequate.

Support - GREEN

Maintenance facilities: 489,000 square feet, which provides a minor surplus; Storage: 351,000 square feet, which provides a minor surplus of 20,000 square feet.

Infrastructure - GREEN

Largely adequate. There is an underground storage tank replacement/upgrade planned for FY92 at \$.65 M, and upgrades/extension of the jet fuel delivery system planned for FY94, \$.5 M. No major environmental problems.

Administrative - GREEN

Administrative: 111,000 square feet, which provides a minor surplus.

QUALITY OF FACILITIES

Condition/Technology - GREEN/GREEN

Facilities are in superb condition and support mission accomplishment without reservation with current backlog of repair valued at only \$7.3 million of routine work.

Configuration - GREEN

The Air Station is well configured to support all aspects of mission assignment. The placement of family housing off-base provides the needed separation from operations and resulting impacts.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Housing - The Marine Corps relies on the local community to provide adequate, affordable housing for married military personnel, bachelor officers and senior grade enlisted personnel. In those areas where suitable housing is not available, we request Congressional authority to build housing on base. Junior grade enlisted bachelors (E1-E4) are all housed on base.

Family Housing - GREEN

Consists of 1,276 homes and 157 mobile home spaces. No family housing construction deficit; local community can support requirements. \$26.2M family housing major repair project is currently providing a whole house rehabilitation for the 1100 Capehart type units. A multi-purpose building is planned for the family housing area for FY95 at a cost of \$2.3 million.

Bachelor Housing - YELLOW

BEQ - There are existing BEQS to accommodate all personnel. 70 percent of the existing BEQ spaces are inadequate due to age or configuration. A BEQ construction project for 315 PN is planned for FY94 at a cost of \$2.25 M.

BOQ - There is no deficit of adequate BOQ spaces at MCAS, Beaufort.

Recreational/Amenities - GREEN

Overall the Base has adequate facilities, with good civilian community opportunities.

Medical - GREEN

The 45-bed USNH Beaufort satisfies the needs of the Base.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Workforce - GREEN

Little requirement for unique employment specialties. Local community provides adequate skills to support employment requirements. The military is a major employer in the community.

Transportation - GREEN

Adequate roads and access to navigable water. Commercial airports available in Savannah, GA, within one hour's drive, and Charleston, SC, within two hours.

Infrastructure - GREEN

Local utilities are adequate; sufficient affordable housing in area.

Industry - GREEN

Local industry meets requirements, with no conflicts with operations.

AIR

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION, CHERRY POINT, NORTH CAROLINA

MISSION

Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, provides facilities for the training and support of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic aviation units. The mission of these units is to conduct air operations in support of the Fleet Marine Force, to include offensive air support, antiair warfare, assault support, aerial reconnaissance (including active and passive electronic countermeasures), and control of aircraft and missiles. To carry out the training portion of its mission, the air station operates an air-to-ground bombing target complex and the outlying areas of MCALF Bogue and MCOLF Atlantic.

Cherry Point is the headquarters of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), with Marine Air Group (MAG)-14, MAG-32, Marine Air Control Group (MACG)-38, Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG)-27, and Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron (MWHS)-2 units assigned. Assigned aircraft include AV-8, A-6 (transitioning to F/A-18), EA-6B, KC-130, HH-46, C-9, and T-39. Other 2d MAW units are stationed at MCAS New River and MCAS Beaufort. The 2d MAW forms the aviation combat element of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Cherry Point is also home to a Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) and a Naval Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment (NAMTRADET).

BASE LOADING (FY97)

	USMC	Other Service	Civilians	Total
Base	838	327	4,585	5,750
Students	321			321
Supported	7,219	149	1,610	8,978
Subtotal	8,378	476	6,195	15,049
Dependents				10,050
Retirees (USMC)				1,981
Total Using Base Facilities				27,080

EVALUATION

MISSION SUITABILITY

Site Specific - GREEN

Air station ideally located since it is required to provide the aviation support for the East Coast MEF, which mandates close proximity to Camp Lejeune, which provides the ground combat element and combat service support units for the MEF.

Deployment - GREEN

Less than 50% of flight time is used in transit to/from training/operating areas. Most ranges are essentially immediately adjacent to the facility.

Relationship - GREEN

The AICUZ has been adopted by both local jurisdictions. There are no serious encroachment concerns.

Weather - GREEN

Location provides adequate diversity of weather for well-rounded all-weather training. Less than 10% of missions are adversely affected by weather.

Survivability - GREEN

Activity is located away from foreign embassies, consulates, and areas of foreign national concentration.

Maneuver Space - GREEN

Under 10% of missions experience delays in arrival/departure clearance.

AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES

Operations - GREEN

parking apron of 643,000 square yards, with a minor deficiency of 17,000 square yards. A FY94 carrier landing area at \$3.0 M is planned for construction. No major deficiencies in runway or taxiways.

Support - GREEN

Maintenance facilities of 696,000 square feet provide minor surpluses of 55,000 square feet; Planned additional maintenance facilities include a FY94 Ops/maintenance project at \$5.46 M, a FY95 engine sound suppression facility at \$7.0 M, and a FY95 Liquid Ox/N generating facility at \$.72 M. Other operational improvements include a FY94 applied instruction project at \$3.6 M, a FY94 F/A-18 weapons training facility at \$4.0 M, and a FY95 EA-6 trainer facility. However, storage of 1.896 M square feet has a significant deficiency of 532,000 square feet.

Infrastructure - YELLOW

Numerous deficiencies. Highest priority is being addressed through a FY92 upgrade of waste water treatment at \$17 M, and cleanup and replacement of 2 polishing ponds containing hazardous waste (scope not yet fully defined):

1

Administrative - GREEN
Administrative: 635,000 square feet, which provides minor surpluses if inadequate facilities are considered.

QUALITY OF FACILITIES

Condition/Technology - GREEN/YELLOW
Facilities are in good condition and support mission accomplishment with current backlog of repair valued at \$20.26 M, much of which is to address problems of an aging plant account.

Configuration - GREEN
The base is close to ideally configured. There is excellent association of operational and logistical support, with very good separation of personnel support and operations.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Housing - The Marine Corps relies on the local community to provide adequate, affordable housing for married military personnel, bachelor officers and senior grade enlisted personnel. In those areas where suitable housing is not available, we request Congressional authority to build housing on base. Junior grade enlisted bachelors (E1-E4) are all housed on base.

Family Housing - GREEN
Consists of 2,819 homes and 81 mobile home spaces. No family housing construction deficit; local community can support requirements. Phases 3 and 4 of the whole-house rehabilitation program for Capehart housing scheduled for FY92 and FY94 at a cost of \$22.0 M.

Bachelor Housing - GREEN
BEQ - Bachelor housing spaces exist to accommodate all enlisted personnel.
BOQ - There is no deficit of adequate BOQ spaces at the MCAS.

Recreational/Amenities - GREEN
Overall the Base has adequate facilities, with good civil community opportunities.

Medical - GREEN
The 30-bed hospital will be replaced in FY93 through the Medical MCON Program.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Workforce - YELLOW
Specialized skills required by NADEP are not indigenous to this area; however, many of these jobs are filled by prior military personnel who choose to locate in this area as a result of nationwide advertising/hiring program. MCAS Cherry Point is a major employer in the area.

Transportation - GREEN

Adequate roads, access to navigable waters, local commercial airport at New Bern, within a 30-minute drive. Rail system connecting with the Air Station provides ready access to ports of embarkation.

Infrastructure - GREEN

Adequate local utilities at MCAS Cherry Point; marginal utilities at MCOLF Atlantic and MCALF Bogue Field. Inadequate utilities at MAEWR and related range complex. Affordable housing is available at all areas.

Industry - YELLOW

Little to no synergistic industrial relations near MCAS Cherry Point or its outlying areas. Some conflict between resort/retirement communities and MCALF Bogue air operations. Agricultural base is compatible with air operations.

AIR

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION, NEW RIVER, NORTH CAROLINA

MISSION

Marine Corps Air Station, New River, North Carolina, is the Marine Corps' principal rotary-wing aircraft base on the East Coast. Its mission is to provide services, material, and training in support of units of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), and other activities and units as designated by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The major units at New River are Marine Air Group (MAG)-26 and MAG-29, which provide helicopter assault, training, and combat support for the Fleet Marine Force, particularly the ground elements located at MCB Camp Lejeune. These units utilize OV-10 aircraft and AH-1, UH-1, CH-46, and CH-53 helicopters, and, with the 2d MAW units at MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS Beaufort, form the aviation combat element of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). New River is also home to the Naval Aviation Observer (NAO) School and a Naval Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment (NAMTRADET).

BASE LOADING (FY97)

	USMC	Other Service	Civilians	Total
Station	318	73	98	489
Students	104			104
Supported	4,204	81	217	4,502
Subtotal	4,626	154	315	5,095
Dependents				5,322
Total Using Base Facilities				10,417

EVALUATION

MISSION SUITABILITY

Site Specific - GREEN

Air station ideally located since it is collocated with the II MEF ground components at Camp Lejeune for which it provides aviation support.

Deployment - GREEN
Collocation with MCB Camp Lejeune, which contains most training/operating areas, ensures that less than 50% of flight time is used in transit.

Relationship - GREEN
While the community has not adopted the AICUZ, essentially all impacts fall within military reservation boundaries. No serious encroachment concerns.

Weather - GREEN
Location provides adequate diversity of weather for well-rounded all-weather training. Less than 10% of missions are adversely affected by weather.

Survivability - GREEN
The activity is located away from foreign embassies, consulates, or areas of foreign national concentration.

Maneuver Space - GREEN
There are under 10% delays in arrival/departure clearance.

AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES

Operations - GREEN
Parking apron: 748,000 square yards, with a surplus of 121,000 square yards. No major deficiencies.

Support - YELLOW
Maintenance facilities: 618,000 square feet, with a deficiency of 52,000 square feet. Storage: 156,000 square feet (9,000 square feet inadequate), with a deficiency of 201,000 square feet. A new property control facility is planned for FY95 at \$3.8 M. Storage deficiencies are now being addressed through use of Camp Lejeune's adjacent facilities.

Infrastructure - GREEN
No major deficiencies on-station, but is tied to MCB Camp Lejeune, which has a waste water treatment deficiency.

Administrative - YELLOW
Administrative: 99,000 square feet, which is a minor deficiency of 6,000 square feet. However, all but 22,000 square feet is inadequate.

QUALITY OF FACILITIES

Condition/Technology - GREEN/YELLOW
Facilities are in better than adequate condition, and mission accomplishment is attained with little reservation with current backlog of repair valued at \$5.8 million. However, the age and design of facilities do create minor difficulties.

Configuration - GREEN

The Air Station is well configured to support the mission and is enhanced by the efficiencies achieved through its collocation with Camp Lejeune for training and support.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Housing - The Marine Corps relies on the local community to provide adequate, affordable housing for married military personnel, bachelor officers and senior grade enlisted personnel. In those areas where suitable housing is not available, we request Congressional authority to build housing on base. Junior grade enlisted bachelors (E1-E4) are all housed on base.

Family Housing - GREEN

Family housing at MCAS New River is managed and accounted for by MCB Camp Lejeune. There is no family housing construction deficit since the local community can provide suitable, affordable homes. Whole house rehab on all family housing units (435 units) is presently underway at a cost of \$16.4 million.

Bachelor Housing - GREEN

Bachelor housing spaces exist to accommodate all personnel, although there are some housed in inadequate spaces.

Recreational/Amenities - GREEN

The Base largely has adequate facilities. A required new physical fitness center is planned for FY94 at \$3.73 M.

Medical - GREEN

Majority of medical care is serviced by the Camp Lejeune Hospital. In conjunction thereto, a new Troop Clinic is now in planning.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Workforce - GREEN

Most skills readily available at competitive rates.

Transportation - GREEN

The Onslow County Airport is within 30 minutes. Rail is available from adjacent Camp Lejeune. Road network is adequate for the Air Station's purposes.

Infrastructure - GREEN

Adequate local utilities. Affordable housing is available.

Industry - GREEN

Local industry is compatible with the Air Station.

RECRUIT DEPOTS

MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

MISSION

The Marine Corps Recruit Depot's mission is to exercise operational control of enlisted recruiting operations in the 8th, 9th, and 12th Marine Corps Districts, through screening, evaluation, verification, and field supervision; to provide guidance and direction on quality control matters for all West Coast enlisted accessions in accordance with standards established by the Commandant of the Marine Corps; to provide reception, processing, and recruit training for enlisted personnel upon initial entry into the Marine Corps; to provide schools for the training of enlisted personnel for recruiting duty and for the training of recruits; to provide training for enlisted personnel selected for the Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Program; to provide marksmanship training and personnel support for Marines stationed in the southwest and to conduct training for reserve Marines as directed.

BASE LOADING (FY97)

	USMC	Other Service	Civilians	Total
Base	713	198	871	1,782
Recruit Training Staff	748	16		764
Students/Recruits	5,295			5,295
Misc	316		45	361
Subtotal	7,185	214	916	8,202
Dependents				2,756
Retirees				31,729
Total Using Base Facilities				42,687

EVALUATION

MISSION SUITABILITY

Site Specific - GREEN

The facility is in the optimal location to serve the needs of the Western Recruiting Region, primarily dictated by its need for transportation and training.

Relationship - GREEN

As a matter of efficiency, the Recruit Depot must be located to facilitate inflow of recruits from the western United States Recruiting Districts and the subsequent assignment to specialized occupational schools, most of which are located at the West Coast air and ground operating bases. MCRD enjoys immediate access to modern air, rail, surface, and sea transportation networks.

Survivability - YELLOW

As in all of Southern California, there is a potential for earthquake damage. Should a 7.0 earthquake occur, indications are that the original 1920's structures and structures built on fill areas would not survive. All other structures are considered sufficiently safe to survive an earthquake of this magnitude

Mobilization - GREEN

Wartime training plans of instruction anticipate increased numbers of recruits being trained in wartime essential skills through augmentation or SMCR/IRR personnel.

Maneuver Space - GREEN

MCRD efficiently utilizes 100 of its 432 acres as outdoor combat training areas. These areas include physical training areas, obstacle, and confidence courses which lie in close proximity to billeting, messing, personnel support, and applied and academic instruction facilities. While the balance of requirements are met at MCRD San Diego, Basic Warrior Training (4 weeks) is conducted at Camp Pendleton, which is capable of expansion as needed.

AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES

Operations - GREEN

Training facilities: 298,000 square feet, with a minor surplus of 2,000 square feet. A combat Training Tank is planned for FY95 at \$1.4 M. Recruit housing: 5131 RE (including 611 RE of inadequate), which is a deficiency of 1785 RE.

Support - GREEN

Maintenance facilities: 249,000 square feet (including 34,000 square feet of inadequate), with a surplus of 114,000 square feet). Storage: 174,000 square feet (majority inadequate), which has significant surpluses. Replacement plans include a project planned for FY94 at Edson Range, \$1.4 M.

Infrastructure - GREEN

No significant deficiencies. Utilities are provided through the civil systems.

Administrative - GREEN

Administrative facilities of 215,000 square feet, with a surplus of 80,000 square feet.

QUALITY OF FACILITIES

Condition/Technology - GREEN/GREEN

Facilities are in superb condition and support mission accomplishment without reservation. Older facilities have been repaired and improved without loss of historic significance. MCRD's Recruit Training Facility, completed in 1988, is state of the art and provides the model for military academic training facilities.

Configuration - GREEN

The Base has largely been redesigned and rebuilt within the last decade, which allowed it to be tailored to its mission. Field training at MCB Camp Pendleton provides the benefits of superior terrain and easy mobilization.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Family Housing - YELLOW

Affordable family housing within a reasonable commuting distance is an ongoing problem. The Marine Corps depends upon Navy family housing in the San Diego area. There is a 3,000 unit deficiency which is being reduced by new construction projects and new public/private venture housing initiatives. A short-term remedy involves a leased housing program managed by MCRD which currently includes 25 leased units and expanding to an additional 50 units by June 1991.

Bachelor Housing - GREEN

BEQ - Adequate BEQ spaces exist to accommodate all enlisted personnel, although a significant number are housed in inadequate facilities.

BOQ - A deficit of 59 BOQ spaces exists. No construction is currently planned; will continue to rely on the civil sector for adequate bachelor housing.

Recreational/Amenities - GREEN

Overall the Base has adequate facilities. The marina was expanded recently and an additional Child Development Facility has been completed.

Medical - GREEN

Inpatient care is available at MCB Camp Pendleton and Naval Hospital, San Diego, a major medical facility. The Base medical clinic provides outpatient care.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Workforce - GREEN

The local civilian workforce provides all the required manpower and expertise required to augment efficient base operation.

Transportation - GREEN

Because of its location in a major metropolitan area, MCRD enjoys immediate access to modern air, rail, surface, and sea transportation networks.

Infrastructure - GREEN

All utilities are purchased locally, and the local community can provide our requirements well into the future.

RECRUIT DEPOTS

MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT/EASTERN RECRUITING REGION, PARRIS ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINAMISSION

The Marine Corps Recruit Depot's mission is to exercise operational control of enlisted recruiting operations in the 1st, 4th, and 6th Marine Corps Districts, through screening, evaluation, verification, and field supervision; to provide guidance and direction on quality control matters for all East Coast enlisted accessions in accordance with standards established by the Commandant of the Marine Corps; to provide reception, processing, and recruit training for enlisted personnel upon their initial entry into the Marine Corps; to provide school to train enlisted Marines, drill instructors and NCO School; to provide rifle and pistol marksmanship training for selected Marines stationed in the southeast area and for personnel of other services as requested; and to conduct training for reserve Marines as directed.

BASE LOADING (FY97)

	USMC	Other Service	Civilians	Total
Base	841	267	631	1,739
Recruit Training Staff	1,244	11	6	1,261
Students/Recruits	4,733			4,733
Subtotal	6,818	278	637	7,733
Dependents				3,405
Retirees				6,820
Total Using Base Facilities				17,958

EVALUATION

MISSION SUITABILITY

Site Specific - GREEN

Facility is in the optimum location to serve Eastern Recruiting Region requirements. Transportation, weather and training conditions make this an ideal location.

Relationship - GREEN
 As a matter of efficiency, the Recruit Depot must be located to facilitate inflow of recruits from the eastern United States Recruiting Districts and the subsequent assignment to specialized occupational schools, most of which are located at the East Coast air and ground operating bases.

Survivability - YELLOW
 Hurricanes could prevent the Recruit Depot from performing its mission for a protracted period.

Mobilization - GREEN
 Wartime training plans of instruction anticipate an increase in numbers of recruits being trained in wartime. Additional essential skills will be provided through augmentation of SMCR/IRR personnel.

Maneuver Space - GREEN
 Live-fire ranges are generally adequate. Although maneuver areas are limited in size, they are considered adequate and are being utilized to the fullest extent.

AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES

Operations - GREEN
 Training: 323,000 square feet (93,000 inadequate), with a surplus of 21,000 square feet. All requirements are met.

Support - GREEN
 Maintenance facilities: 105,000 square feet (5,000 square feet inadequate), with a surplus of 58,000 square feet. Warehousing of 455,000 square feet (some inadequate), providing a minor surplus of 14,000 square feet.

Infrastructure - GREEN
 Requires an upgrade of sewage treatment capability to meet current standards. \$220 K planned for upgrades over next 2 years. Other systems fully met requirements.

Administrative - GREEN
 Administrative: 268,000 square feet, which is a 92,000 square-foot surplus. A replacement Recruit Battalion Operations Center is planned for FY95 at \$2.3 M.

QUALITY OF FACILITIES

Condition/Technology - GREEN/GREEN
 Facilities are in better than adequate condition, and mission accomplishment is attained with little reservation, with a current backlog of repair valued at \$5.2 million.

Configuration - GREEN

The Depot is adequately configured to support its mission. Some minor configuration problems stem from the age of the basic facility. However, they are not of a nature that warrants a reconfiguration.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Housing - The Marine Corps relies on the local community to provide adequate, affordable housing for married military personnel, bachelor officers and senior grade enlisted personnel. In those areas where suitable housing is not available, we request Congressional authority to build housing on base. Junior grade enlisted bachelors (E1-E4) are all housed on base.

Family Housing - GREEN

Consists of 231 homes and 125 trailer spaces. Use 355 houses at Laurel Bay. No family housing construction deficit; local community can support requirements.

Bachelor Housing - GREEN

BEQ - Adequate BEQ spaces exist to accommodate all enlisted personnel.

BOQ - Adequate spaces available in the newly renovated facility.

Recreational/Amenities - GREEN

Overall the Base has adequate facilities. A new Child Development Center is planned for FY95 at \$1.95 M.

Medical - GREEN

Inpatient care is available at USNH Beaufort's 57-bed hospital. Outpatient care is provided at the Base medical clinic.

COMMUNITY SUPPORTWorkforce - GREEN

There are few unique employment specialties needed at MCRD Parris Island, and the local community supports employment requirements. The military is a major employer in the community.

Transportation - GREEN

Adequate roads and access to navigable water. Commercial airports are available in Savannah, GA, within one hour's drive, and Charleston, SC, within two hours.

Infrastructure - GREEN

Local utilities are adequate, and there is sufficient affordable housing in the area.