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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

9 February 1973

(7)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting, 6 February 1973 BY NSC

DATE Feb 12, 2009

Following the WSAG meeting at 1630 on 6 February 1973, Secretary Clements discussed with General Furlong and me the key DOD commitments made at the meeting. Mr. Clements asked that a Memo for Record be prepared summarizing these commitments, and that a file of such Memoranda for Record be retained in a high security safe for his personal reference.

Mr. Clements noted that he had made a commitment at the meeting to provide to Dr. Kissinger upon his return to Washington a series of contingency options, outlining possible courses of action which might be taken in the event of a cease-fire violation in Vietnam. He further noted that these contingency options were to cover a broad spectrum of actions varying from, for example, a mild reaction such as diplomatic protest, to a very severe response. The outline contingency plan was to be initially drafted by ASD (ISA) and subsequently refined by General Haig. After refinement of the plan, a consultation meeting was to be scheduled between Secretary Richardson, Secretary Clements, General Haig, and Mr. Eagleburger for review of the proposal prior to submission to Dr. Kissinger.

A second commitment was made for DOD action to be initiated and monitored by RADM Murphy, the military assistant to the Secretary of Defense. This second commitment involved preparation of information to be provided to General Scowcroft for subsequent transmission to Ambassador Bunker in Vietnam for action. The information to be provided was to be ultimately used by Ambassador Bunker to seek action on the part of the South Vietnamese to ensure the continuation of logistic support into South Vietnam as provided for under the terms of the cease-fire agreement. Shipping schedules and estimated time of arrival of our ships enroute to RVN were to be included. We were to emphasize that we did not want ships diverted from South Vietnam. Our objective was to have three ports designated as mutually agreed upon between South Vietnam and North Vietnam to provide entry for supplies authorized under the

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
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cease-fire agreement. If we could not get three ports designated, the South Vietnamese were to be urged to get at least one port designated through which supplies could enter South Vietnam. In the event we could not get even one port designated, we should plan to bring in the ships and unload them, nevertheless. The main point was that we did not want to permit an interruption of our on-going pipeline of supplies and logistic support, as provided for in the agreement.

Another point made by Mr. Clements was that he and Admiral Murphy had briefed Secretary Richardson on the outcome of the meeting at approximately 1800, 6 February.


John G. Jones
Colonel, USA
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

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TALKING PAPER FOR USE AT THE WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP MEETING,
1000 HOURS, 6 FEBRUARY 1973

SUBJECT: Cease-fire Implementation

TAB A - Withdrawal Planning

- US Forces will complete withdrawal by X+60. Current plan is to withdraw 6000 to 6500 personnel in first 15 day increment. 4000-4500 will be withdrawn in second 15 day increment.
- To date, 3,469 US personnel have been withdrawn from RVN.
- Marine Air Group 12 at Bien Hoa has completed redeployment to Iwakuni, Japan.
- Increments for 3d and 4th 15 day periods will be determined prior to X+30 based on POW release progress, but will be of about equal size.
- ROKFV will commence withdrawal on 3 February on the following schedule:

X-day - X+15	8,802
X+16 - X+30	12,162
X+31 - X+45	14,337
X+46 - X+60	107

To date, 3,581 personnel have been redeployed.

TAB B - Cease-fire Violations

- The trend of cease-fire violations has been downward although there was a slight increase in major and minor violations reported for the 4 February ZULU day and in minor violations on 5 February although major violations were again down on the fifth.
- To date, 4,244 enemy and 699 friendly personnel including one US have been killed.

TAB C - Post Cease-fire Command Structure in SVN

- DRSTO has been authorized 1200 DOD civilians. Organization and recruiting is underway. 418 DOD civilians have been assigned to the DAO. 5530 civilian contractors are currently in-country.
- TDY personnel to ensure operational capability have been identified and are being infiltrated in-country. Military personnel are staffing the DRSTO to ensure its being fully operational by the time MACV closes down on or about X+60.

- Final Terms of Reference and JTD are due from JCS by X+15.
- Guidance has been issued to establish intelligence element at approximately the Washington agreed level of 10 military and 281 civilians.

TAB D - SEA Command Arrangements

- Current planning calls for USSAG/7th AF to become operational at Nakhon Phanom on 15 February.

TAB E - Mine Countermeasures

- As a result of initial meetings in Haiphong on 5 February, 4 MSOs escorted by two destroyers are proceeding to an area 35 miles south-east of Haiphong. The MSOs will commence sweeping on arrival at approximately 060200Z February.
- 3 MSOs departed Pearl Harbor on 26 Jan en route Subic with ETA 19 Feb.
- Support ships with two airborne Mine Countermeasures units were to commence familiarization and a training exercise off Subic Bay on 2 February 1973.

*take up mine sweep
mines
only do in Pilw line
anch*

TAB F - ICCS

-- Contingents strength is as follows:

. Canada	139 (43 deployed)
. Hungary	67 (35 deployed)
. Indonesia	129 (62 deployed and 161 arriving 7 Feb)
. Poland	77 (35 deployed)

-- ICCS deployments were accomplished on 5 February as follows:

. Hue	22
. DaNang	26
. Pleiku	26
. Phan Thiet	25
. Bien Hoa	27
. My Tho	25
. Can Tho	26

*any info on area
relative to China
get to HK by
Monday then send S*

-- There are no major problems concerning support of the ICCS.

- ✓ -- On 6 February an ICCS delegation traveling from Hue to Quang Tri City received incoming fire believed to be 130mm. No casualties were taken and the convoy returned to Hue.

TAB G - Four Party Joint Military Commission

- Four Party Commission Delegation Chiefs met 2 February 1973. Substantive discussions began.
- Representation available as follows:
 - . US - Full team designated and deployed. Strength - 825.
 - . DRV - 668 delegation members in country, deployed as follows:
 - Saigon - 351 DaNang - 45 Phan Thiet - 45 My Tho - 46
 - Hue - 45 Pleiku - 46 Bien Hoa - 46 Can Tho - 46
 An additional 157 DRV personnel are scheduled to arrive on 7 Feb.
 - . GVN - Team designated and deployed. Strength - 460.
 - . PRG - 122 PRG representatives in country of which 22 have been deployed.
- The US has presented its general plan for withdrawal of US forces in 15 day increments. The DRV agreed to this plan.
- The dismantling of US bases has become a primary issue for discussion.
 - . The US representative explained that prior to entry into force of the Agreement, the US and other foreign countries allied with the US transferred by appropriate agreement all military bases in SVN to the Government of Vietnam.
 - . The PRG disagreed with this position and insisted that the FPJMC approve plans for and inspect implementation of base dismantlement.
 - . The DRV requested documentation of base transfers. The US representative refused, but he is being instructed to make the documentation available to support the US case that we have no bases to dismantle.

TAB H - PW Lists

- The DRV has provided a list of prisoners held in NVN containing 495 names.
 - . 491 US servicemen (12 previously released, 23 deceased, 456 to be released)
 - . 1 US civilian
 - . 2 Thai servicemen
 - . 1 ARVN serviceman
- with provisions to be done
with HK gpts
2-6*

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FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Status of Supervising the Cease-fire

- The 27 January Agreement and its related protocols envisioned a greater degree of cease-fire control and supervision than has as yet come to pass. Neither the Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) nor the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) are as fully manned or as fully deployed as the agreement specified. As yet, neither has engaged in meaningful cease-fire violation investigation which will probably determine their success or failure. The Two Party Joint Military Commission (TPJMC) has lagged behind the other two.
- The Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC)
 - The FPJMC has not met its deployment schedule, which called for regional deployment by X+48 hours and subregional team deployment (in operation) by X+15 days. As of X+26, 22 February 1973, there is a FPJMC presence in all seven regions, but it varies considerably and in many cases it could be called a three party commission due to the lack of PRG presence. While the US, GVN, and DRV have either deployed or designated their 825-man contingents, the PRG has made available only 201 men and 141 are in Saigon. The PRG has no personnel in two regions and an average of only five in four other regions.
 - This failure to adequately deploy, traceable in large measure to the PRG, has prevented the FPJMC from conducting meaningful investigation. Since the PRG is not present to protect its interest, it has dragged its feet on developing investigatory procedures.
 - . For example, a FPJMC team sent to investigate the downing of a US CH-47 near An Loc could not agree on how to proceed once it arrived.
 - . The team sent to investigate the fighting at Sa Huynh has remained in Da Nang discussing "procedures".
 - This situation is attributable to several causes. Primary among them is the massive distrust that exists between the Vietnamese parties, particularly between the GVN and PRG. (While supporting the PRG, the DRV has demonstrated a more forthcoming attitude especially where US questions have been concerned.) Both the GVN and the PRG seek to use the FPJMC to their advantage.
 - . Sa Huynh is a case in point. When the RVNAF was in the process of retaking the town, the PRG sought FPJMC help with the GVN dragging its feet. Once the town changed hands, the PRG began raising procedural questions.
 - . Another element is the relative strengths of the PRG and the GVN. The numerical weakness of the PRG and the covert nature of its force produced a natural reluctance to surface until they are sure that their participation serves their purposes. In this regard, the

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Incidents at Hue and Ban Me Thuot have provided them with a ready-made excuse--the safety of the FPJMC teams.

. The GVN's record is not unblemished. They have taken a long list of actions to harass the communist delegations, beginning with the deplaning procedures and generally characterized by their desire to isolate the communist presence. On other hand, the communists wish to take advantage of their presence in GVN controlled areas, particularly Saigon.

-- On balance, however, the FPJMC has made progress. The PW sub-committee is working well. The PW question initially absorbed the major effort of the FPJMC and delayed the development of needed procedural agreements. Teams are being deployed, entry points designated, and investigations begun. Given the nearly thirty years of distrust, the FPJMC has probably moved about as fast as could be expected. At any rate, it shows no signs of breaking down.

- International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS)

-- The ICCS has also failed to meet its deployment schedule and has not yet begun cease-fire violation investigation. While there is an ICCS presence in all seven regions they did not make their X+48 hour deadline and it is unlikely that they will have their 38 teams in place by X+30, or 26 February 1973.

-- This situation cannot be traced to inadequate personnel as in the case of the FPJMC; although the Poles and Hungarians are about 100 men short of the authorized national contingent strength of 290. The Indonesians (294) and Canadians (277) are in-country at approximately full strength. In the case of the ICCS the problems are those inherent in forming an organization from scratch with disparate groups in an unfamiliar and unfriendly environment. In addition, only the Canadians have had any major peacekeeping experience.

. Given this situation, the ICCS has tended to concentrate on procedure and such things as living conditions and creature comforts. This tendency is also driven by the realization that the major provider's presence is decreasing and these needs must be filled quickly.

-- The ICCS, after its slow start, is on the upswing. The Communist contingents are expected to be filled by early next week. In order to move the ICCS along all contingents have recognized the Canadian's expertise and extended Canadian chairmanship at both the central and regional level. For their part, the Canadians have pushed the organization along. They obtained agreement on 20 February for the deployment of the 12 specifically designated teams by stating they would deploy alone if the other members would not come along.

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• This sub-regional ICCS deployment may well provide the PRG with sufficient assurance for them to more fully man the FPJMC.

-- As in the case of the FPJMC, the ICCS has probably performed about as well as could be expected. Hopefully we are at take-off.

- Two Party Joint Military Commission (TPJMC)

-- The TPJMC has not yet been formed. On occasion where matters between the GVN and the PRG that are covered by the Agreement are at issue, their delegates to the FPJMC have assumed the tasks of the TPJMC as provided in Article 12(b) of the cease-fire and joint commissions protocol.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

WSAG

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Indochina - Next Moves (U)

~~Attached~~ Attached is a paper describing three possible courses of military action in Indochina. The options are as follows:

- Ellis* → Option 1: Air strikes in Southern Laos and at Khe Sanh;
- WAC* → Option 2: The same as Option 1, plus air attacks on both sides of the Western DMZ;
- No - Option 3: Air strikes against targets in MR 1, against enemy LOCs in Laos, against Khe Sanh, and against targets on both sides of the DMZ.

Included, as well, is a recommended diplomatic and public scenario aimed at giving the strongest possible message to Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking, as well as putting our actions in the proper context for the American people.

I recommend Option

Must get Samah ok for option 1 otherwise option 2 / If get ok then I'm for option 1

Attachment. Ellis & agree that if no ok from Samah then we go for option 2!

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SUBJECT: Indochina - "Operation PRIME HIT"

MILITARY ACTION

1. This plan (all three options) envisions the application of approximately 80 ARC LIGHT (B-52) and 400 Tactical air sorties per day over a 96-hour period. (NOTE: This level of effort can be provided from in-theater assets; moreover, ENTERPRISE will arrive on-station 17 April bringing the YANKEE STATION force level to three CVAs.)

2. The plan includes maximum flak suppression support as well as the positioning of a DLG off the RVN coast to provide an increased search and rescue capability.

3. The following two basic options are being developed at this time:

OPTION 1 - Emphasis on Khe Sanh and Laos

- A major air campaign against the primary enemy LOC network in southern Laos from the Mu Gia Pass to the Cambodia border.
- Strikes against the Khe Sanh complex (SAM missile sites, airfield, truck parks and logistic storage areas).

OPTION 2 - Emphasis on Khe Sanh, Laos, and the Western DMZ (both sides)

- A major air campaign against the primary enemy LOC network in southern Laos from the Mu Gia Pass to the Cambodia border.
- Strikes against the Khe Sanh complex (SAM missile sites, airfield, truck parks and logistic storage areas).
- The Western half of the DMZ (both sides).

OPTION 3 - Emphasis on Khe Sanh, DRV LOC in SVN, and the DMZ (both sides)

- Primary objective would be enemy logistics, troops, truck parks and storage areas of MR 1 in RVN. It is envisioned that strikes would be executed against targets in the following areas:
 - DMZ (both sides)
 - vicinity of Quang Tri
 - Khe Sanh complex (SAM missile sites, airfield, truck parks and logistic storage areas).

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- A Shau Valley
- vicinity of Hue, including Highway 547 between Hue and the A Shau Valley
- enemy troop locations threatening Kontum, Pleiku and Tonle Cham
- Next priority would be given to lucrative targets along LOCs in Laos, including both sides of the Mu Gia, Ban Karai, and Nape Passes.

DIPLOMATIC MOVES

Upon the initiation of the military steps outlined above, the U.S. should make demarches to the members of the ICCS, the signatories of the Paris Accords, and the U.N. Secretary General, to apprise them of our actions, and to explain our rationale, as follows:

- We have tried to work through the procedures envisaged in the 27 January Accord. But the response has been:
 - Hungarian and Polish intransigence and obstructionism with regard to inspections;
 - Clearly-marked ICCS aircraft shot down by the enemy while on agreed-upon inspection flights;
 - Viet-Cong refusal to man their contingent on the Two-Party Joint Military Commission;
 - Continued, blatant use by Hanoi of the Ho Chi Minh Trail network to bring men and supplies into South Vietnam;
 - No indication of any North Vietnamese withdrawals from Laos and Cambodia--and, in fact, an escalation of enemy activity in both countries.
 - Infiltration of major air defense units into the Khe Sanh area, including surface-to-air missiles and at least one AAA regiment.
- We have dealt directly and privately with Hanoi in an attempt to resolve our differences, but without success. Apparently the only language Hanoi understands is force.
- The situation in Southeast Asia is critical and continues to deteriorate. We now have clear intelligence information that a DRV offensive is in the offing in Quang Tri Province. Thus, our military response to Hanoi's continued violations will be appropriate to the provocation, but limited in both area and time so as to permit a return to the international machinery already agreed upon for enforcing the cease-fire.
- Thus, the United States will, as well, call for a reconvening of the Paris Conference for the purpose of reviewing compliance with the cease-fire and the performance of the policing mechanism.

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Our demarches to Moscow and Peking should include a statement that we have sought their help in persuading Hanoi to live up to its obligations, but without success.

PUBLIC MOVES

Shortly after the initiation of military action (i.e., within 24 hours), we should publicly announce the resumption of the bombing. This announcement should be accompanied by a statement of the reasons for the action, along the lines of the rationale set out above under Diplomatic Moves. The announcement should contain, as well, a statement that the U.S. has asked that the Paris Conference be reconvened. We might also release the text of the private exchanges we have had over the past weeks with Hanoi (we could, as well, include this information as a part of the demarches called for above).

Finally, either at the time we make our public announcement, or at the time that the Paris Conference is reconvened, we should release a detailed statement of DRV cease-fire violations.

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