



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-400-67
15 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Required Forces for COMUSMACV's Air-supported Anti-infiltration Plan

1. Reference is made to:

a. Your memorandum, dated 8 May 1967, subject: "PRACTICE NINE Forces (C)."

b. CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 112040Z June 1967, JCS IN 72845, subject: "PRACTICE NINE Anti-infiltration System (S)."

2. Forces required to support COMUSMACV's Air-supported Anti-infiltration Plan have been reconsidered in view of the decision forwarded in reference 1a. By reference 1b, CINCPAC provided detailed information on certain Army support units. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that certain Army units will be required to provide the necessary support for COMUSMACV's Air-supported Anti-infiltration Plan.

3. To move the anticipated 3,136 short tons per day over the Thailand highway LOC, approximately 435 trucks per day will be required. Current availability of US military trucks is 135 per day and of commercial contract trucks is about 250-260 per day. This deficit in meeting forecast requirements would be 40-50 trucks per day or the equivalent capability of one medium truck company (cargo). A detailed listing of Thailand LOC truck requirements is contained in Appendix A hereto.

OATSD(PA)DFOISR 6
TOP SECRET CONTROL
Copy No. 94-F-6532
Case No. 94-TS-041
T.S. No. 18
Document No. 18

Declassified by Joint Staff
Date 31 Oct 94
701A 4025

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONF

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

Copy 35 of 35 copies each of 4 pages series A.

#677

cy - 8 - Col Edmunds

941103-386

4. (S) The production schedule of the various munitions and sensors is extremely tight, with just enough items during the initial months of employment to meet mission requirements. Failure to provide delivery of one component of the system will result in the inability of the forces to accomplish their mission. In addition, button bomblets and gravel munitions will require continuous monitoring by competent technical escort during transit for safety reasons.

5. (S) The only contractual trucking capability available in Thailand is the Express Transport Organization (ETO), a quasi-governmental monopoly, which uses leased vehicles and hired drivers. Experience indicates that their routes are optional, delivery time uncertain, and control poor. Additionally, CINCPAC has indicated that ETO does not have the capability, either in equipment or trained indigenous drivers, to provide the additional line-haul capability required to meet ILLINOIS CITY requirements. The impracticability of securing additional in-country contractor capability is evidenced by the recent concession of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to allow the use of military trucks in all areas, except Bangkok, when ETO trucks are not available. This concession was granted in March only after repeated failure of the ETO to provide the required transport.

6. (S) Even if assurances are received from the RTG that the ETO would acquire the additional assets required, the ILLINOIS CITY Program would be delayed five to eight months if the capability does not, in fact, materialize or proves to be unsatisfactory. This delay would accrue because of the lead time needed by the Army for the deployment of the required replacement assets.

7. (S) The maintenance company is necessary to provide direct support maintenance, limited general support maintenance, and repair parts support for US Army and Air Force equipment at various locations throughout Thailand. Currently, two light maintenance companies are in-country. These units are located at Sattahip and Korat and are fully committed. With the introduction of additional Army and Air Force equipment into Thailand and the increased use of the LOC in the northeast, it is considered essential that an additional maintenance unit be located

~~TOP SECRET~~

in the northeast sector of the country. It should be noted that transportation truck support requirements are computed based on a 75 percent availability of equipment. Trucks currently traveling the same primitive roads that ILLINOIS CITY trucks will utilize have experienced extensive frame and body deterioration, generating the need for more than normal heavy maintenance. CINCPAC has advised that additional indigenous support is not available within the time frame required, because of the high skill levels required.

8. (S) With the deployment of currently approved Program 4 forces, the military population in Thailand will be increased to 44.4 thousand, which equates to a consumption of 66.6 short tons of Class I frozen and chill per day. Refrigerated cargo presently is shipped from Bangkok to U-Tapao, Korat, Takhli, Sattahip, Phanom Sarakham, Udorn, Sakon Nakon, and Nakhon Phanom. Currently, the transportation company (truck refrigerator) is not required to perform the port-clearance, local-haul missions at Bangkok. However, with the subsequent shift of port operations to Sattahip, the reefer unit will be required to perform the port-clearance mission as well as support the extended LOC to up-country destinations. Based on an experienced average load of five tons per trailer, an average turnaround time of 48 hours and a 10-hour per day single shift operation, 64 trucks will be required. Assuming 75 percent availability, a total requirement for 85 trucks is indicated. The requested additional transportation platoon medium truck company refrigerator (augmented) and the refrigerator truck company in-country will provide a total of 80 reefer trucks in Thailand.

9. (S) To support the highway LOCs, two trailer transfer operating teams and two movement control teams are required to control and maintain trailer pools. The two transfer teams will operate four trailer transfer points, one each at Sattahip, Phanom Serakom, Korat, and Khon Kaen. These teams will be augmented with unskilled local labor, since each team will operate two transfer points. The two movement control teams will be stationed at Nakhon Phanom and Ubon. CINCPAC states that current movement control personnel are over-extended, and no personnel are available for destination bases. The personnel safety aspects of gas-shielded ordnance plus the necessity for constant surveillance of ILLINOIS CITY munitions and sensors require the close control that these teams can provide.


~~TOP SECRET~~

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the deployment of the Army support units is justified based on:

- a. Insufficient trucking capability in Thailand to support the added ILLINOIS CITY requirements.
- b. A requirement for efficient handling and transportation of ILLINOIS CITY munitions by US personnel in view of limited production and safety considerations.
- c. Potential slippage of the program if contractual capabilities do not, in fact, materialize.
- d. A necessity for additional refrigerator truck capability to transport perishables to the increased number of personnel to be stationed in Korat and Nakhon Phanom.
- e. A requirement for heavier than normal maintenance generated by rough usage over primitive roads.
- f. The inability of indigenous contractors to provide the necessary maintenance skills required.

11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the forces shown in Appendix B hereto be approved as additive to Program 4.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



J. O. COBB
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

Attachments

APPENDIX A

THAILAND LOC TRUCK REQUIREMENTS

	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>S/T PER DAY</u> ^{1/}	<u>TRUCKS REQUIRED</u> ^{2/}	<u>PRESENT CAPABILITY</u>	<u>SHORT FALL</u>
<u>MILITARY:</u>	SATTAHIP	U-TAPAO	591	12		
	SATTAHIP	KORAT	472	82		
	KORAT	KHON KAEN	400	35		
	KHON KAEN	UBON	78	14		
	KHON KAEN	UDORN	211	18		
	KHON KAEN	NAKHON PHANOM	<u>112</u>	<u>20</u>		
TOTAL			1,864 ^{4/}	181	135	463/
<u>CONTRACT:</u>	SATTAHIP	CHACHOENGSAO	200	20		
	SATTAHIP	BANGKOK	200	22		
	SATTAHIP	TAKHLI	330	66		
	SATTAHIP	KORAT	437	88		
	SATTAHIP	UBON	80	48		
	SATTAHIP	UDORN	<u>25</u>	<u>10</u>		
TOTAL			1,272	254	250-260	0

NOTES: ^{1/} Estimated total Thailand daily forward tonnage requirements as of Nov-Dec 67. Does not include retrograde or cross sectional requirements.

^{2/} Takes into account truck capacity turnaround time and hours operated daily. Calculated at 12 tons per military truck and 10 tons per contract truck.

^{3/} One medium truck company equivalent based on 60 trucks @ 75% availability = 45 trucks.

^{4/} Approximately 1600 S/T per month is required for ILLINOIS CITY munitions and sensors.

JCSM-400-67

1

Appendix A

941103-390

TOP

APPENDIX B
ADDITIVE FORCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOE</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE REQUIRED</u>	<u>SERVICE^{1/} CAPABILITY</u>
TC TRK CO MED	55-18G	183	Thailand	Aug 67	Dec 67 ^{2/}
CS CO LT MAINT (DS)	29-207F	154	Thailand	--	Apr 68
TC PLAT MED TRK REFRIG (AUG)	55-18F	40	Thailand	Aug 67	Dec 67
TC DET TRAILER TRANS TM GF	55-500R	16	Thailand	--	Dec 67
TC DET TRAILER TRANS TM GF	55-500R	16	Thailand	--	Dec 67
TC DET MVMT CONTROL TM LD	55-500R	5	Thailand	--	Dec 67
TC DET MVMT CONTROL TM LD	55-500R	5	Thailand	--	Dec 67

^{1/} Based on a Decision Date of 15 July 1967.

^{2/} Can be provided prior to 1 November 1967 IOC date by diversion of TRK Co approved for deployment to RVN in Program 4.