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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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8 DEC 1994  
94-F-0532



Director  
Records Declassification Div (NND)  
Room 6350  
The National Archives at College Park  
8601 Adelphi Road  
College Park, MD 20740-6001

Dear Ms. Schauble:

This is in response to your February 3, 1994, letter which forwarded the enclosed documents for declassification review. Your Project Number NND 941103 refers.

We have been advised by the appropriate Component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that they have no objection to declassification and release of the documents with the exception of the information bracketed in red on pages NND 941103-97 to 99, and 188 to 190. That information is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12356, Section 1.3(a)(1). Consequently, the information in red brackets should be denied pursuant to Title 5 USC 552(b)(1). The Initial Denial Authority is Mr. Edmund F. McBride, Chief, Information Management Division, Joint Staff. It is further recommended that document 3, 4 and 43 also be reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency prior to release.

The requester may appeal the denial of Mr. McBride within 60 days of your response to him by offering justification to support reversal of the decision. The appeal should be addressed to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), DFOISR, Room 2C757, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1400.

Sincerely,

  
H. J. McIntyre  
Acting Deputy Director  
Directorate for Freedom of  
Information and Security Review

Enclosures:  
As stated

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FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-148-67  
17 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Movement of a Corps-Size Force to  
South Vietnam (U)

1. (U) In response to your oral request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 December 1966, a study for providing and moving a corps-size force to South Vietnam (SVN) has been prepared. CINCPAC's proposal for a corps force, which was briefed to you in Honolulu during July 1966, was considered during the preparation of this study. The Services have examined their capabilities to provide such a force for deployment to SVN in an assumed emergency situation. The force compositions developed are designed to meet the numerical requirements stated by CINCPAC. The forces do not necessarily correspond to what may be required in an actual emergency condition and may not represent the optimum mix of air and ground forces required for actual operational employment. Three alternative force mixes were considered. These, together with information on shortfalls, availability dates for deployment, measures required to overcome problems, and plans for movement are contained in the attached study. The concept for their employment and command arrangements under which these forces would operate have not been considered. For the purposes of this study, it was assumed that the decision to deploy this force was made on 1 July 1967. Adjustments to the details of the study would be required in proportion to departures from this reference planning date.

2. Despite partial mobilization and drawdown on other commands the entire corps-size force proposed by CINCPAC cannot be provided on a timely basis. However, in an emergency situation, a corps-size force, less certain shortfall units, approaching the capability of CINCPAC's proposed force could close in SVN within approximately 60 to 90 days after a decision to deploy. This force would be composed of Active Forces from CONUS, Hawaii, Japan and Okinawa bases, provided the following personnel-enabling actions were authorized:

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a. Tours of duty for personnel in Southeast Asia would be extended.

b. Terms of service would be extended.

c. Personnel would be returned to Southeast Asia without regard to prior service there.

d. Some units, such as air elements, would deploy to areas other than SVN as required by basing considerations.

3. The three alternative force compositions in the study were examined under certain assumptions to offer a range of options and to bring out various problem areas in fulfilling the requirement expressed by CINCPAC. Except as modified by certain existing cross-servicing agreements, force package requirements for each Service were structured to provide austere logistic self-sufficiency.

a. Alternative 1 consists of a 2-1/3 Army division force, 1 Marine division/group team, and 5 US Air Force tactical fighter squadrons (TFS). Source of forces was restricted to Active Forces in CONUS, Hawaii, Japan, and Okinawa. The 3 divisions, 8 TFS, and the bulk of the support forces available could close in SVN in 90 days.

b. Alternative 2 consists of a 1-1/3 Army division force, a Marine 2- division (-)/1-wing (-) team, and 3 US Air Force TFS. Source of forces was restricted to Active Forces in CONUS, Hawaii, Japan, and Okinawa. The 3 divisions, 8 TFS, and the bulk of the support forces available could close in SVN in 60 days.

c. Alternative 3 consists of a 3-1/3 Army division force and 8 US Air Force TFS. For this alternative, the source of forces was widened to include use of reserves and transfers of units as well as individuals from Europe and Korea. Three and one-third divisions, 8 TFS, and the bulk of the support forces available could close in SVN in 150 days. (This time could be shortened to 90 days if additional shipping is requisitioned.) It makes maximum use of flexibility inherent in Reserve callups but would have a detrimental impact on Europe. It would allow Marine ground and air forces to remain available for other missions.

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4. ~~✖~~ Land-based tactical air or an attack carrier (CVA) may be utilized in all force packages, dependent upon the availability of CVAs, land-based fighter and attack squadrons, and base-loading problems.

5. ~~✖~~ Although the study assumed that tours of duty in Southeast Asia would be extended and deployment restrictions on personnel would be waived, some shortfalls in providing forces by end CY 1967 would, nevertheless, occur. Some required units are not in the force structure and some equipment would not be available. Force availability is summarized as follows:

ITEM	CINCPAC PROPOSAL	FORCES AVAILABLE WITHIN 180 DAYS		
		ALT 1	ALT 2	ALT 3
Strength	134,536	116,927	118,212	123,901
(Army)	(121,685)	( 68,305)	( 42,090)	(113,718)
(Navy) <sup>1/</sup>	( 1,380)	( 0)	( 0)	( 1,380)
(Air Force)	( 11,471)	( 8,176)	( 6,760)	( 8,803)
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	( 40,446)	( 69,362)	( 0)
Maneuver Bns	31 <sup>2/</sup>	31	29	33
(Army)	(31)	(20)	(11)	(33)
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	(11)	(18)	( 0)
Artillery Bns	24 <sup>3/</sup>	20-2/3	20	24
(Army)	(24)	(16)	(11)	(24)
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	(4-2/3)	( 9)	( 0)
Engr Bns	17 <sup>4/</sup>	11	12	15
(Army)	(16)	( 7)	( 6)	(15)
(Navy)	( 0)	( 1)	( 2)	( 0)
(Air Force)	( 1)	( 0)	( 0)	( 0)
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	( 3)	( 4)	( 0)

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>CINCPAC PROPOSAL</u>	<u>ALT 1</u>	<u>ALT 2</u>	<u>ALT 3</u>
Helo Co/Sqdn	24 <sup>5/</sup>	11-1/2	10-1/2	6
(Army)	(24)	( 3)	( 2)	( 6)
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	( 8-1/2)	( 8-1/2)	( 0)
TFS	8	8	8	8
(Air Force)	( 8)	( 5)	( 3)	( 8)
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	( 3)	( 5)	( 0)
LST (Navy)	12	0	0	12

NOTES: 1/ US Navy personnel organic or attached to US Marine Corps units included in Marine Corps figures.

2/ Includes requirement for armored cavalry regiment of 3 maneuver battalions.

3/ Includes an artillery battalion equivalent organic to the armored cavalry regiment and organic division artillery.

4/ Includes engineer battalions organic to divisions and an Air Force civil engineer squadron.

5/ Includes 13 helicopter company equivalents organic to an airmobile division and organic division helicopter companies.

6.  In alternative 1, above, certain available Marine Corps forces were added to compensate for Army shortfalls after the latter were determined. In alternative 2, certain supplemental Army forces were added in the area of corps support to tailor the force more closely to CINCPAC's proposal.

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7. (S) The effect of shortfalls in the above mixes upon the capability of the force to conduct military operations is considered significant but tolerable. The shortfall limitations would occur in helicopter lift, engineer support, terminal services, tactical air support aircraft, and other combat service support. In alternatives 1 and 2, an armored cavalry regiment is not available, although additional infantry/tank battalions are provided which offset this shortfall to some extent. Because present in-country resources in these categories are fully taxed in current missions, diversion to support the corps-size force during its deployment and buildup in SVN would degrade on-going operations somewhat. In the first two alternatives, certain shortfalls could be overcome to a significant extent by selected Reserve callups and transfer of units from Europe and other areas.

8. (S) The study indicates that the impact on the US military posture worldwide of providing this force to SVN would be significant. This impact is substantially greater in alternative 3, which includes transfers from Europe and other areas. However, this impact has not been examined in detail since it was considered beyond the scope of the study.

9. (S) In planning the movement of forces to Southeast Asia, various combinations of transport resources were considered. One Army division would be airlifted in all three alternatives. In the first two alternatives, the Marine assault echelons would be combat loaded and deployed in organic amphibious shipping. Remaining forces would be deployed both by MSTS sealift and MAC airlift. In the third alternative, organic amphibious shipping other than LSTs would not be used. Airlift/sealift resources in support of other commitments in other areas of the world would be reduced to a minimum, but airlift would not be reduced below the minimum JCS-assured airlift currently allocated. The flow of supplies and necessary replacements to forces already in Southeast Asia and deployment of Program 4 forces would not be affected. The readiness of units, the quantity of transport available, and the capability to receive and unload at the destination were the parameters which determined the time phasing and rapidity of movement of the force. These factors are discussed in the study in some detail. The following data summarize some of the major movement statistics:

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<u>ALT 1</u>	<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Short Measurement Tons</u>	<u>Measurement Tons</u>	<u>Pass Ships</u>	<u>Cargo Ships</u>	<u>Airlift Sorties</u>
Air	39,073	55,143				2,852
MSTS	58,439		565,714	16	48	
Amphib	37,052		157,833			
<u>ALT 2</u>						
Air	36,959	61,090				2,930
MSTS	36,494		371,456	12	31	
Amphib	57,026		268,178			
<u>ALT 3</u>						
Air	37,011	52,137				2,417
MSTS	94,490		697,626	16	60	

NOTE: 1/ Includes all personnel that would become available through CY 1968.

10. ~~(C)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the study will be useful in assisting the decision-making process and as an aid in planning should an emergency situation arise in Southeast Asia requiring a large, additional force to be deployed. However, the exact composition of such a force would have to be task organized at that time to provide an appropriate response to the emergency. They note that any actions taken to accelerate or increase currently approved deployments to SVN would have significant impact on the capabilities outlined above.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

J. O. COBB  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

Attachments

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ATTACHMENT TO JCSM-148-67

# Study MOVEMENT OF A CORPS-SIZE FORCE TO SOUTH VIETNAM (U)



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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington, D.C.

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941103-43

14 March 1967

MOVEMENT OF A CORPS-SIZE FORCE TO SOUTH VIETNAM (U)

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941103-44

READYING AND DEPLOYING A CORPS-SIZE FORCE TO VIETNAM

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ Introduction. This is a study to:

a. Determine the Services' capabilities to provide a force of corps size; and

b. Develop a plan for moving it to South Vietnam (SVN) in response to an emergency situation.

To provide a foundation and framework for the study, certain assumptions are made and three alternative compositions for a corps-size force have been established. CINCPAC's requirement for a corps contingency force has been considered during the preparation of this study.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ Assumptions. The following assumptions are made:

a. The emergency situation would be similar to that described in Annex A.

b. All Program 4 forces would be deployed as planned; however, except for the corps force, no forces beyond Program 4 would be deployed. Possible force requirements for the "Practice Nine" project have not been considered.

c. Authority would be granted to withdraw and redistribute equipment, supplies, and critical skilled personnel worldwide.

d. Tours of duty in Southeast Asia/WESTPAC and other overseas areas, as required, would be extended and deployment restrictions on personnel would be waived as necessary.

e. Terms of service would be extended as required.

f. Decision to ready and deploy forces and collateral decisions would be made on 1 July 1967.

g. Some units, such as air elements, would deploy to areas outside SVN as required by basing considerations.

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3. ~~TOP SECRET~~ Alternative Force Packages. The basic elements of the corps force could be provided in several ways. To determine the best way to provide the forces, it appears desirable to examine three alternative force packages. Thus, the problem areas and also the most advantageous situations will be brought to light.

The major force packages are:

a. Two and one-third Army divisions, 1 Marine division/group team, and 5 tactical fighter squadrons (TFS).

b. One and one-third Army divisions, a Marine 2-division (-)/ 1-wing (-) team, and 3 TFS.

c. Three and one-third Army divisions and 8 TFS.

Dependent upon the availability of land-based fighter and attack squadrons and base loading problems, land-based tactical air or an attack carrier (CVA) could become interchangeable in all force packages. Details of these force packages are in Annex B. Because it would become necessary to call up Reserves as a follow-on measure to reconstitute the necessary training and sustaining base, it is considered useful to examine the third alternative under circumstances in which the optimum flexibility afforded by a call up of Reserves could be used. This would include possible transfers of Active units from Europe and Korea to be replaced as soon as practicable by Reserve units or deployment of Reserve units to Southeast Asia.

4. ~~TOP SECRET~~ Capability to Provide the Force

a. The military services are capable of providing forces to make up a corps-size force under the above assumptions as they apply to the three alternatives as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>CINCPAC PROPOSAL</u>	<u>FORCES AVAILABLE WITHIN 180 DAYS</u>			
		<u>ALT 1</u>	<u>ALT 2</u>	<u>ALT 3</u>	
Strength	134,536	116,927	118,212	123,901	1
(Army)	(121,685)	( 68,305)	( 42,090)	(113,718)	2
(Navy) <sup>1/</sup>	( 1,380)	( 0)	( 0)	( 1,380)	3
(Air Force)	( 11,471)	( 8,176)	( 6,760)	( 8,803)	4
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	( 40,446)	( 69,362)	( 0)	5
Maneuver Bns	31 <sup>2/</sup>	31	29	33	6
(Army)	(31)	(20)	(11)	(33)	7
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	(11)	(18)	( 0)	8
Artillery Bns	24 <sup>3/</sup>	20-2/3	20	24	9
(Army)	(24)	(16)	(11)	(24)	10
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	( 4-2/3)	( 9)	( 0)	11
Engr Bns	17 <sup>4/</sup>	11	12	15	12
(Army)	(16)	( 7)	( 6)	(15)	13
(Navy)	( 0)	( 1)	( 2)	( 0)	14
(Air Force)	( 1)	( 0)	( 0)	( 0)	15
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	( 3)	( 4)	( 0)	16
Helo Co/Sqdn	24 <sup>5/</sup>	11-1/2	10-1/2	6	17
(Army)	(24)	( 3)	( 2)	( 6)	18
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	( 8-1/2)	( 8-1/2)	( 0)	19
TFS	8	8	8	8	20
(Air Force)	( 8)	( 5)	( 3)	( 8)	21
(Marine Corps)	( 0)	( 3)	( 5)	( 0)	22
LST (Navy)	12	0	0	12	23

NOTES: 1/ US Navy personnel organic or attached to US Marine Corps units included in Marine Corps figures.

2/ Includes requirement for armored cavalry regiment of three maneuver bns.

3/ Includes an artillery bn equivalent organic to 1  
the armored cavalry regiment and organic divi- 2  
sion artillery. 3

4/ Includes engineer bns organic to divisions and 4  
and Air Force civil engineer squadron. 5

5/ Includes 13 helicopter company equivalents 6  
organic to an airmobile division and organic 7  
division helo companies. 8

b. In alternative 1, certain available Marine Corps 9  
forces were added after the Army shortfalls were deter- 10  
mined. These added forces would fill some of those 11  
shortfalls and thus enhance the over-all operational 12  
capability of the forces. 13

c. In alternative 2, certain supplemental Army forces 14  
were added in the area of corps support to tailor the 15  
force more closely to CINCPAC's proposal. 16

d. Details of the forces and their availability for deploy- 17  
ment are in Annex C. The major shortfalls are as follows: 18

(1) Army: Helicopter units, engineer units, terminal 19  
service units, and petroleum supply units. The Army 20  
forces' mobility and ability to construct and maintain 21  
LOCs and facilities would be limited and support would 22  
be austere. 23

(2) Navy: The shortage of nonorganic resupply T-LSTs 24  
would degrade the ability of COMUSMACV to transport supplies 25  
along the coast of SVN. 26

(3) Air Forces: Civil engineer, heavy repair 27  
squadron(s), and a tactical air support squadron (TASS). 28  
The engineer shortfalls would cause heavier workloads on 29  
existing units that provide these services or require 30  
augmentation by TDY units until they can be overcome. The 31  
TASS shortfalls would cause dispersion of present resources 32  
in SVN until O-2 aircraft production becomes available. 33

(4) Marine Corps: Some interrogator-translator teams and 3 1/2 helicopter squadrons (alternative 2 only). Helicopter mobility would be curtailed to some extent by this shortfall.

5. (b) Problems in Readying the Force and Means of Solving Them (see Annex D for details).

a. Army. Primary problems are to overcome the above-mentioned shortfalls and reconstitute the sustaining base to a posture which would allow it to sustain deployments. Many, but not all, of the shortfalls could be met through withdrawal of units from overseas commands, call-up of selected Reserve units and personnel, sole-source or off-shelf procurement of equipment, and expansion of the existing Army force structure. In cases where the limiting factor is an absolute requirement for long lead-time production of military hardware (e.g., aircraft), no action to overcome shortfall is possible. Specific problems are addressed below:

(1) Use of STRAF. The loss of up to three divisions from the STRAF significantly reduces the ability to respond rapidly to contingencies in other areas of the world. The use of NATO earmarked divisions and combat and combat support units will further degrade the already weakened posture in this Alliance. To ready existing units rapidly requires drawdown of resources from remaining STRAF units as well as some school support units which have general war missions. Most personnel shortages in the units drawn down could be replaced from the Reserves; however, equipment shortages cannot be replaced until CY 1968 and early CY 1969 except, in some cases, through extraordinary logistic actions such as sole-source procurement contracts or off-shelf purchase of like civilian items.

(2) Withdrawals from other overseas commands. 1

Withdrawing units from Europe and Korea to either offset 2  
a shortfall (alternative 1 or 2) or meet criteria of a 3  
force option (alternative 3) will significantly reduce 4  
combat capability in these areas. For example, 5  
alternative 3 requires withdrawal from Europe of 6  
70 percent of all nondivisional engineer combat 7  
battalions, all medium helicopter companies, 55 8  
percent of the light/medium truck companies, 9  
80 percent of general support artillery battalions, 10  
and 45 percent of the armored cavalry squadrons; from 11  
Korea, this alternative requires withdrawal of all trans- 12  
portation terminal service companies and the remaining 13  
medium helicopter company. 14

(3) Sustainability. Even assuming the indefinite 15  
suspension of rotation, to meet and sustain the expanded 16  
Southeast Asia requirement will require expansion of 17  
the Active Army to offset the steady erosion of the 18  
remaining STRAF which must be used to provide replace- 19  
ments for combat attrition. Ultimately, even alterna- 20  
tives 1 and 2 will probably require call-up of 21  
Reserve forces, particularly if any rotation policy 22  
is to be reestablished. 23

b. Navy. Amphibious assault shipping is available world- 24  
wide to lift one and two-thirds Marine Corps division/wing 25  
teams. However, approximately 40 percent of organic Navy 26  
amphibious shipping is forward deployed (2/9 - 3/9 WESTPAC, 27  
1/9 EUCOM, 1/9 Caribbean). The LST component of the 28  
amphibious force is more heavily committed because of its 29  
unique over-the-beach unloading capability. Sixty-seven 30  
percent of the LSTs in PACOM are deployed to or maintained 31  
in the Western Pacific. MSTC operates 36 LSTs, all foreign 32

manned, in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia engaged in 1  
point-to-point and intratheater lift in support of the present 2  
level of operations in Vietnam. Five CVAs are maintained con- 3  
tinuously in the Seventh Fleet. Three of these are engaged 4  
at any one time. Additionally, 2 are maintained forward 5  
deployed in EUCOM, for a total of 7 (or 47 percent) deployed 6  
continuously. A fourth CVA could be engaged in support of a 7  
corps-size force, but only at the expense of a sustained 8  
capability, by deploying an additional CVA or drawing down 9  
on other forward deployments. 10

c. Air Force. Any of the three alternatives can be 11  
supported to provide additional forces to reinforce PACOM 12  
in an assumed emergency. Extraordinary measures, such as 13  
temporary reduction of the CONUS training base and revision of 14  
Air Force personnel rotation policies, would be required to 15  
meet deployments in the July-December period for all three 16  
alternatives, and some unit reequipage in PACAF would be 17  
delayed. Without withdrawal of a tactical reconnaissance 18  
squadron (TRS) from Europe (not considered advisable), the 19  
required TRS does not become available until November 1967 20  
except in alternative 3 wherein Air National Guard (ANG) 21  
are available in July 1967. Provision of two TCS reduces 22  
STRICOM tactical airlift capability. Personnel for support- 23  
ing units are available from worldwide resources; however, 24  
augmentation to 100 percent manning level by withdrawals 25  
from other units presently manned at 80 - 90 percent will 26  
impact on the donor units. Airbase saturation in Southeast 27  
Asia is a matter of record, and additional deployments would 28  
make the upgrading of Nam Phong a matter of urgency. While 29  
interim deployments in an emergency could be accommodated at 30  
existing bases for alternatives 1 and 2, such arrangements 31  
would further aggravate a situation already critical. Addi- 32  
tional air base improvements should be initiated concurrent 33

with a decision to ready the force for deployment. Increased 1  
authorities and funding are required concurrent with a decision 2  
for organizing/equipping the civil engineer RED HORSE squadrons 3  
and for additional procurement of war consumables. The required 4  
TASS O-2 aircraft can be provided only from new production and 5  
would be an unsatisfied shortfall until the period February - 6  
May 1968. To provide augmentation for the Tactical Air Control 7  
Party (TACP) to meet requirements in August 1967 will require 8  
revision of Air Force rotation policies. 9

d. Marine Corps. Assuming the actions included in paragraph 10  
2 are taken, there are no initial major personnel problems 11  
for the Marine Corps forces for alternatives 1 and 2. If 12  
the emergency should continue for a prolonged period, the 13  
sustaining base would have to be reconstituted, and, if 14  
rotation were resumed, it would be necessary to mobilize in 15  
order to provide a rotation base. However, with regard to 16  
logistics, without mobilization, increased funding and 17  
industrial output would be required to sustain the forces 18  
with principal items beyond D + 180. This requirement could 19  
occur sooner for secondary items depending on the manner in 20  
which additional operations would create peculiar demands in 21  
both items and quantities. 22

6. ~~(U)~~ Logistic Considerations 23

a. The corps force, under any of the three alternative 24  
mixes, will operate under field conditions or use existing 25  
facilities in the operational area. Garrison-type equip- 26  
ment would not be utilized or accompany the force. Air 27  
elements would occupy Southeast Asia airfields wherever 28  
they could best be accommodated. It is noted that an 29  
expeditionary airfield (SATS) is included in the Marine 30  
expeditionary force (MEF). Therefore, logistic support would 31  
be limited to that essential to enable the force to accomplish 32  
its mission. In view of these facts, the primary logistic 33

consideration for this force is a matter of availability of 1  
air and sealift and the capability of air and sea ports and 2  
beaches to receive the force. In-country transshipment of this 3  
force have not been considered in the preparation of this study. 4

b. Plans for moving the forces for each alternative have 5  
been developed and are contained in Annex E. US transportation 6  
resources would be fully committed for a period of approximately 7  
four months. During this time, airlift for other areas would 8  
be near the minimum JCS-assured allocation; amphibious shipping 9  
and MSTs lift elsewhere would be at a minimum. The movement 10  
plans indicate the following: 11

Alternative 1: Three reinforced divisions, 8 TFS, and the 12  
bulk of support forces moved by 30 September. 13

Alternative 2: Three divisions, 8 TFS, and the bulk of 14  
support forces moved by 31 August. 15

Alternative 3: Three and one-third divisions, 8 TFS, and the 16  
bulk of support forces moved by 30 November. 17  
This date could be improved approximately 60 18  
days by requisitioning shipping. 19

c. Shipping required and airlift sorties required for the 20  
movement are indicated in detail in Annex E. 21

d. Offloading capabilities in Vietnam would appear to be 22  
adequate if the force moves as shown in the schedules and 23  
is not limited to a small number of the ports available. 24  
This factor is further discussed in Annex E. 25

7. ~~(S)~~ Summary. The three alternative force mixes offer 26  
a choice of options, the major features of which are: 27

a. Alternative 1: Uses Active forces from the Army, 28  
Air Force, and Marine Corps so as to balance the impact 29  
among these three Services. Leaves II MEF(-) to meet NATO 30  
commitments; however, employs one of the NATO committed 31

Army divisions. No units would be withdrawn from Europe. Three divisions, 8 TFS, and the bulk of the support forces could be moved to SVN in 90 days.

b. Alternative 2: Makes maximum use of Marine Corps forces. This leaves the 5th US Army Division to meet NATO commitments; however, it employs II MEF which is NATO committed. No units would be withdrawn from Europe. This alternative would place 3 divisions, 8 TFS, and the bulk of the support forces in SVN in the shortest time, 60 days. This force would be less dependent on port and airfield facilities.

c. Alternative 3: Provides an all-Army ground force and an all-Air Force air element with lower shortfalls and a greater capability for inland sustained operations. Three and one third divisions, 8 TFS, and the bulk of the support forces could be moved to SVN in 150 days. (This time could be shortened to 90 days if additional shipping is requisitioned.) It makes maximum use of flexibility inherent in Reserve call-ups but would have a detrimental impact on Europe. It would allow Marine ground and air forces to remain available for other missions.

ANNEXES

A. Assumed Emergency Situation	23
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ANNEX A

ASSUMED EMERGENCY SITUATION

1. ~~(S)~~ The emergency situation which would generate the need for a corps size force in SVN would have to be of a serious nature to warrant the expedient measures necessary to provide the force. It would have to be clearly apparent to the National Command Authorities that the emergency would lead to the destruction or loss of a substantial part of US forces unless remedial action were taken.
2. ~~(S)~~ Such an emergency might consist of the imminent over-running of friendly forces in the I Corps Tactical Zone; or a heavy enemy thrust from the central highlands toward Qui Nhon to split the country in two; or the encirclement and threatened capture of Saigon by heavy enemy forces.
3. ~~(S)~~ In such a situation, some forces already in SVN probably would have been shifted to meet the threat. The incoming forces could act as reinforcements, replace those forces in vacated areas, or engage in other offensive roles.

ANNEX B

FORCE PACKAGES FOR ANALYSIS

- 1. ~~(S)~~ The following alternative Force Packages are to be analyzed for readying and deploying to Southeast Asia.
  - a. First Alternative. Use of active forces in CONUS, Hawaii, Japan, and Okinawa.
    - (1) Army Forces
      - (a) Abn division from CONUS
      - (b) Mech division from CONUS (converted to an inf division)
      - (c) 3 inf bns from Hawaii (to round out above forces).
      - (d) Armed cav regt (CONUS resources).
    - (2) Marine Corps Forces
      - (a) Marine division (reinforced as necessary from CONUS resources)
      - (b) Marine air forces equivalent to 3 squadrons.
    - (3) Air Forces
      - 5 TFS from CONUS.
    - (4) Amphibious lift for Marine Corps forces plus T-1STs to perform coastal shipping.
  - b. Second Alternative. Use of active forces in CONUS, Hawaii, Japan, and Okinawa.
    - (1) Army Forces
      - (a) Abn division from CONUS (reinforced by 2 battalions).
      - (b) Armored cav regt (CONUS resources).
    - (2) Marine Corps Forces
      - 2 divisions (minus 2/9) with air support equivalent to 5 squadrons.
    - (3) Air Forces
      - 3 TFS from CONUS.

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(4) Navy Forces	1
Same as in alternative 1.	2
c. <u>Third Alternative.</u> Use of active and reserve forces	3
and some Europe transfers.	4
(1) Army Forces	5
(a) 3 infantry divisions.	6
(b) Armored cav regiment.	7
(2) Marine Corps Forces - None.	8
(3) Air Forces	9
8 TFS.	10
(4) Navy Forces	11
12 LSTs.	12
d. Dependent upon the availability of land-based	13
fighter and attack squadrons and base loading in-country	14
and in Thailand, a CVA could be sustained in all force	15
packages.	16

Force <sup>1/</sup>	Personnel		Units Required			Helo Co/Sq	Date Ready For Deployment	Remarks
	Required	Available	Battalions Man Eng Art	Tac Sqd				
<u>Navy Forces</u>								
T-ISTs	1,380	0						Shortfall
<u>Air Force</u>								
Tac Ftr Sqs, Tac Ftr Wg, and Base Operating Support	3,081	3,081				5	July-Sep 67	
Air Force Support Forces	5,729	5,095					Aug 67	Shortfall includes civil engr sqdn and TASS (634 pers)
Total Air Forces	8,810	8,176				5		
<u>Marine Corps Forces</u>								
5th Mar Div	20,005	20,005	9	1	4		July	
Support for 5th Mar Div	11,575	11,494	1	2	2/3		July	Shortfall is 81 personnel
Air Elements	4,587	3,741				3	6	July-Oct 67 Shortfall includes 2 1/2 helo sqdns (846 pers)
Subtotal MC Forces	36,167	35,240	10	3	4 2/3	3	6	Total Marine Corps shortfall 927 pers
Supplementary MC forces to fill Army shortfalls <sup>2/</sup>		5,206					July-Oct	This includes 1 maneuver bn, 1 engr br, and 5 helo sqdns.
Total Forces	136,486	116,727	34	13	21 2/3	8	18	
Total Shortfall		19, 559	3	2	1		6 1/2	

<sup>1/</sup> Grouped for movement purposes

<sup>2/</sup> These supplementary forces would be withdrawn from II MEF which would be degraded correspondingly. They would be used primarily to fill Army shortfalls although two and one-half helo squadrons could be applied against the Marine Corps shortfall.

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ANNEX C

FORCE REQUIREMENTS VS CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE FORCES

ALTERNATIVE 1

<u>Forces</u> <sup>1/</sup>	<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Units Required</u>				<u>Helo CO/Sqd</u>	<u>Date Ready For Deployment</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>Required</u>	<u>Available</u>	<u>Battalions</u>	<u>Tac</u>	<u>Man</u>	<u>Eng</u>			
<u>Army Forces</u>									
Corps Hqs	1,990	1,550						Aug	
82nd Abn Div	15,865	15,865	9	1	3		1	Jul	
5th Mech Div	16,851	16,851	10	1	4		1	Sep	
Armd Cav Regt	3,349		3		1			Feb 68	Entire unit is considered a shortfall
Support Forces for 82nd Div	18,390	13,937	1	3	4		4	Aug-Dec	Shortfall includes 3 helo cos
Support Forces for 5th Div	15,280	8,738		3	3		4	Aug-Dec	Shortfall includes 1 engr bn and 4 helo cos
Support Forces for Corps	18,404	11,363	1	2	2		2	Aug-Dec	Shortfall includes 1 man bn, 2 engr bns, and 2 helo cos
<u>Total Army Forces</u>	<u>90,129</u>	<u>68,305</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>17</u>		<u>12</u>		Total Army shortfall includes 4 man bns, 3 engr bns, 1 arty bn and 9 helo cos. (21,624 pers)

<sup>1/</sup> Grouped for movement purposes

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ALTERNATIVE 2

Force <sup>1/</sup>	Personnel		Units Required			Helo Co/Sqd	Date Ready For Deployment	Remarks
	Required	Available	Man	Eng	Art			
<u>Army Forces</u>								
82nd Abn Div	15,905	15,905	9	1	3	1	July	1 bn not ready til August
Armored Cav Regt	3,349	0	3		1		Feb 68	Entire unit considered a shortfall
Support Forces for 82nd Div	20,452	15,588	2	4	4	4	Aug-Dec 67	Shortfall includes 1 engr bn and 3 helo cos (4,864 pers)
Subtotal Army Forces	39,706	31,493	14	5	8	5		
Supplementary Corps support forces	16,597	10,597		4	4	1	Aug-Dec 67	Shortfall in corps forces include 2 engr bn and 1 helo co (600 pers)
Total Army Forces	56,303	42,090	14	9	12	6		Total Army shortfall includes 3 man ons, 3 engr bns, 1 arty bn, and 4 helo cos (14,213 pers)
<u>Navy Forces</u>								
T-LSTs	1,380	0						Shortfall
<u>Air Forces</u>								
Tac Ftr Sqs, Tac Ftr Wg, and BOS	1,731	1,731				3	Jul-Aug 67	
AF Support Forces	5,602	5,029					Aug 67	Shortfall includes a civil engr sqdn and TASS (573 pers)
Total Air Forces	7,333	6,760				3		
<u>Marine Corps Forces</u>								
Corps Hqs	MEC	278					July	
5th Mar Div	20,005	20,005	9	1	4		July	
2nd Mar Div	17,124	17,124	7	1	3 2/3		July	

<sup>1/</sup> Grouped for movement purposes

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Force <sup>1/</sup>	Personnel		Units Required				Helo Co/Sqd	Date Ready For Deployment	Remarks
	Required	Available	Battalions Man	Eng	Art	Tac Sqd			
<u>Marine Corps Forces (cont)</u>									
Support for 5th Mar Div	12,687	12,611	1	2	2/3			July	Shortfall of 76 pers
Support for 2nd Mar Div	7,517	7,442	1	2	2/3			July	Shortfall of 75 pers
Air Elements	12,954	11,802				5	12	July-Oct 67	Shortfall of 1,152 pers includes 3 1/2 helo sqdns
Total MC Forces	70,665	69,362	18	6	9	5	12		Total Marine Corps shortfall 1,303 pers
Total Forces	135,681	118,212	32	15	21	8	18		
Total Shortfall		17,469	3	3	1		7 1/2		

<sup>1/</sup> Grouped for movement purposes

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ALTERNATIVE 3

<u>Force</u> <sup>1/</sup>	<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Battalions</u>			<u>Units Required</u>		<u>Helo Co/Sqd</u>	<u>Date Ready For Deployment</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>Required</u>	<u>Available</u>	<u>Man</u>	<u>Eng</u>	<u>Art</u>	<u>Tac Sqd</u>				
<u>Army Forces</u>										
Corps Hqs	1,550	1,550							Aug 67	
82nd Div	15,865	15,865	9	1	3		1		Jul 67	
101st Div	15,865	15,865	9	1	3		1		Sep 67	
5th Div	17,527	17,527	11	1	4		1		Sep 67	
Armored Cav Regt	3,349	3,349	3		1				Aug 67	
82nd Div Support	18,536	16,677		3	4		4		Aug-Dec 67	Shortfall includes 2 helo cos
101st Div Support	16,511	13,900		4	3		4		Aug-Dec 67	Shortfall includes 4 helo cos
5th Div Support	16,483	12,827		4	2		4		Aug-Dec 67	Shortfall includes 2 arty bns and 3 helo cos
Support Forces for Corps	19,803	16,158	1	1	3		2		Aug-Dec 67	Shortfall includes 2 helo cos
<b>Total Army Forces</b>	<b>125,489</b>	<b>113,718</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>24</b>		<b>17</b>			<b>Total Army shortfall includes 2 arty bns and 11 helo cos (11,771 pers)</b>
<u>Navy Forces</u>										
T-LSTs	1,380	1,380							Aug 67	

<sup>1/</sup> Grouped for movement purposes

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Force <sup>1/</sup>	Personnel		Units Required			Helo Co/Sqd	Date Ready For Deployment	Remarks
	Required	Available	Man	Eng	Art			
<u>Air Forces</u>								
Tac Ftr Sqs, Tac Ftr Wing, and Base Operating Spt	3,886	3,886				8	July-Aug 67	
Air Force Support	6,014	4,917					Aug 67	Shortfall includes 2 civil engr sqdns and 1 TASS (1097 pers)
<b>Total Air Forces</b>	<b>9,900</b>	<b>8,803</b>				<b>8</b>		
<b>Total Forces</b>	<b>136,769</b>	<b>123,901</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>17</b>	
<b>Total Shortfall</b>		<b>12,868</b>			<b>2</b>		<b>11</b>	

<sup>1/</sup> Grouped for movement purposes

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ANNEX D

SHORTFALLS AND PROBLEM AREAS

1. ~~(b)~~ Additional information on shortfalls and problem areas is provided herein. 1  
2

a. In alternative 1 after the Services had determined their capabilities to provide forces, there was a substantial Army shortfall as indicated in Tabs A and B. This resulted from the Army absorbing the requirement to provide corps support for the entire force. Subsequently, it was determined that certain Marine Corps forces could be made available to overcome some of the Army shortfalls. Hence, these Marine Corps forces, which include five helicopter squadrons, have been added to those forces that can be made available and are subtracted from the shortfall. 3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12

b. In alternative 2, after the Services had determined their capabilities to provide forces, it became apparent that, to meet CINCPAC requirements for a force capable of sustained inland operations, additional corps support would be required. Therefore, in addition to providing support for a divisional slice, the Army was tasked to supply supplementary forces to fill out the needed corps support forces. These types of forces are not normally found in the Marine Corps force structure. 13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21

~~(b)~~ Tabs A and B are spread sheets which give an analysis of the shortfalls. From this analysis, the following are significant findings: 22  
23  
24

a. Army 25

(1) In all alternatives a significant number of shortfalls could be made available in 1968 through activations of units, which are already scheduled: 26  
27  
28

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- (a) Alternative 1 - 76 percent. 1
- (b) Alternative 2 - 90 percent. 2
- (c) Alternative 3 - 68 percent. 3

Units that cannot be made available in 1968 must await  
long lead-time procurement. 4 5

(2) In alternatives 1 and 2, approximately 70 percent  
of the shortfalls could be overcome by a call-up of selected  
Reserves and by transferring units from Europe and Korea  
(less than 10 percent represents Reserve call-up). 6 7 8 9

(3) In alternative 3, there appear to be no additional  
steps that could be taken to overcome the shortfalls  
except sole-source and off-the-shelf procurement with lib-  
eral commercial substitutes. A quantitative estimate of  
the shortfalls that could thus be overcome has not been made. 10 11 12 13 14

b. Air Force. Air Force shortfalls in all three alterna-  
tives are in civil engineer units (RED HORSE) which are not  
in the Active forces and in TASS O-2 aircraft which must be  
provided from new production. For further detail, see  
Tab C. 15 16 17 18 19

c. Navy. The Navy shortfall of 12 LSTs in alternatives  
1 and 2 can only be solved by withdrawing them from other  
areas. 20 21 22

d. Marine Corps. Overcoming helicopter unit shortfalls  
is dependent on production and pilot procurement. Interpreter  
and translator team shortfalls can be made up after 18 months'  
training time. 23 24 25 26

3. (U) Tab C is a discussion of Air Force shortfalls and  
problem areas. 27 28

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TAB A TO ANNEX D

SHORTFALLS

	<u>Total Shortfall</u>	<u>Amount That Could be Overcome By Call-up of Reserves</u>	<u>Amount that Could be Overcome By Transfers From Other Areas</u>	<u>Amount Still Not Available</u>
<u>ALTERNATIVE 1</u>	23,919 <sup>1/</sup>	1,363	14,350	8,206
Army	21,824 <sup>1/</sup>	1,363	12,970	7,491
Air Force	634	--	--	634
Navy	1,380	--	1,380	0
MC	81	--	--	81
<u>ALTERNATIVE 2</u>	17,469	1,291	10,726	5,552
Army	8,213	749	5,488	1,976
Air Force	573	--	--	573
Navy	1,380	--	1,380	--
MC	1,303	--	--	1,303
Army Supple- mentary Corps Support	6,000	442	3,858	1,700
<u>ALTERNATIVE 3</u>	12,868	--	--	12,868
Army	11,771	--	--	11,771
Air Force	1,097	--	--	1,097

<sup>1/</sup> This shortfall can be reduced by 4,360 through use of supplementary Marine Corps forces but is listed here in full for accounting purposes.

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TAB B TO ANNEX D

ARMY DATA ON SHORTFALLS

Unit	Shortfall	Available in 68	Possible Offsets <sup>1/</sup>		Unknown Availability	Possible Offsets <sup>2/</sup>	
			Amount From Reserves	Amount From Transfers		Amount from Reserves	Amount From Transfers
<u>ALTERNATIVE 1</u>	21,824 <sup>3/</sup>	16,004	731	11,433	5,820	632	1,537
ACR	3,349	3,349	0	3,349	0	0	0
Support for 82nd Div	4,453	4,201	262	2,578	252	78	116
Support for 5th Div	6,542	4,896	233	3,861	1,646	61	198
Support for Corps	7,480	3,558	236	1,645	3,922	493	1,223
<u>ALTERNATIVE 2</u>	14,213	12,603	657	9,006	1,610	534	340
ACR	3,349	3,349	0	3,349	0	0	0
Support for 82nd Div	4,864	4,124	657	2,024	740	92	115
Supplementary Corps Support	6,000	5,130	0	3,633	870	442	225
<u>ALTERNATIVE 3</u>	11,771	7,882	---	---	3,889	---	---
Support for 82nd Div	1,859	1,836			23		
Support for 101st Div	2,611	1,048			1,563		
Support for 5th Div	3,656	2,280			1,376		
Support for Corps	3,645	2,718			927		

<sup>1/</sup> Possible offsets to provide in CY 67 those shortfalls that are scheduled to be provided in CY 68.

<sup>2/</sup> Possible offsets to provide in CY 67 those shortfalls for which no date of availability is known.

<sup>3/</sup> This shortfall can be reduced by 4,360 through use of supplementary Marine Corps forces but is listed here in full for accounting purposes.

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TAB C TO ANNEX D

US AIR FORCE PROBLEM AREAS

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ During the period July - December 1967, the Air Force will have the capability to provide up to six tactical fighter squadrons for deployment under an assumed emergency situation. However, there are no additional assets available for a corresponding increase to the CONUS training base to provide for sustained support above the level of forces currently engaged in Southeast Asia. Therefore, these additional deployable units could be sustained for only a short period of time. In this analysis, the possible duration of engagement, or deployment, for the corps size force is not addressed. It is prudent to assume that it may continue for an extended period of time. Since maintenance of an adequate sustaining base is considered critical, both to support deployed forces and to insure a viable capability for other contingency requirements, the data in this Tab are based upon increasing the CONUS training base as additive deployments are executed.

2. ~~TOP SECRET~~ Deployment of additional forces in any alternative can best be accommodated by use of Nam Phong Air Base, in Thailand, to avoid further saturation of operation facilities at other Southeast Asia airfields, to retain some beddown capability in SVN for follow-on forces, and to provide some flexibility. This base is presently being completed to bare-base configuration and would require upgrading to a main operating base capability to support three tactical fighter squadrons (TFS). Tactical operations can be supported initially on an austere basis with TDY PRIME BEEF personnel deployed in advance of tactical units by use of a GRAY EAGLE package and tactical airfield

dispensing system (TAFDS). Additional base improvements 1  
required would be completed thereafter by a heavy repair 2  
(RED HORSE) squadron and organic civil engineer personnel to 3  
support sustained operations. 4

3. ~~(S)~~ Problem areas associated with each alternative, 5  
and possible corrective actions, are discussed in the 6  
following paragraphs. 7

4. ~~(S)~~ Alternative 1 (5 TFS, 1 tactical reconnaissance 8  
squadron (TRS), 2 Troop carrier squadrons (TCS), and 9  
Associated Units): 10

a. Under present programmed aircraft equipage schedules / 11  
and with projected aircraft losses in Southeast Asia, the 12  
Air Force can deploy and provide sustained support for 13  
only 3 of the 5 TFS by end CY 1967 without drawdown of the 14  
CONUS base. All three squadrons would be aircraft from 15  
the active force. The major impact associated with this 16  
deployment would be the required diversion of F-4 aircraft 17  
now programmed for reequipping of PACAF units outside 18  
Southeast Asia. This would result in reduction of WESTPAC 19  
F-4D squadrons to one by end FY 1969 and no replacements 20  
until after FY 2/70. PACAF support of tactical fighter 21  
SIOP would be further degraded. Also, all F-4 squadrons in 22  
Tactical Air Command would be in a replacement training 23  
unit (RTU) role by end FY 1969. Additional attrition 24  
losses by FY 2/70 would require a procurement increase of 25  
54 aircraft. The remaining two squadrons could only be 26  
satisfied by withholding units from the training base, 27  
since Reserve/Guard call-up or Europe withdrawals are not 28  
envisioned in this alternative. Such reduction in the training 29  
base, would seriously degrade Air Force capabilities to sustain 30  
the deployed forces. The reduction could be effected by 31

change to rotation and tour length policies. Should such 1  
actions be taken, it would be possible to provide the remain- 2  
ing two squadrons from the training base in August 1967. 3  
However, in order to determine more specific information 4  
concerning personnel availability, a postulated execution 5  
and deployment period would be required upon which a study 6  
in depth could be accomplished, unit reequipment reevaluated, 7  
and new policies for tour length and rotation established. 8  
Additional attrition replacements for these 2 squadrons 9  
would require increased procurement of 36 aircraft, or a 10  
total of 90 additional aircraft for this alternative. The 11  
TRS requirement can be satisfied by providing a composite 12  
squadron of 12 RF-4 and 6 RF-101 aircraft. The RF-4 ele- 13  
ment of 12 aircraft can only be provided from a partially 14  
equipped squadron in Okinawa, would not be available until 15  
November 1967, and would require an exception to personnel 16  
tour policy. An appropriate increase must be provided to 17  
the training base; however, this resource will not be 18  
available until 4/68. The two TCS can be provided from 19  
active resources, and increased training base can be pro- 20  
vided. However, this will reduce tactical airlift avail- 21  
able to STRICOM. The tactical support units can be pro- 22  
vided from worldwide resources; however, the 31 O-2 air- 23  
craft (9 command/support) for the TASS must be procured 24  
and would become available in February (11), March (11), 25  
and April (9) 1968, and trained TACP augmentation per- 26  
sonnel will become available beginning in March 1968, with a 27  
1 July 1967 decision. All the tactical units concerned are 28  
currently manned at the worldwide rate of 80-90 percent of 29  
authorized level. Movement to an area of 100 percent 30  
manning level and a crew ratio of 1.5 to 1 would cause 31  
considerable personnel turbulence in units from which 32  
augmentees are withdrawn and temporary reductions in 33  
unit efficiency. 34

b. This alternative is logistically supportable; 1  
however, immediate action would be required to procure 2  
additional war consumables, such as munitions, wing tanks 3  
and pylons, to provide sustained support for the additive 4  
forces. Lead time for such commodities varies from six 5  
to nine months. Initial support in other supply areas can 6  
be provided from current stocks (peacetime and WRM); 7  
however, replacement procurement would have to be effected 8  
immediately to reconstitute such stocks to maintain 9  
contingency capabilities. Similar lead times can be 10  
expected. An early decision and authority would be required 11  
for organizing and equipping a civil engineer heavy repair 12  
squadron (RED HORSE) and a civil engineer group head- 13  
quarters for employment at Nam Phong. Although 14  
initial support and austere operating capability can be 15  
provided by organic civil engineer personnel and TDY 16  
PRIME BEEF augmentation deployed in advance of the 17  
tactical units, sustained operations would require upgrading 18  
of Nam Phong to main operating base capability. Such 19  
construction effort requires the skills and equipage of 20  
the RED HORSE unit. Lead time for these units is six months 21  
from decision and approval date. Medical support at 22  
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base would be degraded until 23  
medical personnel could be procured through normal 24  
replacement channels. Also, additional manpower spaces 25  
would be required to reconstitute units from which 26  
augmentees are withdrawn, if the deployment is to be of 27  
sustained duration. 28

5. ~~TOP SECRET~~ Alternative 2 (3 TFS, 1 TRS, 2 TCS, and Associated 29  
Units): 30

a. The problem areas associated with this alternative 1  
are identical to those in alternative 1 (paragraph 4 above), 2  
except that the impacts are lesser in degree. The 3  
reprogramming of 3 F-4 squadron assets from PACAF is still 4  
required, and only the last 3 of the 6 scheduled squadrons 5  
in PACAF could be equipped. Additional procurement of 54 6  
aircraft is required for projected F-4 attrition losses. 7  
The 18 TASS O-2 aircraft (5 command/support) would be 8  
available in February and March 1968 from new procurement, 9  
and the TACP augmentation would be available in March 1968. 10

b. This alternative is logistically supportable with 11  
additional procurement actions required for war consumable 12  
items. Early decision and authority is also required for 13  
organizing and equipping a RED HORSE squadron and civil 14  
engineer group headquarters for employment at Nam Phong 15  
Air Base to provide a sustained operational capability. 16

6. ~~(S)~~ Alternative 3 (8 TFS, 1 TRS, 2 TCS, and Associated 17  
Units): 18

a. In this alternative, Reserve/Guard call-up is 19  
envisioned and would be used. The 9 F-100 ANG units would 20  
be called to active duty as 25 UE units. Five squadrons 21  
would be reorganized and deployed as five 18 UE squadrons. 22  
The other units/aircraft would be required to provide 23  
attrition and CONUS sustaining base. The remaining three 24  
TFS (active squadrons) deploy as in alternatives 1 and 2, 25  
leaving no shortfall in tactical fighter units. Repro- 26  
gramming, unit conversion, and personnel impacts in 27  
alternative 1 also apply, and an increase in procurement 28  
for 54 F-4 attrition aircraft is required through FY 2/70. 29  
ANG F-100 losses in the same period would reduce the ANG 30  
F-100 force to about 5 squadron equivalents at 25 UE. 31

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The major impact in this alternative is the lesser extent 1  
to which augmentation forces could be provided to USCINCEUR 2  
during the period D- to D+30, represented in the reduction 3  
of 9 ANG F-100 units. The total effect of such a 4  
degradation is significant and would require separate 5  
evaluation. The tactical support units can be provided 6  
from worldwide resources; however, the 44 (13 command/support) 7  
0-2 aircraft, new procurement, would become available in 8  
February, March, April, and May 1968 at a rate of 11 each 9  
month. TACP augmentation personnel become available in 10  
March 1968. The two TCS are available as in alternative 1 11  
with the same impact. The TRS can be met in July 1967 through 12  
activation of two ANG RF-84 (BEEFBROTH) units to provide one 13  
deployable 18 UE squadron and one 18 UE squadron for employ- 14  
ment in the RTU role. 15

b. This alternative is logistically supportable; how- 16  
ever, austere conditions would exist due to extensive air base 17  
saturation. Some loss in operational effectiveness would 18  
be expected, and remedial improvements to existing bases 19  
in SVN would be required. Such actions should be initiated 20  
promptly after decision date to provide additional 21  
expeditionary facilities such as ramp and parking (airfield 22  
matting) and POL augmentation, in addition to upgrading 23  
Nam Phong Air Base as quickly as possible to support 24  
sustained operations. Additional procurement actions, as 25  
in alternatives 1 and 2, are required for war consumable 26  
items. A RED HORSE squadron, in addition to one at Nam Phong, 27  
is required at Da Nang to be employed in elements at bases 28  
in SVN receiving the additive forces. To provide civil 29  
engineer supervision, design, and management, a civil engineer 30  
group should also be deployed to Nam Phong. 31

~~TOP SECRET~~

## ANNEX E

## MOVEMENT DATA

1. (U) In preparing the movement schedules, the limiting parameters were the dates of availability for deployment of units, the quantity of transportation, and the capacity of facilities to receive and unload at destination.

2. (S) In alternatives 1 and 2, the units could be moved with few exceptions as they became ready for deployment. The dates for deployment coincide roughly with the availability of transportation. The 82nd Division and those Air Force units available in the first month are moved by air. Significant elements of the Marine forces, which are combat loaded, are moved by Navy amphibious shipping in the first month. MSTs ships are used to carry cargo and some support units also in the first month. The bulk of the remaining combat and support elements are moved by air and MSTs during August and September with a few units and some shortfalls moving in small increments as they become ready over the following several months. In general, the units will maintain integrity and will arrive configured to conduct operations in a minimum of time.

3. (S) In the third alternative, some units will be delayed beyond their readiness dates unless additional commercial shipping could be obtained for a short period. In this alternative also, unit integrity would be generally maintained. Several units would deploy direct from Europe and would marry-up with the force in Southeast Asia.

4. (S) The over-all receiving capability of SVN ports is estimated to be approximately 1,550,000 M/tons per month while actual receipts have averaged about 1,350,000 M/tons per month. Thus, there is a capacity to receive approximately

200,000 M/tons of additional input if all facilities were used. 1  
The additional maximum input of material for the corps force 2  
amounts to slightly over 200,000 tons in the months of August. 3  
and September. Therefore, no significant increase in port 4  
facilities will be required if disposition of the force is 5  
such that multiple ports may be used for its support. 6

5. ~~(S)~~ The airlift required for these movements consists of 7  
all cargo aircraft that can be made available by cutting other 8  
areas of the world to the approved JCS minimum, plus a continued 9  
15,000 S/T cargo per month to SVN. Passenger airlift required 10  
amounts to about one half of the available worldwide MAC owned 11  
or commercial contracted airlift. This would include sufficient 12  
airlift for replacements for combat losses. All MSTs troop ships 13  
(16) will be required for troop lift, July through October. 14  
Amphibious shipping available elsewhere would be at a minimum 15  
for 60 to 90 days. Detailed numbers of ships and airlift 16  
sorties required are in TABS A, B, and C. 17

6. ~~(S)~~ In alternatives 1 and 2, if shortfalls were to be 18  
overcome by transfers from Europe, this could be accomplished 19  
by diverting troop ships, as required and available, from SVN 20  
to Europe for trooplift plus commercial charter of the necessary 21  
Atlantic cargo ships. 22

FORCES	PAX	TONS	MODE	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOVEMBER 67-NOVEMBER 68	REMARKS
CORPS HQ	1550	1175 S/T	AIR		3 Days				AIR TRANSPORTED ELEMENTS REQUIRE: A total of 62 sorties.
CORPS SUPPORT (USA)	6960	91025 M/T	SEA		30 Days				3 troop ships 11 cargo ships
CORPS SUPPORT (USMC)	4920	19620 M/T	AMPHIB		41 Days				
CORPS SUPPORT (USMC)	286	1144 M/T	AMPHIB			41 Days			
CORPS SUPPORT	7961	51667 M/T	SEA					To be moved over a 12 month period when available and ready.	
COMBAT ELEMENTS OF 82ND DIV Plus AIR FORCES (1 SQ)	15865 505	21582 S/T 2231 S/T	AIR AIR	7	21 Days				AIR TRANSPORTED ELEMENTS REQUIRE: A total of 1232 sorties.
CARGO, NON AIR TRANS		21560 M/T	SEA	15	30 Days				NON AIR TRANS CARGO REQUIRE: 3 cargo ships
82ND DIV SPT FORCES & AIR FORCES (5 SQ)	12054 6125	25673 S/T 1013 S/T	AIR AIR		24 Days				AIR TRANSPORTED ELEMENTS REQUIRE: A total of 1450 sorties.
CARGO, NON AIR TRANS		25701 M/T	SEA		30 Days				NON AIR TRANS CARGO REQUIRE: 3 cargo ships
82ND DIV SPT FORCES & AIR FORCES (1SQ)	794 737	1560 S/T 216 S/T	AIR AIR			3 Days			AIR TRANSPORTED ELEMENTS REQUIRE: A total of 68 sorties.
CARGO, NON AIR TRANS		1526 M/T	SEA			30 Days			NON AIR TRANS CARGO REQUIRE: 2 cargo ships
82ND DIV SPT FORCES & AIR FORCES (1SQ)	5290 1443	40129 M/T 1693 S/T	SEA AIR					To be moved over a 12 month period when available and ready.	(AF: Nov 809P, 126 S/T; Jan 475P, 150C S/T Feb 159P, 65 S/T)
5TH DIV SPT FORCES	2606	27513 M/T	SEA		30 Days				1 troop ship 4 cargo ships
5TH DIV Plus 5TH DIV SPT FORCES	22081	172620 M/T	SEA			30 Days			11 troop ships 23 cargo ships
5TH DIV SPT FORCES	6798	76321 M/T	SEA					To be moved over a 12 month period when available and ready.	
ARMY CAV REGT	3349	35017 M/T	SEA					26 Days	Available fr. Aug 67 by transfer from Europe, otherwise Feb 68. Requires 1 troop ship, 5 cargo ships.
MAR DIV/GROUP TEAM	30651	134060 M/T	AMPHIB		26 Days				Combat div to move by amphib ships.
MAR DIV/GROUP SPT	3394	32575 M/T	MSTS		30 Days				1 troop ship, 5 cargo ships.
MAR AIR ELEMENTS	1195	2304 M/T	AMPHIB					26 Days	To move via amphib ships.

\*Time required to attain Col readiness and move to port. Short does not include "WHEEL UP".

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TAB B TO ANNEX E  
ALTERNATIVE II

FORCES	PAY	TONE	MODE	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOVEMBER 67 - NOVEMBER 68	REMARKS
SOME ELEMENTS OF 82ND AIRBORNE DIV AIR FORCES (1 SQ)	15250	20600 S/T	AIR			19 Days			AIR TRANS ELEMENTS REQUIRE: A total of 1079 sorties.
	505	2231 S/T	AIR						
NON AIR TRANS CARGO		21420 M/T	SEA			15	30 Days		NON AIR TRANS CARGO: 3 cargo ships 5 days unloading, 18 days sail time, 7 days offloading.
CORPS SUPPORT (USA)	3451	42037 M/T	SEA			30 Days			2 troop ships, 6 cargo ships
CORPS SUPPORT (USA)	3830	46794 M/T	SEA			30 Days			3 troop ships, 7 cargo ships
CORPS SUPPORT (USA)	8446	86980 M/T	SEA			To be moved over a 12 month period when available and ready			
SUPPORT FORCES FOR 82ND ABN DIV Plus 4 USAF SQMS	10295	27652 S/T	AIR			24 Days			AIR TRANS ELEMENTS REQUIRE: A total of 1445 sorties.
	5446	797 S/T	AIR						
NON AIR TRANS CARGO		20650 M/T	SEA			30 Days			NON AIR TRANS CARGO REQUIRES: 3 cargo ships 5 days unloading, 16 days sail time, 7 days offloading.
SUPPORT FORCES FOR 82ND ABN DIV	4081	8117 S/T	AIR			8 Days			AIR TRANS ELEMENTS REQUIRE: A total of 406 sorties.
NON AIR TRANS CARGO		8000 M/T	SEA			30 Days			NON AIR TRANS CARGO REQUIRES: 1-1/2 cargo ships 5 days unloading, 18 days sail time, 7 days offloading.
REMAINING SUPPORT FOR 82ND ABN DIV AND USAF (1 SQ)	5991	43407 M/T	SEA			To be moved over a 12 month period when available and ready.		(AF: Nov 809P, 128 S/T; Jan 475P, 1500 S/T; Feb-Mar 98P, 65 S/T.	
	1382	1693 S/T	AIR						
ARMY CAV REGT	3349	35017 M/T	SEA			26 Days			Available in Aug 67 if transferred from Europe, otherwise will deploy in Feb 68. 1 troop ship, 5 cargo ships.
5TH MAR DIV/3 MAW (-)	30729	134600 M/T	AMPHIB			26 Days			Combat div to move via amphib ships.
SUPPORT, 5TH MAR DIV/3 MAW (-)	10244	42011 M/T	MSTS			30 Days			Support elements to move via MSTS ship. 5 troop ships, 6 cargo ships.
AIR ELEMENTS	286	259 M/T	AMPHIB			26 Days			
2ND MAR DIV/2 MAW (-)	25735	133000 M/T	AMPHIB			45 Days			
SUPPORT 2ND MAR DIV/2 MAW (-)	1183	25110 M/T	MSTS			41 Days			To move via MSTS ships. 1 Troop ship, 4 cargo ships
AIR ELEMENTS	256	259 M/T	AMPHIB			41 Days			

\*Time required to attain C-1 readiness and move to port.  
This chart does not include "UNRELIABLES".

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TAB C TO ANNEX E  
ALTERNATIVE III

FORCES	FAX	TONE	MODE	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOVEMBER 67 - NOVEMBER 68	REMARKS
CORPS	519	2373 S/T	AIR	7 4 Days					AIR TRANSPORTED ELEMENTS REQUIRE: A total of 82 sorties.
CORPS SPT	7008	69154 M/T	SEA		30 Days				3 troop ships, 12 cargo ships.
CORPS SPT (FR EUR)	4191	10536 M/T	SEA		26 Days				Withdrawn from Europe 1 troop ship, 2 cargo ships.
CORPS SPT	2645	25675 M/T	SEA			30 Days			1 troop ship, 4 cargo ships.
CORPS SPT (FR EUR)	1179	4788 M/T	SEA			26 Days			Withdrawn from Europe 1 troop ship, 1 cargo ship.
CORPS SPT	4884	40476 M/T	SEA					To be moved over a 12 month period when available and ready.	
COMBAT ELEMENTS OF 82ND DIV Plus AIR FORCES (7 TFS)	16096 3225	21800 S/T 3449 S/T	AIR AIR	7 22 Days					AIR TRANSPORTED ELEMENTS REQUIRE: A total of 1110 sorties.
CARGO, NON AIR TRANS		21420 M/T	SEA	15 30 Days					NON AIR TRANS CARGO REQUIRES: 3 cargo ships.
ELEMENTS OF 82ND DIV SPT FORCES & AIR FORCES (4 SQ)	10496 5578	20653 S/T 797 S/T	AIR AIR		19 Days				AIR TRANSPORTED ELEMENTS REQUIRE: A total of 1225 sorties.
CARGO, NON AIR TRANS		20652 M/T	SEA		30 Days				NON AIR TRANS CARGO REQUIRES: 3 troop ships.
SPT FORCES FOR 82ND DIV WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE	3490	13960 M/T	SEA		26 Days				1 troop ship, 2 cargo ships.
ELEMENTS OF 82ND DIV SPT FORCES & AIR FORCES SPT	4296 1097	10500 M/T 3065 S/T	SEA AIR					To be moved over a 12 month period as available and ready.	(AF: Jan 475P, 1500 S/T; Feb 400P, 1500 S/T; Mar 222P, 65 S/T)
ARMY CAV REGT	3349	35017 M/T	SEA					26 Days	Available in Aug 67 by transfer from Europe, otherwise Feb 68. Requires 1 troop ship and 3 cargo ships.
101ST DIV SPT FORCES	2518	12072 M/T	SEA		30 Days				1 troop ship, 2 cargo ships.
101ST DIV SPT FORCES (FR EUR)	6303	49212 M/T	SEA		26 Days				2 troop ships, 7 cargo ships.
101ST DIV & SPT FORCES	17312	147737 M/T	SEA			30 Days			9 troop ships, 20 cargo ships.
101ST DIV SPT FORCES (FR EUR)	1162	6248 M/T	SEA			26 Days			1 troop ship, 1 cargo ship.
101ST DIV SPT FORCES	3518	36439 M/T	SEA					To be moved over a 12 month period as available and ready.	
5TH DIV SPT FORCES	5806	27513 M/T	SEA			30 Days			3 troop ships, 4 cargo ships.
5TH DIV SPT FORCES (FR EUR)	2901	11604 M/T	SEA			26 Days			1 troop ship, 2 cargo ships.
5TH DIV & 5TH DIV SPT FORCES	19210	172620 M/T	SEA			30 Days			9 troop ships, 23 cargo ships.
5TH DIV SPT FORCES (FR EUR)	1748	8942 M/T	SEA			26 Days			1 troop ship, 2 cargo ships.
5TH DIV SPT FORCES	3769	11088 M/T	SEA					To be moved over a 12 month period as available and ready.	

\*Time required to ready units and move to port.

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