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COMMENTS ON THESE INTERVIEWS

ON

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(In Chronological Order)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Association with MACSOG</u>	<u>Rec</u>
Col Donald D. Blackburn, USA	Chief, MACSOG Jun 1965 - May 1966	-
Col John T. Moore, Jr., USAF	Deputy Chief, Operations Branch, MACSOG Jun 1965 - Jun 1966 Chief, Special Plans Office Directorate of Plans, Headquarters, USAF Jun 1966 - to date. Jul 1969	B
Col John K. Singlaub, USA	Chief, MACSOG May 1966 - Aug 1968	C
Capt Bruce B. Dunning, USN	Special Operations Division, OSACSA, Staff Officer & Division Chief Aug 1966 - Nov 1969	D
Col Eugene A. Wahl, USAF	Chief, MACSOG Air Operations Section Dec 1966 - May 1967 Deputy Operations Officer Jun 1967 - Dec 1967	E
Col Harold K. Aaron, USA	Commander, 1st SFG Jun 1967 - May 1968 Commander, 5th SFG Jun 1968 - May 1969	F
Col Robert L. Gleason, USAF	Deputy Chief, MACSOG Mar 1968 - Mar 1969	G

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Annex P 20  
Appendix 3

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COMMENTS ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING

BY

COLONEL DONALD D. BLACKBURN, USA

. . . . . 4  
 [With regard to] the proposal to retain SOG in post- 5  
 hostilities as advisors and then turn over to CAS, I do not 6  
 believe it is a good idea; they tried it once and it became 7  
 necessary to organize SOG. The military should continue 8  
 operations (ostensibly for intelligence purposes) into 9  
 Cambodia and Laos. SOG would do a better job than CAS or 5th 10  
 Special Forces. Perhaps the black/grey radio should be 11  
 retained with a change of theme. Boat operations should 12  
 continue in NVN, strictly surveillance and intelligence 13  
 purposes, but not run by CAS. I can't really tell what the 14  
 situation will be, but we should retain assets and gather 15  
 information. This takes a lot of thought and detailed planning.\* 16

There will be a need to work with the Kha and other 17  
 tribal peoples to get them to do surveillance on the Ho Chi 18  
 Minh Trail. We must keep the border areas under control. 19  
 Where the enemy is trying to deny their operations, it gives us 20  
 a free hand to operate against them and deny ours.\* 21

. . . . . 22  
 During previous periods of hostilities we have recognized 23  
 the contribution of the OSS, guerrillas, Alamo Scouts, etc. 24  
 But, when hostilities cease, we roll up the rug and assume 25  
 everyone is going to behave . . . We then are not adequately 26  
 prepared to cope with fomenting situations or actual out- 27  
 breaks of trouble, for example: Laos where we needed WHITE 28

\* (TS) Interview of Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, USA, p. 5.

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STAR in the northern area and Special Forces operations in the 1  
 Bolovens Plateau; the Congo situation; Cuba, and the early aa,s 2  
 in SVN when the situation dictated a need for an Unconventional 3  
 approach.\* 4

Since operations such as these require resources from 5  
 several departments, I feel we need some kind of independent 6  
 national organization. This organization's directive authority 7  
 would stem from the White House. It would be empowered to get 8  
 its operational resources from the various departments and 9  
 agencies which have the necessary expertise. As indicated, 10  
 this organization would have the authority to coordinate and 11  
 direct operations. From this concept it should not be implied, 12  
 nor do I feel it necessary, that a large complex structure be 13  
 evolved.\* 14

The roles and missions would have to be carefully 15  
 delineated so as not to infringe upon or duplicate the 16  
 functions of other agencies. Some of the responsibilities 17  
 might be: 18

Unconventional Warfare 19  
 Counterinsurgency 20  
 Psychological Operations 21  
 Civic Action 22  
 Police Field Forces 23

The organization could easily expand operations by 24  
 drawing the necessary resources from the various departments 25  
 and agencies. Since its roles in peace and war are related, it 26  
 could develop the necessary experience to efficiently direct 27  
 the varied tasks outlined above. It would be able to coordi- 28  
 nate, plan, and direct operations. It would be able to 29  
 organize, equip, and deploy cells to accomplish various tasks 30  
 around the world.\*\* 31

\* Ibid., pp. 5-6.

\*\* Ibid., p. 6.

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Tab A to  
 Annex P to  
 Appendix B

\*\* Ibid., p. 6.

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The above recommendation provides a point of departure.  
I would recommend assembling a group of experts -- men with  
experience in various types of special operations and organiza-  
tions -- to study the problem in depth and come up with the  
optimum organization, concept and mission \*

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\* Ibid., p. 6.

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COMMENTS ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING

BY

COLONEL JOHN T MOORE, JR., USAF

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I don't foresee any requirement for covert operations after a cessation of hostilities. I say this because I don't think that we are in a position to organize anything in North Vietnam. As I see it, what is going to be required is a continuing capability to watch the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to counter any subversive forces, the Viet Cong in particular. I see a continuation of the PRAIRIE FIRE and the DANIEL BOONE operations but not a resumption of FOOTBOY. It has been dropped already and whatever assets we had, if any of them were loyal anyway, we have lost by now.\*

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\* (TS) Interview of Colonel John T. Moore, Jr , USAF, p. 22.

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COMMENTS ON CONTINGENCY PLANING

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COLONEL JOHN K. SINGLAUB, USA

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I don't think there will ever be a cessation of hostilities from the enemy's point of view. . . there is a definite place for MACSOG . . . under conditions of no overt conventional operations in SEAsia.\*

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Upon cessation of conventional operations, there are many of the current covert operations which would be altered or eliminated; there are others which should be strengthened and intensified. The latter relate to black covert PsyOps. I feel that there will be a need to continue the psychological pressures on the enemy. I believe that there is a requirement for the collection of human intelligence from enemy areas and although this mission might well be assigned to some other agency or activity, it is one that the SOG organization is equipped to handle and they could be used as an intelligence collection activity in addition to their UW operations. I feel that the organization would have to be renamed and relocated in the organizational setup of MACV. Depending upon what type of force was left behind, I feel that it would be possible to create a cover activity to conceal the prime mission of the SOG successor and that, under some advisory role, they could carry on the mission of conducting UW operations. It would have to be done in a more secure manner than is now the case. These operations could not be handled at the MACV level in the same

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\* ~~(TS)~~ Interview of Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA, p 44.

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way that they are now because the present activities of SOG will undoubtedly be included in the directive which specifies that operations against the enemy will come to a halt.\*

To admit that there is a successor to SOG would suggest that we are violating the agreement. We should not give anyone that impression by having a successor to the SOG in name or in personnel. The new unit should be created and phased in by assigning people directly from the States to the new cover organization rather than making lateral transfers for maximum security. It could, of course, include personnel who have previously served in SOG but they would be going out with a different cover.\*\*

\* Ibid., pp. 44-45.  
\*\* Ibid., p. 45.

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COMMENTS ON CO CONTINGENCY PLANNING

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CAPTAIN BRUCE E. DUNNING, USN

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I think we have to get a lot more sophisticated in our  
contingency planning for UW, that we have to make very thorough  
area assessments on which to base our UW planning, and that,  
when we start to employ these assets, they must be employed to  
achieve well thought-out, clearly identified objectives. I  
think much of our contingency planning now is extremely  
superficial, e.g., much of it comprises statements or words  
taken out of field manuals or that guerrilla operations will  
be conducted in the area in question. In the last instance,  
there may be no indication as to how, why, with whom, or  
anything else. We have to do a lot more planning. I think,  
too, that we have to give real thought to the definition of  
unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion,  
and subversion. We have to really think about subversion in  
a lot of areas because we may have to subvert the population  
before we have any chance of developing a base of support in  
which we can conduct guerrilla operations. We have to give a lot  
more attention to escape and evasion; I think we have stumbled  
rather badly in Vietnam on that.\*

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... in the covert actions field at some given point in  
time, depending on how the cessation of hostilities proceeds,  
presumably CIA will again take over responsibility for covert  
actions against North Vietnam. In that case, with respect to  
covert actions, there probably will not be a need for a MACSOG-  
type organization for that particular type of operation.

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\* (PS) Interview of Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN, p. 23.

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However, there should continue to be close links, at least 1  
 back here between the military and CIA as to what is going on 2  
 It is likely, however, that we are going to continue for some 3  
 time to have a requirement for cross-border reconnaissance 4  
 operations because, in a cease-fire or withdrawal or however 5  
 this situation works out, we will have to monitor what the 6  
 enemy is doing. You will have to keep him under surveillance 7  
 and ensure that he is abiding by agreements, tacit or otherwise. 8  
 This is going to virtually make it mandatory that we have some 9  
 sort of cross-border operations for some time. In that role, 10  
 certainly you will need some command and control entity, 11  
 probably a continuation of a truncated SOG to handle those 12  
 operations.\* 13

There is another side to the coin, namely, that at the 14  
 present time there is a considerable amount of resources 15  
 (human and equipment) available to SOG and to its Vietnamese 16  
 counterpart, the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD). The 17  
 STD has a small army which it controls, hopefully, under the 18  
 supervision and guidance of SOG. This could be a very dangerous 19  
 situation, politically, in the future. The Director of STD, 20  
 Colonel Ho, wants very much to retain all of those resources 21  
 and I can't blame him. But I don't think we can afford to let 22  
 him keep them if we can possibly avoid it. The present trend 23  
 in planning is along the lines of ultimately disestablishing 24  
 SOG, taking some of the SOG-type people and incorporating them 25  
 into the MAAG or whatever US structure remains in a special 26  
 operations advising capacity. In addition, we would try to 27

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\* Ibid., p. 46. 28

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to influence the Vietnamese into doing away with the STD, and  
 modifying those command resources into a special operations  
 staff element within the JCS structure, not an operational  
 command. We would prefer that the Vietnamese special operations  
 resources be returned to the armed forces so that they could  
 develop eventually, with appropriate US advisory elements, a  
 modest UW capability in the Vietnamese Navy, the VNAF, and the  
 ARVN. This looks to us to be the safest thing rather than an  
 independent and possibly uncontrollable private military force.\*

I think perhaps this question might be better answered  
 if it didn't relate so much to Southeast Asia and Vietnam. A  
 lot of this depends on what happens elsewhere in Southeast Asia.  
 If things really crank up in Thailand, say, certainly you are  
 going to need a MACSOG-type organization there. If things get  
 hot somewhere in the world where you are going to have a require-  
 ment for the conduct of special operations, you will need a  
 MACSOG-type organization. In that context, absolutely, there  
 is a need for MACSOG-type organizations. You must have, where  
 there is a requirement for special operations, a command and  
 control entity. Whether it should be exactly like SOG, I'm  
 not prepared to say. . . .\*\*

\* Ibid., pp. 46-47.  
 \*\* Ibid., p. 47.

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COMMENTS ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING

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COLONEL EUGENE A WAHL, USAF

I definitely feel that at the conclusion of hostilities, the organization should be retained, should be tailored so as the nucleus is always available and you don't lose the organization completely. In the event you have to build or you have to reactivate the capability, you have the nucleus to work from.\*

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\* (PS) Interview of Colonel Eugene A. Wahl, USAF, p. 8.

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Form 11

Tab E to Annex P to Appendix B



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... of the RVN, USAF, ...

Vietnamese counterparts ... trying to determine what the correct posture is going to be for the non-availability of capability of the RVN. It appears now that training as primarily to ... these UH assets, the 219th helicopters, the MACVS boats, some of the Army equipment, back into the respective Services, however, earmark them as UH dedicated type assets. Take STC which is now both a staff and a command agency for the Vietnamese UH effort, and convert it to a CI CLANT type staff-contingent command. Then when a requirement for a UH effort was necessary, this staff working under the JCC could task the appropriate Service for whatever UH assets were required within the capability whether it be one or two boats or a couple of helicopters, and then take command of those assets while they were doing a specific UH task. When that was over, then revert them to the Service for normal operation, of course, keeping their special UH training up for future operations.

~~(S)~~ Interview by Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF, pp. 8-9

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Tab P to  
Army  
Alphabet