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~~APPENDIX 2~~

(CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

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## CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

## PART I

## INTRODUCTION

A. ~~(TS)~~ Background

With concurrence of the State Department, approval was granted\* in May 1967 to conduct cross-border operations into Cambodia. These operations were conducted under the code name of DANIEL BOONE, later, under the code name SALEM HOUSE. Basically, these operations were oriented toward ground troop reconnaissance and intelligence collection primarily, in the tri-border area.

B. ~~(TS)~~ Scope

1. (TS) These operations were intended to provide early warning of enemy toward the isolated friendly camps in the area and to enable the timely deployment of friendly forces to counter the enemy movement. The constraints were many. These included.

- a. Restrictions as to area of operations.
- b. Reconnaissance teams could not exceed overall strength of twelve men, to include not more than three US advisors.
- c. Tactical air strikes and/or exploitation forces were not authorized for use in Cambodia.
- d. Infiltration and exfiltration would be by foot. Exfiltration by helicopter was authorized in emergency situations only

\* ~~(TS)~~ JCC. MSG 229158Z May 67

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- e. The reconnaissance teams would take all precautions to avoid confrontation with Cambodian military forces or civilian population. 1  
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- f. The teams engage in combat only as a last resort to avoid capture. 4  
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- g. No more than three reconnaissance teams might be committed at any one time. 6  
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- h. The total number of missions would not exceed ten in any one 30-day period. 8  
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2. (TS) With the passage of time, operations instructions governing the conduct of the cross-border teams were modified to include the following: 10  
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- a. The teams were authorized to capture VC/NVA soldiers, who would be evacuated immediately to South Vietnam for interrogation and disposition. 13  
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- b. The use of helicopter gunships to escort helicopter troop ships was authorized as required. The gunships would engage the enemy only when necessary for their own defense or that of the team. 16  
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- c. The teams were authorized to destroy significant enemy caches found during reconnaissance operations. 20  
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- d. The restrictions on the number of US personnel on the reconnaissance team were removed. 22  
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- e. Authority was granted for PAC type aircraft to overfly the DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE area on minimum duration, mission controlled flights. 24  
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2. (TS) DOD/COMUSMACV attempts to remove prohibitions on the use of small exploitation forces and tactical air in support of the reconnaissance team operations have been unsuccessful. The State Department has nonconcurrented in the removal of these prohibitions because of what it considers to be political sensitivities relating to the possible resumption of US/Cambodian diplomatic relations. 27  
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## PART II

## INITIAL PLANNING

A. ~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV OPERATIONAL PROPOSALS

1. ~~(TS)~~ Based on intelligence studies and operational experience, it became clear to COMUSMACV, in late 1965, that the border areas of Cambodia contained motorable infiltration routes, command centers, and base training and supply areas which were being used by the North Vietnam and Viet Cong forces as a sanctuary to mount operations in South Vietnam. In order to foresee and forestall the problems which stemmed from the use of a Cambodian sanctuary, COMUSMACV requested the following authorities be granted as standard operating procedures whenever US troops operated in areas adjacent to the Cambodian border in Darlac, Pleiku and Kontum Provinces.

a. "Artillery and air strikes may be made against enemy weapons firing from the Cambodian side of the border against US troops. This authority would not exceed light artillery range of 10 kilometers into Cambodia."

b. "Ground troops engaged with an enemy on or near the border may maneuver into Cambodia up to two kilometers if such maneuver is necessary for the preservation of the force or the attainment of the objective within South Vietnam."

c. "Observation aircraft and airborne forward air controllers (FAC), in support of US operations, may fly reconnaissance and surveillance missions within a 10 kilometer strip on the Cambodian side of the border. They may direct air and artillery strikes from in-country resources against enemy forces and installations positively identified by ground reconnaissance elements and against enemy forces when their movements or actions clearly indicate they are hostile."

d. "Specially trained ground reconnaissance elements may operate to a depth of five kilometers on the Cambodian side of the border. These specially trained reconnaissance elements may be composed of a mixture of US and Vietnamese or CIDG Mountain personnel as required. Infiltration may be on foot or by helicopter and extraction will be in the same manner."

e. "No Cambodians will be engaged except in self defense nor will any Cambodian Village be attacked by air, artillery fire or ground forces."\*

2. ~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV indicated that the above authorities had been requested only because they were necessary in the defense of

\* ~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV Msg, 091149Z Dec 65

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South Vietnam. They did not indicate that COMUSMACV was seeking a wider war nor would they be so applied. In speaking to COMUSMACV's proposal, the American Ambassador to Vietnam made the following comment:

"I approve the proposed action. But I believe we should be clear in our own minds that we are taking it as an integral part of our effort for the defense of South Vietnam and not because we seek a wider war. Whereas and if the time comes to discuss these matters publicly, it will be well to have this self-limiting statement as part of the record."\*

3. (TS) The authorities proposed by COMUSMACV were not granted as standard operating procedures.\*\* Guidance, however, was provided COMUSMACV concerning actions and counter actions to be taken when operations were being conducted adjacent to the Cambodian border. This guidance was as follows:

a. " When planning operations near the Cambodian/RVN border, in each instance request JCS approval in advance for necessary actions or counter actions against VC/PAVN forces which may involve returning fire or maneuvering into Cambodia in attaining objectives in SVN or in exercise of the right of self-defense."

b. "In emergency situations, US forces are authorized to take necessary counteractions in exercise of the right of self-defense against VC/PAVN attacks directed at US/RVNAF forces from locations inside Cambodia. Keep JCS and higher authority closely advised. An emergency situation is considered to exist when, in the judgment of the commander, the urgency for taking timely counteractions in self-defense of US/allied forces, precludes obtaining prior approval. As necessary, such counteractions may include:

(1) Artillery and air strikes against enemy firing from the Cambodian side of the border against US/RVNAF troops.

(2) Maneuver by US troops, while actually engaged and in contact with VC/PAVN forces, into Cambodia as necessary for the preservation of the force."

c. " No Cambodian forces will be engaged except in self-defense, and no Cambodian villages or populated areas will be attacked by air, by artillery fire, or by ground forces."\*\*\*

\* (TS) Ibid.  
\*\* (TS) Joint State/Defense Msg, 172319Z Dec 65  
\*\*\* (TS) JCS Msg, 152311Z Dec 65

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<del>B. (TS) JCS PLANNING</del>	<u>1</u>
<del>1. (TS) In October 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested</del>	<u>2</u>
<del>a study be made on US policy and alternative US courses of action</del>	<u>3</u>
<del>to deal with Cambodian support of the Viet Cong. As a result of</del>	<u>4</u>
<del>the study, the JCS concluded that certain courses of action</del>	<u>5</u>
<del>were appropriate and necessary for immediate implementation in</del>	<u>6</u>
<del>dealing with the problem. One of these actions provided for the</del>	<u>7</u>
<del>covert paramilitary operations in Cambodia to reduce the infiltration</del>	<u>8</u>
<del>of personnel and material and to collect intelligence information.*</del>	<u>9</u>
<del>2. (TS) While higher authority, in early 1966, had determined</del>	<u>10</u>
<del>not to seek a policy decision for conducting this type of para-</del>	<u>11</u>
<del>military operation, it was considered prudent that planning pro-</del>	<u>12</u>
<del>ceed in the event less serious undertakings should prove ineffec-</del>	<u>13</u>
<del>tive and the problem with Cambodia grew.**</del>	<u>14</u>
<del>3. (TS) CINCPAC, in providing a concept for these paramilitary</del>	<u>15</u>
<del>operations, emphasized the need of organizing and equipping forces</del>	<u>16</u>
<del>and assets to face the growing problems of the use of Cambodia</del>	<u>17</u>
<del>as a sanctuary by the VC and the NVA. CINCPAC proposed that</del>	<u>18</u>
<del>besides intelligence agents, approximately 16 reconnaissance teams</del>	<u>19</u>
<del>and small exploitation forces (four companies) should be organized</del>	<u>20</u>
<del>without delay. These units would be deployed against targets de-</del>	<u>21</u>
<del>veloped by the tactical maneuvering of US forces in areas bordering</del>	<u>22</u>
<del>Cambodia. Until events required deployment in Cambodia, it was</del>	<u>23</u>
<del>determined that they could be fully employed in SVN. CINCPAC</del>	<u>24</u>
<del>also envisioned that fast, shallow draft boats and motorized</del>	<u>25</u>
<del>units, operating from a base in the Gulf of Siam, be used in</del>	<u>26</u>
<del>Cambodian waters for the purpose of agent infiltration, sabotage,</del>	<u>27</u>
<del>* (TS) JCSM-812-65 dated 12 November 1965</del>	<u>28</u>
<del>** (TS) JCS MSG, 25001Z Jan 1966</del>	<u>29</u>
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and stop and search operations. To conduct these operations, 1  
CINCPAC proposed that the following additional support and 2  
authorities would be required: 3

a. Deployment of 156 US Army Special Forces personnel. 4  
b. Funds in the amount of 3.5 million dollars. 5  
c. Authority to recruit, organize, train and equip 6  
deployment assets to include four 150-man company reaction 7  
forces. 8

d. Authority and supporting funds to recruit, organize, 9  
train and equip approximately four 25-man maritime action team 10  
personnel and 10-15 clandestine intelligence collectors. 11

e. Five to six small, fast, shallow draft, non attributable 12  
boats.\* 13

4. (TS) In May 1966, the first three proposals submitted by 14  
CINCPAC were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and forwarded 15  
to the Secretary of Defense for consideration. In order to more 16  
fully assess the resources required, further information concerning 17  
planning factors involving the proposed maritime operations was 18  
requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\*\* In providing this infor- 19  
mation, COMUSMACV determined that control of the covert maritime 20  
operations would be exercised through MACSOG, and the control 21  
of overt and covert ground operations would be exercised through 22  
the 5th Special Forces Group.\*\*\* 23

5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in June 1966, approved the 24  
CINCPAC recommendation to organize, train and equip an initial 25  
indigenous force of 20 clandestine intelligence agents, 16 twenty- 26  
man reconnaissance teams, 4 one hundred and fifty man reaction 27

\* (TS) CINCPAC Msg, 082014Z May 1966 28  
\*\* (TS) JCS Msg, 162024Z May 1966 29  
\*\*\* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 300837Z May 1966 29  
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companies, and 1 one hundred and fifty man security unit. This 1  
 authority was given subject to the following stipulations: 2

a. Approval did not authorize commitment of these forces 3  
 in cross-border operations. 4

b. Forces would not be designated for possible use in 5  
 Cambodia, and, for security purposes, an unclassified code 6  
 name should be assigned the program. 7

c. Ethnic Cambodians (Khmer) would not be allowed to be 8  
 recruited for this force. It was indicated by the Joint Chiefs 9  
 of Staff, that in recruiting these people, Prince Sihanouk, 10  
 the Cambodian Chief of State, might become aware of the program 11  
 and interpret its purpose as being to overthrow his government. 12  
 Posed with such a problem, it was reasoned that Sihanouk might, 13  
 in desperation, throw his lot totally with the Chinese Communists. 14

In June 1966, COMUSMACV tasked MACSOG to prepare plans for con- 15  
 ducting maritime type operations along the Cambodian coast,\* and 16  
 in July directed the 5th Special Forces Group to commence forming 17  
 reconnaissance teams, reaction companies and security forces as 18  
 directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\*\*\* 19

6. (TS) Initially, for security purposes, the Cambodian cross- 20  
 border program was assigned the unclassified nickname FLYING HORSE, 21  
 and until such time as authority was granted to operate FLYING 22  
 HORSE teams in Cambodia, it was intended to use these resources 23  
 in South Vietnam under the operational control of field force 24  
 commanders.\*\*\*\* To disassociate covert cross-border operations 25  
 with overt in-country operations the use of the nickname FLYING 26  
 HORSE was discontinued in September 1966, and FLAMING ARROW 27

\* (TS) JCS Msg, 271912Z June 1966 28  
 \*\* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 090210Z June 1966 29  
 \*\*\* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 120949Z July 1966 29  
 \*\*\*\* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 041140Z Sep 1966 30  
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was used to identify in-country operations and DANIEL BOONE for cross-border operations in Cambodia.\*

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7. (TS) Status reports submitted by COMUSMACV indicate that, during the remaining months of 1966, these forces were gradually organized and trained. Although support requirements were formulated for maritime operations in Cambodian waters, a firm decision to use these forces was not made in 1966.\*\*

~~\* (TS) CINCPAC Msg, 271912Z June 1966~~  
~~\*\* (TS) JCS Msg, 162324Z December 1966~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~PART III (TS)~~~~1967 HISTORY~~~~A. (TS) MISSION AND OBJECTIVES~~

1. (TS) Pending the outcome of diplomatic and psychological initiatives being proposed by a joint State-Defense-CIA Study Group for Cambodia, CINCPAC, in April 1967, requested authority to conduct limited ground reconnaissance and intelligence activities in the Cambodian tri-border area. The following rationale was provided in making this request:

a. "Deployment of Task Force (TF) OREGON to ICTZ has drawn down forces available to I FFORCEV by one infantry brigade and supporting forces. Contemplated assignment of the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division to Task Force OREGON also would deprive I FFORCEV of its reserve forces as the enemy has the capability of attacking through the western highlands of Pleiku and Kontum in battalion strength, or larger, early information regarding his intentions is of special importance. Additionally, as I FFORCEV operations in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces have blocked enemy infiltration routes, enemy forces in Cambodia have moved their operational bases gradually Northward in an attempt to cross into SVN.

b. "The immediate tri-border area therefore has assumed greater importance as an area through which enemy units will pass in their efforts to circumvent friendly reconnaissance elements in Northwestern Kontum Province opposite enemy base area 609 in Laos. Reconnaissance/intelligence operations in the Cambodia tri-border area will provide early warning of enemy movement towards the isolated CIDF/USASF camp at Dak To, a prime target for enemy attack and a launch point for PRAIRIE FIRE operations, and provide time to redeploy forces within SVN to constitute a reserve in the II CTZ."

2. (TS) With concurrence of the State Department, approval was granted in May to initiate DANIEL BOONE cross-border operations in Northeastern Cambodia, subject to the following restrictions:

"a. Area of operation is limited to that portion of Cambodia east of the line formed by the following grid coordinates: from YB 500130 at RKG/RLG border to YA 320580 thence along a line parallel to but two KM north of the SE SAN River to YA 660280 at the RKG/SVN border.

"b. Reconnaissance teams only may be committed and may not exceed an over-all strength of 12 men, to include not more than three US advisors.

\* (TS) CINCPAC MSG, 300056Z April 1967.

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- "c. Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces are not repeat not authorized across the SVN/RKG border into Cambodia. 1
- "d. Infiltration and exfiltration of Cambodia will be by foot. Exfiltration by helicopter is authorized in emergency situations only. 2  
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- "e. Duration of infiltration will be held to minimum time required for investigation. 5  
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- "f. Teams will take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian military forces or civilian population in the area. 7  
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- "g. Purpose of operation is intelligence collection and/or verification. Teams will engage in combat only as a last resort to avoid capture. 9  
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- "h. No more than 3 Reconnaissance Teams may be committed on operations into Cambodia at any one time. 11
- "i. Total number of missions will not exceed ten in any 30 day period. 12  
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3. (TS) Further guidance concerning these operations was provided as follows: 14  
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- a. "Tentative schedule of operations will be submitted to JCS for approval with info copy to State no later than 7 days prior to the operational period and should provide the following information: schedule of missions for the succeeding 30 day period to include date, target, and brief description. Notification of intent to launch all teams should be provided 48 hours in advance. 16  
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- b. "Targets of opportunity, not included on the tentative schedule, will be considered on a case by case basis as expeditiously as possible. 24  
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- c. "Cover and denial. Cover story for these operations will be that teams are conducting anti-infiltration patrols on the SVN side of the border. No acknowledgement of the conduct of cross-border operations into Cambodia will be made. Public affairs guidance will be provided separately. 27  
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- d. "Reporting will include as a minimum infiltration and exfiltration of teams, significant spot reports, reports of any contact with the enemy or Cambodians and periodic summaries. 33  
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4. (TS) In the course of planning for the DANIEL BOONE operations, that were scheduled to begin on 1 June 1967, COMUSMACV determined that, because of infiltration/exfiltration and short stay time restrictions, certain missions would have to be initiated and terminated in Laos. Time/distance factors associated with certain target areas precluded their being 37  
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- \* (TS) JCS MSG, 221958Z May 1967 43

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reached on foot from SVN.\* Another problem area involving these operations concerned the emergency extraction of teams. Forward air controlled (FAC) aircraft were not authorized to fly over Cambodia. If a team required an emergency exfiltration by helicopter, a FAC would be required to locate the team, guide them to a suitable landing zone or exfiltration point, and direct helicopters to that location.\*\*

5. (TS) In addressing the requirement to mount certain teams through Laos, the American ambassador voiced no objection to the procedure provided the use of Lao territory was confined to the strip that was currently assigned to PRAIRIE FIRE operations.\*\*\* Subsequent to these problems coming to light, authority was granted to use approved PRAIRIE FIRE areas for infiltration and exfiltration of DANIEL BOONE reconnaissance teams subject to concurrence of Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane. Authority was also granted to use FAC aircraft to penetrate the Cambodian border at a minimum distance in the DANIEL BOONE area only if required to support emergency exfiltration of DANIEL BOONE reconnaissance teams.\*\*\*\*

6. (TS) As the result of initial operations in Cambodia, CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's rationale and expressed need for the expansion of the DANIEL BOONE area to the south and the use of helicopters to lift teams into the target areas. It was explained that these changes to existing operational authorities were considered essential to provide COMUSMACV with the flexibility necessary to prevent surprise attacks on his exposed flank and to prevent unnecessary loss of US lives. CINCPAC also considered that DANIEL BOONE teams had the capability of providing intelligence on the enemy in Cambodia that could not be obtained from any other available

\* (TS) COMUSMACV MSG, 271230Z May 1967.  
 \*\* (TS) COMUSMACV MSG, 280334Z May 1967.  
 \*\*\* (TS) AMEMBASSY MSG, 280428Z May 1967.  
 \*\*\*\* (TS) Joint State/Defense Msg, 292257Z May 1967.

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source without undue risk of exposing US involvement. In 1  
 view of the above, it was recommended, in August 1967, that 2  
 authority be granted for the employment of helicopter-lifted 3  
 Daniel Boone teams to a depth of 20 kilometers along the entire 4  
 Cambodian Border.\* As a consequence of this appraisal, opera- 5  
 tional authorities were modified in the following manner. The 6  
 area of operation was extended southward from the existing 7  
 zone to the Gulf of Siam at a uniform depth of 20 kilometers 8  
 into Cambodia. The area, in turn, was divided into two zones 9  
 as follows: 10

a. Zone ALPHA - from the tri-border area to Route 13. 11

(1) The limitation on the number of missions in 12  
 Cambodia at any one time was removed, however, 13  
 operations were not to exceed 30 during any 30 day 14  
 period. No more than five of these were to be helicopter 15  
 operations, and these type of infiltrations would not 16  
 exceed a depth of ten kilometers. 17

b. Zone BRAVO-from Route 13 to the Gulf of Siam. 18

(1) Requests for authority to conduct operations in 19  
 Zone BRAVO would be considered on a case-by-case basis 20  
 only. Washington level approval was required for these 21  
 operations, and it was indicated that normally the 22  
 requests should be submitted five to seven days prior 23  
 to launch. 24

7. (TS) The remaining operational restrictions and guidance 25  
 remained in effect which were: 26

a. Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of ex- 27  
 ploitation forces were not authorized in Cambodia. 28

b. Duration of infiltration would be held to the 29  
 minimum time required for investigation. 30

c. The teams would take all possible precautions to 31

\* (TS) CINCPAC MSG, 182345Z Aug 1967.

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avoid contact with Cambodian military forces or the  
civilian population in the area. 1  
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d. The purpose of the DANIEL BOONE operations was  
intelligence collection and/or verification, and teams would  
engage in combat only as a last resort to avoid capture. 3  
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e. Finally, a 48 hour intent to launch message was re-  
which  
quired/would include grid coordinates of the target and  
indicate whether or not helicopters would be used. Silence  
on the part of the State Department and the JCS indicated  
approval of the launch.\* 6  
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8. (TS) Figure E-1 depicts the two zones as they were  
established in October 1967. 11  
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9. (TS) In order to prevent inadvertent and unexpected  
enemy contact in the target landing zone area during team  
insertions, it became evident that visual verification of  
target areas and associated infiltration landing zones, prior  
to launch of a helicopter mission into Cambodia, was highly  
desirable. Additionally, there was a requirement for a  
fixed wing aircraft to properly control and direct the  
helicopter troop ships and gun ships during and after in-  
sertion.\*\* As a consequence, the operational authorities were  
again modified in December in the following manner: 13  
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a. "Authority is granted for FAC type aircraft to over-  
fly the DANIEL BOONE portion of the Cambodian border area. 23  
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b. "These flights will be limited to visual reconnaissance  
of target areas, selection of landing zones, communications  
relay and control of helicopter troopships and gunships  
during infiltration and exfiltration. 25  
26

c. "All FAC flights will be on a mission essential basis  
and of minimum duration. 27  
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d. "Reconnaissance flights will be limited to two per  
Daniel Boone mission. 29


e. "FAC flights over zone BRAVO must be approved on a  
case by case basis at the Washington level.\*\*\* 30  
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\* (TS) JCS Msg, 202247Z October 1967.  
\*\* (TS) CINCPAC Msg, 091248Z Dec 1967.  
\*\*\* (TS) JCS Msg, 231725Z December 1967.

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FIGURE E-1 (TS)



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~~TOP SECRET~~~~B. (TS) RESOURCES~~~~1. (TS) Facilities~~

a. With the increased operating zones and assets, new facilities were required to support the DANIEL BOONE program. In 1967 construction was started at the following locations:

(1) Ban Me Thaut - a camp to accommodate a 1000 man forward operating base.

(2) Duc CO - a launch site with accommodations for 30 men.

(3) Song Be - a tactical operations center and communications bunker.\*

~~2. (TS) FORCES~~

a. As the result of an inquiry by CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, in November 1967, revealed the current and proposed location of the DANIEL BOONE forces, and how they were to be operationally employed. COMUSMACV explained that, when originally authorized, assets were divided into two separate forces to conduct operations (FLAMING ARROW) for the IPFV (OMEGA) and II PFV (SIGMA). These forces established base camps at Nha Trang and Ho Nyoc Tau. In conducting the authorized cross-border operations, these forces were being relocated to Ban Me Thout. These operations would be controlled from FOB number two at Kontum until the DANIEL BOONE command and control center at Ban Me Thuot had been established. Operations in Zone ALPHA would require the establishment of launch sites at Dak To, Duc Co and Song Be, and operations in zone BRAVO would require a similiar site at Song Be and mobile launch sites at Tay Ninh. In summary, it was indicated that DANIEL BOONE operations would be controlled from Ban Me Thuot and would launch from Dak To, Duc Co, Song Be, and mobile launch sites at Tay Ninh and Triton when necessary.\*\*

\* (TS) Annex G to COMUSMACV 1967 Command History.

\*\* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 222247Z Nov 1967.

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b. In a status report to CINCPAC, in November 1967 1  
 COMUSMACV reported that the following forces had been 2  
 turned over to MACSOG for use in the PRAIRIE FIRE program: 3  
 (1) Intelligence agents - 20' 4  
 (2) Reconnaissance Teams - 16' 5  
 (3) Reaction Companies - 4 6  
 (4) Security Forces - 1.\* 7

c. It was determined, at this time, that the 20 intelligence 8  
 agents initially authorized for the program would not be 9  
 employed and they were deleted from DANIEL BOONE forces.\*\* 10

C. (TS) OPERATIONS. 11

During the period 1 July through 31 December 1967, there 12  
 were 99 DANIEL BOONE reconnaissance teams launched from the 13  
 tri-border area south to the "FISH HOOK" area, and 63 14  
 of these teams actually were successful in entering Cambodia. 15  
 Results of these operations are summarized in Figure E-2. 16

D. (TS) DANIEL BOONE Evaluation 17

1. (TS) CINCPAC Joint Survey Team 18

a. A Joint Survey Team convened at CINCPAC Headquarters 19  
 in November 1967 to undertake a comprehensive study of 20  
 MACSOG programs. The team reviewed the cross-border 21  
 operations then being conducted in Cambodia and Laos 22  
 (PRAIRIE FIRE). The discussion section of their report 23  
 concerning these two programs is contained in the Tab to 24  
 appendix D. A conclusion and a recommendation of the 25  
 Team pertaining specifically to DANIEL BOONE operations was 26  
 provided as follows: 27

CONCLUSION 28

"There are certain restrictions placed on operations into 29  
 Cambodia which reduce the operational flexibility and the 30  
 effectiveness of the DANIEL BOONE program. 31

\* (TS) CINCPAC Msg, 170451Z Nov 1967. 31

\*\* (TS) CINCPAC Msg, 050115Z Dec 1967.

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FIGURE E-2 (TS)

DANIEL BOONE OPERATIONS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>TEAMS LAUNCHED</u>	<u>TEAMS ENTERING CAMBODIA</u>
JUL	7	4
AUG	7	2
SEP	11	8
OCT	12	9
NOV	19	15
DEC	<u>49</u>	<u>25</u>
TOTALS	99	63

The breakdown of monthly operations illustrates the rapid build-up of operations during the months of November and December.

## RESULTS:

1. Enemy KIA - 42
2. Enemy KBA - 61
3. Enemy PWs - 2

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RECOMMENDATION

"That restrictions placed on the number of DANIEL BOONE missions per month and on the use of helicopters for these missions be lifted." \*

b. COMUSMACV's comment on the Joint Survey Team's recommendation, above, was:

"Agree that the restrictions on the number of DANIEL BOONE operations will be a problem in an expanding program; however, the major problem remains the restriction on helicopter penetrations. This problem was very discernable in December 1967 when only 26 of the 43 teams launched entered Cambodia. These teams might well have successfully accomplished the assigned mission had helicopter penetrations been authorized without restriction. Request MACV be granted authority to infiltrate by helicopter to the full depth of the DANIEL BOONE area of operations for all missions.\*\*"

2. ~~(TS)~~ AD HOC Evaluation Group

a. An AD Hoc Evaluation Group (AHEG) was formed by COMUSMACV, in December 1967, to examine the operations of MACSOG and determine whether the results achieved were commensurate with the resources committed to its support. In the course of examining MACSOG programs, a detailed analysis was made of DANIEL BOONE operations by the AHEG. As a result of their analysis, the Evaluation Group came to the following conclusions concerning the DANIEL BOONE operations.

(1) "Under the present restrictions, DB assets provide the only ground reconnaissance capability for use in Cambodia by MACV, and that the full potential of this capability should be exploited.

(2) "Although intelligence collection is the sole mission of the DB operations, intelligence results to date have been generally fragmentary and low-level and have not been particularly useful to the adjacent Field Force commanders or to MACV J2.

(3) "Liaison and coordination between MACSOG elements and other elements of MACV have not been adequate to insure that the full potential of DB capabilities is realized. The three principal causes are: Lack of a specific, well-defined arrangement whereby MACV J2 and the Field Forces can task DB for priority intelligence required; lack of a specific well-defined arrangement whereby intelligence can be passed responsively to the

\* (TS) CINCPAC letter serial 0001 of 2 January 1968, Subject Report of Review of MACSOG Programs.  
\*\* (TS) COMUSMACV letter of 17 March 1968, Subj: Report of Review of MACSOG Programs

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Field Forces, and continuous liaison and coordination of operations be assured between Field Forces and MACSOG; and by an inadequate number of commanders and their staff being aware of DB capabilities.

(4) " DB was initiated without the provision of helicopter assets specifically for these operations with the resultant further drawdown on limited helicopter resources for support of operations in RVN. Prior to any expansion of DB operations, helicopter resources in addition to those currently in RVN should be obtained for SOG support.

(5) "In view of current limitations on employment of reaction forces in CAMBODIA, DB Reaction Companies under operational control of MACSOG appear to be in excess of requirements and might be employed usefully for in-country operations.

(6) "A substantial proportion of DB teams attempting to infiltrate into CAMBODIA on foot are stopped short of their targets by enemy forces. Authority to conduct a greater number of insertions by helicopter would help to alleviate this situation.

(7) The advantages of placing DB operations under operational control of the Field Forces so long as the operations must remain covert, are out weighed by the disadvantages; however, if cross-border operations into CAMBODIA by Field Forces elements are authorized, DB forces should be placed under operational control of the Field Force commanders in the adjacent CTZs." \*

b. The AHEG comment on the conclusion and recommendation made by the CINCPAC Survey Team regarding DANIEL BOONE was as follows:

(1) "Conclusion: There are certain restrictions placed on operations into CAMBODIA which reduce the operational flexibility and effectiveness of the DB program.

Comment: Concur. Limitations on number of missions per month in all portions of the DB area pose restrictions on gaining intelligence essential to prosecution of operations in the adjacent areas of RVN. Enemy opposition to ground penetration by reconnaissance teams prevents successful conclusion of a large number of missions. Removal of limitations on the number of helicopter insertions would permit over-flight and evasion of enemy forces enroute to the target. At the present time the majority of teams attempting to penetrate CAMBODIA on foot are first moved to departure areas by helicopter. Thus, with the amount of heli opter support presently provided to DB, more helicopter penetrations could be supported. This Group was not able to determine the reason for a limitation on the number of penetrations per month. Accepting the limit on depth of penetration, it seems that military consideration alone should dictate any such limitation as number of missions. If this is valid, then this Group concludes that the decision is

\* (TS) COMUSMACV DM of 14 Feb 1968, Subj: Ad Hoc Evaluation.

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properly a matter for COMUSMACV. By extension, the availability of resources, particularly helicopters, is the basic limiting factor. Use of such assets within COMUSMACV's purview. This Group concludes that restrictions as to the numbers of DB missions (and numbers of helicopter penetrations) should be removed. As a practical matter, helicopter resources will limit DB missions to approximately 30 successful penetrations per month. The issue is partly academic and partly a matter of conferring on COMUSMACV an appropriate degree of flexibility.

(2) Recommendation: That restrictions placed on the number of DB missions per month and on the use of helicopters for these missions be lifted.

Comment: Concur. Further, recommend that additional emphasis be placed on the use of wire taps. Although success in this area has not been substantial thus far, the potential of this activity appears to be great. \*

d. The AHEG noted that certain recommendations made by their group concerning PRAIRIE FIRE (See Part IV to Appendix D) applied equally to the Cambodian operation and action taken to carry them out would impact favorably on DANIEL BOONE. In addition, the group recommended that:

"(1) Action be taken to remove restrictions on the number of DB missions per month and on the number of missions that can be inserted by helicopter.

"(2) Measures be taken to direct DB operations toward targets that will provide intelligence of greater use to MACV J2 and the Field Forces in areas of RVN adjacent to DB area of operations.

"(3) Liaison and coordination between MACSOG and its subordinate elements and other elements of MACV be improved to include specific terms of reference for tasking of DB capabilities by MACV J2 and by Field Forces; the immediate passing of information from team debriefings to MACV elements concerned, and that increased numbers of personnel be cleared for access to DB information.

"(4) Helicopter support for DB be limited generally to the December 1967 level until such time as additional helicopter resources programmed for SOG support arrive in RVN and thereafter, the level of support be re-examined and a ceiling be established.

"(5) Consideration be given to employment of forces, not required for DB at the current level of operations, for reconnaissance missions in RVN under operational control of Field Forces.

"(6) While DB operations remain covert in nature, operational control of DB remain with MACSOG; however, if Field Forces operations are authorized in CAMBODIA, operational control of DB forces be passed to the Field Forces.

\* (TS) COMUSMACV DF of 14 Feb 1968, Subj: Ad Hoc Evaluation.

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PART IV. 1968 HISTORY

A. (TS) MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

1. (TS) In August 1968, COMUSMACV expressed concern over the continued VC/NVA use of sanctuaries within the border areas of Cambodia. In considering the number of DANIEL BOONE teams that were making contact with the enemy (67 percent), it appeared to COMUSMACV that the enemy was taking increasing advantage of safe havens west of the Cambodian border to mass, refit, and stage units in preparation for future operations. Since intelligence reports indicated an impending large scale enemy offensive, it was deemed that the DANIEL BOONE reconnaissance effort be exercised to its full potential. According to COMUSMACV:

"Efforts to penetrate zone ALPHA of the DANIEL BOONE AO by foot are meeting increasing resistance. Of those teams which do effect a successful penetration many are quickly detected by enemy, who are probably manning observation posts for this purpose. To some degree the penetration difficulty is the result of fixed patterns of infiltration. Relaxation of present operating restrictions would provide MACV the flexibility necessary to break established patterns and to upgrade the overall intelligence input in support of US goals in Southeast Asia."\*

2. (TS) In view of the above, COMUSMACV recommended that authority be granted to insert reconnaissance teams into zone ALPHA by helicopter to the full depth of the DANIEL BOONE AO, and that these type of insertions be increased from five to 30 per month.\* In September 1868, Washington level approval was given to this recommendation.\*\*

3. (TS) COMUSMACV noted in October 1968, that reconnaissance teams had frequently been compromised and subsequently extracted during the early stages of an operation. In these instances, the team's mission was not accomplished. However, rapid

\* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 210650Z Aug 68  
 \*\* (TS) JCS Msg, 251444Z Sept 68

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reinsertion of the team into the same target area could have permitted continuation of the mission. Due to operational restrictions, reinsertion had to be delayed a period of 48 hours to provide time for an intent to launch message to be dispatched. COMUSMACV reasoned that more efficient use could be made of air assets and the probability of mission accomplishment would be heightened if operational authorities were amended to permit the reinsertion of teams which had been emergency extracted without a requirement for the 48-hour intent to launch. It was envisioned that this reinsertion would be accomplished immediately after refueling and rearming of the aircraft, or within 24 hours after extraction. Extraction and intent to reinsert would be included in COMUSMACV's daily progress report.

4. (TS) To provide for the reinsertion of teams, it was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the 48-hour notification and reporting requirements were to remain in effect, except that in Zone ALPHA authority was granted to immediately reinsert teams into an area from which a team had been emergency extracted. Further, this reinsertion authority expired 48 hours after the final emergency extraction of a reinserted team. At the time this authority was promulgated, the restriction was removed which provided that no more than 30 missions per month could be conducted in Zone ALPHA.\*

5. (TS) In order to gain more timely intelligence on enemy activities in Cambodia, COMUSMACV, in November 1968, recommended that Zone ALPHA be extended to the South. As noted by COMUSMACV:

"The enemy's continued use of Cambodia as a place of refuge and as a major source for his external logistical requirements is an area of major concern to this headquarters. Present intelligence holdings indicate that munitions shipments continue to be delivered through Cambodia to VC/NVA forces in the border areas opposite II, III, and IV CTZ. Currently underway is a priority intelligence collection effort into the Cambodian border regions aimed at determining and refining this threat.

\* (TS) JCS Msg, 282027 Oct 68

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"The requirement for timely intelligence dictates the need for conducting ground reconnaissance in Cambodia on a quick reaction basis. Authority is needed for more flexible employment of reconnaissance assets, especially in Zone BRAVO of the DANIEL BOONE area."\*

6. (TS) In order to provide for a third zone of operations which would provide for more flexible employment of forces, and to incorporate other changes, previous authorities for DANIEL BOONE operations were rescinded and replaced with the following authorities in December 1968:

"... Area of operation includes the entire Cambodian border with RVN. This area is in turn divided into three zones as follows:

"A. Zone ALPHA from the tri border area to Route 13 to a uniform depth of 30 km. There are no numerical limitations on Zone ALPHA missions. Helicopter infiltration/exfiltration on all missions is authorized but will not repeat not exceed a 30 km depth. Helicopter infiltration within 10 kilometers of Mondolkiri (Sen Monorom) (YU 3878) or within one kilometer of Routes 14, 131, or 141 will require Washington level approval. Teams are authorized to emplace sanitized M-14 anti-personnel mines in Zone ALPHA north of Srepok River. Mines will be equipped with a self destruction attachment and the location and dates of emplacement will be recorded.

"B. Zone BRAVO from Logo (UT9775) to the Gulf of Siam at a uniform depth of 20 km. Requests for authority to conduct operations in Zone BRAVO will be considered on a case-by-case basis only. Washington level approval is required and requests should be submitted at least 5 days prior to launch.

"C. Zone CHARLIE from Route 13 to Logo (UT9775) at a uniform depth of 20 km into Cambodia, excepting those areas within 5 km of Snoul (XU 542346) and Memut (XU 293077). Operations will not exceed 10 in number during any 30-day period. Helicopter infiltration/exfiltration is authorized, and 48-hour notice of intent to launch is required.

"2. Additional operational restrictions and guidance are as follows:

"A. Purpose of operation is intelligence collection and/or verification. For this purpose, teams are authorized to capture VC/NVA soldiers and immediately evacuate them to SVN for interrogation and disposition. However, in order to retain the focus of these operations on intelligence-type missions, operations to take prisoners will be conducted with discretion. Prisoners, whether wounded or otherwise, may be taken as a result of combat action, but teams will only initiate action for the purpose of taking prisoners when isolated groups of two or three VC/NVA soldiers are encountered. Teams will otherwise engage in combat only for self preservation and avoidance of capture.

\* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 290633Z Nov 68

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the PRAIRIE FIRE FOB at Kontum as well as from transient  
 launch sites. Operational control of DANIEL BOONE operations in  
 the field was exercised through the Command and Control Detachment  
 (CCS) located at Ban Me Thuot.\*

2. ~~(TS)~~ Forces

a. The basic DANIEL BOONE reconnaissance team had the same  
 organization as those employed in the PRAIRIE FIRE program. Due to  
 pure reconnaissance of DANIEL BOONE mission, however, operations  
 were frequently conducted using a split team composed of two  
 US and four VN. In 1968, 24 reconnaissance teams were authorized  
 for these operations.

b. While exploitation force type maneuvers were not  
 authorized in Cambodia, four reaction companies, each having  
 three reaction platoons, were maintained and used to exploit  
 in-country targets and secure forward launch sites.\*

C. ~~(TS)~~ OPERATIONS

1. ~~(TS)~~ In a narrative summary of operations for 1968, the  
 following information was documented by MACSOG concerning DANIEL  
 BOONE operations during the year:

\* \* \*

"1. The Daniel Boone program was hampered somewhat during  
 the greater portion of the year due to events which transpired  
 during the 1968 Tet Offensive. On 14 February 1968, the  
 Daniel Boone Force was made solely responsive to the Field Force  
 Commanders. This situation remained effective until 21  
 September. During this period Daniel Boone cross-border  
 operations decreased considerably. The major effort was  
 directed in-country to support the Field Force Commanders'  
 reconnaissance efforts. While performing this role, DANIEL  
 BOONE forces conducted 439 missions resulting in 374 enemy  
 KIA by body count plus 171 estimated enemy KIA, and em-  
 ployed 376 gunships and 253 TAC Air sorties.

"2. On 22 September, Daniel Boone forces reverted to their  
 primary role of cross-border operations, resulting in a consider-  
 able increase in the number of missions conducted.

\* ~~(TS)~~ Annex F to COMUSMACV 1968 Command History

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"3. During the year, a number of the restrictions imposed upon the Daniel Boone program were lifted thus providing greater flexibility in the conduct of operations.

"a. The restriction of only five helicopter insertions during any 30-day period to a depth of no greater than 10 kilometers inside the Cambodian border was lifted. The increased authority provided for an unlimited number of insertions by helicopter and authorized penetration to the full depth of the zone (20 kilometers).

"b. Initially, the program was restricted to 30 missions during a thirty-day period within Zone ALPHA. This restriction was lifted authorizing unlimited operations into Zone ALPHA.

"c. Authority was granted for emplacement of non-attributable self-destruct anti-personnel mines into Areas 1 and 2 of Zone ALPHA.

"d. Targets in Zone BRAVO required an intent of 14 days to JCS. Thirteen targets within this Zone were relieved of this restriction during CY 68. This included eight targets in the area known as the "Fish Hook" and five in the "Parrot's Beak". These targets were approved for a 72-hour intent, the same as required for Zone ALPHA targets.

"e. To further increase the operational authority, the area of the "Fish Hook" was designated Zone CHARLIE reducing the operating restrictions to those imposed on Zone ALPHA, with the exception that the area was limited to ten insertions per month.

"4. Within the Daniel Boone Area of Operations, a total of 287 missions were conducted in CY 1968. This included going from an all-time low during the month of May 1968, when only five cross-border operations were conducted, to an all-time high during November 1968, when 53 operations were conducted. The results of Daniel Boone cross-border operations included 212 enemy KIA by body count plus 328 estimated enemy CIA and 11 wiretaps; three were highly successful from a tactical viewpoint, although the intelligence value was minimal.

"5. The added flexibility gained through the increased authorities received during the calendar year 1968 was a contributing factor to the increased overall effectiveness of the Daniel Boone program. The percentage of teams entering Cambodia increased by nearly 20% as compared to operations conducted during calendar year 1967. In 1968, 80.3% of teams launched were able to penetrate the border as compared to 65.4% in 1967.

"6. The continued effort toward perfection of techniques and performance has increased the results obtained by the Daniel Boone program in its contribution to the overall intelligence collection effort.

"7. A major limiting factor preventing optimum performance was the shortage of qualified US reconnaissance team leaders. This shortage prevented the Daniel Boone program from maintaining the total number of authorized operational teams. During the major portion of the year, the program was operated at approximately 65.8% of authorized strength."\*

(TS) MACSOG Year-End Review of Vietnam 1968

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2. (TS) A tabulation of the results of missions conducted by DANIEL BOONE forces during 1968, are contained in Figure E-3.

D. (TS) EVALUATION

As the result of increased helicopter and personnel losses sustained in October 1968, COMUSMACV directed that the DANIEL BOONE and PRAIRIE FIRE operations be evaluated to determine their value in relation to the increased losses sustained. Paragraph C of Part VII to Appendix I (MACSOG Intelligence) sets forth conclusions and recommendations which emanated from this evaluation.

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"B. Teams will take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian military forces or civilian population.

"C. Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces are not repeat not authorized in Cambodia. The use in Cambodia of helicopter gunships to escort helicopter troop ships as required is authorized. Gunships will engage the enemy only when necessary for their own defense or that of the team.

"D. Teams are authorized to destroy significant enemy caches found during reconnaissance operations.

"E. Reconnaissance teams may not repeat not exceed an overall strength of 12 men none of whom will be ethnic Khmers. Restrictions on the number of US personnel per team are removed.

"F. Authority is granted for immediate reinsertion of teams into an area from which a team has been emergency extracted. This reinsertion authority expires 48 hours after the final emergency extraction of a reinserted team.

"G. Notification of intent to launch all teams should be provided to Washington 48 hours in advance. Silence on the part of JCS indicates approval of launch.

"H. Authority is granted for PAC type aircraft to overfly the DANIEL BOONE portion of the Cambodian border area on minimum duration, mission essential flights. These flights will be limited to visual reconnaissance of target areas, selection of LZs, communications relay and control of helicopter troop ships and gunships during infiltration and exfiltration. Reconnaissance flights will be limited to two per DB mission. PAC flights over zone BRAVO must be approved on a case-by-case basis at the Washington level.

"I. Cover and Denial. Cover story for these operations will be that teams are conducting anti-infiltration patrols on the SVN side of the border. No acknowledgement of the conduct of cross-border operations into Cambodia will be made. Public affairs guidance (State/Defense Msg 6569/292144Z May 1967) remains in effect.

"J. Reporting will include infiltration and exfiltration of teams, spot reports of significant contact with the enemy, significant team losses and any possible contact with Cambodians.

"3. State concurs."\*

B. (TS) RESOURCES

1. (TS) Facilities. During 1968, DANIEL BOONE operations were conducted from forward operating bases (FOBs) located at Ho Nhoc Tau (POB-6) and Ban Me Thuot (POB-5). Operations into the Cambodian portion of the tri-border area were also conducted from

\* (TS) JCS Msg, 172009Z Dec 1968

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FIGURE E-3 (TS)

SUMMARY OF DB OPERATIONS--CY 68

<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>DB</u>	<u>IN-COUNTRY</u>
RT	287(232 penetrations)	278
Platoon	0	140
Company	0	21
TOTAL	287	439
HELICOPTER GUNSHIP SORTIES	354	376
TAC AIR SORTIES	46(40 in RVN enr to tgt)	253
MINES EMPLACED	0	0
ENEMY KIA (Body Count)	212	374
ENEMY KIA (Estimated)*	328	171
SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS	22	41
CACHES DESTROYED	1	8
STRUCTURES DESTROYED/DAMAGED	0	0
ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED	UNK	UNK
ENEMY VEHICLES DESTROYED/DAMAGED	3	7
ENEMY PRISONERS CAPTURED	3	6
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS	373	0
US KIA	3	14
WIA	11	24
MIA	2	1
TOTAL	16	39
VN. KIA	8	64
WIA	32	178
MIA	5	0
TOTAL	45	242
TOTAL CASUALTIES	61	281
HELICOPTER LOSSES	3	4

\* In June, killed by Air and Artillery

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PART V. 1969 HISTORY

A. (TS) NICKNAME CHANGE

Because of publicized association of operations in Cambodia with the nickname DANIEL BOONE in 1969, COMUSMACV, with CINCPAC approval, changed the nickname of Cambodian cross-border operations to SALEM HOUSE.\*

B. (TS) MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

1. (TS) Initially, in 1968, COMUSMACV had recommended authority be granted to employ tactical / SALEM HOUSE forces. In order to deny the enemy the freedom of movement and protection he enjoyed, COMUSMACV was of the opinion that the employment of tactical aircraft in Zone ALPHA would demoralize the enemy, provide an opportunity to inflict casualties, and hinder his was effort.\*\*

2. (TS) Again in May 1969, the use of tactical aircraft in Cambodia, along with exploitation forces, was proposed. According to COMUSMACV:

"The increased use of Cambodia as a sanctuary and staging area by VC/NVA forces poses a continuing offensive threat to allied forces and installations in RVN. This threat is particularly evident in the tri-border area in the vicinity of Ben Het and Dak To. The recent introduction of enemy armor capabilities in this area serves to emphasize the importance of Cambodia to the enemy as a 'safe haven'.

"The use of exploitation forces in these sanctuaries would force the enemy to increase the forces committed to a defensive role and decrease his offensive capability to infiltrate RVN. Exploitation forces could direct TAC air and artillery against large, well-defined installations and troop positions. These forces would be employed in areas of high enemy density, low civilian population, and containing no known FARK [Cambodian Army] installations.\*\*\*

3. (TS) In view of the above appraisal, COMUSMACV requested authority be granted to commit US-led exploitation forces of platoon size, supported by tactical aircraft and artillery against

\* (TS) CINCPAC Msg, 192312Z April 1969  
\*\* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 252300Z Sept 1968  
\*\*\* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 250250Z May 1969

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well-defined, previously determined targets in the SALEM HOUSE operational area. It was determined that the exploitation forces would be used against targets previously detected by SALEM HOUSE reconnaissance teams, and the total forces would not exceed one platoon and two reconnaissance teams against any one target. Further, during these operations, a maximum effort would be made to avoid contact with Cambodian civilians and army personnel.\*

4. (TS) In June 1969, it was recommended to the Secretary of Defense that:

"...subject to the concurrence of the Department of State, authority be granted to employ SALEM HOUSE exploitation forces of platoon-size, supported by tactical air and artillery, against well-defined, previously determined targets ... in four designated areas in Cambodia."\*\*\*

5. (TS) The Department of State set forth the following position with respect to the above proposal:

"The Department of State is unable to concur in the proposal to authorize employment of SALEM HOUSE exploitation forces in Cambodia. Such authority would significantly change the nature of SALEM HOUSE, by committing US-led troops to the initiative in carrying out combat operations in Cambodia. We do not believe this is wise at present, with efforts under way to resume diplomatic relations, and with Siهانوik at last beginning to take specific action against VC/NVA presence on Cambodian territory. In any case, a decision to expand combat operations into Cambodia in this manner would in our view require Presidential decision."\*\*\*

6. (TS) Because of the State Department's position and the President's decision of 21 June 1969 to proceed with plans to restore diplomatic relations with Cambodia, the Secretary of Defense did not believe the proposal should be pursued, unless the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined SALEM HOUSE exploitation missions to be urgently necessary for the self-defense of US Forces in South Vietnam.\*\*\*

\* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 250250Z May 1969  
\*\* (TS) JCS CM-4304-69 of 6 June 1969  
\*\*\* (TS) Secretary of Defense Memorandum of 9 July 1969, Subj: Additional Authority for SALEM HOUSE

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C. (TS) <u>RESOURCES</u>	<u>1</u>
1. (TS) <u>Force Posture</u>	<u>2</u>
a. In order to provide greater flexibility in support of cross-border operations, MACSOG, in 1969, repostured its SALEM HOUSE and PRAIRIE FIRE forces in the following manner.	<u>3</u> <u>4</u> <u>5</u>
(1) Within the overall authorized strength, the two operations were reorganized into three command and control detachments. Each of these detachments consisted of a headquarters element, a reconnaissance company, and one security company. Thirty reconnaissance teams composed of three US and nine indigenous personnel were formed within the reconnaissance company.	<u>6</u> <u>7</u> <u>8</u> <u>9</u> <u>10</u> <u>11</u> <u>12</u>
(2) The total MACV cross-border forces, for Cambodia and Laos, consisted of one command and control detachment located at Ban Me Thuot (C&C, South), one at Kontum (C&C, Central), and another at Danang (C&C, North), all directly subordinate to MACSOG.*	<u>13</u> <u>14</u> <u>15</u> <u>16</u> <u>17</u>
D. (TS) <u>OPERATIONS</u>	<u>18</u>
1. (TS) SALEM HOUSE Progress Reports revealed the following concerning operations that were conducted during the first six months of 1969.	<u>19</u> <u>20</u> <u>21</u>
a. <u>January</u> . SALEM HOUSE teams were engaged by fire on 15 occasions and were pursued but extracted prior to contact on 17 instances. Friendly casualties incurred were 12 KIA and 2 WIA. In addition, two helicopters were lost; one due to ground fire and one for unknown reasons. Enemy forces suffered an estimated 49 killed by ground and helicopter actions. One enemy prisoner was captured in Base Area 702.	<u>22</u> <u>23</u> <u>24</u> <u>25</u> <u>26</u> <u>27</u> <u>28</u>
b. <u>February</u> . Teams were engaged by fire in 25 incidents and were pursued but extracted prior to contact on 23 occasions. Friendly personnel killed in action dropped while the wounded	<u>29</u> <u>30</u> <u>31</u>
* (TS) COMUSMACV Msg, 090829Z March 1969	

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increased sharply. Enemy forces suffered a total of 38 killed 1  
 (body count) and 47 estimated killed by ground and helicopter 2  
 fire. Two helicopter gunships were lost to enemy ground fire. 3  
 One was destroyed on the ground in Cambodia, the other in SVN. 4  
 Both crews were recovered. 5

c. March. Teams reported enemy presence on 35 missions 6  
 and had to be emergency extracted 21 times during the month. 7  
 Friendly losses were higher than in February. There were no 8  
 confirmed friendly killed in action, but there are five missing. 9  
 Enemy losses were also higher on a percentage basis over the 10  
 previous month, with 35 confirmed killed. One prisoner was 11  
 captured in the CHARLIE Zone. There were no aircraft lost in 12  
 Cambodia, however, three gunships were downed in South Vietnam 13  
 while attempting to extract a team just inside the border north 14  
 of Tay Ninh. 15

d. April. There were 34 missions conducted in Cambodia 16  
 during the month of April. Of these, 91 percent reported 17  
 enemy activity and 86 percent had to be emergency extracted 18  
 to avoid further contact. Friendly losses were one killed, 19  
 two missing, and eight wounded, while confirmed enemy 20  
 casualties rose to 29. There were four helicopters lost in 21  
 Cambodia, three to enemy ground fire and one due to mechanical 22  
 damage. 23

e. May. There were 46 missions conducted in Cambodia 24  
 during the month of May. Of these, 93 percent reported enemy 25  
 activity. Friendly losses were two killed and four wounded, 26  
 while confirmed enemy casualties rose to 37. There were two 27  
 helicopters lost in Cambodia, both to enemy ground fire. 28

f. June. There were 23 missions conducted in Cambodia 29  
 during the month of June. Of these 86 percent reported enemy 30  
 activity. On 6 June 1969, Command and Control South Headquarters 31

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Appendix E

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APPENDIX E

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(Ban Me Thuot) for SALEM HOUSE field operations was attacked 1  
 by mortar and rocket fire. The attack did not affect SALEM 2  
 HOUSE operations. A curtailment of SALEM HOUSE operations 3  
 was in effect from 12 June to 17 June. The purpose of the 4  
 curtailment was to conduct a study of current FARK (Cambodian 5  
 Army) dispositions and reassess planned targets with a view toward 6  
 minimizing possible contacts with Cambodian civilian or FARK 7  
 units. Areas also were studied to determine more suitable 8  
 locations for patrol bases in RVN to support walk-in RT opera- 9  
 tions into Cambodia. 10

2. (TS) Figure E-4 provides an overall summary of these 11  
 operations. 12

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FIGURE E-4 (TS)

## SUMMARY OF SALEM HOUSE OPERATIONS--CY 69

<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>SHAO</u>	<u>IN-COUNTRY</u>
Reconnaissance Team	454	8
Platoon	0	8
Company	0	0
Battalion	0	0
TOTAL	454	16
HELICOPTER GUNSHIP SORTIES	398	0
TAC AIR SORTIES	8	0
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES EMPLACED	4	0
ENEMY KIA (BODY COUNT)	613	0
ENEMY KIA (ESTIMATED)	554	0
SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS	7	0
CACHES DESTROYED	2 2	0
STRUCTURES DESTROYED/DAMAGED	2	0
ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED	12	0
ENEMY PRISONERS CAPTURED	4	0
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS	607	0
HELICOPTER LOSSES	14	0
FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		0
US: KIA	10	0
WIA	47	0
MIA	3	0
TOTAL	60	0
VN: KIA	11	1
WIA	44	2
MIA	1	0
TOTAL	56	3
US/VN TOTAL CASUALTIES	116	3

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Appendix E