



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
**DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SECURITY REVIEW**  
**1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON**  
**WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155**

MAY 1998  
Ref: 98-F-1407/L

Mr. William Burr  
The National Security Archive  
Gelman Library, Suite 701  
2130 H Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. Burr:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of State (DoS) dated March 10, 1997 (Archive Sequence No. 970079DOS021). The DoS located six (6) Department of Defense (DoD) documents in response to your request which it referred here for review and direct response to you.

Four enclosed documents have been declassified in their entirety and are provided for your use. Two other documents, with portions deleted, also are enclosed. One document, entitled "NSSM 69" (dated February 1, 1972), contains information concerning military plans and operations, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Accordingly, those portions are currently and properly classified in accordance with Section 1.5 (a), and are exempt from declassification in accordance with Section 3.4 (b)(5), Executive Order 12958. Release of the deleted information is denied by Mr. Edmund F. McBride, an initial denial authority of the Joint Staff, under the provisions of 5 USC 552 (b)(1).

The second document, also with deleted portions, contains information concerning military plans and operations and concerning the foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, that reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. As with the document above, those portions are currently and properly classified under Section 1.5 (a) and (d), and exempt from declassification in accordance with Section 3.4 (b)(5) and (6), E.O. 12958. Consequently, Mr. Frank Dellerman, an initial denial authority of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and Ms. Margaret P. Grafeld, Director for IRM Programs and Services, DoS, deny the release of the information also pursuant to 5 USC 552 (b)(1).

You may appeal the decision to withhold this information. Any appeal should be forwarded within 60 days of receipt of this letter, to the following address:

Directorate for Freedom of Information & Security Review  
Room 2C757, 1400 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 201301-1400



#957



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

APR 17 1998

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(UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS)

Case Control No.: 199700920  
Requester: Burr, William  
(x) FOIA/PA ( ) Mandatory Review

TO: Mr. A. H. Passarella  
Director, FOI/Security Review  
Department of Defense

FROM: Margaret P. Grafeld, Director *by [signature]*  
Office of IRM Programs and Services

SUBJECT: FOI/PA Referral for Direct Reply

In processing this request, we have located the attached documents which originated with your agency. Please review this material and reply directly to the requester.

We have no objection to declassification and/or release of documents numbered E41A, E45E, E54, E75B, and E95B.

We request that document numbered E80A be withheld in full, and we have noted the exemptions on the document.

With respect to any withholdings made at our request, Margaret P. Grafeld may be cited as the denial authority. Appeals should be directed, within 60 days, to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, c/o Appeals Officer, IPS/PP/IA/ Room 1512, Department of State, Washington, D. C. 20520-1512. The appeal letter should refer to the case control number shown above.

If you have any questions, please call (202) 647-6070.

Attachments:

- (x) Copy of request letter
- (x) 6 documents

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IN ALL CORRESPONDENCE PLEASE REFER  
TO ARCHIVE FILE NO. 970079D0S021

98F-1407

10 March 1997

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Acting FOIA Coordinator  
State Department  
2201 C Street, NW Rm. 1239  
Washington D.C. 20520

Dear Ms. Grafeld:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. Section 552, et seq. (as amended), I hereby request disclosure of the documents described on the attached page of this letter for inspection and possible copying. If you regard any of these documents as potentially exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements, I request that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. As the FOIA requires, please release all reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of documents which contain information you regard as exempt. To permit me to reach an intelligent and informed decision whether or not to file an administrative appeal of any denied material, please describe any withheld records (or portions thereof) and explain the basis for your exemption claims.

This request is made on behalf of the National Security Archive, a nonprofit public interest research institute and library in Washington, D.C. The Archive is a tax-exempt nonprofit organization whose purpose is to enrich public policy debate by making widely available records on important areas of major public concern on foreign, defense and intelligence policy. Documents obtained by the Archive, including the records requested in this letter, are carefully analyzed, indexed, organized into collections and published. Archive document collections are also available for inspection and copying at the Archive by scholars, journalists, members of Congress and their staffs, present and former public officials, other public interest organizations, and the general public. Information in these documents is disseminated across the country through distribution of our published collections to research libraries and through the Archive's other publishing and media activities. I am conducting research on the subject of this request as part of an Archive research team which includes experts on the subject and which already has done extensive research and determined that the requested materials are necessary to our project.

Please also waive all fees in connection with this request. In National Security Archive v. U.S. Department of Defense, 880 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S Ct. 1478 (1990), the Archive was declared entitled to a waiver of all search and review fees under the FOIA as a "representative of the news media." This request also qualifies for a waiver of duplication fees because disclosure of the information in the requested documents is in the public interest since release to us of these records, which directly relate to the formation of U.S. policy on the subject, is likely to contribute significantly to greater public understanding of the operations or activities of the government in making that policy. Should you decline to waive or reduce all duplication fees, we are prepared to pay normal reproduction costs if I decide to copy the records produced, but please describe your specific reasons in writing and notify us before incurring costs over \$100.

To expedite the release of the requested documents, please disclose them on an interim basis as they become available to you, without waiting until all the documents have been processed. If you have any questions regarding the identity of the records, their location, the scope of the request or any other matters, please call me at (202) 994-7000. I look forward to receiving your response within the ten-day statutory time period.

Sincerely,

William Burr

William Burr

FOIA Requester: Bunn, William

FOIA Sequence Number: 970079DOS021

Date of Request: 03/10/1997

NSA Record Number: 17475

Subject of Request:

Copies of any State Department or other agency reports prepared in response to the following National Security Study Memoranda:

1. NSSM 63, U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences, 3 July 1969
2. NSSM 69, U.S. Strategy for Asia, July 14, 1969
3. NSSM 106, China Policy, November 17, 1970
4. NSSM 124, Next Steps Toward the Peoples Republic of China, April 19, 1971

Note: I request that all documents be reviewed in their entirety, and that no information be omitted on the grounds of "non-relevance".

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DOD  
for direct  
reply

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October 8, 1969

A DOD SUPPLEMENTARY PAPER

NSSM-63

U.S. POLICY ON CURRENT SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF  
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SUMMARY

In their effort to alter the foreign policies of the Peking regime towards the USSR and Sino-Soviet issues in controversy, the USSR might decide that Chinese progress in nuclear weapons development, matched by the decline of pro-Soviet influence within the Chinese leadership, would demand that the Soviets seek a rapid change in either or both trends. Soviet efforts might thus move along a spectrum of increasing military violence, beginning with psychological pressures including the threat of military actions and extending through a possible punitive, short-term military strike to protracted war.

Such escalation of Sino-Soviet political-military resources committed to their dispute could offer increasing opportunities for the United States to obtain concessions from either the USSR or China on outstanding issues. Certainly, real dangers are associated with possible American initiatives to sustain or exacerbate the split. However, it is believed that the US must accept increasing risks rather than acquiesce in a return of China to the Soviet sphere. Proceeding from this high priority criterion for the design and selection of American policy options, it is believed also that imaginative consideration must be given to every conceivable cost-risk-returns formula which might promise progress towards the creation of a non-Communist, neutralist or anti-Soviet regime in China.

Under conditions of great Soviet political-military pressure short of war, US options are limited but might accent official pressure on the USSR to negotiate outstanding Soviet-American issues and to avoid war with China. Private American pressure might aim at increasing Sino-Soviet mutual suspicions just as Soviet-American negotiations on any issue (especially SALT) might help generate the same effect.

Under conditions of a Soviet punitive military strike, US options might accent contact with and limited non-military support to Communist China in return for withdrawal of Chinese support of insurgency operations in Southeast Asia and Africa. Pressure on the USSR might continue simultaneously, aimed at both substantive Soviet concessions and enhanced Chinese suspicions of a possible Soviet-American conspiracy against China.

Under conditions of a protracted Sino-Soviet war, the US might consider the feasibility of fostering more extensive contacts with and non-military support to a changing Peking regime. Before acquiescing in a possible geographical fragmentation of China among pro- and anti-Soviet elements, the US might investigate the option of a Third "United Front" between the GRC and the PRC, assuming that the values and goals of both regimes would have experienced significant change in the face of the spectre of Soviet domination of the Mainland.

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October 8, 1969

A DOD SUPPLEMENTARY PAPER

NSSM-63

U.S. POLICY ON CURRENT SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES

A. POTENTIAL SOVIET PURPOSES TOWARD CHINA

1. Until 1966, in spite of harsh words and military clashes, the post-1960 Sino-Soviet conflict had been carried on largely in political terms as a quarrel between members of the Communist system. Mutual accusations accented real or imagined deviations from Marxist-Leninist ideology and sought support among other communist parties. Early October 1969 brought some evidence that the 1966-69 emergence of an ominous military dimension to the quarrel might again be muted in favor of negotiations. However, between 1965 and 1969 significant changes in the mood and style of China's internal political process would suggest that major mutual Sino-Soviet concessions would be unlikely.

2. Thus, alternative courses of development are still possible should the negotiations collapse and should the Soviets decide to abandon their long-range policy of "wait-and-see." Instead, the Soviets might then attempt to force a quicker or even immediate decision by major political-military action. Such an attempt might be prompted by two considerations: (1) rapid development of a Chinese nuclear capacity could deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons against China if such a need should arise and might even represent a threat; and (2) the opportunity provided by chaos in China (alienation of, and indirect opposition to, Mao by important groups of the Chinese population and mutual suspicion within the leadership strata) might be exploited in order to prevent an anti-Soviet Maoist regime from institutionalizing its control. The Soviets might thus believe that the need to act against Peking had become unavoidable while the opportunity to act successfully might not be present for long.

3. If the Soviets should decide to risk military intervention, their aim would probably not be limited solely to delaying Chinese nuclear development; nor would their only purpose be to teach the Chinese a lesson. For such small returns would not be commensurate with potential costs. To buy the removal of China's nuclear weapons, possibly for a short period only, a punitive strike might possibly engender long-range bitter Chinese hostility which could aggravate the Soviet Union's problem. Rather, the Soviets might wish to attempt to change the course of the Chinese revolution and bring Peking back into the Marxist-Leninist camp, in a step-by-step fashion if necessary.

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4. In order to effect such a change, the Soviets would have to relate their actions to the political ferment of the present Chinese situation. The Soviet leadership would have to orchestrate political and/or military actions which would serve as a fuse to set off a political, if not a military, explosion that might break Mao's rule without turning the revolutionary trend in China into a non-Maoist but nationalistic anti-Soviet force.

5. Without predicting the precise outcome of today's state of affairs in Sino-Soviet relations, this paper will outline three broad alternative regimes in China that might result from three courses of action available to the Soviets in their effort to alter the Peking regime. The paper will then outline current American issues with the USSR and China. It will comment on the impact of each Soviet course of action on American opportunities for: (1) obtaining concessions from both the USSR and China on current issues; (2) influencing the emergence of a new regime in Peking, and, perhaps most important, (3) influencing the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations.

#### B. THREE ALTERNATIVE CHINESE REGIMES

1. For the purpose of portraying alternative regimes which might emerge from a deepening Sino-Soviet impasse, this paper will classify them into Communist and non-Communist categories and, with respect to their foreign policy, pro-Soviet, "neutralist", and anti-Soviet. For the sake of brevity, it will eliminate both the Communist-neutralist and the non-Communist pro-Soviet alternatives:

a. A Communist, anti-Soviet (Maoist) Regime: Consolidation of anti-Soviet (Maoist) forces in China could institutionalize what the Soviets might consider the least desirable alternative: an indefinitely hostile political system.

b. A Communist, Pro-Soviet Regime: Such a regime would probably foster renewed cooperation with the USSR, a relationship which would not necessarily require a satellite status for China but might be based on partnership.

c. A Non-Communist "Neutralist" or Anti-Soviet Regime: After the death of Mao, a strongly nationalistic or a very weak central government might emerge to shun a subordinate status with respect to any foreign country and to adopt a neutralist or non-Communist label in pursuit of its own national interests.

2. Alternative b. would probably be the preferred Soviet goal. However, in pursuing this goal, the Soviets would have to be wary of any moves which might turn Chinese internal political development and foreign policies towards either of the anti-Soviet alternatives.

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3. Conversely, alternative c. would probably be the preferred American goal. As with the Soviets, however, American failure to orchestrate carefully selected policies might foster either of the Communist regimes.

### C. SOVIET POLICY OPTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

1. Assuming that the Soviets would prefer to obtain maximum returns with the least investment of resources, especially military resources, three general points along a spectrum of increasing military violence should be examined. Soviet escalation of political-military pressure for the purpose of restoring a pro-Soviet regime in China would be a function of apparent failure at a lower level of military investment. Thus, each political-military phase would contain the potential if not the promise of stronger action, if required.

a. Relatively Non-Violent Measures (Psychological Pressure; Military Threats and Negotiation): If it could produce timely and effective results, the policy option would clearly be the most desirable and least risky. But results would probably be unsatisfactory if improved Sino-Soviet relations evolved too slowly. Thus, Soviet impatience might soon weary of this option if anti-Soviet elements in China seemed to be gaining ground at the expense of pro-Soviet elements. Soviet military leaders would be especially interested in the relationship of Chinese political developments to progress in Chinese nuclear weapons development.

b. Short-Term Military Action: Policy option (a) implies the threat of military action. Its lack of success or speedy progress might force the Soviets to apply the threat. Such military action might first be conceived as a short-term, rapid operation. Besides delaying Chinese nuclear weapons progress, it could be undertaken either in support of a latent but declining pro-Soviet political group in China, or to trigger a political coup. In any case, it would probably be connected with political action (as would be all options). To avoid major risks to the Soviet Union, such military action might initially avoid but ultimately would probably include a pre-emptive strike against the Chinese thermonuclear capability.

c. Prolonged Political-Military Operations: It is assumed that the Soviets would strenuously avoid any large-scale war in China. But short-term military-political action might fail to sustain declining pro-Soviet elements in China and thus demand more protracted Soviet military operations. This could lead to internal Chinese conflict, a fragmentation of the country and possibly civil war, in which the Soviets would have to continue to support elements friendly to them. The Soviets would obviously not wish to be involved in an occupation of the whole of China; but if necessary they might decide to maintain some of their own forces in China and support pro-Soviet Chinese forces occupying as large a part of the country as possible.

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D. AMERICA VERSUS THE USSR AND CHINA: GLOBAL ISSUES

1. We may identify a number of issues (see below) on which the Sino-Soviet conflict could have variable impact (whether fostering or damaging American interests). With respect to the Soviet-American conflict continued Soviet investment of resources in her dispute with China might afford the US opportunities to gain concessions from the USSR on at least three major issues:

a. To undertake or continue Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT)...

b. On the Near East (1) press for withdrawal of Soviet support for the Palestine Liberation Army and other Arab guerrilla groups; (2) propose talks on an arms embargo against the Middle East; (3) ask the Soviets to press the Arabs to adhere to a rigidly - controlled U.N. ceasefire in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

c. Guarantees of access to Berlin, and East German agreement to broader exchanges between East and West Germany.

2. With respect to the Sino-American conflict, four major issues might be influenced in favor of American interests under the proper blend of American initiative and Chinese receptivity:

a. Chinese agreement to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

b. Cultural Exchanges with China and Access of United Nations Missions to China.

c. Chinese Pressure on the Off-Shore Islands Reduced or Ended.

d. Chinese Support of "Wars of National Liberation" and Exacerbation of Disputes Between Sovereign States.

3. Under paragraph 2d above, negotiations with the Chinese might obtain concessions on a case-by-case basis, but only after prior consultation with the friendly country in question:

a. Withdrawal of Chinese support for insurgents in Burma.

b. Withdrawal of Chinese support for insurgents in Thailand.

c. Withdrawal of Chinese support for insurgents in Laos.

d. Withdrawal of Chinese support for radicals in Malaya.



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- e. Agreement to the MacMahon Line as the basis for a Sino-Indian Border Settlement.
- f. Cessation of weapons shipments to Pakistan.
- g. Withdrawal of Chinese support for the Palestine Liberation Army.
- h. Withdrawal of Chinese military missions and all weapons shipments to new African states.
- i. A cease-fire on Quemoy.

E. US POLICY OPTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

1. In any discussion of policy options by which the United States might hope to achieve an improved position on each of the issues cited above, five criteria for designing and balancing US policies must be considered in the following order of priority: (1) minimize compromises on existing American security commitments in the Pacific and in Europe; (2) maximize initiatives which would clearly drive the Chinese away from a detente with the USSR; (3) attempt to foster a neutralist or anti-Soviet non-Communist regime in China; (4) minimize prior American commitments to guarantee any Chinese regime that had so altered its Communist structure or its foreign policy as to agree to American demands on the issues cited above; and (5) try to improve relations with both contestants while attempting to gain leverage where we can from the dispute in pursuit of our own interests.

2. American selection of policy options should be guided by these five principles because American efforts to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict could reap more losses than gains if they drove the Chinese into Soviet arms, created an apparent American guarantee of Chinese security (in return for cited Chinese concessions), engendered a direct American military confrontation with the Soviets or abandoned important elements of the pro-American collective security system in Asia. The American choice of policy options is thus caught in a series of potential dilemmas, to be outlined under each state of Sino-Soviet confrontation already described earlier.

3. The Condition of Soviet Non-Violent Pressure:

a. American options in the event of Soviet success: Soviet success in bringing about the permanent restitution of a pro-Soviet Communist regime in China and a realignment with the Soviet Union by heightened pressure alone (as described under Soviet option (a)) would present the most unfortunate outcome of the present Sino-Soviet dispute from the point of view of US interest. It is possible that the Kosygin-Chou conference may already have laid the foundation for this outcome. Such Soviet success would prevent a new situation as a fait

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accompli, leaving the US little time to prevent or retard the reestablishment of Sino-Soviet unity. Options for US policy would then be limited to a long-range reaffirmation of US commitments in Asia and in the world of non-communist countries. The US might consider the need to counteract this second "loss" of China to the Soviet sphere by attempting to strengthen ties with overseas Chinese communities in Singapore and in other countries of Southeast Asia and with the GRC on Taiwan by fostering firmer cultural, as well as political, links. At the same time, US propaganda might accent the distinction between the PRC and the Chinese people with the aim of fostering a pro-China, anti-Soviet nationalistic trend among the masses.

b. American Options Prior to Clear Evidence of Soviet Success: Under current conditions, Sino-Soviet negotiations are hardly guarantees of a permanent restitution of China to the Soviet sphere. Yet American opportunities and techniques for precluding such an eventuality suffer from the restraints imposed by the criteria outlined in paragraph 1 above. Excessive pressure from the United States, as if to foster the illusion of a Soviet-American conspiracy, would probably lack credibility and might damage the Western security system in Asia. However, if the Chinese leaders believed in such a conspiracy, further direct American pressure on China might so frighten them as to force a return to the familiar Soviet sphere in preference to unknown treatment at the hands of a hostile capitalist power.

American interests might therefore be better served at this stage of Sino-Soviet relations by urging the Soviets to negotiate on outstanding Soviet-American issues (SALT, Berlin, etc.). Even if such negotiations led to no major Soviet concessions, their very existence might sustain Chinese suspicions of continuing Soviet revisionist behavior. At the same time, while cautioning the Soviets against an attack on Peking in public statements, we might deliberately foster private American press accounts to encourage the Chinese belief that the Soviets have been unreliable in past agreements and, even while negotiating, were continuing to escalate their build-up on the Chinese border. Our objective would thus be to sustain the Sino-Soviet polemic through private channels while warning both sides against its apparently eminent escalation through official channels. If it is assumed that the US must bend every effort to preclude Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the second priority criterion in par. (1) above, it might be necessary to consider more radical measures aimed at actually escalating the level of the Sino-Soviet political-military polemic should indicators of a Sino-Soviet detente tend to accumulate.

#### 4. The Condition of a Short-term Soviet Military Attack:

a. American Options in the Event of Soviet Success: Assuming that Soviet military action as described under Soviet option (b) succeeded, US options would still be similar to those described under (2), emphasizing the firmness of our position on the perimeter of the Asian mainland and among the overseas Chinese communities of Southeast Asia. Soviet military action would, however,

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burden the Soviets and the emerging new Chinese Communist regime with the onus of action by force and would provide the U.S. with an opportunity to exploit this liability in political and propaganda fields throughout Asia.

b. American Options Prior to Clear Evidence of Soviet Success:

In the midst of a Soviet attempt to alter the Peking regime by a short-term military strike against border units and, possibly, advanced weapons facilities in conjunction with additional political pressure (e.g., a coup attempt plus international Communist propaganda approval of the Soviet move), the Chinese Communists would probably be more receptive to American pressures to negotiations on outstanding issues.

But their receptivity to such American initiatives would hinge on their expectation of some quid pro quo from the American side. It is doubtful, for example, if an American threat to intervene on the side of the Russians would be credible. However, in return for a clear Chinese withdrawal of support from insurgency movements in Southeast Asia and Africa plus the cessation of firing on Quemoy, Americans might guarantee no support for GRC visions of counterattack across the Straits of Taiwan. Further, we could be prepared to offer the Chinese limited support in the form of medical supplies, food and non-strategic goods normally exported to other Communist countries. Such limited American concessions would hardly constitute a radical departure from existing American policy but might be offered to test Chinese desperation and vulnerability.

As suggested earlier, American pressure for concessions would have to be exerted with caution lest Chinese despair prompt them to surrender to Russian demands. Indeed, should such a contingency be indicated, American options might then include efforts to freeze the status quo and thereby preclude a Soviet victory. US initiatives might include a cease-fire motion in the United Nations Security Council, official protests to the USSR violation of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and secret negotiations with the GRC aimed at forming a Third United Front provided the PRC could be persuaded to entertain such an alternative to ignominious defeat by the Soviets. Americans might thus be forced to consider measures for fostering the shift of the conflict from a short-term to a long-term conflict rather than accept a Chinese surrender and a Sino-Soviet detente.

At the same time, Soviet commitment of military resources might improve American opportunities to gain Soviet concessions on outstanding Soviet-American issues. From the Soviet viewpoint, an American quid pro quo might include an agreement to continue a firm embargo on the shipment of strategic goods to China (leaving the question of non-strategic goods for further negotiation and implying that even strategic goods might be allowed in should pressures on America from China's friends increase further). Recognizing the futility of employing United Nations machinery to any effect in such a situation, the United States might yet agree to avoid embarrassing the USSR in the UN on this question in return for some progress on more important Soviet-American issues.

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However, just as American leverage over Chinese actions under Soviet option (a) would probably be severely limited, so American leverage over Soviet actions under Soviet option (b) would seem to be more restricted than our leverage over Chinese actions. If the Soviets had finally reached the serious decision to attack, there is little that the US could probably do to deter or alter that decision or reverse it during the course of Soviet operations. But the US might shift attention to Chinese vulnerabilities and requirements in hopes of encouraging their resistance, sustaining the Sino-Soviet split and altering the foreign policy objectives of a changing Chinese regime, all in return for American sympathy, minor concessions but no guarantees.

#### 5. The Condition of a Protracted Sino-Soviet Conflict:

a. American Options to Forestall Soviet Success: If Soviet political-military action should lead to prolonged warfare (as assumed under Soviet option (c)), the resulting situation might provide major opportunities for US policy in supporting, by available nonmilitary means, any trend towards Chinese indigenous development and independence. Such a conflict situation could lead to stalemate, fragmentation, or even civil war. While it is impossible to anticipate the turn of events in such a conflict situation, increasing mutual consumption of Sino-Soviet resources, both military and non-military, might set the stage for American initiatives to gain concessions from both regimes while invoking support for national aspirations of the Chinese people and a non-Communist or neutral regime.

It is doubtful that the Soviets would desire such a conflict because its domestic and international political and economic costs might become unacceptable when measured against the questionable returns in Sino-Soviet relations. Furthermore, the possibility of a fragmented China, subject to penetration by American, German, Japanese and other interests and ideologies, would probably hold little appeal for the Soviets. Such an internal regime would actually be tantamount to a non-Communist regime, central authority having only limited control over regional authorities. Thus, in return for her prolonged military and political efforts, the Soviets would be faced by the prospect of, at best, only a partial victory in certain regions of China.

To preclude the loss of what she might consider her just rewards for a long war, the USSR might offer major concessions to the US in return for an agreement to stay out of Chinese internal affairs. Certainly under conditions of civil war or incipient fragmentation and erosion of central power in Peking, the opportunity for a GRC Counterattack might be tempting. Even if the US did not wish to support such an attack, the threat to do so might prompt some cooperation from the Russians.

However, before allowing China to fall into disunity, the US might wish to exert a major effort simultaneously to alter and to save the new regime. Such a policy approach might be all the more justified if preliminary negotiations with the Russians indicated little hope for significant concessions. Nevertheless, a decision favoring direct US involvement on the Mainland would obviously

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be conditioned by the prospect of a direct confrontation with the Russian war machine. Assuming that such a confrontation would not be acceptable to the American public, US policy options would probably be limited to increased economic and possibly outright military aid to selected Mainland leadership groups which retained some hope of resisting Russian military power. Once again, the American objective might be to prevent absolute Soviet domination of the China Mainland even if the US had to offer limited sponsorship to an indigenous, anti-Communist, anti-Soviet leadership, probably south of the Yangtze River.

6. Conclusions: It is alluring to perceive only increasing benefits to the US as the Sino-Soviet conflict escalates from political-military pressure to protracted war. However, there would appear to be a point of diminishing returns to American interests along the scale of rising military violence. For example, it is not clear that American interests would necessarily be best served by a fragmented China in the long run. In any event, it is desirable to consider the option of offering all forms of support short of direct American troop commitments to a central Chinese regime which, threatened by extinction at Soviet hands, indicated a willingness to make major concessions to American interests, including even an acceptance of a revived United Front with the GRC.

The point remains that the situation poses both dangers and opportunities for American security interests in the Far East and elsewhere. Under the existing Sino-Soviet confrontation of October 1969, there are clearly real dangers associated with possible American initiatives to sustain or exacerbate the split. But the US must accept increasing risks rather than acquiesce in a return of China to the Soviet sphere. Proceeding from this high priority criterion, imaginative consideration must be given to every conceivable cost-risk-returns formula which might promise progress towards American goals on the major issues cited above, of which the maintenance of an anti-Soviet or the creation of a neutralist Chinese regime might be paramount.

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100-1000000	<b>MEMO 63 : U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences</b>						DIST.		FOR OR FAA INFO	
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

NSSM 63  
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reply

2 SEP 1959  
In reply refer to  
I-24286/69

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, Ad Hoc Committee on NSSM 63

SUBJECT: DOD Supplementary Views on NSSM 63 Report

As you may recall, the Department of Defense considered the original NSSM 63 draft report to have omitted certain possible alternative courses of development. Accordingly, a DOD Supplementary Paper was submitted to the Working Group for possible incorporation. We have examined the revised final draft of the Working Group, dated August 26, and have found it an improvement. We do not believe, however, that the final draft is fully reflective of the views expressed in the DOD Supplementary Paper. We also recognize that a more radical revision of the draft would have been required.

Inasmuch as it is NSC policy to afford an opportunity for all divergent views to be surfaced for consideration, we request that the accompanying DOD Supplementary Paper on NSSM 63 be forwarded to the NSC Review Group as an integral part of the Ad Hoc Committee's report.

Forwarded for consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee are also some specific comments on the draft final report. These are contained in NSSM 63, U. S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences. Specific DOD Comments.

*William Webster*

Attachments (2)

1. DOD Supplementary Paper on NSSM 63
2. NSSM 63, U. S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences, Specific DOD Comments

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF  
CASSO (ISA)  
30 APR 1999  
DATE \_\_\_\_\_ CASE # 98-R-1A07

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS, THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS PAPER IS

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1st # 800212, Box 5

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A DOD SUPPLEMENTARY PAPER ON NSSM 63  
September 2, 1969

The Crisis in Sino-Soviet Relations -- A Supplementary View

1. It is useful to bear in mind that until recently, in spite of harsh words and military clashes, the Sino-Soviet conflict had been carried on largely in political terms as a quarrel between members of the Communist system with mutual accusations of deviationism and competition for support among other parties of the same camp and movement. In the recent period, the Soviets have increasingly gained the upper hand and have attempted to isolate Peking both within the Communist movement and in the world outside. It is possible <sup>sic</sup> therefore to assume that the Soviets may decide to continue this policy and eventually to be successful in rendering the Chinese Communists relatively harmless or even in bringing them back into line through internal changes in China brought about by pressure of isolation. If this is the case, the present form of conflict would continue although military incidents may give it sharper focus.

2. However, an alternative course of developments must not be overlooked. For it appears possible that the conflict could be transformed if the Soviets should decide to abandon their present long-range policy and attempt to force a quicker or even immediate decision by major political-military action. Two considerations may affect Soviet thinking: 1) the development of a Chinese nuclear capacity which could deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons against China, if such a need should arise, and which may even represent a threat; 2) the opportunity provided by chaos in China in terms of the alienation of and indirect opposition to Mao by large groups of the Chinese population and leadership strata who, if they are suitably placed, might be utilized and exploited in order to prevent the Maoists from institutionalizing their control. The Soviets may believe that the need to act against Peking may become unavoidable while the opportunity to act successfully may not be present for long.

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3. Recent moves on their part indicate that the Soviets may attempt to change the course of events in China by a combination of military and political means of varying degrees. Such action may be directed in the main against the growing Chinese nuclear capability if the Soviet assessment approximates that of NIE 11/13-69 and if it foresees the Soviet industrial cities of Central Asia and the Far East becoming hostage to Chinese MRBM's within two or three years or even sooner. The emergence of long-range Chinese ballistic missiles, perhaps by the early mid-seventies, would constitute an even more serious constraint to Soviet military planning. The enticement to a pre-empting Soviet attack upon Chinese nuclear facilities cannot, therefore, be disregarded, as long as the Chinese weapons are likely to remain in the hands of a hostile leadership.

4. Any radical Soviet military action, with its accompanying risks, would produce a totally new relationship between Moscow and Peking. To buy the removal of China's nuclear weapons, possibly for a short period only, with what might possibly be a long-range bitter Chinese hostility could aggravate the Soviet Union's problem. The optimum goal of Soviet policy must be to bring Communist China back into the fold of a Communist Commonwealth and this goal cannot be attained by creating a bitter Chinese hatred against the Soviets.

Since December 1966, the Soviets have sided with Chinese Party leaders purged by Mao, who, in the Soviet view, has introduced a leader cult and a monarchical succession order that represent "petit bourgeois fanaticism" and that can no longer be regarded as a simple deviation within the Marxist-Leninist system. Since, in this Soviet view, Communism in China has gone astray, the entire future development of Communism in the non-industrial part of the world may be at stake, a potentially disastrous reverse which the Soviets may

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be determined to avert. If the Soviets should decide to risk radical military intervention, their aim might then not be limited solely to delaying Chinese nuclear development; nor would it be their only purpose to teach the Chinese a lesson. Rather, they might attempt to change the course of the Chinese revolution and bring Peking back into the Marxist-Leninist camp, in a step-by-step fashion, if necessary.

5. To do this, the Soviets would have to relate their actions to the political ferment of the present Chinese situation. The political framework established in China by the formation of Revolutionary Committees as sanctioned by the Chinese Ninth Party Congress is dominated by the military. However, as of today, all the emphasis on the need for "unity" in China has been unsuccessful in overcoming the continued conflict and clashes among the different elements inside and outside of Mao's new political structure in spite of the attempt to make the Chinese Party into a Maoist Party. On the surface, discipline among the military has been by and large maintained. The military leadership of the newly established Revolutionary Committees has, however, succeeded in many cases in forcing Peking to accept compromises in forming local political organizations. To some China-watchers there are clear signs of increasing "regionalism" in which the military leadership of the provinces has not only obtained a voice in local affairs, but is also strongly represented in the new Central Committee established in Peking. Several of the military leaders in the provinces who have been under fire from the Maoist Left have maintained their positions and have been able to banish the very Maoist groups that attacked them locally. The survival of the Maoist regime depends, therefore, on the loyalty of the military, and it is here that any Soviet political or military action would have to be directly related to the intricate politics among the Chinese military.

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Politics among the Chinese military and other leaders is not merely a power struggle, but also an expression of differing attitudes towards both professional military issues as well as broader questions of domestic and international policies and developments. As of now, these differences are expressed through elastic interpretations of Mao's slogans and directives. There is no open anti-Maoism at the moment, although there was some open opposition not so long ago even among the military. The purge of the party chief in Manchuria, Kao Kang, after Stalin's death, of former Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai in July 1959, and of former Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing in December 1965 were all related to Maoist policies and presumably to Sino-Soviet relations. It may well be that this interrelationship of Chinese domestic opposition with the Sino-Soviet conflict is more than Maoist imagination. If so, continuing Soviet contact with Chinese military men appears possible though highly dangerous for the respective Chinese leaders and is obviously a matter of the utmost secrecy.

It is even easier to assume a continued empathy on the part of some Chinese Communist leaders toward Soviet Marxism-Leninism. It was this system under which they had grown up and earned their merits -- for which they have been so ill rewarded by Mao in the Cultural Revolution.

Among the Maoists themselves there too has been a substantial house cleaning. A vast majority of the original Red Guards and the Revolutionary Rebels has been sent to the countryside to merge for life with the peasants and thus to "carry on the Maoist revolution." From the outside, they have fought the newly established Revolutionary Committees and have attempted to continue a "true" revolution of the Left. There have been, in consequence, constant infightings within the Revolutionary Committees where struggle and purges continue. Thus under the surface of central (?) rule there exists a highly

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explosive situation which the Soviets will in all likelihood want to turn to their advantage. The question before the Soviet leadership today may well be what political and/or military action would serve as a fuse to set off an explosion that would break Mao's rule without turning the revolutionary trend in China into a nationalistic anti-Soviet force. The latter development would be counter-productive. It could even be assumed that, from Mao's point of view, a Soviet invasion followed by an anti-Soviet people's war, albeit very costly, may not be totally undesirable.

6. A successful rising against Mao would have to come from within the country, as the Soviets must understand. It is obviously in the Soviet interest to provoke and support such a movement, should it occur. This possibility exists for there are "responsible people" in China, according to Soviet assertions, who will be able to remove Mao and bring China back on a Communist course. If we assume that the Soviets have knowledge of, or believe in, the existence of such Chinese leadership, either military, in command of its own forces, or political, but supported by such military men, the chances of success for such a venture would be vastly increased if outside military force could be held in reserve or used to back up any Maoist resistance. It is also possible that, in the Soviet view, outside military action could first break the force that might hold down a military coup within China and thus trigger an anti-Maoist rising. In both situations, however, any Soviet military move would have to be related to expected or hoped for events within China.

#### Soviet Opportunities

1. It is submitted that recent Soviet moves should also be examined in this framework; that is, a shift from the policy merely to isolate China as a distinctly possible Soviet option.

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The targets of Soviet political-military action could be either regional or central or both. The two most likely geographical regions for Soviet incursion and/or support of local risings are Sinkiang and Manchuria. Both areas are of special importance and present special conditions.

The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region has been a special problem area for the Maoist revolutionaries. The majority of its eight million people is non-Chinese -- chiefly Uighur and Kazakh tribal people who are nomads as well as agricultural settlers. Without identifying a number of local Chinese, Uighur and Kazakh figures, it appears possible to speculate on the Soviet exploitation of this political complexity. A useful group for preparing insurgency in Sinkiang could be found by the Soviets among 68,000 Uighurs who in 1962 fled to Soviet territory and were given asylum.

What makes Sinkiang especially attractive as a Soviet target is its importance in the development of China's thermonuclear weapons: major uranium deposits, a nuclear test site at Lop Nor, a missile range, etc. The long line of an exposed Chinese flank in Sinkiang makes this region all the more vulnerable to Soviet support of any secessionist move.

2. The loss of Sinkiang to China would be a considerable handicap, but it might not decide the fate of Mao or be sufficient to counter-balance the outraged anti-Soviet national reaction if it were not combined with other Soviet moves. Of greater actual importance than Sinkiang to Chinese general development are the three provinces of Manchuria: Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang. These provinces are Chinese in population with the exception of a comparatively small Mongolian minority of approximately two million in the Western region of the Hsingan range and a smaller Korean minority in Eastern Manchuria. Manchuria contains the greater part of China's steel production, as well as oil, machines,

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-- It would then appear all the more important for the U.S. to maintain its position in the non-Chinese part of Eastern and Southern Asia, especially in the countries of Japan, Southeast Asia and India, to whom this new Communist unity would be of equally grave concern.

-- If a Soviet-sponsored political coup fails, it might result in the intensification of hostility toward the Soviet Union in China. THEN...

--- The resulting anti-Soviet Chinese policy may be carried on under Maoist or post-Maoist nationalistic auspices.

--- The Sino-Soviet conflict would continue and the danger of a Soviet-type Communist revival in China would become more remote in the near term.

-- Another possible outcome - perhaps even anticipated by the Soviet policymakers - might be a partial success of the Soviet-sponsored effort to remove Mao and re-establish Communism under a Marxist-Leninist party system. THEN...

--- The control of such a new regime may first extend over North China, while the provinces of central and south China could become autonomous and might oppose the Moscow-sponsored new Chinese Communist leadership in Peking or in the Northern and Western Provinces. A disintegration of the political structure might conceivably lead to conflict and civil war. In this case, it would be in the U.S. interest to counter the Soviet effort by attempting to prevent the extension of the control of any new Chinese Communist regime over the whole country.

#### Implications for U.S. Policy

1. U.S. policy depends on the situation as it emerges from possible Soviet action. It will have to relate to two phases of development: a phase of mili-

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tary action should it occur and the phase after military action is completed.

It will be in the Soviets' interests to obtain their purpose in swift military action. If hostilities are quickly terminated, there may be little time for the development of a U.S. policy during the acute phase of hostilities. U.S. policy decisions on the outcome of such actions will depend on the degree of success or failure of Soviet intervention. Assuming that it would be in the United States' national interest not to get ourselves involved in the conflict, it would appear that we should strengthen those Chinese aspirations that would lead to a revival of national tradition and be resistant to Communism and Maoism. Since it would not be in United States interest to substitute Soviet influence in Asia for Peking's influence, whether Soviet intervention in China succeeds or not, U.S. interests would best be served by maintaining the support of an independent nationalistic trend in China. The stress of U.S. policy efforts should be on alternate possibilities for Chinese development. This policy should be directed at Chinese on the mainland and at Chinese groups outside. Under the conditions of each eventuality of Soviet success or failure at intervention, this policy would have to be applied in different ways.

2. If Soviet military-political action succeeds, whatever influence could be exerted on the Chinese mainland would have to be indirect and mainly through communications media. A major portion of the effort would then have to be directed at overseas Chinese groups in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong, and toward Taiwan. Over the longer term, U.S. policy should also strengthen the overseas Chinese educational efforts in schools and universities, as at Nanyang University, Singapore University, and the Chinese University in Hong Kong, our purpose being

to support a Chinese intellectual development outside the doctrinal drill system on the mainland as an alternative for the future.

3. If a Soviet-sponsored political coup fails, or is only partly successful, the opportunity for a U.S. policy in support of nationalistic aspirations in China would be vastly improved. In this case, a major effort should be made to reach different segments of Chinese on the mainland by both overt and covert media, with the effort directed towards a discussion of local, national and international issues, stressing the shortcomings and failures inherent in the present chaos which have arisen from Communist and Maoist policies. This effort should attempt to create doubts and questions. Where appropriate it should show understanding and support for the complaints and bitterness of the victims of the Cultural Revolution. Most of all, the goal should be to counter these negative aspects with encouragement of Chinese pride in the accomplishments of the past and the qualities demonstrated in developments outside the Communist orbit. Where opportunities are available, exhibits of Chinese culture and historical accomplishments can be presented to counter similar Communist efforts. The theme should focus upon the greatness of Chinese cultural tradition, its contribution to general human development, its enduring ethics and its possibilities outside the influence of Communism and Maoism.

It would be very much in our interest to strengthen any aspects of Chinese nationalism that might prevent a Soviet or Maoist success. Assuming that there is not a rapid Communist takeover but a prolonged disintegration, chaos, even possibly civil war, it would be important for any non-Communist leadership on the mainland, should it come to the fore, to see the prospect for alternative

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independent solution for China. Such a solution could be based on the resurgence of a belief in Chinese cultural tradition and values.

4. Assuming that any change within China would have to come from development on the mainland, the outside Chinese groups, including Taiwan, would play a supporting role at best. It is very unlikely that a nationalistic development on the mainland could be created or directed from the outside; but once it existed, United States policy should be prepared to support it directly through policy pronouncements and diplomatic moves towards other countries of the Afro-Asian and Western worlds, and indirectly through whatever means might appear feasible at that time. The overseas Chinese, as well as the Nationalists on Taiwan, would of course be intensely interested in such events on the mainland and their support may be crucial at some juncture. It appears also important for the United States to relate to the strong tradition of a third China in Singapore and Hong Kong and among the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asian countries. In the first years after the Communist victory the relationship of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia to the mainland was ambivalent. Maoism and the Cultural Revolution have for the most part offended the Chinese sensitivities of these groups who formerly had been inclined more towards the mainland than towards Taiwan. Their support in the outcome of a new internal conflict and their support of a non-Communist Chinese solution might be influential in any prolonged crisis in China. Economic support, in relation to their cultural development, and a keen interest in their political life would be among the means of supporting the role which these overseas Chinese groups may yet play.

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5. As to Taiwan, a landing of the Nationalist army on the mainland has long been regarded as unrealistic, and more recently Taiwan policy seems to be turning more to the development of economic viability and the establishment of a political alternative to events on the mainland. As a force in itself, the GRC can scarcely be considered a real alternative to the present Maoist regime. The importance of Taiwan may be not so much in military terms as in the survival of a free educational system and a highly successful economic development in an entirely Chinese setting on what is still Chinese soil. As part of a larger, indigenous mainland movement, the example of Taiwan, the organization of the GRC, and the force it represents may still be important.

If Soviet action should re-open the issue of Communism in China, which has been severely damaged by Maoism, there is no reason for United States policy to close the door to a non-Communist solution. Support of a nationalistic trend in mainland China, and close diplomatic, political, and economic relations to overseas Chinese groups could be major goals for United States policy insofar as the sharpening of the crisis in China and in Sino-Soviet relations is concerned. These policies could form the basis for a United States posture under new conditions created by Soviet political-military action. They could serve as well if the present Soviet hard line should lead to continuing pressure on the Chinese front instead of open military action. Such a posture relates to traditional and present United States policy of support for national aspirations of states whose integrity will basically remain their peoples' own responsibility.

6. Several problems relating to U.S. policy toward events in a Sino-Soviet conflict of growing intensity need further, considerable attention and could usefully be the subject of contingency planning studies. These would include such topics as the possibility of GRC unilateral intervention into a mainland

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conflict, the implications of a succession crisis on the mainland (how should the U.S. react?), and the means by which the U.S. might attempt to forestall a Soviet take-over of a major portion of the Chinese mainland.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

19 JUL 1969  
In reply refer to:  
I-8193/69

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: NSSM 63: U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences

In accordance with your memorandum of July 15, subject as above, please be advised that Mr. Yuan-li Wu, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy Planning and Arms Control), OASD (ISA), OX 73331, will be the OSD representative on the ad hoc group for NSSM 63.

(Signed) G. Warren Nutter

cc: The Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
Military Assistant to the SecDef

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OASD (ISA)  
30 APR 1999  
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- CHECK WITH THIS OFFICE

*Joseph Nante*

REMARKS:

JOHN STEMPEL  
EXT. 3351, ROOM 7222

*11/1/01*

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THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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DJSM 182-72  
1 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

Subject: NSSM 69 (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum (Attachment 1) to the undersigned from the Director, Program Analysis, National Security Council, dated 13 December 1971, subject: "DPRC Meeting December 8, 1971 (NSSM 69)."

2. In the referenced memorandum, the Joint Staff was requested to provide several analyses to clarify difference between JCS and Systems Analysis force estimates which had been highlighted at the last DPRC addressal of NSSM 69. The analyses, which are provided in the Attachments hereto, cover the following subjects:

a.

[REDACTED]

b.

[REDACTED]

c. Comments on the Systems Analysis paper explaining estimates of U.S. forces required to defend in Southeast Asia, to include unofficial estimates of force requirements using Systems Analysis assumptions (Attachment 4).

3. Request you forward the attached analyses to the Director, Program Analysis, National Security Council, as a part of the overall DOD submission for consideration at the next DPRC addressal of NSSM 69.

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*J. W. Vogt*

JOHN W. VOGT  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director, Joint Staff

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR

Lt. General JOHN W. VOOG

SUBJECT: DFRG Meeting December 8, 1971 (NSM 6)

At the DFRG meeting held December 8, 1971, on Strategy and  
for Asia (NSM 69), Dr. Kissinger asked that further work be  
order to clarify the differences between JCS and Systems Analy  
estimates of U.S. ground forces required to stalemate PRC a  
in Korea and Southeast Asia.

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Southeast Asia

For Southeast Asia, Dr. Kissinger asked for a briefing on the Cycle Analysis estimates made under the "optimistic assumptions" which include: (a) PT/RF forces in Southeast Asia are able to control any insurgency which accompanies a PRC attack, (b) Vietnamization is successful, and (c) South Vietnamese and Thai forces improve to the extent that the Thai Army can supply about 2 U.S. divisions (DTR) while the ARVN supply about 6 U.S. divisions (DTR) to defend against the joint PRC/NV attack.

Since his schedule is so tight over the next two months, it may not be possible to schedule the briefing Dr. Kissinger requested and I believe it may therefore be necessary to ask Systems Analysis to prepare a paper describing in some detail the rationale for their estimates in Southeast Asia.

JCS will, of course, be asked to comment on this paper before it is submitted to Dr. Kissinger and I believe it would be very useful if these comments could include unofficial JCS estimates of force requirements made under the same assumptions as the Systems Analysis estimates. This work could include, of course, JCS comments on the likelihood of these assumptions actually materializing.

Since the JCS and Systems Analysis requirements estimates made under the same pessimistic assumptions are so close (about 9 divisions for the JCS and about 8 for Systems Analysis) I suspect that getting estimates based on comparable assumptions will go a long way towards narrowing the apparent gap.

I appreciate your help and support in this matter.



Philip A. Odeen  
Director, Program Analysis




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
c. Assumptions. The following assumptions were used  
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
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2. (TS) NSSM-69 Land Forces Methodology and Assumptions


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
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
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
2. <sup>u</sup>(TS) Marine Corps

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3. Tactical Air Requirements Worksheet:


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
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ATTACHMENT 2

JCS FORCE ESTIMATES FOR DEFENSE OF KOREA



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
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ATTACHMENT 3  
US FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR NORTHEAST ASIA

1. ~~(TS)~~ US Force Requirements.




USC 552  
(b)(1)

2. ~~(TS)~~ Illustrative US Force Requirements Against the Moderate Threat.



do



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

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
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705C 552  
(b)(1)



2. (S) NSSM-69 Land Forces Methodology and Assumptions

a.



do

b.


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ATTACHMENT 4

US LAND FORCE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA


1. (TS) US Land Force Requirements

a.



USC 352  
(b)(1)

b. These planning requirements are based on the following major considerations:



USC 352  
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OASD(SA)  
January 19, 1970  
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U.S. FORCES NEEDED FOR DEFENSE IN SEA  
NSSM-69 METHODOLOGY

I. Introduction

At the 8 December DFRG meeting, several questions were raised concerning the estimated U.S. ground forces needed to counter conventional Communist threats in SEA and the methodology used to derive those estimates. Dr. Kissinger asked that a paper be prepared which laid out the methodology and the key factors used in the methodology as it was applied to SEA, and illustrated the need for U.S. forces as derived by that methodology for a series of security assistance and indigenous force availability assumptions. This paper is in response to that request.

There are three sections to this paper. The first outlines the methodology used to estimate force needs. The second traces the derivation of U.S. forces for SEA--beginning with the threat and concluding with U.S. force needs. And the third shows force needs for a series of force planning assumptions.

II. Force Estimating Methodology

The method used to determine ground force requirements consists of four steps:

1. Convert both threat and allied ground forces to equivalents--U.S. infantry division force equivalents (DFEs)--by multiplying the infantry manpower, artillery and tanks in each force by factors reflecting differences in weapon quality and support, and comparing the outcome with similar comparisons for a U.S. infantry division.
2. Select force ratios appropriate for stalemateing a conventional attack.
3. Compare attacking and friendly forces at each point in time (M-Day, M+1, etc.) to determine if U.S. reinforcements are required to maintain the force ratios. Where allied forces are insufficient, the number of U.S. needed is computed.
4. Repeat the third step for various levels of security assistance, regional defense arrangements, and indigenous regular force availability.


Figure 1 on the following page is a schematic of the methodology.

Using this methodology, computed force needs are estimated to be adequate to stalemate the attacking forces. Follow-on forces which might be desirable to defend or to achieve other strategies (e.g., counteroffensives or regaining territory) which would come at a later time and could be supported from reserves or newly created forces are not addressed. Moreover, the requirement calculations are for conventional defense only and probably would not be sufficient to handle counterinsurgent or area security roles if requirements to control insurgent activities are greater than the capabilities of the allies' regional forces (the RF/FF forces, and in Thailand the National Police). As discussed below, force impact of countering a conventional attack superimposed on an intense insurgent activity can be estimated by repeating the force calculations assuming that the indigenous regular forces are needed to combat the insurgents.

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FIGURE I

# NSSM 69 GPF ANALYSIS LAND FORCE REQUIREMENTS SCHEMATIC



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A Conversion to Equivalents (DFEs)

The first step in any method of deriving ground force requirements to an enemy attack is to convert both enemy and friendly forces to some measure of relative capability. In this methodology, all ground forces are converted to U.S. division force equivalents (DFEs) through a process of valuing the equipment, and support of each force relative to that of a nominal U.S. infantry division.

Each country's force is divided into three categories: (1) tanks/anti-tank weapons, (2) artillery/mortars, and (3) infantry manpower. Considering measurable physical weapon characteristics such as lethal area, values are set for these by comparing them to a standard in each category. The performance characteristics of enemy and friendly tank and antitank weapons are compared relative to the U.S. M-48 tank. Artillery and mortars are compared on the basis of lethal area per hour and the lethal area per 15 minutes of fire, using the U.S. 155mm howitzer as the standard. The values based on measurable characteristics are then adjusted by judgment for less quantifiable capabilities such as target acquisition and fire control. Values are set for each country using judgment to reflect differences in the support available to that country's combat forces.

In gauging the relative effectiveness of infantrymen in maneuver units, somewhat measurable factors are considered--firepower, mobility, combat intelligence and command, control, and communication--and several other less measurable factors such as training, leadership, morale and logistic support.\*

To arrive at the total value of the force in each of the three categories, the values for each weapon or infantryman are multiplied by the numbers of such weapons or men in the force and summed. The total value of each country's force is computed at several points in time (M-Day, M+15, etc.). These values are then compared with similar measures for a U.S. infantry division to derive the relative value of an enemy or allied force in each category. Finally, a weighted average of the three categories (tank/antitank, artillery/mortars, men in maneuver units) is computed to arrive at a single measure of a country's forces in terms of DFEs.\*\*

Obviously, judgment plays an important role in assessing the relative capabilities of the weapons themselves and their effectiveness in the hands of the various forces. To provide this judgment, a panel of experienced men who work in force planning was provided with all the available information on weapons, support, intelligence, etc., and asked to judge what weighting values should be assigned.\*\*\* For example, the panel was used to estimate the effect of the relative support structure on the overall capability of the various forces examined, and to estimate the relative effectiveness of each country's infantry manpower.

\*The weighting values for infantrymen in maneuver units for the following countries are:

U.S.	ROC	NVA	RVN	Thai
1.0	.77	.81	.75	.69

Thus, for example, a Chinese infantryman is judged to be about 77% as effective as a U.S. infantryman.

\*\*The weighting average used for SEA is tank/antitank--10%, artillery/mortars 45%, and infantry--45%, reflecting the relatively limited value of tanks in the SEA environment.

\*\*\*The panel consisted of 19 individuals: 8 from OSD and 11 from the JCS/Army. Of the 19, 4 were civilians and 15 career military.

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The relative capability of a U.S. division and that for each of the Asian ground forces is shown on the following page. Three points should be mentioned:

- The two principal contributing factors to the capability difference between a U.S. division and the other divisions are (1) the size of a U.S. division and (2) the heavy firepower in the tank/antitank and artillery/mortar categories.\*
- The PRC and NVN divisions are less than one-half the size of a U.S. division and about one-third as capable.
- An RVN division is significantly larger than a PRC, NVN, or Thai division and judged to be only slightly more capable.
- A Thai division is half again as large as a PRC division, but judged to be only about equally capable.

B. Force Ratios

The second step of the force requirements computation is to select the force ratio judged adequate to stalemate attacking forces in SEA. So long as neither side has a tactical advantage, the side maintaining the selected overall force ratio is assumed to be able to achieve the objective implied by that ratio (i.e., in this case to stalemate the attack).

Determining an appropriate force ratio is critical. A literature search revealed that a wide range of force ratios have been used explicitly or implied in estimating requirements for ground forces in Asia. These range from 1.6:1 to .9:1 (enemy to friendly) in Korea, with an even wider range having been used in SEA. Moreover, an analysis of some battles in World War II and Korea showed little correlation between force size and outcome in short engagements; other factors seemed to dominate. As this research led to no preferred alternatives, the force ratio tables prepared by the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) for its Computerized Quick Game (CQG) which are based upon an analysis of World War II and Korean War battles and troop movements are used in this study. This source at least assures consistency as the stalemate ratios in these tables have been used extensively by force planners at all levels: in the CINCPAC FRAM model, the Army's FOREWON and SPECTRUM analyses, and the JCS games conducted by SAGA using the ATLAS model.

Because of the uncertainty regarding the validity of the force ratio tables, conservative ratios are used in the computations. For forward defense in Southeast Asia, requirements are based on the 1:1 ratio called for in meeting engagements where neither side has the advantage of prepared positions. Given sufficient warning, some defensive positions would probably be prepared along like avenues of approach throughout SEA. Moreover, it is normally assumed that defenders have some advantage even if they have not prepared their positions. These two factors suggest that the 1.3:1 (enemy to friendly) ratio associated with hastily prepared positions would be appropriate. However, because the attacker (particularly in North Thailand and northern RVN) could in many cases avoid prepared defenses and pick his battlefield--which would constitute a meeting situation--the more conservative 1:1 ratio is used.\*\*

\*It is recalled, however, that the tank/antitank category is judged relatively unimportant in SEA as it is given only a 10% weight in the weighted averaging procedure.

\*\*It might be noted that in the calculations for forward defense in Korea the 1.3:1 ratio is used. Because the ROK/U.S. forces would be defending from prepared positions, the force ratio table calls for use of the 1.6:1 ratio. To be conservative however, the 1.3:1 ratio is used.

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COMPARISON OF FORCE EQUIVALENTS FOR SPA

UNITED STATES			
TANK/AMTANK	Factor	Count	Equiva
Weapons			
M40 Tank	1.42	71	100.82
AV119 (152mm)	1.74	54	93.96
97mm FR	.14	179	25.06
105mm FR	.14	68	9.52
<b>Total M-8 Equivalents</b>			<b>235.08</b>
<b>ARTILLERY/WEAPNS</b>			
81mm Mortar	.25	92	23.00
4.2 inch Mortar	.43	49	21.07
105mm How(T)	.91	54	49.14
155mm How(T)	.96	36	34.56
155mm How	1.00	18	18.00
8 inch How	.87	16	13.92
CSFA	2.00	52	104.00
<b>Total 155mm Equivalents</b>			<b>263.69</b>
<b>INFANTRY IN MANPOWER UNITS</b>			
Manpower	1.0	10,970	10,970
<b>U.S. EPE EQUIVALENTS</b>			
			1.0
<b>TOTAL MANPOWER IN DIVISION</b>			
			<b>48,000</b>

MC LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION			
TANK/AMTANK	Factor	Count	Equiva
Weapons			
75mm FR	.12	54	6.48
<b>Total M-8 Equivalents</b>			<b>6.48</b>
<b>ARTILLERY/WEAPNS</b>			
60mm Mortar	.06	12	.72
82mm Mortar	.14	135	19.32
120mm Mortar	.25	35	9.10
75mm Gun	.28	1	.28
81mm Gun	.32	35	11.52
120mm How	.47	4	1.88
130mm FLD Gun	.93	4	3.72
150mm Gun How	.60	4	2.40
107mm FL	.10	18	1.80
<b>Total 155mm Equivalents</b>			<b>49.32</b>
<b>INFANTRY IN MANPOWER UNITS</b>			
Manpower	.77	7,387	5,683
<b>U.S. EPE EQUIVALENTS</b>			
			.3002
<b>TOTAL MANPOWER IN DIVISION</b>			
			<b>19,200</b>

NORTH VIETNAM			
TANK/AMTANK	Factor	Count	Equiva
Weapons			
75mm FR	.12	54	6.48
<b>Total M-8 Equivalents</b>			<b>6.48</b>
<b>ARTILLERY/WEAPNS</b>			
60mm Mortar	.06	12	.72
82mm Mortar	.14	135	19.32
120mm Mortar	.27	35	9.45
75mm Gun	.30	1	.30
81mm Gun	.34	36	12.24
120mm How	.50	4	2.00
130mm FLD Gun	.51	4	2.04
150mm Gun How	.63	4	2.52
107mm FL	.10	18	1.80
<b>Total 155mm Equivalents</b>			<b>50.79</b>
<b>INFANTRY IN MANPOWER UNITS</b>			
Manpower	.81	7,387	5,983
<b>U.S. EPE EQUIVALENTS</b>			
			.3348
<b>TOTAL MANPOWER IN DIVISION</b>			
			<b>19,200</b>

SOUTH VIETNAM (Current MAP Plan)			
TANK/AMTANK	Factor	Count	Equiva
Weapons			
M41 Tank	.51	12.5	6.38
57mm FR	.06	42.7	2.56
<b>Total M-8 Equivalents</b>			<b>8.94</b>
<b>ARTILLERY/WEAPNS</b>			
60mm Mortar	.06	87.5	5.25
82mm Mortar	.18	46.8	8.42
4.2 inch Mortar	.31	1.9	.59
105mm How(T)	.55	73.1	40.22
155mm How(T)	.69	18.0	12.42
175mm Gun(T)	.43	1.6	.69
<b>Total 155mm Equivalents</b>			<b>76.95</b>
<b>INFANTRY IN MANPOWER UNITS</b>			
Manpower	.75	9,210	6,908
<b>U.S. EPE EQUIVALENTS</b>			
			.4153
<b>TOTAL MANPOWER IN DIVISION</b>			
			<b>33,200</b>

TIELAC (Current IAP Plan)			
TANK/AMTANK	Factor	Count	Equiva
Weapons			
M41 Tank	.43	36.8	15.82
57mm FR	.07	74.2	5.19
75mm FR	.11	44.4	4.88
<b>Total M-8 Equivalents</b>			<b>25.89</b>
<b>ARTILLERY/WEAPNS</b>			
60mm Mortar	.05	75.4	3.77
82mm Mortar	.15	39.0	5.85
4.2 inch Mortar	.25	37.2	9.67
75mm Pack How	.24	7.2	1.73
105mm How(T)	.25	31.2	17.47
155mm How(T)	.59	2.4	1.42
<b>Total 155mm Equivalents</b>			<b>39.91</b>
<b>INFANTRY IN MANPOWER UNITS</b>			
Manpower	.69	8,515	5,944
<b>U.S. EPE EQUIVALENTS</b>			
			.3040
<b>TOTAL MANPOWER IN DIVISION</b>			
			<b>29,200</b>

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### C. Calculating U.S. Force Requirements

Step three, calculating U.S. force requirements, is done by first applying the selected force ratio to the attacking force and thereby determining the total number of friendly forces (in terms of DEFs) needed to stalemate the enemy at each point in time (M-Day, M+15, M+30, etc.). U.S. force needs are derived by subtracting allied forces from the total friendly forces needed.

### D. Effect of Security Assistance, Regional Defense Pacts, and Insurgency

The final step -- calculating the impact of varying levels of security assistance, regional defense pacts, and insurgent activity -- is simply an iteration of step three, reflecting variations in the number of allied forces subtracted from the total friendly forces needed to stalemate the attack.\* For example, if higher levels of security assistance expenditures are provided the Thai and their ground forces improve accordingly, fewer U.S. forces would be needed. In a similar manner, if a regional defense pact is formed which results in the contribution of additional allied ground forces, a larger allied force is subtracted from the total friendly forces needed resulting in the need for fewer U.S. forces.

## III. U.S. Force Needs for SEA

This section traces the calculation of U.S. ground force needs to counter a RVN and a combined FRC/RVN ground attack in SEA using the methodology outlined in section II. First, the RVN and FRC conventional ground threats are examined. Next the size and capability of the RVN and Thai forces projected for FY 76 are reviewed. Then the approach taken to estimate the impact on U.S. force needs of various levels of insurgency is explained. And finally, the U.S. forces needed to stalemate a RVN and FRC attack are determined.

### A. The Conventional Threat in SEA

Though the outcome of the current SEA conflict will influence significantly the size of the RVN army in 1976, it is currently projected to consist of about 410,000 troops in 1976.\*\* The Chinese are projected to have an army of some 150 divisions and a total of about 2.8 million troops.\*\*\*

\*The treatment of high levels of insurgent activity accompanying a conventional attack is discussed in Section III C.

\*\*For the purposes of this analysis, a useful way of categorizing the RVN army in terms of Chinese division slices. A division slice consists of about 7,400 troops in maneuver units and a total of about 19,000 troops.

\*\*\*The Chinese, of course, could not deploy all of these troops into SEA as they have numerous other troop commitments (e.g., defense along the Russian border, Taiwan Straits, North Korean border, and the maintenance of internal security and administration).

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Under the current method of estimating road capacities, the limiting factor on the size of the threat in SEA is the throughput capacity of the road LOC system. Because the LOC system is limited by the wet weather of the Southwest monsoon during May to October, there are two threat levels to be considered.\* If the Communists attempt an all-out six month effort and plan a one season victory they can use the entire dry season capacity of the LOCs to support current combat operations. If they plan to fight year around, however, they must use some of the dry season LOC capacity to build stockpiles for the wet season, thus reducing the level of throughput available for dry season operations. If stockpiles were not built and the Communists did not achieve a one-season victory, they would have large numbers of unsupportable troops in relatively vulnerable forward positions during the ensuing wet season. Thus, both a maximum (dry season only) and a year around threat can be examined.

Only two principal avenues of approach are available to the NVN for a conventional attack on the RVN -- through the Savannakhet (Laos) area and along the coast through Hue (South Vietnam). (See map in Appendix I.) Because of LOC constraints on these two approaches, the NVA is estimated to be capable of supporting only a 13 division slice buildup (250,000 troops) in SVN during the dry season and a 11 division slice buildup (210,000 troops) on a year around basis.

Because the threat to the RVN is LOC constrained, the maximum threat to the NVN remains the same whether there is a NVN only attack or a combined PRC/NVN attack (i.e., the attacking troops could be either PRC or NVN or some combination, but the maximum number supportable remains constant). In a combined PRC/NVN attack there are a total of five primary avenues of attack (see Appendix I): through Moiktila, Burma; Muang Chiang Rai, Thailand; Vientiane, Laos; Savannakhet; and Hue. These five avenues could support about 33 PRC/NVN divisions in the dry season. Of the 33, however, 11 would be in Burma (it is assumed that Burma is not defended). Because of the very poor roads on the northern Thai-Burma border, only about 2.3 PRC divisions could be supported from Burma into Thailand. Thus, as shown in the table on the following page, the PRC/NVN threat to SEA (excluding Burma), is about 24 divisions (about 50,000 troops) in the dry season and about 18 divisions (about 350,000 troops) on a year around basis. \*\*\*

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\*The Hue, South Vietnam avenue of approach has a countercyclical dry season because of the Northeast Monsoon.

\*\*JCS/Service scenarios for defense of SEA generally include the forward defense of Burma.

\*\*\*Because of the uncertainty associated with Laos and Cambodia, two assumptions are made in the analysis. First, it is assumed that Laos and Cambodia are independent countries and therefore neither the NVN nor Chinese stockpile supplies in those countries. Second, it is assumed that neither the NVN nor the PRC meet resistance from Laotian and Cambodian forces.

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PAC/IVN Conventional Threat  
 (as of 1960)

<u>Attack Avenue</u>	<u>Dry Season Campaign</u>			<u>Year Around Campaign</u>				
	<u>Division</u>	<u>Slices</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>DFEs</u>	<u>Division</u>	<u>Slices</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>DFEs</u>
Meiktila, Burma/Tak, Thailand a/		2.3	44,000	.8		0	0	0
Muang Chiang Rai, Thailand		6.3	120,000	2.1		6.0	114,000	2.0
Vientiane, Laos		2.3	44,000	.8		1.3	25,000	.4
Savannakhet, Laos		5.0	95,000	1.7		3.3	63,000	1.1
Hue, South Vietnam		8.2	156,000	2.7		7.6	144,000	2.8
Total Threat		24.1	495,000	8.1		18.2	346,000	6.3

a/ Shown are the FRC forces that could be supported through Burma against the Thai.

B. SEA Allied Forces

To gain an understanding of the potential for the South Vietnamese and Thai to undertake a larger share of the defense burden in SEA, the potential for increased RVN and Thai conventional capability given feasible levels of U.S. security assistance is examined.\* In addition, the potential impact of collective security arrangements among Asian nations on the need for U.S. forces is addressed.

Three levels of security assistance are examined for the RVN and Thailand. While the potential military capability of these two countries may be greater than indicated in the alternatives examined, the high options considered are thought to represent the maximum the South Vietnamese and Thai are likely to realize because of economic and political constraints.

Republic of Vietnam. Under current planning, South Vietnam will have a military establishment in FY 73 surpassed in size only by South Korea and Taiwan among our Asian allies. Maintaining such a large force through 1976 would place a heavy strain on both the RVN economy and U.S. security.

\*The analysis of RVN and Thai security assistance options is somewhat limited as several important questions have not been adequately addressed. For example, the issue of whether the security assistance programs should emphasize RVN and Thai ground forces backed up by U.S. air and naval forces, or whether the programs should be designed to provide a balanced capability (i.e., the mix of land, tactical air and naval forces) to meet the NVN threat is not fully examined. Similarly, the issue concerning development of improved counterinsurgency versus conventional capabilities is not addressed. And finally, though the security assistance options considered are generally feasible within the economic capability of the allied country, the full out-year economic impact has not been adequately examined. For these reasons, the options examined should be viewed more as an illustration of possible impact security assistance programs might have on U.S. force needs in Asia, rather than a definitive analysis of possible security assistance programs for the RVN and Thai.

assistance funds, although such a force would provide Vietnam with a capability to assume a regional security role.\* Because of the economic strain, two lower levels of security assistance are considered for South Vietnam. The capability and cost of the three options are summarized below:\*\*

	RVN Security Assistance Options		
	Current Plan	Option 1	Option 2
Active Divisions <u>a/</u>	15	11	7
Reserve Divisions	0	1	2
Active/Reserve Div. Manpower	550,000	500,000	325,000
RF/PF Forces (Manpower)	550,000	500,000	300,000
Capability of Active/Reserve Divisions (DFEs)	6.3	5.3	4.2
FY 72-75 Security Assistance Cost (\$ Billions) <u>b/</u>	\$2.5-3.5	\$2.0-2.5	\$1.5-2.0

- a/ Divisions or their equivalents (e.g., 3 regiments equal a division).  
b/ Funding includes excess defense material at legal value. Excluded is an estimated \$4 to \$6 billion MAF expenditure for consumable items (e.g., ammunition) to be used in the current SIA conflict.

Thailand. In the case of Thailand, the current security assistance program and two higher options are considered. The current program provides for the equivalent of 5 divisions in addition to substantial modernization of the Thai Air Force and Navy. Under Option 1, the Thai form one additional division and one Marine battalion plus additional tank and artillery units.

\*Maintaining the currently planned RVN force throughout the 1970s would be an impossible economic burden on the RVN unless high levels of U.S. security assistance are provided. Analysis suggests that even with a continuing heavy influx of U.S. financial support, this force level may have a considerable adverse impact on the RVN economy. Reducing the regular forces to about 325,000 by FY 7 would result in a defense establishment which the RVN could probably support by allocating about 5% of her GNP to defense with perhaps only a limited need for U.S. security assistance funds.

In addition to the economic constraints, it appears that maintaining currently planned force levels throughout the 1970s may be politically unacceptable to the RVN even if the U.S. provided significant levels of security assistance. President Thieu has already presented to his Cabinet plans to reduce the size of the regular forces as soon as the war subsides. He feels that if the government is to develop and reconstruct the nation, defense spending must be reduced and defense manpower must be released to increase national economic development.

\*\*The three options assume RVN air and naval forces are those currently planned for end FY '73.

Under Option 2, 2 additional divisions plus the new units and equipment modernization described in Option 1 are formed. The capability and cost of the three options are summarized below.

	Thai Security Assistance Cost		
	Current Plan	Option 1	Option 2
Active Divisions <u>a/</u>	5	6	7
Division Manpower	146,000	178,000	203,000
National Police (Manpower)	84,000	84,000	84,000
Capability of Active Divisions (DFEs)	1.6	2.0	2.4
FY 72-76 Security Assistance Cost (\$ Billions) <u>b/</u>	\$1.4	\$1.8	\$2.4

a/ Divisions of their equivalents (e.g., 3 regiments equal a division).

b/ Funding includes excess defense material at legal value.

Analysis of the Thai economy indicates that increases in Thai force levels must be limited or the Thai will be paying a heavy economic penalty in terms of a stunted growth rate or an increase in inflation. Encouragement for the Thai to increase their forces could be counterproductive if the result was a stagnant economy with increasing budget deficits, increased inflation, and a worsening balance of payments position. Projections of the Thai economy suggest that the Thai can probably support their current forces (Current Plan) throughout the 1970s with gradually reduced levels of U.S. security assistance, and without an undue penalty on economic growth.\* An alternative to the Thai increasing their defense expenditures, although some additional Thai expenditures would probably be needed, would be increased U.S. security assistance levels to Thailand. The high Thai force option (Option 2) would require FY 72-76 security assistance expenditures of about \$600 to \$800 million above the level needed to maintain currently planned forces, as well as continued high levels through the remainder of the 1970s.

To assess the potential impact of collective security arrangements among the Asian nations on U.S. force needs for SEA, the NSSM-69 analysis examined a number of possible regional security arrangements. Though several SEA regional groupings already exist (their main goals are economic cooperation), for various

\*Thailand has achieved an impressive rate of growth as its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown at an average rate of about 7% per year during the last ten years, though this has been aided significantly by U.S. military spending in Thailand. At the same time, Thai defense spending has increased from 2.0% of GDP to about 3.2%. The ability of the Thai to continue to improve their defense capability depends on the prospects for future economic growth. Analysts indicate that the Thai may achieve a 3% to 4% growth rate through FY 76. This slowing of the growth rate--due primarily to expected reductions in Thai expenditures and U.S. military spending--indicates that only very limited additional Thai resources will be available to support their defense establishment.

reasons the consensus was that the prospects are dim for meaningful collective security pacts to reach fruition by 1976.\*

As there is precedent for such deployments, it was considered that security arrangements resulting in troop contributions from South Korea, Australia/New Zealand, or the RVN (sending troops to aid the Thai) would be the most likely possibilities for SEA. Although several security arrangements and levels of troop contribution could be considered, only one possible arrangement is examined here--under the high RVN security assistance option (the Current Plan) the RVN deploys 3 divisions to aid the Thai in defense against the PRC. The impact of this arrangement (or any other in which there is a one DFE contribution under a high security assistance option) is illustrated in Section D.

### C. Impact of Insurgency on U.S. Force Needs

One of the major uncertainties surrounding force level calculations for SEA is the level of insurgency that might accompany a conventional attack and the resulting drain this could have on the availability of regular forces for conventional defense. High levels of insurgent activity could tie down significant numbers of regular forces, thus precluding their use against a conventional attack. A detailed analysis of the forces needed if a conventional RVN or PRC attack is accompanied by high levels of insurgent activity was not conducted. However, approximations of the impact of such a situation can be made by calculating U.S. forces needs under various assumptions about the availability of RVN and Thai regular forces.

With respect to the insurgent threat in Thailand, the U.S. intelligence community estimates that the insurgent movement does not pose an immediate, critical problem to the Royal Thai Government.\*\* The insurgents are not likely to extend their control to heavily populated areas, much less to succeed in upsetting the stability of the Thai government--at least for the next several years. The intelligence community acknowledges, however, that many uncertainties are associated with this estimate; in particular, the outcome of the Vietnam conflict and the changing relations between Thailand and China.

In the case of RVN, a specific threat projection was not made. However, assuming the current SEA conflict draws to a close and a strong non-Communist government remains in Saigon, it was projected that only low levels of insurgent activity would be present in the RVN.

\*Though perhaps it could change, historical experience would argue against Asian allies coming to the active defense of one another without substantial U.S. involvement and support as with South Korea and Thailand in Vietnam. There is also the critical question concerning the timeliness of allied force contributions likely to result from regional security arrangements. The analysis of ground requirements indicates that in most cases the forces needed to defend successfully must be deployed rapidly to the theater or the total number of forces required increased significantly. There is some doubt as to whether the members of a regional security pact could be counted upon to deploy their forces rapidly to theater.

\*\*Insurgents have been active in Thailand since the "Free Thai Movement" was initiated in the early 1950s. Over the years the insurgent movement has grown from about 1,000 active insurgents in the early 1950s to about 6,000 to a growth rate of about 35% per year. Obviously the insurgency is a general regional effort, pursued primarily by non-ethnic Thai, but there are indications the insurgents are beginning to make inroads among the ethnic Thai villages in Northern lowlands.

As noted in Section III, forces designed for use against insurgents are included in both the RVN and Thai force structures. The Thai would have about 84,000 National Police under all three security assistance options, while the RVN would have about 500,000 RF/PF forces under the Current Plan and Option 1 and about 300,000 in Option 2.

The insurgent threat projections and the presence of National Police and RF/PF forces form a base case of low level insurgent activity accompanying a conventional attack. In this situation it is assumed that the National Police and RF/PF forces are able to control insurgent activities and all regular forces are available for conventional defense. Three higher level insurgency cases are also examined. The first assumes that the Thai insurgency grows at higher than expected rates and requires about one-half of the Thai regular forces in addition to the National Police to control insurgent activities. The second assumes that insurgent activity in the RVN remains at higher levels and about one-half of the RVN regular forces are tied down by the insurgents. The final case assumes insurgent activities in both the RVN and Thailand reach such proportions as to require that all RVN and Thai forces be used to control the insurgents.\*

#### D. Estimated U.S. Force Needs

The table below shows estimated U.S. force requirements for each of the variables discussed--threat levels, security assistance options, levels of insurgent activities, and one possible regional security arrangement (the RVN sending 3 divisions--1 DFE--to aid the Thai in defense against the PRC).

#### U.S. GROUND FORCES NEEDED FOR DEFENSE IN SEA<sup>a/</sup> (In Terms of DFEs)

	<u>COMMUNIST THREATS</u>								
	<u>Maximum PRC/RVN</u>			<u>Moderate PRC/RVN</u>			<u>RVN</u>		
	<u>Threat b/</u>			<u>Threat b/</u>			<u>Threat</u>		
	<u>Security</u>			<u>Security</u>			<u>Security</u>		
<u>Assistance Levels</u>			<u>Assistance Levels</u>			<u>Assistance L</u>			
<u>Low Medium High</u>			<u>Low Medium High</u>			<u>Low Medium</u>			
All Thai/RVN Regular Forces									
Engaged in CI/Area Security	8	8	8	6-7	6-7	6-7	4-5	4-5	
One-half Thai/RVN Regular Forces									
Engaged in CI/Area Security	5-6	4-5	3-4	3-4	2-3	2	2-3	2	
One-half Thai Regular Forces									
Engaged in CI/Area Security	3	2-3	2-3	1-2	1-2	1-2	0- $\frac{1}{2}$	0	
No Thai/RVN Regular Forces									
Engaged in CI/Area Security	2-3	1-2	1	0-1	0-1	0	0- $\frac{1}{2}$	0	
RVN Forces Aid Thai <u>d/</u>	2-3	1-2	0	0-1	0-1	0	-	-	

a/ Forces needs shown must be achieved by M+45.

b/ The Maximum PRC/RVN threat is defined as an all-out six month (dry season) effort into Thailand and SVN (about 400,000 troops); the Moderate threat is defined as a year around effort (about 350,000 troops).

c/ The RVN attack the PRC, and only the dry season threat is shown.

d/ The RVN sends about 3 divisions (equating to one DFE) to aid the Thai in defense against the PRC under the High security assistance option.

\*It should be noted that in the analysis reductions in the conventional threat that must accompany high levels of insurgent activity (because of the LOC constraint) were not considered. Thus, the high insurgent activity cases overstate to some extent the magnitude of the threat.

The table shows that in the most pessimistic PRC/NVN threat case--a maximum conventional threat with all Thai/NVN regular forces tied down fighting insurgents about 8 U.S. DFEs would be needed for defense in SEA. In the most optimistic cases--either the maximum or moderate threat cases with the RVN sending 3 divisions to aid the Thai--no U.S. ground forces are needed. Between these two extremes are a number of varying force requirements depending upon the variables thought most appropriate for planning purposes. Against an NVN only attack, U.S. force needs vary from zero to 4-5 DFEs, depending upon the number of RVN regular forces tied down controlling insurgent activities.

#### IV. Force Estimates for a Series of Force Planning Assumptions

The table below shows force requirement estimates for SEA under the following set of assumptions:

1. Burma is not defended.
2. Defense of the PRC/NVN attack against the RVN is along the DMZ and the RVN/Lao/Thai and RVN/Cambodian borders, and against the Thai is in the north/northeast region of Thailand. Defense of a NVN only attack against the RVN is along the DMZ and the RVN/Cambodian border.
3. The RVN does not send troops to aid the Thai.
4. The RVN/Thai armies are as follows for FY 76 (current security assistance plans for both the RVN and Thai):

RVN: 15 Active Divisions  
550,000 Troops  
6.3 DFEs


Thai: 5 Active Divisions (Army + Marines)  
146,000 Troops  
1.6 DFEs

	U.S. Forces Needed for Defense In SEA (U.S. DFEs) a/b/c/		
	PRC/NVN Attack		NVN Only Attack (Dry Season Only Threat)
	Dry Season Only Threat	Year Around Threat	
All RVN/Thai Regular Forces Used for CI Operations	8	6-7	4-5
One-Half RVN/Thai Regular Forces Available for Conventional Defense	4	2	1-2
RVN and One-Half Thai Regular Forces Available for Conventional Defense	2-3	1-2	0
All RVN/Thai Regular Forces Available for Conventional Defense	1-2	0-1	0

a/ Forces stated in terms of U.S. DFEs. One Infantry Division equals 1 DFE; while 1 Marine Division equals 3 DFEs.

b/ Forces shown are for M+60.

c/ Assumes the current security assistance programs for both the RVN and Thai.



[ ]



The next eight (8) pages are denied in their entirety per the provisions of 5 USC 552  
(b)(1) (in accordance with Executive Order 12958, Section 1.5 (a) and 3.4(b)(5))

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS,  
THIS MEMORANDUM IS **SECRET**



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

NSC & F T  
E956  
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Direct  
Reply

1 May 1970  
In reply refer to  
I-35383/70

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: NSSM-69, U.S. Nuclear Policy in Asia

Enclosed is a copy of the working group report as it stands as of this date. Interagency consensus at the working group level has been reached on Sections I and II; however, two subsections dealing with the impact of SALT and the political implications of initiation of nuclear warfare may be added to Section II. Considerable interagency agreement also has been reached on portions of Section III.

Section IV does not have interagency consensus at this point except for parts of subsection A-1, on Korea; the working group as a whole has not addressed the rest of Section IV in detail. Some of the various drafts of Sections V, VI, VII, and VIII, are included but they have not been addressed in detail by the whole working group; additional versions are being prepared. Section VIII is not now completely consistent with the earlier sections and needs additional work.

Basic differences of approach have become apparent with respect to the treatment of Section V on basing, Section VI on assurances, and Section VII on proliferation. Any unresolved substantive differences will be reflected in the complete report.

Work will continue in order to achieve a paper in as short a time as possible. The Interagency Group believes it is feasible to produce a coordinated paper which will be responsive to the stated and implied requirements of the NSSM in a week.

(Signed)

Y. L. Wu  
Chairman, Working Group

Attachments: Secs. I, II, & III  
Tabs for Parts IV, V, V-1,  
V-2, VI-1, VI-2, VII-1,  
VII-2, and VIII

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CASE # 28-P-1407

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