

E-121
- 93-F-1207 -

EC-121 FACT SHEET

The following is an account of the background and facts surrounding the shootdown by North Korean aircraft of our unarmed U.S. Navy EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in international air-space over the Sea of Japan just before midnight EST on April 14, 1969.

Reconnaissance designed to collect information that can be evaluated for intelligence purposes related to our national security is conducted by a wide variety of means. One important part of our over-all intelligence effort is the collection and evaluation of electronic intelligence.

Certain types of electronic emissions and transmissions can be monitored best by airborne equipment. Other types can be gathered more effectively by ships that can operate on station for more extended periods.

If we ever have to operate against hostile defenses, the lives of many of our men and the success of our operations could depend on our knowledge of such information as the location of enemy troop dispositions, ship and aircraft movements, and radars. This is a task for both surface ships and aircraft. Aerial surveillance missions are flown by all of the Armed Forces.

As the President has noted, we have been conducting reconnaissance missions in the Far East and specifically in the Sea of Japan area since 1950. In 1969 there were approximately 190 such missions in the Sea of Japan through March - - all without incident, without threat and without any warning. All such reconnaissance missions are coordinated, evaluated and approved by appropriate senior civilian and military authorities of the Government.

As to the specifics of the April 14 reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan: An unarmed EC-121 of Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One, carrying a crew of 30 Navy men and one Marine and some six tons of equipment, took off from Atsugi Air Base, Japan, at approximately 5:00 a.m. EST on 14 April. The aircraft was directed to fly a track from Atsugi to a point off the Musu peninsula on the North Korean coast, make a number of orbits on an ellipse about 120 miles long running from the northeast to the southwest and land at Osan Air Base in ROK. The route of the aircraft was over international waters at all times.

During this period, one voice transmission was sent from the EC-121 at 6:17 p.m. EST, 14 April and one radio teletype transmission was at 11:00 p.m. EST, 14 April. Both of these messages were routine activity reports.

At a distance some 90 miles Southeast of Chongjin, North Korea at 11:50 p.m. EST, the EC-121 disappeared from radar screens. At 12:04 a.m. EST, on 15 April, 14 minutes later, fighters were scrambled from Osan AB toward the intercept area. These aircraft were subsequently relieved by other fighter aircraft.

#500

The timing of events, as now constructed, is this:
(all EST)

14 April 1969

- About 5:00 p.m. - EC-121 takes off from Atsugi
- 6:17 p.m. - EC-121 transmits routine voice message.
- 11:00 p.m. - EC-121 transmits routine radio teletype message.
- 11:50 p.m. - EC-121 disappears from radar screens.

15 April 1969

- 12:04 a.m. - First fighters scramble to the Sea of Japan.
- 12:53 a.m. - Fighters take off to relieve fighters launched at 12:04.
- 1:42 a.m. - First search and rescue aircraft takes off from Tachikawa AB, Japan.
- 3:40 a.m. - First search and rescue aircraft arrives in search area.

Within less than 15 minutes after on-the-scene evaluation of available information, a high priority message was dispatched and was received in Washington. This high priority message overtook earlier lower precedence messages dispatched on the basis of preliminary information.

The composition of the search and rescue force at various times subsequent to the loss of the EC-121 has been described in briefings and news releases.

Two Soviet destroyers had joined in the search. They were the destroyer No. 429 and the large guided-missile destroyer No. 580. Later the destroyer No. 427 was observed in the area. These three destroyers are the only Soviet ships known to have participated in the search.

Our search aircraft established contact with the Soviet ships. In order to improve communications, a U.S. Air Force radio was dropped to one of the Soviet destroyers. A U.S. Army sergeant who is a Russian linguist was put aboard one of the aircraft dispatched to the search scene.

Our search aircraft located some debris and dropped a smoke signal to mark the spot. One of the Soviet destroyers was guided to the marker, where it put small boats in the water and recovered some of the debris. One of our search aircraft flew low over the Soviet vessel to observe and photograph the debris on the aft deck of the destroyer.

This debris and other debris picked up by our ships and the Soviet destroyer were from the EC-121. Some of the debris had what was reported as shrapnel holes. The debris has been returned to the EC-121's parent squadron at Atsugi for analysis. At this time, there is no definite finding as to whether any of the holes resulted from missile, cannon or machine gun fire.

Debris in the area was not all in the same location. Initially, debris was sighted at 41 degrees 14 N, 131 degrees 50 E and subsequently debris was picked up at various locations as it drifted northward.

Debris from some of the locations tended to drift under the influence of a 1 to 2 knot current generally toward the area of the border between North Korea and the Soviet Union. It is possible that some of that debris has washed ashore.

A parachute for each crew member is a part of the EC-121 equipment. There is no way to tell whether any or all of the crew members were wearing their parachute packs and whether the situation at the time of attack and immediately thereafter provided crew members any opportunity to exit the aircraft.

Two bodies were recovered. No survivors have been found.

Surveillance flights in the Sea of Japan area were halted immediately after the EC-121 loss. On April 18 the President ordered that the reconnaissance missions be resumed and that these flights be protected. The President's orders are being carried out.

31 CREWMEN ON BOARD

- 2 BODIES RECOVERED

29 CREWMEN UNACCOUNTED FOR.

ICOL W. Baxley
CSD/ISA/EAPR Ext 73248
8 May 1969

INFORMATION PAPER

4 November 1992

Subject: U.S. Cold War Losses From 1946 to 1991 - Update

1. Purpose. To present a current compilation of available information on U.S. Cold War Losses.

2. Talking Points.

- Attached data on Cold War losses was compiled from information received from the Joint Staff, OSD, CIA, NSA, DIA and The Services. This is an update report based on the original SECDEF Talking Paper done 25 June 1992.
- Established parameters of the data included: air and sea loss incidents that occurred in proximity to a Communist territory associated with the Cold War era, 1946 to 1991. Incidents associated with Hot War conflicts or combat are not addressed.
- **ENCLOSURE A** presents an overall summary of 38 incidents (down from the 39 contained in the original SECDEF report) involving 351 (changed from 364) individuals, in the following four categories:
 - 176 (vice 187) RECOVERED ALIVE
 - 34 RECOVERED DEAD
 - 8 NOT RECOVERED, DEAD
 - 133 (vice 135) NOT RECOVERED, FATE UNKNOWN
- In all cases involving death, service records indicate that next of kin were notified.
- The 8 individuals in the category NOT RECOVERED, DEAD, are carried in that category due to reliable reports of their fate, mostly from survivors of the incident.
- **ENCLOSURE B** reflects all 38 cases and summary remarks relating to each incident.
- **ENCLOSURE C** presents a summary of 13 (vice 14) Fate Unknown incidents, in which, at least some of the individuals involved in the incident were not recovered and their fate is not known and the possibility of their having fallen into Communist control can not be ruled out.
- **ENCLOSURE D** is a summary of each incident with the names of those individuals NOT RECOVERED, FATE UNKNOWN.

- **ENCLOSURE E** contains summary sheets on the FATE UNKNOWN incidents.
- Concerning press statements, data currently available reflects public knowledge of all incidents, however, the data is currently unclear as to how these incidents became public (i.e., government release, investigative press, speculation, etc.). This area may require further research.
- DASD (ISA) for POW/MIA Affairs sent a representative with Ambassador Toon, and other members of the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs meeting in Moscow, to pursue information disclosed by Russian President Yeltsin during the spring summit. Meeting took place the week of 20 Jun 92. A copy of this Cold War information was provided to the US delegation for their use.
- **ENCLOSURE F** discusses a Joint Staff, 3 November 1992, update to ASD (ISA) on specific Cold War questions and adjusted data base entries.

Prepared by: LTC Jim Caswell, USA
Asia-Pacific Division/POW/MIA/5-8135
INDOWP #713

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSES - INDIVIDUAL POSITION SUMMARY

Generated November 4, 1992 2:30 PM

INCIDENT RECORD NUMBER	DATE OF LOSS	TYPE PLATFORM	OPERATING AGENCY	TYPE MISSION	LOCATION	TOTAL SOULS ON BOARD	TOTAL RECOVERED ALIVE	TOTAL RECOVERED DEAD	TOTAL NOT RECOVERED DECEASED	TOTAL NOT RECOVERED FATE-UNK
2	08/09/46	C-47	USAF	TRANSPORT	YUGOSLAVIA	5	5	0	0	0
1	08/19/46	C-47	USAF	TRANSPORT	YUGOSLAVIA	5	0	5	0	0
3	04/08/50	PB4Y2	USN	PATROL	BALTIC SEA	10	0	0	0	10
4	11/06/51	P2V	USN	PATROL	SEA OF JAPAN	10	0	0	0	10
5	11/18/51	C-47	USAF	TRANSPORT	HUNGARY	4	4	0	0	0
8	06/13/52	RB-29	USAF	RECON	SEA OF JAPAN NORTH OF HOKKAIDO	12	0	0	0	12
6	10/07/52	RB-29	USAF	RECON	KURILE ISLANDS NORTH OF HOKKAIDO	8	0	0	0	8
9	01/18/53	P2V	USN	PATROL	FORMOSA STRAITS	13	7	0	4	2
10	03/10/53	F-84	USAF	INTERCEPT	GERMANY	1	1	0	0	0
11	07/29/53	RB-50	USAF	RECON	SEA OF JAPAN	17	1	2	1	13
43	08/17/53	T-6	USAF	PATROL	KOREAN DMZ	2	1	0	1	0
13	09/04/54	P2V	USN	RECON	SEA OF JAPAN NORTH OF HOKKAIDO	10	9	0	1	0
14	11/07/54	RB-29	USAF	RECON	SEA OF JAPAN NEAR HOKKAIDO	11	10	1	0	0
15	01/19/55	UNKNOWN	USA	TRAINING	KOREAN DMZ	2	1	0	1	0
16	04/17/55	RB-47	USAF	RECON	NORTHERN PACIFIC NEAR KAMCHATKA	3	0	0	0	3
17	06/22/55	P2V	USN	RECON	BERING STRAITS	11	11	0	0	0
18	08/17/55	LT-6	USAF	TRAINING	KOREAN DMZ	2	1	1	0	0
20	08/22/56	P4M	USN	PATROL	NORTH OF FORMOSA NEAR WENCHOW CHINA	16	0	4	0	12
22	09/10/56	RB-50	USAF	RECON	SEA OF JAPAN	16	0	0	0	16
23	12/23/57	T-33	USAF	LOGISTICS	ALBANIA	1	1	0	0	0
24	03/06/58	F-86	USAF	TRAINING	NORTH KOREA	1	1	0	0	0
26	06/27/58	C-118	USAF	TRANSPORT	SOVIET ARMENIA	9	9	0	0	0

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSES - INDIVIDUAL

POSITION SUMMARY

INCIDENT RECORD NUMBER	DATE OF LOSS	TYPE PLATFORM	OPERATING AGENCY	TYPE MISSION	LOCATION	TOTAL SOULS ON BOARD	TOTAL RECOVERED ALIVE	TOTAL RECOVERED DEAD	TOTAL NOT RECOVERED DECEASED	TOTAL RECOVERED FATE-UNK
27	09/02/58	C-130	USAF	TRANSPORT	SOVIET ARMENIA	17	0	4	0	13
28	02/01/60	U-2	CIA	RECON	SOVIET UNION	1	1	0	0	0
29	05/25/60	C-47	USAF	TRANSPORT	EAST GERMANY	9	9	0	0	0
30	07/01/60	RB-47	USAF	RECON	BARENTS SEA OFF SOVIET UNION	6	2	1	0	3
31	10/27/62	U-2	USAF	RECON	CUBA	1	0	1	0	0
12	05/17/63	HELICOPTER	USA	PATROL	KOREAN DMZ	2	2	0	0	0
36	08/06/63	L-20	USA	UNKNOWN	NORTH KOREA	6	0	6	0	0
32	01/24/64	T-39	USAF	TRANSPORT	EAST GERMANY	3	0	3	0	0
33	03/10/64	RB-66	USAF	RECON	EAST GERMANY	3	3	0	0	0
42	12/14/65	RB-57	USAF	RECON	BLACK SEA	2	0	0	0	2
34	01/23/68	SHIP	USN	RECON	OFF NORTH KOREAN EAST COAST	73	72	1	0	0
41	06/30/68	DC-8	USAF	TRANSPORT	KURILE ISLANDS	17	17	0	0	0
35	04/15/69	EC-121	USN	RECON	NORTH KOREA	31	0	2	0	29
25	08/17/69	OH-23	USA	UNKNOWN	KOREAN DMZ	3	3	0	0	0
38	10/21/70	U-8	USA	RECON	SOVIET ARMENIA	4	4	0	0	0
40	07/14/77	CH-47	USA	TRANSPORT	NORTH KOREA	4	1	3	0	0
GRAND TOTAL:						351	176	34	8	133

TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS: 38

--- End of Report ---

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSF

Generated November 4, 1992 at 11:28 PM

<u>DATE OF LOSS</u>	<u>TYPE PLATFORM</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL SOULS ON BRD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
08/09/46	C-47	YUGOSLAVIA	5	AIRCRAFT STRAYED OFF COURSE AND ENTERED YUGOSLAVIAN AIRSPACE AND WAS SHOT DOWN. AIRCRAFT CRASH LANDED AND ALL ONBOARD SURVIVED AND WERE RELEASED.
08/19/46	C-47	YUGOSLAVIA	5	AIRCRAFT STRAYED OFF COURSE AND ENTERED YUGOSLAVIAN AIRSPACE AND WAS SHOT DOWN WITH ALL ONBOARD KILLED.
04/08/50	PB4Y2	BALTIC SEA	10	US NAVY "PRIVATEER" AIRCRAFT DISAPPEARED AT SEA. WRECKAGE FROM CRAFT FOUND, NO TRACE OF CREW. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF CREW SIGHTED IN SOVIET CAMPS. NOTES EXCHANGED BY BOTH US AND SOVIETS.
11/06/51	P2V	SEA OF JAPAN	10	SOVIET NOTE OF PROTEST DELIVERED 7 NOV 51. AIRCRAFT UNDER UN COMMAND. NO SURVIVORS FOUND.
11/18/51	C-47	HUNGARY	4	AIRCRAFT STRAYED INTO HUNGARIAN AIRSPACE AND WAS FORCED DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS. CREW WAS HELD FOR 39 DAYS AND RELEASED. NOTES EXCHANGED ON 3 DEC 51.
06/13/52	RB-29	SEA OF JAPAN NORTH OF HOKKAIDO	12	12 MISSING. SAR SIGHTED EMPTY SIX-MAN LIFE RAFT. RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST OF 16 JUN 52 REPORTED ONE OFFICER SURVIVOR. CDR OF SOVIET FAR EAST AIR FORCES LATER DENIED BROADCAST. NO SUBSEQUENT INFORMATION HAS EVER BEEN RECEIVED. FINDING OF DEATH 14 NOV 55.
10/07/52	RB-29	KURILE ISLANDS NORTH OF HOKKAIDO	8	AIRCRAFT WAS CONDUCTING RECON IN SEA OF JAPAN AND WAS INTERCEPTED BY SOVIET FIGHTERS NEAR HOKKAIDO, JAPAN. SOVIETS REPORTED THAT NO PARACHUTES WERE OBSERVED. THE CREW WAS NEVER LOCATED.
01/18/53	P2V	FORMOSA STRAITS	13	ELEVEN OF THIRTEEN CREWMAN INITIALLY RESCUED BY COAST GUARD HELO BUT HELO CRASHED ON TAKEOFF LOSING AN ADDITIONAL FOUR.
03/10/53	F-84	GERMANY	1	PILOT BAILED OUT AND WAS RECOVERED.
07/29/53	RB-50	SEA OF JAPAN	17	CO-PILOT SURVIVED ATTACK. HE REPORTED ONE MAN DID NOT GET OUT OF THE AIRCRAFT. TWO BODIES WERE LATER RECOVERED. 13 REMAIN UNAC-COUNTED FOR. NOTES WERE EXCHANGED.
08/17/53	T-6	KOREAN DMZ	2	AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN BEHIND ENEMY LINES, WRECKAGE LOCATED NEXT DAY.
09/04/54	P2V	SEA OF JAPAN NORTH OF HOKKAIDO	10	9 MEN SURVIVED AND WERE RESCUED BY US FORCES, 1 MAN KILLED. NOTES EXCHANGED.
11/07/54	RB-29	SEA OF JAPAN NEAR HOKKAIDO	11	AFTER BEING HIT BY SOVIET FIGHTERS, THE AIRCRAFT WAS CRASH LANDED ON THE ISLAND OF HOKKAIDO. ONE CREWMAN WAS KILLED IN THE LANDING. NOTES WERE EXCHANGED.

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSF

<u>DATE OF LOSS</u>	<u>TYPE PLATFORM</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL SOULS ON BRD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
01/19/55	UNKNOWN	KOREAN DMZ	2	ONE CREWMAN MADE HIS WAY SOUTH ACROSS THE DMZ. HE REPORTED THAT THE SECOND CREWMAN WAS KILLED IN THE CRASH.
04/17/55	RB-47	NORTHERN PACIFIC NEAR KAMCHATKA	3	NONE
06/22/55	P2V	BERING STRAITS	11	AFTER BEING HIT BY SOVIET FIGHTERS THE AIRCRAFT CRASH LANDED ON ST. LAWRENCE ISLAND. THREE CREWMAN WERE INJURED DURING THE LANDING. NOTES WERE EXCHANGED.
08/17/55	LT-6	KOREAN DMZ	2	PILOT WAS CAPTURED AND RETURNED ALIVE. THE ARMY OBSERVER WAS KILLED IN THE CRASH AND HIS REMAINS WERE RETURNED.
08/22/56	P4M	NORTH OF FORMOSA NEAR WENCHOW CHINA	16	12 PRESUMED DEAD. 4 BODIES RECOVERED.
09/10/56	RB-50	SEA OF JAPAN	16	16 MISSING. NONE OF THE CREW OR WREACKAGE WAS EVER FOUND. STATUS CHANGED TO DECEASED 31 DEC 56. US ASKED SOVIETS FOR INFO IN AIDE-MEMOIRE 13 OCT 56. SOVIET REPLY WAS NEGATIVE.
12/23/57	T-33	ALBANIA	1	AIRCRAFT STRAYED OFF COURSE AND WAS FORCED DOWN IN ALBANIA. PILOT WAS GIVEN A YUGOSLAVIAN PASSPORT AND ALLOWED TO FLY OUT COMMERCIALY.
03/06/58	F-86	NORTH KOREA	1	PILOT BAILED OUT AND WAS RETURNED UNINJURED.
06/27/58	C-118	SOVIET ARMENIA	9	AFTER BEING HIT BY SOVIET FIGHTERS THE AIRCRAFT CRASH LANDED. ALL ONBOARD SURVIVED AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED.
09/02/58	C-130	SOVIET ARMENIA	17	6 REMAINS RETURNED 24 SEP 58 (ONLY 4 IDENTIFIED). 13 CARRIED AS MISSING UNTIL 16 NOV 61. NOTES EXCHANGED.
02/01/60	U-2	SOVIET UNION	1	THIS INCIDENT IS THE GARY POWERS SHOOTDOWN.
05/25/60	C-47	EAST GERMANY	9	NONE
07/01/60	RB-47	BARENTS SEA OFF SOVIET UNION	6	3 MISSING. 1 DROWNED AND 2 OTHERS WERE RETURNED ALIVE IN 1961.
10/27/62	U-2	CUBA	1	NONE
05/17/63	HELICOPTER	KOREAN DMZ	2	NONE
08/06/63	L-20	NORTH KOREA	6	NO FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE.
01/24/64	T-39	EAST GERMANY	3	NONE
03/10/64	RB-66	EAST GERMANY	3	NONE
12/14/65	RB-57	BLACK SEA	2	AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN FOR UNKNOWN REASONS WHILE ON A RECON MISSION I N THE BLACK SEA. CRASH SITE WAS LOCATED BUT CREW WAS NOT LOCATED SOVIET FIGHTERS WERE AIRBORN BUT NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE RB-57.

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSS

<u>DATE OF LOSS</u>	<u>TYPE PLATFORM</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL SOULS ON BRD</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
01/23/68	SHIP	OFF NORTH KOREAN EAST COAST	73	ONE CREWMAN LOST. SEVENTY-TWO RETURNED.
06/30/68	DC-8	KURILE ISLANDS	17	AIRCRAFT AND ALL CREW UNHARMED.
04/15/69	EC-121	NORTH KOREA	31	IN INITIAL PRESS REPORTS INDICATED 31 ON BOARD. NAVY RECORDS CONFIRM 30 NAVY AND 1 MARINE. TWO BODIES RECOVERED, ALL OTHERS LOST.
08/17/69	OH-23	KOREAN DMZ	3	ALL THREE SOLDIERS WERE RETURNED.
10/21/70	U-8	SOVIET ARMENIA	4	FOUR INDIVIDUALS RECOVERED. THREE US AND ONE TURK.
07/14/77	CH-47	NORTH KOREA	4	ONE MEMBER RECOVERED ALIVE. THREE RECOVERED DEAD.
TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS:	38			--- End of Report ---

DATA AS OF 04 NOV 92 AT 1431L, ENTERED BY APAC DIVISION, J-5, THE JOINT STAFF, POC: LTC CASWELL, EXT 58134

INCIDENT RECORD NBR	DATE OF LOSS	TYPE OF PLATFORM	OPERATING AGENCY	TYPE OF MISSION	LOCATION	TOTAL SOULS ON BOARD	TOTAL NOT RECVD FATE UNKNOWN
3	04/08/50	PB4Y2 ** LOSS REMARKS:	USN	PATROL	BALTIC SEA	10	10
					SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS.		
4	11/06/51	P2V ** LOSS REMARKS:	USN	PATROL	SEA OF JAPAN	10	10
					SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS.		
8	06/13/52	RB-29 ** LOSS REMARKS:	USAF	RECON	SEA OF JAPAN NORTH OF HOKKAIDO	12	12
					BELIEVED TO BE SHOT DOWN BY SOVIETS		
6	10/07/52	RB-29 ** LOSS REMARKS:	USAF	RECON	KURILE ISLANDS NORTH OF HOKKAIDO	8	8
					AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS.		
9	01/18/53	P2V ** LOSS REMARKS:	USN	PATROL	FORMOSA STRAITS	13	2
					DITCHED AFTER HIT BY CHINESE SHORE BATTERIES.		
11	07/29/53	RB-50 ** LOSS REMARKS:	USAF	RECON	SEA OF JAPAN	17	13
					SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET MIG FIGHTERS		
16	04/17/55	RB-47 ** LOSS REMARKS:	USAF	RECON	NORTHERN PACIFIC NEAR KAMCHATKA	3	3
					UNKNOWN CAUSE BUT SOVIET ACTION CAN NOT BE RULED OUT.		
20	08/22/56	P4M ** LOSS REMARKS:	USN	PATROL	NORTH OF FORMOSA NEAR WENCHOW CHINA	16	12
					SHOT DOWN BY CHINESE FIGHTERS.		
22	09/10/56	RB-50 ** LOSS REMARKS:	USAF	RECON	SEA OF JAPAN	16	16
					UNKNOWN, POSSIBLY TYPHOON RELATED OR SOVIET ACTION POSSIBLE.		
27	09/02/58	C-130 ** LOSS REMARKS:	USAF	TRANSPORT	SOVIET ARMENIA	17	13
					SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET MIGS AFTER STRAYING INTO SOVIET AIRSPACE.		
30	07/01/60	RB-47 ** LOSS REMARKS:	USAF	RECON	BARENTS SEA OFF SOVIET UNION	6	3
					SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET MIGS.		

WORLD WAR LOSSES: US PERSONNEL NOT RECOVERED AND NO FATE DETERMINED FROM 1 1991

DATA AS OF 04 NOV 92 AT 1432L, ENTERED BY APAC DIVISION, J-5, THE JOINT STAFF, POC: LTC CASWELL, EXT 58134

<u>INCIDENT RECORD NBR</u>	<u>DATE OF LOSS</u>	<u>TYPE OF PLATFORM</u>	<u>OPERATING AGENCY</u>	<u>TYPE OF MISSION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL SOULS ON BOARD</u>	<u>TOTAL NOT RECVD FATE UNKNOWN</u>
42	12/14/65	RB-57 ** LOSS REMARKS:	USAF AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN FOR UNKNOWN CAUSES.	RECON	BLACK SEA	2	2
35	04/15/69	EC-121 ** LOSS REMARKS:	USN AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY NORTH KOREANS IN SEA OF JAPAN.	RECON	NORTH KOREA	31	29
TOTALS:						161	133

TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS: 13

--- End of Report ---

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSES REL INFORMATION

Generated November 4, 1992 at 2:32 PM

INCIDENT RECORD NBR	DATE OF LOSS	TYPE OF PLATFORM	LOCATION	TOTAL SOULS ON BOARD	TOTAL FOREIGN NATIONALS	TOTAL CREW MEMBERS	TOTAL PASSENGERS	TOTAL OTHER	TOTAL UNKNOWN
2	08/09/46	C-47	YUGOSLAVIA	5	0	5	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USA	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USA	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USA	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USA	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USA	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
1	08/19/46	C-47	YUGOSLAVIA	5	0	5	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	RECOVERED DEAD	USA	CM	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	RECOVERED DEAD	USA	CM	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	RECOVERED DEAD	USA	CM	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	RECOVERED DEAD	USA	CM	Y	N	Y	N	N	
	RECOVERED DEAD	USA	CM	Y	N	Y	N	N	
3	04/08/50	PB4Y2	BALTIC SEA	10	0	10	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	BECKMAN, FRANK, L., E-6	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	BOURASSA, JOSEPH, J., E-4	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	BURGESS, TOMMY, L., O-1	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	DANENS, JOE, H., E-6	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	FETTE, JOHN, H., O-3	USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	PURCELL, EDWARD, J., E-4	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	REYNOLDS, ROBERT, D., O-2	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	RINNIER, JOSEPH, N., E-4	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	SEESCHAF, HOWARD, W., O-3	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	THOMAS, JACK, W., E-6	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
4	11/06/51	P2V	SEA OF JAPAN	10	0	10	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	BAGGETT, REUBENS, E-6	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	FOSTER, PAUL, E-6	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSES

DETAIL INFORMATION

INCIDENT RECORD NBR	DATE OF LOSS	TYPE OF PLATFORM	LOCATION				TOTAL SOULS ON BOARD	TOTAL FOREIGN NATIONALS	TOTAL CREW MEMBERS	TOTAL PASSENGERS	TOTAL OTHER	TOTAL UNKNOWN
		HODGSON, JUDD, C., 0-2		USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N		Y	
		JURIC, PAUL, E-5		USN	CM	Y	N	N	N		Y	
		LIVELY, JACK, E-4		USN	CM	Y	N	N	N		Y	
		MEYER, WILLIAM, S., E-5		USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N		Y	
		RAGLIN, ERWIN, E-6		USN	CM	Y	N	N	N		Y	
		ROSENFELD, SAM, 0-2		USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N		Y	
		SMITH, DONALD, 0-1		USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N		Y	
		WIGERT, RALPH, A., E-5		USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N		Y	
5	11/18/51	C-47	HUNGARY				4	0	4	0	0	0
				SVC		NOK	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED		
		NAME		AFF	STATUS	NOTIFIED	ALIVE	DEAD	DECEASED	FATE UNKNOWN		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	
8	06/13/52	RB-29	SEA OF JAPAN NORTH OF HOKKAIDO				12	0	12	0	0	0
				SVC		NOK	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED		
		NAME		AFF	STATUS	NOTIFIED	ALIVE	DEAD	DECEASED	FATE UNKNOWN		
		BECKER, ROSCOE, C., E-5		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		BERG, EDDIE, R., E-5		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		BLIZZARD, WILLIAM, A., E-5		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		BONURA, LEON, F., E-5		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		BUSCH, SAMUEL, N., 0-4		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		HOMER, WILLIAM, R., E-7		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		MCDONNELL, ROBERT, J., 0-2		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		MONSERRAT, MIGUEL, W., E-5		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		MOORE, DAVID, L., E-7		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		PILLSBURY, DANNY, H., E-3		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		SCHULLEY, JAMES, A., 0-3		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		SERVICE, SAMUEL, D., 0-3		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
6	10/07/52	RB-29	KURILE ISLANDS NORTH OF HOKKAIDO				8	0	8	0	0	0
				SVC		NOK	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED		
		NAME		AFF	STATUS	NOTIFIED	ALIVE	DEAD	DECEASED	FATE UNKNOWN		
		BROCK, PAUL, E., 0-2		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		COLGAN, SAMUEL, A., 0-5		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		DUNHAM, JOHN, R., 0-3		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		ENGLISH, EUGENE, M., 0-3		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		HURSCH, JOHN, A., E-5		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		
		KENDRICK, FRED, G., E-2		USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y		

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSES 'IL INFORMATION

INCIDENT RECORD NBR	DATE OF LOSS	TYPE OF PLATFORM	LOCATION				TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	
				SVC	STATUS	NOK	SOULS ON BOARD	FOREIGN NATIONALS	CREW MEMBERS	PASSENGERS	OTHER	UNKNOWN
		WARD, JOHN, C., 0-3	USFA	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y			
		WIGGINS, WARREN, J., 0-3	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y			
		WOODS, JAMES, E., E-3	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y			
<hr/>												
43	08/17/53	T-6	KOREAN DMZ				2	0	2	0	0	0
				SVC	STATUS	NOK	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED		
				AFF		NOTIFIED	ALIVE	DEAD	DECEASED	FATE UNKNOWN		
				USAF	CM	?	N	N	Y	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	?	Y	N	N	N		
<hr/>												
13	09/04/54	P2V	SEA OF JAPAN NORTH OF HOKKAIDO				10	0	10	0	0	0
				SVC	STATUS	NOK	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED		
				AFF		NOTIFIED	ALIVE	DEAD	DECEASED	FATE UNKNOWN		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		REID, ROGER, H., 0-1		USN	CM	Y	N	N	Y	N		
<hr/>												
14	11/07/54	RB-29	SEA OF JAPAN NEAR HOKKAIDO				11	0	11	0	0	0
				SVC	STATUS	NOK	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED	NOT RECOVERED		
				AFF		NOTIFIED	ALIVE	DEAD	DECEASED	FATE UNKNOWN		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED ALIVE		USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N		
		RECOVERED DEAD		USAF	CM	Y	N	Y	N	N		

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSES DETAIL INFORMATION

INCIDENT RECORD NBR	DATE OF LOSS	TYPE OF PLATFORM	LOCATION	JTAL SOULS ON BOARD	TOTAL FOREIGN NATIONALS	TOTAL CREW MEMBERS	TOTAL PASSENGERS	TOTAL OTHER	TOTAL UNKNOWN
15	01/19/55	UNKNOWN	KOREAN DMZ	2	0	2	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	?	?	CM	Y	N	N	Y	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	?	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
16	04/17/55	RB-47	NORTHERN PACIFIC NEAR KAMCHATKA	3	0	3	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	BROOKS, ROBERT, N., 0-3	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	NEIGHBORS, LACIE, C., 0-4	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	WATKINS, RICHARD JR., E., 0-3	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
17	06/22/55	P2V	BERING STRAITS	11	0	11	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
18	08/17/55	LT-6	KOREAN DMZ	2	0	2	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED DEAD	USAF	CM	Y	N	Y	N	N	
20	08/22/56	P4M	NORTH OF FORMOSA NEAR WENCHOW CHINA	16	0	16	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	?	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSES w/ ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

INCIDENT RECORD NBR	DATE OF LOSS	TYPE OF PLATFORM	LOCATION	TOTAL SOULS ON BOARD	TOTAL FOREIGN NATIONALS	TOTAL CREW MEMBERS	TOTAL PASSENGERS	TOTAL OTHER	TOTAL UNKNOWN
28	02/01/60	U-2	SOVIET UNION	1	0	1	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	RECOVERED ALIVE		CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
29	05/25/60	C-47	EAST GERMANY	9	0	9	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N	
30	07/01/60	RB-47	BARENTS SEA OFF SOVIET UNION	6	0	6	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	GOFORTH, OSCAR, L., 0-3	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	PHILLIPS, DEAN, B., 0-3	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	POSA, EUGENE, E., 0-4	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	?	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	?	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED DEAD	USAF	CM	?	N	Y	N	N	
31	10/27/62	U-2	CUBA	1	0	1	0	0	0
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	RECOVERED DEAD		CM	Y	N	Y	N	N	
12	05/17/63	HELICOPTER	KOREAN DMZ	2	0	0	0	0	2
	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>	<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	?	?	?	Y	N	N	N	
	RECOVERED ALIVE	?	?	?	Y	N	N	N	

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSES - VIL INFORMATION

INCIDENT RECORD NBR	DATE OF LOSS	TYPE OF PLATFORM	LOCATION	TOTAL SOULS ON BOARD	TOTAL FOREIGN NATIONALS	TOTAL CREW MEMBERS	TOTAL PASSENGERS	TOTAL OTHER	TOTAL UNKNOWN
36	08/06/63	L-20	NORTH KOREA	6	0	0	0	0	6
				<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>		
			<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>				
			RECOVERED DEAD	?	?	?	N	N	
			RECOVERED DEAD	?	?	?	N	N	
			RECOVERED DEAD	?	?	?	N	N	
			RECOVERED DEAD	?	?	?	N	N	
			RECOVERED DEAD	?	?	?	N	N	
			RECOVERED DEAD	?	?	?	N	N	
32	01/24/64	T-39	EAST GERMANY	3	0	3	0	0	0
				<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>		
			<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>				
			RECOVERED DEAD	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	
			RECOVERED DEAD	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	
			RECOVERED DEAD	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	
33	03/10/64	RB-66	EAST GERMANY	3	0	3	0	0	0
				<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>		
			<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>				
			RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	
			RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	
			RECOVERED ALIVE	USAF	CM	Y	N	N	
42	12/14/65	RB-57	BLACK SEA	2	0	2	0	0	0
				<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>		
			<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>				
			LACKEY, LESTER, L., 0-4	USAF	CM	Y	N	Y	
			YATES, ROBERT, A., 0-3	USAF	CM	Y	N	Y	
34	01/23/68	SHIP	OFF NORTH KOREAN EAST COAST	73	0	0	0	0	73
				<u>RECOVERED ALIVE</u>	<u>RECOVERED DEAD</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED DECEASED</u>	<u>NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN</u>		
			<u>SVC AFF</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>NOK NOTIFIED</u>				
			RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	?	?	Y	N	
			RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	?	?	Y	N	
			RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	?	?	Y	N	
			RECOVERED ALIVE	USN	?	?	Y	N	

SUMMARY OF COLD WAR LOSSES VIL INFORMATION

INCIDENT RECORD NBR	DATE OF LOSS	TYPE OF PLATFORM	LOCATION	TOTAL SOULS ON BOARD	TOTAL FOREIGN NATIONALS	TOTAL CREW MEMBERS	TOTAL PASSENGERS	TOTAL OTHER	TOTAL UNKNOWN
35	04/15/69	EC-121	NORTH KOREA	31	0	29	0	0	2

NAME	SVC AFF	STATUS	NOK NOTIFIED	RECOVERED ALIVE	RECOVERED DEAD	NOT RECOVERED DECEASED	NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN
BALDERMAN, LOUIS, F., E-5	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
CHARTER, STEPHEN, C., E-6	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
COLGIN, BERNIE, J., E-6	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
CONNORS, BAILARD, F., E-6	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
DUCHARME, GARY, R., E-4	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
DZEMA, JOHN, 0-3	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
GLEASON, DENNIS, B., 0-3	USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
GRAHAM, GENE, K., E-4	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
GREINER, LAVERNE, A., E-7	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
HORRIGAN, DENNIS, J., E-5	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
KINCAID, RICHARD, H., E-5	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
LYNCH, HUGH, M., E-6	USMC	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
MCNAMARA, MARSHALL, H., E-7	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
MCNEIL, TIMOTHY, E-5	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
MILLER, JOHN, A., E-4	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
OVERSTREET, JAMES, H., 0-4	USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
PERROTTET, PETER, P., 0-3	USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
POTTS, JOHN, H., E-6	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
PRINDLE, RICHARD, T., E-3	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
RANDALL, FREDRICK, A., E-5	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
RECOVERED DEAD	USN	?	?	N	Y	N	N
RECOVERED DEAD	USN	?	?	N	Y	N	N
ROACH, JAMES, L., E-6	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
SINGER, JOHN, H., 0-3	USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
SMITH, RICHARD, E., E-7	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
SUNDBY, PHILIP, D., E-4	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
SYKORA, ROBERT, J., 0-2	USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
TAYLOR, ROBERT, F., 0-3	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
TESMER, STEPHEN, J., E-5	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
WILKERSON, NORMAN, E., 0-2	USNR	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y
WILLIS, DAVID, M., E-4	USN	CM	Y	N	N	N	Y

25	08/17/69	OH-23	KOREAN DMZ	3	0	3	0	0	0
----	----------	-------	------------	---	---	---	---	---	---

NAME	SVC AFF	STATUS	NOK NOTIFIED	RECOVERED ALIVE	RECOVERED DEAD	NOT RECOVERED DECEASED	NOT RECOVERED FATE UNKNOWN
RECOVERED ALIVE	USA	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N
RECOVERED ALIVE	USA	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N
RECOVERED ALIVE	USA	CM	Y	Y	N	N	N

FATE UNKNOWN INCIDENT SUMMARIES

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 3

ON 8 APRIL 1950 AN UNARMED NAVY PB4Y-2 FROM VP-26 WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS IN THE BALTIC SEA. THE ENTIRE CREW OF 10 WAS LOST, BUT FATE WAS NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 4

ON 6 NOVEMBER 1951 A US NAVY P2V FROM VP-6 WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS OFF THE COAST OF SIBERIA. THE ENTIRE CREW OF 10 WAS LOST BUT FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 6

ON 7 OCT 1952 A USAF RB-29 WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS IN THE VICINITY OF HOKKAIDO, JAPAN AND CRASHED NEAR RUSSIAN HELD YURI ISLAND. THE ENTIRE CREW OF 8 WAS LOST BUT FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE US PROTESTED TO THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS ADMITTED FIRING ON THE AIRCRAFT CLAIMING IT HAD VIOLATED THEIR AIRSPACE. THEY REPORTED SEEING NO PARACHUTES AND CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE FATE OF THE CREW.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 9

ON 18 JANUARY 1953 A USN P2V FROM VP-22 WAS HIT BY CHINESE COMMUNIST SHORE BATTERIES. THE AIRCRAFT WAS FORCED TO DITCH IN THE FORMOSA STRAITS. ELEVEN OF THE 13 CREWMEMBERS WERE INITIALLY RESCUED BY COAST GUARD HELICOPTER. UNFORTUNATELY THE HELO CRASHED DURING WATER TAKE OFF AND 4 ADDITIONAL CREWMEN WERE LOST. 2 CREWMEN WERE UNACCOUNTED FOR AND THEIR FATES NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 8

ON 13 JUN 1952 A USAF RB-29 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION DISAPPEARED FROM RADAR 100 MILES NORTH OF HOKKAIDO, JAPAN AND 120 MILES FROM THE SOVIET COAST. AN EMPTY SIX MAN LIFE RAFT SIMILAR TO THE TYPE CARRIED ON RB-29'S WAS SIGHTED NEAR THIS LOCATION. HOWEVER, NO WRECKAGE OR SURVIVORS WERE EVER FOUND. THE ENTIRE CREW WAS LOST BUT FATE WAS NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 11

ON 29 JULY 1953 A USAF RB-50 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER THE SEA OF JAPAN WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS APPROXIMATELY 50 MILES SOUTH EAST OF VALDIVOSTOK. INITIAL SEARCH EFFORTS LOCATED 4 SURVIVORS AS WELL AS AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE ADDITIONAL SURVIVORS IN TWO GROUPS. A LIFE RAFT WAS DROPPED BUT DUE TO DARKNESS AND FOG SURVIVORS WERE NOT SEEN TO BOARD THE RAFT. NINE UNIDENTIFIED SMALL BOATS, PRESUMED TO BE RUSSIAN, WERE SEEN HEADING TOWARD THE WRECKAGE. THE FOLLOWING DAY A USN SHIP LOCATED THE LIFE RAFT WITH A LONE SURVIVOR. THE SURVIVING CREWMAN STATED THAT ONE CREWMAN WAS KILLED IN THE FIGHTER ATTACK. TWO ADDITIONAL BODIES LATER WASHED ASHORE IN JAPAN. THE REMAINING 13 CREWMEN WERE LOST AND THEIR FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE US REPEATEDLY DEMANDED INFORMATION ON THIS INCIDENT. THE USSR DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE SHOOTDOWN OR THE FATE OF THE CREW.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 20

ON 22 AUGUST 1956 A USN P4M WAS SHOT DOWN BY CHINESE FIGHTERS OFF THE CHINESE COAST NEAR WENCHOW WHICH IS 160 MILES NORTH OF FORMOSA. FOUR OF THE 16 CREWMENS BODIES WERE RECOVERED. THE REMAINING 12 WERE LOST AND FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 22

ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1956 A USAF RB-50 ON A RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT OVER THE SEA OF JAPAN DISAPPEARED FROM RADAR 200 MILES WEST OF NIIGETA, HINSHU, JAPAN. NO FURTHER CONTACT WAS EVER MADE. THERE WAS AN ACTIVE TYPHOON IN THE AREA WITH WINDS OF 70-80 KNOTS. THE PLANNED ROUTE OF FLIGHT CAME NO CLOSER THAN 120 FROM COMMUNIST TERRITORY. IT IS POSSIBLE THE AIRCRAFT WAS FORCED DOWN BY HEAVY WEATHER, BLOWN OFF COURSE OR WAS INTENTIONALLY FLOWN TOWARD UNFRIENDLY TERRITORY FOR WEATHER AVOIDANCE. THE POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY ACTIONS CAN NOT BE RULED OUT. THE ENTIRE CREW OF 16 WAS LOST AND THEIR FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE US REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM THE USSR ON THE INCIDENT BUT THEY CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT NOR THE FATE OF THE CREW.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 27

ON 2 SEPTEMBER 1958 A USAF C-130 INADVERTELY CROSSED INTO SOVIET AIRSPACE NEAR THE TURKISH BORDER AND WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN ARMENIA NEAR THE CITY OF TALIN. IT APPEARS THAT THE AIRCRAFT WENT DOWN QUICKLY AND ALL ABOARD WERE KILLED. SOME REPORTS OF PARACHUTES APPEARED IN A SOVIET MAGAZINE. THE SOVIETS RETURNED 6 SETS OF REMAINS BUT ONLY 4 COULD BE IDENTIFIED. ALL SHOWED SIGNS OF A HIGH SPEED IMPACT. SINCE ONLY 4 CREWMEN WERE IDENTIFIED THE REMAINING 13 ARE LOST BUT FATE NOT FACTUALLY DETERMINED A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE US PROTESTED THIS INCIDENT AND EVEN RELEASED THE TAPED COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ATTACKING FIGHTERS. THE SOVIETS DENIED SHOOTING DOWN THE AIRCRAFT AND CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CREW OTHER THAN THE REMAINS THEY RETURNED.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 30

ON 1 JULY 1960 A USAF RB-47 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE BARENTS SEA WAS SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS. TWO CREWMEN WERE RESCUED BY A SOVIET TRAWLERS, A THIRD BODY WAS RECOVERED SEVERAL DAYS LATER. THE REMAINING THREE WERE LOST AND FATE NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE SOVIETS CLAIMED AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS AND ADMITTED SHOOTING DOWN THE AIRCRAFT. THEY THREATENED TO TRY THE SURVIVING CREWMEN. AFTER MUCH PROPROPAGANDA THEY RELEASED THE 2 CREWMEN AND RETURNED THE REMAINS OF THE DEAD CREWMAN. THEY CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE OTHER THREE.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 42

ON 14 DECEMBER 1965 A USAF RB-57 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE BLACK SEA WAS LOST FROM RADAR AFTER BEING OBSERVED FLYING ERRATICALLY AND LOSING ALTITUDE. THERE WERE NO SOVIET FIGHTERS NEAR THE AIRCRAFT WHEN IT DISAPPEARED. THE CRASH SITE WAS LOCATED BUT THE CREW WAS NEVER FOUND AND THERE FATE HAS NEVER BEEN FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

THE US AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW WAS SUMMONED BY THE SOVIET DFM ON 24 DECEMBER TO BE CAUTIONED ABOUT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. THE SOVIETS INDICATED THEY KNEW OF THE RB-57 LOSS BUT CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OR THE STATUS OF THE CREW.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 16

ON 17 APRIL 1955 A USAF RB-47 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE NORTH PACIFIC NEAR THE KAMCHATHA PENINSULA WAS LOST. SOVIET ACTIONS CANNOT BE RULED OUT. THE CREW OF 3 WAS LOST AND THEIR FATE WAS NEVER FACTUALLY DETERMINED. A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS.

INCIDENT SERIAL NUMBER 35

ON 15 APRIL 1969 A USN EC-121 ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE SEA OF JAPAN WAS SHOT DOWN BY NORTH KOREAN FIGHTERS AT A POINT 82 MILES FROM THE NORTH KOREAN COAST. THE ENTIRE CREW OF 31 WAS LOST AND TWO BODIES WERE RECOVERED. THE REMAINING 29 CREWMAN WERE LOST AT SEA AND A PRESUMPTIVE FINDING OF DEATH IS THE OFFICIAL STATUS. WHILE THE TOTAL CREW COMPLEMENT WAS INITIALLY CONFUSED, NAVY HAS CONFIRMED 31 CREWMEMBERS ON THIS MISSION.

CHINA -RELATED COLD WAR CASE

18 JANUARY 1953 USN P2V

On 18 January 1953, a USN P2V from VP-22 was hit by Chinese Communist shore batteries. The aircraft was forced to ditch in the Formosa Straits. Of the 13 crewmembers, 11 were initially rescued by a Coast Guard helicopter. However, the helicopter then crashed during its take off and 4 additional crewmen from the plane were lost. The names of the 6 crewmen lost are as follows:

ENS D. C. Angell, USN, Service number not available

PH1 W. F. McClure, USN, Service number not available

AD1 L. Smith, USN, 630-63-09

AL3 R. A. Beahm, USN, 426-82-87

AT3 C. R. Byars, USN, 361-83-55

AT3 P. A. Morley, USN, 426-84-38

CHINA -RELATED COLD WAR CASE

22 AUGUST 1956 USN P4M

On 22 August 1956, a USN P4M was shot down by Chinese fighters off the Chinese coast near Wenchow which is 160 miles north of Formosa. Of the 16 crewmen, the bodies of 4 were recovered. The remaining 12 were lost and their fates never determined. We believe that some of these missing crewmen were rescued, or their remains recovered, by your forces. The names of the 12 crewmen lost are as follows

LCDR William Hutchinson, USN,

LTJG Francis Arthur Flood Jr. USN, 569963/1310

LTJG J. B. Dean, USN,

H. Lonnsbury, USN,

C. E. Messinger, USN,

D. Barber, USN,

AO2 Warren Edgar Caron, USN, 422 30 03

W. Powell, USN,

W. Humbert, USN,

AT3 Donald Eugene Sprinkle, USN, 356 81 92

AT2 Leonard Strykowski, USN, 452 14 92

AD3 Lloyd Lawayne Young, USN, 373 85 93

A CASE STUDY

17/18 APRIL 1955
Pacific Ocean, off Kamchatka
U.S. Air Force RB-47

At 11:30 Khabarovsk time on 18 April 1955, an RB-47E assigned to the 4th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 26th Reconnaissance Wing, with a crew of three was shot down over the Pacific Ocean off the Kamchatka peninsula by Soviet MIG fighters. The aircraft was based at Eielson AB, Alaska. The three crewmen are unaccounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION...

Nearly all information we have gathered about this incident comes from the Russian side. The Russian side of the Joint Commission acknowledges this shootdown. They have passed to the American side documents that indicate that the RB-47, of the 26th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, was tracked by Soviet signals intelligence units from 0943 Khabarovsk time. It was located at that time in the vicinity of Cape Lopatka, at the southern end of the Kamchatka peninsula. By 1057 the plane was reported 43 miles southeast of Cape Vasiliev. The Russians admit in the documents that the plane did not violate their borders. Nevertheless, two MIG-15 aircraft were scrambled to intercept it, and did so 32 miles east of Cape Kronotski (approximately 55 degrees N., 164 degrees east) at an altitude of 12,200 meters. From 11:25-27, the MIGs attacked the RB-47, and it left Soviet radar screens at 1140 hours.

The crash site was reported by Soviet fishermen aboard the boat "Komandor." They reported an explosion 13 kilometers west of the settlement of Nikol'skoye on Bering Island, approximately 55 degrees, 50 minutes North, 165 degrees, 50 minutes East.

Soviet intelligence also reported extensively on the American search and rescue (SAR) efforts. The SAR started on 19 April (it must be recalled that the dates used by the Soviets in this analysis are one day ahead of ours, due to the existence of the International Date Line in the area), and lasted four days using over 20 planes in an extensive SAR effort. However, the Soviet conclusion was "from the nature of the search one can suppose that the Americans do not know the place, cause, and time of the plane's destruction." That is, the plane did not go down where the Americans thought it went down, and so they searched in the wrong place.

The Soviets also mounted a search effort, but do not report success.

THE AMERICAN POSITION...

The Air Force initially described the flight to the families


and the media as a "routine weather reconnaissance mission." Additionally, until 1992 (when Russian documents were received), the U.S. government suspected, but could not prove, that the aircraft was shot down. Contemporary accounts of the incident indicate that in 1955 the Air Force only knew that the RB-47 had failed to return from its mission. The Air Force, in its presumptive finding of death of the crew, said that there was no indication that the plane had been shot down by the Soviets, and no mention is made of survivors. The Air Force describes the U.S. SAR effort as 20 sorties comprising 207 search hours, to no avail. Apparently we had searched for the plane well away from the real crash site. Finally, since the U.S. government was unaware that the RB-47 was shot down by Soviet MIGs, no demarches were made to Moscow concerning the fate of the crew. It is noted that the mean water temperature for those waters at that time of the year was approximately 38 degrees Fahrenheit.

CONCLUSIONS...

The case for the possibility of survivors of this flight can be made, but it is thin. Crewmen of the RB-47 aircraft can survive a crash: Captains McKone and Olmstead did 5 years later. But unless everything went right for these three men - they survived the attack, their parachutes opened, and they got in a raft almost immediately after hitting the water - or unless Soviet patrol boats were on the scene in record time, they would have died of hypothermia in the 38 degree waters of the Northern Pacific.

On the other hand, according to the Russians, the attack took place at high altitude, and some 15 minutes transpired from the initiation of the attack until the RB-47 disappeared from Soviet radar screens, ample time to eject/bail out, assuming that the aircraft was not a catastrophic loss when attacked. Again, we have no information at this time that sheds light on this, other than the Russian documents, which appear to preclude the survival of the three men.

In view of the above, we should continue our joint research in the Russian archives, to include the Naval Archives at Gatchina. This case, like the other shutdown incidents, cannot be considered closed until all such research has been thoroughly accomplished, to include access to the archives of the KGB, which has until now not been permitted. In particular, we should request copies of the debriefings of the only possible living witnesses to the shutdown, the Soviet pilots.



A CASE STUDY

7 October 1952
North of Hokkaido
U.S. Air Force RB-29

On 7 October 1952, an RB-29 aircraft stationed at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan, assigned to the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, carrying a crew of eight, was shot down by Soviet fighter planes during the conduct of a reconnaissance mission. American search and rescue efforts continued through 10 October, but were unsuccessful due primarily to bad weather. However, there were many eyewitnesses to the incident, mainly Japanese fishermen. Soviet search and rescue units recovered the body of one U.S. crewman, John R. Dunham. The remainder of the crew is still unaccounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION...

We have been passed two discrete sets of Soviet documents on this incident: first, the diplomatic record of Soviet responses to U.S. charges of a shootdown at the time, to include an answer to the 1955 American suit against the USSR in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, Netherlands. The second group consists of military documents passed to the American side during the meetings of the Joint Commission.

The Soviets admit that they shot down the plane, and insist that the RB-29 violated Soviet airspace three times over the southern Kuriles. The first and second times were for a total of eight or nine minutes over Tanfilev Island, then over water at latitude 43 degrees, 18' North, longitude 145 degrees 59' East. Fighters were then scrambled from South Sakhalin airfield, and intercepted the RB-29 south of Demin Island. The Soviets state that the U.S. plane fired on the Soviet fighters first and that they were forced to return fire. Two Soviet LA-11 fighters, flown by Senior Lieutenants Zheryakov and Lesnov from the 368th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment, engaged the RB-29. The documents go on to say that the American plane then lost altitude and "went off into the direction of the sea." These actions occurred between 1400 and 1535 Khabarovsk time (which is one hour later than the Japanese local time).

During plenary sessions of the Joint Commission over the course of the last months the Russians have passed us documents which shed light on the crash and their search efforts. A handwritten log indicates that the RB-29 crashed 1.5 KM southwest of Demin Island, and goes on, "the aircraft was in flames as it fell, upon striking the water there were two strong explosions... During examination of the crash site by border troops, the 114th Border Detachment picked up a pilot's headless body... The body was in a black flight suit with the name of Dunkkhen Dzhon Robertson, service # 2073A." No mention is made in any document of the whereabouts of Dunham's body, or of sightings of

parachutes or of survivors.

THE AMERICAN POSITION...

This incident is heavily documented in U.S. files. The U.S. presented a formal diplomatic claim against the USSR in September, 1954 for \$1.6 million for loss of the plane and crew, and took the case to the ICJ in May, 1955. The whole legal dispute centered on questions of sovereignty over the Kuriles and nearby islands. The circumstances of loss are not in great dispute. Soviet fighters shot down the RB-29 in the vicinity of Demin Island at around 1430 local on 7 October 1952 at approximately 43 degrees 24' North, 146 degrees, 6' East.

Eyewitness evidence abounds. The U.S. side interviewed numerous (at least 51) Japanese fishermen who were in the area on 7 OCT 52, some in Soviet custody on Yuri Island. All the interviewees did not see the plane shot down, but did see the plane at some point during its flight. The eyewitnesses tell pretty much the same story: the RB-29 was flying around in the vicinity of the Kurile/Habomai Islands on the afternoon of 7 OCT 52 when fighters appeared and shot the plane down. It went down trailing thick black smoke.

U.S. military authorities were tracking the RB-29 at the Air Defense Center in Nagoya, Japan. They saw the radar tracks of the American plane merge with the track of an unidentified plane. The RB-29 had time to broadcast of "Mayday, let's get the hell out of here," before it went down. All military authorities interviewed by U.S. investigators shortly after the incident insist that the RB-29 was on the U.S. side of the so-called MacArthur line, the dividing line between Soviet and American zones of occupation in post-war Japan. However, later U.S. analysis revealed that the RB-29 probably did violate Soviet airspace during the flight shortly before the shootdown.

The American SAR effort started almost immediately. Fighters from Chitose AB, and planes from the 3RD Air Rescue Group engaged in a search of the general crash area until 12 OCT 52. This effort was hampered greatly by bad weather. The Navy vessel "Falcon Victor" also searched the crash area. No debris or survivors were found.

CONCLUSIONS...


The facts in this case are fairly clear and not in serious dispute. Regardless as to whether the RB-29 violated Soviet airspace, it was shot down just north of Hokkaido on 7 OCT 52. The plane exploded on impact, and both sides conducted extensive SAR efforts, which to our present knowledge yielded only the body of 1LT John R. Dunham. There still remains the issue of survivors, based on the "Mayday" call.

We must point out that not one of the eyewitnesses noted the presence of parachutes, although there is a report as part of the combat log of the 39th Air Division that the Japanese National Police had received reports of 2 parachutes sighted shortly after

the attack. However, it was later reported by USAF tracking station #26 at Nemuro Point that the sighting had been erroneous. There are no other references to survivors in any of the documentation on either side.

As noted above, Soviet SAR efforts resulted in the recovery of Dunham's body, but the Russians do not seem to know where the body is currently located, despite our repeated requests for this information.

We consider this case open. We must press the Russians for the pilot debriefings, as well as for more complete records of their SAR efforts.



7 OCT 52

UNRESOLVED COLD WAR LOSSES 1950 - 1965

- ✓ 1. 8 April 1950. A U.S. Navy PB4Y2 was shot down over the Baltic. 10 men are unaccounted for.
- ✓ 2. 6 November 1951. A U.S. Navy P2V was shot down southeast of Vladivostok. 10 men are unaccounted for.
- ✓ 3. 13 June 1952. A U.S. Air Force RB-29 was shot down over the Sea of Japan. American search planes found empty life rafts, but no survivors. 12 men are unaccounted for.
- ✓ 4. 7 October 1952. A U.S. Air Force RB-29 was shot down north of Hokkaido. The Russians have given us documents that indicate that they recovered Captain John R. Dunham, but since then can not find his remains. 8 men are unaccounted for.
- ✓ 5. 29 July 1953. A U.S. Air Force RB-50 was shot down over the Sea of Japan. One man lived. American search planes saw groups of Soviet patrol boats in the vicinity of the wreckage. 13 men are unaccounted for.
- ✓ 6. 17 April 1955. A U.S. Air Force RB-47 was shot down east of Kamchatka. The Russians tracked the U.S. search effort and sent their own patrols into the wreckage area. 3 men are unaccounted for.
- ✓ 7. 10 September 1956. A U.S. Air Force RB-50 was lost on patrol over the Sea of Japan. The flight plan's proximity to the U.S.S.R. made the U.S. State Department suspect a shootdown. 16 men are unaccounted for.
- ✓ 8. 2 September 1958. A U.S. Air Force a C-130 was shot down over Armenia. The Russians have provided detailed information on the shootdown and crash. 13 men are unaccounted for.
9. 1 July 1960. A U.S. Air Force RB-47 was shot down over the Barents Sea. The Russians have given us documents that indicate that they recovered Major Eugene Posa's body, but they don't know where it is now. 3 men are unaccounted for.
10. 14 December 1965. A U.S. Air Force RB-57 was lost on patrol over the Black Sea. Due to the plane's proximity to the U.S.S.R., the American side suspected a shootdown. 2 men are still unaccounted for.

A CASE STUDY

8 April 1950
Baltic Sea
U.S. Navy PB4Y2 (Privateer)

On 8 April 1950, a U.S. Navy PB4Y2 Privateer on an electronic reconnaissance mission was shot down over the Baltic Sea by Soviet fighters. Although the search and rescue effort was unsuccessful, two unmanned liferafts from the aircraft were eventually recovered, as well as some wreckage (found by commercial fishing vessels). None of the ten crew members were recovered, dead or alive. All remain unaccounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION...

Shortly after the shootdown, the Soviet government acknowledged that its fighters had attacked the Privateer. Further, Stalin's Foreign Ministry stated that the aircraft was attacked because it was flying in Soviet airspace, and had fired on Soviet fighters when they attempted to signal it to land. The Soviet government also stated at the time (and subsequently) that it had no information about survivors from this flight.

Since the establishment of the Joint Commission, the Russian government has provided considerable documentatoin on this incident, most of it contemporaneous to 1950. Soviet documents, including after-action reports of the participating pilots and other air defense officers, all appear to support the long-held position that the aircraft violated Soviet airspace and opened fire on Soviet fighters. Another formerly classified document, a report from the Soviet Navy to Stalin and Bulganin, describes in detail extensive, unsuccessful efforts by forty-five vessels between 22 April and 14 June to locate the submerged aircraft. A 1975 Central Committee document, classified SECRET, appears to be an information paper to reassure the Party that there were no survivors of the flight prosecuted or incarcerated in the Soviet Union. This document seems to have been prepared in response to a resurgence of interest in the case in the American press, with allegations that documents received are interviews conducted in late 1992 by Task Force Russia and Jane Reynolds-Howard, widow of LTJG Robert D. Reynolds, one of the unaccounted for crew members, including discussions with retired General-Colonel Fedor Ivanovich Shinkarenko, who commanded the Soviet fighter unit that shot down the Privateer. The Shinkarenko interviews support some, but not all, of what the Soviet government had stated in 1950, as well as the version of events described in the above-mentioned documents. Shinkarenko recalled that his pilots did not actually see the plane crash due to cloud cover. In his opinion, "all pilots of the plane died...it's sad, we had no confirmation that we have found the bodies...they were washed away...If there had been one member of the crew, dead or alive, after the search was carried out...I should have known this..." Shinkarenko also stated that the Soviets had monitored an extensive American search and rescue effort; that the Soviet Navy had been given orders to recover the aircraft, if possible, to show to the United Nations; and,

significantly, that he had been told that "remnants of the plane" had indeed been recovered (contrary to the assertions in the document described above"). General Shinkarenko also recalled that Stalin himself had given the order not to show the recovered parts to the UN, "once he knew what the plane contained."

THE AMERICAN POSITION...

As with many of these incidents, research in the American archives reveals a fundamental disagreement with the Soviet government concerning both the location of the incident and who opened fire on whom. (The American government insisted that the Privateer was over international waters, and that, with the exception of a single .38 caliber pistol, the aircraft was unarmed.) The American position in 1950 was that the aircraft was on a "training flight" from West Germany to Denmark when it was attacked. (Later, in 1975, the Naval Investigative Board report of the incident was declassified, which admitted that the Privateer was engaged in a "special electronic search project mission.") There are also differences in various Soviet and American accounts concerning the exact time of the incident, as well as a somewhat confusing reference in some Soviet accounts to the aircraft as a "B-29." However, the Commission believes that these facts are not relevant to our current task of accounting for the ten mission men. The American side concurs with the Soviets that the aircraft fell or landed in the Baltic Sea, approximately 15 miles northwest of the city of Liepaya. There are no indications in the American archives that would point to any eyewitnesses to the shootdown, or to any radio "mayday" transmissions by the crew. Nor are there any indications whatsoever that any of the crew might have bailed out of the aircraft, as, for example, had occurred in some other flights. Thus, the U.S. government had no information at the time of the incident that any of the crew had survived and been picked up by the Soviets. However, by 1956, new information had apparently convinced the American government to reconsider this position. On 17 July 1956, the Department of State sent a demarche to the Soviet government, in which Washington referred to reports concerning detained U.S. military personnel that had "become so persistent, detailed and credible" that they merited the attention of the Soviets. The demarche specifically referred to reports from persons formerly detained in the Soviet Union that they had "conversed with, seen, or heard reports concerning United States military aviation personnel," in the Gulag, and concluded that the United States government "is compelled to believe that the Soviet government has had or continues to have under detention" members of the Privateer crew and the crew of another lost flight, an RB-29 shot down over the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952. The Soviet government rejected this assertion on 13 August 1956, stating that "no American from the personnel of the U.s. Air Force or U.s. Naval Aviation are on the territory of the Soviet Union."

CONCLUSIONS...

Unlike some incidents from which there were either survivors or credible eyewitnesses, the actual events of the 8 April 1950 shootdown itself are simply insufficiently clear to indicate whether or not there could have been survivors. We have thus left with the

testimony of the only eyewitnesses, the Soviet aviators themselves, testimony which is both flawed and incomplete. For example, the formerly "top secret" statements of the four Soviet pilots seem flawed. (They are uncharacteristically brief and similar, and they read as if their contents were dictated to the aviators.) The statements are incomplete in the sense that they do not answer the key question of the Privateer's ultimate fate (i.e. All four Soviet pilots state merely that the aircraft "sharply descended, entered the clouds at an altitude of 500 meters," and "supposedly crashed into the sea 5-10 kilometers from the coast.") As a result, we are left with the reality that no one saw the aircraft crash, while no "mayday" distress calls were heard that might indicate whether there was a chance to bail out of ditch the aircraft. Thus, to the question of the possibility of survivors, we are left with the following:

1. No one saw the aircraft crash or break up. Thus, we simply cannot rule out the possibility of survivors, in spite of what General Shinkarenko believes.

2. There exist a number of reports from released Gulag inmates indicating that there were indeed survivors from this flight who were imprisoned in the Gulag. There are enough of these reports over the years to suggest that they cannot be ignored. Certainly the U.S. government, by 1956, placed sufficient credibility in these reports to send the above-mentioned demarche to Moscow. More recently, Task Force Russia interviewed a Lithuanian citizen who stated that he was an inmate in a Soviet prison in Irkutsk in the summer of 1950 with an American intelligence officer named "Robert." The Task Force has confirmed through official Russian sources in the Irkutsk Oblast that this man was indeed an inmate at the time he claims. thus, while we do not dismiss his statement, we note that he was unable to identify Lt. Reynolds when we showed him a photo lineup. While we had been unable to confirm that these sightings or reports were necessarily members of the Privateer crew, the Task Force believes that the frequency, content, and timeframe of these reports at a minimum suggest that some American aviators were detained in the Gulag.

3. The recovery of the Privateer's intact lifeboats may not necessarily indicate survivors, however, we cannot ignore that lifeboats were found, and that this could indicate a soft landing rather than a catastrophic mid-air destruct of the aircraft. The Task Force has been unable, however, to confirm a persistent report that John Noble, after his repatriation from the Gulag, was shown a copy of a photo by his U.S Navy debriefer that showed the intact Privateer floating on the water with a Soviet patrol boat moored alongside. Nothing in the "Klaus File" or other U.S archives supports the existence of this photo, and we cannot place credence in its existence absent any corroborating information.


4. From information obtained from interviews of family members and former participants in these reconnaissance flights, it is obvious that the crew was aware of the dangers inherent in their mission, and that they were well-drilled in emergency action procedures (ditching and bailout).

5. The aircraft went down within a relatively short distance from Soviet maritime facilities, which could have dispatched patrol craft that could have reached the site of the crash within 1-2 hours from the time they were alerted. The massive Soviet search for the wreckage, as well as open-source Russian articles on Soviet air defense, clearly indicate that

Moscow was aware that the aircraft was most likely an intelligence collector. Hence the capture and interrogation of its crew would have been a clear objective of the intelligence services.

In view of the above information, we believe that further efforts are called for in investigating this incident. The Task Force notes that one Soviet document (referred to above) that describes the search of the crash site deals with salvage operations directed at locating the submerged Privateer, operations that only commenced two weeks after the incident. We believe it appropriate to direct our research at locating any possible records that would indicate possible patrol boat search and rescue operations in the 8-21 April time frame. Our study of other Cold War incidents in waters adjacent to the Soviet land mass in the proximity of Soviet naval bases indicates that such operations to recover survivors were routinely mounted.

In particular, we note that a colleague of General Shinkarenko, retired Colonel Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhov, told Task Force Russia interviewers in 1992 that, although he had personally supervised the destruction of local files on this incident, more information could probably be located about it in Soviet Air Force "Bulletins on Lessons Learned from the Downing of U.S. Aircraft Violating Soviet Borders." In addition, Col Ryzhov suggested that it was normal for the KGB to prepare "parallel reports" on such incidents, "since the KGB was directly involved in the prevention or resolution of border violations." The Task Force concurs with Col Ryzhov's suggestion, while noting that his statement is at odds with the assertions to the Commission by the intelligence services that they had no part to play in such events.



A CASE STUDY

6 November 1951
U.S. Navy P2V "Neptune"

On 6 November, 1951, at 1010 hours Vladivostok time, A U.S. Navy P2V Neptune reconnaissance aircraft was shot down near Cape Ostrovnoy, USSR by Soviet fighters. The aircraft was assigned to the United Nations Command of General Matthew Ridgway. The aircraft did not transmit a "mayday" distress signal, and none of the ten crew members have been accounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION . . .

The Soviet government immediately protested this incident, delivering a demarche on 7 November to the American Charge d'Affaires in Moscow. The Soviet demarche stated that the aircraft had violated Soviet air space, had been pursued and fired upon by Soviet fighters after it initiated fire and then failed to heed instructions to land. The Soviet demarche concluded that the Neptune was last seen "disappearing toward the sea." The Soviets did not release this demarche to the public, nor did the U.S. government make any public mention of the incident until 23 November, when the fact of the incident and the Soviet demarche were made known. On that same day, "Pravda" carried a front-page article stating that the Presidium of the USSR had awarded the Order of the Red Banner to two Soviet naval aviators for "exemplary fulfillment of their service duties." "Pravda" also declared that the American aviators had been "impudent fellows" who had received a "proper lesson." Soviet archives provided to the U.S. Delegation of the Joint Commission in 1992 shed limited additional light on this incident. A 6 November 1951 "Top Secret" report from N. Kuznetsov to Stalin reported the incident, stating that the American "intruder" had been detected "within the boundaries of our territorial waters, 7-8 miles (10-15 Km) from the shore." The report described the incident as having been provoked by the Americans, who opened fire first, and named the two Soviet pilots as "Lykshov," the leader, and "'Shchukin, the wingman". Stalin was told that "The intruder was shot down by return fire from our fighters. At 1018 hours it fell, burning, into the water and exploded 18 miles (32 km) from the shore." (Note: This detail differs from the description of the plane's fate contained in the 7 November 1951 demarche described above.) The report also stated that "Three torpedo cutters sent to the area of the crash did not find any trace of the plane," and informed Stalin that Soviet naval signals intelligence units had monitored unsuccessful attempts by the Americans and the Japanese to communicate with the downed aircraft. On the following day, Stalin received a follow-up report which described radio intercepts of the American search and rescue effort. This report noted that "The American planes conducting the search did not come closer than 100 miles (180 km [sic]) to our shores," and that, "Based on this, I conclude that the downed American plane did not manage to report the incident with our

fighters." Finally, the Russian side released a 7 November 1951 Central Committee document, formerly "Top Secret," containing the text of the Soviet demarche. This document is an extract, para 312, from a Politburo document, Protocol No. 84, the contents of which are unknown.

THE AMERICAN POSITION . . .

As described above, Washington was silent on this incident for more than two weeks. U.S. archives indicate that, during this period, a debate was carried on within the U.S. Department of State centering around the advisability or lack thereof of a direct protest to the Soviet government, in view of the fact that the lost aircraft was actually assigned to the U.N. Command. The initial American public position, when expressed on 23 November by the U.S. Navy, was only that the aircraft had been on a weather reconnaissance patrol and was missing. The Navy did not state that it had been shot down, or give the location of the incident. The Department of State, however, released information indicating that the aircraft had been missing since 6 November 1951 after being fired upon by Soviet fighters, and that Moscow had protested the incident, claiming that the aircraft had violated Soviet air space, and was "last seen disappearing toward the sea." Further, the U.S. countered the Soviet demarche by charging that the missing Neptune was "attacked without warning" by Soviet fighters while over international waters in the Sea of Japan. A 1964 United States Air Force Historical Division Research report of cold war shootdown incidents contains considerable details concerning this incident, to include the conclusion that "The United States did not request a UN investigation, nor did it give any indication that the Soviet government would be asked to discipline those responsible for the incident, pay damages, or give assurances against a repetition of the incident. UN Secretary Lie indicated that no action would be taken by the UN unless the Soviets or the United States demanded a Security Council debate. The matter was dropped by both sides..." Finally, a declassified 17 December 1951 internal Department of State document sheds some light on the failure to pursue this matter, concluding that "The American flyers were lost in performance of duty and, as such, are unfortunate casualties of the Korean War and, as much as we dislike it, there is little we can do to obtain redress.... In the circumstances, I think it is probably more in accord with realities of the situation if we take no further action in this case." The Task Force has thus far been unable to locate any documents in U.S. archives that would specifically point to any survivors of this incident who might have been picked up by the Soviet patrol boats described in the above-quoted report to Stalin. On the contrary, the contemporaneous American documents lament the absence of any eyewitnesses as a hindrance to making a strong American case to protest the incident.

CONCLUSIONS . . .

Regrettably, we have very little to go on in this case. As with most of the other incidents, it occurred in a remote area with no known witnesses other than the Soviet participants. Whereas there is extensive U.S. documentation in the Klaus files concerning other incidents, some of which indicates the possibility of survivors, we have not been able

to discover such information on the Neptune crew. The case for survivors is thus extremely thin and speculative:

1. The Soviet account of the incident describes a period of eight minutes from interception by the naval aviation fighters until the crash of the aircraft; theoretically sufficient time to permit bailout by a well-trained crew. The absence of any "mayday" distress signal from the Neptune does not necessarily mean that there was no time to react -- the radio could have been disabled at the outset of the attack.

2. Soviet documents indicate that patrol boats were in fact dispatched to the scene, and that American search and rescue efforts were far away. Had any crew members survived the shootdown, the Soviets had the motive, the means, and the time to search for them and take them into custody.

3. When the family of LTJG Samuel Rosenfeld, one of the missing crew, attempted to clear the title to his vehicle in 1952, the U.S. Navy wrote to the California Department of Motor Vehicles, "Lt j.g. Samuel Rosenfeld, legal owner of a Super Packard, was declared missing in action on a combat flight in the Korean War since 6 Nov 1951. Subsequent reports, unconfirmed, indicate that LT Rosenfeld is being held as a prisoner of war. There has been no declaration by competent authorities that Lt. Rosenfeld is dead, but to the contrary (they) indicate that he is still alive." Later in the year, LT Rosenfeld and the remainder of the crew were declared dead by the Department of the Navy. The Task Force has thus far been unable to locate any documents in the archives (intelligence reports, for example) upon which this Navy statement was based.

4. Finally, in March, 1993, Task Force Russia's Moscow office received a letter from a Russian citizen. The writer indicated that his grandfather had been an NKVD camp guard in Sinda, near Khabarovsk in the Soviet Far East from 1951 until 1959. The writer explains that his grandfather recalled that, in 1952, there were five American prisoners brought to the camp -- one was an aviator, another was named "Poll." Task Force analysts note that no members of the 13 June 1952 RB-29 shootdown are named "Paul," but that two enlisted crew members of the Neptune, Juric and Foster, have the surname "Paul." (In addition, one crewmember of the RB-29 shot down on 7 October 1952 over the Sea of Japan -- Brock -- is also named "Paul.") The writer also recalled that his grandfather told him that one of the Americans died between 1957 and 1959, and was buried in the local cemetery, which still exists. This information is certainly inadequate to make a definitive correlation with possible survivors of the Neptune, however it merits careful follow-up.


The above information suggests some avenues that we must pursue in order to move toward the truth on this incident. Clearly, while we are not interested in the dispute over the location of the incident, or who opened fire on whom, we must pay attention to the fact that one Soviet document states that the aircraft crashed into the sea, which differs from the version in the 7 November Soviet demarche. Since we now have the names of the two pilots, we should attempt to locate and debrief them. In addition, in the case of the 8 April 1950 Privateer case, our Russian colleagues have been able to provide the statements prepared by the participants. We should try to obtain these same documents on this incident,

from both pilots and from the crews of the search and rescue patrol boats (Pacific Fleet and Border Guards archives). In addition, we should ask the Russians to provide the "Top Secret" Presidium protocol No. 84 referred to above, since it most certainly must contain significant information on this flight. (The extract of this protocol that we have received, para 312, contains only the text of the Soviet demarche, which clearly was not "Top Secret." What is in the body of the protocol itself that was so sensitive?) Finally, as in all such incidents, we have not received documents from the KGB or GRU archives. In 1992, the Foreign Intelligence Service (formerly KGB) informed General Volkogonov in writing that:

The Foreign Intelligence Service does not have any data available on American aircraft that had violated the State border during the "cold" war period and were shot down over the territory of the former USSR. Neither do we have information about the crews of those aircraft. This type of information is not stored in the intelligence archives.

The Task Force notes that both documents and interviews obtained by our Moscow Team indicate that the KGB did play a role in these incidents, and that it maintains files on them. General Volkogonov, for example, stated in his Report to the Commission as of 21 September 1992 that the matter of Cold War incidents "is basically a secret history, in which the special services of the US and USSR are involved." We should access these files, as well as Pacific Fleet and Border Guard archives.

Lastly, the Task Force must follow up on the March, 1993 letter concerning American prisoners in Sinda.



A CASE STUDY

13 June 1952
Sea of Japan, Southeast of Vladivostok
U.S. Air Force RB-29, #44-61810

On 13 June 1952, an RB-29 aircraft stationed at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan, carrying a crew of twelve, was shot down by Soviet fighter planes during the conduct of a reconnaissance mission. American search and rescue aircraft searched unsuccessfully for survivors, locating only an empty six-man life raft, and a possible second raft four miles south of the first raft. No eyewitnesses, such as Japanese fishermen, could be located. An initial report from American military sources that a Soviet radio station reported that a survivor was picked up by Soviet forces was later retracted when analysis revealed that the radio broadcast actually referred to a different shootdown in the Korean War zone. The entire crew of twelve remains unaccounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION . . .

The Russians have passed the U.S. Delegation less information on this flight than any other similar incident. For forty years the United States government and the families of the lost men did not know for certain that this aircraft was shot down. In early 1992, a formerly classified document provided by the Russian Delegation of the Joint Commission confirmed for the first time that the RB-29 had been shot down by a MIG-15 aircraft. This document, dated 25 June 1952, from the Ministry of Government Security to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, states that the American aircraft had been shot down "over our territorial Sea of Japan waters south of Valentin Bay." The report pointed out to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that an American demarche of 18 June 1952 claimed that wreckage from the RB-29 had been located some 80 miles south of Valentin Bay (and thus in international waters). Finally, the Soviet document reported that "Coast Guard and border patrol ships did not locate any plane fragments or equipment from the downed plane, or any members of the crew." With the exception of this document, we have not received any other direct information from the Russians on this incident. In fact, in General Volkogonov's 22 September 1992 "Report by the Chairman of the Russian Side of the Joint Russian-American Commission on the Results of the Work as of 21 September 1992," the General states that "There is documentary evidence on 10 such occurrences," then lists the incidents, without even a mention of the 13 June 1952 shootdown.

THE AMERICAN POSITION . . .

An American demarche (#689) to the Soviet government dated 18 June 1952

requested assistance in determining information on the fate of the RB-29 crew. This document informed Moscow that the United States had located some wreckage of the flight in international waters, which suggested the possibility of survivors. It requested the Soviets "to investigate urgently" and inform the United States government "of any circumstances." The demarche failed to enlist any Soviet assistance, nor did it elicit a Soviet admission that their forces had had anything to do with the disappearance of the aircraft. Absent any eyewitnesses, or even a "mayday" distress call, the United States government apparently did not feel that it could accuse the Soviet Union of shooting the aircraft down. The American search and rescue effort commenced at 2030 hours, three hours after the shootdown, but the first aircraft did not depart Yokota until 0317 hours on the 14th of June, almost ten hours after the actual shootdown. Four years later, however, on 17 July 1956, Washington had acquired sufficient information from numerous different intelligence sources to support the belief that some or all of this crew might have been picked up by Soviet forces and imprisoned. In a demarche that mentioned both the RB-29 and the 8 April 1950 Privateer crew, Secretary of State Dulles referred to reports concerning detained U.S. military personnel, reports that had "become so persistent, detailed, and credible" that they could not be ignored. This demarche described reporting from released inmates of the Soviet Gulag who had "conversed with, seen, or heard reports concerning United States military personnel" in the Gulag, and concluded that the United States government "is compelled to believe that the Soviet government has had or continues to have under detention" members of the Privateer crew and the crew of another lost flight, an RB-29 shot down over the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952. This demarche listed all unaccounted for members of both the 8 April 1950 and the 13 June 1952 flights. (The Soviet government rejected this assertion on 13 August 1956, stating that "no American citizens from the personnel of the U.S. Air Force or U.S. Naval Aviation are on the territory of the Soviet Union.")

CONCLUSIONS . . .

Arriving at the truth concerning this incident has been and continues to be one of our Commission's most difficult challenges. For example, while our Russian colleagues have passed us volumes of information on other incidents, such as the 8 April 1950 case, or the 29 July 1953 RB-50 case, we have only obtained the single document mentioned above relevant to this case. Also frustrating is the fact that the U.S. archives have been equally stingy. The Klaus file, for example, which has yielded much about many of these incidents, contained almost nothing on this flight. Repeated verbal and written appeals by the American Delegation to the Russian Delegation during the September and December 1992 Commission meetings have also failed to produce results. Consequently, the facts of this incident are sketchy, and the case for the possibility of survivors is speculative and thin: we know that the Russians shot down the aircraft and dispatched patrol boats to the site.

1. We know that the Soviets shot down the aircraft and dispatched patrol boats to the site. Depending upon the facts of the engagement itself, some of the well-trained crew of the RB-29 could have bailed out, or the plane could have ditched. The relatively fast-moving Soviet patrol boats of the time could have arrived quickly at the scene. Given the fact that at least ten hours elapsed before the first American search and rescue aircraft was launched

from Yokota, any Soviet patrol boats would have had considerable undisturbed time to mount a search for survivors before the Americans arrived. At least one lifeboat was spotted by the American search aircraft, but only at 1445 hours on 14 July, almost a full day after the shootdown. It should be mentioned here that a veteran B-29 aviator who is familiar with the RB-29 has pointed out in a letter to one of the next-of-kin of the crew that "The presence of a life raft in the area of the presumed crash is indicative of nothing more than the fact that a B-29 had indeed been there. On the upper side of the fuselage, directly above the thickest part of the wing, are two raft compartments, one on each side. Each one holds a six-man raft, and both are rigged to automatically eject and inflate should the ship go into the water, so a raft in the water in no way indicates that there were survivors."

2. The crew of this plane would have been a lucrative intelligence target for the Soviet intelligence services, which would have done their utmost to have picked up survivors.


3. On July 3, 1952, a B-29 bomber was shot down as it attempted to bomb a Yalu River bridge over Sinuiju, North Korea. Some of the crew survived, and were taken to Mukden, China for interrogation. One of these men has told Task Force Russia that his Chinese interrogators suddenly shifted the focus of their interrogation one day, and began to query him in detail about Major Samuel Busch, the aircraft commander of the RB-29. To quote his statement, "In a month or two after arriving in China, the interrogation got around to Maj. Busch. Continuously back to that subject, again and again. If he were dead at the bottom of the Sea of Japan, why all the interest? I am convinced today as I was then that they had Busch." (This belief was echoed by one of the man's crew mates, who was also grilled by the Chinese about Major Busch.) Were the probing questions about Major Busch posed on behalf of Soviet intelligence officers who were struggling for information to use in their interrogation of the officer?

4. Finally, as in the case of the other shootdowns of the early 1950's, there are numerous intelligence reports of sightings of captured American aviators detained in the Gulag, some of which correlate in time and content with this and other flights. While no single report is convincing by itself, the number of reports and the variety of sources collectively suggest survivors from one or more of these shootdown incidents. As pointed out above, these reports were taken sufficiently seriously by the U.S. Department of State at the time that they resulted in a demarche to the Soviet government.

Based upon the above information, where do we go from here?

First, we cannot ignore the uncharacteristic scarcity of documentary information on this incident provided so far by our Russian counterparts. We know the kinds of information that have been retained in their archives on other shootdown incidents, and we need to firmly request that they renew their efforts on this case. Our experience with other cases makes it clear that when Soviet fighters shot down an American aircraft, the act generated an extensive paper trail, a trail that should include reports to the highest levels of the Party and government. For example, concerning the 6 November 1951 shootdown, we have received two declassified reports to Stalin himself, one written on the day of the shootdown, the other

on the following day. Or, in the case of the 8 April 1950 shootdown, our Russian colleagues have located the pilots' statements, and we have been able to interview the Commander of the unit that carried out the operation. The same is true for the 29 July 1953 RB-50 case, on which we have received numerous pages of information. In addition, we have nothing from the intelligence services on this incident, nor have we thus far located any documents concerning the case in the Air Defense Archives in the Central Ministry of Defense Archives at Podolsk. We must explore these avenues with the Russians. We should also attempt to identify the pilots or other personnel involved in the shootdown or attempted rescue efforts on the Soviet side and interview them if possible. Finally, we should remember the advice of one retired Soviet colonel, who told us in December that the answers to this and other similar incidents in the Sea of Japan are more likely to be found in Vladivostok and Posyet than in Moscow. Our advertisements in the media in Vladivostok and any other measures we can take to raise our signature in the Far East may net a retired officer or some other sincere Russian citizen who remembers what happened on 13 June 1952.



A CASE STUDY

7 October 1952
North of Hokkaido
U.S. Air Force RB-29

On 7 October 1952, an RB-29 aircraft stationed at Yokota Air Force Base, Japan, assigned to the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, carrying a crew of eight, was shot down by Soviet fighter planes during the conduct of a reconnaissance mission north of the island of Hokkaido. American search and rescue efforts continued through 10 October, but were unsuccessful due primarily to bad weather. However, there were many eyewitnesses to the incident, mainly Japanese fishermen. Soviet search and rescue units recovered the body of one U.S. crewman, John R. Dunham. The remainder of the crew is still unaccounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION...

We have been passed two discrete sets of Soviet documents on this incident: first, the diplomatic record of Soviet responses to U.S. charges of a shootdown at the time, including an answer to the 1955 American suit against the USSR in the International Court of Justice. The second group consists of military documents passed to the American side during the meetings of the Joint Commission.

The Soviets stated that they shot down the plane, and that the RB-29 violated Soviet airspace three times over the southern Kuriles. The first and second times were for a total of eight or nine minutes over Tanfilev Island, then over water at latitude 43 degrees, 18' North, longitude 145 degrees 59' East. Fighters were then scrambled from South Sakhalin airfield, and intercepted the RB-29 south of Demin Island. The Soviets state that the U.S. plane fired on the Soviet fighters first and that they were forced to return fire. Two Soviet LA-11 fighters, flown by Senior Lieutenants Zheryakov and Lesnov from the 368th Air Defense Fighter Aviation Regiment, engaged the RB-29. The documents go on to say that the American plane then lost altitude and "went off into the direction of the sea." These actions occurred between 1400 and 1535 Khabarovsk time (which is one hour later than the Japanese local time).

During plenary sessions of the Joint Commission over the course of the last months the Russians have passed us documents which shed light on the crash and their search efforts. A handwritten log indicates that the RB-29 crashed 1.5 KM southwest of Demin Island, and goes on, "the aircraft was in flames as it fell, upon striking the water there were two strong explosions... During examination of the crash site by border troops, the 114th Border Detachment picked up a pilot's headless body... The body was in a black flight suit with the name of Dunkkhen Dzhon Robertson, service # 2073A." No mention is made in any document of the whereabouts of Dunham's body, or of sightings of

parachutes or of survivors.

THE AMERICAN POSITION...

This incident is heavily documented in U.S. files. The U.S. presented a formal diplomatic claim against the USSR in September, 1954 for \$1.6 million for loss of the plane and crew, and took the case to the ICJ in May, 1955. The American legal position centered on questions of sovereignty over the Kuriles and nearby islands. U.S. records indicate that Soviet fighters shot down the RB-29 in the vicinity of Demin Island at around 1430 local on 7 October 1952 at approximately 43 degrees 24' North, 146 degrees, 6' East.

Eyewitness evidence abounds. The U.S. side interviewed numerous (at least 51) Japanese fishermen who were in the area on 7 OCT 52, some in Soviet custody on Yuri Island. All the interviewees did not see the plane shot down, but did see the plane at some point during its flight. The eyewitnesses tell much the same story: the RB-29 was flying in the vicinity of the Kurile/Habomai Islands on the afternoon of 7 OCT 52 when fighters appeared and shot the plane down. It went down trailing thick black smoke.

U.S. military authorities were tracking the RB-29 at the Air Defense Center in Nagoya, Japan. They saw the radar trace of the American plane merge with the track of an unidentified plane. The RB-29 had time to broadcast, "Mayday, let's get the hell out of here," before it went down. All military authorities interviewed by U.S. investigators shortly after the incident insist that the RB-29 was on the U.S. side of the so-called MacArthur line, the dividing line between Soviet and American zones of occupation in post-war Japan. However, later U.S. analysis revealed that the RB-29 probably did violate Soviet airspace during the flight shortly before the shutdown.

The American SAR effort started almost immediately. Fighters from Chitose AB, and planes from the 3RD Air Rescue Group engaged in a search of the general crash area until 12 OCT 52. This effort was hampered greatly by bad weather. The Navy vessel "Falcon Victor" also searched the crash area. No debris or survivors were found.

CONCLUSIONS...

The facts are not in serious dispute. The RB-29 was shot down just north of Hokkaido on 7 OCT 52. The plane exploded on impact, and both sides conducted extensive SAR efforts, which to our present knowledge yielded only the body of 1LT John R. Dunham. There still remains the issue of survivors, based on the "Mayday" call.

We must point out that not one of the eyewitnesses noted the presence of parachutes, although there is a report as part of the combat log of the 39th Air Division that the Japanese National Police had received reports of 2 parachutes sighted shortly after the attack. However, it was later reported by USAF tracking

station #26 at Nemuro Point that the sighting had been erroneous. There are no other references to survivors in any of the documentation on either side.

As noted above, Soviet SAR efforts resulted in the recovery of Dunham's body, but the Russians have not responded to our repeated requests for its location.

We consider this case open. We request the return of Dunham's remains, as well as more complete records of Soviet SAR efforts.

A CASE STUDY

29 July 1953

Sea of Japan, near Vladivostok
U.S. Air Force RB-50

At 0615 local time on 29 July 1953, an RB-50 with a crew of 17 men was shot down in the Sea of Japan southeast of Vladivostok. Captain John Roche, United States Air Force, the co-pilot, was recovered by the U.S. Navy the next morning, 30 July 1953 at 0419. CPT Roche reported that both he and the pilot, Captain Stan O'Kelley, had managed to bail out. CPT O'Kelley died in Roche's presence in the water awaiting rescue. The bodies of CPT O'Kelley and Master Sergeant Brown, the engineer, were subsequently recovered. The remaining 13 men are unaccounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION . . .

The Russian side of the Joint Commission acknowledges this shutdown. Our Russian counterparts have passed documents to the American side indicating that Soviet authorities at the time believed that the U.S. plane violated Soviet territorial waters in the vicinity of Cape Gamov, flew over Askold Island, and was shot down 15 kilometers south of Askold Island. Initial research by the Russian side indicated that no Soviet patrol craft were in the area of the crash site, although the Russian Delegation did indicate that one Soviet fishing trawler, which was stopped by a U.S. naval vessel, was transiting the area of the crash site. In demarches to the United States government at the time, the Soviet government stated that the aircraft had violated their air space, and opened fire on Soviet fighters when they attempted to point out that the American flight was violating the Soviet state border. The Soviet note stated that, after an exchange of fire with their fighters, the American aircraft "disappeared in the direction of the sea." Further, one Russian-provided debriefing of a participating fighter pilot indicated that "the American aircraft opened fire and inflicted serious damage on one of the Soviet aircraft by piercing the fuselage and left wing and also by destroying the cockpit's hermetic seal." According to a report submitted by Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov at the time, "the violator aircraft broke into pieces and fell flaming into the water at a distance of 15 kilometers to the south of Askold Island." Admiral Kuznetsov's report does not make any mention of survivors, however the Soviet reply to the U.S. demarche stated that "the Soviet government has no information at its disposal about the crew or the whereabouts of the aforementioned aircraft." Finally, documents provided by our Russian counterparts reveal that Soviet signals intelligence units closely monitored the ongoing American search and rescue effort and reported its progress to the Headquarters, Far Eastern Fleet.

THE AMERICAN POSITION . . .

The incident as seen from the American side seems somewhat different. While both sides agree on certain details, such as the approximate time of the incident, or the fact that a Soviet trawler was in the area, the agreement ends here. For example, CPT Roche, the sole survivor, states emphatically that the aircraft was attacked well off the Soviet coastline in international air space. CPT Roche acknowledges that the RB-50 fired on the Soviet fighters, but states that this only was done after the RB-50 was attacked. On 5 August 1953, the United States government delivered a demarche to the Soviet government. This demarche rejected Soviet claims that the shootdown occurred over Soviet territorial waters, or that the RB-50 triggered the shootdown by initially firing on Soviet fighters. Washington's demarche further stated that a "thorough investigation" of the incident had established that 1) the flight was on a "routine navigational training flight"; 2) twelve Soviet patrol boats were seen in the area, "obviously picking up survivors of the crash"; 3) the pilot of an American rescue aircraft spotted four survivors, to whom a liferaft was dropped; and 4) "a second group of three people was detected approximately one-half mile east of where the lifeboat was dropped." Task Force Russia research of U.S. archives, including the "Klaus Files," has uncovered some eyewitness testimony from participants in the American search and rescue operation, as well as Captain Roche's recollections recorded shortly after his rescue. These sources do establish the presence of some twelve Soviet patrol craft in the area of the crash site at approximately 1600 hours, some twelve hours before U.S. Navy vessels arrived in the area to rescue CPT Roche. The archives also clearly establish that American search and rescue personnel observed groups of yellow objects in the water that could have been either survivors or Mae West life vests spilled from the wreck. However, to date, the documentation uncovered by the Task Force does not conclusively demonstrate that the patrol boats which were sighted were actually picking up survivors as described in the U.S. demarche. We do not rule out the possibility that some intelligence reports from other sources were the basis for this statement, reports that have not survived the passage of time. However, as stated, the extant documentation (eyewitness reports) concerning survivors in the water is subject to interpretation, and we continue our research..

CONCLUSIONS . . .

Disagreement over the location of the shootdown, or who opened fire on whom are not the issues that our Commission should address. Our only concern is the fate of the unaccounted for crew members. We believe that there is at least a reasonable chance that some of the men of this flight successfully bailed out, and were subsequently picked up by Soviet patrol craft. To summarize:

1. Both Captains O'Kelley and Roche managed to successfully bail out, in spite of the severe damage inflicted by Soviet fighters. This suggests that others might also have escaped from the stricken aircraft.

2. Interviews with CPT Roche and others who served in the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron suggest that these air crews were well trained and drilled in emergency actions, and wore their parachutes during such flights. The crew of this particular aircraft had practiced escape drills together prior to the mission.

3. Once attacked, CPT O'Kelley sounded the bailout alarm at approximately 18,000 feet. This gave the crew adequate time to bail out.

4. CPT Roche survived nearly twenty-four hours in the water prior to being picked up by an American destroyer. Others from his crew could have survived as well.


5. Any such survivors would have been vulnerable to capture by Soviet patrol boats for almost eight hours prior to the arrival of the U.S. Navy destroyer. The Soviet patrol boats were spotted within range of the wreckage at 1600 hours on the 29th of July. American naval vessels only closed on the crash site some twelve hours later.

6. Based upon the debriefings of the search and rescue personnel, there is at least a reasonable possibility that American search and rescue aircraft spotted other survivors in the water during the daylight hours of 30 July, yet American naval units could not locate anyone other than CPT Roche.

7. There has been persistent, albeit unconfirmed, intelligence reporting since this incident indicating that some members of the crew were picked up by Soviet forces and interned in the Gulag. One retired Russian officer stationed in Vladivostok at the time of the incident told our Commission in December, 1992 that it was widely rumored in Vladivostok at the time that Soviet Maritime Forces had apprehended some survivors of this flight.

8. Finally, during this period of the Cold War, such reconnaissance flights by the American Air Force were understandably viewed as threatening by the Soviet government. A shootdown incident such as this, within easy range of KGB-operated Maritime Border Guard posts, posed an excellent opportunity for the intelligence services to gain control of American intelligence personnel.

In view of the above information, we believe that further efforts are called for in investigating this incident. In particular, while the archives of the Air Defense Forces may contain many documents concerning the shootdown itself (some of which have already been provided by the Russian side), we believe that the matter of possible survivors, their interrogation, and their eventual incarceration would have been matters handled by the KGB in a strictly compartmented manner.



A CASE STUDY

17/18 APRIL 1955
Pacific Ocean, off Kamchatka
U.S. Air Force RB-47

At approximately 11:30 Khabarovsk time on 18 April 1955, an RB-47E assigned to the 4th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, 26th Reconnaissance Wing, with a crew of three was shot down over the Pacific Ocean off the Kamchatka peninsula by Soviet MIG fighters. The aircraft was based at Eielson AB, Alaska. The three crewmen are unaccounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION...

Nearly all information we have gathered about this incident comes from the Russian side. It has passed to the American side documents that indicate that the RB-47, was tracked by Soviet signals intelligence units from 0943 Khabarovsk time. It was located at that time in the vicinity of Cape Lopatka, at the southern end of the Kamchatka peninsula. By 1057 the plane was reported 43 miles southeast of Cape Vasiliev. The Russians stated in the documents that the plane did not violate their borders. Nevertheless, two MIG-15 aircraft were scrambled to intercept it, and did so 32 miles east of Cape Kronotski (approximately 55 degrees N., 164 degrees east) at an altitude of 12,200 meters. From 11:25-27, the MIGs attacked the RB-47, and it left Soviet radar screens at 1140 hours.

The crash site was reported by Soviet fishermen aboard the boat "Komandor." They noted an explosion 13 kilometers west of the settlement of Nikol'skoye on Bering Island, approximately 55 degrees, 50 minutes North, 165 degrees, 50 minutes East.

Soviet intelligence also reported extensively on the American search and rescue (SAR) efforts. The SAR started on 19 April (it must be recalled that the dates used by the Soviets in this analysis are one day ahead of ours, due to the existence of the International Date Line in the area), and lasted four days using over 20 planes in an extensive SAR effort. However, the Soviet conclusion was "from the nature of the search one can suppose that the Americans do not know the place, cause, and time of the plane's destruction." That is, the plane did not go down where the Americans thought it went down, and so they searched in the wrong place.

The Soviets also mounted a search effort, but do not report success.

THE AMERICAN POSITION...

Until 1992 (when Russian documents were received), the U.S. government suspected, but could not prove, that the aircraft was shot down. Contemporary accounts of the incident indicate that in

1955 the Air Force knew only that the RB-47 had failed to return from its mission. The Air Force, in its presumptive finding of death of the crew, said that there was no indication that the plane had been shot down by the Soviets, and no mention is made of survivors. The Air Force describes the U.S. SAR effort as 20 sorties comprising 207 search hours, to no avail. Apparently we had searched for the plane well away from the actual crash site. Finally, since the U.S. Government had no definitive information that the RB-47 was shot down by Soviet MIGs, no demarches were made to Moscow concerning the fate of the crew. The mean water temperature for those waters at that time of the year was approximately 38 degrees Fahrenheit.

CONCLUSIONS...

There is a slim chance for survivors in this case. Crewmen of an RB-47 aircraft can survive a crash: Captains McKone and Olmstead did 5 years later. But unless everything went right for these three men - they survived the attack, their parachutes opened, and they got in a raft almost immediately after hitting the water - or unless Soviet patrol boats were on the scene in record time, they would have soon died of hypothermia in the 38 degree waters of the Northern Pacific.

On the other hand, according to the Russians, the attack took place at high altitude, and some 15 minutes transpired from the initiation of the attack until the RB-47 disappeared from Soviet radar screens. Theoretically, there was ample time to eject/bail out, assuming that the aircraft was not a catastrophic loss when attacked. However, we have no information at this time that sheds light on this, other than the Russian documents, which appear to preclude the survival of the three men.

In view of the above, we should continue our joint research in the Russian archives, to include the Naval Archives at Gatchina. This case, like the other shootdown incidents, cannot be considered closed until all such research has been thoroughly accomplished, to include access to the archives of the KGB. In particular, we request copies of the debriefings of the only possible living witnesses to the shootdown, the Soviet pilots.

A CASE STUDY

10 SEPTEMBER 1956
Sea of Japan
U.S. Air Force RB-50

On 10 September 1956, a USAF RB-50 stationed at Yokota AB, Japan, assigned to the 41st Air Division, 5th Air Force, was lost over the Sea of Japan. There was a very powerful storm, Typhoon Emma, in the area. No distress signal was received, and all sixteen crew members remain unaccounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION...

On 13 November 1956, in response to a 13 October 1956 U.S. request, the Soviet Government informed the American Embassy that they had no information about the airplane or its crew.

The Russian side of the Joint Commission has passed us no documents on this incident and considers it closed.

THE AMERICAN POSITION...

At the time of the loss, the U.S. Government described the plane as a weather flight, sent out to check the typhoon. However, subsequent information confirms that this was an intelligence gathering flight.

The U.S. Government, in a 13 October 1956 note, requested information from the Soviet government on this flight, but the U.S. note was a request for assistance vice a demarche. At the time, a U.S. Air Force spokesman discounted the idea that the RB-50 might have been shot down.

The American search and rescue effort was apparently hampered by Typhoon Emma. Emma was a powerful storm, with winds of at least 140 mph. The winds had reached that level before the weather gauges on Okinawa were blown away by the storm. Elements of the 3rd Air Rescue Group participated in the search, but their effort did not begin until the 12th, possibly due to extremely bad weather. In all, the 3rd flew 8 sorties totalling over 94 hours. They flew what they believed to be the flight plan of the plane, but found nothing. However, the RB-50 could have been blown severely off course, or shot down. We do not know the exact location of the crash.

CONCLUSIONS...

We have no evidence that this plane was shot down by Soviet fighters. However, since the loss incident occurred in an area where the Soviets had shot down other U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, the possibility that it was shot down, however remote, cannot be excluded. Sam Klaus apparently did not suspect that

this was a shutdown, and prepared no case for the International Court of Justice.

Regardless of the cause of the aircraft's loss, the question of survivors must be addressed. In this connection, Typhoon Emma severely hindered American search and rescue efforts, and would have done the same to any similar Soviet effort. Furthermore, the typhoon would have made survival in the water all but impossible, should any of the crew have survived the crash.

While the preponderance of available information would thus argue against a shutdown scenario or the possibility of survivors, it is still possible that the remains of some crew members could have come into Soviet hands. We have already provided our Russian colleagues a list of the sixteen men and requested that they check their records accordingly.

A CASE STUDY

2 September 1958
Soviet Armenia, near Yerevan
U.S. Air Force C-130

On 2 September 1958, a U.S. Air Force C-130 carrying seventeen personnel was attacked and shot down by Soviet fighter aircraft in Soviet airspace. The aircraft crashed and burned approximately 55 kilometers northwest of Yerevan, Soviet Armenia. Subsequent to the incident, the Soviet government repatriated six sets of human remains to American officials. Four of the remains were identified, leaving a total of thirteen unaccounted for personnel (of whom only eleven can be in Russia).

THE RUSSIAN POSITION . . .

The Soviet government initially denied that its forces had shot down this aircraft, while acknowledging that it had indeed crashed in Soviet territory. The Soviets returned the six sets of remains within two weeks of the incident. However, as late as August, 1959, the Central Committee drafted for Khrushchev's signature a response to a letter from U.S. Vice President Nixon concerning this flight, stating that "on 2 September 1958 no Soviet fighter downed an American aircraft and that on that day a U.S. military aircraft crashed near Yerevan." Subsequently, documents provided to the U.S. Delegation of the Commission in 1992 establish definitively that the aircraft was shot down by Soviet air defense forces after violating the border, that the wreckage was exploited in detail for documents or other information that could establish its mission, that Soviet radio intercept units monitored the American search and rescue effort, and that documents and artifacts obtained from the crash site were passed to the KGB. A copy of one Central Committee document, formerly "Secret", describes preparations by the Soviet government to send a demarche to the U.S. government on 12 September. The Soviet document describes an American note on the incident as having "an obviously provocative tone." It recommends that the government reject the American request to visit the crash site, observing that "the area where the plane went down is considered a border region where foreigners are not allowed and access by the Americans would be nonproductive." According to this document, Moscow entrusted the repatriation of the six sets of remains to the KGB. Another declassified report from Andre Gromyko to the Central Committee, dated 7 December 1958, relates that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington was invited to the Department of State by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Murphy, who asserted that 1) the aircraft had been lured into Soviet territory by a Soviet radar beacon; 2) that "eyewitnesses" had seen parachutists exit the aircraft; and, 3) that some of the eleven unaccounted for crew members could possibly be alive. Gromyko also reports to the Central Committee that Ambassador Murphy asserted that the United States had a tape recording of conversations between Soviet pilots and controllers that proved the incident was a shootdown, and that articles in a Soviet military

journal" also proved this fact. The Soviet Ambassador refused to listen to the tapes, and "rejected the Americans' conjectures" relating to the articles. Other relevant documents obtained by the Commission include a 3 September 1958 report of the forensic investigation done on the remains of the crew members. This report commences with a "Preliminary Information" section, which states that "The foreign aircraft, shot down over Soviet territory on 2 September 1958 at 1506 hours began to burn, started to disintegrate while in the air, and fell in flames to the earth 44 km south of the city of Leninakan." The report contains a detailed description of the charred human remains, and concludes, "Based on the examination of the remains of the foreign aircraft crew, I ascertain that the charred remains of the human bodies at the crash site of the aircraft are those of seven human corpses." (Note: U.S. forensic specialists disagreed, concluding that there were only six sets among the remains repatriated.) Finally, on 21 January 1993, personnel of Task Force Russia were able to read a 4 September 1958 Soviet investigating commission's report of this incident at the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense in Podolsk. The report was comprehensive, and provided new information, such as the names of the Soviet pilots who actually shot down the C-130, a detailed description of the action itself, gun camera photography, and the fact that approximately seven to ten minutes elapsed from the beginning of the attack until the aircraft crashed. The report does not mention any information on possible parachutists exiting the aircraft prior to the crash.

THE AMERICAN POSITION . . .

This is the only Cold War shootdown incident which the United States has acknowledged resulted from a violation of Soviet air space. The U.S. government initially described the aircraft as "a transport type aircraft" performing a "routine operational mission over Turkey," which, "in the vicinity of the Turkish-Soviet border ... was intercepted and attacked by Soviet fighter aircraft." The American side was able to obtain a tape recording of the actual attack, and attempted unsuccessfully, as described above, to play it for the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. One of the most definitive documents in the U.S. archives concerning this flight is a 31 August 1959 Department of the Air Force document entitled, "Continuance of Missing Status Beyond Twelve Months (Case 546)." This document summarizes information developed in the twelve months since the incident, which includes several unconfirmed reports that some crew members might have parachuted from the aircraft. The document concludes that 1) "Past experience has demonstrated that the USSR has deliberately withheld or distorted information concerning the whereabouts or fate of UN personnel who have disappeared in territory controlled by Communist countries"; 2) that the missing status of the crew should not be terminated "until the State Department and the intelligence agencies have explored and exhausted all available means to procure the complete details of the whereabouts and fate of these men;" and, 3) "the personnel herein considered may be living and that any change in their status on this date is beyond the safe calculated risk of error." In addition to this report, the files of Dr. Samuel Klaus, former Department of State official, contain considerable documentation pertaining to this incident, to include additional, albeit unconfirmed, indications of possible survivors. Klaus himself was apparently convinced as a result of his personal, exhaustive investigation, that some of the men of this flight survived and were captured by the Soviets. Finally, the Task Force

notes that the 15 January 1961 issue of the Soviet magazine "Ogonyok" contains an article concerning cold war shootdowns written by an East German, Wolfgang Schreyer, which indicates that eleven of the crew were able to parachute from the plane on the outskirts of Yerevan. However, the Task Force has obtained a copy of the original German-language version of this article, which contains no mention of parachutists or survivors.

CONCLUSIONS . . .

All available information indicates that no one who might have remained in the C-130 at the time of the actual crash could have survived the impact and fire. Thus, we are left with the issue of whether or not any of the crew were able to exit the aircraft in the course of the attack.

1. The high altitude (Soviet documents say 10,000 meters) and the duration of the attack (Soviet estimate: seven to ten minutes; American estimate: five minutes) were favorable for the possibility of bailout. The Air Force 13 August 1959 report describes the aircraft's internal configuration in detail, and concludes that "Operational personnel estimate that it would require only 30 seconds (emphasis in original report) after warning for the eleven special operators to bail out using all available escape exits." The Air Force report also states that "The crew had been briefed to wear parachutes throughout the mission."


2. No single report concerning parachutists is convincing; some, indeed, lack credibility or are simply rumors. However, there is sufficient information concerning the possibility of parachutists/survivors that, in conjunction with the information in paragraph 1, above, it cannot be dismissed. One report of interest found in the Klaus files indicates that several Armenian citizens fled to Turkey shortly after the incident, claiming that they were afraid the authorities would retaliate against them for harboring American parachutists. Investigators were dispatched to Turkey to interview these refugees, but their reports are not extant.

3. One Soviet pilot reported that he observed debris breaking away from the tail of the aircraft. Could he have seen men exiting the aircraft?

4. As with all of these shootdowns, should any of the intelligence specialists or other crew members have fallen into Soviet hands, there would have been considerable incentive to keep them for long-term exploitation. Unlike shootdowns over international waters, in the case of this incident, the Soviets had undisputed, long-term access to the site, with no competition from American search and rescue forces.

We have much more work to do before we will be able to resolve this incident. The documents provided so far by the Russian Delegation of the Commission make it clear that the KGB had an interest in this event and played a role. As in the case of the other incidents, we have not yet seen the archives of the intelligence services on this one. Similarly, we should strive to locate the participating pilots, Senior Lieutenants Lapotkov and Gavrilov, and interview them. On the American side, we should persevere in our attempts

to locate any U.S. documents that indicate the possibility of survivors--particularly refugee reports from Armenians. An advertisement in the Armenian emigre press in Fresno, California would be well advised, as would a trip by the Commission to Armenia, with attendant publicity. Finally, we should interview Wolfgang Schreyer to resolve the discrepancy between the two versions of this incident attributed to him.



A CASE STUDY

1 July 1960
Barents Sea
U.S. Air Force RB-47

On 1 July 1960, an RB-47 aircraft stationed at Brize-Norton AB, England, assigned to the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, carrying a crew of six, was shot down by Soviet fighters during the conduct of a reconnaissance mission. American search and rescue efforts were unsuccessful. Soviet trawlers picked up two survivors, Captains John R. McKone and Freeman B. Olmstead, and the body of the pilot, Captain Willard G. Palm, all later repatriated. The Soviets in October 1960 recovered the body of Major Eugene E. Posa. The remaining two members of the crew are unaccounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION...

The Russians have passed us documents dealing mainly not with the shootdown itself but with the repatriation of the survivors and of Palm's body.

The Soviets shot down the plane north of Cape Svyatoi Nos (Holy Nose). The Soviets stated that the plane had violated Soviet airspace within the 12 mile limit. The American survivors contended that they were a full 50 miles off the Soviet coast when the attack took place.

Soviet maritime vessels picked up the two survivors and Palm's body from the Barents Sea. McKone and Olmstead were taken to Moscow and put in Lubyanka Prison, where they were interrogated at great length by Soviet security services. Palm's body was returned to American control by the end of July, 1960.

The USSR tried McKone and Olmstead much as they had done with Francis Gary Powers a few months earlier. Although the two Americans were found guilty of espionage, as an overture to the new Kennedy Administration they were released in January, 1961.

Documents passed to us by the Russians also indicate that the body of Major Eugene E. Posa was raised from the waters of the Barents Sea in October, 1960. The body was supposed to have been transferred on 17 October 1960 to Severomorsk. Also, a report from October, 1961, indicates that a Soviet trawler raised "part of a human leg (a foot and part of a shin).. one boot and a blue wool sock." This was badly decomposed and was thrown back into the sea by the trawler's captain.

THE AMERICAN POSITION...

The record on the U.S. side is fairly complete, to include a book on the incident called "The Little Toy Dog," written in 1962.

The record shows that the RB-47 took off from Brize-Norton on 1 July, followed its flight plan around Norway, then south parallel to the Kola Peninsula, then a left turn parallel to the northern coast of the USSR, and, if it had been allowed to continue, to the turnaround point west of Novaya Zemlya. By U.S. reckoning, the plane never got closer than 30 miles from the Soviet coast.

McKone and Olmstead saw each other and the blackened form of one other airman on the way down after bailing out. The blackened form was wrapped in his parachute and was dropping like a rock toward the water. They saw the plane blow up over the open ocean. They saw no other crew members as they parachuted to Earth.

The U.S. immediately mounted a search and rescue effort, but given the distance involved from England to the shootdown site, the attempt was late and imprecise, since the exact location of loss was not known.

Diplomatically, the U.S. immediately demarched the USSR for information on the flight, and after the Soviets admitted holding two survivors on July 11, tirelessly worked bilaterally and in the United Nations to secure their return.

CONCLUSIONS...

There are still three men unaccounted for from this flight. First, the remains of Major Posa must be found and returned to U.S. control. Could the remaining two crewmembers have survived the flight? It is certainly possible - two airmen did survive. So others could have been plucked out of the Barents Sea, too.

On the other hand, the two known survivors were returned. Why would the Soviets give two back and keep two others? One theory is that because the two missing men were intelligence specialists, while McKone and Olmstead were pilots.

To determine the fate of the three remaining missing American servicemen, we should request at a minimum the following documents from the Russian Archives: the debriefings of McKone and Olmstead, the incident report filed by the pilot who shot down the plane, Captain Vasily Polyakov, and the reports filed by the trawlers who searched for survivors in the Barents Sea.

A CASE STUDY

14 December 1965
Black Sea
U.S. Air Force RB-57

On 14 December, 1965, an RB-57 aircraft assigned to the 7407 Support Squadron in Germany, on temporary duty in Turkey, with a crew of two aboard, was lost over the southern Black Sea. The two crewmen are unaccounted for.

THE RUSSIAN POSITION...

On 24 December 1965, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov called in U.S. Ambassador Kohler and, in a carefully worded prepared statement, lectured him about U.S. reconnaissance flights near Soviet borders, to include the 14 December flight. Kohler asked specifically for information about the incident and raised questions about Soviet interference with the plane. Kuznetsov would not elaborate on his prepared remarks.

We have received no information from the Russian side of the Joint Commission on this incident.

THE AMERICAN POSITION...

At the time, despite initial concerns about Soviet involvement, after a careful reading of all available information, U.S. officials found no indications that the Soviets were involved with this loss. We have uncovered nothing new on this incident.

Search and rescue efforts were carried out by the Turkish Navy until 24 December 1965. Wreckage from the plane was found and delivered to U.S. authorities. The wreckage shows no obvious signs that the plane had been attacked by hostile aircraft (e.g. no bullet holes). No survivors were found.

CONCLUSIONS...

We have no evidence that the Soviets were involved in the loss of this aircraft. Nevertheless, regardless of the cause of the aircraft's loss, the question of survivors must be addressed. Although there seemed to be no organized Soviet search effort, the possibility still exists that remains of crew members could have come into Soviet hands. We have provided our Russian colleagues the names of the two men and request that they check their records accordingly.