~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

H358

PERSPECTIVE TRANSFORMED IMAGERY (U)

7 August 1980

#535

Copy: 1 of 1

Control Number: 615529-1-/

202 Pages

Classified By: Source Material, JCS

Review On: 30 June 2000

Declassified by
DDO/NCC
20 Nov 92

~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PERSPECTIVE TRANSFORMED IMAGERY (U)

(U) This document contains five (5) copies each of forty (40) photos, as follows:

1. 15 feet above ground, 100 feet from building, annotated FAR LOW. 12 photos x 5 copies = 60 sheets

2. 15 feet above ground, 50 feet from building, annotated NEAR LOW. 12 photos x 5 copies = 60 sheets

3. 115 feet above ground, 100 feet from building, annotated FAR HIGH. 4 photos x 5 copies = 20 sheets

4. 115 feet above ground, 50 feet from building, annotated NEAR HIGH. 12 photos x 5 copies = 60 sheets

Each photo also is annotated with a number indicating which "clock" angle it is taken from. E.g., 1200 means a photo of the north face, 0100 is 30° over, etc. Figure 1 illustrates this.



Figure 1. Scene Geometry (U)


OBSCURED AREA
FACE 1


OBSCURED
AREA



FACE 5

FACE 6



FACE 7

FACE 8

FACE 8


FACE 10


FACE 11

FACE 12

COMPOSITE OF EAST END

G-625

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDonmcc
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON DADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

MSG121
111700R DEC 79
FM JTF/J2
TO [redacted]RGR/S2
INFO DELTA/S2
JTF FORWARD/MG GAST

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: EEI SUPPORT

REF: DELTA 099 DTG 101630R DEC

1. DATA ON NAIN AND MANZARIYEH AIRFIELDS BEING REEXAMINED IN LIGHT OF YOUR QUESTIONS. FINAL PRODUCT WILL BE PROVIDED VIA TTY OR COURIER AS APPROPRIATE. LT COL [redacted] HANDCARRIED [redacted]

(C) 2. THE FOLLOWING IS INTERIM RESPONSE AND MAY BE MODIFIED IN FINAL PRODUCT. [redacted]

A. NAIN MILITARY AIRFIELD

1. AIRFIELD/TRAINING SITE IS IN CARETAKER STATUS WITH PROBABLE DAY LIGHT PRESENCE OF 30-50 PERSONNEL DROPPING TO 10-15 AT NIGHT AND ON IRANIAN WEEKEND (THURSDAY/FRIDAY)

2. SITE WAS/IS ELECTRONIC WARFARE TRAINING RANGE SUPPORT AREA WHICH IS LARGELY INACTIVE AT THIS TIME. NORMAL AIR BASE SECURITY FOR NON TACTICAL UNIT IS IN EXISTENCE MINIMUM GUARD FORCE STRENGTH ESTIMATED AT SIX PERSONNEL. SMALL ARMS ARMORY IN MAIN SUPPORT BLDG.

3. SITE IS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE SERVICED BY TELEPHONE ALTHOUGH THIS CANNOT BE CONFIRMED. [redacted]

4. VEHICLE TRAFFIC PATTERNS ARE BEING DEVELOPED FOR THE NAIN AIRFIELD AREA BUT IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH FULL 24 HOUR SURVEILANCE.

5. ALTHOUGH THE RUNWAY IS USEABLE THERE IS NO ROUTINE AIR TRAFFIC INTO/OUT OF AIRFIELD. THE PURPOSE OF THE RUNWAY WAS TO PROVIDE AIR ACCESS FOR STUDENTS WHEN THE ELECTRONIC RANGE WAS ACTIVE FOR TRAINING.

6. THERE ARE NO KNOWN NAV AIDS ON THE AIRFIELD.

7. REINFORCEMENT WOULD COME FROM THE TOWN OF NAIN APPROXIMATELY 12 NM SW.

8. THERE IS NO GOOD LOCATION TO HIDE MC 130 AIRCRAFT DURING DAYLITE HOURS. PARTIAL SCREENING CAN BE OBTAINED FOR THE RH53 BY POSITIONING IN THE SA-3 SITE AND BEHIND THE RADAR MOUND.

9. SELECTION OF BEST AVENUE OF APPROACH MUST BE LEFT TO GROUND FORCE PLANNERS BASED ON CONTINUING ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE. PHOTO COVERAGE WILL BE CONTINUED AS LONG AS NAIN REMAINS A CANDIDATE SITE.

10. NO INFORMATION IN HAND ON AVAILABILITY OF APU. REMOTE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT A UNIT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE BUT OPERATIONAL STATUS WOULD BE QUESTIONAL. [redacted]

PARAGRAPH
1,2,3,4 ANALYSIS OF ACTIVITY LEVELS AT SITES 1-4 IS BEING CONDUCTED AND WILL BE PROVIDED AS COMPLETED. BASICALLY VERY LIMITED ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED AT ANY OF THE LOCATIONS [redacted]

5. DOUBTFUL IF OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE MOBILE CONTROL SITE AS NO AIR ACTIVITY WAS NOTED ON THE AIRFIELD IN MORE THAN 90 DAYS.

6. PRECISE PURPOSE OF THE BLDGS SOUTH OF BLEACHERS IS UNKNOWN BUT LOCATION AND APPEARANCE WOULD INDICATE USE AS VIP PERSONNEL SHELTERS AND POSSIBLE REST FACILITES. NO ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED AT THESE BUILDINGS ON THE AIRFIELD PROPER.

7. PURPOSE OF U/I VEHICLES NORTH OF AIRFIELD IS RANGE TARGETS. THE VEHICLES ARE DERELICT AND HAVE BEEN PRESENT AT THE SAME LOCATION SINCE FEB 77, WITH THE ONLY EXCEPTION BEING THE ADDITION OF TWO MORE VEHICLE HULKS PRIOR TO MAY 1979. FOR REFERENCE PURPOSES TARGET VEHICLES ARE LOCATED ON GRID REF 20/LIMA ON MANZARIEYH PHOT PRODUCT.

8. VEHICLE TRAFFIC REPORT REQUESTED [redacted] AVAILABILITY ONE WEEK.

9. MOST LIKELY REACTION FORCE WOULD BE FROM THE AMMUNITION DEPOT FIVE MILES SOUTH. FORCE COULD NUMBER UP TO A-REINFORCED COMPANY EQUIVALENT COMPOSED OF KHOMEINI SUPPORTERS FROM AMONG THE LOW RANKING SOLDIERS. TRANSPOT WOULD BE VIA TRUCK AND ROUTE IF APPROACH WOULD BE ALONG MSR AND NEW HIGHWAY. SOME REINFORCEMENT MIGHT BE EXPECTED FROM THE SUPPORT SITE (ANNOTATION C) LOCATED TWO MILES SOUTH OF THE MAIN AIRFIELD AND THE TARGET VEHICLE SUPPORT AREA (ANNOTATION B). REACTION TIME COULD VARY FROM NIL IF NO EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS IS PERMITTED AND AIRFIELD CONTROL CAN BE ATTAINED WITHOUT MAJOR FIREFIGHT TO UNORGANIZED REINFORCED COMPANY EQUIVALENT WITHIN 30 MINUTES IF NOTIFICATION OF TAKEOVER IS COMMUNICATED TO THE AMMO DEPOT AND/OR QOM-TEHRAN ARMY OR RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES.

10. THE QUESTION OF AIR REACTION IS HIGH DEBATEABLE. WORST CASE ALLOWS FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT [redacted]ZARIYEH OCCUPPATION IS DETECTED AND AIR AUTHORITIES LINK IT TO RESCUE EFFORT. IF THIS RECOGNITION OCCURRS WITHIN 20 MINUTES AFTER THE COMPOUND ASSAULT IS DETECTED THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ON ALERT AND/OR AMBITIOUS HELICOPTER PILOTS MIGHT ATTEMPT TO INTERICT FORCE ON THE GROUND AT MANZARIYEH. ESTIMATE MAXIMUM SAFE GROUND TIME AFTER DETECTION AND ALARM SPREAD TO BE ONE HOUR.
RVW 11 DEC 09

[redacted]

TOP SECRET [redacted] H-11

Item Number: ____

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW REQUIRED
CLASSIFIED ON: 20 NOV 92
CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
REVIEW ON: OADR
DERIVED FROM: [redacted]
Multiple Sources

SUBJECT: Deployed J2 Operations

TIMEFRAME: 19-26 April 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (S/[redacted]) Two J2 personnel deployed to [redacted] with JTF main body. J2 deployment checklist is at Attachment 1. [redacted] had earlier deployed their personnel and communications equipment. [redacted] had also established their communications equipment early at Wadi Kena, however, their personnel deployed with JTF main body.

2. (S/[redacted]) [redacted] support elements were adjacent to the J2 element which was co-located with the JTF staff in one of the MIG-21 bunkers at the airfield. [redacted] JTF intelligence operations, less [redacted] weather, operated from this bunker. Weather operations were conducted from unique weather trailers.

3. (S/[redacted]) The forward JTF element had allocated sufficient space for J2 operations in the bunker and had built wooden partitions upon which the necessary graphics could be hung. The physical arrangements allowed ready access between J2, [redacted] elements and permitted a fully integrated J2/J3 operation.

4. (S/[redacted]) The primary J2 functions were to request, receive, analyze, and disseminate the latest intelligence received from [redacted] and DIA (through JCSE channels). Additional

CLASSIFIED BY COMJTF
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

[redacted]

TOP SECRET [redacted]

requirements that surfaced are identified in the after-action report (Attachment 2), along with problem areas and recommendations.

5. (U) (TS) Due to the small size of the J2 element (2 personnel) and the numerous unexpected requirements, both J2 personnel operated full time from 20-23 April (approximately 0600-2400). Beginning on 24 April, both J2 personnel remained fully operational through the execution phase.

COMMENTS:

1. (S) (TS) No insurmountable problems arose for the forward J2 element at any time. Support from [redacted] and the Response Cell/DIA was outstanding. [redacted] support was satisfactory, but, except for one instance, [redacted] was confined to political/economic developments that had little impact on JTF operations at that stage. The one exception to this was th[redacted]

[redacted]

2. (U) (TS) The most significant problem concerned personnel. The deployed J2 element must have a minimum of 3-4 personnel assigned in order to be fully supportive of COMJTF, J3, and subordinate elements.

RECOMMENDATIONS: See Attachment 2.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Major [redacted] (USA), ODCSOPS, DA

Captain [redacted] (USA), DIA

POINTS OF CONTACT: None.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. J2 deployment checklist

2. (C) After Action Report, J[redacted]

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION

That all planning elements develope an intelligence data base for primary and alternate mission prior to deployment, to preclude excessive tasking of limited J-2 assets.

PHASE: EXECUTION

The primary goal of intelligence reporting during execution was to

[redacted] to the JTF, so that [redacted] could be provided to the COMJTF.

Once the mission was aborted, [redacted]

CHALLENGE

Once the helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft had launched, the normal teletype message flow from [redacted] and the USS NIMITZ decreased significantly. In order to avoid this indication of impending action, J-2 attempted to transmit dummy messages to those locations. This action could not be accomodated due to the communications arrangement that existed, i.e., sending teletype messages would eliminate the voice capability of the communications equipment.

RECOMMENDATION

That provisions be made in communications planning for transmission of dummy message traffic during execution, in order to maintain a constant electronic signature.

[redacted]

prevented rapid dissemination of intelligence to subordinate elements located at [redacted]. Secondly, on numerous occasions, messages received through JCSE and addressed to J-2 were not delivered to J-2. Rather, the copy was provided to other elements who had a direct interest in the information contained in the report, e.g., KC-135 personnel.

RECOMMENDATION

1. (U) That a xerox capability be provided at the JTF CP.

2. (U) That communications personnel provide all intelligence messages directly to the J-2.

CHALLENGE

[redacted] J-2 barely managed to provide adequate support with only two personnel assigned. The need to have two intelligence personnel present for duty at all times was obvious.

Need minimum of 3 OK RZ

(U) RECOMMENDATION

That a minimum of three intelligence personnel deploy with the JTF.

OK

CHALLENGE

[redacted] Re-transmission of [redacted] to the helicopter detachment and to [redacted] was a problem due to the classification of the messages. Although both recipients could receive and maintain codeword material, not all JCSE personnel at the JTF were cleared for this material. Further, the possibility of inadvertant compromise by the placing of codeword material in uncontrolled message logs and files was significant. Sanitization of this material before re-transmission was time consuming and did not allow a torn-tape capability.

RECOMMENDATION

(S) That [redacted] provide sanitized reports to the JTF, or that [redacted] re-format the reports with a tear line to assist in re-transmission of sanitized versions.

OK

CHALLENGE

[redacted] Planners for the KC-135 and C-141 aircraft arrived at [redacted] with virtually no knowledge of the intelligence situation as it applied to their missions.

NIMITZ and to the 1st SOW forward element at [redacted]. Besides the normal assimilation and distribution of intelligence, J-2 personnel undertook final coordination of previously conducted planning and responded to intelligence requirements that had not been forseen during planning. The most significant actions were as follows:

(S) (FRD) 1. J-3 briefing for [redacted] concerning the operational details of the rescue plan. This was essential to insure [redacted]

(S) (FRD) 2. Final agreement between SWO and S-2, 1st SOW on timing of weather briefings for 1st SOW crews.

(S) (FRD) 3. Coordination between S-2, 1st SOW and KC-135/C-141 personnel resulting in S-2, 1st SOW providing KC-135/C-141 crew briefings.

(S) (FRD) 4. Preparation of approximately 30 E&E packets for KC-135, C-141, and [redacted] personnel.

(S) (FRD) 5. KC-135/C-141 crews had virtually no knowledge of Iranian and other Persian Gulf countries' air defense capabilities nor the probability of detection. J-2 provided intelligence data required for these elements to plan their various flight routes.

A, E (S) (FRD) 6. J-2 coordinated with S-2, [redacted] anger Bn for establishment of a temporary PW holding facility at [redacted]

A (S) (FRD) 7. J-2 coordinated with COMJTF, S-2, 1st SOW, and JTF [redacted] for AC-130 deception at [redacted] during Night 2 operations.

A, C, E (S) (FRD) 8. [redacted] on added importance, when the 1st SOW advised that MC-130's would have to refuel before returning to [redacted] on Night 1. [redacted] the Response Cell, and the USS NIMITZ provided sufficient informatio[redacted]

A, C (S) (FRD) 9. Final intelligence reports from [redacted] were received through [redacted] and were re-transmitted to CTOD-D at Masirah immediately prior to launch of the MC-130's.

C (S) (FRD) CHALLENGE

Message distribution was less than adequate. Only one copy of messages received through JCSE and [redacted] was provided to J-2. This

[redacted]

to ALL operating

the JTF be applied [redacted] personnel agencies in support of the JTF

PARTICULARLY those whose EXTERNAL ACTIVITY SIGNATURE would change IF PERSONNEL KNEW the deployment was REAL. RJ

[redacted]

PHASE: ESTABLISHMENT OF ISB/J-2 (Site Alpha)

(U) (FS) Immediately upon arrival at [redacted] J-2 personnel (2 officers) and J-3 organized and established the J-2/J-3 work areas in the JTF CP bunker. Of primacy, was the organization of the various graphics--charts, maps, execution displays--to facilitate planning, briefing, intelligence analysis, and coordinating the operation upon execution. No problems were encountered in this regard. Having constructed several maps consisting of numerous sheets, e.g., JOGS, prior to deployment saved considerable time during this phase.

(S) (FS) The amount of room provided for J-2 and supporting intelligence elements was sufficient. The [redacted] elements were co-located in the JTF CP bunker approximately 15 feet from the J-2. The physical set-up for these elements was satisfactory, and their close proximity to the J-2 provided an excellent working environment for intelligence support.

(S) (FS) Since [redacted] and JCSE communication links were established prior to the arrival of the JTF at [redacted] intelligence operations began almost immediately after arrival of the JTF. Both the [redacted] personnel briefed the J-2 on their capabilities and the procedures they had established for their elements. J-2 then briefed both elements on their requirements in support of J-2 and the manner in which they would provide intelligence support.

PHASE: PRE-LAUNCH

(S) (FS) Intelligence arrived continuously through the three separate communications channels: [redacted] and JCSE. Secure telephone to the Response Cell, [redacted] provided an excellent back-up capability. However, during these periods in which the satellite communication channel was inoperative, we lost [redacted] JCSE, and secure telephone capability. Using [redacted] a channel was established for the transmission of [redacted] and Response Cell intelligence to the JTF during these periods.

(S) (FS) Intelligence was provided to the CCMJTF and the staff on an update basis. No formal briefings were conducted at the JTF. A read-file of all pertinent intelligence was available to staff members and intelligence personnel of subordinate units. Subordinate units were required to read the intelligence reports and extract applicable data, since only one copy of each report was provided J-2. Intelligence reports were also forwarded to th[redacted]

AFTER ACTION REPORT

E (C) J2 [redacted]

PHASE: PRE-DEPLOYMENT

(S) J-2 began preparing deployment foot-lockers containing intelligence materials approximately one month prior to receipt of the deployment order. A detailed listing had been prepared of intelligence products that would be required to support the deployed J-2 operation at [redacted]. A final check was made with SFOD-D to insure that all critical items were being taken by either SFOD-D or J-2. [redacted] to assist operational planners in the event of a significant change in the operational concept once the JTF had arrived at [redacted].

(S) Final coordination was made with DIA, [redacted] concerning intelligence support from those agencies to the JTF at [redacted] and the Response Cell in the Pentagon. Communications personnel from [redacted] and the JCSE moved forward to [redacted] before the JTF main body, established communication links to CONUS, and began receiving intelligence reports.

(S) J-2 contacted all of the monitors and coordinated their link-up with SFOD-D at [redacted]. J-2 coordinated with CIA [redacted]

(U)

CHALLENGE

Once the deployment order was received and a date for deployment of the JTF was set, a deception plan concerning a training exercise was implemented. The objective of the deception was to hide the reality of the JTF deployment and the imminent execution of the rescue option. The objective WAS MET AS PLANNED. Activity went forward on the basis of AN EXERCISE deployment. Some personnel on the JTF staff who were programmed to deploy were not formally advised of the actual deployment until 2-3 days after receipt of the order. Consequently, they functioned for a period of time under the misconception that another training exercise was scheduled. AFTER the FACT this WAS CONSIDERED PERSONALLY OBJECTIONABLE by A FEW INDIVIDUALS but totally UNDERSTOOD by the MAJORITY. [redacted]

(U)

RECOMMENDATION

1. That any deception plan to hide the actual deployment of

~~TOP SECRET~~

INTEL ITEMS FOR DEPLOYMENT

ITEM	NUMBER
ANNEX B/OPORD	1 cy
INTEL ESTIMATE #5	1 cy
OB/GUARD FOLDER	1 cy
TEHRAN OB/AIR OB	1 cy
BACKGROUND FOLDER	1 cy
DIA RADAR CHARTS (3)	3 cys
[redacted]	1 cy
HOSTAGE DATA	1 folder
HOSTAGE DEBRIEF	2 sets
HOSTAGE PHOTOS	2 sets
HOSTAGE VIDEO TAPES	1 cy
BLUEPRINTS OF BUILDINGS	2 cys
WEATHER PACKAGE	
TIME CONVERSION CHARTS	
E&E POINTEE-TALKEE	
BLOOD CHITS	
TRANSLATIONS OF BLOOD CHITS	

DMA ROUTE PRODUCTS

GARMSAR	25
TEHRAN EAST APPROACH #3	25
TEHRAN-KARAJ	25
TEHRAN-MANZARIYEH	25

DMA SPECIAL MAP PRODUCTS

1:50,000 TEHRAN SPECIAL	25
1:25,000 CITY PLAN (4 SHEETS)	4
B/W CITY PLAN W/EMBASSIES	25
COLOR CITY MAPS	25
TEHRAN EAST APPROACH (PLASTIC)	25
ONC NORTH (PLASTIC)	50
ONC SOUTH (PLASTIC)	50
IRAN ROAD MAP (PLASTIC)	50
IRAN ROAD MAP (PAPER)	50

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

DMA PHOTO-GRIDDED PRODUCTS	
COMPOUND-STADIUM	12
MANZARIYEH	12
MEHRABAD	12
NAIN AIRFIELD	12
DESERT TRACK #1	50

DIA PHOTO MATERIAL	LATEST/BEST
COMPOUND	3/3
STADIUM	3/3
MFA	3/3
MEHRABAD	3/3
KARAJ	3/3
SEMNAN NEW	3/3
NAMAK	3/3
ANARAK	3/3
DARBAND	3/3
DESERT TRACK #1	3/3
BLIVET DROP LOCATIONS	
A.	3/3
B.	3/3
C.	3/3
D.	3/3
GHOST AIRFIELD	3/3
TRANSFER AREA (CAVANSERY)	3/3
STAGING SITE (WAREHOUSE)	3/3

JTF PLANNING BOOKS	
TRUCK ROUTE	1 cy
HELICOPTER ROUTE	1 cy
EMERGENCY LZ's	1 cy
CRITICAL FACILITIES	1 cy
DMA DATA POINT REDCUTIONS	1 cy

~~TOP SECRET~~

MC&G MATERIALS

GNC 12	5 cys	(1: 5,000,000)
JNC 35, 36, 22, 23	5 cys	(1: 2,000,000)
ONC G4, G5, G6, H6, H7	5 cys	(1: 1,000,000)
TPC G5A, G5B, G5C, G5D H6B, H7A, H7B, H7D	5 cys	(1: 500,000)
JOG NI 39-1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8	10 cys	(TEHRAN/SEMNAN/MANZARIYEH)
NI 39-11, 12, 15, 16	10 cys	(NAIN/ESFAHAN)
NI 40-10	10 cys	(DESERT TRACK) (1: 250,000
ALL OTHERS [NH 39, 40, 41 NG 39, 40, 41 NI 38, 39, 40, 41 NJ 38, 39, 40, 41]	2 cys	

FLIGHT SUPPORT MATERIALS

FLIP CHART L19/L20	4 cys
FLIP CHART H13/H14	4 cys
FLIP CHART L15/L16	4 cys
FLIP CHART L17/L18	4 cys
ENROUTE SUPPL-E/NA/ME	4 cys
FLIP (VOL 1) PUB TERM E/NA/ME	4 cys
FLIP (VOL 2) PUB TERM E/NA/ME	4 cys
MIL AVN NOTICE E/NA/ME	4 cys

DEBRIEF SUPPORT MATERIALS

- HOSTAGE DEBRIEF FORMS
- TAPE RECORDER AND TAPES
- SHORT WAVE RADIO
- SPARE BATTERIES

ADMIN/MESSAGE SUPPORT

- DD 173 (OVERPRINTED)
- MANIFOLD PAPER (CARBON)
- LARGE FOAM BRIEFING BOARDS

~~TOP SECRET~~

W/

H78

[redacted]

191600Z MAR 80

H78

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92 DAO/NMCC
DERIVATIVE CL BY ~~Multiple Sources~~
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] Multiple Sources

FM: JTF/J2
TO: SFOD/S2
[redacted]
1 SOW/A2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

(C)

1. INCREASED HOSTILITY AMONG SOME LEADING IRANIAN RELIGIOUS FIGURES AND PUBLIC DISPUTES AMONG POLITICAL LEADERS ARE CONTRIBUTING TO THE ALREADY UNSTABLE ADMINISTRATION IN TEHRAN. WITHIN THE THEOCRACY, OPEN DISAGREEMENTS HAVE ARISEN BETWEEN AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI AND A LEADING CLERIC IN MASHHAD, AYATOLLAH QOMI, WHO [redacted] HAS SPOKEN OUT AGAINST CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES AS WELL AS THE CONSTITUTION. ON THE POLITICAL SCENE, THERE REPORTEDLY IS A GROWING NUMBER OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES AND THE ADMINISTRATION IN TEHRAN AS WELL AS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ITSELF. [redacted]

2. PRESIDENT BANI-SADR TOLD A FRENCH INTERVIEWER RECENTLY THAT KHOMEINI WAS "IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT AS REGARDS THE DANGER OF PARALLEL DECISION-MAKING CENTERS." ACCORDING TO BANI-SADR, KHOMEINI WILL PRONOUNCE ON THIS POINT IN AN IRANIAN NEW YEAR MESSAGE ON MARCH 21. BANI-SADR IS QUOTED AS SAYING "IRAN CANNOT STAND THE PARALYSIS ANY LONGER."

3. THE DOS WAS ABLE TO TALK TO BRUCE LAINGEN AND HIS TWO COLLEAGUES AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY YESTERDAY. THE THREE ARE DESPERATE FOR NEWS, BUT OTHERWISE WELL. DOS WAS ABLE TO PATCH THROUGH CALLS TO THE FAMILIES IN EACH CASE.

(C)

5. REFERRING TO A REPORT THAT HE HAD STATED THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD GUARANTEE THAT THE SHAH'S LIFE IF THAT WERE THE COST OF HIS EXTRADITION, BANI-SADR REPORTEDLY NOW SAYS HE PERSONNALLY FAVORS THIS COURSE, BUT ANY DECISION WOULD BE UP TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND TO KHOMEINI. HE APPARENTLY ALSO COMMENTED THAT GIVEN IRAN'S OBJECTIVE OF WANTING TO "CHANGE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS," REFRAINING FROM EXECUTING THE SHAH WOULD BE TRIVIAL IN COMPARISON.

[redacted]

6. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE WILL HEAR ORAL ARGUMENTS IN THE HOSTAGE CASE ON MARCH 18 AND 19. THE HEARING WILL OPEN WITH A STATEMENT BY THE COURT'S PRESIDENT NOTING THAT IRAN HAD BOTH IGNORED AN ORDER TO FREE THE HOSTAGES AND FAILED TO OFFER A DEFENSE.

7. REUTER REPORTS THIS MORNING THAT IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS HAVE ANNOUNCED THE ARREST OF A WOMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL WHO HAS ALLEGEDLY CONFESSED TO PASSING INFORMATION TO WILLIAM DAUGHERTY, ONE OF AT LEAST THREE HOSTAGES ACCUSED BY THE MILITANTS WITH BEING CIA AGENTS. A SPOKESMAN FOR THE MILITANTS IS SAID TO HAVE CONFIRMED THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS' STATEMENT, BUT GAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS HIMSELF.

8. THE FUNDAMENTALIST AND PREDOMINANTLY CLERICAL ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY (IRP) APPEARS TO HAVE CONSOLIDATED ITS LEAD IN THE FIRST ROUND OF PARLIAMENTARY BALLOTING BY TAKING 46 OF THE 69 SEATS ACTUALLY WON SO FAR. IT APPEARS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT TWO-THIRDS OF THE SEATS IN THE NEW PARLIAMENT WILL NOT BE DECIDED IN THIS VOTING ROUND, POSTPONING SEATING THE NEW DEPUTIES UNTIL AFTER A RUN OFF VOTE ON APRIL 3.

9. THE IRP CLAIMS THE LEAD IN ABOUT HALF OF 75 DISTRICTS WHERE AN APRIL 4 RUN-OFF WILL BE NEEDED. IN THE REMAINING 116 DISTRICTS VOTE COUNTING IS AS YET NOT COMPLETED.

10. IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE RESPONDED TO ELECTION FRAUD CHARGES BY SETTING UP A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE BALLOT-RIGGING COMPLAINTS. NEVERTHELESS, OBSERVERS IN TEHRAN SAY IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO LET THE ELECTION RESULTS STAND. BANI-SADR'S MOST RECENT STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT, FOR EXAMPLE, NOTES ONLY THAT ANY IRREGULARITIES ARE PROBABLY DUE TO "EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP AND "LAX ORGANIZATION."

11. USUN REPORTS SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM INFORMALLY BRIEFED SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS YESTERDAY ON THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION. HE EMPHASIZED IN HIS REMARKS THAT THE COMMISSION'S MANDATE, APPROVED BY BOTH THE U.S. AND IRAN, REQUIRES BOTH A REVIEW OF IRAN'S GRIEVANCE AND A SEARCH FOR WAYS TO RESOLVE THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. WALDHEIM SAID HE DID NOT CONSIDER THE COMMISSION TO HAVE FAILED AS IT HAD HELPED TO IMPROVE THE ATTITUDE IN IRAN TOWARD THE U.N. AND ITS WORK.

12. [redacted] DESPITE NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS TO THE CONTRARY. DOS IS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO BLOCK DELIVERY OF TEN NEW, U.S. DESIGNED, ITALIAN-MADE HELICOPTERS ORDERED BY IRAN.

(S)

(S)

17. WEATHER ANALYSIS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST - 19 MARCH 1980

(A) POOR WEATHER OVER IRAN TODAY AS MAJOR STORM COVERS ALMOST THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WITH CLOUDY SKIES, RAINSHOWERS, AND ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS, A WEAK UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE IS EVIDENT OVER THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN BRINGING CLOUDY SKIES TO N1/4 OF EGYPT AND WESTERN TURKEY, JET STREAM CIRRUS STILL TRANSITING SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST ACROSS EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA, OTHERWISE CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY CONDITIONS FOR THESE TWO AREAS,

(B) LONG RANGE OUTLOOK FOR THE MIDDLE EAST REGION
19-21 MAR: A MAJOR STORM MOVES THROUGH IRAN WITH COLD FRONT EXTENDING SOUTH BACK ACROSS THE PERSIAN GULF INTO SAUDI ARABIA 19-20TH WITH CLEARING SKIES BEHIND THE STORM PATH, WITH CLEARING OVER THE WHOLE COUNTRY BY LATE 20TH, THE NEXT SYSTEM APPROACHING WESTERN TURKEY TODAY IS A WEAK UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE WITH LOW CEILINGS, RAINSHOWERS, AND POSSIBLY SOME ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS AFFECTING PRIMARILY THE MEDITERRANIAN AND CENTRAL MIDDLE EAST AS IT TRACKS ACROSS SYRIA AND IRAQ TO PASS INTO IRAN THE 21ST, A STRONGER UPPER AIR DISTURBANCE IS EXPECTED TO DEVELOP IN EXTREME NW PORTION OF EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MOVE INTO TURKEY ON THE 21ST. EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA WILL ESCAPE THE BRUNT OF THESE STORMS HAVING FAIR SKIES AND WARM TEMPERATURES FOR THE MOST PART, JET STREAM CIRRUS MOVNG ACROSS NORTHERN AFRICA SHOULD CONTINUE TRACKING ACROSS THE SOUTHERN PORTIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST.
22-28 MAR: COMBINATION OF UPPER AIR DISTURBANCES EXPECTED TO REMAIN OVER IRAN 22-23RD. HIGH PRESSURE TO DOMINATE THE MIDDLE EAST TEMPORARILY 23-24TH BEFORE NEXT STORM MOVES INTO TURKEY AREA ON THE 25TH AS A WARM FRONT. A COLD FRONT FOLLOWS ON 26TH INTO TURKEY AND GRADUALLY TRACKS EASTWARD INTO NW IRAN BY THE 28TH. SOUTHERN PORTIONS OF MIDDLE EAST TO REMAIN HOT AND DRY FOR THE MOST PART WITH BLOWING DUST/SAND FROM AFTERNOON WINDS.

(C) WIND/TURBULENCE FORECAST FOR IRAN & PERSIAN GULF
IRAN: WESTERLY SURFACE WINDS (S-NW) AT 10-15 KNOTS GUSTS 25-30 KNOTS 19TH DECREASING TO 5-15 KNOTS 20TH. LIGHT TO MODERATE TURBULENCE SURFACE 10,000FT 19TH, NONE AFTER 20/18Z.
PERSIAN GULF: SURFACE TO 1500FT AGL WINDS WESTERLY (SW-NW) 10-20 KNOTS WITH LIGHT TURBULENCE 19-20TH.

~~REVW 19 MARCH 2010~~

[redacted] SPOKE

NNNN

1905

151530Z MAR 80
FM: JTF/ J-2
TO: DELTA/S-2
1 SOW/A-2
[redacted]/S-2

A

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

H83

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 93
DERIVATIVE CL BY [illegible]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] Multiple Sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: DIA ASSESSMENT IRANIAN AIR DEFENSE 14 MAR 80

1. THE CAPABILITY OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE TO PERFORM ITS AIR DEFENSE MISSION CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS LIMITED. INTERNAL CONFLICTS, SHORTAGES OF TRAINED MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL AND SPARE PARTS, PURGES OF KEY SENIOR OFFICERS AND PILOTS, AND THE LOSS OF US TECHNICAL SPPORT PERSONNEL HAVE HAD A DETRIMENTAL IMPACT [redacted]

OPERATIONALLY READY RATE IS DISTINGUISHED FROM FLYABEL RATE. TO GE OPERATIONALLY READY, ALL ON-BOARD SYSTEMS (INCLUDING WEAPON SYSTEMS) MUST BE FULLY OPERATIONAL, WHILE AN AIRCRAFT MAY BE CONSIDERED FLYABLE IF IT CAN BECOME AIRBORNE REGARDLESS OF THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF ITS WEAPON SYSTEM.

2. MANY OF THE SENIOR AIR FORCE OFFICERS HAVE BEEN PURGED AND MANY BASE COMMANDERS ARE NOW MAJORS [illegible] LIEUTENANT COLONELS WITH LITTLE EXPERIENCE. COMMANDS ARE CHANGING RAPIDLY CONTRIBUTING TO INSTABILITY. THE "ISLAMIFICATION" OF THE ARMED FORCES IS TAKING ITS TOLL THROUGH LOSS OF PILOTS WHO DO NOT LIVE UP TO THE ISLAMIC CODE (I.E. THOSE WHO DRINK OR GAMBLE OR DO NOT SAY PRAYERS). DISCIPLINE AND MORALE HAVE SUFFERED AS A RESULT AND COMMANDERS ARE TAKING NO INITIATIVE DUE TO THE UNCERTAIN SITUATION. [redacted]

[redacted] THE LOSS OF US TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND SHORTAGE [illegible] HAS MAUSED IRAN TO SEEK, TO DATE UNSUCCESSFULLY, ALTERNATIVE SOURCES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. [redacted]

A
B)

[redacted]

[redacted] SECRET H-286

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Maj [redacted] Cpt [redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DMA - [redacted] HQ DMA - 254-4426

DMA - [redacted] HQ DMA - 254-4445

DMA - [redacted] DMAAC - (314) 263-4806 (AV) 693

Attachments

Tehran FLIGHT ROUTES STUDY (overlay SEP)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MACHINE: 227-3178 VOICE: 227-4078/225-1861

DACOM TRANSMITTAL SHEET

DTG RECEIVED FOR TRANSMITTAL:

FROM:

Org/Office Symbol	Name of Originator	Originator Tel. Nr.
J5J-1	LTC [redacted]	71948

Subject:	Classification	Nr of Pages
REQUEST FOR INFO	SECRET/NOFORN	3

TO:

Org/Office Symbol	Name of Recipient	Recipient's Tel Nr.
550 DMAAC	[redacted]	34806

DTG Document Transmitted	Operator

☒ Deliver Immediately ☒ Return Original

☐ Deliver During Normal Duty Hours

REMARKS/TRANSMISSION HISTORY:

~~SECRET~~

G Eyes Only [redacted]

SECRET/NOFORN [redacted]

AG (G) FM: [redacted]

TO: DMAAC// [redacted]

1. We need DMAAC to study 2 more short routes for vertical obstructions.

2. Routes are to be designated RED 4, 5 as indicated on the accompanying map.

3. DCL - 300' AGL

4. Lanes indicated on map.

5. Request same product as before keyed to 1:50,000 Special map.

6. We will send courier to pick up product - essentially an instant replay of what I did last time.

7. Classification of product to be SECRET NOFORN.

8. Suspense: As soon after Thanksgiving Day as possible but within 3 weeks. Not a crunch project (not an overtime crash and burn).

9. Thank you.

[redacted]

G

Eyes Only [redacted]

SECRET/NOFORN WORKING PAPER

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

WORKING PAPER



APPENDIX IV - VO IDENTIFICATION CODES

Code No.	Vertical Obstruction Identification
010	Power transmission lines and aerial cables.
015	Pipelines over gorges, rivers or embayments.
* 020	Towers (free standing): transmitting and receiving, cooling, water towers, stickmasts, observation, water intake, lattice towers, airfield control towers, light standards and flare pipes.
* 025	Towers (guyed): transmitting and receiving, stickmasts and communications.
030	Building: industrial, commercial, institutional, apartments, warehouse, hanger, stadium, power plant, house of religious worship,hospital, school, grain elevator, prison, palace, castle and administration.
040	Mixed vegetation.
050	Deciduous vegetation.
060	Evergreen vegetation.
* 070	Tanks: oil storage, silo, gasometer and water
080	Smokestacks.

* SEE ATTACHED ENCLOSURES 1 AND 2

090	Bridges: deck, suspension, arch, truss, lift, cantilever, movable span and trestle.
100	Drilling Rigs/Derricks: off-shore platforms, cranes, dredges and draglines.
110	Dams.
120	Miscellaneous: ski jumps, ferris wheels, monuments, arches, steeples,pyramids, advertising/display signs, aqueducts and lighthouses.
130	Dissimilar Aggregated Obstructions.
140	Area Where Data Collection Not Requested by User.
150	Area Where Terrain Variations Too Great for Command Clearance Setting.
160	Area Where Required Imagery for VO Analysis Not Available.
170	Area Where Level 1 VO Height Threshold Different Than That in Remainder of Data Block.
180 -	HIGH RESOLUTION SEARCH AREAS

VOIC EXAMPLES



PYLONS & TOWER TYPES

EXAMPLES

21



POWERLINE PYLONS TYPE A

24



POWERLINE PYLONS TYPE II

22

POWERLINE PYLONS TYPE I

VERTICAL OBSTRUCTION TYPES

23



POWERLINE PYLONS TYPE Y

26

RADIO/TV TOWER TYPE A

27

MICROWAVE TOWER TYPE A

28

OBSERVATION TOWER



VERTICAL OBSTRUCTION TYPES

25



RADIO/TV TOWER TYPE I

29

RADIO RELAY TOWER TYPE I

ENCLOSURE 1

UNCLASSIFIED

TANK TYPES (VOIC 070)

EXAMPLES

71



CYLINDRICAL FLAT TOP



CYLINDRICAL DOMED TOP



CYLINDRICAL PEAKED-TOP

72



CYLINDRICAL PEAKED-TOP TOWER MOUNTED

73



BULLET

74



SPHERICAL WITH COLUMN SUPPORT

75



SPHERICAL

SPHEROIDAL



76



DRY GASOMETER



WET GASOMETER

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ #2:16

FBIS 93 (SEE 80--HOSTAGES MOVED)

AFP: UNCONFIRMED REPORTS INDICATE HOSTAGES IN NORTHWEST TEHRAN

PA231907 PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH 1858 GMT 23 DEC 79 PA

(TEXT) TEHRAN, DEC. 23 (AFP)--THE 50 AMERICAN HOSTAGES HELD HERE HAVE BEEN MOVED BY THEIR STUDENT CAPTORS FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY TO AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION, A WELL-INFORMED CATHOLIC SOURCE SAID TODAY.

THE IRANIAN STUDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN OCCUPYING THE EMBASSY SINCE NOVEMBER 4 REPORTEDLY TOLD A LOCAL CATHOLIC PRIEST OF THE MOVE DURING A MEETING HELD TO PLAN CHRISTMAS FESTIVITIES FOR THE HOSTAGES.

ACCORDING TO ONE OF THE PRIESTS WHO ATTENDED THIS MEETING--AND HIS VERSION HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY OTHER PRIESTS WHO WERE PRESENT--THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER PART OF TEHRAN.

HOWEVER, HE ADDED, WE CANNOT TELL YOU WHERE. THE LOCAL CATHOLIC CLERGY HAD APPARENTLY BEEN INFORMED OF THE LOCATION.

OTHER, UNCONFIRMED REPORTS FROM CATHOLIC AND ISLAMIC CIRCLES INDICATED THAT THE HOSTAGES MAY HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE MODEL PRISON IN VIN, NORTHWEST OF TEHRAN.

WELL-INFORMED SOURCES SAID THAT ARCHBISHOP DUVAL OF ALGIERS IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE HERE TOMORROW AND TO VISIT THE HOSTAGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES OF AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEYNI.

23 DEC 1900Z KH/KK

Declassified by
DOD NMCC
20 Nov 96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified By:~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ #275

FBIS 104 (SEE 14, 15--AFP REPORTS)'''''

AFP: FRENCH DEPUTIES SAY IRAN TO RELEASE HOSTAGES SOON

OW232200 PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH 2156 GMT 23 DEC 79 OW

(TEXT) TEHRAN, DEC. 23 (AFP) -- A DELEGATION OF THREE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEPUTIES HERE RECEIVED WORD FROM IRANIAN AUTHORITIES TONIGHT THAT THREE AMERICAN HOSTAGES WOULD BE FREED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW HOURS AND THE OTHER 46 COULD BE RELEASED SOON AFTER.

IN A PRESS STATEMENT, THE FRENCH DEPUTIES SAID THE THREE HOSTAGES HAD BEEN JUDGED BY THE STUDENTS AND FOUND NOT GUILTY. THEY SAID IF THE AMERICANS DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO WORSENING THE SITUATION, "THE 47 OTHER HOSTAGES SHOULD BE RELEASED SOON."

IN THE COMMUNIQUE, THE FRENCH DEPUTIES SAID THAT THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAD ACKNOWLEDTED THE INFLUENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL FRENCH EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A RELEASE OF HOSTAGES.

CCC: PARAGRAPH ONE, LINE FOUR TO READ:
WITHIN THE NEXT FEW HOURS AND THE OTHER 47 COULD BE RELEASED SOON

23 DEC 2223Z KH/RSC'''''

Declassified by
DDONMCC
20N0092

Declassified by
Declassified ON:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

FBIS 39[illegible]

TURKISH CP RADIO VOTCP CL[illegible]S U.S. PREPARING TO ATTA[illegible] IRAN [redacted] BG

TA160743 (CLANDESTINE) VOICE OF TURKISH COMMUNIST PARTY IN TURKISH TO EUROPE AND TURKEY 0600 GMT 16 NOV 79--TA

(UNATTRIBUTED COMMENTARY: "THE DEMANDS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE ARE JUSTIFIED")

(TEXT) DEAR LISTENERS, SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS ARE TAKING PLACE IN OUR NEIGHBOR IRAN. THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE ONCE MORE CLARIFIED INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS AND IMPERIALISMS--FIRST AND FOREMOST U.S. IMPERIALISM--REAL INTENTIONS, THEIR AGGRESSIVE POLICIES, THEIR EFFORTS TO DOMINATE OTHER PEOPLES AND THEIR PLOTS TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY VENTURES TO SAFEGUARD THEIR INTERESTS. FURTHERMORE, THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE PROVED THAT THE JUSTIFIED STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PEOPLES AND THEIR FREEDOM AS WELL AS FOR LASTING PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG PEOPLES IS AN INSEPARABLE PART OF THE STRUGGLE WAGED AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM AND HAVE EXPOSED THE CURRENT IMPORTANCE OF THIS STRUGGLE.

DEAR LISTENERS, WHAT ARE THE REQUESTS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE? THE RETURN TO IRAN OF THE SHAH--WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLING OF THOUSANDS OF IRANIAN PATRIOTS--AN END TO U.S. INTERFERENCE INTO THEIR COUNTRY, AND A STOP TO THE USE OF THE U.S. EMBASSY AND CONSULATES IN IRAN AS THE CENTER OF CIA AGENTS BEING SENT INTO THE COUNTRY. THE DEMANDS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE ARE JUSTIFIED.

WHAT HAS BEEN THE REACTION OF AGONIZED U.S. IMPERIALISM AFTER ITS ROBOT, THE SHAH, WAS TOPPLED AND ITS POSITIONS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD WERE LOST? WASHINGTON HAS BEGUN TO IMPOSE AN ECONOMIC EMBARGO ON IRAN. IT IS BLOCKING IRANS MONEY IN ITS BANKS. IT IS DISPATCHING WARSHIPS TO IRANS VICINITY. THUS, IT IS PREPARING FOR AN OPEN ATTACK ON A COUNTRY THAT HAS ASKED FOR NONINTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. A TRIAL OF THIS ATTACK IS BEING STAGED IN TEXAS.

THE WEST GERMAN NEWSPAPER DIE WELT WRITES THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENT A PLAN FOR A MILITARY ATTACK ON IRAN. IT ADDS THAT NO TIME SHOULD BE LOST IN THIS DIRECTION.

Declassified by DDONmcC 20Nov92

HOWEVER, THESE PRESSURES OF U.S. IMPERIALISM AND ITS OVERT ATTEMPTS AT AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAN WILL BE FOILED BY THE DETERMINED STAND OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AND BY THEIR GROWING HATRED OF U.S. IMPERIALISM--THE CHIEF DEFENDER OF THE BLOODY ADMINISTRATION WHICH SHED THE IRANIAN PEOPLES BLOOD FOR YEARS. THE IRANIAN PEOPLE ARE JUSTIFIED IN THEIR DEMANDS AS WELL AS IN THE STRUGGLE THEY ARE WAGING AGAINST THE U.S. IMPERIALISM.

Classified By: ~~FBIS~~
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

THE TUDEH PARTY--THE PARTY OF THE IRANIAN COMMUNISTS--HAS CALLED FOR UNITY OF ACTION AND FORCE OF THE PROGRESSIVE FORCES AND THE IRANIAN PEOPLE IN THE STRUGGLE BEING WAGED AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM.

SECRET

AUG 80

-0 [illegible] 02 31

NMCC-CWD

[illegible]CC465ILMR30 C O N F I D E N T I A L ZYUW

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

J5(02) J3:NMCC NIDS SECDEF(27) SECDEF: USDP(15) DIA:
:DIA(15) NMIC AIRFORCE(03) NAVY(05) ARMY(04) FILE
[illegible]

[illegible]SIT/2210[illegible]/2210224/00P:18TOP2210293
[illegible]UEMCAA #0789 2210290
[illegible] CCCCC IOC STATE ZZH
[illegible]RUSBOD
[illegible]UEMC #0789 2210290
[illegible] CCCCC ZZH
[illegible]723[illegible]Z AUG 80
[illegible] SECSTATE WASHDC
[illegible] AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE #[illegible]

[illegible] I D E N T I A L
[illegible] OFFICIAL USE STATE 239789
[illegible] 12[illegible]: N/A

[illegible]: PGOV, PINT, PINS, XO, AF, PK, IR

[illegible]: (LOU) TEXT OF NATIONAL VOICE OF IRAN
[illegible]ADCAST

[illegible] THESE FOLLOWS [illegible] OF CLANDESTINE NATIONAL
[illegible] OF IRAN [illegible] IN PERSIAN TO [illegible] 1730 [illegible]
[illegible] AS MONITORED BY FBIS:

[illegible] DEAR COMPATRIOTS: EVERY IRANIAN KNOWS THAT THE U.S.
[illegible]AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PLAYS THE PRINCIPAL ROLE IN PRE
[illegible] AFGHAN MERCENARY GROUPS IN PAKISTAN AND OTHE-
[illegible] CAMPS FOR DISPATCH INTO AFGHANISTAN, AND THIS IS
[illegible]TIRELY TRUE IN THE CASE OF THE CAMPS OF THESE
[illegible] REVOLUTION MERCENARIES [illegible], WHOSE DUTY IS
[illegible] THE [illegible] OF THE AFGHAN
[illegible] REVOLUTIONARIES IN [illegible].

[illegible] INTELLIGENCE
[illegible] C O N F I D E N T I A L [illegible]

DSP
CJ
J3
J2
RY
H271

Broadcast
C

Declassified by
DDO NMCC
20 Nov 92

AUG 80

VZCZCNCC[illegible]
J3:NMCC
ACTION

DISTR
J5(02) J3:NMCC MIDS [illegible] SECURE: [illegible]
:DIA(15) NMIC [illegible] NAVY[illegible] [illegible] FILE
(051)

TRANSIT/2210206/2210224/[illegible]
DE RUEHCAA #0789 2210206
ZNY CCCCC ZUC STATE 7[illegible]
TOO RUSBGD
DE RUEHC #[illegible]
ZNY CCCCC ZZ[illegible]
O 072302Z AUG 80
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE [illegible]
BT
[illegible]
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STAT[illegible]
E.O. 12[illegible]

TAGS: [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]
BROADCAST

1. (LOU) THESE FOLLOWS TEXT OF [illegible]
VOICE OF [illegible]
AUGUST [illegible]

TEXT [illegible] COOPATRIOTS: [illegible] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PLAYS [illegible] PARING AFGHAN [illegible] IN PAKISTAN [illegible] FOREIGN CAMPS FOR DISPATCH INTO AFGHANISTAN, AND THIS IS ALSO ENTIRELY TRUE IN THE CASE OF THE CAMPS OF THESE COUNTERREVOLUTION MERCENARIES IN [illegible], [illegible] IS TO IMPLEMENT THE [illegible] WHICH THE CAMPS OF THE AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES IN PAKISTAN [illegible].

IF IN THE PAKISTANI CAMPS THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
PAGE 1

DSP
CJ
J3
J2
HZ7

AGENCY LEADS THE MILITARY AND SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN, IN THE CASES OF MASHHAD THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BESIDES ENGAGING IN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY AND ANTI-AFGHAN ACTIVITIES, AT THE SAME TIME HATCHES PLOTS

AGAINST THE GAINS OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE REPUBLICAN SYSTEM OF IRAN AT THE CENTER OF ITS ATTENTION.

ALL THE CAMPS OF THE AFGHAN MERCENARIES IN PAKISTAN ARE LED BY THE U.S. CONSUL IN PESHAWAR, OR TO PHRASE IT BETTER, THE CIA EXPORT IN MATTERS OF SABOTAGE, PLOTS AND MILITARY COUPS. AT THE SAME TIME THE CENTER WHICH IS SITUATED IN PESHAWAR HEADS THE CENTER OF THE AFGHAN MERCENARIES IN MASHHAD LED BY HUSAYN (JUMJU). THIS CRIMINAL AND LEADER OF THE AFGHAN MERCENARIES, WHO OPERATE IN OUR HOMELANDS TERRITORY, HAS VERY CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN PESHAWAR. THUS THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS WIDELY ACTIVE THROUGH ITS MERCENARIES IN OUR COUNTRY. THE AMERICANS WHO HAVE BEEN DRIVEN OUT OF OUR COUNTRY FOLLOWING THE REVOLUTION, ARE NOW STRIVING TO ENTER IRAN THROUGH ANOTHER DOOR BY USING THE CENTER OF THE AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES IN MASHHAD. THE INTERESTING THING IS THAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS SPY DEN IN MASHHAD IS IN THE HANDS OF THREE AFGHAN ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE CONCEALED THEMSELVES UNDER THE MASK OF ISLAM.

THE AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY CASE IN MASHHAD IS ATTEMPTING TO INTENSIFY ITS ACTIVITY BY ESTABLISHING AFGHAN CAMPS IN OTHER TOWNS. IT IS SAID THAT THE MILITARY TRAINING OF THESE MERCENARY BANDS IS CONDUCTED BY FORMER SAVAKISTS AND ACCORDING TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF CIA EMPLOYEES IN PAKISTAN. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO COMPREHEND THE FACT THAT ABOVE ALL THE PRIMARY AIM OF THIS TRAINING IS THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE GAINS OF THE REVOLUTION WITHIN OUR COUNTRY. RECENTLY IT HAS BEEN REVEALED THAT AMONG THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AFGHAN SMUGGLERS ARRESTED IN IRAN WAS SMUGGLING ARMS TO AFGHAN MERCENARIES BASED IN THIS SAME CAMP IN MASHHAD, OR THEIR SALE TO SEPARATIST AND MERCENARY ELEMENTS IN THE WEST OF IRAN.

RECENT EVENTS IN OUR COUNTRY DEMONSTRATE THAT ZIAUL

HAQ ALSO IS INTERESTED IN THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE GANG OF AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONAIRES IN IRAN. BY RECEIVING LARGE AMOUNTS OF ARMS AND DOLLARS FROM AMERICANS ZIAUL HAQ PROVIDES THE CENTER OF THE AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES IN MASHHAD WITH WEAPONS AND FUNDS. FUNDS WHICH THE SAVAKIST AGENTS OF THE CIA RECEIVE THROUGH ZIAUL HAQ ARE ABOVE ALL USED FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTS AGAINST OUR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. MOREOVER, THE UNITED STATES IS IN THE PROCESS OF FEVERISHLY CONCENTRATING ITS GREAT NAVAL FORCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF. THE PENTAGON IS ATTEMPTING TO INCREASE ITS ARMED FORCES IN THE PERSIAN

GULF REGION TO 500,000 MEN IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN OF CONTROL OVER THE PERSIAN GULF REGION AIMED AT SAFEGUARDING THE SO-CALLED MILITARY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

WASHINGTON IS IN THE PROCESS OF PREPARING A PLAN OF LARGE-SCALE MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. WITHIN OUR COUNTRY THE U.S. RELIES ON ITS FIFTH COLUMN, NAMELY REGRANTS OF THE FORMER REGIME, SAVAKISTS AND OFFICERS OF THE FORMER IMPERIAL ARMY. IT CAN BE SAID WITH CONFIDENCE THAT THE CENTER OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY AFGHANS IN MASHHAD--WHICH IS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--IS ALSO COUNTED AMONG THESE BLACK FORCES.

OUR COUNTRY'S RECENT EVENTS--SUCH AS PLACING BOMBS IN VARIOUS PLACES, TERROR, ATTACKS AND ASSAULTS ON OFFICES OF PROGRESSIVE PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS AND (WORD INDISTINCT) NEWSPAPERS, AND THE CREATION OF VARIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE LEADERS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION ARE NOT ACCIDENTAL. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS MASKED AND UNMASKED ASSOCIATES EXPLOIT THE CENTER OF THE AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES IN MASHHAD AS A MEANS FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST OUR REPUBLIC SYSTEM, FOR INCITING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS OF PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT AWARE OF THE FACTS AND NATURE OF THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION AND FOR PROVOCATION AGAINST OUR HOMELANDS NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC FORCES, IN ORDER TO WEAKEN THE UNITED FRONT OF THE TRUE FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM.

PAGE 4 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 01899

IT IS BY TAKING THESE FACTS INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THIS QUESTION IS JUSTLY POSED BY THE PEOPLE: WHY IS PERMISSION TO OPERATE IN OUR LIBERATED HOMELAND GIVEN TO SUCH COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY AND ANTI-IRANIAN ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH AND UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY?

END TEXT CHRISTOPHER
BT
#9780
ANNOTES
ABW

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

PAGE 4 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 00110011
NNNN
080225Z

[redacted] SECRET

Item Number: #H265

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Map/Related Products Delivery

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (U) DMA J2 identified necessary maps and in conjunction with DMA planned production of necessary special maps.

2. ( ) J3 identified areas for training and tasked J2 to acquire necessary maps and photo grids.

3. (U) DMA Depending upon situation, DMA would ship maps to J2 or subordinate units as necessary.

COMMENTS:

1. (U) DMA If maps were immediately available in WDC, delivery in some cases was same day and at least next day.

2. (U) DMA Shipments from warehouses outside of WDC or from WDC to locations other than Pentagon were shipped Express Mail and in all cases were timely.

3. (U) DMA If maps were out of stock or insufficient quantities existed additional maps were printed which would add a minimum of 1 day to delivery time.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LtCol [redacted] Maj [redacted]

Cpt [redacted] Cpt [redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DMA - [redacted], HQ DMA, 254-4426

ATTACHMENTS:

[redacted] SECRET

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92 DDO, NMCC
DERIVATIVE CL. BY
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON 0402
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

OTHER RELATED ITEMS: [redacted]

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [redacted] Maj [redacted] Cpt [redacted]
Cpt [redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DMA [redacted] HQ DMA, 284-1126

DMA [redacted] DMA/HTC, 227-2736

ATTACHMENTS:

Photo Grids: HFA, Embassy, Garmsar, Karaj, SUSAN, Semnan-New, Manzariyeh, Mehrabad, Doshan-Tappeth.

[redacted] SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

SAME AS H-#199

MSG218
031420R JAN80

FM JTF
TO SFOD [redacted]

H-#200

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] Multiple Sources

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: NAIN INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM INTERVIEW OF US MILITARY OFFICER WHO VISITED NAIN MILITARY AIRFIELD SEVERAL TIMES WITH LAST VISIT OCCURRING AUGUST 1978.

A. PERMANENT PARTY PERSONNEL ESTIMATED AT 30-50 INDIVIDUALS BROKEN OUT AS FOLLOWS:
   1. CAREER SARGEANTS 6-10
   2. CONSCRIPT SECURITY GUARDS 15-20
   3. CONSCRIPT SUPPORT PERSONNEL 15-20

B. COMMUNICATIONS
   1. MOST BLDGS LINKED BY TELEPHONE
   2. ALL LINES UNDERGROUND
   3. MAIN SWITCH/JUNCTION LOCATED IN BASE HQS/COMMAND POST BLDG.
   4. DATA FLOWS TO MICROWAVE SITE LOCATED 3.5 NM SOUTH OF COMPLEX ON ROAD TO NAIN FOR AUTOMATIC RELAY TO ESFAHAN.
   5. WINDOWS ON OFFICIAL STRUCTURES (COMMAND BLDG, TECH CONTROL BLDG) HAVE VERTICAL BARS.
   6. TYPICAL EXTERNAL DOORS ARE OFFICIAL BLGS ARE METAL FRAME WITH UPPER PORTION HAVING GLASS INSERT.

C. GUARDS CAN BE EXPECTED AT FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:
   1. MAIN GATE
   2. HQS BLDG
   3. GENERATOR BLDG
   4. TECH CONTROL BLDG
   5. POSSIBLY AT CORNER POINTS ALONG PERIMETER FENCE

D. KEY BLDGS WILL HAVE SOME EXTERNAL LIGHTING TYPICALLY AT ENTRANCES AND EXITS BUT MOST OF COMPOUND IS EITHER NOT LIT OR VERY DIMLY LIT. PERIMETER FENCE HAS LIGHTING (APPROX EVERY 75-100 FT.) THAT IS DIVERTED OUTWARDS.

E. AN UNIDENTIFIED ELEVATED LINE RUNS ALONG THE NAIN-ANARAK ROAD EAST OF THE COMPLEX. THE HEIGHT OF THE POLES HAS BEEN LOWERED AT THE EAST END OF THE RUNWAY SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE AIRCRAFT APPROACH.

2. [redacted]

A. [redacted]
B.
C.

RVW 03JAN00

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

MSG404

DTG: 301330Z JAN 80

H - #132

FM: JTF/J2
TO: SEOD/S2
[redacted] S2
FSOW/A2
HELO/M2

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple sources
JS, DIA

~~T O P S E C R E T~~

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH VOWED TO MAKE CANADA PAY FOR SMUGGLING SIX U.S. DIPLOMATS OUT OF IRAN, "SOONER OR LATER, SOMEWHERE IN THE WORLD, CANADA WILL PAY FOR THE ACTION THEY HAVE TAKEN," GHOTBZADEH SAID IN A STATEMENT TO JOURNALISTS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE CLANDESTINE DEPARTURE OF THE SIX AMERICANS, WHO LEFT THE COUNTRY ON CANADIAN PASSPORTS, WOULD VERY PROBABLY MAKE CONDITIONS WORSE FOR THE 50 AMERICAN HOSTAGES HELD AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN. NEVERTHELESS, GHOTBZADEH INDICATED IRAN WOULD NOT FORMALLY BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CANADA. WE HAVE NO WORD ON THE REACTION TO THIS AFFAIR OF PRESIDENT-ELECT BANI-SADR AND OTHER REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS, OR IF ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF U.S. CHARGE LAINGEN AT THE MFA.

2. THE MILITANTS HOLDING THE HOSTAGES AT THE U.S. EMBASSY TODAY DEMANDED TO KNOW HOW SIX EMBASSY STAFF, POSING AS CANADIAN DIPLOMATS, COULD SLIP OUT OF IRAN AT THE WEEKEND WITHOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S KNOWLEDGE. A STUDENT SPOKESMAN TOLD REUTER EARLY TODAY; "THE FOREIGN MINISTRY MUST KNOW THE NUMBER OF DIPLOMATS IN IRAN, SO HOW COME MORE THAN THE KNOWN NUMBER OF CANADIAN DIPLOMATS WERE ABLE TO LEAVE?" THE STUDENT SPOKESMAN SAID THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE TREATMENT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY HOSTAGES AND SAID THE STUDENTS ANTICIPATED NO REPRISALS AGAINST CANADIAN CITIZENS STILL IN IRAN.

3. IRAN'S CENTRAL BANK HAS SENT A ONE-SENTENCE INSTRUCTION TO MAJOR AMERICAN BANKS ADVISING THEM THAT ALL OPERATING LICENSES HAVE BEEN REVOKED. THIS MEANS THE BANKS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THEIR REPRESENTATIVE OFFICES IN TEHRAN. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THIS MOVE NOW IS NIL SINCE THE BANKS HAD WITHDRAWN THEIR STAFF SOMETIME AGO. THE ORDER WILL SEVER A LINE OF COMMUNICATION AND WILL COMPLICATE FUTURE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE BANKING AND FINANCIAL DISPUTES.

4. [redacted]
(A) FAIS NOTES THIS MORNING THAT IMAM KHOMEINI HAS CALLED ON THE [redacted]

6. THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF BANI-SADR IS PROVIDED AS BACKGROUND.

(A) THE 46-YEAR-OLD SON OF A MULLAH, BANI-SADR OWES HIS APPARENT VICTORY PRIMARILY TO SPLITS IN THE SHIA MUSLIM CLERGY -- HE WAS ENDORSED BY MANY INFLUENTIAL CLERICS WHILE OTHERS, INCLUDING AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI, BACKED OTHER CANDIDATES. BANI-SADR ALSO DID WELL AMONG THE MIDDLE CLASS, WHICH RESPECTS HIS WESTERN EDUCATION AND 15 YEARS' RESIDENCE IN PARIS. HIS REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS ARE EXCELLENT -- HE SUPPORTED FORMER PRIME MINISTER MOSSADEGH IN THE 1950S, WAS EXILED IN 1963, AND FIRST CONTACTED KHOMEINI IN 1966. DURING HIS YEARS IN FRANCE HE DEVELOPED CONTACTS WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF ANTI-SHAH GROUPS, INCLUDING LEFTISTS AND PALESTINIAN ACTIVISTS.

(B) BANI-SADR IS BEST KNOWN AS A RADICAL THEORETICIAN OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS. HIS VAGUELY FORMULATED VIEWS INCLUDE NATIONALIZING INDUSTRY, INCREASING EMPHASIS ON AGRICULTURE, ABOLISHING INTEREST RATES, AND SIGNIFICANTLY CURTAILING OIL EXPORTS TO REDUCE IRAN'S DEPENDENCE ON THE WEST.

(C) ALTHOUGH HE WAS ONE OF KHOMEINI'S PRINCIPAL AIDES DURING THE AYATOLLAH'S RESIDENCE IN PARIS, BANI-SADR'S RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMEINI HAS BEEN AMBIVALENT. HE APPARENTLY DID NOT WANT AN OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT WHEN KHOMEINI RETURNED TO IRAN, BUT HE WORKED BEHIND THE SCENES TO IMPLEMENT HIS ECONOMIC THEORIES. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT HE DOES NOT GET ALONG WELL WITH KHOMEINI'S CLERICAL ASSOCIATES AND THAT HE REGARDS THEM AS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AMATEURS.

(D) BANI-SADR HAS DISAGREED WITH KHOMEINI ON A WIDE VARIEY OF ISSUES. HIS RESIGNATION AS FOREIGN MINISTER LAST NOVEMBER WAS THE DIRECT RESULT OF CROSSING KHOMEINI OVER THE HOSTAGE ISSUE. BANI-SADR LONG HAS HELD THAT THE HOSTAGE ISSUE DISTRACTS THE NATION FROM ITS REAL PROBLEMS. HE MADE LITTLE MENTION OF THE HOSTAGES DURING THE CAMPAIGN, SAYING ONLY THAT THE CRISIS SHOULD BE RESOLVED QUICKLY, EITHER BY RELEASING THE HOSTAGES OR PUNISHING THEM.

(E) BANI-SADR'S FIRST TASK WILL BE TO ORGANIZE HIS SUPPORTERS TO WIN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS FOR THE 270-MEMBER PARLIAMENT OR MAJLES. HE WILL ALSO HAVE TO CHOOSE A PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET, AND MAY REPLACE FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH SOON. HE IS LIKELY TO FACE STRONG OPPOSITION FROM SENIOR CLERICS, INCLUDING BEHESHTI, WHO HAVE NO INTENTION OF SURRENDERING POWER. WHILE THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MAY SOON BE FORMALLY ABOLISHED, ITS MEMBERS WILL CONTINUE TO ADVISE KHOMEINI AND MAY FUNCTION AS A KITCHEN CABINET. SENIOR CLERICS WILL ALSO DOMINATE THE COUNCIL OF GUARDIANS, COMMITTEE OF CLERGYMEN AND LAWYERS SOON TO BE APPOINTED BY KHOMEINI TO OVERSEE THE MAJLES.

(G) HE IS ALSO LIKELY TO FACE LEFTIST OPPOSITION. THE PRO-SOVIET TUDEH PARTY, FOR EXAMPLE, BACKED ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY CANDIDATE HABIBI AND PROBABLY HAS BEEN ANGERED BY BANI-SADR'S PLEDGE TO ASSIST THE AFGHAN REBELS. THE MARXIST FEDAYEEN CAN BE EXPECTED TO OPPOSE ANYONE WHO ATTEMPTS TO REESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER.

(H) KHOMEINI, OF COURSE, WILL CONTINUE TO INTERFERE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND CAN REMOVE THE PRESIDENT AT ANY TIME UNDER THE CONSTITION. NONETHELESS, HE WILL HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT BANI-SADR, UNLIKE FORMER PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN, HAS DEMONSTRATED WIDE POPULAR SUPPORT INDEPENDENT OF THE AYATOLLAH.

(I) THE MILITANTS AT THE US EMBASSY ARE AWARE THAT BANI-SADR HOPES TO END THE HOSTAGE CRISIS QUICKLY. THEY UNDOUBTEDLY ARE NOT PLEASED WITH HIS APPARENT ELECTION VICTORY AND MIGHT MAKE AN EFFORT TO DISCREDIT HIM OR MAKE THE SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS AS DIFFICULT AS POSSIBLE.

(J) AS LONG AS KHOMEINI REMAINS ALIVE AND FIT, HE WILL BE THE SINGLE MOST INFLUENTIAL FIGURE IN IRAN. THE AYATOLLAH'S VISION OF THE REVOLUTION WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH BANI-SADR WILL HAVE TO WORK. IF KHOMEINI DIES IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, BANI-SADR'S TASK WOULD PROBABLY BE OVERWHELMING. THE GOVERNMENT IS TOO FRAGILE TO MAKE THE TRANSITION TO HIS LEADERSHIP AT THIS POINT, AND NONE OF THE SENIOR CLERICS IS CAPABLE OF ACCEDING TO THE AYATOLLAH'S MANTLE. IN THE POWER STRUGGLE THAT WOULD FOLLOW KHOMEINI'S DEATH, THE LEFT, THE MILITANTS, AND THE MINORITIES WOULD MANEUVER FOR THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE.

REVW 30 JAN 10

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON DADR
CLASSIFIED FROM [redacted] DIA, JS

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

MSG315
191445Z JAN 80

FM JTF
TO DELTA
[redacted]
INFO I SOW

~~TOPSECRET~~

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT

1. DR. HASAN HABIBI, SPOKESMAN FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, HAS REPORTEDLY ADMITTED IN A MAGAZINE INTERVIEW THAT THE COUNCIL HAS NO CONTROL OVER THE MILITANTS AT THE US EMBASSY. WE HAVE RECEIVED SEVERAL REPORTS WHICH INDICATED THE COUNCIL IS ANXIOUS TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT TO THE HOSTAGE CRISIS, BUT HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN VETOED BY KHOMEINI. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE MILITANTS ARE NOT COMPLETELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF KHOMEINI, AND HE WISHES TO AVOID A SHOWDOWN WITH THEM.

1A. FORIEGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT A UN INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES AGAINST THE FORMER SHAH IS A PREREQUISISTE TO THE RELEASE OF THE 50 AMERICAN HOSTAGES. GHOTBZADEH REITERATED THE IRANIAN STAND THAT THE EXTRADITION OF THE SHAH, THE RETURN OF HIS WEALTH, AND THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES MUST OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY.

2. AS A FOLLOW-ON TO AN EARLIER REPORT OF AN ABORTIVE COUP ATTEMPT BY IRANIAN ARMY OFFICERS, THE KUWAITI PRESS NOW REPORTS THE COUP WAS LED BY FORMER NAVY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, ADMIRAL MADANI. A BEIRUT NEWSPAPER ALSO REPORTS THAT 63 MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE EXECUTED RECENTLY FOR THEIR PART IN THE ALLEGED COUP. WE STILL HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO SUBSTANTIATE THESE REPORTS. ADMIRAL MADANI, AS OF YESTERDAY, WAS STILL CONSIDERED ONE OF THE TWO FRONT-RUNNERS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE. ITS IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS IS A SMEAR CAMPAIGN AGAINST MADANI BY POLITICAL OPPONENTS.

3. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT STATES THAT AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR ALLEGED ASSOCIATION WITH THE FORQAN TERRORIST GROUP THAT HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR KILLING SEVERAL OF KHOMEINI'S CLOSE ASSOCIATES. WE CANNOT SUBSTANTIATE THIS REPORT. THIS COULD BE FABRICATED ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT BEHESHTI AS A RESULT OF A POWER STRUGGLE AMONG THE CL[redacted]
A POWER STRUGGLE IS PRESENTLY GOING ON WITHIN THE CLERICAL ELEMENTS IN IRAN.

4. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS REMAINED SILENT ON THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE REASON FOR KHOMEINI'S SILENCE WAS FIRST ESTIMATED TO BE THAT HE WAS WAITING FOR THE SOVIET VETO OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. HOWEVER, HIS SUBSEQUENT SILENCE IS PERPLEXING. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT KHOMEINI'S SILENCE REFLECTS HIS VIEW THAT THE US IS STILL IRAN'S NUMBER-ONE ENEMY. ALSO IT IS EASIER TO CRITIZE A POWER THAT IS 10 000 MILES AWAY THAN ONE THAT IS A NEIGHBOR

~~SECRET~~

H-47 127

MSG 418
3115ZØZ JAN 80
FM: JTF
TO: DELTA
[redacted]
1 SOW
HELO DET

~~T O P S E C R E T~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Jul 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted]

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTEZADEH CONTINUES TO BE CRITICAL OF THE CANADIAN ROLE IN HELPING SIX EMBASSY STAFF TO LEAVE TEHRAN THIS WEEK. HE IS REPORTED THIS MORNING AS SAYING IN A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH CANADIAN BROADCASTING COMPANY, "YOU SHOULD REALIZE THE TENSIONS THIS HAS CREATED AMONG THE STUDENTS." HE ADDS, " I'M NOT ANTICIPATING ANYTHING BUT WHEN TENSIONS RISE, YOU CANNOT ANTICIPATE THE REACTIONS." HOWEVER, INSOFAR AS WE KNOW, THE MILITANTS THEMSELVES CONTINUE TO STAND BY THEIR STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY THAT THE DEPARTURE OF THE SIX WILL NOT AFFECT THE HOSTAGES' TREATMENT.

2. FORMER RELIGIOUS PROSECUTOR AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI YESTERDAY ACCUSED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF "NEGLIGENCE OR TREASON" FOR ALLOWING THE AMERICANS TO ESCAPE. HOWEVER, GHOBZADEH RESPONDED IN A RADIO INTERVIEW THAT HE HAD NO IDEA THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN AT LARGE IN TEHRAN.

[redacted] A LIST OF NIOC STAFF [redacted] OF BEING RELATED TO THE OLD REGIME" HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC BY THE PETROLEUM MINSITER'S OFFICE IN TEHRAN. 165 PERSONS ARE PRESENTLY BEING INVESTIGATED. REPORTEDLY THE MAJORITY OF THESE ARE LOW-LEVEL WORKERS FROM ABADAN; NO ONE AT NIOC HEAD-QUATERS IN TEHRAN IS APPARENTLY AFFECTED. OIL MINSTER MOINFAR HAS PROMISED A PURGE OF "TAINTED" MANAGEMENT STAFF EVER SINCE HE TOOK OFFICE. POSSIBLY THIS MOVE IS DESIGNED TO REASSURE FEARFUL MANAGERS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MEETING THE DEMANDS OF EXTREMISTS FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTION. WHETHER EITHER GROUP WILL BE SATISFIED REMAINS TO BE SEEN; IN THE MEANTIME [redacted]

4. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH WEST GERMAN T.V. BANI-SADR SAID THAT IRAN HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION AND REALIZES THAT IT COULD BE ATTACKED AS AFGHANISTAN WAS. HE WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT FOR ITS DEFENSE IRAN MUST DEPEND OF THE ENTIRE IRANIAN POPULATION RATHER THAN THE ARMY OR AN ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S. HE SAID THAT RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. CAN CHANGE ONLY IF THE AMERICANS GIVE UP THEIR POLICY OF EXPANSION AND [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SECRET H-127 p 2

5. IN A NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW AFTER THE ELECTION BANI-SADR WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE EFFORTS HE HAD INITIATED WHILE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSED SHAH HAD NOT PROVEN POSSIBLE AND WOULD NOT WORK OUT UNLESS THE IRANIANS CAN MAKE THE SHAH, HIS CRIMES AND HIS CORRUPTION THE MAIN ISSUE. BANI-SADR ADDED THAT IF THIS BECOMES THE MAIN ISSUE, EVEN IF THE SHAH CANNOT BE BROUGHT BACK, THE PRIMARY IRANIAN AIM WILL HAVE BEEN ATTAINED AND THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER NEED FOR HOLDING THE HOSTAGES.

6. TEHRAN RADIO TODAY BROADCAST AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CENTRAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE SAYING THAT FOLLOWING CLASHES WHICH TOOK PLACE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN ON 30 JAN, THE SON OF KHOMEINI APPEALED FOR CALM AND ORDER FOR THE SAKE OF THE HEALTH OF HIS FARTHER. IT WAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT KHOMEINI'S SON-IN-LAW, AYATOLLAH ESHRAQI, HAS GONE TO THE UNIVERSITY TO INVESTIGATE THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE CLASHES. THE CENTRAL COMMITTE SAID THAT RECENTLY CLASHES HAS TAKEN PLACE THROUGHOUT THE CITY WHICH HAVE LED TO DISORDER AND DISTURBANCES, AND WARNED THAT IT WILL STOP SUCH INCIDENTS WITH SEVERE MEASURES AND HAND OVER THE OFFENDER TO THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE.

7. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE HOSTAGE CRISIS BEGAN, THE USSR HAS BEGUN TO CRITICIZE IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES FOR ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENTS. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY THINK THAT THE ELECTION OF BANI-SADR AS PRESIDENT OF IRAN PORTENDS A MODERATION OF ANTI-U.S. FEELING. THE TUDEH PARTY, REFLECTING SOVIET THINKING, BACKED ANOTHER CANDIDATE, AND THE SOVIET-SPONSORED "NATIONAL VOICE OF IRAN" OMITTED BANI-SADR AS AN ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATE.

(S)

[redacted] THIS IS POSSIBLY IS A RESULT OF THE LEAK OF THE EXTRACTION OF THE ANDERS PARTY FROM TEHRAN. THIS OFFICE IS PREPARING A SHORT TERM ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

SECRET

MSG 099
O 101630R DEC 79
FM [redacted]
TO JTF/[redacted]
INFO [redacted]NGR /[redacted]
BT
~~TOPSECRET~~
SUBJ: EEI SUPPORT FOR [redacted] RANGERS

G-620

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

1. [redacted]

A. NA

[redacted]

(2
(3
(4

B. MANZARIEYH [redacted]

[redacted]

2. (TS) INTELLIGENCE SHOULD BE PASSED DIRECTLY TO [redacted] RANGER WITH DELTA AS INFORMATIONS ADDRESSEE. [redacted]
REVW 10 DEC 2009

~~SECRET~~

Item Number: ____

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Interview of DOD Personnel as [redacted] Collection Assets

TIMEFRAME: June 1980 - July 1980

SUMMARY:

1. ( ) COMJTF decided early during SNOWBIRD planning that the JTF needed a capability to insert DOD personnel into Iran to collect intelligence in support of the rescue option. These DOD assets would complement reporting [redacted] COMJTF directed J2 to screen DOD civilians and military personnel to identify individuals who could enter Iran to perform clandestine intelligence collection missions.

(S) 2. ( ) The primary required characteristic for such individuals was ability to speak a foreign language. [redacted] language ability was acceptable, although other languages were preferred. This was due to difficulty in obtaining [redacted]

(C) 3. ( ) J2 contacted Commander [redacted], and H[redacted], to obtain lists of language-qualified personnel to be interviewed. The Defense Intelligence School also permitted a J2 representative to review the files of students currently attending the career course.

(C) 4. ( ) After screening the lists, two J2 personnel interviewed likely prospects. Approximately [redacted] personnel were interviewed, of whom [redacted] were selected for [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO ____
REVIEW ON OADR

[redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

TASKS

[redacted] J-2

* Identifies Intelligence Requirements
* Coordinates National Collection Resources

[redacted]

- HUMINT [redacted]
- Other (Service and Nongovt)
- STATE - Maintains Liaison Link
* Coordinates Tech intel effort
* Serves as [redacted] principal intel advisor/analyst

[redacted] J-3

* Identifies and validates intel support requirements
* Identifies and validates operational support requirements

[redacted]

* Selects and trains
- HUMINT assets
- Support Assets
* Assesses suitibility of assets for [redacted]
* Plans, develops, and coordinates mechanisms for infiltration and [redacted] operations in support of SNOWBIRD
* Operations:
- Coordinates with J-2/J-3
- Serves as POC [redacted] for HUMINT [redacted]
- Conducts other tasks as specified by [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

MSG 052
O 241415R NOV 79
FM DELTA
TO JTF//VAUGHT[redacted]
BT
[redacted]

SUBJ: CRITICAL INFO GAPS (U)

1. (TS) DELTA MISSION PLANNING IS IN FINAL STAGES. IMPERATIVE THAT AVAILABLE INTEL AND INTEL GAPS BE REVIEWED BY SOD-JCS PLANNERS TO INSURE WE ARE BOTH IN SYNCH AND TO REITERATE OUR NEEDS WHERE GAPS EXIST.

2. (TS) EMBASSY COMPOUND/HOSTAGES:

A. (TS) [redacted]

B. (TS) HOSTAGE PHYSICAL CONDITION GOOD, BUT MENTAL CONDITION MAY BE DETERIORATING. HOSTAGE REACTION TO RESUCE UNKNOWN, BUT APPEARS THEY WILL BE ABLE TO MOVE AND RESPOND TO INSTRUCTIONS WITH SOME ABLE TO EXERCISE SOME LEADERSHIP. OTHER USAGE OF HOSTAGES (E.G. CLEARANCE OF LZ) NOT CONTEMPLATED.

C. (TS) TOTAL U.S. HOSTAGES STILL IN DOUBT WITH OUR COUNT AT 50 [redacted] INDICATE POSSIBILITY OF THE FOLLOWING TO BE HOSTAGES: LIJECK, MARK; STAFFORD, JOSEPH; ANDERS, ROBERT; STAFFORD, KATHRYN; PLOTKIN, JERRY REQUEST CONFIRMATION OR DENIAL.

D. (TS) EMBASSY COMPOUND UNDERGOING GRADUAL HARDENING AGAINST ATTACK EVIDENCED BY AUTOMOBILE DISPERSALS IN FIELDS, SANDBAG POSITIONS WITHIN COMPOUND AND ON SOME BUILDING TOPS. NO OTHER INDICATIONS OF SOPHISTICATED WPNS POSITIONS, TRENCHLINES, BUNKERS, AUTOMATIC WPNS OR AA POSITIONS IN THE COMPOUND OR BUILDINGS SURROUNDING IT. NO EVIDENCE OF BOOBY TRAPS, MINES OR OTHER TYPE DEVICES WITHIN THE COMPOUND WITH AVAILABLE INTEL REPORTS OF FOOT AND VEHICLE TRAFFIC WITHIN THE COMPOUND TENDING TO SUPPORT THIS, BUT CONFIRMATION REQUIRED. PRIMARY OBSTACLES TO ASSAULT ARE WALLS AROUND AND WITHIN COMPOUND AND BUILDINGS WITHIN. COMPOUND DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SET UP FOR AMBUSH OF A RESCUE FORCE AND MEASURES TAKEN TO DATE IN ATHLETIC FIELDS INDICATE ANTICIPATION OF A HELICOPTER RATHER THAN GROUND ASSAULT. [redacted]

3. (TS) STUDENTS/GUARDS:

A. (TS) ESTIMATE OF NUMBERS VARIES FROM 100 TO 450 OF WHICH 200 MAY BE ARMED. OUR ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE NUMBERS PROBABLY INCREASE CONSIDERABLY AT WEEK[redacted]

B. (TS) KNOWN GUARD/STUDENT LOCATIONS INCLUDE CHANCERY, AMB RESIDENCE, DCM RESIDENCE, STAFF QUARTERS, NEW CONSULATE. [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 97
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

[redacted]

COMPLEX AT NORTH END OF COMPOUND, PROPERTY AND SUPPLY WAREHOUSE. SANDBAG POSITIONS ON BUILDING TOPS ASSUMED TO BE OCCUPIED AT NIGHT WHEN COMPOUND IS ILLUMINATED.

4. (TS) INDICATIONS ARE THAT GUARDS HAVE PRIMARY MISSION OF PREVENTING ESCAPE AND TO PROTECT HOSTAGES FROM POPULACE AND IRANIAN FACTIONAL GROUPS WHICH MIGHT WANT TO HARM/KILL THEM. THE GUARDS ROLE AS "EXECUTIONERS" CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED BUT WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY UNDER EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES OR ON ORDER FROM KHOMEINI. THIS BEING THE CASE, THE ASSUMPTION HERE IS THAT A GROUND ASSAULT WHICH ACHIEVES SURPRISE WOULD PROBABLY BE VIEWED AS AN INTERNAL THREAT (I.E. LOCAL IRANIAN EFFORT RATHER THAN U.S.) AND THE INITIAL REACTION OF THE GUARDS WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE ASSAULT FORCE AS OPPOSED TO THE IMMEDIATE ELIMINATION OF THE HOSTAGES. WHAT IS JCS ASSESSMENT?

5. (TS) COMPOUND EXTERIOR:

A. (TS) REPORTS INDICATE THAT BUILDINGS ALONG TAKHT-E JAMSHID, KUTCHE AMERICA, BIST METRI, DAH METRI, AND ARDALAN ARE BEING OCCUPIED BY STUDENT SUPPORTERS WITH AN UNKNOWN PROPORTION UNDOUBTEDLY ARMED. THIS PROVIDES AN IMMEDIATE REINFORCING CAPABILITY AND VANTAGE POINTS FROM WHICH AUTOMATIC SMALL ARMS FIRE CAN BE DIRECTED INTO THE EMBASSY COMPOUND AND PZ'S. [redacted] WHAT IS JCS ASSESSMENT?

6. (C)(TS) REPORTS ON NUMBERS, LOCATION AND MANNING OF VEHICULAR CHECK POINTS ON ROADS LEADING INTO TEHRAN WITHIN THE CITY AND THE VICINITY OF THE EMBASSY PROPER VARIES GRATELY [redacted] MUST GET A HANDLE ON THESE PROCEDURES ALONG ALL PROPOSED ROUTES AND ASSESS THE PROBABILITY OF FORCE COMPROMISE BEFORE REACHING THE OBJECTIVE. CURRENT PLAN IS PREDICATED ON ACHIEVING SURPRISE WHICH IN TURN MEANS THE FORCE MUST BE ABLE TO MOVE UNDETECTED BY VEHICLE TO IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND [redacted]

7. (TS) SOURCES THAT THIS UNIT HAVE TALKED TO INDICATE THAT A ROUTE INTO THE CITY FROM THE SOUTH OR SOUTHWEST IS VERY COMPLICATED AND VERY DANGEROUS. STREET PUNKS ARE ARMED AND TOTALLY UNPREDICTABLE. VEHICLES ARE STOPPED AT RANDOM FOR SEARCHES OR TO EXTRACT TRIBUTE. AN ASSET WHO HAS BEEN OVER THIS ROUTE STATES IT IS THE WORST WAY TO ENTER THE CITY. ANY PLAN ENVISIONING INSERTION OF FORCE FROM THIS DIRECTION FACES A HIGH PROBABILITY OF COMPROMISE FAR AWAY FROM THE TARGET AREA. WITH PRESENT STATE OF ANARCHY/TENSION IN TEHRAN, THIS SITUATION WILL DEFINITELY NOT IMPROVE.

8. (TS) SUMMARY: MISSION SUCCESS IS PREDICATED ON THE FOLLOWING:

A. (TS) VIABLE HUMINT REPORTING CAPABILITY PRIOR TO FORCE INSERTION IN IRAN.

B. (TS) ROUTE SELECTION BASED ON INFORMATION CURRENTLY HELD AND HUMINT CONFIRMATION NOT JUST PROXIMITY TO PROPOSED LAGER AREAS.

REVW 24 NOV 2009

BT

EOM

[redacted]

TOT 23/14/Z
G-188

(S) MSG 084
230900Z APR 80
FM: JCS/RC-J-2
TO: SITE ALPHA
INFO: SFOD
1ST SOW
A(C) [redacted] RANGERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO _____
REVIEW ON [redacted]
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500Z 23 APR 80

1. TEHRAN RADIO REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT CAMPUS UNREST AROUND THE COUNTRY HAD CALMED, AS VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS CLOSED THEIR OFFICES. IN TEHRAN, SUPPORTERS OF THE LEFT-WING FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT REPORTEDLY EVACUATED TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AFTER A DAY OF FIERCE CLASHES WITH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS WHICH LEFT THREE DEAD AND AT LEAST 350 WOUNDED.

(S) 4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUED IN SANANDAJ YESTERDAY. KURDISH GUERRILLAS REPORTEDLY BESIEGED THE IRANIAN ARMY OFFICER'S CLUB AND THE LOCAL RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION. THE ARMY SAID KURDISH REBELS SURROUNDED THE OFFICER'S CLUB AND HAD CUT OFF WATER, ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONE LINKS. NEITHER SIDE GAVE FIGURES FOR YESTERDAY'S CASUALTIES, BUT THE ARMY ADMITTED LOSING 20 DEAD AND 36 WOUNDED ON THE 21ST WHEN KURDISH GUERRILLAS ATTACKED AN ARMY COLUMN SKIRTING SANANDAJ ON ITS WAY NORTH TO RELIEVE GOVERNMENT FORCES IN SAQQEZ. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] MEANWHILE, FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH HAS REJECTED AN OFFER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE TO MEDIATE THE IRAN-IRAQ DESPUTE. IN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO IRAN-IRAQ,

[redacted]

IRAQI ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE CONTINUING CRISIS INCLUDE THE DRAFTING OF ADDITIONAL CONSCRIPTS AND RECALL OF PERSONNEL WITH PRIOR MILITARY EXPERIENCE. IRAQ ALSO HAS CHARGED THAT THERE ARE "5000 IRANIAN COMMANDOS" LOCATED IN KHUZISTAN PROVINCE.

[redacted] IN ONE CITY OF THAT PROVINCE ABADAN, A BOMB EXPLOSION ON 21 APRIL KILLED SEVERAL AND WOUNDED AT LEAST 17 OTHERS.

VIS	3 OMANI PATROL BOATS	22124829	2344N3/06038E7	090T/15K	(USS-NIMITZ)
[redacted]	PAMIR AGI 477	23024526	2232N9/06117E5	(USS NIMITZ)	

H. SOVIET PRESS [illegible] NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORTING WITH INCREASED ANTI-US POLEMICS IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND NEW COMMENTARIES AS MOSCOW PUBLICLY WARNS TEHRAN AND THE ARAB WORLD OF POSSIBLE U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION.

BT

[redacted]

NNNN

TOP SECRET

Item Number: 4576

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Photo Analysis - General (SNOWBIRD (S))

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (TS) J2 established a set of targets and specific areas to be exploited by DB5F as collected.

2. [redacted]

3. (TS) Actual targets exploited were prioritized by J2 and changed as the situation dictated. All targets in J2 Problem Set for collection were not necessarily exploited.

4. (TS) Additional photo analysis requiring more detailed study and production were tasked through DIA to the appropriate office within DIA.

COMMENTS:

1. (TS) J2 established a priority for photo reproduction products to be supplied as collected (e.g., 2 ea 20 x 24; 10 x 12 of Am Emb as collected) with the daily SNOWBIRD report.

2. ( ) J2 maintained daily liaison with DIA JSJ-1 and DB5-F in photo exploitation requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. ( ) That JSOC establish and maintain liaison with DIA for photo exploitation.

2. ( ) That DIA continue to provide expeditious photo analysis as the national situation dictates.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20Nov92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR

TOP SECRET

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

TOP SECRET

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LTC [redacted] Cpt [redacted] Cpt [redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DIA - LTC [redacted] JSJ-1 - 2782(NMIC) - 6951032/903243(G)/2581(R)

- LTC [redacted]

- LTC [redacted]

- Mr. [redacted] DB5F - KY3-2503

- Mr. [redacted] DB5F - KY3-2503

ATTACHMENTS:

1. SNOWBIRD Report

TOP SECRET

G500

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DD & MCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

ZCZCDVA684
RUEAIIF
RUEIZJC #0304 2321700
TTTTT
1645Z AUG 80
CS/SNOWBIRD/J2
[redacted]

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ CITE J3 0304

SUBJ: SURVEILANCE REQUIREMENT NBR 6

[redacted]

2. (TS) [redacted] KOOB, SWIFT, HOHMAN, AND ODE AS BEING DETAINED IN THE CHANCERY. [redacted] FAILED TO INDICATE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THEIR LOCATION AND/OR LIVING CONDITIONS LEAVING THE PRESUMPTION THEY ARE STILL BEING HELD WITHIN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND.

3. (TS) RECOGNIZING THIS PROBABILITY AND THE FACT THAT THE

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC0304 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~
COMPOUND IS STILL AN INFORMATION CLEARANCE CENTER FOR EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION TO ALL HOSTAGES, THE SURVEILANCE OF THE COMPOUND REMAINS A MAJOR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT OF THIS OFFICE.

4. (TS) [redacted]

5. (S) SUGGEST THIS SUBJECT BE TABLED AT THE THURSDAY [redacted] MEETING.

REVW 19 AUG 00
BT
#0304

~~SECRET~~ G582

Item Number: ____

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Hostage Photographs

TIMEFRAME: September 1980 - October 1980

SUMMARY:

1. ( ) J-2 obtained from various sources pictures of the hostages.

2. ( ) J-2 worked by [redacted] to produce B&W photographs of the [redacted] so that updated photographs could be used for identification.

3. ( ) J-2 took B&W photographs of [redacted] as follows [redacted] to provide further updated pictures.

[redacted]

5. ( ) DIA processed subsequent photographs taken by J-2.

COMMENTS:

1. ([redacted] Time Delay was 7-10 days

2. ( ) J-2 produced photographs of equal or greater quality using 1/2 frame (PENFT) copy camera and Panatomic-X filter. Exposure was 1/30 sec at f:3.5 (wide open). Time delay was 3 days.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. ( ) That an Intel 1/2 frame copy camera always be kept available.

2. ( ) That adequate supplies of panatomic-x film be kept available.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO ____
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] Multiple Sources

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

3. ( ) That personnel with knowledge of copy photography [redacted] and development be available for consultation.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS: [redacted]

J-2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Cpt [redacted] Cpt [redacted] Cpt [redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DIA - LTC [redacted] JSJ-1 (NMIC 2782 R)

LTC [redacted] JSJ-1 90-3243G, 2581R,

LTC [redacted] JSJ-1 695-1032

ATTACHMENTS:

1. [redacted]

2. J-2 Produced Photographs

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JSI

Subject: [redacted]

[redacted]

2. Reported Locations:

a. TEHRAN:

5 - Ayatollah Khomeini's residence, in Ne'eavran next to the Sa'atabad Palace.

15 - Evin Prison

b. TABRIZ: 5 - Former US Consulate or another U/I location.

c. JAHROOM (85 NM SE of SHIRAZ): 5 - JAHROOM Jail - Built under Shah and is as large or larger than Evin Prison (in air conditioned portion).

d. NAJAFABAD (27 km West of Esfahan): 5-Ayatollah Montezzari's residence - possible location 32 degrees 38`N, 051 degrees, 21`E.

e. QOM: 5- at Fezeyeh Religious School in Ayatollah Montezzari's residence on the school grounds.

f. YAZD: 5 - Revolutionary Guard Base (town jail/police building) next to residence of Ayatollah Montezzari Qa'im. - Possible location 31 degrees 53`N, 054 degrees, 22`E.

g. MASHAD: 5- Former US Consulate or residence of Ayatollah Maqadam Shiraz.

h. SHIRAZ: U/I - Private residence located on ZAND Ave next to Iranian British Society Gardens surrounded by large garden and HQ for revolutionary guards.

3. Initial report would be appreciated by 1200 hours, 11 Jun 80 with subsequent updates as the information becomes available.

4. POC: CPT [redacted] X79923, Secure 2825.

[redacted]

LTC USAF

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY ~~[redacted]~~ DDoNMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: ACS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ G447

CLASSIFIED

[redacted]

[redacted] RUEAILF RUEAILJ
[redacted] RUEIZJC #0517 0051500
[redacted]
[redacted] 051440Z JAN 81
[redacted] WDC//J-2//
[redacted] RUEAILF [redacted]
INFO RUEAILJ/DELTAY//S-2// A
[redacted] /J-2//
[redacted] S-2//
[redacted]
[redacted] CITE J-2 0517

SUBJ: REACTION FORCE
REF: (A) [redacted] DTG 102303Z DEC 80
(B) [redacted] /J-2 MSG 0469, DTG 151435Z DEC 80 A

1. (TS) REF A REPORTED POSSIBILITY OF REACTION FORCE BILLETED IN GYMNASIUM LOCATED IN AMJADIEH STADIUM COMPLEX ACROSS ROOSEVELT FROM EMBASSY COMPOUND.

(S) 2. [redacted]

PAGE 2 RUEIZNC05[redacted]

3. [redacted] THIS OFFICE CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY HOSTILE FORCES IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE EMBASSY GROUNDS. APPROXIMATELY THREE REPORTS (NONE SITING DIRECT OBSERVATION) HAVE REFERRED TO THE STADIUM COMPLEX BEING USED AS A REVOLUTIONARY GUARD ARMORY AND/OR REACTION FORCE BILLETING AREA.

4. [redacted] HAVE RELIABLE OBSERVER VISIT STADIUM COMPLEX PARTICULARLY THE LARGER BLDGS ON THE SOUTH SIDE TO CONFIRM OR DENY THE PRESENCE OF HOSTILE FORCES.

REVW 05 JAN 00
BT
#0517

CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY ~~[illegible]~~ DDONMCC
☐ RECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]
multiple sources

1

~~SECRET~~

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

G-452

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 91
DERIVATIVE CL BY [illegible]
☐ DECL ☑ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

[illegible] DEC 80
[redacted]/WDC/J2
[redacted]/J2

A(S)
G

[illegible] S E C R E T LIMDIS CITE J2 0485

[illegible] LOCATION CONFIRMATION (U)

[redacted]

TEHRAN CITY PLANS, LOCATED A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE (ANNOTATION 19/TEHRAN SPECIAL 1:50,000) IDENTIFIED AS U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND FACILITY."

[redacted] BY COB 15 DEC 80.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0485 T O P S E C R E T LIMDIS

(B) INTERVIEW OF FORMER U.S. COMMANDER ON (18 DEC 80) REVEALED FACILITY WAS PART OF A COMMUNICATION TRIAD WHICH INCLUDED THE HQS COMPOUND, A RECEIVER SITE LOCATED WEST OF HQS WITHIN THE NEW U.S. COMMISSARY CANTONMENT AREA, AND A TRANSITTER SITE COLLOCATED WITH THE USAF SEMIC SITE LOCATED ON THE NORTHERN EDGE OF THE LAVIZAN COMPOUND. [redacted]

(C) DURING THE INTERVIEW THE FORMER COMMANDER STATED THE FACILITY HAD BEEN USED AS A BARRACKS FOR U.S. ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND IRANIAN MILITARY GUARDS, HOWEVER, THE FACILITY WAS U.S. UNILATERAL OPERATION NOT A COMBINED US/IRANIAN AND WHEN THE AMERICAN ELEMENTS WITHDREW AFTER THE REVOLUTION THERE WAS NO NEED FOR IRANIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL TO STAY.

(D) THE FORMER COMMANDER ALSO PROVIDED NAMES OF TWO ADDITIONAL U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO HAVE FAMILIARITY WITH THE COMPOUND. THIS OFFICE IS EFFECTING CONTACT.

(S)
2. [redacted]

PAGE 3 [redacted]

REV 19 [illegible]
BT
[illegible]

SECRET

G-452

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ G-700

US Charge Laingen Plus two Rescue Considerations

(S) Considerations

- This rescue must be conducted at approximately the same time as the Delta operation.

--If it is conducted prior to the Delta attack it would undoubtedly result in increased security arrangements at the American Embassy.

--It would be difficult to conduct this rescue attempt after the Delta operation due to the probable increase in security at the Foreign Ministry.

- Intelligence needs to be emphasised for this objective area. JTF J-2 is attempting to gain additional intel on this rescue objective and to get a mock-up built.

(S) General Plan

A - Forces. Five to [redacted]

- Insertion Options.

C (S) -- Normal country arrival with [redacted] (Preferred method, however, may be difficult due to recent Canadian action).

(S) -- Paradrop or airland [redacted]

(S) - Assault.

A -- Conducted at approximately the same time as the Delta attack. (Would require communications between Delta and [redacted] Personnel.) Attack procedures will depend upon the intelligence provided.

(S) - Extraction Options.

(S) -- By vehicle out to a deserted landing area [redacted] (Preferred method as it would not add additional coordination problems with the Delta operation.

-- By same helos assigned to extract Delta (not recommended as it may impact on the Delta ops.)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92 /DDO/NMCC
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL OR DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] multiple sources

~~TOP~~ SECRET

[redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

1. GENERAL

SINCE 4 NOV, THREE US DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN HELD IN THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA). THEIR PRECISE STATUS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN VARIOUS TERMS, INCLUDING A STATEMENT THAT THE THREE WERE FREE TO LEAVE, BUT THEIR SAFETY COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED. UNTIL MID-FEBRUARY, THEY WERE IN REGULAR TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH THE US DEPARTMENT OF STATE: HAD USE OF MFA TELEX SERVICES, AND RECEIVED MAIL DELIVERIES THROUGH VISITS OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS. SINCE THAT TIME, TELEPHONIC CONTACT HAS BEEN AT LEAST PERIODICALLY INTERRUPTED. THE THREE INTERNEES ARE: CHARGE D'AFFAIRS BRUCE LAINGEN, SECURITY OFFICER MICHAEL HOWLAND, AND POLITICAL COUNSEL VICTOR TOMSETH.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA

A. THE MFA BUILDING IS LOCATED APPROX 2 KM SOUTH OF THE US EMBASSY; UTM COORDINATES 39S WV 3765 4960 OR LAT 35 DEG 41 MIN 20 SEC NORTH, LONG 051 DEG 24 MIN 59 SEC EAST. IT IS POSITIONED ON A COMPOUND WHICH OCCUPIES AND ENTIRE BLOCK, BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY FORUGHI, ON THE EAST BY RUDAKI, ON THE SOUTH BY KEYBAN-E MUZEH, AND ON THE WEST BY QUAVAM OS SALTANEH (LABELLED KEYBAN-E STALIN ON SOME MAPS).

B. THE FACILITIES IMMEDIATELY ON THE COMPOUND ARE:

(1) NORTH - THE MAIN MFA BUILDING, WITH THE MFA ANNEX.

(2) WEST - THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM.

(3) SOUTH - THE ETHNOLOGICAL MUSEUM / LIBRARY.

(4) SOUTHEAST - HELIPAD.

C. OTHER SIGNIFICANT FACILITIES IN THE SURROUNDING AREA:

(1) MINISTRY OF WAR - APPROX 100M NORTH OF COMPOUND.

(2) POLICE HEADQUARTERS - APPROX 100M EAST OF COMPOUND.

(3) NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL CORPORTATION - APPROX 300M SOUTHEAST OF COMPOUND.

D. DIRECTIONS OF ONE-WAY STREETS NEAR MFA:

(1) STREETS BORDERING MFA COMPOUND:

FOROUGHI	EAST
RUDAKI	SOUTH
KEYBAN-E MUZEH	EAST
QUAVAM OS SALTANEH	NORTH

(2) OTHER NEARBY STREETS:

SEPAH (NOW IMAM KHOMEINI)	WEST
HAFEZ	SOUTH
FERDOWSI	NORTH
NADERI (NOW JUMHORI ISLAMI)	EAST

3. HOSTAGE LOCATION:

A. THE MAIN MFA BUILDING, WHERE THE HOSTAGES ARE HELD, IS SHAPED LIKE A WRENCH WITH THE LONG AXIS ON AN EAST-WEST LINE. IT IS A THREE STORY BUILDING WITH TWO WINGS JOINED BY A CENTRAL CORRIDOR APPROX 80 METERS LONG. THE EAST WING IS "C"-SHAPED WITH THE OPEN SIDE TO THE EAST, APPROX 40 METERS ON A SIDE. THE WEST WING IS ROUGHLY SQUARE, ALSO APPROX 40 METERS ON A SIDE. THE HOSTAGES ARE LOCATED ON THE THIRD FLOOR OF THE CENTRAL CORRIDOR, ON THE WESTERN HALF OF THAT PORTION OF THE BUILDING.

B. THERE ARE THREE ENTRANCES TO THE MAIN MFA BUILDING: ON THE EAST, THE SOUTH, AND THE NORTH. THE EAST ENTRANCE IS THE USUAL WORKING ENTRANCE, WHILE THE ENTRANCE ON THE SOUTH SIDE IS RESERVED FOR CEREMONIAL OCCASIONS. THE NORMAL ROUTE TO THE HOSTAGE LOCATION, FOR A VISITOR, IS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) ENTER AT GROUND LEVEL AT THE EAST END OF THE BUILDING, THROUGH THE GLASS DOUBLE DOORS AT THE CENTER OF THE "C"-SHAPED EAST WING.

(2) DURING THE DAY THERE ARE THREE CONSCRIPT-TYPE GUARDS IN THE RECEPTION AREA JUST INSIDE THE ENTRANCE. AN ELDERLY CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE AT A DESK ON THE LEFT IN THE RECEPTION AREA CHECKS CREDENTIALS DURING THE

DAY.

(3) GO UP THE STAIRCASE ON THE LEFT. ALL STAIRCASES ARE MARBLE WITH CARPET RUNNERS.

(4) UPON REACHING THE SECOND FLOOR, MOVE WEST ALONG A CORRIDOR WHICH LIES ALONG THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE CENTER SECTION OF THE BUILDING. THIS HALLWAY IS MARBLE, WITH A CARPET RUNNER. THERE ARE OFFICES ALONG THE NORTH SIDE OF THIS HALLWAY, AND WINDOWS ALONG THE SOUTH SIDE.

(5) CONTINUE WEST THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF THE CENTRAL PORTION OF THE BUILDING TO THE STAIRCASE AT THE WEST END. TAKE THE STAIRS TO THE THIRD FLOOR. TURN LEFT AT THE TOP OF THE STAIRS; MOVE ALL THE WAY AROUND TO THE BACK OF THE STAIRWELL. THIS IS THE WESTERN ENTRANCE TO THE "DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION AREA", THE LARGE BALL ROOM WHERE THE HOSTAGES ARE HELD. DURING THE DAY THERE IS A GUARD AT THIS ENTRANCE.

C. IT SHOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO GAIN ACCESS TO THIS ROOM BY ENTERING THROUGH THE SOUTH ENTRANCE, PASSING THROUGH THE "HALL OF MIRRORS", ASCENDING THE CENTRAL STAIRCASE, AND ENTERING THE HOSTAGE QUARTERS THROUGH THE EAST DOOR INTO THEIR QUARTERS. THIS DOOR, HOWEVER, IS CURRENTLY CHAINED AND SECURED WITH A PADLOCK.

D. NORMAL WORKING HOURS FOR THE EMBASSY HAVE BEEN REPORTED AS APPROX 0730 OR 0800 UNTIL 1400 OR 1500 HOURS LOCAL.

E. THE ROOM ITSELF IS APPROX 20 X 20 METERS, WITH WINDOWS ON THE NORTH SIDE, OVERLOOKING FORUGHI, AND ON THE SOUTH SIDE, OVERLOOKING THE HELIPAD AND THE EMBASSY GROUNDS.

F. IN THE CENTER OF THE ROOM IS A LARGE PERSIAN RUG. ON THE NORTH SIDE ARE TWO CHAIRS AND A SOFA; ON THE SOUTH SIDE ARE THREE COTS, A DINING TABLE AND A VERY LONG, HEAVY BANQUET OR BUFFET TABLE.

4. GUARD FORCE:

THE ONLY IDENTIFIED GUARD LOCATIONS ARE:

A. ONE GUARD ON THE GATE IN THE COMPOUND FENCE, WHICH IS ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE MFA COMPOUND. THE GATE IS SOUTH OF THE MFA BUILDING AND NORTH OF THE HELIPAD.

B. THREE CONSCRIPT-TYPE GUARDS AND ONE CIVILIAN RECEPTIONIST AT THE EAST ENTRANCE, INSIDE THE RECEPTION AREA.

C. ONE GUARD OUTSIDE THE HOSTAGE QUARTERS; A CIVILIAN, ON THE WEST DOOR WITH IS THE PRIMARY ENTRANCE TO THE ROOM.

5. EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES:

A. GUARDS FROM THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS OR WAR MINISTRY COULD ARRIVE WITHIN 10 MINUTES, PROBABLY UP TO A SQUAD STRONG. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT GUARDS ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FACILITY,SUCH AS EITHER OF THESE TWO, WOULD DROP EVERYTHING AND RUN TO THE MFA WITHOUT HESITATION, HOWEVER. IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT FIRING WOULD CAUSE THEM TO BE ADDITIONALLY CONCERNED WITH THE SECURITY OF THEIR OWN POSITIONS, RATHER THAN TO IGNORE THEIR ORIGINAL RESPONSIBILITIES. FURTHER, INDIVIDUALS REACTING FROM OTHER COMPOUNDS MAY ENGAGE IN INTRAMURAL FIRE-FIGHTS AND DETRACT FROM, RATHER THAN ADD TO, EFFORTS BY LOCAL SECURITY FORCES.

B. WITHIN 10-15 MIN, THE FIRST ELEMENTS OF PASDARAN COULD BE IN THE AREA. WHILE THERE ARE SIZEABLE PASDARAN ELEMENTS AVAILABLE, IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY FOR THEM TO PROVIDE A MASSIVE RESPONSE TO THE MFA, RATHER THAN RETAIN FORCES TO COVER THE US EMBASSY. IF THE EMBASSY WERE HIT AT THE SAME TIME AS THE MFA, IT IS QUESTIONABLE HOW MUCH RESPONSE WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE MFA.

C. WITHIN 20-30 MIN, THE BEGINNINGS OF CROWDS COULD BE EXPECTED IN THE VICINITY OF THE MFA, IF IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT AN INCIDENT WAS IN PROGRESS. THIS AREA SEEMS TO HAVE LESS POTENTIAL FOR CROWD FORMATION THAN THE EMBASSY. THERE ARE FEWER SMALL SHOPS IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA WHICH ALSO SERVE AS MERCHANTS' LIVING QUARTERS.

D. ROTARY WING LZ'S:

(1) THE STANDARD HELIPAD IN THE SOUTHEAST PORTION OF THE MFA COMPOUND IS APPROX 150 METERS FROM THE HOSTAGE LOCATION. (IT IS APPROX 50 X 80 METERS, WITH THE LONG AXIS RUNNING NORTH-SOUTH.)

(2) THERE IS A CLEARED FIELD APPROX 250 METERS SOUTH OF THE HOSTAGE LOCATION WHICH WOULD SERVE AS A ROTARY WING LZ. (IT IS APPROX 40 X 80 METERS, WITH THE LONG AXIS RUNNING EAST-WEST.)

E. FIXED WING LZ'S:

(1) ASSUMING AN AVERAGE SPEED OF 25 MPH, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DRIVE FROM THE COMPOUND TO THE WESTERN END OF MEHRABAD AIRFIELD (APPROX 10 KM WEST) IN APPROX 15 MINUTES.

(2) USING A FIGURE OF 25 MPH IN TOWN, AND 50 MPH ON THE OPEN HIGHWAY, KARAJ AIRSTRIP, APPROX 40 KM TO THE WEST, COULD BE REACHED IN APPROX 45 MIN. KHARIZAK AIRSTRIP, APPROX 30 KM TO THE SOUTH, COULD BE REACHED IN APPROX 40 MIN. MANZARIYEH, APPROX 90 KM TO THE SOUTH, COULD BE REACHED IN APPROX 1.5 HOURS.

F. PHYSICAL SECURITY NOTES:

(S) (1) THE ENTIRE COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED BY A FENCE OR WALL, [redacted] THE BOTTOM 3' of the WALL APPEARS TO BE SOLID, PROBABLY CEMENT, WITH WROUGHT IRON BARS FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FENCE.

(2) THERE ARE ORNATE GRILLS (ACTUALLY SECRITY BARS) ON THE FIRST -FLOOR WINDOWS ONLY, ON THE MAIN MFA BUILDING.

(3) KEY DIMENSIONS:

THIRD FLOOR WINDOWS TO HOSTAGE AREA:	11' HIGH x 4.9' WIDE
GROUND TO TOP OF ROOF PARAPHET:	62.7'
GROUND TO BOTTOM OF THIRD FLOOR WINDOWS:	38'
GROUND TO TOP OF WING ON SOUTH ENTRANCE:	34'

(4) IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IF CLANDESTINE CONTACT COULD BE MADE WITH THE INTERNEES, THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO ASSIST IN THEIR RESCUE. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT HOWLAND HAS BEEN ABLE TO MOVE AROUND OUTSIDE THE MINISTRY ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS, AND HAS SAID THAT HE COULD EFFECT THEIR ESCAPE IF PROVIDED WITH A FILE AND SOME PUTTY. OF THE THREE INTERNEES, HOWLAND AT LEAST HAS CONSIDERED AND PLANNED METHODS OF ESCAPE, AND REPORTEDLY RUNS AND DOES PT REGULARLY WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THEIR QUATERS. THE INTERNEES HAVE TELEPHONE, TELEVISION, AND RADIO AVAILABLE IN THEIR QUARTERS, AND HAVE COMMENTED SEVERAL TIMES IN MESSAGE TRAFFIC TO USDOS THAT THEY LISTEN TO THE "BREAKFAST SHOW" ON VOA (VOICE OF AMERICA).

[redacted]

1. GENERAL:

[redacted]

2. COMPOUND:

A. THE ETHNOLOGICAL MUSEUM ON THE MFA COMPOUND APPEARS TO BE VANDALIZED AND UNUSED - POSSIBLY IT WAS UNDER CONSTRUCTION BEFORE THE REVOLUTION AND NEVER FINISHED. THE BUILDING IS UNLIGHTED AT NIGHT.

B. THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM MAY OR MAY NOT BE OPEN. IT WAS OBSERVED TO BE CLOSED, BUT ALLEGEDLY WILL REOPEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

C. THE BUILDING IN THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE COMPOUND MAY HOUSE THE "WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION" PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT TO BE LOCATED IN THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM.

3. PERIMETER GUARDS:

A. NORTH GATE IN FENCE:

FOUR PERSONNEL WERE SEEN NEXT TO THE GUARD SHACK AT THE WEST END OF THE MAIN BUILDING. THE GUARD SHACK IS LOCATED AT THE INNER WEST END OF THE GATE. ONLY ONE OF THE FOUR MILITARY GUARDS HAD A WEAPON; A G-3 WITH ONE MAG. HE ALSO CARRIED A BAYONET ON HIS BELT. GUARDS AT THIS POINT WERE GENERALLY STANDING AROUND THE GATE, BUT NOT INSIDE THE GUARD SHACK. THE GUARDS WERE YOUNG (19-20 YEARS OLD). ALL WORE LIGHT BROWN FATIGUE-TYPE UNIFORMS. NO RADIOS, AMMO POUCHES, FLASHLIGHTS, ETC., WERE NOTED. ONE OBSERVER SAW A DESK INSIDE THE GUARD SHACK, AND SURMISED THERE WAS PROBABLY A PHONE INSIDE ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SEE ONE. LIGHTING AROUND THE GATE WAS BRIGHT, WITH ILLUMINATION PROVIDED BY STREET LIGHTS RATHER THAN SPECIAL SECURITY LIGHTING. GUARDS APPEAR TO ROTATE ON AN UNKNOWN SCHEDULE.

B. NORTH ENTRANCE TO BUILDING:

THE NORTH ENTRANCE AT THE CENTER OF THE MAIN MFA BUILDING APPEARS TO BE UNUSED. ONE CONSCRIPT-TYPE GUARD, ARMED ONLY WITH A BAYONET ON HIS BELT WAS WANDERING AROUND THIS AREA. THE GUARD WENT NO

[redacted]

FARTHER EAST OR WEST THAN THE WIDE PORTIONS OF THE BUILDING. THE NORTH SIDE OF THE BUILDING IS SEPARATED FROM THE STREET BY A CHAIN STRETCHED BETWEEN CEMENT POSTS IN THE GROUND. THE POSTS ARE APPROXIMATELY 5M APART AND 1M HIGH. THERE IS A GAP IN THE CHAIN WHERE A WALK-WAY FROM THE STREET EXTENDS TO THE ENTRANCE TO THE BUILDING.

C. EAST ENTRANCE TO MAIN MFA BUILDING:

THERE IS NO PERIMETER FENCE ALONG THE EAST END OF THE MAIN MFA BUILDING: THEREFORE THE EAST ENTRANCE TO THE BUILDING IS DIRECTLY ACCESSIBLE FROM THE STREET. INSIDE THE EAST ENTRANCE, ONE CONSCRIPT-TYPE GUARD WITH A RIFLE AND BAYONET WAS SEEN ALONG WITH AN ELDERLY CIVILIAN WHO WAS PRESUMABLY THE RECEPTIONIST. THIS OBSERVATION WAS MADE ON A SATURDAY AT APPROX 1830 HOURS, WHICH WOULD BE A RATHER SLACK PERIOD. A TELEPHONE WAS SEEN ON THE RECEPTIONIST'S DESK ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ANTEROOM. THE EAST DOOR WAS A HEAVY WOOD DOOR WITH GLASS PANES, EACH APPROX 30CM ON A SIDE. THE DOOR WAS KEPT LOCKED FROM THE INSIDE BY A WARDED TYPE DEAD BOLT LOCK. THE KEYS WERE SEEN HANGING FROM THE LOCK ON THE INSIDE OF THE DOOR. THE KEY CHAIN CONTAINED APPROX 10 KEYS, INCLUDING SEVERAL HEAVY KEYS FOR WARDED LOCKS AND SEVERAL SMALLER, MODERN LOOKING KEYS, SUCH AS WOULD BE USED IN PIN TUMBLER LOCKS. LOOKING WEST FROM THE ANTEROOM THERE WAS A CLEAR VIEW DOWN THE CENTRAL CORRIDOR OF THE BUILDING. THREE SETS OF DOUBLE GLASS DOORS WERE SEEN IN THE CORRIDOR. THE FIRST SET WAS AT THE EAST END OF THE CORRIDOR, AND WAS OPEN. THE SECOND SET APPEARED TO BE NEAR THE CENTER OF THE CORRIDOR (EVEN WITH THE SOUTH ENTRANCE). THE LAST SET APPEARED TO BE AT THE FAR END OF THE CORRIDOR, NEARLY ALL THE WAY TO THE WEST END OF THE CENTER PORTION OF THE BUILDING. THE EAST FENCE AROUND THE MFA COMPOUND CONNECTS WITH THE SOUTH CORNER OF THE EAST FACE OF THE MAIN MFA BUILDING. THE EAST FACE OF THE MAIN MFA BUILDING WAS WELL LIGHTED BY STREET LIGHTS, AND NO SECURITY LIGHTS AS SUCH WERE SEEN. CARS ARE USUALLY PARKED WITHIN THE ENTRANCE AREA AT THE EAST END OF THE BUILDING DURING THE DAY TIME, BUT NONE WERE SEEN THERE AT NIGHT.

D. GATE IN EAST FENCE:

THERE IS A GATE IN THE EAST FENCE, APPROXIMATELY IN THE CENTER OF ITS NORTH-SOUTH LENGTH. TWO GUARDS WERE OBSERVED AT THIS GATE ALONG WITH AN ADDITIONAL TWO GUARDS WHO MAY HAVE BEEN ROVING GUARDS, OR MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE GATE. ALL GUARDS APPEARED TO BE MILITARY CONSCRIPTS, ARMED WITH G-3'S AND BAYONETS ON THEIR BELTS. NO OTHER EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS AMMO POUCHES, FLASHLIGHTS, OR RADIOS WAS SEEN. THE GUARD SHACK WAS

LOCATED ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE GATE. ONE OF THE GUARDS WAS SEEN SITTING INSIDE THE SHACK, READING. THE GATE AREA WAS WELL-LIGHTED BY STREET LIGHTS, AND NO ADDITIONAL SECURITY LIGHTING WAS SEEN HERE.

E. EASTERN MOST GATE IN SOUTH FENCE:

THERE ARE ACTUALLY TWO GATES AT THIS LOCATION, ONE ON EITHER SIDE OF A GUARD SHACK. WITHIN THE GUARD SHACK, SEVERAL CIVILIANS WERE OBSERVED, BUT THERE IS PROBABLY ONE CIVILIAN POSTED THERE REGULARLY. THE CIVILIAN WHO WAS REGULARLY SEEN THERE WAS DRESSED IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, TO INCLUDE A SUIT JACKET WITHOUT A TIE. HE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ARMED AND SEEMED TO BE MORE OF A CARE-TAKER THAN A GUARD. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE IS A CONSCRIPT GUARD ASSOCIATED WITH THIS GATE. CONSCRIPT GUARDS WERE SEEN IN THE AREA ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION. THEY MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE NIOC BUILDING ACROSS THE STREET (COVERED LATER IN THIS REPORT) OR MAY HAVE BEEN ROVING GUARDS. AT NIGHT, A SMALL LIGHT, SUCH AS A DESK LAMP, WAS SEEN INSIDE THE GUARD SHACK. THE GATE AREA IS WELL LIGHTED BY STREET LIGHTS; NO SECURITY LIGHTING WAS OBSERVED.

F. OTHER GATES IN SOUTH FENCE:

THE FENCE ALONG THE SOUTH WALL HAS THREE OTHER GATES, IN ADDITION TO THE ONE DISCUSSED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH. THERE ARE NO GUARDS AT ANY OF THESE THREE GATES, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE WESTERN MOST GATE, WHICH IS LOCATED DIRECTLY SOUTH OF THE ARCHEOLOGICAL MUSEUM. A GUARD IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, ARMED WITH A PISTOL, WALKED OUT TO THIS GATE FROM THE SOUTH ENTRANCE TO THE MUSEUM ON ONE OCCASION, ALTHOUGH THIS GATE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE HIS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY.

G. GATE IN WEST FENCE:

THERE IS A GUARD SHACK LOCATED ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE GATE. TWO GUARDS WERE SEEN IN THIS SHACK. THEY WERE OLDER MEN (35-40 YEARS OLD), DRESSED IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES WITH BLUE SHIRTS. NO WEAPONS WERE SEEN. THESE GUARDS APPEARED TO BE DRESSED THE SAME AS TWO OTHER GUARDS ACROSS THE ROAD (DISCUSSED LATER IN THIS REPORT). THIS AREA WAS WELL LIGHTED BY STREET LIGHTS; NO SECURITY LIGHTING WAS SEEN.

4. ROVING GUARDS IN THE MFA COMPOUND:

THERE WERE 2-4 CONSCRIPT-TYPE GUARDS, ARMED WITH G-3'S AND BAYONETS SEEN ROVING IN THE COMPOUND. TWO OF THESE MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE GATE IN THE EAST FENCE. THESE ROVING GUARDS TENDED TO STAY ON THE PATHS AND ROADS INSIDE THE COMPOUND. THEY CONCENTRATED ON THE AREA IN FRONT OF THE MAIN MFA BUILDING AND THE PREPARED

HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE. THEY WENT NO FARTHER WEST THAN THE MFA ADMIN ANNEX; NO FARTHER SOUTH THAN THE NORTH EDGE OF THE ETHNOLOGICAL MUSEUM.

5. GUARDS IN AREAS ADJOINING MFA COMPOUND:

A. OFFICER'S CLUB COMPOUND:

TWO PASDARAN GUARDS WERE SEEN ON THE OFFICER'S CLUB COMPOUND, WHICH ADJOINS THE MFA COMPOUND ON THE NORTHWEST, ACROSS FORUGHI STREET. THEY WERE SEEN NEAR THE GATE AT THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE COMPOUND. THE ONE NEAREST THE GATE, APPARENTLY GUARDING IT, CARRIED AN AK-TYPE WEAPON AND WORE CAMOUFALGE PANTS WITH A T-SHIRT. THE OTHER, INSIDE THE COMPOUND, WORE A FIELD JACKET AND CARRIED A G-3.

B. POLICE HEADQUARTERS:

THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS, ADJOINING THE MFA COMPOUND ON THE EAST SIDE HAS AN ENTRANCE ON ITS WEST SIDE WHICH OVERLOOKS THE MFA COMPOUND. THERE ARE TWO SETS OF STEPS LEADING FROM THE NORTH AND SOUTH UP TO A PLATFORM IN FRONT OF THE ENTRANCE. THE PLATFORM IS AT LEAST 10M ABOVE THE STREET AND AFFORDS A GOOD VIEW, LOOKING DOWN INTO THE MFA COMPOUND. DAY AND NIGHT, THREE POLICEMEN WERE POSTED ON THIS PLATFORM. TWO OTHERS WERE SEEN ON ONE OCCASION AT NIGHT, AS THEY WALKED DOWN THESE STEPS AND WALKED AROUND THE POLICE COMPOUND. MOST POLICE WERE DRESSED IN BLUE PANTS, SHIRTS, AND JACKETS. TWO WERE SEEN WITH GREEN JACKETS AND BROWN PANTS. ALL WERE WEARING LARGE BLUE SAUCER HATS. THE POLICE GENERALLY CARRIED UZI 9MM SMG'S SLUNG ON THEIR RIGHT OR LEFT HIPS. NO SPARE MAGAZINES, RADIOS, OR THEIR EQUIPMENT WAS SEEN.

C. NIOC COMPOUND:

ONE CIVILIAN (NO WEAPON SEEN) AND ONE CONSCRIPT (ARMED WITH A G-3 AND BAYONET) WERE POSTED AT THE GATE INTO THE NIOC COMPOUND. THIS ENTRANCE IS ON THE NORTHWEST PORTION OF THE NIOC COMPOUND, AND THE GUARD SHACK IS LOCATED ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE GATE. THE CIVILIAN GENERALLY STAYED NEAR THE GUARD SHACK, SOMETIMES GOING INTO IT AND USING THE TELEPHONE, ETC. THE CONSCRIPT WAS GENERALLY POSTED IN THE ENTRANCE, BUT WANDERED AROUND THE AREA, SOMETIMES CROSSING THE STREET TO TALK WITH AN MFA GUARD.

D. TWO GUARDS WERE OBSERVED IN THE GUARD SHACK AT THE GATE TO THE LARGE WHITE OFFICE BUILDING LOCATED TO THE WEST OF THE MFA COMPOUND. NO WEAPONS WERE OBSERVED ON THE GUARDS OR IN THE SHACK, BUT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN ARMED. NO TELEPHONE WAS SEEN, BUT THE OBSERVERS SUSPECTED ONE IS IN THE SHACK. THE GUARDS WERE APPARENTLY CIVILIANS.

6. PHYSICAL SECURITY:

A. LIGHTING:

THE ENTIRE PERIMETER OF THE MFA COMPOUND WAS WELL LIGHTED AT NIGHT BY STREET LIGHTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE SURROUNDING ROADS. THE SOUTH FACE OF THE MAIN MFA BUILDING WAS BRIGHTLY LIGHTED. THERE WERE NUMEROUS FLOODLIGHTS ON THE BUILDING AND GROUNDS, INCLUDING TWO T-BARS OF THREE FLOODLIGHTS EACH, MOUNTED NEAR THE SOUTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST CORNERS OF THE BUILDING. THERE WERE ALSO LIGHTS MOUNTED ON THE ROOF OF THE BUILDING, ESPECIALLY ON THE EAST AND WEST ENDS OF THE BUILDING, AIMED TOWARDS THE CENTER PORTION. THERE WERE NUMEROUS LIGHTS ON POLES, APPROX 2M HIGH, LIGHTING THE GROUNDS. POWER FAILURES IN THE CITY WERE COMMON. NO GENERATORS WERE HEARD IN OPERATION IN THE MFA COMPOUND, ALTHOUGH THE AREA WAS NOT OBSERVED DURING A POWER OUTAGE. THE ONLY DIMLY LIGHTED PORTION OF THE MFA COMPOUND PERIMETER WAS ON THE SOUTH FENCE, BETWEEN THE TWO MUSEUMS. TWO STREET LIGHTS WERE OUT AT THIS POINT.

B. FENCE/CONSTRUCTION:

THE FENCE ON THE EAST AND WEST OF THE MFA COMPOUND IS APPROX 2.6M HIGH. IT HAS A CONCRETE FOUNDATION APPROX 1M HIGH AND .6M THICK, WITH APPROX 1.7M HIGH STEEL BARS, POINTED AT THE TOP, SPACED APPROX .3M APART, AND APPROX 2CM THICK. THERE ARE TWO HORIZONTAL BRACES OF 2.5CM BY 1CM BAR STOCK, SPACED APPROX 10CM UP FROM THE BOTTOM AND DOWN FROM THE TOP OF THE BARS. PILASTERS (COLUMNS OF STONE OR CEMENT BLOCK) THE FULL HEIGHT OF THE FENCE REINFORCED IT APPROX EVERY 5-7M. THE PILASTERS ARE APPROX .7-.8M WIDE AND THICK, AND EACH IS TOPPED WITH AN ELECTRIC LAMP. THE GATE IN THE EAST FENCE AND THE EASTERN MOST GATE IN THE SOUTH FENCE APPEAR TO BE SECURED WITH BUILT IN WARDED LOCKS. THE GATES ARE ALSO OF STEEL BARS, JOINED ON THE BOTTOM BY SHEETS OF APPROX 10MM SHEET STEEL ON THE BOTTOM 1.5M OF THE FENCE. THE SOUTH FENCE IS OF LIGHTER CONSTRUCTION, EXCEPT FOR THE PART OF IT TO THE EAST OF THE EASTERN MOST GATE, WHICH IS OF THE SAME TYPE AS THE FENCE ON THE EAST AND WEST OF THE COMPOUND. THE FENCE ON THE MAJORITY OF THE SOUTH SIDE IS APPROX THE SAME HEIGHT AS THE REST OF THE COMPOUND, BUT IS MADE OF 3CM SQUARE STOCK (POSSIBLY HEAVY SQUARE TUBING, WITH WALLS 5-6MM THICK). THE BARS ARE JOINED TOGETHER BY HORIZONTAL BARS AT THE TOP AND BOTTOM. THE FENCE RESTS ON A STONE OR BLOCK FOUNDATION APPROX 30CM HIGH. THE THREE GATES IN THE LIGHT WEIGHT PART OF THE SOUTH FENCE APPEAR TO BE LOCKED AT ALL TIMES. THESE GATES INCLUDE A VERTICAL BOLT IN THE CENTER OF THE GATE WHICH CAN BE LOWERED INTO THE GROUND FOR ADDED STRENGTH. THESE BOLTS ARE CHAINED DOWN.

C. GATE STATUS:

(1) THE GATE IN THE NORTH FENCE IS OPEN DAY AND NIGHT. THERE MAY NOT EVEN BE A GATE WHICH CAN BE PULLED ACROSS THIS GAP IN THE FENCE.

(2) THE GATE IN THE EAST FENCE IS USUALLY KEPT CLOSED. IT IS THE MAIN VEHICULAR GATE INTO THE MFA COMPOUND.

(3) THE EASTERN MOST GATE ON THE SOUTH FENCE IS USUALLY KEPT CLOSED, BUT THE PORTION ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE GUARD SHACK IS OPENED TO ALLOW PERSONNEL IN AND OUT AS NECESSARY.

(4) THE OTHER THREE GATES IN THE SOUTH FENCE ARE ALMOST ALWAYS CLOSED, EXCEPT THE WESTERN MOST GATE, WHICH WAS SEEN OPEN ONE TIME. IT IS THE GATE DIRECTLY SOUTH OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM.

D. COMMUNICATIONS:

WHILE TELEPHONES WERE NOT CONFIRMED IN ALL GUARD SHACKS, THEY WERE OBSERVED IN SEVERAL, AND ARE PROBABLY PRESENT IN ALL OF THEM. SEVERAL VERTICAL RADIO ANTENNAS WERE SEEN ON THE ROOF OF THE MAIN MFA BUILDING: THEY WERE PROBABLY VHF OMNIDIRECTIONAL ANTENNAS.

INDEX

(4 365)

TAB	CONTENT
1	AMERICAN EMBASSY LAYOUT AND MODEL
2	EXTRACTION AIRFIELD (MANZARIYELI, IRAN)
3	E [redacted]
4	ROUTE MAP
5	IRAN MAP
6	COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
7	COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS
8	TIME FLOW CHARTS (see aij)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92 [illegible]
DERIVATIVE CL BY [illegible]
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] multiple sources

~~Classified By: DCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

SAFEHAVEN


ATLANTIC GAPSAT
PENTAGON
JTF
SAFEHAVEN
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
— HF RADIO (PARKHILL SECURE
— DCS (SECURE VOICE/ TELETYPE
— UHF SATELLITE (SECURE VOICE
TELETYPE


NCA
JCS
CINC
COMJTF
TACTICAL AIR FORCES
TACTICAL NAVAL FORCES
TACTICAL ARMY FORCES
DELTA
[redacted]
RANGERS
(TENTATIVE)

JTF Command Relations



TOP SECRET UNCLASS

TOP SECRET UNCLASS

ASSEMBLY



NOTE: ALL COMMUNICATIONS VIA [redacted] DCS

— — PARKHILL DEVICES TO BE [redacted]

RON



— DCS (SECURE VOICE/TELET
— UHF SATELLITE (PARKHILL SEC

TOP SECRET
UNCLASS

ISB


ATLANTIC GAPSAT
INDIAN OCEAN GAPSAT
UNCLASS
PENTAGON
JTF
DELTA
HF RADIO (PARKHILL SEC
DCS (SECURE VOICE/TELET
UHF SATELLITE (PARKHILL

EMPLOYMENT


ATLANTIC GAPSAT
INDIAN OCEAN GAPSAT
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
PENTAGON
JTF
[redacted]
— LOS RADIO (VHF/UHF/
— HF RADIO (
— DCS (SECURE VOICE /
— UHF SATELLITE (

MYSTIC STAR SUPPO



TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL


COMPOSITE
ATLANTIC GAPSAT
INDIAN OCEAN GAPSAT
PENTAGON
JTF
DELTA
COMJTF
LASALLE
MIDWAY
TOP SECRET
UNCLASS
HF RADIO (LOW POWER)
HF RADIO (PARALLEL SECURE)
DCS (SECURE VOICE / TELETYPE)
UHF SATELLITE (PARALLEL SEC)
UHF SATELLITE (VINSON SEC)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20Nov92
DERIVATIVE CL BY ~~multiple sources~~
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]
multiple sources

G329

VZCZCBVA211
OO RUEAIIF
DE RUEIZJC #0112 1361659
ZNY TTTTT
O 151700Z MAY 88
FM JIF/RICE BOWL
TO RUEAIIF/[redacted]
BT
T O P S E C R E T CITE JS 80000

SUBJ: FOREIGN MINISTRY UPDATE DEBRIEFING.

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED DURING A DEBRIEFING [redacted] HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE EAST END OF COMPLEX IS CONSIDERED GOOD BEING BASED ON [redacted] OF THE EAST WING. SOURCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE WEST WING IS LIMITED AND MUST BE JUDGED SUPERFICIAL.

2. SOURCE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING NEW INFORMATION (A) THE BUILDING (EAST WING AT LEAST) IS SERVICED BY AN ELEVATOR. THE SMALL COVERED ENTRANCE LOCATED BEHIND THE EAST WING AND FACING THE INTERIOR GARDENS IS A PRIVATE ENTRANCE FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0112 T O P S E C R E T
MANY OF THE NORMAL WORKING PERSONNEL ARE BROUGHT TO THE MFA IN BUSES. MOST WORKERS ENTER THROUGH THE WEST PORTICO ENTRANCE, CROSS THE COURTYARD AND ENTER THE BUILDING AND ASCEND THE APPROPRIATE STAIRWELL. (B) THE SOURCE CONFIRMED THE LOCATION OF THE NIGHT TIME DUTY OFFICER AS BEING THE DAYTIME DOCTOR'S OFFICE LOCATED ON THE GROUND LEVEL OFF THE COURTYARD AND THE SOURCE INDICATED NEITHER THE DUTY OFFICER NOR THE EXTERNAL GUARDS ARE LIKELY TO KNOW THE CORRECT LOCATION OF THE MFA TRIO, HOWEVER THE TELEPHONE SWITCH BOARD OPERATOR (LOCATED IN THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE COURTYARD) MIGHT KNOW THE ROOM NUMBER. (C) ACCORDING TO SOURCE THE TELEPHONE NUMBER THAT LAINGEN PROVIDED PREVIOUSLY (321-246) IS LOCATED ON THE THIRD FLOOR. THE CODE DEPT IS LOCATED ON THE FOURTH (ATTIC) FLOOR ABOVE THE FOREIGN MINISTERY OFFICER. (D) THE TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR THE SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR IS 321-8211. THE BALANCE OF THE REPORT IS A PARTIAL DESCRIPTION OF EACH FLOOR.

3. FIRST FLOOOR: SOURCE KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST FLOOR WAS LIMITED BUT DID CONFIRM DATA PREVIOUSLY KNOWN OF THE PRINCIPAL ENTRANCES AND ADDED THE LOCATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PRIVATE ENTRANCE, AND FACT THAT

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0112 T O P S E C R E T
ELEVATORS EXIST IN THE EAST WING. SOURCE STATED THE BULK OF THE FIRST FLOOR WAS OCCUPPIED BY VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY NONE OF WHICH HANDLED CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.

4. SECOND FLOOR: THE SOURCE CONFIRMED THAT THE PROTOCOL OFFICES ARE LOCATED ON WEST END OF THE 2ND FLOOR IN THE SOUTH WING. THE NORTH WING CONTAINS THE LEGAL OFFICES. THE CORRIDOR JOINING THE EAST AND WEST ENDS OF THE BUILDING RUNS DOWN CENTER OF THE MAIN BUILDING SECTION AND HAS OFFICES TO BOTH SIDES AND A LARGE CIRCULAR OPEN AREA AT THE BUILDING CENTER POINT. THE PRINCPAL PROTOCOL OFFICES LOCATED IN THE WEST END/SOUTH WING ARE (FROM EAST TO WEST) CLERKS ROOM, DEPUTIES OFFICE, SECRETARIES OFFICE, CHIEF OF PROTOCAL OFFICE AND CHIEF OF RECEPTION OFFICE

EXECUTIVE SUITE OCCUPPYING THE SOUTH WING, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE (SECRETARIAT) STAFF OFFICES OCCUPPYING THE NORTH WING. THE AREA IS SERVED BY TWO ELEVATORS ONE FOR EACH WING, LOCATED EITHER SIDE OF CENTRAL SECTION. THE SOURCE DESCRIBED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS SUITE AS INCLUDING (IN COUNTER CLOCK WISE ORDER) A LARGE CONFERENCE ROOM,

A PRIVATE DINING ROOM, AN UNIDENTIFIED PRIVATE ROOM, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OFFICE, A SMALL EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE ROOM AND A LARGE RECEPTION AREA. THE SOURCE REPORTED THAT AN ATTIC 4TH FLOOR EXISTED ABOVE THE FOREIGN MINISTER AREA BUT DID NOT HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF ITS LAYOUT.

6. THE FOLLOWING IS A PARTIAL LIST OF TELEPHONE NUMBERS WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AREA (PREFIX 321)
   A. FM OFFICE SUITE 200, 201, 202, (PRIVATE LINE 600)
   B. CODE ROOM 264, 268 AND 269
   C. SECRETARIAT AREA 213, 214, 215, 217, AND 236

7. DEBRIEFING SOURCE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE BLDG REFERED TO AS THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY ON THE 1978 CITY MAP IS NOW AND HAS BEEN FOR SEVERAL YEARS ANOTHER MFA ANNEX THAT CONTAINS CONSULATE AND SECURITY OFFICES.

[redacted]

#0112

NNNN

DEP
C/S

VZCZCDVA649
OO RUEHIIF
DE RUEIZJC #0290 2271515
ZNY TTTTT
O 141510Z AUG 80
FM JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2
TO [redacted]
BT
~~T O P S E C R E T~~ CITE J3 0290

SUBJ: REPORTED HOSTAGE LOCATION DATA
REF: (A) JCS SNOWBIRD CITE 0272
(B) JCS SNOWBIRD CITE 0278
(C) JCS SNOWBIRD CITE 0285

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING DATA OBTAINED BY [redacted] PROVIDED THE REVISION TO THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INITIAL INITIATION DATE OF O/A 23 AUGUST. SUB-SOURCE NOW STATES NO ACTION ON HOSTAGE SITUATION WILL BE TAKEN UNTIL AFTER 4 NOVEMBER AND IMPORTANTLY ALL HOSTAGES ARE BACK ON EMBASSY COMPOUND, UNDER GUARD BY ORIGINAL GROUP OF MILITANTS. ALSO ACCORDING TO SUB-

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC0290 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~
SOURCE THE MILITANTS EMPLOYED HOSTAGE LOOK ALIKES TO SUPPORT THE DISPERSION DECEPTION.

[redacted]

3. (S) OTHER [redacted] INDICATIONS OF ACTIVITY WITHIN THE COMPOUND [redacted] WHICH AT THE LEAST INDICATES HUMAN ACTIVITY OF SOME NATURE WITHIN THE CONSULATE BLDG.

4. (S) [redacted] INDICATIONS OF HUMAN (HOSTAGE) RESIDENCE WITHIN THE COMPOUND INCLUDE [redacted] WHICH INDICATE NO CHANGE IN DETENTION ENVIRONMENT WHICH ACCORDING TO [redacted] WAS THE CHANCERY. (NOTE: IT IS DOUBT-

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC0290 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~
FUL IF REMAINING HOSTAGES WERE TOLD OF [redacted]).

5. (S) [redacted] OR THE FACILITY MAY BE THE BINNET AREA FOR THE "ALLEDGED MILITANT RESERVE REACTION FORCE".

JW 14 AUG 0
B.
#

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMES
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED
REVIEW ON OA
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

RYRYRYRY

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 MAY 93
DERIVATIVE CLASS
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON
DERIVED FROM

MSG2[illegible]
DTG: 2914[illegible] APR 80

FM: JTF/RC
TO: DELTA/ADVANCE
SOW

A(c):

T O P S E C R E T

1. ACCORDING TO THE EMBASSY MILITANTS, THE HOSTAGES WHICH THEY CLAIM WERE TAKEN TO TABRIZ HAVE BEEN INCARCERATED AT THE FORMER US CONSULATE IN THE AZERBAIJANI CAPITAL.

4. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARING TO USE INTERNATIONAL FORUMS IN WHICH TO PROTEST THAT THE ATTEMPT TO FREE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES WAS A VIOLATION OF [illegible] TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

MEANWHILE, ALTHOUGH AT LEAST ONE UN DELEGATE IN NEW YORK CONSIDERS IT UNLIKELY THAT IRAN WILL TAKE THE CASE TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL,

EGYPT AND THE U.S. TO BE EXPELLED FROM THE UN.

"SINCE THE OCCUPATION OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN TEHRAN AND THE SEIZURE OF ITS STAFF AS HOSTAGES, THE NINE HAVE REPEATEDLY CONDEMNED THIS INADMISSIBLE VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THEIR PRESENT TIME OF TRAIL.

B. "THEY CONSIDER THAT THE SITUATION CREATED BY THIS VIOLATION OPENS THE DOOR TO DEVELOPMENT FRAUGHT WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. A RETURN TO A STATE OF LEGALITY IS THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE PEACE AND SECURITY.

C. "THE EUROPEAN [illegible] FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE ON 22 APRIL IN LUXEMBOURG

D. "THE NINE DECLARE THAT

[illegible] THE NINE DECLARE THEIR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE STEPS WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS INTENDS TO TAKE TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES."

8. TEHRAN DOMESTIC SERVICE QUOTES DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHAFA CHAMRAN AS SAYING THAT HE BELIEVES THE HOSTAGES SHOULD BE RELEASED, BECAUSE EVERY COUNTRY HAS AN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN EACH OF ITS EMBASSIES. WHAT THE HOSTAGES WERE DOING IS DIPLOMATICALLY ACCEPTABLE AND HENCE THEY SHOULD NOT BE TRIED, HE SAID. CHAMRAN ADDS THAT IT IS U.S. POLICY THAT SHOULD BE TRIED.

9. PRESIDENT BANI-SADR HAS SAID THAT THE BODIES OF THE CREWMAN KILLED IN THE RESCUE OPERATION [illegible] TURNED OVER TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POPE, THE SWISS GOVERNMENT, AND THE RED CROSS. THE BODIES HAVE BEEN MOVED TO THE CORONER'S OFFICE IN TEHRAN A SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT FROM BANI-SADR'S OFFICE ASKED ARCHBISHOP CAPUCCI TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TRANSFER. DOS UNDERSTAND THAT CAPUCCI IS NOW EN ROUTE TO TEHRAN FOR THIS PURPOSE. AN OFFICIAL IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE HAS DENIED REPORTS THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS DEMANDING ANY MONEY FOR THE RETURN OF THE BODIES OF THE EIGHT DECREASED AMERICANS.

10. MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY RELEASED A STATEMENT YESTERDAY REVEALING THAT THREE SEPARATE ARMED ATTACKS OCCURRED AT THE COMPOUND DURING THE MORNING HOURS OF APRIL 28. ACCORDING TO THE MILITANTS, THE ATTACKS CONSISTED OF THREE DIFFERENT AUTOMOBILES APPROACHING THE EMBASSY WITH SOME SHOOTING REPORTED. REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS MANAGED TO REPULSE THE ATTACKERS ON EACH OCCASION. THE MILITANTS INDICATED

11. ELSEWHERE [illegible] AND SEVERAL [illegible] SQUARE IN SOUTH [illegible] AND THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PHYSICAL DAMAGE [illegible]

12. A GROUP CALLING [illegible] SELF THE "FEDERAL FRONT FOR THE [illegible]BERATION OF IRAN" CLAIMED RESPONDIBILITY FOR THE BOMBINGS. ACCORDING TO AFP, ANOTHER GROUP, THE "KHORRAMDIN SHOCK GROUP" WAS REPORTED TO BE BEHIND THE KHOMEINI SQUARE INCIDENT.

13. COMING CLOSE ON [illegible] RESCUE [illegible] ATTACKS HAVE [illegible] ACTIONS AG[illegible] [illegible] ALLEGED THAT THE [illegible] SABOTAGE OPERATION [illegible] REP[illegible] HAVE [illegible]

14. AN ABORTIVE ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ASSASSINATE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SADEQ GHOTBZADEH IN KUWAIT TODAY, A KUWAIT GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN SAID. THE SPOKESMAN SAID SEVERAL SHOTS WERE FIRED AT A VEHICLE IN GHOTBZADEH'S MOTORCADE WHICH WAS HEADING FOR THE AMIR'S PALACE AT ABOUT 0930 LOCAL TIME. GHOTBZADEH, WHO ARRIVED IN KUWAIT YESTERDAY EVENING, WAS TAKING TO KUWAITI HOSPITAL. HIS CONDITION IS UNKNOWN.

15. TEHRAN HAS HAILED THE RESIGNATION OF SECREATARY OF STATE VANCE AS A MAJOR BLOW TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY. A BANNER HEAD LINE IN THE MAIN EVENING DAILY DESCRIBLE MR. VANCE'S RESIGNATION AS "A GRAVE CRISIS IN THE WHITE HOUSE." THE PAPER, RECALLING FREQUENT U.S. STATEMENTS ABOUT INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND POWER STRUGGLES IN IRAN SUGGESTED THAT THE DESCRIPTION MIGHT BETTER BE APPLIED TO WASHINGTON. FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH, SPEAKING AT A NEWS CONFERENCE IN LEBANON, SAID THAT THE CONFUSION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON WAS "A DANGER TO THE WHOLE WORLD."

GUNS. BANDAR ABBAS ALSO HAS [redacted]

[redacted]

21. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH C[redacted]

A. [redacted] GROUPS AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR [redacted] USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA [redacted] GROUPS AND RCMXUXPY USSAMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA [redacted]

[redacted]

VIS SOVIET PAMIR AGI 477 [redacted] 2810327 1950N/06205E 220/15 [redacted] USS [redacted] CORAL SEA)

RDF SO[redacted] 2818172 2444N/06302E [redacted]

[redacted]

B. ARABIAN SEA [redacted]

[redacted]


23. SOVIET SATELLITE ACTIVITY
[redacted]
Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 10 APR
NNNN

SECRET [redacted]

MSG 195
DTG 281208Z APR 80
FM: JTF/RC
TO: SITE ALPHA
INFO: [redacted]
FM [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONSULTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO _____
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

G-210.

TOP SECRET

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ZBIGNIEW BTZEZINSKY YESTERDAY SAID THAT THE ABORTED MISSION TO FREE THE HOSTAGES SHOULD BE A WARNING TO IRANIANS NOT TO SCORN AMERICAN POWER OR DOUBT U.S. WILLINGNESS TO UBE MILITARY FORCE. MR. BRZEZINSHI SAID "THIS COUNTRY AND THIS PRESIDENT WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY AND WE HAVE THE MEANS FOR DOING IT." HE ADVISED THE IRANIANS NOT TO "SCOFF AT AMERICAN POWER."

2. THE IRANIAN MILITANTS PUT THE CHARRED BODIES OF THE U.S. COMMANDOS WHO WERE KILLED PARTICIPATING IN THE HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION ON DISPLAY IN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. IN WHAT WAS A REPULSIVE [illegible] SPECTACLE EVEN BY IRANIAN STANDARDS, AYATOLLAH SADEQ KHALKHALI PRECEDED OVER A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHCH THE REMAINS WERE SHOWN TO THE PRESS. KHALKHALI SAID THE BODIES WOULD BE EVENTUALLY RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES, BUT NOT TO THE U.S. AUTORITIES. AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI ALSO WAS RUMORED TO HAVE DEMANDED THAT THE FREEZE ON ASSETS BE LIFTED AS A CONDITION FOR THE RETURN OF THE BODIES. PREVIOUSLY, PRESIDENT BANI-SADR HAD SAID THAT THE REMAINS COULD BE RETURNED TO THE U.S. WITHOUT CONDITIONS. THE PAPAL NUNCIO ATTEMPTED UNSUCCESSFULLY YESTERDAY TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RETURN OF THE BODIES.

3 (S [redacted] TEHRAN RADIO SAID YESTERDAY THAT THE FIRST GROUP OF HOSTAGES HAD ARRIVED IN TABRIZ. THE BROADCAST GAVE NO DETAILS ON HOW MANY CAPTIVES WERE TRANSFERRED. THE MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY RELEASED A STATEMENT IN WHICH THEY ASKED THE "COMMITTED CLERGY, THE UNIVERSITY STAFF WHO BELIEVE IN ISLAM AND ALL THE BRAVE CLASSES IN TABRIZ...TO GIVE THE UTMOST COOPERATION TO THE STUDENTS WHO HAVE ACCOMPANIED THE HOSTAGES FROM THE ESPIONAGE DEN TO TABRIZ."

4. ACCORDING TO ISRAELI PRESS MOST OF THE 50 AMERICAN EMBASSY HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO QOM TOGETHER WITH A GROUP OF MILITANTS AND A DETACHMENT OF PASDARAN FOR SECURITY. A MILITANT SPOKESMAN REPORTEDLY TOLD AN ISRAELI JOURNALIST BY PHONE THAT T HE MILITANTS WILL MEET WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS "TO DECIDE WHETHER TO PUT THE AMERICANS ON TRIAL FOR ESPIONAGE."

5 (S [redacted]

6 (S [redacted] YESTERDAY. THE THREE AMERICANS HAVE NOT BEEN MOVED.

SECRET [redacted]

7. BOTH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE IRANIAN TRANSITIONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON HAVE ADVOCATED HOLDING THE BODIES OF THE EIGHT US CREWMEN UNTIL WASHINGTON AGREES TO RELEASE IRANIAN ASSETS FROZEN BY THE US. PRESIDENT BANI SADR HAD ANNOUCED PREVIOUSLY THAT THE BODIES WOULD BE RETURNED WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS ATTACHED, BUT THERE APPEARS TO BE GROWING OPPOSITIONS FROM SOME QUARTERS TO THAT STAND.

8. HEADS OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE NINE-NATION EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY ARE HOLDING A TWO-DAY SUMMIT MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG WHICH WILL FOCUS HEAVILY ON IRAN. [redacted]

[redacted] FRENCH PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING SAID THAT FRANCE WAS READY "TO PURSUE ITS EFFORTS IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES TO OBTAIN THE HOSTAGES RELEASE."

9. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS ISSUED AN INSTRUCTION TO PRESIDENT BANI-SADR CALLING ON HIM TO INVITE WORLD ORGANIZATION TO OBSERVE THE "CRIMES" PERPETRATED BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. KHOMEINI SAID GROUPS FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD SHOULD BE INVITED TO IRAN "TO SEE WHAT THE WORLD-DEVOURING AMERICA HAS DONE TO AN INDEPENDENT NATION DESPITE ITS DECLARED SUPPORT TO HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND HUMANITARIANISM." KHOMEINI ALSO EXPRESSED HIS DEEP DISAPPOINT-MENT WITH AMERICA'S WESTERN ALLIES FOR THEIR CONTINUED SUPORT OF THE

IGN MINISTER SADEQ GHOTBZADEH ARRIVED IN BEIRUT TODAY FOLLOWING AN OFFICIAL VIST TO SYRIA. IN A JOINT STATEMENT RELEASED IN DAMASCUS, IRAN AND SYRIA JOINTLY CALLED FOR THE EXTRADITION FROM EGYPT OF THE FORMER SHAH OF IRAN.

11. [redacted]

12. [redacted]

13. [redacted]

[redacted]

14. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR REMAINS IN SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA. A PATROL CRAFT REMAINS IN THE HORMUZ STRAIT.

VIS SOVIET PAMIR AGI 477 271352Z 2108N/06049E 210/10 (USS CORAL SEA)

VIS SOVIET ALTAY AO IZHORA 261330Z 2039N/06222E DIW (USS CORAL SEA)

EST SOVIET TANKER PAMYAT LENINA 28 APR 2550N/05700E

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

D. [redacted]

E. [redacted]

[redacted]

16 [redacted]

17. SOVIET PRESS: THE SOVIETS ARE STANDING BY THEIR DENOUNCEMENT OF THE ABORTIVE U.S. RESCUE MISSION IN IRAN AND CONTINUE TO PUBLICLY WARN TEHERAN OF POSSBILE U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

BT

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

SG 170
S1152 APR 80
1: JCS/RC-J2
D: SITE ALPHA
NFO: SFOD
[redacted] RANGERS
1 SOW
T

[redacted]

202

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [illegible]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVISION OADR

[redacted]

SUBJ: INTELL SUPP: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 [redacted]

JEE
Δ
NOTE
ALL AFTER
CAUSED by
Release of
"Bus People"

[redacted]

3. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WILL MOST LIKELY USE THE INCIDENT TO ONCE MORE DIVERT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE'S ATTENTION FROM PRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND TO REVIVE POPULAR FERVOR FOR HIS ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. HE WILL CITE THE ABORTED RESCUE ATTEMPT AS PROOF THAT THE US IS TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE REVOLUTION.

[redacted]

6. YESTERDAY IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER QOTBZADEH [redacted]


IN ANTICIPATION OF VIOLENCE FOLLOWING
APPARENTLY
APRIL WHEN IRAQ
INAKHUZESTAN PROVINCE
CENTRAL BORDER
THE SHATT AL
SOVIET PRESS (U)
USSR HAS REACTED
THE ACTION AS AN ARMED
PROPAGANDA WILL CONTINUE
TO WARN TEHRAN
Classified By: USS
Declassified On: OADR

QQSL 2105
MSG054
DTG 221432Z

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

G - 187

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [illegible]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON [illegible]
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

FM [illegible]
TO [redacted] RANGERS
[illegible]
[illegible] SOW
SITE ALPHA

~~T O P S E C R E T~~

SUBJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500 22 APRIL 1980

[redacted]

2. FIGHTING BROKE OUT AGAIN YESTERDAY BETWEEN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS AND LEFTISTS ON THE TEHRAN UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. THE FUNDAMENTALISTS, NOT ALL OF WHOM APPEAR TO BE STUDENTS, HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SIMILAR CLASHES THROUGHOUT IRAN OVER THE PAST THREE DAYS AS OF YESTERDAY.

3. PRESIDENT-ELECT BANI-SADR DENOUNCED THE RIGHTWING MUSLIM ATTEMPTS TO TAKE OVER UNIVERSITIES AS BEING "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY," AND SAID THESE ACTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL BACKING ENJOYED HIS GOVERNMENT AMONG MODERATE, CENTRISTS, AND OTHER GROUPS. [redacted] THESE ACTIONS, WHICH ARE PROBABLE DESIGNED TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE CLERGY'S HOLD ON THE COUNTRY, APPEAR TO BE YET ANOTHER FACET OF THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE MODERATE SECULARISTS AND THE HARDLINE CLERGY.

4. SHOOTING BETWEEN ARMY TROOPS KURDISH GUERRILLAS ENTERED ITS FOURTH DAY YESTERDAY IN THE KURDISH TOWN OF SAGGEZ. [redacted] THE ARMY SHELLED THE TOWN DURING THE NIGHT OF 20-21 APRIL, AND MORE THAN 100 PEOPLE HAVE DIED SINCE THE FIGHTING IN SAQQEZ BEGAN. THE ARMY COLUMN WHICH ATTEMPTED TO BKIRT AROUND SANANDAJ TO GET TO SAQQEZ, BUT WAS ATTACKED BY GUERRILLA FORCES, WAS LAST REPORTED TO BE STILL 20 MILES FROM SANANDAJ.



12. SOVIET PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT MOSCOW HAS ALREADY BEGUN EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT A POSSIBLE US BLOCKADE OF IRAN. AN ARTICLE IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "MOSCOW NEWS WEEKLY" SAID CARGO FROM WEST EUROPE IS POURING INTO [redacted] AND THAT TRANSIT OF IRANIAN IMPORTS VIA SOVIET TERRITORY IS OF "VITAL IMPORTANCE" TO IRAN BECAUSE OF A THREATENED US ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT RAIL TRAFFIC THROUGH JOLFA AND ASTARA IS SO SLOW THAT THE FREIGHT TIE-UP COULD LAST FOR MONTHS.

TO DELTA
INFO [redacted] 2
[redacted]

[redacted]

CONDUCTED ON [illegible]
DERIVATIVE CL BY [illegible]
☐ DECL. ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] D.A

SUBJECT: IRAN SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800 25 NOV 79

[redacted] THIS TRIP WAS SUBSEQUENTLY POSTPONED UNTIL MID-DECEMBER. IN A MELANGE OF STATEMENTS GIVEN IN PRESS INTERVIEWS, BANI-SADR INDICATED:

A. IRANIAN-US RELATIONS HAVE NOT ONLY BEEN SEVERED BUT HAVE ALSO BECOME HOSTILE.

B. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE US WILL ATEMPT TO FREE THE HOSTAGES BY MILITARY ACTION.

C. THE US MUST RETURN THE SHAH, AS IT IS "TOO LATE" NOW FOR ANY PLAN TO SEND HIM TO A THIRD COUNTRY.

D. A US DECLARATION CONDEMNING THE SHAH'S ALLEGED CRIMES WOULD GIVE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES "A GOOD DISPOSTION FOR DISCUSSIONS."

[redacted] THAT IRAN PROBABLY SHOULD NOT EXPECT DELIVERY OF ANY MISSILE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

[redacted]

6. CARRIER TASK FORCE 70 REPORTED AN IRANIAN WAR SHIP WAS LOCATED IN THE GULF OF OMAN, JUST SOUTH OF THE HORMUZ STRAITS, ON 25 NOVEMBER.

A. IRANIAN OIL MINISTER MOINFAR THREATENED TO CUT OFF OIL SHIPMENTS TO COUNTRIES THAT PERMIT THE US TO FREEZE IRANIAN ASSETS IN OVERSEAS BRANCHES OF US BANKS.

B. IRANIAN RADIO HAS BEEN SURFACING REPORTS THAT THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS AGREED TO A 20-DAY CEASE-FIRE BECAUSE IT ALLEGEDLY SUPPORTS KHOMEINI'S ACTION OF CONFRONTING THE US. THE KURDS, HOWEVER, REPORTEDLY HAVE MADE THE CEASE-FIRE CONTINGENT ON A WITHDRAWAL OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS FROM KURDESTAN WITHIN 15 DAYS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS AT NOON (IRAN TIME) ON THE 25TH. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT SUCH A CONDITION WOULD BE MET, AND THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION THAT THE KURDS HAVE ACTUALLY MADE SUCH AN OFFER [redacted]

9. SIGNIFICANT IRANIAN PROPAGANDA:

A. VARIOUS IRANIAN SPOKESMEN CONTINUE TO HARP ON THE ALLEGED US-ISRAELI CONSPIRACY INVOLVED IN THE TAKEOVER OF THE GREAT MOSQUE IN MECCA IN AN EFFORT TO INFLAME MOSLEM OPION AGAINST THE US.

B. IRANIANS ARE ALSO CLAMING THAT THEY HAVE THE SUPPORT OF IRANIAN KURDS AND AFGHANI DISSIDNTS FOR THEIR ACTIONS AGAINST THE US.

C. A PRESS REPORT OF IRAQI ORIGIN INDICATES THAT ON 23 NOVEMBER A PASSENGER AIRCRAFT LOADED WITH IRANIAN PILGRIMS RETURNING FROM THE HAJ WAS ALMOST SHOT DOWN BY IRANIAN AIR DEFENSE FORCES AS IT TRIED TO LAND AT BANDAR ABBAS. THE AIRCRAFT WAS REPORTEDLY ENGAGED BY IRANIAN GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES BECAUSE IT HAD NOT GIVEN ADVANCED NOTICE OF ITS INTENT TO LAND. IF TRUE, THIS REPORT SUGGESTS A CONSIDERABLE LEVEL OF VIGILANCE AND [redacted]

E. IRANIAN OIL MINISTER MOINFAR ISSUED A THREAT SAYING THAT ANY COUNTRY THAT OPPOSES THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN WILL BE LEFT WITHOUT IRANIAN PETROLEUM.

F. THE ARAB PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ISSUED AN APPEAL TO ALL ARAB COUNTRIES TO BREAK OFF ALL POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE US. [redacted] THE CONGRESS WAS FOUNDED IN LIPYA IN 1977 BY THE REJECTIONIST FRONT COMPRISED OF ARAB STATES OPPOSED TO EGYPT'S PEACE MOVES WITH ISRAEL. THEY INCLUDE LIBYA, ALGERIA, SYRIA, SOUTH YEMEN AND THE PLO.)

10. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE MIDWAY TASK GROUP: A KRIVAK I GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUES SURVEILLANCE OF MIDWAY, OPERATING AT 7-11 NM FROM THE CARRIER. A MINESWEEPER AND AN OILER ALSO REMAIN IN THE VICINITY [redacted]

11. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST THE KITTY HAWK TASK GROUP: THE SOVIET CRUISER TASK GROUP, CONSISTING OF A GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER [redacted], AND A NAVAL ASSOCIATED MERCHANT TANKER, ARE IN THE VICINITY OF THE GREAT NICOBAR ISLAND [redacted] THE KITTY [redacted] AT AN INCREASED SOA AND ARE APPROX 400 NM SOUTHWEST OF THE SOVIET UNIT, WHILE THE REMAINING US UNITS TRAIL KITTY HAWK BY APPROX 100NM. A SOVIET OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH VESSEL IS IN THE CENTRAL MACASSA STRAIT. THE SOVIET UNITS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TOWARD THE ARABIAN SEA.

12. COLLECTION ACTIVITY AGAINST DIEGO GARCIA: AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIP IS PROBABLY EN ROUTE SOCOTRA ISLAND FROM THE SEYCHELLES, WHERE A GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER AND AUXILIARY REMAIN. ANOTHER AUXILIARY DEPARTED THAT AREA; [redacted] PROBABLY PASSED APPROX 200 NM NORTHEST OF DIEGO GARCIA, POSSIBLY EN ROUTE RENDEZVOUS WITH THE DESTROUND CRUISER TASK GROUP. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT AN AUXILIARY WILL CONDUCT MAJOR SURVEILLANCE AGAINST THE US FACILITIES AT DIEGO GARCIA.

[redacted]

15. AS LEADER OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, FIDEL

CASTRO OF CUBA HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY THE US AND GUYANA TO MEDIATE THE RELEASE OF THE US HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN, ACCORDING TO THE IRANIAN CHARGE AT THE UN ON 21 NOVEMBER. A NUMBER OF OTHER NONALIGNED NATIONS ALSO HAVE ASKED CASTRO'S MEDIATION AS WELL. THE CUBAN LEADER HAS AGREED PROVIDED IRAN APPROVES. THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TOLD THE IRANIAN CHARGE THAT IF THE NONALIGNED COUNTRIES MET NOW, IRAN PROBABLY WOULD BE CONDEMNED FOR HOLDING THE US HOSTAGES. HE URGED THAT IRAN SETTLE THE OCCUPATION OF THE US EMBASSY AND DETENTION OF US PERSONNEL BEFORE AHY SUCH MEETING TOOK PLACE. SHOULD THIS BE DONE, THE CUBANS WOULD CONVENE A MEETING OF NONALIGNED NATIONS AT THE UN AND PRESS FOR A STATEMENT SUPPORTING IRAN'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE US SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD STRENGTHEN IRAN'S POSITION IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY.
RVW 26 NOV09

KOKN

DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

70

[redacted] (USMC)

AV 899-2024

041450Z

FM JTF/REAR
TO JTF/FORWARD
INFO [redacted]
USMC HELO. DET
[redacted]

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN IRAN

1. FINAL RESULTS OF THE REFERENDUM ON THE NEW CONSITITUION ARE NOT EXPECTED UNTIL THE END OF THIS WEEK. THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE VOTE WILL BE OVERWHELMINGLY IN FAVOR OF THE CONSITITUION. WHAT IS LESS CLEAR, HOWEVER, IS THE ACTUAL VOTER TURN-OUT AROUND THE COUNTRY. THE IRANIAN REGIME NO DOUBT WILL CLAIM A MASSIVE TURN-OUT, BUT REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE REFERENDUM WAS LARGELY BOYCOTTED BY A NUMBER OF THE MAJOR ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS AND THE MIDDLE CLASS. THE IRANIAN JURISTS ASSOCIATION PUBLICLY CAME OUT IN OPPOSITION TO THE CONSTITUTION, WITH A LONG LIST OF DETAILED OBJECTIONS.

2. [redacted] THERE ARE CONTINUING PRESS REPORTS QUOTING THE CAPTORS ON THE COMPOUND AS STATING THAT ALL THE HOSTAGES ARE THERE. OTHER JOURNALISTS, INCLUDING LE MONDE CORRESPONDENT CONCLUDE THAT AT LEAST PART OF THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN MOVED. ONE CORRESPONDENT SAYS THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TOLD HIM THAT "THE PRISONERS ARE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY COMPOUND AND ELSEWHERE".

3. REUTERS REPORTS THAT ONE OF THE CAPTORS AT THE COMPOUND HAS STATED THAT 8 OF THE 50 HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR INTENSIVE INTERROGATION BY NON-STUDENT "EXPERTS". [redacted] THE CAPTORS HAVE SAID THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVE THE 8 GUILTY OF ESPIONAGE. THE CAPTORS ALSO CLAIM THAT "PSYCHOLOGICALLY, AN ATMOSPHERE OF AFFECTION AND FRIENDSHIP HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE HOSTAGES AND THE STUDENTS."

4. THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND THE MUJAHEDIN GUERILLA GROUP HAVE STARTED SETTING UP NEW MILITARY TRAINING CENTERS FOR CIVILIANS, IN RESPONSE TO KHOMEINI'S EARLIER CALL FOR A YOUTH ARMY OF MILLIONS.

5. THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF COMMERCE HAS URGED THE PEOPLE TO REFRAIN FROM PANIC BUYING OF RICE, AND HAS CLAIMED THAT SUPPLIES WILL BE ADEQUATE AND THE PRICE REMAIN UNCHANGED.

6. DESPITE THE MODERATE TO LIGHT TURNOUT IN MANY AREAS OF IRAN, EARLY REPORTS SHOWED THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM, NOT SURPRISINGLY, WINNING BY AN OVERWHELMING MARGIN. BOTH DAYS OF THE ELECTION WERE MARKED BY VIOLENCE IN MANY OF THE ETHNIC AREAS. THE KURDS IN NORTHWEST IRAN HAVE ISSUED AN ULTIMATUM DECLARING THAT IF THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES BY 19 DECEMBER, THEY WILL RESUME HOSTILITIES. THE KURDS BEGAN A SELF-IMPOSED 20-DAY CEASE-FIRE ON 27 NOVEMBER.

7. A STUDENT SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT EIGHT OF THE FIFTY HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR INTENSIVE INTERROGATION IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE ESPIONAGE TRIALS. [redacted]

8. [redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

11. SEVERAL I-HAWK SITES, NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN TO DIA, HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY [redacted] WHO SURVEYED AND EVALUATED THE SITES PRIOR TO 18 FEB 79.

[redacted]

IN PLACE, OPERATIOAL TRAINING SITES: # HASHIMABAD -- 15 EA.

SITES NEAR COMPLETION: # BANDAR-MASHUR - 1 EA.
SITES REQUIRING LITTLE PREPARATION:
OMIDYE AB -- 3 EA
BANDAR MASHUR - 1 EA
SHAROKI AB - 2 EA
ISFAHAN - 2 EA.

DATA NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN TO DIA.

HE EVALUATES HAWK CREW ABILITY AS POOR AND INDICATES THAT THE RAYTHEON TRAINING PROGRAM WAS NEVER COMPLETED. HE SUGGESTS THAT AT BEST, CREWS COULD PROBABLY MAN 8 BATTERIES, BUT MORE PROBABLY, NO BATTERIES ARE OPERATIONAL.

12. KHOMEINI'S FIRST MOVE AFTER THE REFERENDUM RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED, WILL REPORTEDLY BE TO SET UP A SEVEN-MEMBER NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. HE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEFLARE WAR AND MARSHAL THE ARMED FORCES ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL, WHICH HE APPOINTS.

[redacted] A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE IS LINGERING IN THE NORTH-WESTERN GULF OF MAN. A MINESWEEPER IS CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF BOTH THE USS MIDWAY(TG 70.1) AND USS KITTY HAWK (TG 70.2) TASK GROUPS IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA. A GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER AND A NAVAL SUBORDINATED MERCHANT TANKER ARE LOCATED SOUTH OF THE US TASK GROUPS. A SECOND GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER REMAINS IN THE VICINITY OF PORT VICTORIA, SEYCHELLES, WHILE A LIGHT FRIGATE IS LINGERING IN THE WESTERN GULF OF ADEN.

[redacted]

14.

[redacted]

16. THE SITUATION IN TRIPOLI REMAINS CALM. ALL DEPENDENTS AND THE THREE EMBASSY SECRETARIES HAVE DEPARTED COUNTRY AND ARE NOW IN PARIS AND ROME AWAITING ONWARD TRANSPORTATION. 10 OFFICIAL AMERICANS REMAIN IN COUNTRY.

17. CHARGE EAGLETON MET WITH THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP. THE MAJORITY OF COMPANIES REPORTING INDICATE THAT THEY WILL BE OFFERING THEIR EMPLOYEES VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE. EXXON AND OCCIDENTAL, HAVE CHARTERED AIRCRAFT FOR THE DRAW-DOWN AND EXPECT TO START MOVING PEOPLE OUT OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS. NO COMPANY PLANS ANY STAFF DRAW-DOWN AT THIS POINT.

18. MAJOR ATTENTION NOW FOCUSES ON A SPEECH BY COL. QADHAFI SCHEDULED FOR THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 4. THE RALLY IS TO BEGIN AT 8:30 AM WITH QADHAFI SCHEDULED TO SPEAK AROUND 10:30AM (3:30 AM EST). LOCAL RUMOR INDICATES THAT BOTH OIL AND THE ATTACK ON THE EMBASSY WILL BE ON THE COLONEL'S AGENDA.

[redacted]

19. STATE DEPT HAS ORDERED IMMEDIATE EVACUATION OF ALL DEPENDENTS FROM FOLLOWING POSTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: BEIRUT, DACCA, KUWAIT. ACTION BEING TAKEN AS A GENERAL PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE WHICH REFLECTS TENSION IN THE AREA AND IS NOT FOCUSSED ON THESE THREE PARTICULAR LOCATIONS. CONUS IS THE ONLY DESIGNATED SAFEHAVEN FOR EVACUATED DEPENDENTS.

20. WEATHER:
A) MID - RANGE FORECAST FOR U.S. EAST COAST
4-6 DEC: PARTLY CLOUDY TO CLOUDY SKIES MOVING INTO THE EAST COAST AT MID AND HIGH LEVELS ASSOCIATED WITH UPPER LEVEL JET STREAM. VISIBILITIES GOOD. GUSTY SURFACE WINDS EXPERIENCED THE LAST FEW DAYS DECREASING AS INTENSITY OF WINTER HIGH PRESSURE SYSTEM WANES. GRADUAL WARMING OF TEMPERATURES EXPECTED THE NEXT FEW DAYS.
6-9 DEC: SURFACE FRONT MOVES INTO NORTHERN PORTION OF THE EAST COAST WITH CLOUDY SKIES, LOW CEILINGS, ISOLATED RAINSHOWERS EARLY IN THE PERIOD MOVING SOUTH GRADUALLY; EXPECTED TO BE SOUTHEAST OF THE AREA BY 9TH.
B) LONG - RANGE OUTLOOK FOR SOUTHWEST U.S.A.
4-6 DEC: UPPER LEVEL RIDGE CONTINUES TO DOMINATE DESERT REGION. CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES (MID AND HIGH LEVEL CLOUDS FROM JET STREAM) WILL PREVAIL. SURFACE VISIBILITIES GOOD EXCEPT NEAR POPULATED AREAS. SURFACE WINDS INFLUENCED BY TOPOGRAPHY AND DIURNAL HEATING/ COOLING; CALM AT NIGHT, GUSTY IN THE AFTERNOON AT 10-15 KNOTS.
7-13 DEC: UPPER LEVEL RIDGE WILL COTINUE TO DOMINATE WITH SURFACE HIGH PRESSURE KEEPING FRONTAL SYSTEMS NORTH OF DESERT REGION. CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES (MID AND HIGH LEVEL CLOUDS).

21. WEATHER: LONG - RANGE OUTLOOK FOR IRAN
4-6 DEC: CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES WILL CONTINUE IN IRAN AS HIGH PRESURE DOMINATES REGION. PATCHY MORNING HAZE EXPECTED WITH REDUCED VISIBILITIES, OTHERWISE NO VISIBILITY RESTRICTIONS.
6-13 DEC: A WEAK FRONTAL SYSTEM WILL ATTEMPT TO MOVE INTO THE NORTHERN PORTION OF IRAN ON 6-7TH WITH CLOUDY SKIES AND INTERMITTENT RAINSHOWERS. PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES IN SOUTHERN HALF OF IRAN. PARTIAL CLEARING OF SKIES FROM 7TH TO 10 AS HIGH PRESSURE DOMINATES AGAIN. ANOTHER FRONT EXPECTED TO MOVE THROUGH THE NORTHERN PART OF IRAN FROM 10TH TO 13TH.
RVW 04 DEC 09

NNNN

[redacted] SECRET

H

MSG204
310900R DEC 79

FM JTF
TO DELTA/SFOD
[redacted]
INFO [redacted]

G #6

[redacted] S E C R E T CITE J3 00045

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE/COMPOUND DATA

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted] AND THE FORTY NAMES PUBLISHED IN THE TEHRAN TIMES ON 25 DECEMBER AGAINST [redacted] CONFIRMS THAT AT LEAST FIFTY AMERICANS ARE STILL BEING HELD CAPTIVE. ALL THESE SOURCES HAVE BEEN CORRELATED AND PROVIDE A BASELINE FROM WHICH THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS HAVE EVOLVED.

A. CLEAR CORRELATION HAS BEEN MADE ON THE FOLLOWING THIRTY SIX INDIVIDUALS:

1) KATHERINE KOOB, DOS
2) WILLIAM KEOUGH, DOS
3) JERRY PLOTKIN, CIVILIAN
4) COL THOMAS SCHAEFER, USAF
5) LT CDR BOB ENGELMAN, USN
6) RICHARD MOREFIELD, DOS
7) WILLIAM GALLEGOS, USMC
8) DONALD HOFFMAN, USA
9) KEVIN HERMENING, USMC
10) MICHAEL MOELLER, USMC
11) FRED KUPKE, DOS
12) THOMAS AHERN, DOS
13) BERT MOORE, DOS
14) MICHAEL METRINKO, DOS

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON [redacted] OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] multiple sources

[redacted] SECRET

15) ELIZABETH SWIFT, DOS
16) PHILLIP WARD, DOS
17) JOSEPH HALL, USA
18) BARRY ROSEN, DOS
19) JOHN GRAVES, DOS
20) WILLIAM BELK, DOS
21) ROBERT BLUCKER, DOS
22) CHARLES JONES, DOS
23) JIMMY LOPEZ, USMC
24) RODNEY SICKMAN, USMC
25) STEVE KIRTLEY, USMC
26) PAUL LEWIS, USMC
27) JERRY MIELE, USMC
28) COL LEE HOLLAND, USA
29) GARY LEE, DOS
30) WILLIAM DAUGHERTY, DOS
31) MALCOM KALP, DOS
32) CPT PAUL NEEDHAM, USAF
33) JOSEPH SUBIC, USA
34) STEPHEN LAUTERBACK, DOS
35) ROBERT ODE, DOS
36) JOHN LIMBERT, DOS

B. THERE ARE FOUR NAMES ON THE TEHRAN TIMES LIST WHICH (C) DO NOT CORRELATE DIRECTLY WITH EXISTING US LISTS [redacted]. THE FOUR NAMES FROM THE TEHRAN TIMES ARE LISTED BELOW WITH THEIR POSSIBLE REAL NAMES SHOWN IN PARENS:

(1) JOHN GROSS (COOK)
(2) JOHN DINICKEL (MCKEEL)
(3) DONALD T CORTEZ (SHERER)
(4) RICHARD OWEN (QUEEN)

C. REGARDLESS OF THE CORRECTNESS OF CORRELATION OF [redacted] AS STATED ABOVE, [redacted] AT LEAST TEN AMERICANS REMAIN UNACKNOWLEDGED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. THE NAMES OF THESE TEN FOLLOWS:

(1) GREGORY PERSINGER, USMC
(2) REGIS RAGAN, USA
(3) DUANE GILLETE, USN
(4) MIKE KENNEDY, DOS
(5) ALAN GOLACINSKI, DOS
(6) BRUCE GERMAN, DOS
(7) BILL ROYER, DOS
(8) CLAIRE BARNES, DOS
(9) DAVID ROEDER, USAF
(10) CHARLES SCOTT, USA

(C) 3. DURING THE COURSE OF THE EMBASSY INDICENT VARIOUS REPORTS HAVE SURFACED INDICATING SOME OR ALL OF THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN MOVED FROM THE COMPOUND AT VARIOUS TIMES. MOST OF THESE REPORTS HAVE BEEN QUESTIONABLE AND GONE UNCONFIRMED, ALTHOUGH BASED UPON STATEMENTS BY THE MILITANTS, [redacted]

[redacted] THE DIFFICULTY WITH ANY ANALYSIS OF THIS NATURE STEMS FROM OUR LACK OF INSIGHT INTO THE MILITANTS REASON FOR SELECTING INDIVIDUALS FOR EXTERNAL CONFINEMENT, AND IS ALSO COMPOUNDED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT "EXTERNAL CONFINEMENT" MAY BE ON A RANDOM BASIS, VICE A "HARD CORE" SPY BASIS, OR MAY BE ON A "SOFT CASE" INNOCENT BASIS".

B. [redacted]

C. EVERY EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO FOLLOW UP THE [redacted] BUT NO CORRELATIONS HAVE BEEN OBTAINED THROUGH [redacted] (HISTORICAL OR SUBSEQUENT) AND NO POSITIVE [redacted] CORRELATION HAS YET BEEN MADE.

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

MSG004
142015R
~~FOREIGN~~
SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY AS OF 14NOV79

THE SITUATION WE ARE FACED WITH TODAY IS THE RESULT OF DETAILED PLANNING BEGUN AT LEAST FOUR WEEKS AGO. THE RESULT WAS AN ORGANIZED TAKE OVER OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND TEN DAYS AGO. ALTHOUGH THE "STUDENTS" ARE THE INSTRUMENTS, THEY HAVE THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE IRG AND THE AYATOLLAH. THE SITUATION AT THE COMPOUND HAS NOW SETTLED INTO A ROUTINE WITH DEMONSTRATIONS PERIODICALY STAGED OUTSIDE THE GATE NEAR THE CHANNCELLREY ON TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD. CROWD SIZE VARIES FROM 50 CURIOSITY SEEKERS TO SEVERAL HUNDRED WHEN AN UNANNOUNCED INCIDENT SUCH AS ELECTRIC BLACK OUT OCCURS, TO SEVERAL THOUSAND WHEN A CALL GOES OUT VIA THE RADIO OR ON THE LOCAL PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM.

THE HOSTAGES ARE BEING HELD IN SEVERAL LOCATIONS WITHIN THE COMPOUND.

[redacted]

HOSTAGES: NOTE THAT GUARD FORCE FIGURES ARE ONLY ~~PROJECTIONS~~ AND NO BASED ON OBSERVATION.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] multiple sources

~~Classified By~~ JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

THE HOSTAGES ARE UNDER GUARD BY A STUDENT FORCE OF [redacted], ALL OF WHOM ARE ARMED WITH AT LEAST A PISTOL. EXTERIOR GUARDS ALSO CARRY G3 RIFLES AND UZI SMG. [redacted]. ALL THE STUDENTS WEAR A IDENTIFICATION BADGE ON THEIR CHEST. THE STUDENTS CONTROL SECURITY WITHIN THE COMPOUND AND EMPLOY A SET PROCEDURE FOR ALLOWING PRESS AND DIPLOMATIC VISITORS.

OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND SECURITY IS MAINTAINED BY THE IRG AKA PASDARANS ARMED WITH RIFLES AND SMG. THE NORMAL IRG GUARD POST IS ON TAKHT-E-SMASHID STREET AND TYPICALLY IS MANNED BY [redacted] PERSONNEL [redacted] REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE STUDENTS AND THE IRG ARE AVAILABLE FROM SEVERAL LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. THE PRINCIPAL FORCES AND THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES ARE SHOWN HERE

a. WITHIN 10-15 MINTUES - LOCAL MILITIA (IRG / PASDARAN) 50-100 (SEE NOTE BELOW)

b. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES - LOCAL CROWDS 100-300

c. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES - IRG STRIKE TEAM 150-200 (MOTORIZED)

d. RANGER REACTION COMPANY 120-160 (MOTORIZED)

e. WITHIN 30-45 MINUTES - IRG BACK-UP STRIKE FORCES 1,000-1,500

f. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES - IRG STRIKE FORCE RESIDUAL 1,500-2,000

NOTE: OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IS THE PRESENCE OF TWO PASDARAN KOMITEH STATIONS LESS THAN 1 KM SOUTH OF EMBASSY WITH A NOMINAL STRENGTH OF 2X250-MAN "STRIKE FORCES."

[redacted]

[redacted] FORCE-FIGURES ARE PROJECTIONS [redacted]
WITH NOT ESTIMATES?

[redacted] THIS LETTER IMPLY THE DB OBSCURED [redacted] THE DB PRESENT? IT IS

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCDVA083
OO RUEAIIF
DE RUEIZJC #0022 3432106
ZNY SSSSS
O 092100Z DEC 79
FM JTF/RICE BOWL
TO [redacted] IMMEDIATE
BT
[redacted] 13 00022

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356 #3
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DPENMC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON 9 ADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

1. THE ENTIRE SCENARIO IS BEING CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED WITH THE THREE PRINCIPAL IRANIAN FACTIONS (STUDENTS, IRG CADRE, AND KHOMEINI HIEARCHY). ALL ARE VYING FOR THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES WITH VERY LITTLE COMPROMISE OF BASIC PRINCIPLES. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT EACH IS BEING INFLUENCED BY LEFTIST ELEMENTS FROM WITHIN.

[redacted]

3. RECENT RUMORS OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION HAVE DRAWN THE REGULAR MILITARY INTO THE SCENARIO BUT THEY STILL REMAIN ON THE PERIPHERY. THE SERVICES HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO IMPROVE READINESS AND ARE UNDOUBTABLY TAKING MEASURES TO RESPOND, BUT MOST ASSESSMENTS CREDIT THE SERVICES WITH MINIMAL CAPABILITIES. CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN NOT TO ACCEPT THESE GROSS ASSESSMENTS AS APPLICABLE TO SPECIFIC LOCATIONS OR AS APPLICABLE AFTER IRANIAN FORCES HAVE RECEIVED CONFIRMATION OR WARNING OF U.S. TACTICAL ACTIONS.

4. THE SINGLE GREATEST WEAPON BEING EMPLOYED BY THE KHOMEINI HIERARCHY IS A CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:

A. ESTABLISH GREATER DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY THAN ACTUALLY EXISTS.

B. KEEP USG OFF BALANCE BY INITATING NEW ACTIONS, THREATS, PROMISES AND ARTIFICAL MILESTONES SO THAT AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER PLAN CANNOT BE DEVELOPED. THESE ACTIONS TYPICALLY EXTEND THE INCIDENT TIME IN INCREMENTS OF 3-5 DAYS AND WORKS TO FORESTALL U.S. ACTIONS.

5. EMBASSY COMPOUND/HOSTAGES

A. [redacted]

ONCE THE TRIALS ARE IMMINET THE HOSTAGES MAY BE REGROUPED AND SEGREGATED BY THE REGIME [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

B. TOTAL COUNT IS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUSPECT BUT RECOMMEND BASE LINE FIGURE OF 49-52 BE USED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. FIVE OFFICAL AMCITS HAVE BEEN AT LARGE IN THE CITY, MOVING OCCASIONALLY AND PERIODICALLY CHECKING IN WITH LAINGEN, TOMSETH, AND HOWLAND BY PHONE. THE LAST THREE INDIVIDUALS ARE LOCATED IN THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER PROTECTIVE CUSTODY.

C. BEST ESTIMATES AT THIS TIME PLACE MOST HOSTAGES IN THE COMPOUND, WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT FOUR PERSONNEL, (AS THE STUDENTS STATED FROM THE BEGINNING) ARE BEING HELD EXTERNAL TO THE COMPOUND. [redacted] BUT THE FOLLOWING ESTIMATES ARE PROVIDED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

[redacted]

D. HOSTAGE CONDITION

- SUGGEST A FEW HOSTAGES MAY BE PHYSICALLY INCAPACITATED AT EXECUTION TIME OR BECOME SO SHOCKED IF EXECUTION IS REACTED TO IMMEDIATELY AND VIOLENTLY BY HOSTILE FORCES THAT SOME MAY NOT WANT TO LEAVE THE "SECURITY" OF THEIR ENVIRONMENT.

[redacted]

7. CURRENT ESTIMATE OF STUDENT GUARD FORCE STILL HOLDS AT [redacted] WITH NOMINAL STRENGTH DURING DAY LIGHT HOURS OF [redacted] DROPPING TO APPROXIMATELY [redacted] DURING THE NIGHT WITH ESTIMATED [redacted] OFF DUTY/ON DUTY RATIO. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE PASDARAN GUARDS AT ENTRANCE TO CHANCERY [redacted] AND ROVING PATROLS OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND ON THE SURROUNDING STREETS. THE FOLLOWING IS ESTIMATED HOSTILE STRENGTH BY MAJOR LOCATION.

[redacted]

[redacted]

NOTE: SEE TWO ATTACHED MESSAGES WHICH PROVIDE [redacted] OF EXTERNAL GUARD FORCE.

8. EXTERIOR THREAT: [redacted] THREAT EXISTS FROM THE SURROUNDING BUILDINGS AND THE CHANCERY. THE POTENTIAL FOR THIS THREAT IS ESTIMATED TO BE SO HIGH THAT THE ATHLETIC FIELDS IN THE COMPOUND WOULD BECOME KILL ZONES WITHIN 7-12 MINUTES AFTER THE ASSAULT ACTION IS IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AND/OR A WARNING CALL FOR HELP IS BROADCAST ON THE PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM CONTROLLED FROM THE CHANCERY. [redacted] THE RESULTS ARE PROVIDED BELOW:

A. ATHLETIC FIELDS WITHIN THE COMPOUND COULD BE SUBJECTED TO FIRE FROM 12-14 LOCATIONS.

B. PARADE FIELD/BASKETBALL COURTS NORTH OF COMPOUND COULD BE SUBJECTED TO FIRE FROM 12-14 LOCATIONS. IN ADDITION THERE ARE THREE LARGE CONSTRUCTION CRANES WHOSE BOOMS COULD INTERFERE WITH HELICOPTER OPERATIONS.

C. STADIUM ACROSS ROOSEVELT BLVD COULD BE SUBJECTED TO FIRE FROM 6-8 LOCATIONS. ALSO OF NOTE IS THE PRESENCE OF FOUR SELF SUPPORTING [redacted] FLOOD LIGHT TOWERS WHICH ARISE [redacted] ABOVE THE [redacted] STADIUM WALLS.

9. REACTION TIMES: [redacted] BASED UPON CONTINUING CONCERN FOR ASSAULT FORCES THE FOLLOWING HOSTILE FORCE REACTION TIMES ARE POSTUALTED: (ALL TIMES ARE ESTIMATED FROM THAT POINT IN TIME WHEN THE RECOGNITION OF THE ASSAULT REACHES THE CHANCERY AND THE SURROUNDING ENVIRONS.)

A. WITHIN 5-7 MIN-FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

B. WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES REINFOREMENTS FROM LOCAL IRG MILITIA/PASDARAN STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.

C. WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES 100-300 MILITIA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS

D. WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES IRG MILITA REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

E. WITHIN 30-45 MINUTES IRG BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

F. WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

RVW 09 DEC 09

BT

#0022

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

PERSPECTIVE TRANSFORMED IMAGERY--GROUP 2 (U)

September 2, 1980

Declassified by
DDO NMCC
20 Nov 92

Classified by Source Material
Review on July 20, 2000

615781-1

Copy 1 of 1
32 Pages

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

[redacted] [redacted]

Perspective Transformed Imagery -- Group 2 (U)

(U) This document contains the second group of perspective transformed imagery. There are three prints of each image. The particular face is identified near the lower right hand corner of each image. Figure 1 shows the relationships of the faces. The final image is a composite of faces 11, 10, and 8.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] SKULL



*PARTLY OBSCURED

FIGURE 3. SURFACE NOMENCLATURE (II)

[redacted] DEATH



A-359


NEAR HIGH 0100


FAR HIGH 0800


FAR HIGH 0200


NEAR LOBI 1000


NEAR LOW 0600


NEAR LOW 0500


NEAR LOW 0400


NEAR LOW 0300


NEAR LOW 0200


HEAP LOW 0100


F4P LOU 1200


FAR LOW 1100


FAR LOW 1000


FAR LOW 0900


FAR LOW 0200


FAP LOW 0700


FAR LOW 0600


FAR LOW 0500


FAP LOW 0400


FAR LCU 0300


FAR LOW 0200


FAR LOU 0100

SWA 02 (~~FOUO~~) E&E Factors: Terrain Hazards and Surface Condition Categories

SUMMARY: Soutwest Asia covers about 1,239,000 square miles (over one-third the size of the U.S.) and is a harsh land of extremes. Cross-country movement can be severely hindered by high snow capped mountains, by rugged mountains with almost vertical slopes, salt flats which are miry in the wet season, and a vast expanse of sand dunes. Southwest Asia can be divided into 10 definable regions. The Azerbaijan Highlands and the Zargos Mountains of Iran form the western boundary of Southwest Asia. This region is characterized by intermittent mountainous and hilly areas with a few scattered plains. In the mountainous areas, cross-country movement can be severely hindered by slopes greater than 30 percent (some are almost vertical). Running west to east along the Caspian Sea, the terrain of the Elbuez Mountains is very similar to that mentioned above. The mountains are very rugged and contain many V-shaped valleys and gorges. However, along the Caspian coast, there are only low hills and flat, marshy plains. With slopes averaging 20 percent, the hills tend to be rounded in the east and more rugged and sharpe crested in the west.

The Interior Basin of Iran has some mountains but consists mainly of two desert basins in the northwest and southeast, and widely scattered hilly areas. The two desert basins contain areas of salt flats and high dune ridges. Along the peripheries of the basins the plains are moderately rolling to deeply dissected badlands with almost vertical slopes.

The coastal region along the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman includes areas of extensive irrigation canals and ditches. There are coastal marshes in the west, especially at the head of the Persian Gulf. Stream banks near the mountains (especially in the west) are high and rocky; near the coast they consist of either sand or mud.

The Eastern Frontier Mountains, running north to south along Iran's eastern border, and the Makran Mountains, running east from the Strait of Hormuz into Pakistan, form an inverse T in central Southwest Asia. This region is characterized by rugged mountains separated by plains and a few scattered hilly areas. The plains contain salt flats and areas of sand dunes. The hills have slopes of 10-45 percent with local relief of approximately 1,000 feet. The very rugged and barren mountains have very steep slopes running from 45 percent to vertical (90 percent) with an average local relief of about 2,500 feet.

The Hindu Kush region covers the Pakistan Highlands and the Hindu Kush Mountains of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Parapomius Ranges to the south and east of the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan. It has some of the highests mountains in the world with peaks up to 24,000 feet. Streams flow in steep gorges (50 to 600 feet high) and waterfalls are common. All streams are fed by snowmelt, precipitation, runoff, and glaciers (in the northeast).

The Northern Plain of Afghanistan is a region of rolling hills (10 to 200 feet) and cliffs (10-50 feet) near the central mountain ranges and sandy plains to the north. Sand dunes on the Northern Plain can be as high as 100 feet.

The Southern Plain of Afghanistan consists chiefly of desert and semi-desert type terrain. There are also scattered belts of hills and a few mountains. The plains are made up of either sandy or rocky/gravel type

soil. Hills and mountains in the region are generally rounded, although some are moderately dissected with steep-sided ravines.

The Baluchistan Plateau in western Pakistan is basically arid tableland with a few small salt marshlands and swampy areas in the north and west. The southern portion is an area of rolling hills descending into an area of dry plains along the Arabian Sea.

The Indus River Plain along the eastern border of Pakistan extends north from the Arabian Sea to the foothills of the Hindu Kush. Along the eastern and western boundaries of the region sandy and stony desert areas are found with sand dunes up to 200 feet high. The Indus River flows over 1,000 miles from the Hindu Kush to the Arabian Sea and has several major tributaries. All of these streams are normally more than 500 feet wide and many exceed a mile in width. Tidal swamps are common in the Indus delta area and may extend several miles inland.

SWA 02.01 (~~SOUO~~) Specific Terrain and Surface Condition Categories

SWA 02.01.01 (~~TOUO~~)

Condition:
Cross-country movement can be severely hindered or precluded by steep slopes (greater than 30 percent).
Typical Locations: Steep hills and mountains surrounding Iran's interior basin, Afghanistan's central mountain ranges, and the Hindu Kush ranges in central and northern Pakistan.
Background and Details: There are numerous rugged mountain ranges in Southwest Asia. V-shaped valleys and vertical cliffs are common. An average slope of 45 percent or greater is found in the west mountain areas which make up over 50 percent of the landmass of Southwest Asia. The Azerbaijan Highlands in NW Iran and the Hindu Kush range in northern Afghanistan and Pakistan are the tallest mountain ranges i Southwest Asia with peaks above 15,000 feet and a local relief ranging from 6,000 to 17,000 feet. The Hindu Kush range has some peaks as high as 24,000 feet and are among the highest mountains in the world. Some peaks are snow covered year-round. The Eastern Frontier Mountains along the eastern border of Iran, the Baluchistan Highlands in southwest Afghanistan, the central mountain ranges of Afghanistan to include the Paropamisus Range, and the southeastern ranges in Afghanistan to include the Safed Koh all have peaks averaging between 10,000 and 15,000 feet. Characterized by very rugged terrain and steep slopes, local relief is generally between 1,000 and 10,000 feet. The Elburz, Zargos, and Eastern Frontier Mountains surrounding Iran's Interior basin and the Makran Mountains running west from Pakistan to Iran, have peaks with an average elevation from 5,000 to 10,000 feet and local relief between 1,000 to 9,000 feet. The remaining mountainous areas of Southwest Asia include the Baluchistan Basin in southwest Afghanistan, and Afghanistan's northern and southwestern plains. These mountainous areas have peaks averaging under 5,000 feet with local relief of 500 to 6,000 feet. Even these lower mountain ranges are rugged and sharp crested. Slopes often exceed 45 percent and approach vertical (90 percent) where streams run through gorges and canyons.

SWA 02.01.02 (~~FOUO~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Cross-country movement can be hindered by steep slopes in some locales (slopes greater than 30 percent).
Typical Locations: Scattered throughout the entire SWA area.
Background and Details: The hilly regions in Southwest Asia generally run parallel to the mountain ranges or are scattered throughout mountain regions and highlands. Slopes usually run between 10 to 30 percent although steeper slopes are found scattered througout. Average local relief ranges from 500-2,000 feet, and elevation above mean sea level ranges from 200-9,000 feet. Areas of smooth, rounded hills can be found among the middle and southern regions of Afghanistan's central mountain ranges, parellel to the Elburz Mountains in the NE along the Caspian Sea, scattered throughout the Baluchistan Basin in SW Pakistan and in the Azerbaijan Highlands in NW Iran. Moderately rugged terrain exists in the northern plains of Afghanistan where sand dunes with the shape of cresting waves have gentle slopes on the windward side and very steep slopes on the leeward side. Local relief in the area is generally under 1,000 feet. Terrain in the hills of the southeast basin and southwest plains of Afghanistan, the foothills which parallel the Makran Mountains in southeast Iran/southwest Pakistan and the Zargus Mountains along the western border of Iran is characterized by hills/foothills which are moderately dissected. More rugged and deeply dissected terrain can be found in the central mountain ranges of Afghanistan to the south of the Hindu Kush Mountains, the Baluchistan Highlands of SW Pakistan, the central and southern portions of the Elburz Mountains along the Caspian Sea, the Eastern Frontier mountains along Iran's eastern border and a few widely scattered areas in Iran's Interior Basin.

SWA 02.01.03 (~~FOUO~~)

Photo Reference:
Condition:
Cross-country movement can be hindered by surface roughness (pertains to areas having boulder fields, slide areas, very rocky terrain, lava flows, etc.).
Typical Locations: Steep hills and mountains surrounding Iran's Interior Basin, Afghanistan's central mountain ranges, and the Hindu Kush Ranges in central and northern Pakistan.
Background and Details: The landmass of Southwest Asia is located in one of the most unstable earthquake belts of the world. Iran, for example, averages approximately 100 earthquakes per year. These quakes, along with the destructive effects of thawing and heavy rainsa make landslides, mudslides, and or snow avalanches a common occurrence in areas where steep slopes are found. The Indus Plain in eastern Pakistan, the northern and southwestern plains of Afghanistan, the Interior Basin and flat coastal areas along the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman in Iran are the only areas where this might not be a problem.

SWA 02.01.04 (~~TOCO~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Cross-country movement can be hindered or precluded by major streams, especially during seasonal flooding.
Typical Locations: Throughout SWA during the rainy season. During the dry season along the Caspian SEA, at the head of the Persian Gulf in Iran and on the Indus River plain in Pakistan.
Period(s): Rainy season is Mar-May in AF, Dec-Apr in IR, and Dec-Apr in PK. PK also has a monsoon season May-Sep.
Background and Details: The degree of difficulty that major streams present to cross-country movement varies greatly depending upon geographic location and season of the year. Rivers in the Indus Valley in Pakistan, for example, crest biannually. First, during Feb through Apr due to snow-melt in the northern mountains and again during the monsoon season (Jul through Aug) when the valley is almost entirely under water. The following regions in Southwest Asia are affected by major flooding during the wet seasons. First, the western third of Iran from the Persian Gulf through the Zagros Mountains and the Azerbaijan Highlands east to the Caspian coast. Stream widths in this region range from 60-400 feet along the Gulf to as wide as 700 feet around Lake Urmia in the highlands and along the Caspian coast. The Zayandeh River's width on the eastern side of the central Zagros Mountains is over 1,000 feet at flood stage levels. Stream depths are generally under three feet during the dry season and over three feet during the wet season. The Safid River and the streams along the Persian Gulf, however, are over three feet deep year-round. Second, in northern and southeastern Afghanistan, stream widths from 40-150 feet are found in the lower end of watercourses. Stream depths are six feet or less. Third, in southwestern Afghanistan, stream widths in the lower end of watercourses average 250-350 feet. However, the Helm Land River is over 1,000 feet wide in places. Stream depths are six feet or less. Fourth, in Pakistan's western interior region, major flooding is a factor only within 50-75 miles of the coast of the Arabian Sea where widths vary from 60-500 feet and depths are generally less than three and one-half feet. Finally, in the Indus region most primary watercourses are over 100 feet wide and up to 2,000 feet wide in the Delta region. The Jhelum and Chenab tributaries of the Indus are over a mile wide during floodstage and stream depths exceed three and one-half feet. Additionally, the Indus Delta region along the coastal regions of Pakistan has one of the densest areas of irrigation canals and ditches to be found anywhere in the world. These canals average 10-20 feet wide and have steep banks from 2-12 feet high.

SWA 02.01.05 (~~TOCO~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Cross-country movement can be hindered or precluded by swift-flowing streams, especially during wet periods.

Indus River drainage system in NE Pakistan, and in Western Iran and along the Persian Gulf.
Period(s): Wet season: Afghanistan Mar-May, Pakistan and Iran Dec-Apr.
Background and Details: The velocity of streams and rivers in the lower end of their watercourses in Southwest Asia is normally negligible except after heavy rains when currents can become torrential. In the mountains and regions of steep hills the velocity of streams increases to 10-20 feet per second or more, especially during the wet season. In southeastern Afghanistan most streams flow through deep gorges where swift rapids and waterfalls are common. In eastern Pakistan in the northern mountains, the upper reachs of the Indus River and it stributaires cascade down through deep gorges and narrow valleys producing swift rpaids and numerous waterfalls. At higher elevations in Iran, especially the Azerbaijan Highlands and the Zargus and Elburz Mountains, stream velocities may also be high at times. In all areas, snowmelt at the end of the cold period will cause the stream depths to rise considerably and velocity to increase accordingly.

SWA 02.01.06 ([redacted])

Photo reference:
Condition:
Cross-country movement can be hindered or precluded by large or interconnected lakes/reservoirs.
Typical Locations: Lake Urmia in NW Iran.
Background and Details: Lake Urmia, located in the Azerbaijan Highlands of NW Iran, is the only perennial and largest lake in Iran. It is approximately 90 miles long and 30 miles wide. The lake contains manny small islands and during the dry period decreases in size by about 25 percent. Although the average depth of the lake is around 17 feet it can be as deep as 50 feet in its northwest end.

SWA 02.01.07 ([redacted])

Photo reference:
Condition:
Cross-country movement can be hindered or precluded by marshes, swamps, or bogs, especially during wet periods.
Typical Locations: Along the Caspian Sea, at the ehad of the Persian Gulf, around Lake Urmia in Iran, in SW Afghanistan, and along the Indus Valley in Pakistan.
Period(s): Year-round, predominantly Nov-May.
Background and Details: Southwest Asia has two classes of wet miry areas which can hinder cross-country movement - perennial marshlands and intermittent lakes and salt flats that become mirey only during the wet season. Perennial marshes can be found along the coast of the Caspian Sea, at the head and in other scattered coastal areas along the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. They are also found around Lake Urmia in the Azerbaijan Highlands of NW Iran. In SW Afghanistan, marshes exist along the lower Helmland and Arghandab Rivers and in Pakistan along the Indus River and its tributaries. During the wet season these marshy areas will increase in size as water levels rise. Other areas that become miry

during periods of precipitation are scattered salt flats in Iran's Interior Basin and along Afghanistan's rivers located in the Northern and Southern plains.

SWA 02.01.08 (~~EGUC~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Cross-country movement can be severely hindered or precluded by heavy accumulations of snow and/or drifts.
Typical Locations: Iran in the Zagros and Elburz Mountains and Azerbaijan Highlands at elevations above 1,300 feet in the north and above 2,200 feet in the south, Pakistan in the mountains throughout (year-round above 12,000 feet), Afghanistan in mountains above 8,000 feet (year-round above 12,000 feet).
Period(s): Dec-Mar in AF & PK, Jan-Feb in IR, year-round in Hindu Kush.
Background and Details: Heavy snow accumulations and drifts would prove to be a major obstacle to cross-country movement at the higher elevations during the winter months throughout most of Southwest Asia. The snow depth varies depending upon the region and altitude. In Iran, snows average between one and one-half and 6 feet deep. In Pakistan, snow can reach a depth of four feet at higher elevations, and in Afghanistan 5 feet or more. Deep snow cover and glaciers are found year-round at very high elevations (approximately 20,000 feet) in the Hindu Kush range.

SWA 02.01.09 (~~EGUC~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Cross-country movement can be hindered by accumulations of snow at various times during the cold period.
Typical Locations: In the Elburz and Zagros Mountains of Iran, the Azerbaijan Highlands, the central mountain ranges of Afghanistan, and the Hindu Kush in Pakistan.
Period(s): Dec-Apr.
Background and Details: During the cold period, cross-country movement may be hindered by accumulations of snow at moderate elevations in most of the mountain ranges throughout Southwest Asia. Areas which may be affected at times by accumulations are the Zagros Mountains and Azerbaijan Highlands in eastern Iran, the Elburz Mountains along the Caspian Sea, scattered areas in the lower half of Iran's Interior Basin, the Paropamisus and Central mountain ranges of Afghanistan, and the Hindu Kush in northern Afghanistan and Pakistan. Except in the high mountains, snow depth normally doesn't exceed one-half foot and snow cover doesn't normally last more than a week.

SWA 02.01.10 (~~EGUC~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Cross-country movement can be impeded by shifting sand and/or sand dunes.

Typical Locations: Scattered throughout all of SWA.
Period(s): Year-round.
Background and Details: Large, sandy desert areas are found throughout Southwest Asia where shifting sand dunes and ridges can hinder cross-country movement. Sand dunes normally crest at about 50-150 feet high. Sand ridges may be as high as 500 feet. These deserts of shifting sand dunes and ridges are located in the southern and northern plains of Afghanistan, in Pakistan's Central Baluchistan Highlands, the Thar Desert along the Pakistan-India border, the Thal Desert on the NW Indus Plain, and scattered throughout Iran's Interior Basin region. June through Sep in Iran's Interior Basin, dust storms are particularly heavy. During this period a phenomenon known as "the wind of 120 days" occurs, and large dust storms and dust devils are common.

SWA 02.01.11 (~~FOUO~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Cross-country movement can be hazardous due to flash flooding, especially during the wet season.
Typical Locations: Throughout, especially Iran's Interior Basin, the Makran region, Baluchistan Highlands and Afghanistan's northern and southern plains.
Period(s): Iran, Dec-Jun; Pakistan, Jul-Aug (Indus River drainage system) and Dec-Mar; Afghanistan, Apr-Jul.
Background and Details: During the wet season, flash floods are common throughout all Southwest Asia and pose a definite threat to cross-country movement. Although flash floods can occur anywhere on the Southwest Asia landmass, the most likely areas of occurrence are marshlands, salt flats, and intermittent streams locales. Some of the more likely areas include the valleys and salt flats in Iran's Interior Basin, the Makran region and Baluchistan Highlands of Pakistan, the salt flats on the northern and southern plains of Afghanistan, the lower reaches of the Kunar and Kabul Rivers in east Afghanistan, and marshy areas in SW and NE Afthanistan. In areas of steep slopes, streams may be temporarily dammed by land slides until enough water builds up to break through the obstruction and cause severe local floods downstream from the site.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SWA 03 (FOUO) E&E Factors: Concealment

SUMMARY: Tthe conditions which exist in Southwest Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) offer some of the harshest and most merciless evasion situations in the populated world. With forest coverage comprising less than five percent of the total surface of an otherwise arid and rocky landscape, concealment and survival are precarious. Good cover exists generally only in the mountainous areas - the Zagros and Elburs Mountains of Iran and the Hindu Kush which extends from Afghanistan into the Northwest Province of Pakistan. Concealment in the hills, primarily in eastern Afghanistan, is afforded by the rugged terrain of the mountains. Evergreen forests offering year-round cover tend to be found in the most inaccessible parts of the region, in the mountains from about 9,000 to 12,000 feet elevation. On many of the lower slopes and in the flood plains of the major rivers, broadleaf deciduous forests offer only seasonal cover from Apr-Oct. Many watercourses in the area are intermittent and dry up fro several months of the year, resulting in concomitant loss of adjacent vegetative cover. The most arid areas may experience rainfall only one year in three. Centruries of accommodations to this meager water supply have led the inhabitants to develop resourceful solutions to irrigation: underground irrigation reservoirs and aqueducts called "Karez" or "Quanat." They are scattered throughout the area and, where they exist, will permit some tree and plant growth. Outside of forested areas, vegetation is chiefly comprised of evergreen scrub and thorn bushes, which offer only limited cover. The areas of intense cultivation afford only minuscule cover and concealment since the crops are both too low to conceal an evader and always found in areas of great population density.

AFIS Comment and Discussion:

Concealment conditions which significantly affect the chances for successful evasion are summarized below, primarily for emphasis. Concealment is given equal emphasis to population and security hazards when potential evasion locales (PELs) are considered. Users are reminded that the quality of concealment will vary dramatically according to the density, age, type, and management of vegetation; and in proportion to the extent and type of surface irregularities. In temperate zones, the quality of concealment, particularly at lower altitudes, may largely depend upon sesonal changes in foliage. As a rule, areas having underbrush are more suited for evasion than areas which may have large stands of trees which, because of forest management or natural conditions (pine forests for example), afford poorer concealment from ground observation. Concealment conditions described in this section are used to assess the quality of potential evasion locales (PELs) noted in sections 9, 10, 11, and 28; however, the final "rating" given those locales represents an attempt to average concealment conditions over the extent of the PELs involved.

SWA 03.01 (FOUO) Specific Concealment Conditions

SWA 03.01.01 (FOUO)

Photo reference:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Condition:
Concealment from aerial observation is virtually non-existent due to lack of vegetation and absence of significant surface features.
Typical Locations: The entire southwestern plain of Afghanistan, nearly all of Iran except the Caspian Sea littoral and the highlands of the Elburz and Zagros mountains, and most of the western part of Pakistan west of the Indus River valley flood plain.
Background and Details: By far the most prevalent terrain/vegetation feature of SWA is the vast expanse of barren, desert area where vegetation is either lacking entirely, or is restricted to small, isolated shrubs and mosses. Expansive areas are totally lacking in vegetation. The sporadic, minuscule vegetative growth which does survive is predominantly composed of evergreen scrub, lichen, moss and other small plants which are all xerophytic and salt tolerant. They generally grow to less than a foot in height. The lowlands are typically barren desert and only above 15,000 feet can Alpine vegetation be found. Trees, if they exist, are found widely separated and only at the higher elevations; they typically do not exceed 20 feet in height. A combination of searing heat (often over 100 degrees in the summer months) driven with hot winds and lack of vegetation gives rise to frequent dust storms and drifting sands over many of these desert areas. Cover and concealment must be considered to be virtually non-existent.

SWA 03.01.02 (~~FOUO~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Concealment from ground observation is poor in areas having low-lying vegetation and a general absence of significant terrain irregularities.
Typical Locations: Areas of marsh grass to some small areas of mangrove swamp forest in the Indus River Delta and along the Persian Gulf in Iran.
Background and Details: Very little of SWA contains any swampy or marshy areas. The few areas are found in isolated locations and are generally insignificant for concealment purposes; moreover, the attenant vegetation, usually marsh grass, grows only to a height of 1-3 feet. Marshes and tidal swamps are found in the coastal areas of Iran, along the Persian Gulf in the vicinity of the Straits of Hormuz and in Pakistan in the Indus River delta on the Arabian Sea. The only other marshy area is in the Scistan Depression at the border between Afghanistan and Iran where one typically finds salt flats and marsh grasses. The mangrove swamp forests exist only in a very narrow band at a few places along the Persian Gulf in Iran, and contain trees 15-25 feet high with concommitant dense prop roots.

SWA 03.01.03 (~~FOUO~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Concealment from ground observation enhanced by surface irregularities which partially or largely compensate for any absences of vegetation.

Typical Locations: At extremely high altitudes in the Hindu Kush and along the Wakhan Corridor of northeastern Afghanistan, and the northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan (NWFP).
Background and Details: At these very high altitudes there are areas of permanent glacial fields, totally devoid of vegetation. Cover and concealment are afforded by the extreme ruggedness of the terrain, some of the hardest in the world.

SWA 03.01.04 (~~POOR~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Concealment from ground and aerial observation very poor in areas which lack vegetation of sufficient height to obscure even a prone evader during non-growing periods, and probably lack sufficient concealment to obscure a crouching or upright evader during the growing season.
Typical Locations: Most slopes in the highlands, except for semi-desert areas south of Peshawar; clustered in groves along streams, and in the mountain rimland of Iran.
Period(s): Apr-Oct.
Background and Details: The vegetation of most of this region is overwhelmingly scrub consisting of a sparse cover of low shrubs, brushwood, and small trees which are scattered throughout the area. Shrubs generally range 4-10 feet in height and are widely spaced, offering limited concealment. Shrubbery is chiefly evergreen and thorny bushes, frequently interspersed with tufts of grass. This type of vegetation is most predominant in the highlands of Afghanistan where it forms much of the growth on the mountains, hills, and high plains which are characteristic of the country. Scrub vegetation is prevalent over large expanses of the Pakistan hills and plains, but seen only rarely in isolated areas of Iran. Scrub offers only limited concealment during the growing season because of the lack of height. However, the irregularity of the associated terrain where this vegetation predominates offers some cover from flat trajectory fire.

SWA 03.01.05 (~~POOR~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Concealment from aerial and ground observation ranges from poor to good in broadleaf deciduous forests; conditions improve during the growing season and significantly degrade during the leafless period.
Typical Locations: Mountains, hills, slopes, and around some settlements in the Caspian coastal and flood plains in southern and eastern Iran, lower elevations of Elburz and Zagros Mountains in Iran, and the flood plains in Pakistan within 5 miles of the major rivers in the Indus Valley.
Period(s): Generally Apr-Oct in Iran on the northern faces of the Elburs Mountains, Jul-Dec in the Indus flood plain of Pakistan.
Background and Details: Varying types of deciduous trees are found in widely scattered areas of SWA. Most broadleaf deciduous dense forests have trees which are less than 80 feet high, usually reaching only 20-50

feet in height. The following types of trees are commonly found: oak, willow, poplar, birch maple, beech, and ash, as well as some varieties of nut trees such as pistachio and almond. The spacing of trees in mature stands can range from 15-30 feet throughout the region with dense undergrowth in many areas. This type of vegetation is most commonly found at higher elevations; however, deciduous trees are uncommon in Afghanistan except for planted poplar and willow found around settlements, and mixed in with needleleaf trees on the eastern slopes of the Hindu Kush at extremely high altitudes. In Iran, deciduous vegetation is found on the northern facing slopes of the Elburz Mountains, in the northwest, in the Caspian coastal plain, and the Zagros Mounhtains. The steep slopes of Pakistan north of Peshawar contain small forests of this type; elsewhere in Pakistan deciduous vegetation is concentrated in the flood plain of the Indus and other major river valleys where elevations are below 1,000 feet. On these flood plains, there is a dense undergrowth of deciduous shrubs with luxuriant grass. Trees are leafless Jan-Jun in Pakistan and Nov-Mar in the mountains and highlands of the remainder of the region.

SWA 03.01.06 (~~Rough~~)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Concealment from aerial and ground observation generally poor in cultivated and orchard/vineyard areas; conditions improve during growing season when trees are in leaf and crops mature.
Typical Locations: Fertile conditions are found generally only in the well-irrigated areas adjacent to major streams and rivers, and along the seacoasts.
Period(s): In the most fertile portions of this region there are both summer and winter crops. Wheat, the predominant crop in the area, is planted from Sep-Dec and harvested in May or Jun. Often the same fields are used in rotation for other crops, e.g. corn, which is planted in May through Jun and harvested in the fall. Barley is planted in the fall or Feb/Mar, and harvested by Jun.
Background and Details: In contrast to the prevailing vegetative conditions in the region, small areas are very productive and cultivated for cereal grains, fruits and other crops. These irrigated areas are the sites of small settlements surrounded by cultivated fields. In Afghanistan a narrow band of cultivation extends along the Helmland River and in the larger river valleys and basins, as well as the Oases of Balkh and Qonduz provinces. Iran's cultivated land is found along the Caspian Sea littoral, the north coast of Sanadej (near the Turkish border), and in the Kuhzistan Plain at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. The Indus River flood plain and the rolling hills around Peshawar support cultivation in Pakistan. Opium poppies provide a major, albeit often illicit, cash crop throughout the region, particularly in the eastern half of Iran and the northwest frontier provinces of Pakistan. Growing to only 3-4 feet in height, poppy fields would afford an evader little concealment. Moreover, the fields are carefully tended and guarded. Poppies are planted in the fall and in Mar and are harvested as one crop in May. In addition to indigenous cultivated

crops, the principal fruit and nut trees include apricot, peach, dates, citrus, almond, and pistachio. Croplands growing out of the flood plains are augmented by selective irrigation. Where water is not available, there is no cultivation and the non-irrigated lands are characterized by desert or evergreen scrub. These croplands are nearly exclusively confined to plains and rolling hills and gentle slopes; consequently there is little or no cover to be had from surface irregularities.

SWA 03.01.07 (FOUO)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Concealment from air and ground observation ranges from fair to good in areas covered by needleleaf and evergreen forest interspersed with accompanying underbrush. Inasmuch as these are almost exclusively found in the highlands and mountainous areas with steep slopes, the rugged terrain enhances concealment and affords good to excellent cover.
Typical Locales: Extreme eastern Afghanistan, foothills of the Hindu Kush, and in Paktia province of Afghanistan. Extreme northern highlands of Pakistan.
Period(s): Year-round.
Background and Details: Forested areas are very uncommon in SWA, accounting for only two percent of the total land area of Afghanistan, three percent of Pakistan, and 11 percent of Iran. Mixed broadleaf and needleleaf evergreen forests with open to moderately dense canopy offering year-round coverage are only sparsely distributed throughout the region. Most needleleaf evergreen trees (e.g. pine and fir) range from 60-180 feet in height, but at the highest elevation they often are less than 60 feet tall and have open to moderately dense canopy. The undergrowth of shrubbery may vary from sparse to dense, with many isolated grassy openings or clearings. Needleleaf evergreeens consist chiefly of chilghoza pine, blue pine, chir pine, and fir. Needleleaf evergreen growth is usually found in the foothills of the Hindu Kush and in northern Pakistan. Evergreen forests are generally situated in the most remote, inaccessible areas of the region-- the rugged mountains and steep slopes north and south of Jalalabad, Afghanistan at elevation between 9,000 and 12,000 feet, in the adjacent rugged mountainous areas immediately to the east in the northern mountains, and hills of Pakistan where the elevations range between 3,000 and 11,000 feet.

SWA 03.01.08 (FOUO)

Photo reference:
Condition:
Concealment from ground observation ranges from very poor in areas which lack vegetation of sufficient height to fair where there is sufficient concentration to afford concealment to a crouching/prone evader; concealment from aerial observation is generally poor owing to the lack of vegetation having sufficient height and density to obscure an evader from aerial view.

Typical Locations: In mountainous areas, highlands, and the steep slopes of Iran and Afghanistan. Not generally found in Pakistan.
Period(s): Mountainous steppes and grasslands are green only from Mar-mid-Jul; they are dried and grey/brown the remainder of the year.
Background and Details: In addition to grassy clumps which intersperse evergreen and deciduous forested areas, several narrow strips of seasonal grasslands with no intervening wooded areas stretch across Afghanistan and Iran. In both cases these are found in the northern plains, foothills, northern steep slopes of the mountainous areas, along the northern face of the Paropamisus Range and Hindu Kush of Afghanistan, roughly paralleling the Amu Darya River/Soviet border with Afghanistan, and along the steep slopes of the Zagros mountains of Iran. They constitute only a small percentage of the land surface of Afghanistan and Iran. These grasses are found at elevations ranging from 2,000 to 6,000 feet, but generally are confined to levels below 3,000 feet. Non-irrigated grasslands are relegated largely to sheep grazing. Inasmuch as these grasses often occur in clumps rather than solid stands and seldom exceed three feet in height, they offer only minimal concealment; the only appreciable cover would be afforded by some surface irregulalrities.

SWA 04 (~~FOUO~~) E&E Factors: Population Distribution

SUMMARY: An accurate accounting of Southwest Asia's population does not exist since a complete census has never been taken due to a large population of wandering nomads and cultural attitudes regarding privacy and the the seclusion of women. Based on partial census however, it is estimated that the area has a population of around 126 million people, with 31 million in Iran, 65 million in Pakistan, and 30 million in Afghanistan. The overall population is concentrated along rivers, streams and large bodies of water such as the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Areas of the greatest population concentration are found in and around the Elburz Mountains, the Zagros Mountains, the Azerbaijan Highlands (all in Iran), along the NE border of Iran, along the Indus River and its tributaries in Pakistan, and along the edges of the mountain ranges in Afghanistan where watercourses fed by snowmelt flows out of the mountains and hills. On the northern Indus Plain in Pakistan near the Indian border, the concentration of population is particularly dense due to the setting up of refugee centers/cities in the area. In general, highway networks are found in areas of dense population. In the less populated areas, road systems are little more than a network of paths. Afghanistan, for example, has more than 18,000 miles of caravan routes. Some of the Major cites are as follows: Tehran, the capital of Iran; Rasht in Iran along the Caspian Sea; Abadan in Iran at the head of the Persian Gulf; Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan; Herat in western Afghanistan; Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan; Karachi in Pakistan on the Arabian Sea; and Lahore in Pakistan in the Indus Valley near the India border.

AFIS Comment and Discussion:

The following summary of information concerning the potential for inadvertent contact between an evader and the indigenous population in this country is provided for emphasis only. Specific population/settlement informaiton for geographic sectors is included in Section 28. Potential Evasion Locales (PELs) for this country are partially selected on the basis of population densities and settlement patterns in the study area. The conditions noted in this section represent attempts to portray average conditions. Local variances in these conditions should be expected. These conditions neither reflect possible displacements of population in wartime nor provide for possible reconcentration/relocation in accordance with civil defense plans. Generally, it is thought that such relocation would not significantly alter the conditions described in this section and in Section 28.

SWA 04.01 (~~FOUO~~) Distribution Patterns

SWA 04.01.01 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:

Inadvertent contact would be virtually impossible to avoid due to the high density of population in urban/suburban concentrations located in the study area.

Typical Locations: Urban/surburban areas with populations of 50,000 and more. In Pakistan, the Indus Plain is an area of particularly heavy

population density which runs between 500 and 1,500 persons per square mile.

Background and Details: Condition is found in the following sectors:
01 and 08 in the vicinity of Rezaiyeh, Iran;
17 in the vicinity of Tabriz, Iran;
13 & 21 in the vicinity of Kermanshah, Iran;
27 in the vicinity of Khorramshahr, Iran;
27 in the vicinity of Abadan, Iran;
28 in the vicinity of Ahvaz, Iran;
29 in the vicinity of Dezful, Iran;
31 in the vicinity of Hamadan, Iran;
35 in the vicinity of Ardabil, Iran;
43 & 53 in the vicinity of Qazvin, Iran;
44 in the vicinity of Rasht, Iran;
51 & 61 in the vicinity of Qom, Iran;
59 in the vicinity of Esfahan, Iran;
61 in the vicinity of Kashan & Qom, Iran;
62 & 63 in the vicinity of Tehran, the capital of Iran;
66 in the vicinity of Shiraz, Iran;
89 in the vicinity of Yazd, Iran;
126 in the vicinity of Kerman, Iran;
159 in the vicinity of Mashhad, Iran;
194 in the vicinity of Herat, Afghanistan;
225 in the vicinity of Qandahar, Afghanistan;
238 & 252 in the vicinity of Quetta, Pakistan;
259 in the vicinity of Mazari-i-Sharif, Afghanistan;
261 in the vicinity of Hyderbad, Pakistan;
277 and 263 in the vicinities of Rohri and Sukkur, Pakistan;
284 in the vicinity of Kabul, captial of Afghanistan;
298 in the vicinity of Jalalabad, Afghanistan;
304 in the vicinity of Bahawalpur, Pakistan;
305 in the vicinity of Multan, Pakistan;
308 & 309 in the vicinities of Peshawar and Kohat, Pakistan;
309 & 319 in the vicinities of Mardan and Risalpur, Pakistan;
307 & 317 in the vicinity of Sargodha, Pakistan;
316 and 325 in the vicinity of Lyallpur, Pakistan;
318 & 327 in the vicinity of Islamabad, Pakistan;
318 & 327 in the vicinity of Rawalpindi, Pakistan;
326 & 327 in the vicinity of Gujianwala, Pakistan;
327 in the vicinity of Jhelum, Pakistan;
318 & 319 in the vicinity of Wah, Pakistan;
323 & 246 in the vicinity of Karachi, Pakistan;
333 in the vicinity of lahore, Pakistan;
and 334 in the vicinity of Sialkoti, Pakistan.

SWA 04.01.02 ~~(TOOO)~~

Condition:
Inadvertent contact would be difficult to avoid due to the relatively high density of population generally distributed throughout the

study area.
Typical Locations: Condition is found scattered throughout the Azerbaijan Highlands in NW Iran, the Elburz Mountains along the Caspian Sea, the northern Zagros Mountains in western Iran, around the central mountains of Afghanistan, and throughout the Indus Plain in Pakistan. The population density ranges generally between 100 and 200 persons per square mile.

SWA 04.01.03 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Inadvertent contact might be avoided for an indeterminate duration because population tends to be concentrated in cities and towns which are separated by areas having relatively low density of population.
Typical Locations: Conditions is found scattered throughout the lower Indus Plain, surrounding the central mountains of Afghanistan, throughout most of the Zagros Mountains in western Iran and portions of NE Iran. The population density ranges between 50 and 100 persons per square mile.

SWA 04.01.04 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Inadvertent contact probably could be avoided with caution due to the relatively low density of population within the study area, and the tendency of settlements to be widely separated.
Typical Locations: Condition is found in the mountains of Pakistan, northern plains and higher mountains of Afghanistan, souther Zagros Mountains in eastern iran and portions of NE Iran. The population density runs between 25 and 50 persons per square mile.

SWA 04.01.05 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Study area is virtually uninhabited, and inadvertent contact is considered unlikely.
Typical Locations: Conditions is found in the Hindu Kush in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the southern desert of Afghanistan, western desert of Pakistan and the eastern desert bordering India, Iran's central basin, and in coastal areas along the Gulf of Oman and the southern half of the Persian Gulf. The population density is 25 persons per square mile or less.

SWA 12 (~~FOUO~~) Survival Factors: Weather and Climate

SUMMARY: Southwest Asia is a region of extreme climatic conditions which are strongly influenced by its harsh and diverse topographic features. In the high mountains of central Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, very cold temperatures, evidenced by perennial snow and glacier fields, persist throughout the year. Iran, on the other hand, experiences very cold temperatures only seasonably at higher elevations in the Zagros Mountains and Azerbaijan Highlands along Iran's western border, the Elburz Mountains along the Caspian Sea and in a few scattered places in the eastern Frontier Mountains along its eastern border. On the other extreme, Southwest Asia also experiences extraordinarily hot temperatures, sometimes over 120 degrees F. During the summer months, very high temperatues are common in coastal areas, in Iran's central basin, on Afghanistan's norther and southern plains, and in Pakistan's Indus Valley and Baluchistan Basin. Coastal areas are unique in that while the other areas have a very dry climate, they experience very high humidity (up to 97 percent) in addition to the high temperatures. These very hot and humid areas are found in Iran along the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Gulf of Oman; and in Pakistan along the Arabian Sea. Another climatic characteristic which is experienced throughout Southwest Asia is extreme diurnal variations in temperature. Temperatures during a 24 hour period can vary by as much as 50 degrees. For example, during the early morning hours temperatures may be as low as 60 degrees F. and by late morning rise to over 100 degrees F. In the regions which contain wide expanses of flat terrain, winds flow unimpeded across the landscape and often reach gale force levels. The central basin and head of the Persian Gulf in Iran, the northern and southern plains in Afghanistan, the Balachistan Basin, Makran coast and Indus Plain in Pakistan are areas where sand and dust storms are a common phenomena year-round but especially prevalent during the summer months (Jun-Aug).
The amount of rainfall varies considerably not only from one region of SWA to another but from one area of a country to another. For example, norther Iran's coastal area long the Caspian Sea receives SWA's highest level with an average of more than 45 inches falling each year. Iran's Interior Basin, on the other hand, may receive no rainfall for years at a time. Afghanistan's northern and southern plains receive very little rainfall (2-4 inches). In Pakistan, the Southwest Monsoon and its intensity has a profound effect upon the amount of rainfall. One year of drought may be followed by a year of very heavy accumulations. Monthly averages can vary from 15 inches to one inch or less. The occurence of fog considerably reduces visibility in mountainous areas and coastal areas along the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Gulf of Oman during the winter and spring months (Nov-Apr). The Indus Valley in Pakistan also experiences fog during the Southwest Monsoon (Jun-Aug). Flash flooding with torrential currents is common after heavy periods of rain in many mountain valleys and plains areas throughout Southwest Asia.

SWA 12.01 (~~FOUO~~) Specific Weather and Climate Hazards

SWA 12.01.01 (FOUO)

Condition:
Moderately low temperatures occur during the cold period.
Typical Locations: Condition is found throughout SWA.
Period(s): Nov-Mar at lower elevations, Apr-Oct at higher elevations.
Background and Details: A region of diverse topographical features, moderately cold temperatures occur throughout the year at various locales in SWA. Along the Gulf of Oman minimum daily winter temperatures average in the mid 50s F. and low 60s and drop to the mid 40s to 50s along the Persian Gulf. On the plains of northern Afghanistan, mean daily minimums are in the high 20s to mid 30s and daily maximums in the high 40s to mid 50s. During the summer months at elevations above 10,000 feet mean daily minimum temperatures may be in the 30s and 40s with maximums in the 50s and 60s. These conditions are found in the Zagros Mountains and Azerbaijan Highlands in western Iran, the Elburz Mountains in northern Iran, the central mountain ranges in Afghanistan, and the Northern Mountains in Pakistan.

SWA 12.01.02 (FOUO)

Condition:
Extreme low temperatures tend to prevail during cold period.
Typical Locations: Condition is found at elevations above 10,000 feet in the Azerbaijan Highlands and Zagros Mountains in western Iran, in the Elburz Mountains along the Caspian Sea, the Central Mountains of Afghanistan and the Hindu Kush in northern Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Period(s): Generally Nov-Mar depending on lattitude and elevation.
Background and Details: Temperatures in these high mountainous areas are extremely cold, remaining below freezing all witner with minimums well below 0 degrees F. A record low temperature of -50 degrees F. was recorded in Afghanistan at an elevation of just over 9,000 feet. The mean daily maximum temperature in the foothills of Pakistan's northern mountains (Dec-Feb) is around 15 degrees F. More extreme conditions with colder temperatures and longer periods are found in the Hindu Kush of Afghanistan and Pakistan where perennial glaciers can be found at very high elevations. Extreme temperature conditions occur only during Dec-Feb in the Azerbaijan Highlands and the Zagros and Elburz Mountain chains of iran.

SWA 12.01.03 (FOUO)

Condition:
Extreme low temperatures occasionally occur during the cold period.
Typical Locations: Condition is found at elevations from 3,000-10,000 feet in the Azerbaijan Highloands and Zagros Mountains in eastern Iran, the Elburz Mountains along the Caspian Sea, the Eastern Frontier Mountains in eastern Iran, the central mountain ranges in Afghanistan, the Makran Mountains in western Pakistan and foothills of the Hindu Kush in northern Pakistan and northern Afghanistan.
Period(s): Generally Nov-Mar depending on lattitude and elevation.
Background and Details: During the winter months, temperatures in these

areas can at times be extremely cold at night (0 to -20 degrees F.) and then rise to 40-50 degrees F. by afternoon. The mean daily temperature in Afghanistan and Iran during the months of Dec-Feb is around 20 degrees F. and rises to 40 degrees F. in Pakistan.

SWA 12.01.04 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Extreme high temperatures can occur during the hot period.
Typical Locations: Condition is found at elevations below 7,000 feet in the hills and plains along the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea, in Iran's central basin, Afghanistan's nothern and southern plains, western Pakistan and the Indus Valley in eastern Pakistan.
Period(s): Apr-Oct.
Background and Details: Maximum temperatures in SWA vary between 70 and 110 degrees F. with possible readings as high as 120 degrees F. in some locales. The Eastern Lowlands of Pakistan are one of the hottest regions in the world, with Apr-Oct temperatures persistantly rising to the 100 degree F. to 115 degree F. range. The Khuzestan plains in SW Iran are also noted for extremely high summer temperatures where daily maximums exceed 110 degrees F. Generally the relative humidity throughout SWA is low except for coastal areas. In fact, the climate in Tehran during the summer months is very similar to that found in Salt Lake City during the same period. Humidity reaches 70-80 percent in the coastal areas with mean daily temperatures exceeding 110 degrees F. This combination of both high heat and humidity can have a pronounced debilitating effect on humans.

SWA 12.01.05 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Windchill hazard area. Combination of temperatures, wind, and/or dampness tend to promote loss of internal body heat (hypothermia).
Typical Locations: Conditions is found in mountainous areas in the Azerbaijan Highlands and Zagros Mountains of eastern Iran, the Elburz Mountains along the Caspian Sea, the Central Mountain Ranges in Afghanistan, and the Hindu Kush in northeastern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan.
Period(s): Year-round at elevations above 5,000 feet, Nov-Mar at elevations below 5,000 feet.
Background and Details: At higher elevations, very strong wind conditions are found on exposed mountain peaks/slopes and in narrow valleys and passes. Gale force winds combined with cold temperatures and precipitation will present a definite windchill/hypothermia threat to an evader in the mountainous areas outlined above.

SWA 12.01.06 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Coastal water temperatures vary. During cold periods they are low enough to severely reduce water survival time while immersed. As a rule, ditching is not recommended during the Nov to Apr period unless there is a good probability of immediate rescue. During warm periods rescue should not be

delayed, and cold water survival gear may still be required early and late in that period.
Typical Locations: Caspian Sea.
Period(s): Nov-Apr.
Background and Details: During the winter months, surface water temperatures may be well below 50 degrees F. in the Caspian Sea. In fact, drift ice occurs in the southern part along Iran's northern coast during the months of Dec-Feb.

SWA 12.01.07 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Fog and/or low clouds can hamper rescue operations and restrict visibility to an extent that ground navigation is difficult at certain times.
Typical Locations: Condition is found mainly in coastal areas and mountainous regions.
Period(s): Generally Nov-Jun; Jun-Aug in Indus River region of Pakistan.
Background and Details: Poor visiblity conditions due to fog occur frequently during the winter and spring months along the Caspian Sea coast in northern Iran. Visibility restrictions of less than 2 and one-half miles occur mainly during the morning hours. Visibility restrictions of less than 2 and one-half to 6 miles occur only occasionally along the southern coast of Iran on the Persian Gulf. In the valleys of the foothills and mountains of the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan and Pakistan, morning fog is prevalent during the period from Nov-May when visibility restrictions of less than one and one-fourth miles occur 25 to 50 percent of the time. To the west, poor visibility conditions due to fog associated with the Southwest Monsoon occur frequently from Jun-Aug.

SWA 12.01.08 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Area tends to experience blowing snow and/or "whiteout" conditions during the cold period.
Typical Locations: Condition is found in mountainous areas in the Azerbaijan Highlands and Zagros Mountains in eastern Iran, the Elburz Mountain chain running east to west along the Caspian Sea, the Central Mountain Ranges in Afghanistan, and the Hindu Kus in northern Pakistan and northeastern Afghanistan.
Period(s): Snow cover is common throughout SWA in mountainous areas at elevations above 6,000 feet during the winter months (particularly Jan-Feb). Blizzard conditions, ground snow cover and high winds often combine to produce snow drifts, low visibility and "whiteout" conditions. These conditions are most likely to occur in the Northern Mountains of Pakistan, the Hindu Kush range in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, the central mountain ranges of Afghanistan, and at the higher elevations in the Zagros and Elburz Mountains of Iran.

SWA 12.01.09 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Area tends to experience dust/sand storms which are severe enough to

significantly reduce visibility.
Typical Locations: Condition is found in flat areas in Iran's Central Basin, along the Persian Gulf, in Afghanbistan's northern and southern plains, the Baluchistan Basin in western Pakistan and the Indus Valley in eastern Pakistan.
Period(s): Year-round but most common from Jun-Aug.
Background and Details: Sand and dust storms can occur at anytime during the year but are most common during the summer months. Severe and frequent sandstorms occur in the deserts of eastern Iran and western Afghanistan, and on the high plateau of southwest Pakistan. These duststorms and sandstorms are characterized by very strong winds of more than gale force levels (greater than 27 knots). The "Shamal" is such a wind which occurs on Iran's southern plains at the head of the Persian Gulf and blows for several days at a time during the months of Jun-Jul. During the winter months the "shamal" is usually more violent but of shorter duration. Iran's central plateau has its "wind of 120 days," beginning in Jun and ending in Sep. At times, this wind creates duststorms and dust devils.

SWA 12.01.10 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Dust devils (cyclones from two feet to several thousand feet high) often develop in the deserts on fairly calm, sunny afternoons.
Typical Locations: Condition is found in flat, dry, desert areas in Iran's interior basin, the plains along the Persian Gulf, the northern and southern plains of Afghanistan, the Baluchistan Basin of western Pakistan, and the Indus Valley in eastern Pakistan.
Period(s): Year-round.
Background and Details: Dust devils normally move slowly across desert landscapes following the direction of the prevailing surface winds. Although they are usually of short duration and pose no real threat to an evader, evan a small one may be strong enough to throw about small, loose objects on the ground.

SWA 12.01.11 (~~FOUO~~)

Condition:
Mirage and shimmers (distortion of objects) are common obstacles to good visibility over flat, hot areas.
Typical Locations: Conditions are found in desert and semi-desert areas in Iran's Interior Basin, on the plains along the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan's northern and southern plains, the Baluchistan Basin in western Pakistan, and the Indus Valley in eastern Pakistan.
Period(s): Year-round.
Background and Details: These phenomena are common in the above outlined areas and outlines of discernible objects may be completely altered or rendered indistinct. Although this condition is most prevalent during the hotter months (Jun-Aug), it can occur on any sunny day throughout the year. One can reduce the effect of mirage and shimmer by climbing to a higher locale in the immediate vicinity.

SWA 13 (~~FOUO~~) Survival Factors: Food, Water, and Shelter

SUMMARY: Survival conditions in Southwest Asia are precarious at best. The availability of natural substances for food, water, and shelter rnage from occasionally good to predominantly non-existent, depending upon locale and time of year. Adequate sources of food and shelter-making materials exist generally only seasonally in the well-irrigated areas of major stream courses, and year-round only in the evergree-covered areas of the mountains. Water, when available is likely to be contaminated or brackish. Over 80 percent of the region is so arid and inhospitable to life that survival in these areas is tenuous indeed. Because the basic necessities for survival are so relatively sparse and widely separated, one must accept that anyplace, where the minimum conditions for sustained existence occur already will have been exploited and occupied by other peoples, either permanent, transient, or nomad.

SWA 13.01 (~~FOUO~~) Food

Condition:
Adequate sources of natural food thought to be available year-round.
Typical Locations: In the well-irrigated and concomittantly densely populated areas; along the narrow flood plains paralleling major water courses, e.g. the Indus River Plain in Pakistan, the southwestern lowlands of Iran, and along selected rivers in Afghanistan, especially the Helmand in the southwestern basin, the Kaul, and the Hari Rud.
Period(s): Year-round; especially those crops planted more than once a year. Most plentiful Apr-Oct.
Background and Details: Despite the general paucity of vegetation in Southwest Asia, certain areas can provide adequate quantitites of natural foods from plant sources. However, these are usually restricted to areas with water either from man-made irrigation resources or along the major watercourses of the larger streams and flood plains. The principal natural food sources is grain; in fact, this is the only dependable source. Of the common cereal grains, wheat is the most predominant and is the staple food of most of the population. Wheat is cultivated as both a summer and winter crop thoughout the region. Winter wheat is generally sown in the autumn and harvested in the spring; the other seasonal period runs from May-Sep. Wheat and other grains are most prevalent in the southwestern lowlands of Iran, the irrigated areas of Afghanistan, and the Indus plain of Pakistan; however, in each instance (particularly in Pakistan) the attendant high population density will entail undersireable risks for the evader. There are a few other possibilities for locally plentiful vegetative food sources but these are primarily available only in the spring and summer. Rice is prevalent in the narrow Afghan plains and the Indus Flood Plain. Additionally, citrus fruits, dates, and miscellaneous legumes grow in some scattered, irrigated areas, e.g. in Afghanistan along the main streams of the southwest basin (e.g. Qandahar), along Iran's Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf littorals, and in the Indus Flood Plain.

Condition:
Generally inadequate sources of natural food available year-round, with a need to place more reliance on animal sources.
Typical Locations: Afghan Highlands, Pakistan's Thar Desert region, Iranian Interior Plains and Highlands.
Period(s): Year-round; food availability is especially critical in the cold season from Nov-Mar in must of SWA.
Bacground and Details: Food sources are sporadic and there is little assurance that natural sources will be available year-round, owing to growing periods, seasonal temperatures and the intermittent and unpredictable nature of rainfall. In these areas, food sources-- particularly the seasonal types-- even if they are minimally available, are nearly always associated with small oases or settlements in populated areas. Such sources have attendant security risks. Moreover, because of long experience with banditry, local farmers (especially in Afghanistan) have developed routines for posting guards over domestic flocks and crops; a potential evader will run the risk of discovery in attempting to use such a potential source. In the Afghan Highlands there is a general shortage of water for up to 10 months of the year. Food sources are limited to livestock and a few crops in or near scattered settlements. The Thar Desert east of the Indus Flood Plain in Pakistan may bring forth some edible wild plant life; which is most plentiful after occasional rainfalls that are especially prevalent in Jul and Aug. In the Iranian Interior Plains and highlands small amounts of cultivated food may be available in the villages, particularly in the northwest. Nevertheless, owing to the scarcity of natural food sources and the unavailability of edible plants, usually it will be necessary to rely on small game or domesticated animals for food. These include goats, sheep, horses, rabbits, foxes, bears, birds, and snakes. In the Highlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan one finds leopards, jackals, musk cats, bears, wild sheep and wild goats. Desert game is marginally available, being restricted to gazelles, small game and some birds. Several fish types are oftn plentiful in both the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf where the indigenous population traditionally does not eat fish. In the most arid areas animal sources of food are restricted to domesticated animals available only around settled, hence guarded, areas.

Condition:
Minimal natural sources of food available year-round.
Typical Locations: In the desert and semi-desert areas which exist throughout SWA; generally anywhere the lack of irrigation severely limits crop growth of any kind and where the harsh climate is unsupportive of animal life.
Period(s): Year-round.
Background and Details: Much of the area under discussion is nearly devoid of any plant life and animal source of sustenance. In broad expanses of the region the availability of food and water is the exception rather than the rule. Areas lacking in fresh water generally have minimal vegetative growth of any kind and are therefore incapable of supporting most animal

life. Aghanistan's Southwester Desert Basin is such an area where the combination of intense summer heat and scarcity of water most of the year result in no dependable source of food except for irrigated areas along the Helmand River. In the extreme highlands of the Hindu Kush permanent glacial fields support little life. Water in the Persian Gulf's Makran Coastal Plain (Iran and Pakistan) is so brackish that virtually nothing can live for several hundred miles inland. Directly to the north of the Makran is the Baluchistan Basin which is a sparsely populated barren gravel plain know for intense heat, lack of water or food, and dust storms. Iran's Interior Plains and Highlands contain very little natural food, water, or shelter, and are subject to severe sandstorms for up to one-third of the year. In Pakistan's western and northern highlands food and water may be only locally available.

SWA 13.02 (~~FOOD~~) Water

Condition:
Adequate sources of water thought to be available year-round.
Typical Locations: Northern Afghanistan and selected portions of the Southwest Basin; Iran's Caspian coast and Elburz and Zagros Mountains; urban areas; Pakistan's Indus Plain.
Period(s): Year-round.
Background and Details: Although SWA is generally an arid region, in some locales water supplies may be marginally available. However, sources of water, even where plentiful, must be approached with caution. Nearly all water should be considered contaminated and should be treated prior to drinking. The sanitation conditions throughout the entire area are exceedingly primitive and raw sewage may adulterate nearly all water supplies. Abundant water quantities are available from streams and canals in northern Pakistan. Mountainous areas particularly in Afghanistan, containing lakes, rivers and streams close to snow melt, have fresh water. Water treatment facilities and central distribution systems exist only in the largest cities. While the Indus flood plain has large quantities of water, much of it is brackish up to 100 miles inland from the coast.

Condition:
Adequate sources of water thought to be available except during extreme dry periods.
Typical Locations: Afghan Highlands and mountains; Pakistan Highlands and Potwar Plain; portions of the Elburz and Zagros Mountains of Iran.
Period(s): Plentiful supplies exist Mar to early Jul in the Afghan Highlands. Throughout most of Iran only Jul and Aug have abundant moisture. Pakistan's wet season runs Jun-Sep.
Background and Details: Water supplies are deficient along dry or depleted lower courses of even some major streams during particular seasons of the year. Depending on the locale, this could vary from only a few months to nearly the entire year. For example, in southeast Afghanistan, the streams may be dry for as much as 10 months a year. The Afghan Southwestern Desert is deficient in dependable water supply and the various river systems likewise have varying periods of wet and dry spells. The Kabul system is dry from Mar-Sep, roughly coinciding with the wet period of the

Kunar in the northeast. The Afghan lowlands are generally dry except in the fall. In Pakistan, streams, rivers, and canals generally reach their maximum flow from Jul to Sep. The northern hills and Potwar Plain south of the Khyber Pass and Rawalpindi have only seasonally plentiful water supplies, as do various locations in the Indus flood plain farther than 10 miles from the main course of the river. Iran's watercourses attain moderate levels in Jul and Aug and are often insufficient the rest of the year. Seasonally plentiful areas in Iran include the eastern extensions of both the Zagros and Elburs Mountain chains and the area north of Lake Urmia to the Soviet border.

Condition:
Generally an arid region with extremely limited sources of water, which are always associated with settlements or water gatherers.
Typical Locations: Iran: Interior Plains and Highlands. Pakistan: Baluchistan Basin. Afghanistan: Northern Steppe, Makran coastal plain (of Iran and Pakistan).
Period(s): Year-round.
Background and Details: The prevailing characteristic of this area of the world is that it is a water-deficient region where there are few major streams, where most watercourses run only intermittently, where years may pass without any rainfall, and where there are large areas in which the only available water is brackish, saline, or otherwise unpotable. The Northern Steppe of Afghanistan is a water-deficient region; the few perennial streams are heavily depleted by diversion of water for irrigation. In Iran's Interior Plains and highlands very little water is available, although small amounts may be found in the tiny villages, particularly in the northwest. Pakistan's Baluchistan Basin is generally regarded as having inadequate sources of fresh water for any of several reasons: water sources may be widely dispersed (i.e. more than 10 miles apart), quantities may be minuscule or lacking entirely, or the available water may tend to be saline, brackish, or contaminated. Sometimes water in sufficient quantity to be meaningful exists for only short periods of time and these periods tend to be unpredictable and cannot be depended upon. For centuries, local residents have supplemented sparse surface water resources with an intricate system of water-retaining underground chambers and conduits. These structures are sometimes found along major caravan routes traversing the arid regions of Afghanistan and Iran. This system to channel water underground to retard evaporation is called a "Karez" in Afghanistan or a "Qanat" in Iran.

SWA 13.03 (~~POOR~~) Shelter

Condition:
Generally adequate sources of shelter or shelter-making materials year-round.
Typical Locations: Mountains and forested areas, especially the Zagros and Elburz Mountains of Iran, Northern Afghan Highlands, Northern Highlands of Pakistan and, marginally, in the verdant areas of the Indus River Flood Plain.
Period(s): Year-round.

Background and Details: Dependable shelter-making materials are largely restricted to vegetative substances which grow only sparsely throughout the region. The best year-round source is considered to be material found in the occasional evergreen/needleleaf forests of some mountainous areas. Less desireable, but still usable, are broadleaf deciduous forests, found elsewhere in highland regions, plus stands of trees, vegetation, and cultivation along major watercourses and oases. Such conditions exist in the northern mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the mountain rimland of Iran. The Indus delta has extensive crop cultivation and attendant undesireable high population density. Occasional grasslands, marshes, and swamps enumerated in Section 03 as a rule do not provide suitable materials for shelter contruction.

Condition:
Shelter and shelter-making material very scarce year-round.
Typical Locations: Most of Pakistan's Thar Desert and Baluchistan Basin, Afghanistan's Northern Steppe and Southwest Desert Basin, and Iran's Caspian Plain and southwestern lowlands.
Period(s): Year-round.
Background and Details: The above mentioned areas are some of the most barren in the world and provide no predictable source of shelter-making materials. Throughout much of the region where natural growth is insufficient to construct housing, the indigenous peoples obtain their shelter either from tents of animal materials or, in the very arid regions, from rude huts constructed from sun-baked bricks. Realistically, there is very little shelter-making material available. In Afghanistan, centuries of scrounging for fuel and forage have often denuded the foothills of even scattered scrub and brush. Trees in Afghanistan are uncommon except for the mountainous areas and the scattered willows and poplars around settlements. Areas generally considered unsuitable for shelter materials include Pakistan's Baluchistan Basin and Thar Desert, Afghanistan's Northern Steppe and Southwestern Desert Basin (except for the irrigated areas along the Helmand), and in Iran, the Interior Plains and Highlands, the Caspian Plain, and the southwestern lowlands. An ancient tradition exists in Afghanistan which in extreme necessity might provide some shelter. An old type of structure called a "caravansary" still may be found along the ancient major trade routes. These simple constructions traditionally consist of a large, empty building for sleeping quarters and surrounding an open court. "Caravansaries" were established in historical times and have still been maintained to provide rest stops for caravans and other travelers. Caution should be used in approaching them inasmuch as some of them have fallen into disrepair or have been taken over as confinement facilities and observation posts. At the very least, they would constitute a focal point for other travellers.

Condition:
Only shelter available is found by taking advantage of surface features.
Typical Locations: Rugged mountain highlands of Afghanistan, particularly in the Wakhan Corridor; Pakistan's Northwestern Hills; Iran's Interior Highlands.

Period(s): Year-round.
Background and Details: In the rugged mountain highlands natural materials for shelter construction are so scarce as to be considered non-existent. An evader will have to rely on the use of rocks to build some sort of structure or seek shelter in depressions, gullies, or the numerous caves which dot the region. Such conditions are often found in the northern hills of Afghanistan and Pakistan and have been used for centuries, even to the present day, to good advantage by partisans and hill tribes. Local peoples, especially nomads who owe little allegiance to external organizations, often rely on these hills for shelter and concealment as they wage guerilla actions against opposing forces, including the national government, foreign invaders, and rival tribes.

SWA 14 (~~POCO~~) Edible Plants

Photo references:
SUMMARY: Wheat, rice and barley are the only cultivated crops which are found throughout Southwest Asia. Other plants common to two or more countries include the following: date, apricot, pomegrantes, sugar cane, corn, pumpkins, squash and onions.

IRAN

The most prevalent crops found in Iran include wheat, barley, and rice. Crops that have expanded rapidly in recent years are apricots, dates, grapes, and citrus fruits.

Index of Edible Plants not Common to the United States

COMMON NAME	IMPORTANCE
Monkey-bread tree	Fruit (raw/cooked) & leaves (cooked)
Common cape-bush	Buds (cooked)
Chickpea	Seeds (raw or cooked)
Coriander fruits	Fruit used as condiment
Jew's mallow	Young leaves (cooked)
Sabestan plum	Fruit (raw or cooked)
Indian hazelnut	Nuts (raw or cooked)
Olive	Fruit (cooked)
Pomegranate	Fruit (raw or cooked)

AFGHANISTAN

Only three percent of the entire country is arable due to the mountainous terrain and arid climate. Food resources in Afghanistan are inadequate to supply a balanced and sufficient diet. The chief crops are wheat, rice, corn, barley, sugar beets and cane and a wide variety of vegetables including carrots, turnips, radishes, eggplant, spinach, lettuce, onions, and garlic. Legumes, such as beans, peas and lentils and forage crops, such as alfalfa and clover are widely grown in the irrigated ares. Fruits and nuts including oranges, lemons, apricots, plums, apples, peaches, grapes, pears, cherries, pomegranates, walnuts, almonds and pistachios are raised in orchards, vineyards and truck gardens. Dates are found in the extreme south and figs are found in oases in large quantitites. Melons, watermelons, pumpkins, squash and cucumbers are grown in profusion in irrigated areas under 2,000 feet in elevation.

Index of Edible Plants not Common to the United States

COMMON NAME	IMPORTANCE
Wild leek	Bulbs (cooked)
Common fennel	Leaves (cooked)
Pistachio tree	Nuts edible (roasted)
Sugar cane	Stems used for sugar contents

PAKISTAN

Pakistan has two major crop seasons: summer edible crops sown in May and Jun and harvested from Sep through Nov, include rice, milled, grain sorghum, and corn. Winter edible crops sown in Nov and Dec and harvested in Apr and May include wheat and gram (chickpeas). Vegetable crops include onions, potatoes, pumpkins, and squashes. Principal fruits are mangoes and bananas.

Index of Edible Plants not Common to the United States

COMMON NAME	IMPORTANCE
American bully	Fruit (raw or cooked)
Sugarapple	Fruit (raw or cooked)
White mangrove tree	Fruit (raw or cooked)
Common caperbush (Capertree)	Buds (cooked)
Elephantapple	Fruit (raw or cooked)
bakultree	Fruit (raw or cooked)
Date plum	Fruit (raw or cooked)
Sugarcane	Canes (stems) are source of sugar
Indian plum	Fruit (raw)

SWA 15 (~~FOUO~~) Dangerous Plants

Photo references:

SUMMARY: Although over 60 poisonous or vesicant (blister causing upon contact) plants are found in Southwest Asia, none are found throughout the area and only four are found in two countries. These species include aconite (AF & PK), milfoil (IR & PK), henbane (IR & PK) and spotted henbane (IR & PK).

IRAN

Three of the most common poisonous plants of medical importance found in Iran include the following: (1) the poison daisy (having flowers and leaves which are vesicant upon contact) found throughout the country; (2) sultan's seeds (having seeds which are vesicant upon contact) found in the provinces of Kerman and Baluchestan Va Sistan; and (3) sumac (the whole plant is irritant upon contact) found in the provinces of Azerbaijan-e Khavari, Gilan, Tehran and Mazandaran.

Index of Poisonous or Allergenic Plants

COMMON NAME	MEDICAL IMPORTANCE
Lucky bean	Seeds poisonous upon ingestion
Milfoil	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Fish poison	Berries poisonous upon ingestion
Poison daisy	Flowers and leaves contact vesicant
Birthwort	Root poisonous upon ingestion
Common wormwood	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Common beet	Leaves (beet tops) poisonous upon ingestion
Egyptian cassia seeds	Seeds poisonous upon ingestion
Starbur	Leaves poisonous upon ingestion
Kapochist	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Spotted hemlock	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Sultan's seeds	Seeds poisonous upon ingestion and contact vesicant
Thornapple	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Panther strangler	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion

Henbane	Seeds poisonous upon ingestion
Blue morning-glory	Seeds poisonous upon ingestion
Acrid lettuce	Leaves poisonous upon ingestion
Chickling vetch	Seeds poisonous upon ingestion
China tree	Fruit & leaves poisonous upon ingestion
Hairy onosma	Root poisonous upon ingestion
Sumach	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Castor oil plant	Seeds poisonous upon ingestion
Common groundsel	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Black nightshade	Fruit poisonous upon ingestion
Strychnine tree	Seeds poisonous upon ingestion
White hellebore	Rootstalk poisonous upon ingestion

AFGHANISTAN

Of the more than 15 varieties of dangerous flor found in Afghanistan, hemp, birdweed, english plantain, cowslip, stonecrop, and the castor oil plant are found countrywide.

Index of Poisonous or Allergenic Plants

COMMON NAME	MEDICAL IMPORTANCE
Aconite	Root poisonous upon ingestion
Wild celery	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Oat	Seed is poisonous
Hemp	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Spotted hemlock	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Bindweed	Latex poisonous upon ingestion
Bermuda grass	Pollen allergenic
Larkspur	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Horsetail	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion

Snakes-head Fritillary	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Wild barley	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Iris	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Opium poppy	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
English plantain	Pollen allergenic
Cowslip	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Castor oil plant	Seeds poisonous upon ingestion
Stonecrop	Latex contact vesicant
Ragwort	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion

PAKISTAN

The following poisonous plants are found countrywide: common nettle, common rue, juniper, and sodom apple. The stiff hairs on leaves and branches of common nettle are an irritant upon contact. The entire plant of common rue is a vesicant upon contact. Juniper leaves and the latex of the sodom applie will also cause blistering upon contact.

Index of Poisonous or Allergenci Plants

COMMON NAME	MEDICAL IMPORTANCE
Milfoil	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Aconite	Entire plant poisonous ingestion
Sacktree	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Roman wormwood	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Marijuana	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Lambsquarters	Seeds poisonous upon ingestion
Bitter apple	Fruit and leaves poisonous upon ingestion
Bermuda grass	Pollen allergenic
Devils apple	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Coralbean	Seeds and pods poisonous upon ingestion
Black henbane	Seeds, leaves & root poisonous upon ingestion

Persian lilac	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Leander	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Tobacco	Leaves poisonous upon ingestion
Yellow woodsorrel	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion
Opium poppy	Entire plant poisonous upon ingestion, particularly unripe capsule
Ghela	Unripe fruit & root poisonous upon ingestion
Black nightshade	Fruit poisonous upon ingestion

16-01

SWA 16 (~~ROUO~~) Game Animals

IRAN

Numerous species of wild animals suitable for food are found in Iran. In addition to predators and extremely dangerous types, there are wild goats, wild dogs, hyenas, foxes, porcupines, squirrels, and mongooses. There are two species of wild sheep and several varieties of deer. Wild boar are found in forested ares, but must be approached with caution; the wild ass is found in the eastern deserts. Wolves, foxes, and porcupines especially, but also other animals may be rabid and care should be exercised in approaching them; only healthy animals should be used as a source of meat. There are many wild birds in Iran, some indigenous and other migratory. Pelicans and flamingoes breed in large numbers along the Persian Gulf; game birds include partridge, grouse, snipe, and various types of ducks. Nearly 200 species of fish, of which 150 are edible, abound in the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf. They are plentiful inasmuch as the indigenous population traditionally does not consume fish.

AFGHANISTAN

Wild goats and sheep are found at high elevations in the ranges of the Hindu Kush Mountains. Deer, on the other hand, inhabit only the forests of Badakhshan in the northeast corner of the country. Gazelles, donkeys, wolves, foxes, wildcats, and jackals are found throughout the country as well as hares and other small rodents. Migratory birds, predominantly ducks, are common during the spring and fall and are hunted for food as are quail (which are abundant) and pheasant (which are rare).

PAKISTAN

The desert gazelle and other small animals and birds are found in the semi-desert and desert areas in southern Pakistan. As one moves northward into the foothills and away from the desert, the leopards, jackals, foxes, wildcats, hyenas, and musk cats are found. Larger wildlife are more numerous in the northern part of the country. Highland animals found in this are include the Siberian ibex, Marco Polo sheep, wild goat, brown bear, and Himalayan black bear. Also present are the blue sheep, bearded brown and white wild sheep, goat antelope, and snow leopard. The crocodile, hog deer, wild boar, and many varieties of poisonous and nonpoisonous snakes are found in the Indus Delta. Coastal waters, especially off Karachi, provide lobster, prawn, cod, mackeral, dolphin and shark.

SWA 17 (~~POCO~~) Dangerous Animals

IRAN

Dangerous or poisonous fauna of significance to the evader include scorpions and spiders. Numerous fishes having poisonous flesh or a venomous sting are found in the coastal waters of the Caspian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf, and the rivers of the Caspian Basin. These fish instinctively avoid confrontations and would present a hazard only if deliberately caught and handled. Their bizarre appearances are good indicators and serve notice they they should be left alone. Nine types of sea snakes having a neurotoxic venom are found in the coastal waters of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. These snakes, the bite of which is potentially fatal to man, are aquatic reptiles and normally will not attack when left alone. In addition to the sea snakes, eight types of poisonous snakes having a neurotoxic or hemotoxic venom are found in various regions of the country. As a general rule, terrestrial snakes confine their movements to nighttime, during overcast weather, and after a rain; they thend to hole up during the heat of the day and become extremely slow and lethargic as the temperature cools and approaches 50 degrees F. With 17 species of poisonous snakes inhabiting the countryside and coastal waters, all snakes should be left strictly alone unless they are being killed for food. Predatory animals which pose a danger include lions (although nearly extinct), tigers (limited to the Caspian forests of the north), and the more common panthers, and wildcats. Additionally, in various parts of Iran there are cheetahs, jackals, wolves, foxes, hyenas, brown bears, and wild boar.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan has a variety of dangerous predatory animals. Tigers live in the northern river basin along the Amu Darya River. Hyenas are found in the mountainous areas and high plains and wild dogs and some leopards inhabit scattered parts of the country. Wolves, found throughout the country, prowl in wither and sometimes attack adults. Bears have also been reported. Poisonous snakes with hemotoxic and neurotoxic venom are found throughout the country. The Asian sand viper, one of the more prevalent species, has neurotoxic venom and lives in desert areas of southeastern Afghanistan. Other poisonous snakes include the Asiatic cobra and krait, which are found in eastern and southern Afghanistan and vipers which exist in the western region. The Saw Scaled viper is prevalent throughout Afghanistan and is a major cause of snakebite fatalities. Venomous spiders and scorpions inhabit all of Afghanistan.

PAKISTAN

Poisonous centipedes and scorpions are found throughout Pakistan. The followingt poisonous invertebrates having a venomous sting live in the coastal waters and the Arabian Sea: aguas vivas, court cone, feather hydroid, leather urchin, marbled cone, matelelei, sea mouse, sea nettle, sea wasp, stinging coral, and stinging hydroid. Both the octopus and

SWA 18 (~~FOUO~~) Common Diseases

SUMMARY: Living conditions in Southwest Asia are primitive and unsanitary by Western standards. Environmental factors which contribute to the high incidence of communicable diseases include a shortage of potable water, a general lack of adequate sewage disposal facilities, and ignorance of personal hygiene and good sanitary habits. Amebic dysentery, hepatitis, salmonella, common dysentery, tuberculosis, influenza and malaria are all endemic to the area and carry a high risk of incidence for a potential evader.

IRAN

Ignorance of and inattention to standars of hygiene and sanitation cause significant health problems in Iran. Many diseases found in Iran are spread by mosquitoes, sandflies, lice and ticks. Standing water in irrigation projects, marshes, and water suppliessupport mosquito populations from Mar-Dec and are responsible for spreading malaria, dengue, West Nile encephalitis, and elephantiasis. The lack of sanitary conditions in towns and villages leads to the propagation of large populations of sandflies from Apr-Nov, resulting in a threat from sandfly fever and skin inflammations. Lice, which transmit typhus and relapsing fever, are prevalent in the population. Diseases transmitted by ticks include relapsing fever, Russin Spring-Summer encephalitis, tick typhus, and Crimean hemorrhagic fever. One must assume that all locally procured food is contaminated and will pose a threat of intestional disorders. Diseases of high incidence which are transmitted by contaminated food and water include amebic dysentery, food poisoning, hepatitis, salmonellosis and shigellosis. Influenza and tuberculosis are highly communicable diseases present in varying degrees. Leptospirosis contacted from contaminated water or infected animals also poses a high health threat.

AFGHANISTAN

Like most countries in the area, Afghanistan's sanitary conditions are regarded as exceedingly primitive by Wester standars and engender serious health hazards for an evader. Communicable diseases are a major problem throughout the country, particularly in the rural areas. The most widespread diseases include: amebic dysentery, chickenpox, diptheria, helminthiases, infectious hepatitis, influenza, malaria, measles, paratyphoid fever, poliomyeletis, shigellosis, typhoid fever, trachoma, and tuberculosis. Malaria and dysentery would probably pose the greatest difficulty to a downed U.S. aircrewman. Malaria appears to be reaching epidemic proportions in certain areas of the country, especially in the most irrigated, fertile, and hence more densely populated regions such as Jalalabad plains in the northeast and the Helmand valley of the southwest. Irrigation ditches, open wells, and shallow rivers in these areas provide an excellent breeding habitat for mosquitoes. Moreover, inasmuch as ditches serve as receptacles for sewage and refuse, they also are a breeding and distribution medium for many other diseases. Because of the generally primitive sanitary practices throughout Afghanistan, the population is afflicted by

various gastrointestinal difficulties including diarrhea and parasites, especially echinococcosis (tapeworm). Widespread animal diseases which can be communicated to humans include antrhax, brucellosis, rabies, and tuberculosis. The dust, heat, and dryness of the huge desert areas contribute their own particular problems of trachoma (a contagious form of conjunctivitis) and bacterial conjunctivitis. Although an evader generally avoids association with other people, he should be aware of some prevalent diseases which are spread by human contact. Veneral diseases exist, including syphillis in the large towns near the borders and gonoccocal conjunctivitis in the rural areas. Leprosy is endemic in the Hazarajat-- a maze or ridges, plaeteaux and valleys southwest of Kabul.

PAKISTAN

The evader in Pakistan is likely to encounter less-than-favorable standards of health, hygiene, sanitation, and concomitant high rate of communicable disease. This high incidence of disease results from environmental conditions as well as primitive sanitary procedures. Throughout much of the country there is an acute shortage of fresh water; much of the are is extremely aird. Where quantities of water do exist, they are nearly always contaminated, either from natural or manmade conditions. In many areas the only available water is brackish to the point of being unusable. Therefore, any source of abundant water-- streams, rivers, canals, wells, or ditches-- tends to be used for all purposes; drinking, washing, and sewage disposal. As a result, numnerous epidemic and endemic diseases afflict the population. The principal communicable diseases are respiratory (such as pulmonary tuberculosis), intestinal (such as dysentery), conjunctive (such as trachoma), and parasitic (such as helminthiases). The principal communicable waterborne diseases includ typhoid and paratyphoid fevers. Because the country has nearly universal soil and water pollution, much of the population suffers from all types of diarrheal diseases. The list of widespread sicknesses also includes various plagues, "oriental sores" (leishmaniasis), typhus fever, relapsing fever, scrub typhus, and intestinal parasites. The potential evader should be aware that rabies and veneral diseases are also widespread. There has been limited achievement in combatting some well-known virulent diseases, e.g. malaria, smallpox, and cholera. The incidence of these problems varies greatly and depends upon local success at eradication through immunization, vaccination and other forms of control.

SWA 20 (~~FOUO~~) General Survival Information

SWA 20.01 (~~FOUO~~) Water

SWA 20.01.01 (~~FOUO~~) Need for Water

The body needs at least two quarts of water per day or dehydration will occur. Without sufficient water, physical and mental capabilities are degraded. A loss of as little as two quarts of body water (2.5 percent of body weight) decreases efficiency 25 percent. Loss of 15 percent of body weight by dehydration is usually fatal. Body water is used to remove toxic wastes. Any increase in the concentration of waste in water consumed will also increase the need to remove these materials. This results in a decrease in body water and thus, increases the need for water. It is for this reason that the need for water supersedes the need for food. SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS OF DEHYDRATION IN MAN: With deficits of body water of: 1-5 percent of body weight; Symptoms are thirst, vague discomfort, loss of efficiency of movement, anorexia (no appetite), flushed skin, increased pulse rate, and nausea. 6-10 percent of body weight; dizziness, headache, dyspnea (labored breathing), tingling in limbs, absence of salivation, cyanosis (Body blue), indistinct speech and inability to walk. 11-20 percent of body weight; delirium, impaired movement, swollen tongue, inability to swallow, deafness, dim vision, shriveled skin, painful urination, numb skin, anuria (defective urination or none).

SWA 20.01.02 (~~FOUO~~) Conserving Body Water

An evader can delay the onset of dehydration by conserving body water. In a hot environment, conserve sweat. Remain in the shade during the warmest part of the day. Keep body covered (keep clothing on) to retard evaporation of sweat. Activities should be undertaken during the late afternoon and early morning or evening when it is cooler. If an evader must undertake an activity during the heat of the day, he or she should work or move slowly and keep on all clothing. If sufficient drinking water is not available (at least 2 quarts per day), do not eat. Do not ration water, ration sweat. Drink water as it is needed. If one does not drink enough to overcome water debt, it is doubtful that the water drunk will do any good, and it will only have been wasted. In cold climates, remove the outer clothing when engaged in strenuous activities. This will prevent excessive sweating.

SWA 20.01.03 (~~FOUO~~) Water Sources

Water from standing bodies of water (rivers, streams, and lakes) should be purified before drinking. If the water contains considerable debris, filter it also. Use an undershirt, section of parachute cloth, or other suitable, clean material. Dry stream beds often have water just below the surface. The water accumulates and sinks at the lowest point on the concave side of a bend in the channel. Try digging in these outside bends. Water with an extremely pungent odor or that which, when sampled, produces gagging should be avoided. In coastal areas, construct a solar still over a seepage hole to desalinate salt or brackish

20-C1-

water. Springs are often considered as safe sources of water to drink without treating. They usually are safe, but it is difficult to determine the true source. It is best to purify all water. The idea that flowing water is pure, is folklore. This is not so, and no amount of flowing over rocks and sand will purify it. Along coasts where rivers and streams enter the sea, the water will be brackish for a considerable distance inland. Brackish water can be consumed in small amounts. It will probably be freshest when the sea is at low tide.

SWA 20.01.04 (~~FOUO~~) Rain Water Collection

Rain water, directly collected, is probably the only source of water that needs no purification. Collect it by spreading a canvas or other material that will hold or absorb the water. After a rain, collect water that is caught in foliage. A canvas can be spread in such a way that it will collect the water as it drips. The moisture can also be sponged from leaves with a clean piece of material and then transferred to a container by wringing the cloth. When no more liquid can be wrung from the cloth, try to suck as much as you can from the damp cloth. Water is often collected in the hollows of trees, and within overlapping leaves of air plants located on the branches of trees. Check any plant that appears to have a configuration that might trap water. Hollows in rocks, low areas in the terrain, and other natural basins also collect water.

SWA 20.01.05 (~~FOUO~~) Ice and Snow Melting

Ice and snow can be melted to produce water. For the time, effort, and fuel involved, ice is a better source of water than snow. Melt ice rather than snow whenever possible. If you lack fuel or have a limited supply, melt snow in bare hands. If the sun is shining, melt snow on a dark tarpaulin, signal panel, flat rock, aircraft wing, or any other surface so that water will drain into a container. Open water can often be located at lake outlets or in places where tributaries flow into a pond or stream. Ice will be thinnest over rapids or small falls and at the edge of deep streams with banks that hold drifting snow. A smoke-like fog often indicates open water.

SWA 20.01.06 (~~FOUO~~) Collecting Condensation Water

Water can be collected from the air and cool objects by means of condensation. Dew that forms on metal objects, rocks, and vegetation can be collected by brushing it into a container or sponging it with a clean cloth and then wringing it out. Cold stones collected from beneath the soil, if placed on a waterproof tarp, may cause enough dew to collect for a small but refreshing drink.

SWA 20.01.07 (~~FOUO~~) Use of Sea Water

Unless an evader has a desalting kit or solar still, do not drink any sea water. Dampen clothing with sea water to promote cooling by evaporation and thus conserve water by conserving sweat. There are dangers

involved in sea water baths, the risk of accidental ingestion of sea water and increased temptation to drink sea water. Do not add sea water to fresh water in the belief that it will increase the supply. The ingestion of salts will only increase the need for water.

SWA 20.01.08 (~~FOOD~~) Plant Sources

Internal water from plants requires no further treatment. A safe procedure to follow when trying unfamiliar plant sources is to avoid those that exude only a milky or colored liquid and those that produce a liquid that tastes bitter or soapy.

SWA 20.01.09 (~~FOOD~~) Animal Sources

Fish juices have been suggested as a possible source of potable liquid, both alone and mixed with sea water. The use of such animal fluids in either way is of doubtful value in preventing dehydration. Fish juice alone contains proteins, which, when metabolized in the body, produce waste products. These waste products must be excreted in the urine. The production of urine requires the use of water which will only increase dehydration. Any water gained from the fish juice itself will therefore be of no value. As for mixing fish juices with sea water, no sea water should ever be intentionally consumed. The drinking of animal blood should be avoided for the same reason as given for fish juices. NEVER DRINK URINE. The waste materials contained in urine will only add to, and increase, the concentration of waste materials in the body. It will require more water to eliminate the waste than is gained by drinking the urine. The loss of body water will greatly outweigh any water gained from the urine.

SWA 20.02 (~~FOOD~~) Food Sources

SWA 20.02.01 (~~FOOD~~) Plants

Never eat large quantities of a strange plant food without first testing it. When cooking facilities are available: Get rid of any disagreeable taste by boiling the plant in water for 5 to 15 minutes, or take a teaspoonful of the plant food, prepared in the way it will be used, hold it in your mouth for 5 minutes. If, by this time, no burning sensation occurs, swallow it. Wait 8 hours. If no ill effects such as nausea, cramps, or diarrhea result, eat a handful and wait 8 hours. If no ill effects show up at the end of this time, the plant food may be considered edible. Remember that olives are bitter and grapefruit is sour, and that you are trying a new food, so that an unpleasant taste does not always mean the plant is poisonous or even unpalatable. When cooking facilities are not available: Take a teaspoonful of the plant food, prepared in the way it will be used, hold it in your mouth for 5 minutes. In general, it is considered safe to try foods that you observe being eaten by birds and mammals. Food eaten by rodents (mice, rats, rabbits, beavers, squirrels, muskrats), or by monkeys, baboons, bears, racoons, and various other omnivorous animals (meat and plant eaters) is usually

safe for eating. Cook all plant foods when in doubt about the edibility. Small quantities of a poisonous plant are not necessarily dangerous. A noteworthy exception is the death angel mushroom (Amanita phalloides), which may prove fatal after eating a few spoonfuls. Avoid mushrooms and other fungi. Cooking will not dissipate the poisonous properties of mushrooms. Avoid eating untested plants that have a milky juice. Also avoid letting the juice contact your skin. Exceptions to this include wild figs, breadfruit, and ripe papayas, all of which contain milky juice but which are quite harmless and nonpoisonous, cooked or uncooked. To avoid ergot poisoning from eating infected heads of cereal grains or other food grasses, discard all grain heads having black spurs in place of normal seed grains.

SWA 20.02.02 (~~POOO~~) Animals/Game

Most edible domestic and wild animals are basically the same in the United States as they are in various parts of the world. Most freshwater fish muscle is also good to eat provided the meat is cooked to destroy possible parasites. Many sea fish muscles are edible raw. One of the areas of plentiful food is along the seacoast yet it is also dangerous if the evader does not know the following general rules (these rules apply to most animals but especially to fish and mollusks): 1. If any doubt exists as to the edibility of fresh seafood, take at least one of the following precautions: a. Apply the edibility test before eating; (1) taste a small portion of the food, and if this stings the mouth or tastes bad, do not eat it. (2) If it is acceptable, swallow a small portion and wait one hour to check results. (3) If there is no reaction, the flesh is relatively safe, since those chemically induced toxins (except those caused by spoilage) would produce symptoms within a short period of time. A small serving may then be eaten. When spoilage is suspected, this procedure should not be used. (4) If no symptoms occur within 12 hours, the flesh can be considered edible. If the fish is suspected of being poisonous, this test must be applied to each fish. All fish of the same species should not be assumed to be edible. b. Feed a portion to an animal (e.g., a rat, pig, dog, or cat) which can be observed for some time. Incidentally, cats are less sensitive to toxic fish than are rats, pigs, or dogs. 2. Do not eat the skin, head, or internal organs, especially the gonads and liver, of any fish not known to be entirely edible. If these organs are needed for sustenance, use the edibility test prior to consumption. 3. Do not eat fish that look like: a. Puffer fish, which become balloonlike when disturbed. b. Porcupine fish, which are covered with spines and also expand when disturbed. c. Sunfish (molas), which appear to be a large head with no body or tail. d. Scaleless fish, when in doubt that it may be one of the above. 4. Cooking should not be relied on to detoxify seafood. Marine animals may be eaten raw if desired, but all fresh water organisms must be cooked before being eaten. Marine animals do not serve as vectors of human parasites but many fresh water species do. Marine species caught from fresh water habitats must also be cooked before eating. 5. In temperate or semitropic oceans, shellfish should not be eaten during the warm or summer months. A "red tide bloom" should be suspected if an unusually high number of beach animals, such

as bivalves, starfish, or crabs, are dead or dying. If shellfish are the only available food and there is doubt about their being safe to eat, apply the edibility test to cooked, gutted specimens. Each time a mollusk is gathered from a new area, repeat the test. 6. If fish or mollusks are taken from waters suspected of containing human pollutants, eliminate the viscera and cook throughly before testing for edibility. Mollusks may be partially purified by placing them in clean, running water for several days; however, they should still be cooked and tested for edibility before being considered safe (especially when industrial wastes may be involved). 7. When spoilage is suspected, do not eat any aquatic food with a peculiar smell (i.e., as opposed to the way it smelled when fresh) or with a suspicious color or texture (e.g., slimy). If, upon pressing the thumb against the flesh, the fish remains deeply indented, it is probably stale. If a fish (especially one with dark meat) has a sharp peppery taste, discard it. Cooking will deactivate some bacterial toxins but should not be relied on to make stale meat safe. 8. First aid for fish or shellfish poisoning is generally symptomatic. Since many of the symptoms produced by different toxins are similar, both diagnosis and treatment are difficult. Empty the stomach immediately. Small amounts of powdered charcoal or chalk taken internally may help absorb the toxin if medical facilities are not available. After the stomach has been completely emptied, the victim should be given sufficient liquids and rest.

SWA 20.03 (~~FOUO~~) Snakebite - Dangers and Avoidance

General knowledge about poisonous snakes can be very important during an evasion situation. It is often more difficult to determine whether a snake is poisonous in many other areas of the world than in the United States largely because of the increased ratio of poisonous to nonpoisonous sankes and the lack of the distinctive recognition features which we apply to our few deadly snakes at home. In other parts of the world, it is not always easy to identify a poisonous snake because the only characteristic which differentiates venomous snakes from harmless ones is the presence of poison fangs and glands. You can determine the presence of these parts withoug dangers only in dead specimens, and even then the fangs may be hard to find. The notion that all poisonous snakes have lance-shaped or triangular heads or some other distinguishing feature is not only erroneous, but also dangerous.

Snakes dangerous to man fall into two categories-- those with fixed front fangs and those with folded front fangs. Fixed-fanged snakes usually have neurotoxic venom (affecting the nervous system) while folded-fanged snakes usually have hemotoxic venom (affecting circulatory system).

Symptoms of neurotoxic venom are irregular heartbeat, decrease in blood pressure, weakness, severe headache, dizziness, blurred vision or blindness, hearing difficulty, mental confusion, lack of muscle coordination, muscle spasms, twitching, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. Usually there is no pain at the site of the bite and some or all symptoms do not necessarily develop at the same time. With neurotoxic venoms, symptoms usually involve a tingling sensation in the extremities, a gradual loss of muscular coordination, and an increasing difficulty of speech.

Symptoms of hemotoxic venom are painful tissue swelling at the site of the bite (developing within three minutes to one hour). Other symptoms include throbbing pain; headache, thirst, capillary destruction, bleeding under the skin, gums, or nailbeds, digestive tract hemorrhage, convulsions due to brain hemorrhages, and blood in urine and stool.

Poisoning from snakebite is a medical emergency which requires immediate attention since most of the venom will be moved rapidly through the body within the first thirty minutes after being bitten. If you identify a snakebite as that of a poisonous variety and medical aid is not available, proceed with personal first-aid measures. Keep body activity to a minimum and avoid food or alcohol. Apply a tourniquet continuously to the limb two or three inches above the bite, but do not tighten the tourniquet so that it cuts off arterial circulation. Apply suction to the bite area immediately and continue for at least one hour. The best method is by using the mouth with a chewing and sucking motion. Snake venom, if swallowed, will cause no harm unless there are cuts or open sores in the mouth or throat. Do not cut the skin unless professional medical aid is immediately available. The most widely used supportive measure, especially in severe cases, is to administer a polyvalent antivenin prepared from the serum of immunized horses.

Simple precautionary measure can minimize the possibility of snake bite. Avoid den areas such as holes in the ground, crevices in rocks, caves or under rocks, old logs, and piles of debris. The striking distance of snakes has often been exaggerated and few are able to strike out more than one-third to one-half of their body length. Snakes are often well-camouflaged and the biggest danger is being bitten after having accidentally stepping on one. Snakes (heads removed) may be used as a food source.

General recommendation: unless you are absolutely sure of what you are dealing with-- stay away from snakes.

SWA 20.04 (~~FOUO~~) Personal Survival Equipment for Aircrews

All survival experiences include problems that must be solved. While the severity of the problems can increase or decrease based on such factors as physical condition, terrain, climate, availability of water and food, enemy presence and the distance to safety or help, problems will always exist. Solving them requires a combination of knowledge, skill, determination and equipment. The equipment contained in your principal survival kit should be the best available. However, it is recommended that potential evaders pack and carry a small personal survival kit to be primarily used if the issue kit must be discarded while attempting to evade. A personal kit should be in a crush proof container small enough to fit in a flying suit leg pocket without impeding movement or necessary actions within the aircraft. It is a good idea to reinforce the stitching of the carrying pocket. Such a kit will necessarily be too small to hold items for all survival/evasion contingencies. It can however, contain basic items which could mean the difference between success and failure.

SWA 20.04.01 (~~FOUO~~) Self Medical Aid (If Required)

Very little can be put into a container measuring approximately 1 inch by 3 inches by 5 inches that will cope with the more serious injuries that can result from shootdown and ejection. The kit can however, contain basic items useful in treating or alleviating possible later injuries and ailments. At a minimum, it should contain water purification tablets, anti-diarrhea pills, several "band aid" type bandages of assorted shapes and sizes and approximately forty antibiotic pills or capsules. (Check with medical personnel as to the recommended type and the necessary prescription). An "ace" type elastic bandage is a worthwhile addition if space is available.

SWA 20.04.02 (~~FOUO~~) Protection from the Elements

This ranges from little or no problem during a temperate zone summer to an extreme one in an arctic or sub-arctic winter. The basic solution entails adequate clothing, sleeping gear, shelter, and the ability to create adequate heat. Size of a pocket survival kit will limit heating aids to waterproof matches, a small commercial type flint and steel device and compressed cotton for use as a fire starting material.

SWA 20.04.03 (~~FOUO~~) Procurement and Preparation of Water and Food

Solving this problem, particularly the acquisition of water, is an absolute must if the evasion/survival experience is of an extended duration. It is safest to purify all drinking water unless it is procured from a tap from a known safe source. If boiling is the method selected, it should be continued for one minute plus one minute for each one thousand feet of altitude. Several heavy plastic bags about 8 inches by 12 inches in size can be carried in the kit. They are useful in the chemical purification of water as well as for waterproof storage. Twenty feet of snare wire, an assortment of fish hooks, sinkers, and several "MEPPS" type spinners, and approximately 50 feet of 10 to 12 pound test monofilament line will fit easily into the container and will prove useful in the procurement of wild food. A piece of heavy-duty aluminum foil approximately 20 inches by 10 feet in size can be folded so as to fit into the kit. Sections of it should be doubled or tripled in thickness and used for purifying water by boiling as well as for cooking food stuffs. If handled carefully, never allowed to boil dry over heat and only used over heat from coals, the foil will last for months. In many areas of the world human excrement is used for fertilizer in cultivating vegetables. In such areas, or when in doubt, all such vegetables must be boiled or otherwise cooked before eating. A cutting tool of some sort is a necessity in a survival/evasion situation and it is recommended that your pocket kit contain a small, high quality two bladed pocket knife and a small sharpening stone. The inclusion of a packet of approximately 6 "exacto" type blades is also recommended.

SWA 20.04.04 (~~FOUO~~) Travel

The kit should include a small high quality compass with at least the north indicator visible at night. Approximately 10 feet of strong cord (small diameter) included in the kit will furnish material for making safety lanyards for possible attachment to the compass, knife and mirror (below).

SWA 20.04.05 (~~FOUO~~) Communication

The matches and other fire starting materials in the kit will assist in attracting attention but smoke and fire are usually visible to both friend and foe. A mirror is a secure signalling device and one should be included in the kit. It should be double or triple the thickness of ordinary window glass and as big as possible.

SWA 20.04.06 (~~FOUO~~) Miscellaneous

Several needles of various sizes, some strong thread and several safety pins will aid in repairing clothing and equipment. If an individual wishes to carry a slightly larger personal survival kit, additional medicinal items may be considered after consulting a medical corps physician.

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SWA 23 (S/NOFORN) Captivity Factors

NOTE: The information contained in this Section covers the topics normally covered in Sections 23-27 of SERE Guides. In this Guide, they are grouped together to facilitate their use. This will not alter the basic SERE Guide format.

OVERVIEW

IRAN

U.S. Aircrews in Iran are likely to encounter government security forces as well as hostility from the local populace. Iran's post-revolutionary leaders have adopted a strong anti-U.S. bias which as become widespread because of its extensive treatment in the public media. Even among groups which might retain pro-U.S. attitudes or among factions which oppose Tehran's present leadership, there is a chance that suspicion and paranoia towards foreigners would incite fears and threats, and prisoner treatment might be harsh. Captured aircrews should make every effort to convince their captors of their U.S. military status and avoid provocative behavior.

As a consequence of the Shah's western orientation, most of Iran's populace is rather well informed on what constitutes the norm of humane treatment. Extreme measures leading to death, permanent injury or disability would probably be avoided. In the event that the United States were involved in direct military action, instead of merely economic sanctions or a rescue attempt of other prisoners, the religious leaders in Iran would certainly be more vociferous in denouncing the United States. Under such conditions, or in the event of circumstances resulting in the death or injury of Iranians, treatment of U.S. prisoners would become much more severe.

In cases where U.S. servicemen are captured in remote areas and transferred to government control, it could be expected that the transfer might take several days, thereby allowing the opportunity for a measure of natural friendship between captors and captives to develop. Under such circumstances, and especially if the captors held anti-government views, there is a chance that the servicemen would be accorded better treatment. The possibility of such an accurrence would be heavily dependent on geography, time, the political affiliation of the captors and the absence of revolutionary guard personnel who have been widely assigned to the parmilitary, police and armed forces to insure their control by the present government. Information regarding the presence of downed American servicemen could be expected to be relayed quickly to the revolutionary forces and it is doubtful that circumstances would permit captors sympathetic to the prisoners' plight the opportunity of actually according the servicemen a safe haven.

Immediate medical care available to injured American servicemen could be expected to be very limited. It is anticipated that injured personnel would be most likely airlifted from their point of capture and taken as soon as possible to one of the major hospitals in the Tehran area. Iranian governmental officials could be expected to provide the servicman with the best medical aid possible in order to keep them alive for subsequent propaganda and exploitation purposes.

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Any negotiations for the release of captured servicemen could be expected to be of extended duration. Decisions relating to prisoner treatment would be slow in coming due to the requirement that such matters be worked through a laborious process of representative committees, each of which can be expected to try to use the prisoner issue as a means for the retention or expansion of their own power base. Significant decisions relating to prisoner treatment can be expected to lie with the Ayatollah Khomeini or in the event of his demise, a committee of Ayatollahs of lesser stature.

The demise of Ayatollah Khomeini will not necessarily cause the downfall of the revolutionary government in Iran nor could it be expected to result in the release of any captured U.S. service personnel. The momentum of the revolution, the strategic placement of Ayatollah Khomeini's associates, the new constitution and the dominance of religious figures in the new parliament and cabinet would provide a basis for a successor regime which would have to be dealt with to effect a prisoner release.

The death of Khomeini would most likely result in the creation of an informal coalition of the most senior religious and governmental figures, which would be held together at first by their desire to protect their power and the ideals of the revolution. The Council of Guardians, the President, a few senior members of the clergy and one or two top military figures would be able to at least temporarily keep the government operating. However, such a condition could not be expected to last very long since it would contain too many ambitious men and too many political and religious schisms. One group would eventually acquire control. It is doubtful that it would be possible during this interim period to effect a prisoner release, since each group would be reluctant to identify itself with a moderate stance on the prisoner release issue.

AFGHANISTAN

The treatment of U.S. service personnel in Afghanistan will be dependent on several factors including (but not limited to) whether the U.S. is at war with Afghanistan or another islamic country as well as the attitude of the particular group which captured the servicemen. During a wartime situation, in which the the U.S. was engaged in a war against a unified Afghanistan and not a Soviet-controlled "puppet state", it is believed that U.S. service personnel would be treated with extreme harshness by the Afghanistan people and conceivably could be summarily executed after being brutally tortured. Should a U.S. pilot fall into Soviet or Afghan Goivernment hands, at the present time, it is probable that the aircrew member would be treated as a prisoner of war and interned or, in the event of an inadvertent flight error, accused of being a spy and temporarily detained for propaganda purposes. It can be anticipated that American servicemen would be thoroughly exploited by the Afghanistan government with Soviet assistance. Wounded service personnel would probably be offered limited medical aid at the point of capture and then transferred back to Kabul for treatment.

Insurgent forces, on the other hand, might possibly offer assistance to U.S. service personnel and help them exfiltrate from Afghanistan, provided the insurgents initially took the time to identify the downed

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET

25-03

survivors as Americans. U.S. servicemen should make every effort to convince their captors of their U.S. miltiary status and avoid provocative behavior. Some insurgent groups might automatically assume that the downed servicemen were Soviet personnel and summarily execute them as they have reportedly done with Soviet military personnel in the past. Other insurgent groups such as the Jamiat Islami and the Hekmatyar forces have been more interested in the extraction of information for intelligence purposes and would be more inclined to keep prisoners alive. Members of some insurgent groups are reported to have taken great pains to extensively torture their captives, and this factor might allow U.S. personnel additional time to either be recognized as non-Soviet personnel or to properly identify themselves as Americans. As the insurgent forces have increased contact with Soviet personnel they can also be expected to become better qualified at distinguishing Soviet forces from the military forces of other countries and therefore be inclined to show greater restraint in disposing of their captives.

The medical facilities of the insurgent forces are generally non-existent or extremely limted and insurgent forces could be expected to attempt to transport injured U.S. service personnel as quickly as possible across the Pakistan border for tgreatment. The medical facilities available to government forces in remote areas are also limited. It can be expected that injured American servicemen, assuming that there were only a small number invovled, would probably be removed by Afghan or Soviet officials to one of two hospitals located in the Kabul area. The Academy Military Medical Science Hospital, located near the American Embassy, is being used for the treatment of high-ranking Afghanistan officials and Soviet officers. The military 1st Hospital, located near the Indian Embassy, is being used for the treatment of Soviet enlisted personnel. Both hospitals are reported to have excellent medical staffs and equipment as well as facilities that would afford the security needed for the temporary safeguarding of prisoners whom the Soviets valued as future subjects for propaganda exploitation.

PAKISTAN

The reception that U.S. personnel could expect in Pakistan would be directly related to the Pakistani perception of U.S. military action. If the U.S. action was viewed as being contrary to Pakistan's national interests, (i.e. military action against a brother muslim country) then the chance of a hostile reception would be greatly enhanced. If, however, the U.S. military action was perceived as being in support of Pakistan, that is, countering a Soviet military offensive against Pakistan, or resulting from an inadvertent overflight, U.S. personnel would expect to receive a friendly reception accompanied by adequate medical attention.

One factor which might prove to be very important would be the speed with which the American service personnel could be extricated from Pakistan. The present government is very susceptible to world publicity and pressures generated by other Islamic countries. The longer American service personnel remained within Pakistan the greater would be the possibility that the servicemen would be permanently interned or brought to trial for alleged crimes against the Islamic community.

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

SWA 23.01 (S/NOFORN) Captivity Factors: Interrogation/Exploitation

SUMMARY:

IRAN

The country of Iran is presently in a state of turmoil. The effectiveness of both its intelligence and security forces has been greatly diminished since the Ayatollah Khomeini took control of the government. Iran's armed forces, paramilitary personnel, and law enforcement agencies have been demoralized. Iran's intelligence services have been effectively disembowelled by the executions of the trained intelligence personnel who were formerly employed by SAVAK, the Shah's intelligence service. The new intelligence service, SAVAMA, is still in its formative stages and at present lacks the leadership and authority to carry out its assigned responsibilities.

AFGHANISTAN

The country of Afghanistan is now involved in civil war. The central government is completely dominated by the Soviet Union. Islamic insurgent forces are operating primarily within the remote mountainous regions of Afghanistan but have also penetrated into its major urban centers.

The effectiveness of Afghanistn's intelligence and security forces has in the past been extremely poor. Under Soviet guidance and direction the intelligence and security services can be expected to improve substantially. Additionally, East German personnel are also reportedly involved in the training of Afghanistan personnel.

Afghanistan's intelligence and security forces ~~are~~ can be expected to be generally poorly-trained and poorly-motivated. They have limited capabilities in mounting sustained searches for evaders and utilizing modern interrogation/exploitation techniques. However, an evader may be faced with Soviet expertise and techniques.

PAKISTAN

The country of Pakistan is presently under martial law. The martial law regulations grant Pakistan's intelligence and security forces broad discretionary rights with regard to limiting individual rights and privileges. During the most recent period of martial law, there has been a sharp increase in activity on the part of all agencies involved in intelligence and security activities. This increased activity is the result of Afghanistan's becoming a Soviet-dominated state and the concern of Pakistan's leaders that their country might be drawn into Afghanistan's civil war.

Pakistan's intelligence and security forces are generally well trained and highly motivated. They are capable of mounting sustained searches for evaders and utilizing modern interrogation/exploitation techniques.

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SWA 23.01.01 (S/NOFORN) Organizations Responsible

Iran's National Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAMA)

Iran's intelligence organization prior to the revolution was referred to as SAVAK and was formed under the guidance [redacted] officers. SAVAK had both internal and external functions. Its external mission was to gather intelligence in foreign countries, conduct covert activities, and monitor activities of Iranian dissidents abroad. Its internal security function was to uncover foreign agents and anti-regime elements and counter their activities.

After the fall of the Shah's government, the provisional government created a new internal security organization, the Research Committee. The name of the Research Committee was subsequently altered when Ayatollah Khomeini assumed control of the government. The Iranian National Security and Intelligence Organization is now referred to as SAVAMA (SAZMAN ETLDA-AT VA AMNIYAT MELLI IRAN). SAVAMA is a tightly-knit organization that has gained the respect of Khomeini by identifying and killing former members and operatives of the Shah's security forces. SAVAMA's primary mission is to counter foreign clandestine activities in Iran. [redacted]

[redacted]

SAVAMA at present is still in the formative stages. There is a general lack of leadership and direction within the security services. Additionally, some of the functions of SAVAMA have been assumed by the revolutionary council and neighborhood paramilitary forces supportive of the revolutionary guard. [redacted] There is also concern that political ramifications would result from reviving an agency similar to that which had been denounced as a tool of the Shah's tyranny.

Afghanistan's Intelligence and Security Services

Until recently, four organizations were primarily concerned with intelligence collection and interpretation in Afghanistan. One of these was the Department of National Protection, which reported directly to the Prime Minister and had primary responsibility for counterintelligence, counter-subversion and counterinsurgency activities. Another was the Directorate of Intelligence in the Department of Police and Gendarmerie within the Ministry of Interior. The other two organizations were the Reconnaissance and the Intelligence departments in the Ministry of National Defense, which were responsible for the collection of military intelligence. In

the past Afghanistan's internal intelligence network was marked by ineffective operational methods, a heavy reliance on paid informants, insufficient regard for operational security and accuracy of information, and inadequate communication systems. Coordination among the intelligence and security forces in the past was also reported to be very poor. There was virtually no central direction and each agency interpreted its own responsibilities as it saw fit. This resulted in considerable overlapping of functions and duplication of effort.

The Afghanistan Intelligence and Security Organization developed under Soviet direction is entitled KAD and is responsible for all internal security and military intelligence. KAD is comprised of two subdivisions--the Internal Section and the Military Intelligence Section. Unlike its predecessor organizations KAD has been given centralized control over intelligence resources and is receiving direct guidance on its operations from trained Soviet personnel.

Under Soviet tutelage, KAD possesses almost unlimited authority to draw upon law enforcement agencies and the intelligence components of other ministries.

Foreign servicemen picked up by Afghan Army or paramilitary forces such as the gendarmerie or police units might be questioned briefly by such forces but would be turned over to KAD as soon as possible. KAD has been assigned the responsibility of interrogating foreign nationals who have been suspected or charged with the commission of crimes against the Afghan government in the past, and it can be anticipated that the potential interrogation/exploitation of U.S. service personnel would be assigned to KAD. KAD's actions with regard to the interrogation/exploitation of PWs would be controlled and directed by Soviet personnel.

Pakistan Intelligence Services

(S) NF

[redacted]

OURCE

SWA 23.01.02 (S/NOFORN) Potential Intelligence Collection Objectives

Initial collection objectives would most probably include informaiton concerning the circumstances surrounding the prisoner's capture, his mission, his unit, his instructions and possible infiltration and exfiltration routes. Continued interrogation would probably be used to acquire more specific information concerning communications systems, weapons systems, tactics, personnel, locations of units other than his own, effectiveness of forces and order of battle information. Interrogators could be expected to be continuously seeking biographic data on the prisoner, other prisoners and his superiors for use in other interrogation sessions or for propaganda use.

SWA 23.01.03 (S/NOFORN) Potential Propaganda Exploitaiton Objectives

IRAN

The Iranian government has in the past pursued a vigorous but ineffective prisoner propaganda program. While Iranian propaganda specialists have had marked success in gaining access to foreign television networks for propaganda purposes, those in charge of the propaganda programs have been woefully uninformed about American attitudes and the correct methodology on how to shape American opinion. Propaganda activities such as the burning of the American flag, the parading of a blindfolded American prisoner before angry crowds and the public display of the uncovered charred remains of the U.S. service personnel who tried to rescue Embassy hostages have not demoralized the American public as intended, but have acted to unify and anger American citizens and heighten their criticism of the Khomeini regime.

However, it can be expected that media appearances involving prisoners as well as films of "showcase detention factilities" would be utilized to try to influence world opinions. Prisoners in some instances could be expected to be blindfolded and taken out of their interrogation facilities in order to excite large demonstrations of people. The filming of such events by Iranian and foreign news media personnel must be anticipated. Recent trials of individuals in Iran have reportedly been filmed for future public dissemination. Iranian propaganda specialists and members of the Revolutionary Guard to whom the prisoner would probably be entrusted for security purposes, could be expected to try to use news media officials for propaganda purposes. In the past, Iranian officials have selected prisoners and

ARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
OURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

then sought to interrogate them before foreign film crews without the news media being able to ask any questions. Foreign news-men fortunately have rejected such attempts and have heldout for televised interviews in which they themselves could participate.

In addition to their exploitation for propaganda purposes, it can be anticipated that any captured American documents would be used in conjunction with the possible trial of some of the downed American servicemen as spies. Propaganda exploitation of downed U.S. se[redacted] be handled by propaganda exploitation specialists [redacted]

AFGHANISTAN

Attempts by the Afghan government to exploit prisoners through its news media have been only marginally successful and in some cases have resulted in damage to the government's image. However, Soviet personnel now control Afghanistan's news media and have total control over the Ministry of Information and Culture. Virtually all of the information being produced by the government of Afghanistan is being produced by Soviet writers and propaganda specialists. Soviet advisors have also been assigned as editors for Afghanistan's newspapers. Therefore, it should be anticipated that any propaganda exploitation of downed American service personnel would be controlled by Soviet propaganda specialists and would be much more sophisticated than in the past.

Under Soviet tutelage, recent Afghan propaganda has included public confessions by captured opposition leaders who have also encouraged insurgents to turn themselves in to authorities. The films of American businessmen arrested by authorities have been shown on both Soviet and Afghanistan television to try to convey the impression of U.S. involvement in internal hostilities. Extensive film coverage has been taken of the release of political prisoners and made available for public consumption. Some prisoners have been subjected to televised "show trials" and interviews which have depicted the prisoners as spies in order to make maximum propaganda use of their captivity.

PAKISTAN

[redacted]

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

OURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

23-01

SWA 23.01.04 (S/NOFORN) Potential Indoctrination Objectives

Exploitation of PWs for intelligence information and propaganda purposes would take precedence over attempts to politically indoctrinate PWs. Reported incidents suggest that indoctrination of detainees is not a primary objective. It is doubtful that any concentrated effort would be made to convert U.S. personnel to Islam. This does not rule out other related forms of political exploitation. U.S. personnel can expect to be subjected to repeated conversations with authorities which could include efforts to convince thme through reason or by verbal harrassment to reject anti-regime ideas and positions prior to their exit from the country. Efforts could include the following: sophisticated efforts to break down their resistance to propaganda or intelligence exploitation through attempts to convince them that their war-connected actions were illegal, immoral, contrary to U.S. traditions, or done at the request of "capitalists" who had no stake in the conflict; and attempts to discredit U.S. military traditions, leadership, regulations, the Code of Conduct, or service capabilities in such a fashion as to create doubt, anxiety or dissension among their fellow prisoners. Propaganda exploitation and prisoner indoctrination themes could be expected to be closely related with the ultimate goal being more to control the prisoner in such a manner as to facilitate a "trial" of his country's national policies before the public news media rather than to change the prisoner's personal values.

In Afghanistan, it is possible however that servicemen interned in a more permanent facility could conceiveably be subjected to a political indoctrination program operated by the Afghans under Soviet guidance and direction.

SWA 23.01.05 (S/NOFORN) Interrogation/Exploitation Methods

IRAN

Iranian interrogators have an established record for the use of extreme interrogation and exploitation methods which have ranged from physical and metal deprivation to torture. In the past, prisoners have been subjected to intensive beatings, homosexual rapes, electric shock treatment and other forms of torture. Recently, American Embassy personnel, while not subjected to torture, have been isolated, blindfolded, initially subjected to long periods of time in which their arms have been tied behind their backs, verbally abused, subjected to forced periods of silence, kept in semi-darkened rooms, subjected to deprivation of sleep (lights burning all night), and subjected to intense interrogation. Some prisoners have also been taken out and publicly shown to large crowds, thereby subjecting them to tremendous psychological pressure.

Downed U.S. service personnel should anticipate that they will be initially questioned by whatever group takes them prisoner. This could include, among others, the Revolutionary Guard, the Gendarmerie, the Irainian Army, SAVAMA, the Police or neighborhood revolutionary committees. Becuase of the strained relations between the U.S. and Iran, U.S. servicemen could

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
OURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

expect harsh treatment from members of any of the groups. Initial exploitation objectives can be expected to be directed at the obtainment of tactical or time-sensitive information related to the individual's unit and mission. More detailed and extensive interrogations can be expected after the PW is transferred to a more permanent internment facility.

There is no way to predict the patterns which interrogations might follow. Some of the more sophisticated techniques have included the following: Initial preparation of written questions and written answers subsequently followed by detailed review of the answers; intensive, repetitious questioning; alternating threats of punishment and promises of better treatment by different interrogators or teams of interrogators; and the witnessing of mock executions. In the past, the intelligence and security services have also made extensive use of paid informers who have been planted in prison cells. [redacted] However, the use of English-speaking informants cannot be discounted, as it is likely that some of the exploitation personnel will have attended American universities and will have an excellent command of the English language, [redacted]

AFGHANISTAN

At present, the Afghan government is totally dominated by the Soviet Union. While it is anticipated that the interrogation of U.S. servicemen would probably be conducted by Afghan intelligence personnel acting under Soviet direction and control, it is possible that Soviet advisors might directly participate in such interrogations "at the request of the central government." In the past, the Afghan Intelligence and Security Forces have relied very heavily on informants. Such informants have included individuals of all backgrounds and education levels. Children have also been used as informants. Listening devices have been used but only to a limited extent. The recruitment of informants has been accomplished through coercion, appeals to patriotism or the promise of money or other gratuities. Some informants are paid a small monthly stipend or are compensated for each piece of information produced.

Interrogations conducted without Soviet assistance have, in the past, been unsophisticated with minimal regard for operational security and accuracy of information. Since the Soviet invasion, detailed information about Afghanistan's interrogation and exploitation methods has been scarce. However, the Soviet Union has attained an all-encompassing and pervasive interest in Afghanistan and a close Soviet-Afghanistan relationship can be expected in the future to be an important factor in the exploitation of captured PWs and their treatment. With Soviet assistance, Afghan intelligence and security personnel will be more proficient and the use of all standard methods of interrogation can be expected. Should the standard approaches not work, the use of less sophisticated methods to soften prisoner resistance can be anticipated. American businessmen and other foreign nationals arrested by authorities have reportedly been subjected to physical and psychological mistreatment designed to extract "confessions."

OURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Physical debilitation (including bronchial pneumonia, jaundice, etc) has resulted from prisoners being subject to harsh and primitive prison conditions. Interrogations have been marked by incessant questioning, deprivation of sleep, accusations of being "spies" or having committed criminal acts, promises of special treatment and other inducements including offers of asylum in East Germany. Reports indicate that the interrogation of prisoners has in some cases been accompanied by severe beatings and electrical shock treatments. Although there have been no documented instances of physical torture being used against Americans in Afghanistan, an American prisoner is reported to have been placed in the psychological stressful position of being able to hear the screams of other prisoners as they were believed to be tortured. Evidence does support the fact that torture has been used by Afghan exploitation personnel against other nationalities to extract information, and excecutions of some prisoners have taken place.

Assuming that English-speaking personnel were available, it is possible that American PWs might be initially questioned at the time of capture but it is more probable that PWs would be passed very quickly up the line to KAD personnel in order that detailed interrogation could be conducted under the supervision of trained Soviet personnel. In the past, interrogations have been conducted primarily by Afghan officials but it is believed that Soviet officials have recently participated in some interrogations. During the initial period of interrogation, prisoners in Afghanistan have generally been subjected to extensive sessions, in some instances lasting as long as 16 hours a day over a 10 day period. The sessons have included direct questioning and the submission of written questions which the prisoner was forced to answer. Some interrogation sessions have begun with the captors demanding that the prisoners write a detailed history (to include personal background) leading up to their capture.

(S) PAKISTAN

[redacted]

ARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SECRET
OURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

[redacted]

SWA 23.01.06 (S/NOFORN) Interrogation Facilities

[redacted] It should be expected that interrogators at the major security or detention centers will have access to electronic monitoring devices, that lighting conditions will be controlled, and that isolation cells will be available. Interrogation rooms can be expected to be very austere, containing in some cases only straight-back chairs and floor lamps. Field interrogation conditions can be expected to be much less sophisticated.

SWA 23.01.07 (S/NOFORN) Exploitation Personnel

(S) IRAN

Due to internal unrest in Iran and the many diverse groups which could conceivably be involved in the interrogation/exploitation of downed U.S. servicemen, it is difficult to anticipate with any degree of certainty the personal characteristics or traits of interrogation personnel who might be utilized to extract intelligence or military-related information. However, interrogation/exploitation personnel can be expected to include some English-speaking individuals who have been educated in the United States and who have an excellent knowledge of U.S. lifestyles. Others may include individuals now employed by SAVAMA who were formerly employed by the Shah's intelligence and security services, or Army J-2 staff, [redacted] It is belived that former SAVAK personnel selected for employment with SAVAMA would most probably be drawn from SAVAK's Departments II (Foreign Intelligence), VII (Intelligence Analysis) and VIII (Counterespionage), and would have been carefully screened by revolutionary authorities for their loyalty to the Khomeini regime.

If there were a small number of downed American servicemen captured, exploitation personnel could be expected to be selected from Ayatollah Khomeini's militant revolutionary followers or those who were in full agreement with the "ideals" of the Islamic Revolution. In such a situation, inspectors from Tehran's Prosecution Department could also conceivably be involved in the interrogation program. An interrogation committee would most probably be set up to manage the exploitation of PWs and would probably consist of a small core leadership of Islamic fundamentalists who would make decisions on a consensus basis. Major participants in the exploitation program from both the standpoint of security and exploitation could conceivably include the revolutionary guard force and even a few of the militant students who were left in charge of the American Embassy personnel. Members of the latter group are reported to be politically reliable but rigid,

[redacted]

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

event of large numbers of detainees, less-qualified Afghan military or civilian personnel could be expected to be involved in the interrogation phase. In the event of an internment of a large number of PWs, it is anticipated that the regular prison guard force would be supplemented by personnel from Afghanistan's Gendarmerie (a paramilitary police force) which has been utilized in the past to assume security duties previously assigned to other services. In the past, the capabilities of the Gendarmerie, have been extremely limited and its performance inhibited by inadequate training, poor logistical support, obsolete equipment and corruption. However, the Soviet Union is presently engaged in upgrading the qualifications of Gendarmerie personnel and it should be anticipated that, with the Soviets in charge of the Afghan prison system, that the Gendarmerie will be more attentive to their assigned responsibilities.

PAKISTAN

(S)

[redacted]

SWA 23.02 (S/NOFORN) Prisoner Treatment

SUMMARY:

IRAN

The treatment of prisoners in Iran can be generally described as extremely harsh by any standard, characterized by poor food in insufficient quantities, very poor sanitation, limited medical services, and overcrowding of inadequate facilities. Inadequate medical treatment and the poor quality sustenance has caused malnutrition, food poisoning, and chronic illness. The treatment of downed U.S. servicemen will depend greatly upon whether the Iranians perceive the captured servicemen as victims of an indadvertent overflight or as military forces involved in aggressions against Iran.

[redacted]

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Under present circumstances, captured U.S. servicemen could be expected to receive very harsh treatment. It can be anticipated that PWs will initially be interrogated and then immediately isolated in separate cells or rooms. Depending upon the numbers captured, downed servicemen may be interned in military or civilian facilities. Buildings such as the American Embassy in Tehran have special significance for Iranians as "symbols of captialistic tyranny" and could be used for internment purposes. Under some circumstances, PWs may be initially kept with both hands and feet tied. Communications between prisoners will not be permitted and prisoners will be denied all information about outside events. A prisoner's sleep will be controlled and deliberately kept short and intermittently broken by intensive questioning. Guard personnel will be rorated often to heighten the depersonalization process.

Efforts would be undertaken to increase PW fears, tensions and sense of abandonment. Even the smallest infraction can be expected to be dealt with extremely harshly. In some cases, prisoners have been placed in solitary confinement for periods of up to three or four months. It is possible that a distinction will be made with respect to the younger, lower-ranking service personnel, who may receive less harsh treatment than senior officials. Minority servicemen might also receive better treatment depending upon how their captors perceive their involvement in the events preceding their capture. Treatment of PWs may not necessarily be effected to any appreciable extent by the public news media or world opinion calling for fair treatment. However, as with the internment of U.S. PWs in North Vietnam, better treatment of PWs could result from the Iranian perception of a need to improve its image in the light of world opinion.

Mail privileges and visits from the Red Cross, or members of the clergy will be carefully controlled and permitted only when deemed advantageous for propaganda purposes. Requests by newsmen to verify the condition of the detainees would most likely be denied "for security reasons" as they have in the past, and PWs can expect extended periods of captivity.

AFGHANISTAN

The treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan has traditionally been extremely harsh, and has been characterized by poor food in insufficient quantities, very poor sanitation with minimal toilet facilities, an absence of medical services, and gorss overcrowding and poor management of inadequate housing facilities. Prison staff personnel are usually recruited from the lower socio-economic strata and often include rejects from the military services who often have little knowledge of or interest in efficient prison administration. Afghanistan's prisons are so overcrowded that the government has had to confiscate private homes to use as temporary detention facilities. Prisoners in some facilities have been forced to sleep in shifts, with two shifts being forced to stand while one sleeps. These conditions are said to allow a prisoner only two to three hours of sleep per night. Prisoners are normally issued two blankets, and they are often forced to sleep on the floor due to the inadequate number of cots or beds. Political prisoners have normally been confined in communal cells unless they are believed to possess significant information, or are considered to be "hard core", in which case they are confined in individual cells and isolated from the general prison populace. Due to the present overcrowding, political prisoners

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

have been comingled with criminal prisoners rather than segregated from one another.

Some prisoners in Afghanistan have, under Soviet direction, been relocated to the Soviet Union in such areas as Siberia and are being held for possible exchange for Soviet prisoners. However, it is felt that any downed U.S. servicemen would be interned in Afghanistan and exploited in that country for propaganda purposes. The Soviets would want it to appear that the Afghans were in control of their own country. It is possible that a highly valued and critically ill prisoner might, as a last resort "under the guise of humanitarian reasons,' be removed to East Germany or the Soviet Union for medical treatment which might otherwide not be available in Afghanistan.

Prison routine varies depending upon the internment facility and the severity of the offense committed. In the past, prisoners in large facilities and those convicted of felonies and "crimes against the state" have been assigned to work details, while political prisoners have been subjected to more stringent controls. Reports from previously detained individuals, suggest that the norm of prisoner treatment in Afghanistan is deliberately harsh, primitive and debilitating. Prisoners released recently from Afghan prisons have told of the use of torture including mangled or extracted nails, missing fingers, scarred bodies and emaciated physical conditions.

PWs can anticipate that prison conditions in part will be controlled by the attitudes and the objectives of prison personnel and interrogators, the numbers of PWs within the facility, and their captor's perception of the value of the PWs for military or propaganda purposes. There is evidence to indicate that Afghan officials would not totally ignore international concerns about human rights and that the treatment PWs could expect to receive would be less severe than that accorded their own nationals. Uncooperative prisoners considered to be a threat to Afghanistan's security have reportedly, in some cases, been summarily executed without a trial and it would be important to establish a record of the servicemen held captive in order to afford them as much protection as possible. It is felt that U.S. service personnel would probably be protected from executions and would instead be exploited for their propaganda value.

PAKISTAN

Generally, prison conditions can be expected to be substantially below western standards and characterized by poor food, very poor sanitation, limited medical services and frequent overcrowding of prisoners. In the past, prison conditions in Pakistan have varied greatly according to the size of the prison, the classification which the legal authorities have assigned to the prisoner at the time he was placed in judicial custody, and the individual's position or rank. For a more detailed discussion of Pakistan's prison classification system, see Section 23.03.
Generally speaking, prisoners who have been held in national security cases have been treated well and seldom subjected to physical abuse. In Pakistan, the distinction between different classes of prisoners will be an important factor with regard to the use of physical force used on a detainee. Some subjects in criminal cases who have lacked money or influence have been

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

subjected to very rough treatment by the police. Prisoners from the upper social economic strata or those with money to buy good treatment have generally been treated well and not normally subjected to physical abuse.

SWA 23.03 (S/NOFORN) Confinement Facilities

SUMMARY:

IRAN

Iran's prison system was originally constructed along the lines of the French penal system. In the past, the Iranian prison system has been officially under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice with the Ministry of Interior and the armed forces also playing an important role in its operation and management. There have been three classifications of prisons in Iran: (1) police jails, which have been operated under Gendarmerie superivison in rural areas and under the supervision of SAVAMA and the National Police in urban areas and which have been used for preventive detention and short-term prisoners; (2) court prisons, which have been operated under the criminal courts and used primarily for sentences of intermediate duration; and (3) penitentiaries operated under direct military supervision and used for long-term sentences and the internment of political and criminal prisoners. It is reported that almost every city and town has a prison, although in most cases, the facility could be used only for temporary detainment and not for the permanent incarceration of prisoners.

Detailed information on the organization of the Iranian penal system now being operated by the new revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini is not available. Iranian officials are now reportedly engaged in a review of the country's prison system with the intent of reorganizing it in accordance with new Islamic revolutionary concepts. There are several prisons in or near Tehran as well as the outlying provinces. The major prisons that have been used in the past for internment of political prisoners or for criminals requiring maximum security have been Qasr, formerly a police prison and Evin and Komite prisons which formerly were run by SAVAK.

(C) [redacted] Additionally, the Komiteh Interrogation Center has been used in the past as a detention center for Afghans prior to their deportation back to Afghanistan.

Generally, Iran's prisons are seriously overcrowded. This condition has been caused by the large numbers of individuals that were charged with having committed crimes against the revolution or as being operatives of the Shah. Mismangement has also contributed to the problems of existing prison facilities.

(C) [redacted] In some of the prisons, the Revolutionary Council has recently attempted to centralize control over the respective intelligence and security services to make the management of the penal

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

(C)

system more efficient. [redacted]

It must be anticipated that downed U.S. service personnel would be interned at different facilities to complicate possible rescue attempts. However, should the Islamic leaders decide to try PWs as "spies" or for "war crimes" it is conceivable that the detainees would be interned together in one heavily-guarded facility. Maximum security facilities available at Evin and Komite prisons make them prime candidates for use by the Iranians in the detention and possible trial of downed U.S. service personnel. Should the Iranian officials decide for propaganda purposes to allow news media coverage of some of the prisoners during their incarceration, they might be moved to Qezl Hesar Prison southwest of Tehran. In the past, this was used by the Shah as a model prison and conditions at the facility are reported to make it ideal for propaganda exploitation.

AFGHANISTAN

Detailed information on the organization of the Afghanistan penal system is not available. In the past, prisons have been administered under the National Jail and Prison Regulation Act. Prisons were located in each of the provincial capitals and were maintained and run by different provincial police organizations. Under a recent reorganization the prison system has been transferred from the Department of Security to the Logistics Department of the Ministry of Interior. Soviet officials now occupy the senior positions in every Ministry, including the Ministry of Interior, except for the Afghanistan Foreign Ministry, where one holds the post of Deputy Director. The Afghanistan penal system is now controlled by the Soviets, who have reportedly acted recently to centralize control of the prisons and, in some instances, to countermand previous orders given by high-ranking Afghan prison officials. Due to the present Soviet/Afghanistan relationship, the Soviets would most likely make all decisions relating to U.S. PWs to include the conditions of their internment.

There are several provincial prisons in Afghanistan. The major prison used for the detention of political prisoners or for those prisoners requiring maximum security precautions is Policharki prison. Two other prisons which have been regularly used in the past for the dentention of less important political prisoners have been the provincial prions located in Herat and Samagan. [redacted]

[redacted]

PAKISTAN

Detailed information on the organization of the Pakistan penal system, presently being operated by officials under recently enacted martial law provisions, is not available. There are several prisons in Pakistan. The prisons are generally overcrowded and poorly managed. Prison personnel are fairly well-trained but receive very low pay and are inclined to use physical force against prisoners interned in the lower cell classifications. The major prison used for political prisoners is Rawalpindi Prison. Inadvertent peactime intruders would, if interned, probably initially be held in the higher-graded cells within Rawalpindi Prison.

SWA 23.03.01 (S/NOFORN) Specific Confinement Facilities

The below listed confinement facilities are described for purposes of illustration. More detailed information on some of the facilities is available. Users requiring additional information should contact the originating agency. Some of the information pertaining to the specifics within the prisons has not been corroborated.

IRAN

EVIN PRISON - is located in the northern part of Tehran approximately one mile west of the Royal Tehran Hilton Hotel. Evin is believed to be the primary prison used for the internment of political prisoners. Due to its modern security systems, it would be the most likely facility used for the internment of downed American service personnel. Reportedly, Evin is administered by the revolutionary committees with revolutionary guard force personnel in charge of prison security. Although very little information is available, it is reported to be the most modern of Iran's prisons and is said to contain a labyrinth of passageways that can be used to isolate, secure, and transfer prisoners between different cells within the internal complex. During the last several months preceding the termination of the Shah's regime, it has been reported that attempts were made to further modernize the facility by installing electronically operated security doors.

KOMITE PRISON - has been one of Iran's most notorious prisons and has been [redacted] past to house criminal as well as political prisoners. [redacted] d "Komite" [redacted] the gendarmerie [redacted] es are thought [redacted] nant force within the committe [redacted] The prison is a three and one-half storied, heavily guarded structure enclosed within a high wall. Entrance into the prison is gained through a narrow entrance way at the front of the prison. The prisoner is brought through the main gate, and led immediately to a screening area secured by an iron door which is just inside the main gate. At this time, the prisoner's personal belongings are taken from him to include his socks, belt, and shoes. The prisoner is then led blindfolded through a second iron door which opens into a circular courtyard. If the prisoner were not blindfolded as he exited the door, he reportedly would see opposite him a flight of stairs and to their right, rooms with

[redacted]

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

windows on the first floor. To the left of the stairs, there is a corridor which leads to the prison showers which are located at the end of the corridor. Directly ahead he would see the two top floors of the prison and a halfstory structure on top. Each of the two top floors has a balcony attached to it looking over the courtyard. The prison cells together with several interrogation rooms are reportedly located in rooms on each of the first three floors. The cells are divided into wards. There are six wards on the three floors. Wards 1, 3, and 5 are located on one side; wards 2, 4 and 6 on the other. Wards 1 and 2 are located on the first floor and are reported to include Komite's solitary confinement and maximum security cells. The cells usually contain no furniture and prisoners are given one blanket. It is believed that there are twenty-three cells located in each of the first floor wards. The cells on the third floor, (wards 5 & 6) are believed to be larger than those found in the first two floors. Communications between prisoners in Komite has been limited mainly to speaking to those that share the same cell or with those who share an adjacent cell. [redacted]

QASR PRISON - is located north of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The prison is reportedly capable of handling up to 2,500 prisoners. It appears that Qasr is administered by the police although Revolutionary Guard force personnel may also be involved in the security and operations of the prison. Qasr has been used by the Council of Revolutionary Tribunal for the incarceration, trial, and in some cases, the execution of senior civilian and military officials employed by or affiliated with the Shah's regime. Complaints about poor prisoner handling has resulted in the recent transfer of most of the prison's political populace to Evin Prison. At present, Qasr is believed to house only criminal prisoners. Information with regard to the internal structure of the prison and the locations of the cells is not available, although it is belived to contain a large courtyard in the center of the prison, a mosque, a small hospital, and a prison library. Confinement facilities for the encarceration of female prisoners are also reported to be present.

AFGHANISTAN

POLICHARKI PRISON - is located approximately 25 miles to the east of Kabul. The Jalabad road, leading to Pakistan, servces as the main access road to the prison. Policharki Prison was originally designed to accomodate 3,266 prisoners including special facilities for 390 dangerous and recalcitrant type and 414 female prisoners. Policharki today is heavily overcrowded. The prison population recently has been estimated to number between 6,000 and 15,000 prisoners. Five or six prisoners are being housed in small one to two man cells in the center prison area. Other prisoners are being kept in larger units in an adjacent building with 120 or more prisoners in cells measuring 20 by 30 meters. The bulk of the prisoners are ex-military personnel, parchmist party workers and individuals arrested recently in Kandha

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Province. Foreign nationals are also reported to be interned at Policharki. The prison is heavily guarded with three check points before reaching the main gate to the prison. The main entrance to Policharki is through a gate located off of Jalabad Road. Two security posts are found at this entrance which leads through an inner security wall and on to a small circular lawn area. Once entry is obtained, one must go through a second inner security wall to enter the main prison facility which is octagonal in shape. Guards are posted on the inside of each of the security walls and Soviet tanks guard the entry to the main gate. Four watch towers are found at the corners of the outer perimeter wall and are believed to contain anti-aircraft type guns and machnine guns. Tanks and armored personnel carriers are located on the inside of the prison grounds as well as directly outside the main prison gate. Numerous guards armed with klosmikov pistols and AK-47 assault weapons are assigned to each cell block. Additionally, Soviet soldiers man machine gun emplacements at the main gate and are posted at various locales throughout the prison. The prison complex contains several buildings in addition to the main, octagonal shaped structure which is reportedly used to house prisoners requiring maximum security. It is composed of 8 separate wings each of which could be sealed off very quickly to isolate the spread of prisoner outbreaks of violence. Female prisoners are segregated from male prisoners and are housed in a separate building located outside the main octogonal prison facility but within the internal security wall. In addition to the regular guard force "special military guard squads" are also assigned. Reportedly, these units are segregated from the regular force and assigned special security functions, purportedly to include the handling of executions. Soviet transport planes ~~are being~~ reportedly used for the transport of prisoners from the outlying areas to the Policharki Prison

PAKISTAN

RAWALPINDI PRISON - is located in the city of Rawalpindi and is Pakistan's primary penal institution. It has been traditionally used for important political prisoners and others who have required maximum security. Rawalpindi Prison, as with other Pakistani prisons, is managed through the use of regiments or levels of prison conditions normally organized from an A to C with grade A prison cells representing the best conditions that the average prisoner could hope to receive under optimum conditions. Prisoners in grade A cells do not normally share cells with others and the cell normally containes some type of toilet facility. In some cases, prisoners are even allowed to have their own servants prepare their food for them. Prisoners in grade B cells generally have limited sanitation facilities and the cells are used to house prisoners of lesser social position or importance. Although several prisoners are normally housed together, political prisoners are normally segregated from hardcore criminals. Sometimes a Chowkidar (watchman) is assigned to cook the prisoners food and clean the cell. Grade C cells are normally badly overcrowded and prisoners are often forced to sleep on the bare floor without blankets. Political prisoners are often interned with hardened criminals. Grade C cells have very poor sanitation facilities and normally only a bucket is provided. Prisoners, with the

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

exception of those in solitary confinement, are allowed to receive food and clothing in packages which have been carefully searched for weapons or other contraband. The terms of a prisoner's confinement will also determine whether the prisoner is assigned to work details ranging from hard labor to light work assignments such as chain weaving. With the exception of prisoners in solitary confinement, prisoners are also allowed exercise walks around the prison grounds. It is possible for a prisoner to ssek a higher prison classification by applying to the courts or having judicial authorities make an independent determination that his poor physical condition or position warrant an upgrading. The more influence a prisoner can bring to bear on the government officials, the better will be his chances for improved conditions. The granting of improved conditions has not always meant that a prisoner's sentence would eventually be commuted.

[redacted]

SWA 23.04 (S/NOFORN) Legal Status of Prisoners

In order to comprehend the manner in which justice would be administered in Southwest ASia, it is necessary for one to understand the legal ramifications of Iran's new Islamic Constitution and its impact on Iran's executive, legislative, and judicial bodies; Afghanistan's adoption, at Soviet direction, of a set of interim Constitutional provisions referred to as "The Basic Principles;" and recent developments in Pakistan's implementation of more stringent martial law provisions.

SWA 23.04.01 (S/NOFORN) Administration of Justice

IRAN

The Iranian constitution, theoretically, guarantees the protection of individual rights. The language of the constitution, at least in theory, limits the degree to which the government may proceed in depriving citizens of their liberty. However, in practice, constitutional guarantees have been consistently ignored and the government has used wide discretion in the enforcement of laws and the use of coercion to insure compliance. The new government has ignored international accords and asserted that any decision with respect to prisoners will be controlled by the Iranian Parliament and the application of Islamic Law.

In December of 1979, the Iranian people approved, by referendum, a new constitution for Iran. In addition to being poorly drafted, confusing and dogmatic, the new constitution is an instrument of tyranny. Either directly or indirectly, more power has been vested in one man than in any other constitution found in effect throughout the world. The constitution, which is based upon the writings of Khomeini, represents a continued effort to change Iran from a monarchy into an Islamic society similar to the world of Islam after Muhammad's death in the 7th century.

The basic of the new constitutional enactments is that Islam, as interpreted by Ayatollah Khomeini and who was appointed as the leader (Fagih)

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

of Iran, will resolve all disputes, fill any void and lead the way to a just and perfect political system. Under the constitution, Khomeini has been given the widest possible powers imaginable. As the leader of the Iranian people, Khomeini appoints the religious jurists on the Council of Guardians, a body which approves all legislation passed by the National Assembly. As Iran's leader, he also appoints the highest judicial authorities who must themselves be religious jurists. In his capacity as Commander of the Armed Forces, he may appoint or dismiss the commanders of the three military services, the Chief of the General Staff, and Commander of the Revolutionary Guards. At the suggestion of the Council of Guardians, Khomeini may order a mobilization of the armed forces and declare war. He also approves the competence of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic and may dismiss the President after a finding by the Supreme Court that the President has violated the Law.

The Constitution provides for a Paliament comprised of 270 deputies. The number of deputies is subject to change every ten years depending on shifts and decreases and increases in population. The term of office is for four years. Except for one representative each for the Jewish and Zoroastrian faiths, one member for Asyrians, and two members for Armenians, the entire membership of Paliament must be Muslims. It has been given the exclusive right to pass laws and ratify certain transactions. However, this right is severely limited by provisions which provide for the establishment of the Council of Guardians which has the power to decide whether a law is in contradiction to the constitution. Ayatollah Khomeini's power of veto over the Legislature also extends to the judicial apparatus through the use of a similar mechanism. The power of the President (principles to 129) and the Prime Minister (principles 134 and 136 to 139) are almost nonexistent.

The Constitution provides for the establishment of a judicial system "based on Islamic rules." the highest judicial body is called the "High Council on the Judiciary" and consists of the head of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and three "religious and just judges" chosen by their own group of peers. The head of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General must be religious jurists (mujtahids) whose piety and knowledge of Islamic law authorizes them to make interpretations of the law which in turn have the force of the law. The High Council of Judiciary is charged with establishing necessary organizations within the Ministry of Justice, determining the procedures for selecting the members of the Supreme Court, preparing other bills having to do with the judiciary, and appointing and dismissing judges. The term of office for the Council is 5 years, but members can be reelected at anytime. Procedures for the election of members are to be established by a separate law.

The Constitution provides a statement as to the independence of the Judiciary but other provisions insure that Ayatollah Khomeini or a successor regime has veto power over all the actions of the judiciary. Both the head of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General are appointed by and subject to dismissal by Khomeini. The three remaining members are required to be members of the clergy who will share his views. The language of the constitution makes it clear that even in the absence of Khomeini the decisive

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

vote in the judiciary will be held by the Islamic clergy. In brief, the country is to be governed by Ayatollah Khomeini during his lifetime and afterwards by a council of Islamic clergy. The constitution grants the clergy the widest possible powers. Any successor to Khomeini will retain Khomeini's powers and have the ability to control the judiciary through appointments to the Judiciary Council and the legislature through appointments to the Council of Guardians. Any decision relating to the trial, sentencing, or imprisonment of downed American service personnel can be expected to be conducted at the direction and with approval of Ayatollah Khomeini or a successor group of senior religious leaders.

AFGHANISTAN

At present, the Afghanistan government is totally dominated by the Soviets and is operating under an interim set of constitutional provisions referred to as the "Basic or Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." The "Basic Principles" provide the new Revolutionary Council of the DRA, or more accurately its Presidium, with almost absolute power. The "Basic Principles" carry the authority of a provisional constitution and will remain in force until the ratification of a new DRA constitution by the Loya Dirga (Afghanistan's General Assembly). Until a new constitution is ratified, the Revolutionary Council will continue to be the most powerful governmental authority with the exception of the Soviet Advisory group.

Any decisions relating to the trial, sentencing or imprisonment of downed American service personnel can be expected to be conducted in accordance with directions from the Revolutionary Council. Its members have been carefully screened and approved by the Afghan Soviet advisory group which supervises and directs all significant decisions made by the Revolutionary Council. The Revolutionary Council's authority is extensive. It has the power to approve all laws and is responsible for the appointment of all judges. The Revolutionary Council also serves as the final court of appeals. The President of the council is held to be the Chief of State and in this capacity serves as the country's Prime Minister unless he chooses to appoint one. Several decrees have been recently issued by the Revolutionary Council which, at least traditionally, would impact on a prisoner's rights. The third decree issued by the Revolutionary Council relates to articles pertaining to judiciary procedures. Article one of the decree declares that with the exception of constitutional laws and regulations, all other laws and regulations shall remain in force provided that they are "applicable and compatible" with the issuances and decrees of the Revolutionary Council. Articles II and VI deal with the establishment of a new judiciary system which will include a High Judiciary Council headed by a Minister of Justice. The duties of the New Ministry of Justice are still to be detailed and will be subject to review and approval by the Revolutionary Council.

The implementation of death sentences rendered by the Revolutionary Council under Articles II and VI must be approved by the Chariman of the Revolutionary Council. Articles VII and VIII of the third decree provide for the establishment of a Revolutionary Court which will be responsible to the Revolutionary Council. Procedures allow the new court to conduct trials in the various provinces thus alleviating the burden of transferring

all prisoners to Kabul. Trials are to be carried out in accordance with revolutionary decrees. Under the revolutionary decrees, any civil or military prisoner that commits or has been determined to have committed any offense either against the revolution; against the interests of the people; against national interests; or has in some way endangered the domestic or foreign interests of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is considered to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Miliary Courts. Under the broad mandate of the new decrees, the revolutionary military courts have been given virtually unrestricted power to try any case. It is belived therefore, that trial of foreign service personnel would be handled by the Revolutionary Military Courts.

PAKISTAN

The Pakistani constitution guarantees the protection of individual rights. As written, its statutes and regulations pertaining to the limits to which the government may proceed in depriving individuals of their liberty are inadequate to guarantee individual rights. There are numerous loopholes in the language of the constitution and its subordinate legislation which allow the government wide discretion in the enforcement of the law and the use of coercion to ensure such enforcement. Additionally, the present government has declared a state of martial law and Pakistan's courts are in disagreement with respect to its effect on and interpretation of the constitution as it relates to the safeguarding of prisoner rights. Some Pakistani courts, especially those courts controlled by the present government, have taken the position that the enactment of martial law suspended constitutional rights to the extent that any constitutional "privileges" contradictory to the orders issued by Pakistan's martial law administrators were rendered null and void. The Sind High Court challenged this decision and held that the government's enactment of martial law ("the law of necessity") cannot be used to limit or abrogate individual liberties that are guaranteed by the constitution. The Sind High Court has taken the position that under the constitutional powers of judicial review that every executive action in the country is amendable to judicial review and that the burden is on government officials to satisfy the courts that the law permitted the action and was lawfully taken. More recently, the government has enacted constitutional amendment 212(A) which authorizes military courts to try offenses against martial laws and forbids any appeal of the martial law decisions by the civilian courts. New provisions of the martial laws (including Law order 77) grant sweeping authority to the military courts which give them immunity from review by civil courts, even Pakistan's Supreme Court.

SWA 23.04.02 (S/NOFORN) Civilian and Military Courts

SUMMARY: The degree to which civilian courts are actually functioning within each of the three countries is uncertain. Revolutionary military courts in Iran have usurped most, if not all, of the power of the judiciary. Afghanistan has recently established a high judiciary council as its highest court and is utilizing revolutionary tribunals to control all legal matters relatied to activities which impact on the security of the country.

The jurisdiction of Pakistan's civilian courts have been seriously impaired by recent martial law edicts that deny the right of appellate review of the dicisions of the martial law tribunals. However, there are indications that some of the functions held by judiciary of each of the countries will remain, to some extent, as vestiges for the new authorities and therefore it is necessary to have a general knowledge of the judicial systems now in a state of transition.

IRAN

CIVILIAN COURTS. During the Shah's regime, the Supreme Court of Iran was the highest civilian court. Under the new constitution, the highest judicial body will be a "High Council of the Judiciary" consisting of the head of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General and three "religious and just judges". The High Council of the Judiciary is now charged with reorganizing the existing judicial system and establishing a system that will be based on Islamic rules. Located in Tehran, the Supreme court consists of the Attorney General, a public prosecutor, and elven branches comprised of four justices each. The Supreme Court has had jurisdiction of appeals in criminal cases involving punishment from two months imprisonment to execution and typically resolved jurisdictional disputes in the lower courts.

The next lower level of courts, to include the provincial courts, courts of appeal, courts of assize and criminal high courts, have operated in provincial capitals as courts of appeal in civil and criminal cases. The provincial courts have also served as courts of first instance for criminal cases where the punishment has included over two years imprisonment. In hearing criminal cases, three judges have normally been seated unless the offense involved a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death in which case five judges have traditionally heard the case. There have been no juries. Traditionally, serious felonies were handled by provincial courts while misdemeanors were heard in county courts consisting of several judges, an investigating officer and a prosecuting attorney. The next lowest ordinary tribunals were referred to as district courts. Each district court has had one judge who tried civil cases involving less than 50,000 rials and criminal case with maximum sentences up to one month imprisonment generally referred to as minor offenses or contraventions. Iran's judiciary is now in a state of reorganization with the greatest change taking place in the development of the preeminence of the revolutionary courts over the established courts and the enforcement of the principles of Shariat laws in lieu of Iran's secular laws.

REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. The constitution now provides for military or revolutionary tribunals to be established for the investigation of crimes related to national security by members of the military, gendarmerie, police security forces and the Revolutionary Guard. "Other crimes" committed by military or security personnel supposedly are to be handled by the regular courts of the Ministry of Justice. In any case, the Provost Marshall and his military courts are now considered at part of the unified judiciary system and come under its principles.

There is uncertainty as to whether military or civilian courts would

be used for the trial of downed American service personnel. The issue appears to be moot since the actions as well as the decision of either court would be controlled by Ayatollah Khomeini or a revolutionary committee appointed by him and applying Islamic law. However, there are major differences between the manner in which civilian courts have conducted themselves historically and the operations of the new revolutionary courts. Based upon Ayatollah Khomeini's predilection to use the revolutionary courts for the trial of political prisoners to include foreign nationals, downed American servicemen would, if tried, probably be brought before revolutionary tribunals.

REVOLUTIONARY COURT PROCEDURES. Defendants in the revolutionary courts are now tried under the Shari, Islamic law based primarily upon the Koran rather than under Iran's penal code. Trials within revolutionary courts are conducted by a five man panel of judges. Verdicts in the trials, some of which have lasted less than one hour, are rendered by a majority vote of the judges. The sentence is handed down by the senior judge and carried out immediately after Khomeini has been notified. There are no appeals. Although the new regulations allow for defense attorneys, they have been noticeably absent. The guidelines also allow for "open courts" but in practice, attendance has been limited to witnesses, relatives of the accused and reporters from pro-government newspapers. Additionally, members of the foreign press have recently been admitted.

Islamic theories of evidence before the revolutionary courts suffer from inherent defects in that they are based on a presumption that a respectable Islamic man would not willingly tell a lie and therefore must be presumed to be telling the truth. The influence of faulty memory, or testimony colored by personal bias would not be discounted in the process. Also, the detrimental effect of prosecution attorneys being able to ask leading questions is not recognized as such. The public record only lists the charges and the sentences. The reasoning behind the sentences is normally unavailable for attorneys involved in other litigation before the same court. It is argued that there are no requirements for a statement of the evidence upon which the decision is based because it is one that has been reached by Islamic judges applying Islamic law and consequently inherently fair to all the parties concerned.

It is quite conceivable that the trial of downed servicemen might be held within one of the prison mosques at Evin, Qasr or Komite thereby affording the captors maximum security precautions as well as symbolic religious connotations for the Islamic people. Revolutionary trials have regularly been held in some of the mosques such as the mosque within Qasr Prison. Iranian religious leaders have argued for the use mosques on the basis that they are meant to serve not only a religious function but also for "political education and communication with the people."

The legal setting is one of extreme prejudice for those accused and is peculiar to Islamic justice. the walls of most of the courtrooms have been covered with pictures of Iran's religious leaders and with highly emotional pictures or paintings depicting victims or members of the Iranian populace affected by the accused's actions. Witnesses as well as spectators are searched as they enter the courtroom. Men and women are seated separately on opposite sides of the courtroom. The trial is normally convened

with the chanting by a choir boy of a few verses of the Koran followed by the audience chanting Allah Akbar (God is Great). If the defendant is prepared to recount his transgressions and confess, the proceedings begin with a confession or statement by the defendant, interrupted occasionally by questions from the justice ministry prosecutors. Normally the prisoner's testimony follows a pattern of chronicled, arduous and lengthy interrogation to carefully extract names, places and events. If the defendant is not prepared to confess, the proceedings commence with a highly emotional statement from prosecuting attorneys followed by numerous government witnesses testifying against the accused. The official language and script of the Islamic Republic is Persian. Official documents, correspondence and statements submitted to the court must be in Persian. Portable cassette tape recorders are used to record testimony. Witnesses are sworn to the Koran. The accused is usually permitted an opportunity to speak but often his testimony is met with outbursts from the audience or derisive laughter.. The absence of legal counsel to speak in behalf of the accused is not a basis for delaying or preventing the trial. Islamic legal precedents are dispositive of the issues as well as any procedural matters brought before the court. In Islam, a peculiar institutional combination of Islamic legal systems and the absence of a traditional hierachy accounts for the absence of an appellate process which is present in almost all other legal systems.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan's controlling judicial body is its revolutionary council which operates under an interim set of constitutional provisions titled the "Basic or Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." Under the new principles, the highest court in Afghanistan is the High Judiciary Council headed by the Minister of Justice. Afghanistan's lower courts have been replaced by revolutionary military courts which are to be responsive to the needs of Afghanistan's revolutionary council. It can be anticipated that the courts would handle any legal matters brought before them in accordance with procedures outlined by the revolutionary decrees which have been approved by the Soviet Union. Very little detail is available with respect to the operations of the revolutionary courts. Reports indicate that the courts are not abiding by judicial due process and are instead following summary martial procedures.

Afghanistan, even without Soviet intervention, has typically adhered to the application of secular laws over the Islamic Shariat religious laws. Afghanistan's former constitution essentially set up a secular state which enjoined its courts to try cases in light of the constituion and the laws of Afghanistan. However, the constitution did recognize the Sharia Hanafi School of Jurisprudence but only to the extent to those issues which were not resolved through the application of Afghanistan's existing laws and regulations. It is anticipated that Afghanistan would only resort to the traditional Shariat legal concepts in the trial of downed U.S. service personnel if it was determined by governmental officials, at Soviet direction, that the use of Islamic law concepts would result in the attainment of support for its position from other Islamic countries and any propaganda objectives it sought to achieve.

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SECRET
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAKISTAN

Based upon current Pakistan/U.S. relations, it is believed that Pakistan would abide by its commitment as a signatory of the Geneva Convention articles relating to prisoners of war and would not move to try downed American servicemen. Should Pakistan make a determination to try American service personnel, it could proceed either through the use of its civilian courts or the revolutionary courts now operating under its Martial Law provisions. Very little information is available with respect to the operations of Pakistan's martial law courts. Reports indicate that the courts are not strictly adhering to judicial due process and are resolving legal issues in a summary fashion along the lines of the traditional Islamic Sharia Law concepts. Although appeals have been allowed for decisions rendered by martial law courts to Pakistan's civilian courts, recent constitutional amendments will probably curtail this process.

More detailed information is available with respect to the operations of the civilian courts. In the past, Pakistan's highest tribunal, the Supreme Court, had orginal, appelate, and advisory jurisdictions but did not include original, or first instance jurisdiction dealing with criminal cases. The criminal courts of first instance have consisted of three categories including the three high courts, courts of sessions at district headquarters, and three lower levels of magistrate courts. All magistrates in a district have been subordinate to the district magistrate who also functions as the deputy commissioner. As prescribed in the Pakistan Code of Criminal Procedure, an offense punishable by imprisonment not to exceed one month has been triable by a third-class magistrate. An offense punishable by imprisonment not to exceed six months may be disposed of by a second-class magistrate. A felony carrying a possible sentence of imprisonment not to exceed two years, solitary confinement, or flogging with a maximum of thirty lashes, has normally been under the jurisdiction of a first-class magistrate or the judge of a court of sessions. The sessions judge is able to hand down any of the sentences prescribed by law, to include the death sentence, but it must be confirmed by the high court. a criminal case may be committed to higher courts by either a second-class or a first-class magistrate if the is satisfied, upon a pretrial inquiry, that there is a prima facie case for trial before a jury or with assessors (lay advisers). In certain instances, a serious case may be referred directly to the appropriate high court by the advocate general of the provincial government if he has the approval of the governor. As the highest criminal court, the high court may direct the transfer of a pretrial inquiry or trial pending in any subordinate tribunal to another of equal or superior jurisdiction in the interests of securing fair and impartial justice.

Trials have generally been classed in two categories, summons (if a finding of guilty is rendered, have been punishable by a maximum of six months imprisonment) and warrant (~~cases by~~ death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment exeeding six months). Prosecution has been handled by police officers in magistrate courts, by a public prosecutor before a court of sessions, and by the provincial advocate general before a high court. In summons cases, the particulars of the alleged offense are stated orally to the accused, and no formal charge need be prepared in writing. If the accused pleads guilty, his admission must be recorded "as early as possible

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SECRET
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

in the words uttered by him." The accused has the right to counsel, but the court is not required to appoint one if he fails to assert his right. In certain cases, the magistrate may dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to be represented by counsel. In a court of sessions the judge has the discretionary power to reject the jury decision, even though it was unaimous, if he was of the opinion that the verdict was not supported by the evidence and hence might constitute a miscarriage of justice. If the jury verdict is not accepted, the sessions judge must refer the case to the high court as an appeal without recording judgment of aquittal or of conviction and must state the reason for his action. Upon review, the high court will render a decision.

Historically, the justices of the Pakistani high courts have tried to insulate themselves from executive or military pressure and, until recently, have been successful. As a result of recent martial law provisions, the replacement of certain members of the judiciary and pressure that is being brought on them, even high courts appear to be losing their independence. The pressure exerted on lower court judges has been even more blatant. Members of the lower courts have been subjected to harassment, verbal abuse, and suspension from office. Military guards have also been stationed at some judges' residences to insure judicial pronouncements favorable to the government's position. Addtionally, the attorney general has recently appeared on behalf of the government during legal proceedings. The latter action has put tremendous pressure on members of the judiciary since the Attorney General also serves ad the Law and Parlimentary Affairs Minister, the individual responsible for the appointment of justices to the bench as well as the judicial authority charged with initiation of disciplinary proceedings againstjudges who are "alleged to have abused their judicial powers." Based upon current trends, it is anticipated that, unless circumstances change, there will be a further concentration of authority in the military courts at the expense of the civilian judiciary produing a dminishment of appellate procedures and the abridgement of the right of Habeas Corpus.

The effectiveness of the Pakistani lawyer's role in safeguarding individual rights has been mixed. In ordinary political overtones, lawyers have generally provided effective and determined advocacy for their clients and have, by Asian standards, developed a reasonably good sense of trial advocacy. The lawyer's role in highly charged cases with poltical overtones is much more circumspect. Pakistani lawyers are hesitant to take highly charged political cases and could be expected to be extremely reluctant to represent downed American servicemen. Any defense of the rights of American captives would be handled by Pakistani lawyers assigned by the court and carefully screened by the central government.

In capital offenses, lawyers are appointed by the court for an accused and paid for by the State. The accused is normally provided an opportunity to select a lawyer for his defense from a list provided by the court. The public defense system does not operate for non-capital crimes. However, civilian counsel has been made available for some individuals recently called before summary military tribunals. The question of when and whether prisoners are tried in cases having political overtones has been more dependent on outside political developments than courtroom legal debate and precedents. Legal technicalities in such cases are generally held to be irrelevant.

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SWA 23.04.03 (S/NOFORN) Rights Accordèd Civil or Political Prisoners

IRAN

Ayatollah Khomeini has asserted that the rigths of accused persons in Iran are to be controlled by Islamic law and not by international agreements entered into prior to the revolution. An understanding of the Islamic laws and general legal precedents can be expected to be extremely important in understanding Iran's treatment of its own political prisoners as well as downed American service personnel. Other than the right to hold ideas, the right of habeas corpus and the right to trial, there are no other absolute rights provided for the Iranian people. Every other right mentioned in the constitution is either conditioned or curtailed. For example, "life, property rights, etc.," are immune from interference "except in circumstances provided by law." Publications and press are free in the expression of issues "unless they are contrary to Islamic rights or public rights." Mail censorship, wiretaps and investigations are forbidden "unless done in accordance with law." The determination of what is legal is to be determined in all cases by Ayatollah Khomeini and his revolutionary Islamic jurists. Although the investigation of political crimes are to be held openly before a jury in the courts of the ministry of justice, it is for the court to determine whether the matter also has criminal aspects which might limit the rule's application as well as the people being allowed to be present because of "security considerations" or the possibility of "overcrowding."

Under the Iranian laws, a person accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent and the use of torture to extract information is forbidden. An accused individual is also reported to have the right to counsel. However, a series of contradictions lies in the fact that the basence of attorneys who, in most cases, would be fearful of representing an individual against whom the State has filed charges, will not result in the dealy of a trial. Compromise of legal issues is always the right of litigants "except if it allows what (Islam) has forbidden or forbids what (Islam) has allowed." Witnesses for the prosecution are presumed to be truthful and can be asked leading questions. Witnesses for the parties are to be those who have been determined by authorities to be just and pious and as Islamic persons shall be sworn to the Koran. The question of an involuntary confession or the case of torture shall be determined by an Islamic revolutionary committee appointed by Khomeini or members of the judiciary which owe their allegience to him. Similar ambiguity exists in a provision relating to the rights of non-Moslems in Iran. The constitution provides that non-Moslems must be treated with "good moral conduct and Islamic justice" and that their rights must be respected. However, a further provision notes that "this principle will be applicable to those who do not get involved in anti-Islamic activities and in conspiracies hatched against the Islamic Republic of Iran." Under the latter situation, such individuals are in effect deemed to have waived their right to judicial protection.

AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan makes it very difficult to predict, at present, what legal rights would be accorded to a civil, political or war

prisoner. Reports indicate that traditional laws relating to political prisoners are being totally ignored, prisoners are being treated extremely harsly, some prisoners have been tortured and summarily executed without charges ever being brought against them, and some prisoners are being physically removed to the Soviet Union. Individuals accused of criminal offenses have been tried according to provisions in Afghanistn's penal code which made provision for legal counsel for an accused, confrontation of witnesses, and appeal procedures. The Basic Principles are now, at least theoretically, used as guiding regulations for civil and criminal procedures.

The controlling regulations within the Basic Principles relating to rights of an accused, enables government officials to detain individuals for investigation without charges being lodged. Once the investigation phase has been completed the dossiers of accused individuals are submitted to the court for judicial consideration through the special revolutionary prosecutor's office. Other sections of the criminal code have a bearing on the procedures relating to the presentation of evidence, the use of confessions, sentencing procedures, and terms of imprisonment. In practice, revolutionary decrees are being used as justification for procedures that have already been taken or are about to be taken against political and non-political prisoners. Under the umbrella of such decrees several thousand prisoners have been held without trial or charges and some have been summarily executed. The new Afghan Constitution, proposed by the revolutionary council, is reported to include provisions relating to the independence of the judiciary, openness of judicial sessions, trial in the hative language of the accused, the right to defense of the accused, and an explanation of the resons for judicial decisions. However, notwithstanding the expressed intent of the new constitution, it is extremely doubtful that the above provisions will have any real meaning in light of the present actions of members of the Revolutionary Council and its Soviet advisors which have restricted individual rights and freedoms. The new constitution is reported to include a section that will define more specifically the powers of the Revolutionary Council and its Presidium. The Presidium will be constitutionally charged with the supervision of the judiciary to insure the proper observance of laws and decrees and in maing recommendations with respect to pardons or the investigation of punishments relating to individuals incarcerated in Afghanistan's prison system.

There are three general categories of original charges customarily levied against persons accused of punishable acts in Afghanistan. These include: (1) encroaching on the achievements of the revolution; (2) encroaching on the internal security of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; and (3) encroaching on the national sovereignty and independence of the country. Foreign nationals interned in Afghanistan have normally been accused of endangering the territorial integrity of Afghanistan. Under established guidelines, serious cases involving a death sentence are to be referred to Kabul for disposition. Based on current reports, it is doubtful whether approval for many of the executions has been coordinated with officals in the Revolutionary Council in Kabul. With respect to summary executions of some types of prisoners, authority appears to have been limited to officials in the provinces.

SECRET

It can be anticipated that decisions relating to downed American service personnel would not be unilaterally entrusted to provincial authorities but would be directly controlled by members of the Revolutionary Council. The Council could be expected to be the judicial body that negotiators would have to deal with in trying to effect the release of downed service personnel. Release could not be effected at present without Soviet support and approval. Generally, the Afghan constitution, as amended, gave modern legal codes priority over Islamic Shariah law. However, the possibility exists that members of the Revolutionary Council might turn, at least in part, to Islamic laws to justify actions taken against captured service personnel although revolutionary edicts and martial law provisions now in existence or subsequently enacted by the Revolutionary Council will most probably serve as the primary legal basis for the internment and treatment of prisoners. A general knowledge of Islamic Shariah concepts is necessary for an understanding of legal concepts that could affect a downed American serviceman's treatment in Afghanistan.

PAKISTAN

In order to fully comprehend rights which might be accorded to domestic civil and political prisoners, it is necessary to distinguish between rights set forth in the constitution from the recent restrictions placed on constitutional rights by the nactment of martial law in Pakistan. The fundamental right of Pakistani citizens are set forth in Pakistan's consitution which guarantees that the government may not deprive citizens of freedom except in cases specified by law. Both the citizen's person and home are deemed inviolable and search of the home and siezure of property are permissable only in cases specified by law. Under the constitution, the right to public trial is guaranteed, although it is recognized that the law may specify exceptions to the principle. An accused person is guaranteed the right to legal counsel and to have a defense counsel, either of his own choice or one appointed by the court. Other rights include freedoms of speech, press and assembly.

The Pakistani criminal code was designed to reflect the guiding principles expressed in the constitution and to implement the constitutional obligations of the State and citizens and to protect the rights of the individuals. Criminal procedures require that an accused must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours after arrest. Generally, magistrates have been willing to grant remands only if they are satisfied that the person held has not been subjected to third degree methods. Even if bail is not granted, Pakistani civilian courts, in most cases, have transferred the accused from police custody to judicial custody. Once a prisoner is transferred to judicial custody the prisoner has been placed in jail and thereafter has been subject to more formal prison rules and regulations.

Notwithstanding constitutional provisions and the traditional criminal procedures, it is now possible under martial law edicts to detain an individual without charges being filed if the the individual is believed to have committed a crime or other acts prejudicial to the safety of the country. The detention of political prisoners, without charges, has become quite common. Under recent changes to the Martial Law Orders, the reasons for the detention or restriction of the individual's liberties need not be

conveyed to the accused or his legal representative. The normal period of preventive detention is 90 days. At the end of this time, the individual is required to be brought before a commission for judicial review. The reviewing commission normally consists of a judge, a representative of the executive and one other person "impartially" selected by the government. The judge is empowered to render a decision after receiving the recommendations of the other panel members. The period of preventive detention can be extended if the judge determines that the circumstances clearly warrant such a finding. A writ of petition is normally used by opposing counsel to question the legality or constitutionality of a particular martial law regulations. Habeas corpus petitions can also be used to try to expedite the review before the judicial panel. After charges have been filed against a prisoner, it is possible for his counsel to seek a trial date so that the charges can be heard.

The question of ~~if and when~~ important political defendants in Pakistan ~~will be~~ are tried and convicted or freed depends more on outside political developments than on courtroom legal debate. Trials may be before a civilian or military court but normally charges against individuals held under martial law provision relating to preventive detention are held before summary military tribunals. The decisions of such courts have been the subject of judicial appeal to Pakistan's higher courts. Under new governmental directives, such appeals will apparently no longer be allowed.

Under the most recent amendment to Article 199 of the constitution, the High Courts are forbidden to rule on the validity or effect of any martial law regulation, or order, or military court decision; entertain any judicial proceeding which might fall under military jurisdiction; make any issuance of process including a writ of information against any martial law administrator, or issue any order that would have the effect of nullifying any past, present, or future martial law practice or policy. Additionally, the most recent constitutional amendment declares that all martial law orders and regulations issued since July 1977, were validly made and are enforceable. Lastly, the amendment creates a Federal Shariat Court that is mean to insure that Islamic law will be the controlling influence in the courts.

Procedural rights will be controlled by the decison to try an individual before the regular courts or the martial law tribunals. Rigths to cross examination, for example, differ depending on whether the trial is conducted under summary trial procedures or the procedures customarily used in the higher courts. Under martial law rules, the defendant's attorney is required to act as "a friend of the court" and speak through the accused while under the regular judicial procedures the defendant's attorney is allowed to more fully crossexamine the government witnesses. Under earlier ruling it was not possible for a summary military tribunal to impose the death penalty without the issue being reviewed by a higher court. There is uncertainty now with respect to whether the summary military tribunals on their own authority will be able to impose death penalties.

SWA 23.04.04 (S/NOFORN) Islamic Law - General Legal Sources

The description that follows does not fully do justice to Islamic law precepts or procedures but is meant to briefly outline legal sources that could considerably influence Islamic jurists faced with questions relative to

prisoner treatment. It is possible that some of the Islamic sources could be widely interpreted depending upon whether the jurist was a Shia or Sunni Moslem or was a follower of one of the different Islamic schools of law accepted by the Moslem community.

The entire body of Islamic law is called the Shariah. It is Divine Law that must be followed by all Moslems. The Shariah encompasses economic, social, and political behavior as well as religion, dogma and law. The Shariah for the Shiites has five primary sources: (1) the Koran (the Holy Book of Islam); (2) the Sunna (or the practice of the Prophet); (3) the Ijtihad (or the interpretations of the Mujtaheds); (4) the Agl (reason); and (5) the Ijma (Consensus).

The Koran is regarded as the utterance of Allah communicated in his words by the angel Gabriel to the Prophet. The word Koran signifies "recitation." It is also called Forgan (discrimination), or the means by which man can discriminate between truth and falsehood and al-kitab, the prototype of all books. The recitation of the Koran and the writing of it are sacred acts. The Koran is an appeal to mankind and to the Arabs in particular to obey the law of God which has already been revealed or can be discovered. In the last years of his career, the prophet, as a ruler was faced with legal problems on which he sought divine guidance, and the answers that he uttered in a trance are a legal element in the Koran. There are said to be 500 such texts, but most of these deal with ritual and only about 80 deal with legal material. These 80 texts have been subjected to intensive interpretation to extract the maximum amount of meaning from them. The Koranic texts together with non-legal texts in the Koran, moral exhortations and even divine promises, have all been construed by analogy to afford legal rules.

The Sunna is the practice of the Prophet. Its authority comes next only to the Koran and it is not derived from the community's acceptance of the prophet as a person of authority but from the divine will as expressed in the Koran. For this reason, the Moslem community accepts all of Muhammed's verbal commands, his deeds, and his tacit approval as the way of life, a binding factor, and a model that ought to be followed. The Sunna is often expressed in "Hadiths". Hadiths are stories of a particular occurrence in which the Prophet was involved (the sunna is the act that occurs). There are many collections of hadiths which serve as standard references. Large parts of the Sunni collection have been translated into English. The Shiites and Sunni each have their own collections. Although there is much duplication, the Shias reject some hadiths accepted by the Sunnis and their own unique hadiths. The differences normally revolve around the right of succession to Ali.

The Sunni is to be found in "traditions" of what the Prophet said, did, or by his silence approved. There are about 40 hadiths of great importance which are "sacred sayings" or "traditions" in which God speaks through Muhammad. There are also traditions of the Prophet himself and traditions that embody legal decisions of the first four caliphs or of other "companions" of the Prophet. For the Sunni, the authority of traditions of the caliphs or "companions" is less than the authority of the traditions of the prophet himself. The Shiites believe that an authentic tradition attributed to the

Imam is as binding as the direct word of God received through Muhammad. Therefore, when Khomeini quotes a hadith as he has done in his treatise Islamic Government, he is not relating a parable or narrating a story to make a point, he is instead quoting something that has the force of law There has been a wholesale fabrication of "traditions" from almost the earliest period as "companions" sought to decide what the prophet had said or would have said. Many of the traditions were attempts to interrelate the controversies of earlier times with more current problems. Attorneys have attempted to reexamine the traditions to try to determine the authenticity of the hadith. Unfortunately such a reexamination inherently suffers from a presumption of truth based on the fact that a respectable man does not willingly tell a lie. Factors such as faulty memories or personal bias become discounted in the critical review process.

The Agl is human reason or intellect. Agl permits the truth to be discovered by an Islamic jurist when texts differ or contradict each other. Under Islamic law, legal rules made by Agl must be regarded as parts of the Shariah and people must obey them. In Shia law, God is the legislator because he created Agl to make law. Agl makes law directly, God makes law indirectly. Law made by Agl is like the law of God in that it is a precept of faith and a social duty, and its obedience is obligatory. However, Shia jurists reject the private use of reason as a rule of law.

The Ijma or consensus is used by both Sunnis and Shias as a source of law, but they define it differently. The Sunnis recognize the consensus of the community and the consensus of the great law teachers. For the Shia, Ijma means "agreement of those who interpret in their religious judgments the commands of the imams on a particular question" (i.e., the mujtaheds). Islamic legal sources are therefore made up of the Koran itself, reference works that provide guidance on Koranic principles, and the practical treatise of the mujtaheds.

It should be noted that the "legal sources" that followed the Koran and the Sunni were introduced at least a century after the Prophet and were built upon the opinions of individual jurists and are clearly subordinate to the first two primary Islamic legal sources. The question of the sources that the jurists relied upon in maing a decision and the opinions derived is always open to reconsideration as to their compliance with the Koranic and prophetic texts and the fulfullment of their ultimate goals.

SWA 23.04.01.01 (S/NOFORN) Ilamic Law - Application to PWs and Interpretation of/Regard for the GCPW

IRAN

In order to find the appropriate legal sources relevant to the treatment of prisoners of war, one must, according to Islamic principles, look to three

sources, i.e. the Koran, the "Koranic Pinciples" and the "practical treatises." The Koran would provide the text which would be appealed to for relief. the Koranic commentaires would also have to be searched since the commentaries would provide the opinons of Islamic scholars on the "real" meaning of the Koranic verse in question. In many cases, the commentaires could be expected to differ widely according to whether the commentation was primarily by a theologian, a jurist, a philosopher or a mystic. None of the commentaries are in English. A Persian language commentary is most likely to be in Shiite, while an Arabic commentary is most likely to be either Sunni or Shiite. Additionally, the "practical treatises" or books of case law which describe the way the Shariah has actually been applied in the past would also have to be reviewed. The latter books would be of critical importance in understanding the rights that conceivably might be accorded to downed American servicemen or hostages, but it is doubtful whether the latter books are available in the United States. The mujtaheds do not require the actual written texts since they have, for the most part, memorized the writings.

There appears to be only one passage in the Koran that deals specifically with captured prisoners of war, although there are other passages that appear to relate to other questions such as amnesty, the application of the Geneva Convention provisions and the subject of clemancy. The Koran states that while the taking of hostages for ransom has no place in righteous warfare, in certain exceptional instances, it is allowed. The Koran does deals with treaties with non-muslims and it can be argued that the aforementioned would create an obligation for Iranian officials to adhere to the Geneva Convention. However, recent events have clearly demonstrated that the current leadership in Iran has consistently ignored the application of international agreements.

If prisoners of war are taken, under Islamic principles, it would be up to the leader of the community (i.e. Ayatollah Khomeini) to exercise his discretion as to the time and conditions of their release. More omniously, if those captured are determined in any way to have contributed to the death of other moslems or to have "committed acts against God," jurisdiction could be obtained over them without normal investigative and judicial procedures having to be adhered to by Iran's leadership before rendering a punishment against them.

SWA 23.04.05 (S/NOFORN) Criminal Punishment Legally Imposed

IRAN

Shiite law, as administered by Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers in Iran today, is harsh and uncompromising. A significant amount of the punishment being meted out to officials of the former regime is conducted out of revenge for which a religious coloration is sought. Nontheless, the severity of the judgments has had precedent in situations where they clergy in Iran has held significant power. Unfortunately, Shiite justice need not be what Khomeini has made it. During periods when an uncompromising fundamentalist has not been preeminent, clerical justice has been less severe. It is important to note that whether Khomeini's fundamentalism prevails or not, the texts of the Shia Islam will be critical to any consideration relating to

treatment or punishment of downed American servicemen for the forseeable future.

There are no special obligatory penalties under Islamic law for prisoners, even those charged with espionage. In approving executions by the revolutionary courts, Ayatollah Khomeini has invoked a concept summed up in the Persian phrase "MUSSED I AL-ARD" or the "corrupt of the earth." Khomeini has interpreted the phrase to refer to people who have committed an act against God. Two standard charges that have been made against nearly all of those executed by the Khomeini regime have been "spreading corruption on earth" and "warring with God." the statements are derived from a verse in the Koran. A common interpretation of the language is that "one who wages war" is anyone who resorts to armed violence and "spreading corruption" means disturbing public security in some manner (i.e. by terrorizing the Iranian people). Commentators have indicated also that there is no higher corruption that taking the life of a Muslim or violating their honor.

Legal punishments have included death and dismemberment. The manner of execution is optional under Islamic law, otherwise Khomeini's use of the firing squad would be an innovation and consequently forbidden. However, there is some debate about the manner of dismemberment but it is usually held by Iranian jurists that dismemberment should involved the right hand and the left foot. One commentator insists that the thumb and heel should remain, but others are not so charitable. Other commentators believe that punishment by amputation is meant to apply only to punishment for simple theft, while "theft with killing" requires dismemberment followed by crucifixtion. Exile of prisoners has also been used by some of Iran's jurists as a judicial sentence. The precise meaning of "exile" has been debated and it is important to note that such a sentence can actually refer to the drowning of the individual rather than the prisoner being forced to leave the country or forced to reside in a particular remote section of the country. there is also the unsettled question of the meaning of the sentence of crucifixtion and whether the sentence is to precede or follow execution. Under Islamic law, whippings are recognized as legal punishment. The whippings can be public or private. The number of times an individual is whipped is normally fixed by the judge according to his individual perception as to the severity of the crime.

Because of the importance of the issue, the imposition or execution of any sentence against downed American servicemen can be expected to be conducted only with the approval of Ayatollah Khomeini or in his absence with the consent of a revolutionary committee composed of lesser Ayatollahs. However, there is unsettling evidence which indicates that despite attempts by government officials to prevent the carrying out of a sentence, that at least one of Khomeini's leading jurists has, on occasion, acted unilaterally to carry out his sentences before government officials could intervene.

AFGHANISTAN

Punishment meted out to wrongdoers under Afghan criminal laws has been traditionally extremely severe. Afghanistan's penal code is based on the Shariah law, derived from the Koran, and distinguishes three types of crimes: those calling for punishment according to the Koran (i.e. theft, drinking alcohol, etc.); those calling for retaliation or payment of indemnity

(murder, personal injury, etc.); and other crimes with punishments which have ranged from reprimand to death. Traditionally, the two methods of execution in Afghanistan have been hanging for criminals and the use of firing squads for the execution of political offenders.

PAKISTAN

Since the imposition of martial law, the Pakistani government has endorsed the establishment of a traditional Islamic legal system (NIAZM-I-ISLAM) including the use of punishments codified in the Sharia law. Under existing martial law provisions, harsh penalties have been administered for the commission of even minor crimes. Prisoners have been subjected to severe disciplinary actions for breach of prison regulations. Public whippings and amputation have been reconstituted as forms of punishment.

Public whippings have been used in many instances in order to deter others from committing similar acts. They are normally conducted by fellow prison inamtes sentenced to life terms. These inmates have been rewarded with extra rations for "succesful" floggings. A physical or medical attendant is normally available to stop the whipping if an individual's life appears to be in jeopardy. The usual flogging sentence ranges between 5 and 15 lashes and is accompanied by a sentence to hard labor in one of the country's penal institutions. Under Pakistani law, individuals over age 45 are exempted from whippings and normally have their faces painted black and are either given additional work details or placed in solitary confinement instead. Public whippings today are considered by Pakistani authorities to be less severe than initially administered under Pakistan's martial law provisions due to the fact that the traditional cat of nine tails has been replaced by the less lethal malacca canes.

Under existing martial law provisions, amputation is permissable only for offenses involving theft, dacoity (armed robbery by not less than 5 men) and robbery. Under Pakistani law, amputation as a form of punishment cannot be combined with any other punishment. Under Islamic law the amputation has to be done by a qualified surgeon while the prisoner is under local anethesia. The surgery is normally done in public or in jail as directed by the military court prescribing this punishment. Under normal procedures, a right handed person would have his left hand amputated or vice versa. Despite the government's implementation of the new, harsher Islamic penalties, (i.e public whippings, amputation, and public hangings) the judiciary has demonstrated great reluctance in the past to execute such sentences.

Aiders and abetters in the commission of a crime, under martial law, are normally awarded the same punishment as prescribed for the primary offenders. Pakistan upholds the use of the death penalty in certain cases including sabotage and resisting or injuring any member of the civil or military forces or any civilian police official. Death can also be used as the maximum punishment for dacoity. The death penalty is normally inflicted by hanging but can be carried out "in such other manner as directed by the court in a particular case."



SWA 23.05 (S/NOFORN) Geneva Convention Signatory

IRAN

Iran was one of the orginal signers of the Geneva Convention articles relating to treatment of prisoners of war. However, Ayatollah Khomeini has asserted that Iran is not bound by agreements which are violative of Islamic law and has refused to abide by such international agreements as the following: the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; the 1973 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally protected persons (including diplomatic agents); the 1955 US-Iran Treaty of Amunity; and the charter of the United Nations.

Nothing under Islamic law precludes immunity by treaty and Iran, as a signatory of these conventions, is legally bound by their terms not only under International Law but also under Shariah Law. It is highly unlikely under present conditions, that Ayatollah Khomeini would recognize or abide by the provisions of the Geneva Convention or any similar treaty in all its respects unless its application suited his objectives.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan was one of the original signers of the Geneva Convention articles relating to prisoners of war. Current information indicates that Afghanistan officials are not adhering to legal standards with respect to the treatment of captured insurgents within their own country. It is uncertain whether they would feel compelled to adhere to the Geneva Convention articles in all respects regarding downed American service personnel. The Afghan government is totally dominated by the Soviet Union and it can be expected that any application, or lack thereof, of the articles relating to PWs will be conducted with the direct or indirect consent of Soviet officials.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan was one of the original signers of the Geneva Convention articles relating to treatment of prisoners of war. It is anticipated that unless circumstances in Pakistan substantially change, that Pakistan would adhere to such principles with regard to the treatment of downed American service personnel.

SWA 23.06 (S/NOFORN) International Red Cross Supervision/Inspection of PW Camps

SUMMARY: The degree to which officials in each of the three countries would cooperate with the International Red Cross or the United Nations, with respect to downed American service personnel cannot be stated with any certainty.

IRAN

Based upon the lack of cooperation Iranian officials have demonstrated with respect to hostages held at the American Embassy, it is believed that Iran would cooperate only to the limited extent that its own actions served to enhance its propaganda exploitation objectives.

AFGHANISTAN

Based upon reported information, it is believed that Afghan officials would cooperate with the International Red Cross or other similar agency only if such action was first approved by the Soviet Union and then only to the extent that its cooperation could serve to further the exploitation objectives of the Soviet Union and/or Afghanistan.

PAKISTAN

In the past, the International Red Cross or Amnesty International have been granted permission to interview political detainees at Rawalpinid and other penal facilities. The controlling factor appears to be whether the charges levied against an accused are political or criminal. Both organizations have been allowed to interview political prisoners. Political prisoners, who have subsequently been charged by government officials with the commission of criminal acts have been denied the above visitation rights.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

12/7 I #131

LEAFLET DROP

1. TWO BASIC LEAFLET DROP OPTIONS, HIGH ALTITUDE FROM C-141 IN ORBIT OVER EASTERN MED, AND FROM MC-130 IN FLIGHT OVER TEHRAN.

2. NECESSARY TO PREPARE LEAFLETS FOR DROP. FOUR DAYS REQUIRED TO DESIGN CONTENTS AND 2 DAYS TO PRODUCE LEAFLETS. PROCESS OF DESIGNING LEAFLETS CAN BE STARTED [redacted] PRIOR TO DECISION ON OPERATION.

(S) REQUEST AUTHORITY TO INITIATE LEAFLET DESIGN (INTENTION IS TO EMPLOY FOUR FT BRAGG PSYOP PERSONNEL [redacted] TO DESIGN LEAFLETS; ~~PLANNING~~ WOULD BE DONE IN WASHINGTON).

3. OBJECTIVES TO BE SUPPORTED BY LEAFLET THEMES MIGHT INCLUDE:

- APPEALS TO IRANIAN PRIDE AND NATIONALISM TO RELEASE HOSTAGES.
- IRAN VULNERABLE TO US MILITARY POWER BUT US DOES NOT WANT TO EMPLOY MILITARY FORCE.

(OBJECTIVES TO PROMOTE DIVISIVENESS WITHIN IRAN ARE NOT RECOMMENDED).

REQUEST APPROVAL OF THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES AS GUIDANCE FOR DESIGNING LEAFLET THEMES

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED BY
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

LEAFLET DROP

4. [redacted] MISSION WITH BLANK PAPER OVER OCEAN TO TRAIN AIR CREWS [redacted] AND PSYOP PERSONNEL TO PACKAGE AND DISSEMINATE MATERIAL CONSIDERED NECESSARY.

REQUEST AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT TRAINING MISSION

~~TOP SECRET~~

— LEAFLET/CHAFF TRAINING —

~~REDO MATRIX~~

~~REMOVE AC-130 FLARE~~ (MOVE TO ~~DISCARDED~~ OPTION)

~~REMOVE COMBINATION~~

~~ADDRESS AC-130 LEAFLET~~ /CHAFF COMBINATION

~~ON SAME AIRCRAFT~~

EXPAND C141 ENTRY

SAMPLE WINDS

MEMO TO GO OVER

MORE ELECTRICAL

WORK W/ DR. PERRY

DAMAGE DISTRIBUTION

— BUT NOT THE GENERATION

RR 143/AL

FSN 5864-160-3960NW32

5000 UNITS

NOT IN AF

ECM DIRECTORY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TEHRAN

WESTERN (SECULAR) / LITERATE

N

1. INTELLIGENTSIA
2. BUREAUCRATS
3. MILITARY OFFICERS
4. NATIONAL FRONT
5. ARMED MILITANTS

EISENHOWER AVE - SHAH REZA AVE

S

1. MULLAS
2. BAZAARIS
3. ETHNIC MINORITIES
4. RURAL MIGRANTS
5. ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY
6. ARMED MILITANTS

CONSERVATIVE (ISLAMIC) / ILLITERATE

Prevailing Winds →

← 30 km →

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOLLOW-ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

LEAFLET DEVELOPMENT

RADIO CASSETTES WITH VERBAL APPEAL

VOA / RADIO LIBERTY / RFE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~P SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN:

TARGET AUDIENCE(S):

THEME:





~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: *Appeal to Moderation*

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): *All Literate Muslims*

THEME: *Islamic Shame*

GOD IS
THE MERCIFUL,
THE COMPASSIONATE



IS THE [redacted] MISTREATMENT OF
INNOCENT AMERICANS
MERCIFUL? IS IT
COMPASSIONATE?



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: Emphasize vulnerability to U.S. Actions

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Bazaaris, Intellectuals, Middle class, Technocrats

THEME: Economic sanctions threaten Iran



MERCHANTS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN:

TAKE ACTION TO BRING BACK THE FRUITS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND TO REGAIN PROSPERITY!! DO NOT SUPPORT A CONFRONTATION WHICH ONLY DRAINS THE NATION'S LIFE BLOOD.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: UN RESOLUTION

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Mullas, Muslim People, Republican Party, Ghazanchi's, Intelligentsia

THEME: Shame to Persian Culture



↑ See attached Farsi translation for layout ↑
in Farsi of layout.



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: Appeal to Moderation

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Bazaaris, Ulemas

THEME: Islamic Shame

IMAM HOSAYN SENT HIS ENVOY TO
KUFA.
WOULD HE HAVE SENT HIM TO
TEHRAN?
FREE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES NOW



TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: UN Resolution

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Middle classes, bazooris, mullahs

THEME: Isolation of IRAN

THE WHOLE WORLD

Supports the



UN Resolution for

Immediate Release of US HOSTAGES

"... Release Immediately the hostages..."

Voted for the UN Resolution

Bangladesh

France

Pakistan

USSR

Support the Resolution



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: *APPEAL TO MODERATION*

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): *ALL LITERATE MUSLIMS*

THEME: *ISLAMIC SHAME*





~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: *Appeal to Moderation*

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): *All Literate Muslims*

THEME: *Islamic Shame*





~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: UN Resolution

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Middle classes, bazaaris, mullahs

THEME: Isolation of IRAN

THE WHOLE WORLD

Supports the



UN Resolution for

Immediate Release of US HOSTAGES

"... Release Immediately the hostages..."

Voted for the UN Resolution	Support the Resolution
Bangladesh	
France	
Pakistan	
USSR	



TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: *UN Resolution*

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): *Middle classes, bazaaris, mullahs*

THEME: *Isolation of IRAN*

THE WHOLE WORLD

Supports the



UN Resolution for

Immediate Release of US HOSTAGES

"...Release Immediately the hostages..."

Voted for the UN Resolution	*Support the Resolution*
Bangladesh	
France	
Pakistan	
USSR	



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: Appeal to [illegible]

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Pro-Iranian Americans

THEME: Islamic Shame

IMAM HOSAYN SENT HIS ENVOY TO
KUFA.
Would He have sent him To
TEHRAN?
FREE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES NOW



[illegible] Rose. ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: Appeal to Moderation

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Bazaaris, Mullah's

THEME: Islamic Shame

IMAM HOSAYN SENT HIS ENVOY TO KUFA. Would He have sent him to TEHRAN? FREE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES NOW

NOTE: USE AS BACKGROUND THE SACRED GRILLE COVERING THE TOMB OF IMAM REZA AT MASHED

BROWN BACK W/ GRILL IN GOLD



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: UN RESOLUTION

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Mullahs, Muslim People, Republican Party, Cabinet's, Intelligentsia

THEME: Shame to Persian Culture

And so beyond these, man himself appeared who was to be the key to every lock and close-linked thing. As a tall cypress was his head upraised — — To him was given speech and intellect — and all the animals, both wild and tame, were made obedient to him who had been given reason, sense and wisdom. Then regard him in this light

of wisdom. See what Man's significance and meaning be. Perhaps you think him ill, malevolent, perverse and find no trace of higher good; but know that in two worlds you have been nurtured, and have passed through realms that lie between. In primal nature first, you are the last in time — Therefore, O man, do not forever waste yourself in games.

Allah is Great

Ferdausi



↑ See attached Farsi translation for layout ↑
in Farsi of layout.



The United Nations
Together have asked The
Islamic Republic of Iran
and The United States to
Show Restraint.
Put Aside The Games.
Free The American Hostages.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: UN RESOLUTION

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Mullas, Muslim People, Republican Party, Qazanci's, Intelligentsia

THEME: Shame to Persian Culture



↑ See attached Farsi translation for layout ↑
in Farsi of layout.



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: *Appeal to Moderates*

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): *All Literate Muslims*

THEME: *Islamic Jihad*





~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: UN Resolution

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Middle classes, bazaaris, mullahs

THEME: Isolation of IRAN

THE WHOLE WORLD

Supports the



UN Resolution for

Immediate Release of US HOSTAGES

"... Release Immediately the hostages..."

Voted for the UN Resolution	Support the Resolution
Bangladesh	
France	
[illegible]	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: [illegible]

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): [illegible]

THEME: [illegible]



↑ See attached Farsi translation for layout in Farsi of layout. ↑



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LEAFLET DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

1. Identify National Objective
2. Identify Psychological Objective
3. Analyze Targets
4. Develop Campaign - Leaflet as media selected.
5. Background and Intel Research
6. Leaflet Roughout
7. Initial Pretest ← CURRENT STATUS
8. Modification
9. Pretest
10. NSC Approval
11. Production
12. Dissemination
13. Effects Analysis

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LEAFLET EXECUTION TIMES (ESTIMATED)



1. TRANSLATION:
2. TECHNICAL CHOICE:
   CALCULATIONS
   CHOOSE PAPER
3. COMPOSITION
   LAYOUT
   ILLUSTRATION
4. PRETEST:
   PRINT ON STOCK
   EXPERT REVIEW
   REVISION
5. NSC APPROVAL
6. TRAINING: (for Delivery)
   PREPARE BLANK SAMPLES
   PRACTICE DELIVERY
7. PRINT:
8. CUT:
9. PACKAGE:

10. DELIVERY OF COMPLETED LEAFLETS TO STAGING POINT:

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S) ACTIONS for LEAFLETS

1. Obtain 2 translators / 1 Artist	CIA
2. Produce Draft Leaflets.	8TH PSYOP
3. Pretest Draft Leaflets Using Native Persians.	CIA/PSY
4. Revise Leaflets Per Pretest	8TH PSYOP
5. Complete Pretest	CIA
6. Fabricate Dispensing Device(s) a. Boxes - Joint Packaging Institute b. Dispenser — 1st SOW	USAF
7. APPROVALS	JCS - NSC
8. Test Dispensing System/DISSEM PATTERN	USAF
9. obtain paper stock	CIA
10. Print and Package Leaflets	CIA
11. Transport to Staging Areas	CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: Vulnerability to US Military Strength

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): [illegible]

THEME: IRRESISTIBLE US Military Strength

(B-52) (light trim background)

THE WIND THAT BROUGHT THIS PIECE OF PAPER COULD BRING SOMETHING ELSE



HOW CAN YOU STOP THE WIND?

- THE US HOSTAGES ARE INNOCENT
- THEIR DETENTION ONLY ANGERS ALL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
- THE HOSTAGES MUST BE RELEASED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: Appeal to Moderation

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): [illegible]

THEME: Islamic Shame

IMAM HOSAYN SENT HIS ENVOY TO

KUFA.

Would He have sent him to

TEHRAN?

FREE THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES NOW



[illegible]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: Appeal to Illegal Immigrants

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): All Illegal Migrants

THEME: Islamic Jihad

GOD IS
THE MERCIFUL,
THE COMPASSIONATE



IS THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF
INNOCENT MUSLIMS
MERCIFUL? IS IT
COMPASSIONATE?



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: [illegible]

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): [illegible]

THEME: [illegible]



↑ See attached Farsi translation for legend ↑
in Farsi of legend.



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~T~~ SECRET

CAMPAIGN: UN Resolution

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Middle class, peasants, mullahs

THEME: Isolation of Iran

THE WHOLE WORLD

Supports the



UN Resolution for

Immediate Release of US HOSTAGES

"... Release Immediately the hostages..."

Voted for the UN Resolution	Support the Resolution
Bangladesh	
France	
[illegible]	



TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN:

TARGET AUDIENCE(S):

THEME:

LEADERS OF THE NEW IRAN



WHERE IS THE REVOLUTION GOING?

THINKERS AND STRATEGISTS OF THE REVOLUTION:

HOW CAN THE SYMPATHETIC NATIONS OF THE WORLD HELP TO BUILD THE NEW IRAN WHILE THE ILLEGAL HOSTAGE SEIZURE ISOLATES THE REVOLUTION?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN:

TARGET AUDIENCE(S):

THEME:

WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT?



Pictures or Drawings Suggesting that Border is closed

SHOULD REASONABLE MEN DEFY THE WORLD?

WHAT WILL THE U.N. DO IF ITS RESOLUTION IS DEFIED?



WORK FOR RELEASE OF THE AMERICANS SO THAT PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS CAN PREVAIL

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: International Reaction

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): [illegible]

THEME: Islamic World appeals to [illegible] of hostages

THE ISLAMIC WORLD REJECTS HOSTAGE-TAKING



DEVOUT BELIEVERS:

WHY DO THE ISLAMIC NATIONS LIMIT THEIR SUPPORT TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION? CAN THEY ACCEPT THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES AS A GODLY ACT?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN:

TARGET AUDIENCE(S):

THEME:

RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS!!

THE WORLD REJECTS VIOLATION OF IRAN'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

- ON 4 DECEMBER 1979 THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLVED THAT THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATS SHOULD BE RELEASED AND THE CONTROVERSY SOLVED IN PEACE.

- THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL HAS DECLARED THAT TRIAL OF THE HOSTAGES WOULD CONTRAVENE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEFY THE UNITED NATIONS

Appropriate proverb or

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: [illegible]

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): [illegible]

THEME: [illegible]

HONORED SIRS

—appropriate preamble—

PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE, EDUCATORS, LEADERS OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT !! PLEASE REFLECT ON THE THREAT FACING THE REVOLUTION.

How can the world think of the Shah's crimes when all eyes are on the illegally-seized hostages?

Let the world see the responsible character of the Iranian Revolution by working for the release of the hostages!

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: Vulnerability to US Power

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): [illegible] to Tehran [illegible]

THEME: Result of confronting US military power





~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: Vulnerability to US Military Power [illegible]

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): Middle Classes, Intelligensia, [illegible]

THEME: Regional Enemies, US strength and restraint

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN:

TARGET AUDIENCE(S):

THEME:





~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: [illegible]

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): [illegible]

THEME: Economic sanctions threaten Iran



MERCHANTS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN:

TAKE ACTION TO BRING BACK THE FRUITS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND TO REGAIN PROSPERITY!! DO NOT SUPPORT A CONFRONTATION WHICH ONLY DRAINS THE NATION'S LIFE BLOOD.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN:

TARGET AUDIENCE(S):

THEME:





~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TL SECRET~~

CAMPAIGN: [illegible] Actions

TARGET AUDIENCE(S): [illegible]

THEME: Economic sanctions threaten Iran



MERCHANTS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN:

TAKE ACTION TO BRING BACK THE FRUITS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND TO REGAIN PROSPERITY!! DO NOT SUPPORT A CONFRONTATION WHICH ONLY DRAINS THE NATION'S LIFE BLOOD.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~SECRET~~

i-733 D

2 May 1980

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 29 Nov 92 DDO, NMCC
DERIVATIVE CL BY ~~Multiple Sources~~
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON UADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] Multiple Source

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Damage Assessment - Operation RICE BOWL

1. Purpose. To conduct a detailed analysis of the equipment and information that was available at Desert Track One after U.S. forces departed the scene and make a damage assessment.

2. Background.

a. TAB A depicts the units left at Desert Track One that contained classified or possibly sensitive equipment/information.

b. TAB B lists the individual units and addresses the likelihood of accessibility of classified or sensitive equipment. This TAB also addresses helicopter #6 which remains in the desert, south of Desert Track One. All classified and sensitive information has been reported to have been removed from the helicopter.

c. TAB C depicts only those units which contained classified information/equipment or sensitive information that possibly could have been compromised.

d. TAB D lists the documents and equipment which possibly were compromised and briefly states the damage assessed as a result.

3. Discussion. The following is a damage assessment of those classified or sensitive documents/equipments contained in TAB D:

A

a. (S) JTF-79 CEOI extracts consisting of pilot's personal knee board cards containing call signs, frequencies, types of radios, location of mission sites in Iran and identifies participating units such as SFOD-D and Rangers.

- No COMSEC damage has resulted from compromise of classified information because the need for security has been overtaken by events or, in the case of call signs, codewords and frequencies, security can be regained by changes.

E

- Politically sensitive is the identification of stations/locations in foreign countries, which, in the hands of the Iranians, could be used to allege cooperation by these countries with the United States [redacted]

- Operational security has been seriously compromised because primary landing zones, staging bases, and other facilities needed to support the rescue operation have been identified.

Downgraded to SECRET per authority of DDO, (NMCC)

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

Classified by: DoD Dir 5001.2(M-1)
Review: 2 May 2000

[redacted]

b. TACAIR Information consisted of aircraft call signs and frequencies plus geographic coordinates of reference points in Iran.

- Although no classification is noted on the document entitled "TACAIR INFORMATION", compromise of this document is extremely damaging to national interests as it identifies the location - geographical coordinates of numerous sites, to include the warehouse, which the raiding party was scheduled to utilize, and it indicates the possible intent to accomplish air raids by tactical aircraft.

c. CVW-8 Card of the Day, classified CONFIDENTIAL, details the call signs and frequencies in use by ships assigned to the U.S. for the period 0400, 24 April 1980 to 0400, 25 April 1980. Compromise of this document is not considered damaging to national security as the information reflected is changed daily and thus was overtaken by events.

d. (C) Navigation Card, which details coordinates and navigational data for the route to Tehran and Manzariyeh is considered classified. The card contains no information of a politically sensitive nature. Compromise of this item would not endanger national security or interests.

e. (C) The document identified as "Watch Schedule for Hideout Security" contains the guard watch schedule to be utilized by the team at the hideout location. Although the document is unclassified and contains no information of a politically sensitive nature, it does provide the [redacted]

f. Document entitled "Codewords for 24 April 1980" details codewords in use on day indicated which could be used to identify such things as Soviet aircraft, USAF aircraft, and specific countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, India, and Pakistan. This information is politically sensitive as it links the above countries, although indirectly to the operation.

[redacted]

[redacted]

- The secure IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) authentication equipment, of which at least one piece of equipment was compromised, is of minimal consequence. This equipment was compromised many times in Southeast Asia. Acquisition of the key used in this operation would not affect security of past or future transmissions.

- Two unused "one-time" crypto pads were subject to compromise, but this is of no consequence because: (1) the crypto principle involved is unclassified, and [redacted]

A

j. USS NIMITZ communications frequency codes were carried by all the helicopters. The security compromise is minimal because the codes can be easily changed.

4 (S) Summary. Damage resulting from equipment and information probably now in Iranian hands, [redacted] is assessed as minimal.

A,B,C

A

E

[redacted] used by Iran to embarrass some of the countries in the region by allegations of cooperation with the U.S.

[redacted]

B

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Unit	Classified or Sensitive Equipment/Data
C-130	Unknown. Inventory is being taken, but because this aircraft was totally destroyed, no analysis of documents/equipment is necessary.
(C) Helicopters	Secure Voice Communication Equipment - PARKHILL (Helicopter #1 only) - NESTOR "BLUE BINDER" - EMERG LZs Location C [redacted] - Tehran maps Call Signs/Frequencies TACAIR Information Sheet Mission Plans Communications Electronics Operating Instructions (Brevity Code) USS NIMITZ Frequency Codes Flight Route Maps Other Commo Equipment - Whiskey-3 - PT-25 UHF - Unsecure radio - PSC-1 UHF - backpack radio - Motorola 350 - hand-held radio - PRC-90 - survival-radio
DELTA FORCE	Communication Equipment Special Equipment, i.e., night visual devices A Weapons, i.e., [redacted] weapons. Inventory is being taken and will be available in approximately one week.

TAB B

Unit	Likelihood of Accessibility of Classified or Sensitive Equipment
C-130	None - destroyed by fire.
Helos #4	Destroyed by IAF [redacted]
Helo #3	None - destroyed by fire.
Helo #6	None - crew removed classified data after forced landing.
Helos #7, 8	Probably intact and accessible.
DELTA FORCE	Unknown but assumption made that some equipment left behind at desert site. Inventory of equipment lost will be available later.

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET [redacted]

TAB C

Unit	Classified or Sensitive Data Likely Accessible
Helos #1, 2, 4 (About 12 hours)	Secure Voice Equipment - PARKHILL - NESTOR "BLUE BINDER" (contained photographs) Call Signs/Frequencies Mission Plans
Helos #7, 8 (Intact)	"BLUE BINDER" Call Signs/Frequencies Mission Plans
DELTA FORCE	Unknown: Preliminary inventory indicates the loss of the following communication equipment: (all unclassified).

Item	Quanity
AN/PRC-77	1
AN/PRC-66	2
PSC-1 (prototype satellite terminal)	1
PT-25	3
AN/PRC-74	6
AN/WSC-3	1
KOI-18	1

TAB D

ASSESSED DAMAGE

	Classified Compromise	Sensitive
- Secure Voice Equipment		
-- PARKHILL	Serious (If given to Soviets)	N/A
-- NESTOR	Minimal	N/A
- "BLUE BINDER"		
[redacted]	Minimal	Minimal
[redacted]	Minimal	Identifies sit [illegible]
- JTF-79 CEOI Extract	Minimal	[illegible]
- Brevity Codes	Minimal	N/A
- Route Books with Maps	Minimal	N/A
- CVW-8 "Card of the Day"	Minimal	N/A
- Call Sign Extracts	Minimal	[redacted]
- Watch Schedule/Hideout	Minimal	[redacted]
- USS NIMITZ Frequencies	Minimal	N/A
- TACAIR Info	[redacted]	[redacted]
- Pilot Mission Briefing Notes	Minimal	N/A

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

767

4 November 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: ~~MG Vaught~~ MG Secord HAS REEN

Info: 1st SOW
101st AV GP

(U) Subject: Potent Charge II (Heavy Lift Assault Training)

A Purpose: Train units to perform specific SNOWBIRD (TS) tasks relating to a terminal area assault by Delta-plus and [redacted] Rangers on Marilyn and the sports complex.

Concept: Train an assault force to acceptable standards by deploying the flying units to [redacted] and Ft Bragg, NC to work closely with ground elements to develop the skills and procedures necessary to conduct air assault operations against SNOWBIRD (~~TS~~) targets.

A Assets: 5 HH-53H, 2 HH-53C, 4 CH-47, 14 UH-60, [redacted]

Objectives of [redacted]ased training:

1. Develop the HH-53 and CH-47 assault capability for use against SNOWBIRD (~~TS~~) targets.

2. Training Potent Charge I aircrews in assault operations, using ground unit directed training.

3. Develop techniques and procedures for joint assault operations including loss of mission aircraft.

4. Rehearse the "last mile" portion of the assault mission.

5. Develop effective "last man" procedures for the extraction of friendly forces.

A OPSEC: The training at [redacted] was conducted to practice air assault procedures utilizing USAF and Army aircraft. The exercise at Camp A. P. Hill is an extension of the research and development exercise named "Potent Charge". Potent Charge is a joint US Army and Air Force test involving UH-60

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20Nov92 DOD/WHS
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD
DECLASSIFY ON 4 NOVEMBER 2000

~~TOP SECRET~~

Blackhawks, HH-53 Pavelow, and CH-47 CHINOOK, Helicopters. The test is designed to develop the capabilities of the UH-60/HH-53/CH-47's in a low intensity environment along the lines of the RDF mission.

Sequence of Events:

1. A training meeting was held on 6 oct 1980. Delta briefed appropriate people on the ground plan which enables aircrews to evaluate how the helicopter forces would support the activity. Some criteria was set for the terminal training mission. No specific information was available.

(S) 2. On 9-10-11 oct, the heavy lift helicopters deployed to [redacted] for training with [redacted] A sample training schedule was established by the Rangers and helicopter forces (Atch 1).

(S) 3. On 10 Oct, HH-53 crews received area orientation, range briefing, training schedule, and flew an orientation flight to the LZ, [redacted] (Atch 2).

4. On 11 Oct, the Rangers established their load plans and completed static load training (Atch 3). A problem was identified with the CH-47 internal tank configuration. The 101st was notified. Training was continued using the HH-53 as the troop carrier. CH-47's flew the profiles without troops for formation/assault training. In addition, selected Rangers participated in rappelling and hoist training with the HH-53.

5. On 12 Oct, the Rangers briefed the Op Plan for the following week. Aircrews attended the op plan briefing to familiarize themselves with the ground op order.

(S) 6. On 13 Oct, combined assault training was begun. The schedule called for afternoon and night training which followed a specific profile. During the afternoon training, the crews flew five assault profiles. On the first assault, the Rangers deployed, set up their perimeters, check points, and security. They ran their ground plan then withdrew picking up passengers, accounting for personnel, and collapsing their defenses. The aircraft then egressed to a laager area, unloaded the assault troops, and debriefed the profile. The two lead aircraft took off with two CH-47s each and made three assault approaches and landings. When they returned, the Rangers reconfigured the six HH-53s and performed another assault profile. The forces returned to [redacted] where the mission was debriefed. That evening the training continued. The forces performed the same sequence of events at night. Average times recorded from the time the helicopter sound could be identified until the assault force was on the ground was 60 seconds. The sound could be heard sooner than 60 seconds but its location and identity could not be determined. Total time was about 1:20 to 1:40.

7. On 14 Oct, the same training profile was used. By the end of training, the Rangers had completed eight iterations of their ground plan; the HH-53 crews had flown eight assault profiles; the lead aircraft had flown 20 formation assaults; and the CH-47s had flown 12 formation assaults. Half were during daylight, half at night.

(U) 8. The 15th of October was a no fly day so maintenance could prepare the aircraft for the terminal mission.

(U) 9. On 16 oct a 16 hour terminal training mission was flown to assault positions at Camp Wilcox, A.P. Hill AAF. The Op Order is contained in Attachment 4.

Summary of mission:

Delta-plus assault force and SAR Force (Black) and Ranger security/extraction force (GOLD) deployed to MacKall aboard 14 UH-60s and 6 HH-53s with 4 CH-47s in reserve carrying the CCT for use at A.P. Hill AAF.

At MacKall, flight leads and ground commanders briefed; and aircrews briefed to clarify activities. The aircraft were refueled. The helicopter forces departed for the objective area with the UH-60s in the lead on the 280nm route at 1900.

Enroute two HH-53s were disabled, one lost an engine and was forced to land, and one had a chip light and make a precautionary landing. As planned, the troops were transferred to a CH-47 backup and continued the mission. The HH-53 with the chip light corrected the problem and returned home. The lead UH-60 lost its doppler nav equipment and had to DR along the route and did not follow the preplanned course.

At 2130, the Delta-plus forces aboard the UH-60s assault flight landed at their objective (Atch 4). Simultaneously, the security/extraction force aboard the heavy lift assault force landed in their target area. The landing area was lighted as a precaution against striking wires and poles. All forces were delivered on time and on target.

The assault forces deployed, established the security perimeter, protected the passengers, and loaded them for departure.

The force then proceeded to A. P. Hill AAF to debrief and refuel. The forces then redeployed to their training bases.

Objectives Attained

(U) 1. There is now a joint HH-53/CH-47 assault capability capable of performing against SNOWBIRD (TS) targets.

(U) 2. Ground and air units realize the complex problems of the other force and the considerations for assault operations.

(U) 3. Procedures were developed for aircraft substitution, communications, assault landings, formation tactics, and terminal operations.

(U) 4. Training was conducted against LZs and obstacles that closely simulated SNOWBIRD (TS) targets. Missions were short 40-60nm and training profiles covered all the mission requirements to include - onload, enroute, assault, deployment of forces, withdrawal of forces, and egress.

5. Ranger DACO procedures have been effectively developed practiced, and evaluated to precisely account for friendly forces.

(U) 6. The terminal mission was exceedingly successful. Personnel were well able to handle all the problems encountered, and adjust to last minute changes in the operation and short planning time. The crews have reached a skill level that can easily compensate and adjust to changes, problems, and emergencies.

7. As a special note, the CCT at Hurlburt responded with about three hours notice to establish and control the FARRP at A. P. Hill AAF. Their response and performance is noteworthy.

Problems encountered:

(U) 1. Planning and Coordination was not timely, joint planning and coordination meetings were not held until two days prior to the mission. Planning information was not disseminated to all component units. The Op Order was published the morning of the exercise and was not received by some units until after the exercise.

(U) Recommendation: It is imperative that joint missions be organized and planned far enough in advance to be safe, effective missions that yield the maximum training benefit. This is especially true if participating units are at different locations. Joint training should be managed and coordinated by JTD not component units. This has been mentioned in several previous after action reports and worked well during Potent Charge I. The units should identify their particular and joint training objectives and include them in the intermediate and terminal training objectives. A coordinator or chairman who is overall manager/coordinator of the training should be appointed. He should have an Ops Staff to evaluate progress toward intermediate and terminal training objectives; and a planning staff, composed of

representatives of the participating units, to be the central planning and briefing cell. The planning staff is especially critical if the units are not colocated. It is a JTD responsibility to insure the planning and training conducted by participating units is mutually beneficial to all. If some units are not prepared to complete a mission properly, don't do it. We must stop relying on the skill and professionalism of the crews to save poorly planned and poorly briefed missions. The crews are trained in the basic procedures that will carry them through any missions but they have a tremendous advantage if there is a plan to follow.

Recommendation: Sequence of events for Joint training:

(U) 1. JTD - Establish the operational requirement, identify the units to participate in the training, and identify the terminal training objectives.

(U) 2. JTD managers and unit planners establish the intermediate training objectives, standards, and approximate training time to meet the objective.

(U) 3. Units should establish their logistics requirements and advance parties should be deployed.

(U) 4. A terminal training mission should be identified at least 72 hours prior to mission briefing time.

- Areas surveyed by unit representatives
- Routes established
- logistic support established

(U) 5. The following should be firmly established and an Op Order published before 48 hours:

- LZ/PZ/Holding areas
- FARRP
- Transload in/out
- Sequence of events
- CEOI

(U) 6. Unit planners refine the data to present the crews with a comprehensive mission profile at least 24 hours prior to the mission briefing. The crews can then plan and coordinate crew and flight activities.

(U) 7. Twelve hours prior to mission briefing the crews should receive an extensive briefing with all parties present. If at separate locations, the briefing should be earlier and if possible given to all units by the same individual.

(U) 8. Mission brief should be a formal briefing IAW JHTF procedural manual. This briefing should be face to face and include CCT procedures.

(U) These procedures should be utilized for every exercise. The larger the exercise, the more lead-time will be a factor in proper planning. Prior planning and proper coordination are absolutely necessary. The schedule will vary with the complexity of the mission, but the last elements in items 4 through 8 should be closely adhered to; and if the schedule is not met, activities should be adjusted to allow for proper planning. Rushing into an exercise ill-prepared detracts from training and diminishes the value of terminal missions as a demonstration of the terminal training objectives.

(U) 2. Mission briefings: The individual units had excellent briefings; but there was no joint briefing or face-to-face briefings for participating units. On the grass 30 minutes before take-off is not the time to brief mission leads. When do they brief their crews? Compartmentilization is good and the briefings should not be in intricate detail; but the sequence of events and the dynamic flow of the mission should be understood by all.

Recommendations: Same as for the planning problem.

3. Maintenance: The improved quality of maintenance is worth mentioning. All missions and aircraft scheduled took-off as scheduled. Every day six HH-53 and four CH-47 flew as scheduled. On mission day, seven HH-53 and four CH-47 flew. Three missions were not completed as scheduled. One was an aircraft incident, on 13 Oct when HH-53 995 (SLICK) had a tail rotor strike while landing in the Laager area. Two people were injured, a Pararescue Specialist and a Ranger. The second and third occurred on the terminal mission. One HH-53C lost an engine and was replaced by the spare HH-53H. The spare aircraft then had a main gear box chip light and, as a precaution, landed and transferred the rangers to a CH-47. the mission was completed. Of 64 HH-53 sorties scheduled 61 were flown as briefed (95%) (Atch 5). This does not include 14 deployment sorties and 4 administrative sorties that were also flown as scheduled. The CH-47s flew all sorties as scheduled. There has been a significant effort by all units to improve the maintenance support. This effort should continue, it is producing results.

(U) Recommendation: We should minimize deployment requirements for the flying units. If we intend to use our flying resources in the near future, it is time to return these systems to their units to be kept in the best condition. When the aircraft are deployed away from home station, their condition deteriorates. It can take up to a week to recover from a deployment. We cannot afford to have aircraft away from home station in less than optimum condition if there is the possibility that they will be on alert for immediate deployment.

4. Equipment problems:

a. CH-47 load capacity. A problem with the internal capacity of the CH-47 surfaced during the training. One mission of the CH-47 is to spare for the HH-53 in the assault mission. This is impossible with the internal tank configuration presently in use. There is very little room to load and carry the Ranger assault force into the objective and far less capacity than the HH-53 to take on additional passengers should problems arise in the LZ.

(U) Recommendation: The CH-47 should be configured to carry 50+ personnel. Immediate modification of the internal tank system to allow removal of sufficient tanks to allow the CH-47 to carry the specified load. The time of removal should be decreased from 2-3 hours to 15-20 minutes.

(U) b. HH-53 gross weight limits. Still under study. The capability is there, the problem is an administrative one of who will accept responsibility if there is a problem.

(U) 5. Navigation: Navigation problems could prove to be mission stoppers. If available, the capability of the Pave Low is indispensable in the barren terrain where towns, highways, and other prominent man-made features are missing. On the terminal mission, equipment problems caused the Blackhawk crews to revert to DR navigation. As a result, the Blackhawk flight was flying up to 5 miles to the right of course and slightly off on the control times. This is especially noteworthy since the navigation checkpoints were prominent points over towns and cities along the route.

(U) Recommendation: If the Pave Low aircraft are available, they should lead the assault flights on extensive navigation legs (over 100 nm). Procedures for the Pave Low to relinquish lead at the IIP were used during Poison Dart and were very effective. They involved leading the Blackhawk to the IIP turning on the final heading then braking off from the flight and having the Blackhawks proceed to the target. The Pave Low has the navigation capability to avoid using inhabited areas as checkpoints.

(U) Training Area: [redacted] to use as helicopter landing zones are difficult to find and present Op Sec problems. Almost any urban scenario will dictate the use of a [redacted] or [redacted] or similar [redacted] Building [redacted] is impractical.

(U) Recommendation: Find or build LZs at Hurlburt, Campbell, and [redacted] that can be specifically used to simulate a [redacted] By finding or creating an LZ as large as a [redacted] then cutting the surrounding trees so they taper out in the profile of the [redacted] The units needing this type facility will have one to practice with. Making a [redacted] out of the [redacted] has three main advantages: concealment from satellite observation, low exposure to public scrutiny, and cost.

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS:

a. OPSEC - When deploying the helicopter resources (especially the 1st SOW) the following precautions are recommended to counter the obvious surveillance.

1) Deploy the H-53 on an exercise to a remote location.

2) Load them on C-5s at that location or fly them to a C-5 base. Loading C-5s at Hurlburt will give agents watching a week of warning to prepare for a mission.

3) Move 2 or 3 MAC H-53s to Hurlburt or a simulated exercise location to keep the weapon system visible.

(U) b. ICS - Technical intelligence cannot be relied on to guarantee the safety and security of our LZ's. Our intended LZs are obvious and require very little to defend. In addition, they have been identified in previous mission scenarios. It is imperative that ICS clear/secure or verify the LZ before the helicopter forces are committed. The assault force is especially vulnerable on the ingress phase of the assault. The one situation worse than starting out with zero surprise is starting with a Hot LZ. Our forces are too fragile to risk this situation.

(U) C. Deployments: I will reiterate the recommendation in the maintenance comments. When we deploy the aircraft we decrease their capability to support mission requirements. If the aircraft must be deployed, the aircraft should be kept away from adverse conditions i.e. dust, at places like Oro Grande, long deployments, and extended flights.

(U) d. Emergency Refueling Capability: The light weight hose/adapter system that can be used with the H-53 fuel dump system will be a valuable system in mission scenarios that require extensive fuel planning and flying to fuel limits. The ability of one H-53 to refuel another could be the difference between completing a mission and losing an aircraft.

(U) Follow-Up Actions:

The following debriefing items have been compiled to assist units in establishing and fulfilling equipment and procedural requirements. Acceptable comments should be incorporated in an H-53/UH-60/CH-47 supplement to the JHTF procedural manual.

Equipment related comments:

(U) a. 7A engines for the HH-53C are necessity. The program is on track and goals should be met soon. Spare engines are on hand for immediate upgrade if necessary.

(U) b. Minimum equipment package. A parts package should be identified for the H-53. This package should include a tool kit and materials to make repairs in the field. During the training, an H-53 was returned to service in the field because the CH-47s carried a reserve supply of oil.

(U) c. Fuzz burning chip detectors. There have been several instances where H-53's have made precautionary landings because of chip lights. The corrective action was to shut down and clean off the chip detector plug. The fuzz burning plug could save time and maybe a mission.

(U) d. IR lights - efforts should be made to expedite the acquisition of the IR glass from LAS. It was indicated by the crews that the dimmer switches work well.

(U) e. Passenger related equipment. There were several items that were identified as passenger related equipment that would either facilitate operations or make the personnel more comfortable.

(U) (1) Head set - There should be a head set available for the team chief or DACO or troop commander to facilitate communications with the crew. Direct communications is more efficient than yelling and hand signals in the dark.

(2) Ear plugs - The Rangers are issued ear plugs, but some get lost, misplaced, etc. Extra ear plugs should be carried for passengers. This is especially important if passengers are going to be picked up enroute. The use of ear plugs is important in decreasing the effects of fatigue caused by the loud noise in the helicopter.

(U) (3) Support straps - Running a tie down strap through the seat anchor points along the side bulkhead provides a hand hold for passengers to support themselves. Rangers with heavy packs need this type support during the maneuvers used in low altitude, high speed assault approaches.

(U) (4) Air sick bags. Air sickness did not appear to be a problem. There is the possibility that on extensive low level flight in turbulent conditions i.e. mountains, bad weather, etc., some will get sick.

(U) (5) Plenty of water.

f. CCT should deploy with helicopter units. (U) The use of unmarked LZs is almost certain. CCT should be available to evaluate and establish proper LZs and control when necessary.

g. [redacted] capability. The ability to [redacted] is a viable capability. This is especially valuable on long [redacted] missions where transferring from [redacted] could make the difference between recovering an aircraft and its lead or losing it.

Procedural related comments:

(U) a. Departure

(1) Mark the aircraft with a chalk number to enable the ground forces to easily identify their aircraft. If a spare is used, it should assume the position and markings of the aircraft it replaces. Aircraft will be marked from right to left for fingertip formations and clockwise for diamond formations.

(2) Aborts. If a spare replaces a mission aircraft it will pick up the passengers (and crew if necessary) and assume the mission aircrafts position. All the crews and the on-board troop commanders should be made aware of any losses to coordinate activities and insure all are aware of changes and responsibilities.

(3) The aircrew commander and troop commander should establish a load and showtime for the mission. The ground commander should be aware of the capabilities of the aircraft and maximum load possible. This should be done during the planning phase. The troop commander must know what the weight limits will be so as not to make unrealistic demands.

(4) Loading:

(a) When passengers are loaded, they should move as far forward as possible and remain standing until everyone is on-loaded. Then they can sit down for takeoff. They should remain standing until cleared to sit down to enable last minute passengers to come aboard.

(b) Aircrew members should help guide people on board the aircraft. Many will not have NVGs nor will they be familiar with the H-53. To facilitate loading the cargo tie down lights should be used.

(U) 5. Armed troops should board the aircraft with their weapons cleared and muzzel down. They should keep the muzzel down during flight. All ammunition should be secured to keep loose shells from becoming a hazard. When offloading, weapons should be cleared with clip installed. Troops will chamber a round when off the aircraft.

(U) 6. Assault:

a. Approach:

(1) Extensive preflight planning should be done to study the route to establish navigation check points, deceleration points, and visual clues to allow the assault force to properly fly the fastest assault possible, keep airspeed changes on final to a minimum, and have a smooth transition from assault run-in to landing.

(2) IR lights should be tested prior to arrival at the LZ.

(3) Communication Control Point (CCP) should be established to insure precise coordination on the final phase of flight. The CCP should be prior to the IIP or before the point where the assault force transitions from enroute to assault formation.

(4) During the final phase of the assault, both pilots should be on the controls in case one or the other is wounded. All protective gear should be used, flack vests, armor seats, ballistic helmets, etc.

(5) Passengers should be briefed to depart aircraft by a route that will avoid landing areas used by other aircraft.

(6) DACO procedures. DACO personnel will indicate when all people are accounted for. The primary means of notification should be over interphone. When the crew is cleared, the flight leads should be notified. The flight leads will insure all members of his flight are ready prior to signaling for takeoff. Primary means of notification will be radio backed up with a visual signal. The signal for YES would be appropriate.

(7) When personnel go to another aircraft because of loading, maintenance, or combat considerations, the transfer should be coordinated prior to the movement.

CG

[redacted] Major, USAF
Special Assistant, Helicopter Operations

SCHEDULE FOR ASSAULT TRAINING HEAVY LIFT

9 Oct - Thursday - deploy to [redacted]

(U) 10 Oct - Friday - HH-53
0900 - Range briefing
1000 - Rappell training with HH-53
1200 - Load planning
1430 - Orientation flight LZ

11 Oct - Saturday - CH-47 arrive
1545 - HH-53 orientation flight assault practice at [redacted]

(U) 12 Oct - Sunday
1200 - orientation mission brief
1500 - CH-47 orientation flight
1400 - Ground Op Order Brief

13 Oct - Monday
1200 - Briefing all crews/Rangers
1500 - Takeoff for day assault practice
1715 - Return debrief
1930 - Takeoff for night assault practice

14 Oct - Tuesday
1200 - Briefing all crews/Rangers
1500 - Takeoff for day assault practice
1700 - Return, debrief
1930 - Takeoff for night assault practice

(U) 15 Oct - MX Day

(U) 16 Oct - MSN Day
1300 - Brief
1500 - TO 2130 T.O.T.

Attachment 1

TRAINING OBJECTIVES (STATIC LOAD TRAINING)

1. LOADING:

   a. Seating plan
   b. Sequence
   c. Approaches
   d. Seat belts
   e. Weapons clear/antennas secured
   f. Bump plan
   g. Wounded/litter cases
   h. Vehicles
   i. Stowage

2. ARMAMENT:

   a. Weapons
   b. Air/ground use
   c. Fir control/rules of engagement

3. COMMUNICATIONS:

   a. UHF/VHF/FM
   b. Range
   c. Intercom
   d. Location on A/C

4. CAPABILITIES:

   a. Speed/Altitude/Range
   b. A/C load/Crew number

5. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (LZ/PZ):

   a. Terminal Guidance
   b. Back-up signals
   c. LZ/PZ size and requisite characteristics
   d. LZ/PZ markings
   e. Day/Night considerations
   f. Ground guides

6. SAFETY/EMERGENCY PROCEDURES:

   a. Rotor dip
   b. Emergency exits
   c. Emergency gear - 1st Aid/Fire/Radio/Survival
   d. Crash positions
   e. Crew vest accessories
   f. Shutdown of power/Emergency
   g. Blind spots (Pilots), Personnel Loading

7. INFRA-RED CAPABILITIES:

   a. Internal lighting
   b. Light switchboards

8. SEARCH AND AIR RESCUE (SHAR):

   a. First Aid
   b. Firefighting
   c. Communications
   d. ATC (limited)
   e. Security
   f. Pilot/SAAR LDR coordination
   g. A/C destruction
   h. Tow/lift points
   i. Possible cut points interior & exterior
   j. Rappel
   k. Crew removal
   l. Rotor brake
   m. Emergency AC shutdown
   n. Emergency A/A in event of crash

9. CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT/DOCUMENT LOCATIONS:

   a. Document containers
   b. Equipment/Avionics
   c. Destruction requirements
   d. Priority of tasks

OPORD 1-81

[redacted]

5. Command and Signal:

a. Signal: Annex F (Communications/Electronics)

b. Command: TF Cdr in UH-60 #4 during Flite; CP VIC Bldg AMB during assault. VIC SE Corner of EZ GOLD until extraction; in HH-53 #_____ during Exfil.

[redacted]

COL

OFFICIAL

[redacted]

Ops Officer

Annexes: A - Marshalling Area Diagram

B - Operations Overlay

C - Refuel Position Diagram

D - Sequence of Events

E - Service Support

F - Communications/Electronics

G - Search and Rescue

DISTRIBUTION:
As Required

ANNEX A, MARSHALLING AREA
DIAGRAM, TO OPORD 1-81



0 500M 1000M 1500M

SCALE APPROXIMATE

CAMP MACKALL ARMY AIRFIELD NC

SECRET

To OPORD 1-81



[redacted]



FT AP HILL AAF #1

ANNEX C (REFUEL POSN DIAGRAM)
TO OPORD 1-81

ANNEX D (SEQUENCE OF EVENTS) TO OPORD 1-81

161400	Weather Decision
161400	ADVON Departs
162045	TF [redacted] Assemble at FLS 2, Ft Bragg
162115	TF [redacted] Depart FLS 2
162130	JTF [redacted] Marshalls at Camp Mackall AAF
162300	JTF [redacted] Depart Camp Mackall AAF
170130	JTF PASCHALL TOT Camp Wilcox, Ft. A.P. Hill (First H-Hour) [Incl 1 (Operations Schedule) to Annex 1, (Sequence of Events) to OPORD 1-81]
o/a 170230	JTF [redacted] Refuel/Critique
TBA	JTF [redacted] TOT Camp Wilcox, Ft. A.P. Hill (Seconf H-Hour)
NLT 170500	JTF [redacted] Redeployment Operations
o/a 170600	TF [redacted] arrive ~~Range 19~~ FLS 2, Ft. Bragg
o/a 170600	TF [redacted] arrive Camp Mackall AAF (Refuel Stop)
ASAP	TF [redacted] Depart Camp Mackall AAF (To [redacted]
171000	ADVON Returns

~~SECRET~~

INCLOSURE 1 (OPERATIONS SCHEDULE) TO ANNEX D (SEQUENCE OF EVENTS)

TO OPORD 1-81

OPSKED

EVENT	TRANSMITTED TO	CODE WORD
1. Assault Force on the Ground/Assault in Progress	Gold to [redacted] Cdr [redacted] Cdr to COMJTF	SHOTGUN
2. # of Hostages Extracted via held to Exfil Airfield	[redacted] Cdr to COMJTF	"23 CANARIES AIRBORNE"
3. All Forces Departing Compound.	[redacted] Cdr to GOLD	HOT FOOT
4. All Forces Closed in to STADIUM	[redacted] to COMJTF	RODEO
5. Compound Assault Force Extracted via HELO/Enroute to Exfil Airfield	[redacted] to COMJTF	"Lift #1 Airborne"
6. GOLD Element Extracted/Enroute to Exfil Airfield	[redacted] to COMJTF	"LIFT #2 AIRBORNE"

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
(Classification)

Copy no ___ of ___ copies

[redacted]
Fort Bragg, NC 28307
_____ October 1980

ANNEX E (Service Support) to OPORD 1-81

References: Map, Special; Series V834S, Fort A. P. Hill Firing Ranges, VA; Edition 4-DMATC, 1:25,000

Map, TPC G-21A-S, Edition 5 1:500,000

Map, TPC G-21B-S, Edition 5 1:500,000

Map, TPC G-21C-S, Edition 5 1:500,000

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU

1. GENERAL

This order provides for cbt svc spt to [redacted]ear Fort A. P. Hill. [redacted]s supported by internal assets, Fort Lee, VA, Fort A.P. Hill, VA, and Camp MacKall, NC. Supporting elements open on-call as per prior [redacted] S-3, coordination.

2. MATERIEL AND SERVICES

a. Supply.

(1) Class I. (Rations)

(a) [redacted] mess hall hours for 16 Oct dinner meal changed to 1600-1645 hours.

(b) C-rations available upon request from [redacted] S-4.

(2) Class II. (Individual clothing & equipment) Priority to [redacted] limited, selected items available to remainder of task organization personnel.

[redacted]
(Classification)

[redacted]

A

[redacted]

[redacted]

(6) Class VI [illegible]

(7) Class VII. (Major end items) Available [illegible] [redacted] S-4.

A

(8) Class VIII. (Medical) Available [illegible] [redacted] S-4 Medical Section (direct coordination authorized) and [illegible] personnel.

(9) Class IX. (Repair parts) JHTF support [illegible] up [illegible].

(10) Air resupply. Emergency requests will be [illegible] [redacted] S-3 to S-4.

A

b. Transportation.

(1) In support of [illegible] departure, 1514[illegible]

(a) Number of personnel: 10 ea

(b) [illegible] hand carry.

(c) Departure point: loading dock.

(d) Departure time: 151400Z, ETA: [illegible]Z.

(e) Departure vehicles: 2 [illegible] wans, [illegible]

(Classifi[illegible])

SECRET

[redacted]
(Classification)

(ANX E (SVC SPT) to OPORD 1-81 - [redacted]

(f) Drivers: from personnel in (a) above.

(g) Load time: 161330Z.

(h) Destination: Camp A. P. Hill.

(2) In support of TF [redacted] assembly at FLS-2, 162045Z.

(a) Number of personnel: 100+

(b) Cargo: hand carry.

(c) Departure point: loading dock.

(d) Departure time: 162115Z.

(e) Departure vehicles: 7 ea

1 L-100, 4½-ton van with 25 PAX [redacted]

2 L-103, 4½-ton van with 25 PAX [redacted]

3 M-185, 4½-ton SP [redacted] 0 PAX

4 M-314, 4½-ton SP [redacted] 20 PAX

5 H-215, 9 PAX van, 9 PAX

6 Standby:

#7, 9 PAX van

M315, 4½-ton SP (Log)

(f) Drivers from personnel in (a) above. S-4 responsible for driver of H-215 who will serve as guard.

(g) Load time: 162015Z.

(h) Destination: FLS-2.

[redacted]
(Classification)

(3) In support of JTF Paschall, Cp MacKall AAF, 162130Z.

(a) Number of personnel: 2 to 4 ea

(b) Cargo: hand carry.

(c) Departure point: loading dock.

(d) Departure time: 162000Z, ETA: 162130Z.

(e) Departure vehicles: 2 ea (S&T owned) 9 PAX van and 4½-ton.

(f) Drivers: S&T

(g) Load time: 161955Z.

(h) Destination: Cp MacKall,

c. Services. Individuals responsible for cleaning of individual equipment and turn-in of unserviceable items to respective unit.

d. Maintenance.

(1) Ground vehicle maintenance available at Fort Bragg; contact team will be made available upon request.

(2) Aircraft maintenance is the responsibility of JHTF.

3. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. Emergencies to be handled by nearest hospital; priority to military hospital. Facilities enroute are as follows:

(1) Military

(a) Womack Army Hospital, Ft Bragg, NC. FM 40.60 VHF 150.425 LL 396-0301

(b) Kenner Army Hospital, Ft Lee, VA (Petersburg, VA) Motorola Model B1240, Freq 32.50 LL734-1518

[redacted]

(Classification)

(ANX E (SVC SPT) to OPORD 1-81 - [redacted]

(c) Dewitt Army Hospital, Ft Belvoir, VA (75 miles north of Fort A. P. Hill) Davidson Army Airfield moniters VHF 126.3 UHF229.4 LL-664-1938.

(2) Civilian Hospitals

(a) Moore County Hospital (Pinehurst, NC, vicinity of Camp MacKall) VHF 123.5 (or contact emergency room at Womack Army Hospital and have them alert Moore County).

(b) NC Memorial Hospital, Chapel Hill, NC VHF 123.5.

(c) Duke Unviersity Medical Center, Durham, NC UHF 123.5

(d) Mary Washington Hospital, Fredricksburg, VA (vicinity of Fort A.P. Hill) LL 373-4110.

c. General. Fort A.P. Hill is supported medically by a U.S. Army Health Clinic. It is not operational after 1630 hours daily.

d. Minor injuries to be handled by respective unit medical personnel.

4. PERSONNEL

Selected personnel to act as players TBA.

5. CIVIL - MILITARY COOPERATION

As directed by [redacted] S-3.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

[redacted]
COL, IN
Commanding

OFFICIAL:
[redacted]
S-4

[redacted]

(Classification)

ANNEX F (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) to OPORD 1-81

[redacted]

References: Map, Special; Series V834S, Fort A.P. Hill Firing Ranges, VA; Edition 4-DMATC, 1:25,000

Map, TPC G-21A-S, Edition 5 1:500,000

Map, TPC G-21B-S, Edition 5 1:500,000

Map, TPC G-21C-S, Edition 5 1:500,000

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU

1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces: Enemy EW capability to exploit a short term operation are considered to be negligible. Enemy equipment is compatible with U.S. equipment, therefore all FM, UHF, HF, SATCOM Radio circuits are subject to intercept/jamming. USSR poises a serious intercept/jamming problem to any U.S. effort.

b. Friendly Forces:

(1) [redacted] provides common Crypto keying material for [redacted] and 101st Abn (Ambl).

(2) OPORD 1-81.

c. Attachments and Detachments:

(1) Attachments, 1 PLT of [redacted]

(2) Detachments. 1 RTO supports [redacted] with 2 PT 25/KY 65's and associated equipment 14-17 Oct 80.

d. Base Comm Section:

(1) Provide 1 NCO to support the [redacted] with 2 PT 25/KY 65's 14 - 17 Oct 80.

(2) Provide 2 NCO's with PRC 77/KY 38's to support [redacted]

(3) Install, operate and maintain SATCOM communications IAW Appendix 1. Equipment to be operational NLT 162200Z Oct 80.

(4) Provide 1 NCO with PRC 66 and PRT 250/KY 68 to S-3 [redacted] Dpt o/a 161400Z Oct 80.

e. Fwd Comm Section:

(1) Provide 1 RTO with PRT 250/KY 65 to [redacted] HQ

(2) Provide 1 RTO with PRC 77/KY 38 to [redacted]

(3) Provide 1 PRC 66 to MAJ [redacted] NO to [redacted]

(4) Augments Base Comm Section as required.

(5) Provide 1 RTO with PRT 250/KY 65 to [redacted] HQ.

f. Maintenance Section:

(1) Assists [redacted] and 101st Abn (Ambl) in the maintenance of C-E equipment.

(2) Provides standby maintenance capability for all C-E equipment 162000 until Endex.

g. [redacted]

(1) Enters SATCOM net IAW Appendix 1.

(2) Enters [redacted] internal nets IAW Appendix 2.

(3) Receipts for four KY 38's from [redacted] COMSEC custodian.

(4) Operates as Net Control Station/for HELO CLT Net.

(5) Equip 2 SAR Teams with 1 PRC 77 per team.

h. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Comm Center Section provides service to [redacted] 101st Abn (Ambl) and other designated units/personnel.

(2) Radio

(a) SATCOM (See Appendix 1)

(b) [redacted]ternal Nets (See Appendix 2)

(c) Air to Air Nets (See Appendix 3)

(3) Visual Signals:

~~(a) One white star cluster - Initiate extraction from primary EZ~~

~~(b) Two white star clusters - Extract from Alternate EZ~~

~~(c) Three star clusters - abort mission.~~

(d) One red star - wall will be blown in 30 seconds.

(4) Emergency Communications:

(a) Channel 3 of [redacted]X 360's is designated as SAR frequency for E & E operations.

(b) PANELS in the form of a [redacted] Symbol are designated as SAR Daylight ground to air communications for E & E Operations (Indicates request for extraction - area is secure).

(c) Emergency Radios such as the URC 10 or PRC 90 may be used for emergency ground to air communications. Frequencies used are international distress frequencies.

(5) Crypto Material:

(a) HJ Time 1500Z Daily

(b) Nestor - USKAK 8588C Day 5. Period 16 Oct till completion of exercise.

(c) Parkhill - USKAT 2066A Day 5. Period 16 Oct till completion of exercise.

(d) KY-65 Settings:

	HF RAD	ALL OTHER
	DELAY IN	HF IN	NON HF IN

4. Service Support: Annex E

5. Command and Signal:

a. Signal. CEOI Item 2-8[redacted] is in effect.

b. Command; per basic order

Appendixes: 1. SATCOM

2. [redacted] Internal Nets

3. Air to Air Nets


INTERNAL NETS
PRI _____ MX360 CH1
ALT _ _ _ _ FM(SECURE)
AC130
UH
NONSI
LA
PRI: __ FM(SECURE)
ALT: __ UHF
NON-SECURE
FM
CMD
WALL
MX360
CH3
MX360
CH4
MX360
CH2
DACO
MX360
SECURITY
MX360
DACO
FM
CH3
CH4
SECURITY
ELEMENTS
UH60

[redacted]

SATCOM



APPENDIX 1

[redacted]

AIR TO AIR NETS



ANNEX G, SEARCH AND RESCUE, TO OPORD 1-81

ACTIONS OF PERSONNEL IN DOWNED AIRCRAFT:

a. Shut down engines, fuel system and electrical system.

b. Assemble all injured at the nose of the downed aircraft.

c. Uninjured form local security in front of the aircraft.

d. Remove all weapons and sensitive material and secure.

e. Each individual should retain his personal gear.

f. Attempt to zero all secure equipment and leave hood up as a signal to the SAR team that this has been accomplished.

g. Maintain a fire watch to the aircraft - does not catch fire.

h. Set up IR scrobe for signal to SAR aircraft that LZ is clear and secure.

i. Be prepared to assist aid and litter teams.

j. Pilot in charge of personnel until SAR arrives.

SECRET

SECRET

SCHEDULE OF HH-53 ACTIVITIES.

TAIL #/AC	DATE	Z ETD	Z ATD	Z ETA	Z ATA	SORTIES	HRS	Cum SORT/HR
432/[redacted]	9 OCT	—	1925	—	2305	1	3.7	1/3.7
647/[redacted]	9OCT	—	1955	—	2140	1	2.7	2/6.4
795/[redacted]	9 OCT	—	1855	—	2140	1	2.7	3/9.1
652/[redacted]	9OCT	—	1910	—	2140	1	2.5	4/11.6
648/[redacted]	9OCT	—	1910	—	2140	1	2.5	5/14.1
433/[redacted]	9OCT	—	1910	—	2140	1	2.5	6/16.6
650/[redacted]	9OCT	—	1910	—	2140	1	2.5	7/19.1
995/[redacted]	9OCT	—	1855	—	2140	1	2.7	8/21.8
647/[redacted]	10OCT	—	2045	—	2315	1	2.5	9/24.3
652/[redacted]	10OCT	—	2045	—	2315	1	2.5	10/29.8
650/[redacted]	10OCT	—	2045	—	2315	1	2.5	11/32.3
433/[redacted]	10OCT	—	2045	—	2315	1	2.5	12/34.8
995/[redacted]	10OCT	—	2045	—	2315	1	2.5	13/37.3
795/[redacted]	10OCT	—	2045	—	2315	1	2.5	14/39.8
995/[redacted]	11OCT	1400	1455	1600	1600	1	HOIST TNG 1.1	15/40.9
432/[redacted]	11OCT	1900	1925	2200	2225	1	3.0	16/43.9
648/[redacted]	11OCT	1900	1925	2200	2225	1	3.0	17/46.9
995/[redacted]	11OCT	1900	1925	2200	2205	1	2.7	18/49.6
650/[redacted]	11OCT	1900	1925	2200	2225	1	3.0	19/52.6
647/[redacted]	11OCT	1900	1925	2200	2225	1	3.0	20/55.6
652/[redacted]	11OCT	1900	1925	2200	2205	1	2.7	21/58.3
433/[redacted]	12OCT	1800	1825	—	1945	1	RCF 1.3	22/59.6
433/[redacted]	13OCT	1900	1945	2100	2125	1	2.7	23/62.3
647/[redacted]	13OCT	1900	1845	2100	2125	1	2.7	24/65.0
650/[redacted]	13OCT	1900	1845	2100	2115	1	2.5	25/67.5
995/[redacted]	13OCT	1900	1845	2100	2115	1	2.5	26/70.0
48/[redacted]	13OCT	1900	1845	2100	2115	1	2.4	27/72.4

FORM 3125

GENERAL PURPOSE (8" X 10½")

SECRET

SECRET

G

795 / [redacted]	13 OCT	1900	1845	2100	2125	1	2.7	28 / 75.1
650 / [redacted]	13 OCT	2330	2325	0230	0100	1	[illegible]	[illegible] / 76.7
* TAIL STRIKE 995 / [redacted]	13 OCT	2330	2325	0230	0025	1	TAIL STRIKE 1.0	30 / 77.[illegible]
647 / [redacted]	13 OCT	2330	2310	0230	0135	1	2.3	31 / 80.[illegible]
795 / [redacted]	13 OCT	2330	2325	0230	0135	1	2.2	32 / 82.2
648 / [redacted]	13 OCT	2330	2325	0230	0150	1	2.4	33 / 84.6
433 / [redacted]	13 OCT	2330	2325	0230	0135	1	2.2	34 / 86.8
288 650 / [redacted]	14 OCT	1900	1855	2100	2125	1	2.5	35 / 89.3
648 / [redacted]	14 OCT	1900	1855	2100	2125	1	2.5	36 / 91.8
433 / [redacted]	14 OCT	1900	1855	2100	2140	1	2.7	37 / 94.5
432 / [redacted] 2 FERRY	14 OCT	1900	1400 / 1600 / 1855	2100	1430 / 1630 / 2045	3	2.8	40 / 97.3
652 / [redacted]	14 OCT	1900	1855	2100	2140	1	2.7	41 / 100.0
795 / [redacted]	14 OCT	1900	1855	2100	2140	1	2.7	42 / 102.7
433 / [redacted]	14 OCT	2330	2335	0230	0325	1	3.8	43 / 106.5
647 / [redacted]	14 OCT	2330	2335	0230	0315	1	3.7	44 / 110.2
650 / [redacted]	14 OCT	2330	2335	0230	0315	1	3.7	45 / 113.9
432 / [redacted]	14 OCT	2330	2335	0230	0315	1	3.7	46 / 117.6
652 / [redacted]	14 OCT	2330	2335	0230	0325	1	3.8	47 / 121.4
795 / [redacted]	14 OCT	2330	2335	0230	0325	1	3.8	48 / 125.2
649 / [redacted]	14 OCT	—	2225	—	0055	1	2.5	49 / 127.7
70 649 / [redacted]	16 OCT	1900	1920	0300	0715	3	5.0	52 / 132.7
433 / [redacted]	16 OCT	1900	1855	—	2100	1	2.1	53 / 134.8
433 / [redacted]	16 OCT	—	2300	—	0220	1	3.3	54 / 138.7
433 / [redacted]	16 OCT	—	0515	—	0900	1	3.7	55 / 143.6
795 / [redacted]	16 OCT	1900	1930	—	2100	1	1.5	56 / 145.1
795 / [redacted]	16 OCT	—	2300	—	0215	1	3.3	57 / 148.4
795 / [redacted]	16 OCT	—	0610	—	0955	1	3.9	58 / 152.3

AF FORM SEP 77 3128

GENERAL PURPOSE (8" X 10[illegible]) U.S. G.P.O. 1977-[illegible]

SECRET

647/[redacted]	16 OCT	1900	1900	—	2100	1	2.0	5m/154.3
647/[redacted]	16 OCT	—	2300	—	0215	1	3.3	60/157.6
647/[redacted]	16 OCT	—	0610	—	0955	1	3.7	61/161.3
652/[redacted]	16 OCT	1900	1900	—	2055	1	1.9	62/163.2
652/[redacted]	16 OCT	—	2302	—	0215	1	3.2	63/166.4
652/[redacted]	16 OCT	—	0610	—	2302	1	3.7	64/170.1
650/[redacted]	16 OCT	1900	1900	—	2100	1	2.0	65/172.1
650/[redacted]	16 OCT	—	2300	—	0230	1	3.5	66/175.6
650/[redacted]	16 OCT	—	0510	—	0840	1	3.5	67/179.1
650/[redacted]	16 OCT	—	0905	—	0950	1	0.7	68/179.8
432/[redacted]	16 OCT	ENGINE FAILURE				1	ENGINE FAILURE	
649/[redacted]	16 OCT	CHIP LIGHT	MGB			1	MGB CHIP 2.9	

FORM SEP 77 3125 GENERAL PURPOSE (8" X 10½") ☆U.S. G.P.O. 1977-261-301/1373

I-406

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICAT

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE ACT	PRECEDENCE INFO	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY DATE-TIME	MONTH	YR
				F(S)TS		241200			

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

0197

(C) FROM: ALPHA/JZ

E, G

TO: [redacted]

(C) PASS IMMEDIATELY TO COL BECKWITH/

A MAJ [redacted] (SFOD-D).

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE

DISTR:

RELEASER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

SIGNATURE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DATE TIME GROUP

DD FORM 172 (OCR)

S/N 0102-LF-001-6000

☆U.S.G.P.O. 1979-291-118

~~SECRET~~

SC 109437
1 #0200

MSG 155
250937Z APR 80
FM: JCS/RC
TO: SITE ALPHA/CDR JTF
BT
[redacted]

SUBJ: REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPT
REF: YOUR 250817Z APR 80
YOUR 250805Z APR 80

A 1. DEPARTURE SCHEDULE APPROVED [redacted] MOVE TO [redacted] APPROVED.

C 2. ISOLATION IN [redacted] NOT AUTHORIZED AT THIS TIME.

3. REQUEST SUBMIT ALTERNATIVE ISOLATION SITES FOR HELO CREWS AND [redacted]

(U) 4. SEND YOUR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

(U) 5. GRADUALLY DRAW DOWN SEA SURVEILLANCE ON YOUR DISCRETION. COORDINATE WITH USCINCLUF.

6. CONCUR [redacted] ISOLATION NOT REQUIRED.
BT

i - #523

NNNN

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON: 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE BY: DDONTACC
CT DECL/DOWNGRADED BY: Secret
REVIEW ON: OADR
DERIVED FROM: [redacted]
multiple sources

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

L-584 TOT/08252
RC/

SSN 0225
ZNY TTTTT
DTG 250817Z APR 80
FM JTF/J3
TO JCS/RC
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: REDEPLOYMENT CONCEPT
1. INTEND TO REDEPLOY AS FOLLOWS:
A. RANGERS REDEPLOY 251400Z TO [redacted] ISOLATE AT [redacted]
B. DELTA REDEPLOY PM 25 APR TO LANGLEY. ISOLATE AT [redacted] (S)
C. HELO PILOTS REDEPLOY WITH JTF HQ PM 25 APR. PILOTS WILL ISOLATE AT [redacted] JTF RETURN TO WASHINGTON.
2. INTEND TO DRAW DOWN JTF SUPPORT AT [redacted] AS MC-130/AC-130/RC-130 REDEPLOY OVER TWO TO FOUR DAY PERIOD.
3. REQUEST ADVISE JCS INTENTIONS OF MAINTAINING EC-130/HC-130 SEA SURVEILLANCE SIGNATURE AT [redacted]
BT
#0225

NNNN

#584

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

Classified By: JCS OADR
Declassified ON:

~~SECRET~~

~~Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals~~

FORCE

~~SECRET~~ I-190

INR

Draft Portions of Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Contingency Guide for Southwest Asia (Iran, Afghanistan & Pakistan) (~~FOUO~~)

JCS/J-3 FCD
Washington, DC

1. Provided at Attachment 1 for your review and use, as appropriate, are DRAFT (has not yet been proofed) portions of those SERE Guide Sections on Southwest Asia completed to date. Arrangement of this material is as follows:

SECTION 02 (Pages 02-01 - 02-07) E&E Factors: Terrain Hazards and Surface Condition Categories (FOUO)
SECTION 03 (Pages 03-01 - 03-06) E&E Factors: Concealment (FOUO)
SECTION 04 (Pages 04-01 - 04-03) E&E Factors: Population Distribution (FOUO)
SECTION 08 (Pages 08-01 - 08-05) SAFE Locators (S/NOFORN)
SECTION 12 (Pages 12-01 - 12-05) Survival Factors: Weather and Climate (FOUO)
SECTION 13 (Pages 13-01 - 13-06) Survival Factors: Food, Water, and Shelter (FOUO)
SECTION 14 (Pages 14-01 - 14-02) Edible Plants (FOUO)
SECTION 15 (Pages 15-01 - 15-04) Dangerous Plants (FOUO)
SECTION 16 (Page 16-01) Game Animals (FOUO)
SECTION 17 (Page 17-01) Dangerous Animals (FOUO)
SECTION 18 (Pages 18-01 - 18-02) Common Diseases (FOUO)
SECTION 20 (Pages 20-01 - 20-08) General Survival Information (FOUO)
SECTION 23 (Pages 23-01 - 23-41) Captivity Factors (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)

2. Sections 01 (Introduction/Table of Contents), 05/06 (Security Hazards and Border Security/Conditions), 07 (Resident and Minority Groups), 10 (Category "A" Evasion Locales), 11 (Category "B" Evasion Locales), 1[illegible] (Category "C" Evasion Locales), 19 (Indigenous Medical Care), 21 (Socio-Cultural Hazards, and 22 (Indigenous Diet) will be completed shortly. The remaining Section (24 - E&E Conditions by Geographic Sector) will be the last, and most lengthy portion of the Guide. Plsns. inform this office of your needs regarding the remaining portions of the SWA SERE Guide.

GERALD T. FRAZIER, Major, USAF
Chief, Defense Support Division

1 Atch
Draft Portions of Southwest Asia SERE Guide (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) 1 ea.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO JICC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

~~Classified by Multiple Sources~~
~~Review on 16 October 2026~~
~~Extended by HQ USAF, ACSI~~

[redacted] (~~FOUO~~).

~~Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals~~
~~WARNING NOTICE~~
~~Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MCN

MSG #56
DTG 221512Z APR 87
FM: JTF/RC
TO: JTF/CDR

~~[illegible]~~

SUBJ: SENSITIVE LETTERS

E (U) 1. HAVE CONTACTED [redacted] HE KNOWS HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. WE ARE ACTIVELY WORKING ON SOLUTIONS HERE TO MAKE COMPLIANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS AS EASY AS POSSIBLE FOR ALL CONCERNED.

C [redacted] 2. LTG GAST RECOMMENDATIONS ON USE OF [redacted] (S) BEING PURSUED HERE.

G (U) 3. LTRS BEING CARRIED ON PERSON OF [redacted]

BT

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR



NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 MAY
DERIVATIVE CL BY
☐ DECL CL DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

RA

MCN

#685

TJC

A(S)

[illegible]
FM JCS/[illegible]-JL
TO SITE ALPHA/JL
INFO [illegible]

T O P S E C R E T

SUBJECT: DRY GULF LIST

SITE ALPHA/JL PASS TO COMJTF

(1) THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS COPY OF MEMO PROVIDED TO CJTS ON 20 APRIL 80 PER COMJTF DIRECTION.

(2) THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ACTIVITY THAT MAY BE REPORTED DURING THE COURSE OF THE RICE BOWL OPERATION THAT IF TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT COULD UNDUE CONCERN AND POSSIBLY A PRECIPITOUS DECISION.

A. DETECTION OF AN IRANIAN C130 OR P3 ON A MARITIME SURVEILLANCE MISSION OVER THE PERSIAN GULF. THE IRANIANS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING MISSIONS OF THIS TYPE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS ON A ROUTINE BASIS.

B. DETECTION OF AN IRANIAN NAVAL UNIT IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. THE IRANIANS HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN A NAVAL PATROL IN THE STRAITS FOR MORE THAN [illegible] MONTHS. AND MORE RECENTLY HAVE INCREASED THEIR PATROLLING OF THE NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF.

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

DTG 201330Z APR 80
FROM JCS/RC-J2
TO [redacted]
INFO [redacted]
SITE ALPHA/JE

~~EYES ONLY~~

SUBJECT REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
REF (A) [redacted] MSG #0060 DTG
191915Z APR 80, SAB
(B) JTF/RICEBOWL MSG #0091
DTG 192300 Z APR 80
SUBJ: HOSTAGE UPDATE
(C) JTF/RICEBOWL MSG #0092
DTG:

(1) REF ALPHA REQUESTED UPDATE OF HOSTAGE CONDITIONS AND LOCATIONS FROM [redacted]

(2) REF BRAVO, PARAGRAPH THREE PROVIDED COMMENT ON OVERALL HOSTAGE LOCATION. NO FURTHER DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

(3) REF CHARLIE, PARAGRAPH THREE INDICATED [redacted]

(4) JCS/RC-J2 ASSESSMENT [redacted]

THIS OFFICE DOES NOT BELIEVE THE CHANCERY CONTAINS SUFFICIENT CREATURE COMFORT FACICITIES TO PERMANENTLY HOUSE FIFTY HOSTAGES AND A GUARD FORCE OF 50-80. RECOMMEND FOR TACTICAL PLANNING PRUPOSES THAT HOSTAGES ARE NOT ALL BEING HOUSED IN THE CHANCERY.

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

#686

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] multiple sources

Classified By JCS OADR
Declassified ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ #376 ~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted] OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

PAGE NO. 1 | NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION	LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED FROM HOUR	DATE	TO HOUR	DATE
JTF-79	[redacted]		22 Apr		

E

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
1	1905L		FM [redacted]		
			PERSONNEL CONFIRMED AS		
			DEPARTED EUROPE		
2	2400L		RELEASED TEMIG MSG TO		
			NIMITZ FOR DELTA		
3	0010L		RECEIPTED FOR MSG 84-89		
			ROUTED AS REQUIRED		
4	0050L		JCS RC ADVISED: THEY HAVE		
			SOURCED AND WILL SHIP TO		
			SEYMOUR JOHNSON TONIGHT		
			100% OF OUR AC-130 FLARE		
			RACKS AND FLARE CARTRIDGE		
			REQUIREMENT.	NOTED HERE	
5	0130L		RELEASED KC-135 TACAIR		
			SUPPORT MSG FOR COL MOORE		
6	0200Z		Received call from JCS requesting	Called in	
			exact altitudes and [illegible]	[redacted]	
			coordinates over [redacted]		
				[redacted]	
				Info provided.	
7	0330Z		JCS requested status Ac.		
8	0700L		RECEIVED CHANGE 3 TO CEOI		
			FROM [redacted]	PASSED TO [redacted]	

E, G

G

G

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92 DDO NMCC
DERIVATIVE CL BY multiple sources
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] multiple sources

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY | SIGNATURE
[redacted]

DA FORM 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~ ~~Classified By: JCS~~ ~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

[redacted] Y OFFICER'S LOG
For use of this form, [redacted] the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief [redacted] for Military Operations.

PAGE NO. 2 | NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION: JTF 79

LOCATION: [redacted]

PERIOD COVERED: FROM HOUR / DATE 24 APR — TO HOUR / DATE

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
9	1705Z		TWO AC-130's REPORTED IN DOWN		
			STATUS [redacted] CHECKING		
10	24 APR 0345Z		[redacted] PICKED UP		
			LEM TO MB80 TO SERVICE		
			MAC CREWS.		
	0440Z		FROM JCS:		
			[redacted] 240115Z		
			3 EC-130 WILL ARR 241300Z		
			MSN [redacted] THIS HAS		
			BEEN COORDINATED WITH		
			EUCOM.	ADVISED [redacted]	
ALL TIMES THAT FOLLOW WILL BE ZULU					
	24 APR 80				
11	1400Z		1 [redacted] DEPARTS [redacted]		
			FOR REFUEL SITE.	NOT PASSED BY J-3 TO JCS PER SOP	
	1507Z		8 RH-53 DEPARTED NIMITZ		
			FOR REFUEL SITE.	"	
	1527Z		3 EC-130 AND		
			2 MC-130 DEPART [redacted]		
			FOR REFUEL SITE	SUMMARY A/C LAUNCH MSG TO JCS	
12	1600Z		[redacted]		

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY | SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1 NOV 62 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

PAGE NO. 3 | NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION: JTF-79 [redacted]

LOCATION: [redacted]

PERIOD COVERED: FROM HOUR 1715Z DATE 24 Apr 80 TO HOUR 1845Z DATE 24 Apr

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	
	[redacted]		[redacted]	NOTED/POSTED	
13	1715Z				
			AT 1700Z.	NOTED/PLOTTED	
14	1720Z		TWO HELOS REPORTED ON		
			GROUND.	PASSED TO COMJTF	
15	1730Z		[redacted]		
	[redacted]		(SOURCE: JCS)		
16	1737Z		3KC-135's DEPARTED [redacted]		
			ON TIME FOR ARCT W/ 130's ON		
			RETURN LEG AND FOR NAVY (CTF-70)		
			CAP	POSTED	
17	1835Z		ADVISED TWO HELOS DOWN FOR		
			MAINTENANCE. TWO HELOS DOWN		
			TO ASSIST. FOUR PROCEEDING		
			TO REFUEL SITE. (SOURCE: HELOS)	PASSED TO COMJTF NOTED	
18	1845Z		THE TWO ASSIST HELOS ENROUTE		
			TO REFUEL SITE. NO CLEAR		
			WORD ON TWO DOWN HELOS/CREWS.		
			(SOURCE: HELOS)	PASSED TO COMJTF. NOTED	
19	1813Z		LEAD MC-130 ARRIVED REFUEL		
			SITE.	PASSED TO COMJTF. NOTED	
20	1836Z		1 KC-135 DEPARTED [redacted]		
			ON TIME FOR ARCT W/ 130 - NAVY CAP	NOTED. POSTED	

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY: [redacted] J34 [redacted]

DA FORM 1 NOV 62 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WORKING PAPER

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

PAGE NO. 4 | NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION: JTF-79 (E) | LOCATION: [redacted]

PERIOD COVERED — FROM: HOUR 1730Z DATE 24/Apr/80 | TO: HOUR | DATE

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
21	~~1930Z~~		TWO MC-130's AT REFUELSITE.		
			ENGAGED BUS, GAS TRUCK, AND		
			THIRD VEHICLE. THIRD VEHICLE		
			GOT AWAY IN DIRECTION OF		
			TEHRAN. (SOURCE: MC-130)	COMJTF ADVISED	
22	2000Z		FOUR FIXED WING ON GROUND AT		
			REFUELSITE (SOURCE MC-130)	"	
			TWO MC-130 DEPARTED FOR		
			[redacted] TIME UNKNOWN.		
23	2024Z		FIRST HELO AT REFUELSITE.		
24	2030Z		SECOND HELO AT REFUELSITE.		
			THIRD HELO INBOUND.	"	
25	2035Z		THIRD HELO AT REFUELSITE	"	
			TWO DUE AT 2100Z. OTHER		
			HELO STATUS UNKNOWN.		
26	2080Z		~~FOUR~~ HELOS (TOTAL) ON GROUND		
			TWO ARE 10 MINUTES OUT.	COMJTF "GO"	
			STATUS OF REMAINING 2 UNKNOWN		
			AT THIS TIME.		
27	2102Z		SIX HELOS ON GROUND. FOUR		
			ALREADY REFUELED.	POSTED	
28	2138Z		ONE HELO HARD DOWN FOR		
			HYDRAULICS. FIVE UP.		

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY | SIGNATURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DA FORM 1 NOV 61 1594 — PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ WORKING PAPER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

PAGE NO. 5 | NO. OF PAGE

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION: JTF-79(C) | LOCATION: [redacted]

PERIOD COVERED — FROM HOUR / DATE: 24 APR 80 | TO HOUR / DATE:

E

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
29	2142Z		WE HAVE 54 HOSTAGES. WHAT DO WE DO WITH THEM NOW?	COMJTF ADVISED	JBR
		2149Z	BE PREPARED TO DESTROY SIXTH HELO (SOURCE-COMJTF)		JBR
30	2212Z →		"ABORT MISSION. RELEASE HOSTAGES. DESTROY SIXTH HELO. SEVENTH HELO CREW UNACCOUNTED FOR AT THIS TIME.		JBR
31	2224Z		HELO IMPACTED INTO [redacted] C-130 ON FIRE.	COMJTF ADVISED	JBR
32	2250Z		AS FAR AS GROUND ELEMENTS CAN DETERMINE THERE WERE NO SURVIVORS OUT OF HELO/SOME BURNS/ MANY INJURED //		
33	2252Z		GRND ELEMENTS REQUESTING TAC AIR TO DESTROY HELOS/ALL C-130 EXCEPT DAMAGED 130 ABN ACFT/ ENOUGH FUEL TO MAKE [redacted] //		
34	2257		BELEAVE THAT ONE PERSON IS TRAPED IN C-130 AND POSIBLY SOME IN BACK OF C-130.		

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY | SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1 NOV 62 1594 — PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

PAGE NO. 4 | NO. OF PAGES

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION: JTF-79 ~~(C)~~

LOCATION: [redacted]

PERIOD COVERED: FROM HOUR / DATE 24 APR — TO HOUR / DATE

E

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN
	2300		HELO 5 ARR AT TIGER (NIMTZ) RAG LOC	
35	2215		[redacted] WAS ADVISED THAT	
			MISSION WAS CANCELLED.	
36	2220		2 MINOR BURNS; 1 GOING INTO	
			SHOCK. ~~DRAGON~~ DRAGON 3 HAS 74 PERSONNEL;	
			54 ON No. 5.	
37			DRAGON 3 HAS 77 PERSONNEL	
			ON BOARD.	
38	2324		ONLY 3 INJURIED ON FIRST TWO A/C	
39	2326		IN ABOUT 3 MIN #5 HELO IS GOING	
			INTO SAR TO LOOK FOR MISSING HELO.	
40	2329		TANKER CDR WANTS TO KNOW HOW	
			MANY A/C OVERHEAD (TANKERS).	
41	2332		THERE ARE 3 TANKERS OVER HEAD	
42	2333		TANKER WITH LOWEST STATE OF	
			FUEL IS TO RETURN HOME OR GO	
			TO ALTERNITE BASE.	
43	2337		REQUESTING ETA OF 141 AT	
			[redacted] LOC	
44	2340		DRAGON 3 HAS 77 PERSONAL ON	
			BOARD WITH 1 INJURED. REPUBLIC	
			4 HAS 66. TOTAL OF ABOUT	
			186	

G

E

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY | SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1 NOV 64 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

PAGE NO. 7 | NO. OF PAGE

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION: JTF-79 (CJ)

LOCATION: [redacted]

PERIOD COVERED — FROM: HOUR | DATE: 24 APR — TO: HOUR | DATE

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	IN TI
(25)	2344		HELO + DELTA ON 141 WILL		
			TAKE DELTA OUT ON FIRST C141.		
			REPUBLIC & ~~AAS~~ 66 WITH 3 INJURED,		
			2 MINOR AND 1 MAJOR.		
			RECEIVED DIRECT OVERFLIGHT		
			TO [redacted]		
(26)					

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1 NOV 68 1594 — PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~HANDLE VIA~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

PAGE NO. | NO. OF PAGE

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION | LOCATION | PERIOD COVERED

FROM		TO	
HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
	25 Apr 82		

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	IN TI
	0800Z		A/C CLEARED IRANIAN AIRSPACE		

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY | SIGNATURE

DA FORM 1 NOV 44 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

SECRET

#391

AC

Classified By JCS
Declassified ~~ONI~~ OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 10/27/92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

SECRET

(i-200)

~~TOP SE~~

[redacted] or use of this form, see AR 380-

-J2-
THOUGHTS

HANDCARRY

EYES ONLY

HANDCARRY

BASIC
INFO
D

ANCE
IN REGU-

ated from classified documents)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY SDO NMC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
VED FROM [redacted]
multiple sources

~~P SECRET~~

MAY 73 24

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS LABEL ARE OBSOLETE

c43—10—83437-1 554-183 GPO

[redacted]

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON OADR

TOP SECRET #200

3. Follow On Recommendation:

Recognizing that this was the first trans-global combat raid planned and launched by U.S. military forces, a comprehensive account of the intelligence support effort would be of great value as a case study for the education of future middle and senior level intelligence officers of all services who may be thrust into similiar situations in the future. Recommend that subsequent to the release of the hostages a chronological account of intelligence actions and situation estimates be prepared and commented on by each intelligence officer assigned to the task force and associated units, with the intent being to highlight the effective and suggest means to improve the ineffective.

G

[redacted]

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Post Script:



(S) (TS) The key intelligence question from May 1980 through to January 1981 was, "Where are the hostages." Militant statements beginning shortly after the rescue attempt reported dispersion of hostages to many locations throughout Iran.

[redacted]

- Organization should be conventional and unconventional.
  - -- Conventional
    - . Organized, equipped and trained in conventional command structure (within CINC's structure)
  - -- Unconventional: [redacted]
    - . Funding, personnel, equipment depot, maintenance, intelligence unconventional systems
    - . Federation of talents/capabilities
    - . Trusted agents in DOD units
    - . Specialists who can think unconventionaly
    - . Revolutionary/terrorists

[redacted] Federation of capabilities

- -- Capabilities located in CONUS, Europe and Pacific
- -- Tied together by conventional staffing under [redacted] Staffs
  - . But [redacted]

(6) JTF Commander Designated

- -- bu[redacted]
  - . Best located in Washington
  - . Assigned or attached to OJCS

- Plans and capabilities reviewed periodically
  - -- by OPS Deps

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Secret Sensitive~~ ~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

What actions do we take now to be better prepared next time?

- Define the mission for Special Ops Forces (What do you want it to do) i.e.:
  - -- Counterterrorism (International)
  - -- Internal Base Defense
  - -- Counterinsurgency
  - -- Noncombatant Emergency Evacuation
  - -- Conventional Force Support Roles
  - -- Differentiate JTF & RDF Roles & Missions
- Size & organize the force so it can be responsive to the mission without "Bureaucratic Red Tape"
  - -- Streamlined chain of command
  - -- Operational control direct to JCS Special Operations Staff
  - -- JCS/SOD Staff expanded to manage the force (permanently)
- Train the force together to practice various tactics necessary to support mission objectives
  - -- Delta
  - -- Rangers
  - -- [redacted]/Marine recon unit
  - -- 1SOW
  - -- CCT
  - -- Mobile fuels
  - -- Communications
  - -- Helicopter force
  - -- ABCCC assets
  - -- SAC (Spec Ops KC-135)
  - -- MAC (SOLL)
  - -- Additional forces as required
  - -- Air Weather Service (AWS)

A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

- Long range TACAIR Support
- C^3 planning
- Long range air refueling

- DIA, [redacted] DMA, DOS must have clearly defined support role and be responsive to mission support of JCS/JTF validated requirements
  - -- Shorten intelligence gathering time
  - -- Access to civilian resources and talent
  - -- Make it available when needed
- Funding program set up for Special Operations that is responsive to short notice requirements
  - -- Normal funding cycle unresponsive
  - -- No flexibility in contingency funding
  - -- Need equipment, logistic support et.al, items on short notice
- Blue Ribbon Work Group of USAF/USMC USA Special Ops Background (experts) determine what helo is best for the mission and what equipment it should have
  - -- Must be in-flight refuelable
  - -- Capable of navigation under limited IFR conditions (dust)
  - -- Long range-heavy lift
  - -- Can operate off ship/land
  - -- Total secure comm package air-to-air - air-to-ground
  - -- Can operate (taxi) off unprepared surface
  - -- Standard configuration of all aircraft
  - -- Air transportable and reassembled ~~in 20 min~~ rapidly
- Look at other types of aircraft STOL fixed wing

- Must have established and in-being organization within each Service dedicated to support CT or Internal Base Defense (assuming a single Purple Suit unit is not formed)
  - -- Not a secondary mission
  - -- Train with CT counterparts
  - -- Institutionalize capability
- Training of the force must be constantly supervised by JCS (JTF type) to ensure emphasis on potential real world scenarios. (NOT ORI oriented)
  - -- Reduce training time in which to be able to execute the mission
- Organize command and control and communications element of the force and have it train with the group permanently
  - -- Exercise CPX
  - -- Exercise communications in detail
  - -- Conduct "What if Drills" certify our tactics as being sound
- Restate role and mission of Unconventional Warfare Resident Coordination (UWRC) at various specified, unified, and component commands
  - -- Single point of contact for CT
  - -- Coordinates command activity with JTF
  - -- Trusted agent for JTF tasking
  - -- Must be specially selected and trained
  - -- Command section acknowledged
- Deception actions of JTF and UWRC must be fully understood and appreciated and supported by CINCs.
  - -- [redacted]

- Specialized equipment for these units continually under review and state of art hardware made available.
  - -- Right aircraft for job
  - -- Necessary equipment onboard
  - -- State of the art updates provided
  - -- Direct tie-in to R&D efforts of general purpose force and [redacted]
- Special modification and maintenance programs to keep aircraft in peak condition
  - -- Get AC-130s and CH-53's under the "Big Safari" program or one similar
  - -- Must have consistent depot level maintenance expertise readily available
  - -- Depot attuned to mission of units and directs their support in serving those interests
- Personnel Selection System established for Special Operations units that ensures high level of qualification
  - -- Screen records
  - -- Conduct personnel interviews
  - -- Have try outs - see what they can do
  - -- Conduct orientation flights
  - -- "Goldplate" to extent possible
  - -- Retention program to hold on to expertise once trained
- [redacted] OPSEC throughout planning is an absolute necessity.
  - -- Think OPSEC before making any personnel or equipment movements
  - -- Do not make [redacted] plan too intricate to point where we foul up our own system

A

- COMSEC observed on mission to maximum extent possible
  - -- Broken only under a given set of circumstances as published in the CEOI
  - -- Must also allow for judgemental decisions as to when the Break Radio Silence should other than pre-briefed mission planning circumstances be encountered.
- Employment of helicopters must account for unforecast weather conditions
  - -- PINS/OMEGA/RADAR/FLIR run by a navigator - pilots just fly
  - -- MC-130 leads helicopters to target as added alternative
  - -- Helos also have navigators on all lead elements
  - -- Inflight refueling required - go non-stop
- Paint scheme of MC-130 and AC-130 aircraft requires standard airlift appearance
  - -- Black and blue paint makes movement of talon and AC-130 aircraft clandestinely difficult
  - -- Paint all ~~Talons~~ standard airlift colors - retain infra red low reflectivity texture
- Work to modify Gunships to enable gun activation
- Retain all blacked out operating techniques and improve hardware
  - -- IR landing lights (separate panel)
  - -- IR beacons runway lights
  - -- IR VASI
  - -- IR inflight refuel lights
  - -- Air-to-air TACAN improvements for bearing as well as DME
  - -- State of the art portable TACAN

- Hold annual conferences of the CT force to ensure all commanders are updated on mission objectives and plans
  - -- Keep EUCOM, ALTCOM, REDCOM and PACOM in the loop and up to date
  - -- Tailor the agenda so as to have each Service present its status and problems
- (C) - Appoint a JCS/SOD team to continually look for remote training sites
  - -- Sterotyped training area OPSEC problem
  - -- Varied scenarios test flexibility of force
  - -- [redacted]
- (C) - Conduct CT exercises under [redacted]
  - -- Deploy overseas and assault an objective area
  - -- Bring overseas units to CONUS for training exercise
  - -- Work in training scenarios with [redacted] forces
- Use statisticians to compute probabilities of success and what weighted effort must be applied to guarantee success (as near as possible)
  - -- Required helos launch to finish
  - -- Required C-130s
  - -- Required ground force
- Use [redacted] foreign locals intimately familiar with the objective area to help in detailed mission planning.
  - -- Weather forecasters
  - -- Ex Air - Army - Navy personnel
  - -- Police - National/local/state
  - -- Government officials, etc.

- COMSJTF must have secure satellite comm with all his force elements
  - -- System must have redundancy
  - -- Each element must be able to communicate with one another SECURE
  - -- Aircraft within each element must be able to communicate secure
  - -- Net control ground stations must be in the loop
  - -- Tape record the mission for documentary purposes
  - -- Rehearse use of this system during training
- Helicopter Mobility Problem
  - -- No present heavy lift helo can be rapidly disassembled, i.e., 20 minutes
  - -- Onloaded into C-141 or C-5
  - -- Airlifted 15,000 miles
  - -- Offloaded at remote operating base
  - -- Reassembled in 10-20 minutes
  - -- Launched with an assault force onboard against an objective area
  - -- R&D effort concentrate on developing this capability
  - -- Objective is to reduce time to get helo force into position ready to launch - avoid long range insertion mission if possible
- KC-135's and ~~Talons~~ C-130s must have modifications to enable intercom between tanker and reciver through the "boom"
  - -- Can talk inter aircraft without being detected by foreign COMSEC agents

~~SECRET~~

- Develop Refueling DROGUE Interphone System for helos
  -- Same purpose as Special Ops C-130s
- More in-flight refuelable C-130s must be added to ISOW inventory
  -- Only six aircraft CT equipped
  -- Need at least 6 more IFR aircraft
  -- CONUS should possess required assets to do any mission without drawdown of overseas assets (OPSEC/training problem)
- ACCS at Keesler should be available to ISOW Hurlburt
  -- Added source of IFR aircraft when needed
  -- EC-130s can be modified to do either CT or ABCCC mission
  -- Bad OPSEC problem when need arises to borrow 7 ACCs aircraft to accomplish special ops mission
- [redacted] so it can be used in [redacted]
  -- Makes landing at [redacted] can be used up to point of touchdown
  -- AC-130 mount FLIR in left front wheel well
  -- MC-130 should study possibility of similar location
- An [redacted] should be developed for the MC-130 FLIR system
  -- Used to mark LZ
  -- Used to mark DZ
  -- Remotely controlled from MC-130 cockpit

~~SECRET~~

-- Develop capability to use in Night black out landing final approach phase

- All Special Operations aircraft should be equipped with normal navigation aids
  - -- ADF, VOR, TACAN, ILS
  - -- Use hostile country navaids when they are available
- Rehearsals must include every aspect of the mission to be accomplished
  - -- Do not cut corners
  - -- Practice and train as you will fly the actual mission
  - -- Make all players as well as hardware play
  - -- Worst case each aspect of the mission
  - -- Plan for alternatives
  - -- The mission must have redundancy and flexibility to succeed
  - -- Above all more communications work at all echelons
  - -- Ensure command element has capability to ascertain mission is in trouble and means to take positive action to control the situation

[redacted] SECRET

Questions for Interview on Intel

1. When was TF J-2 shop formed? What was its initial mission?
2. Describe evolution in size and mission.
3. Describe interface with DIA.

[redacted]

5. Describe interface with Army-InsCom.
6. Describe how intelligence requirements were formulated.
7. Describe significant intelligence events from 4/11/79 to 4/24/80. (How was intel product disseminated? To whom [Components]? What guidelines?
8. What were major intelligence problems over this same period?
9. As distinguished from intelligence requirements, what were major ops support requirements (those handled by J-2)? Problems if any?
10. Were there any aspects or practices in TF MO (such as strictest adherence to OPSEC) which acted as constraints in Intel arena?
11. Viewed in retrospect, what might have been done in your arena of activity to make intelligence support more effective?

[redacted]

[redacted] SECRET

[redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

23 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG WILSON

1. Formation of J-2/Mission:

. 4 Nov 79 - Compound Taken

. 5-6 Nov 79 - DIA Liaison to SOD Planning

. 7 Nov 79 - Full Time IO assigned from within SOD = DIA, DMA

[redacted]

. 12 Nov 79 - SOD Planning Staff Designated as JTF

. 17 Nov 79 - Specific [redacted] Liaison Officers/ POC Identified

. Mission: Support Planning and Execution of Rescue Operations.

(S) 2. Interface with National Intelligence Agencies:

. Size of J-2 enlarged as requirements and force entities were identified

- [redacted] S2 Known to J2
- 1SFOD-D S2 Known to J2
- 1SOW DI Known to J2

. Interface with

- DIA - Good and continuing
- DMA - Excellent and continuing

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. Formulation of Intelligence Requirements:

. Most requirements formulated by J-2 anticipation

- Field requirements received by message. Responses disseminated by message or hard copy/courier delivery
- JTF requirements to national agencies - face to face, secure phone, classified message. Replies usually by message or hard copy, occasionally secure phone

4. (S) Significant Intelligence Events:

[redacted]

- 19/20 Nov 79: 13 Hostages released [redacted]
- 27 Nov: Militants claim Embassy mined - [redacted]

B, C

[redacted]

- 29 Jan: Six US Citizens exit w/Canadian Doc's

[redacted]

- 14 Feb: Militants decry Secret Government plan to release hostages
- 20 Feb: Khomeini praises militants and urges them to hold compound and hostages
- 22 Feb: Khomeini announces fate of hostages lies w/Parliament
- 8 Mar: Scheduled transfer of hostages to government not accomplished
- 26 Mar: Behesti favors putting hostages on trial - said majority of IRC agrees

[redacted]

- 6 Apr: IRC refers matter of hostages to Khomeini, Khomeini decides hostages should remain under control of militants
- 7 Apr: USG breaks relations w/Iran, President warns of military option

B,C (S)

[redacted]

- 16 Apr: MFA trio moved to new location
- 17 Apr: USG announces additional sanctions against Iran. President announces next step might be military action
- 21 Apr: Clashes between leftists and Islamic fundamentalists occurred at Tehran University
- 25 Apr: White House announced US launched rescue operation on 24 April but recalled the force short of execution

(S)

5. Major Intelligence Problems:

B,C

[redacted]

6. Operation Support:
   - All requests for foreign data
   - All photo and MC&G support
   - OPSEC and Security guidance
   - Weather data - foreign and domestic

7. Detrimental Aspects and Practices:

   - Limited coordination with DOS
   - Independent [redacted]

8. Recommendations:

   - Train more IO in the complementary use of various Intelligence disciplines
   - Have a viable DOD Humint Program
   - Have a coordinated DOD/DOS program

G

[redacted]

Lt Col, USAF
x 55078

~~SECRET~~

TOT / 0950Z
RC

MSG 001
DTG 220915Z
FM: CDR, JTF SITE ALPHA
TO: JTF/RC SOD
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJ: SENSITIVE LETTERS

REF YOUR MSG 212200Z APR 88

1. (U) INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTOOD.

2. (U) WE HAVE VIEWS WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL IF DIRECTION PROVIDED FOR DELIVERY OF LETTERS TO U.S. AMBASSADORS.

3. (S) COL [redacted] IS STATIONED AT [redacted] BUT EMBASSY IS IN [redacted] HE CAN TRAVEL TO THAT LOCATION AND BE AT DESIGNATED SECURE PHONE OR RECORD COMM.

4. (S) TC [redacted] HAS BEEN TASKED TO OBTAIN [redacted] FORCE SUPPORT TO FLY TO [redacted] USING DESCRETION, TIMING, ETC. HE MUST ALSO BE AT PRE-DESIGNATED COMMUNICATIONS.

5. (S) GSN [redacted] SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM SINCE HE HAS SECURE PHONE.

6. (S) WE COULD POSSIBLY MAKE NOTIFICATION WHEN DIRECTED BY CJCS. HOWEVER OUR COMMUNICATIONS COULD BE OVER EXTENDED DURING CRITICAL PHASE OF THE MISSION. SUGGEST YOU EYPLORE FEASIBILITY OF DIRECTING DELIVERY FROM YOUR LOCATION FOR BOTH [redacted] AND [redacted] BEST AND MOST SECURE WAY COULD BE THROUGH [redacted]

7. (U) WE UNDERSTAND THAT DELIVERY OF SENSITIVE LETTERS TO ANYONE IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL DIRECTED BY CJCS.

~~TOP SECRET~~
BT

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: ~~QADR~~

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ REQ TO DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON QADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TOT 222059

VC

#288

MSG062
DTG 221735Z APR 18

FM JCS/RC/J2
TO SITE ALPHA/J2
INFO [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [illegible]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON [illegible]
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

J-3 | 222315 L MAGE

~~[illegible]~~

SUBJ: SUSPECTED HOSTAGE LOCATIONS

1. THE FOLLOWING DATA WAS PROVIDED TO CJCS AT HIS REQUEST ON 22 APRIL 1988.

[redacted]

[illegible] 22 APR 18

[illegible]

A.G.

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

ZCZCDP0920
DAN: 010-002341
INPUT CDSN = DKA367
TOR: 172224Z JAN 80 TOT: 172227Z JAN 80

AUTO=** UNASSIGNED **

ACTION=** UNASSIGNED **

INFO= DNCO(1)

TOTAL COPIES = 00001
RTR=29

OTTMZYUW YDHODS 0025 0172143-MORN--YEKDQH.
ZNY MMORN
ZKZK 00 SOA DE
O 172140Z JAN 80 ZYH
FM AFSSO USAFE//CAT//
TO SSO EUCOM ECJ-3 CAT
SSO RMAIN
ZEN //322 ALD//
INFO JCS
(S) [redacted]
ZEM
T[redacted]FORN EYES ONLY
(S) FOR JCS: LTG [redacted], USEUCOM: RADM PACKER,
[redacted], RHEIN-MAIN [redacted] FOR [redacted]
[redacted], 322 ALD: B/G SMITH
SUBJ: MC130 EXECUTE ORDER (U)
REFS: A. USEUCOM 121435Z JAN 80 (TS/NF) NOT TO [redacted]
B. JCS 170131Z JAN 80 (TS/NF)(S)NOT TO [redacted]
C. USEUCOM 170746Z JAN 80 (TS/NF)(S)NOT TO [redacted]
1.(C)(TS/NF) THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER FOR CONDUCTING UNILATERAL MC130 ORIENTATION AND TACTICAL TRAINING IN [redacted]0-22 JAN 80. THIS ORDER IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT. THIS MESSAGE PASSED SEPARATELY TO: USAFE FORWARD [redacted]
2.(S)(TS/NF) MISSION: [redacted] WILL SELF DEPLOY A DETACHMENT OF MC130 WITH AIRCREWS AND SELECTED SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE AN INTEL OFFICER AND A SOCCT TEAM MEMBER

(C)TO EGYPT FOR UNILATERAL AREA ORIENTATION

[redacted]
NOFORN [redacted] EYES ONLY

AND TACTICAL TRAINING TO ENHANCE UNIT CAPABILITY.
3.(S) ~~(TS/NF)~~ COMMAND AND CONTROL: [redacted] MC130 DETACHMENT WILL REMAIN UNDER THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF USCINCEUR, AND UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CINCUSAFE. A
4.(S) ~~(TS/NF)~~ CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
A. [redacted] MC130 DETACHMENT WILL SELF-DEPLOY WITH ONLY ESSENTIAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN AUSTERE CONDITIONS FOR A PERIOD OF TWO DAYS. MC130 WILL DEPLOY AND REDEPLOY USING THE ROUTE AND CALLSIGN OF A CONVENTIONAL MAC C130. DEPLOY, EMPLOY AND REDEPLOY OPS WILL BE CONDUCTED SO AS TO PRESENT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE VISIBILITY.
B. [redacted] MC130 DETACHMENT WILL CONDUCT LOW LEVEL TERRAIN FOLLOWING OPS ONLY ON [redacted] APPROVED ROUTES. A, E
TRAINING BUNDLE//TTB AND HSLLADS// PARA DROPS AND ASSAULT LANDING ZONE OPS WILL BE CONDUCTED ONLY AT [redacted] AFLD. PASSIVE ECM SIGNAL INTERPRETATIONS AUTHORIZED.
C. SCHEDULE OF EVENTS:

PAGE 3 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~ ~~NOFORN EYES ONLY~~
(1) 200500Z JAN 80 DEPT [redacted] VIA PREARRANGED ROUTING AND SPECIAL PROCEDURES. E
(2) 201230Z JAN 80, ARRIVE [redacted]
(3) 210500Z-1200Z JAN 80, DAY LOW LEVEL TERRAIN FOLLOWING PROFILE AND TRAINING BUNDLE DROP AND ASSAULT LANDINGS.
(4) 211230Z-1730Z JAN 80, DAY/NIGHT LOW LEVEL TERRAIN FOLLOWING PROFILE AND TRAINING BUNDLE DROP AND ASSAULT LANDINGS.
(5) 220100Z-0600Z JAN 80, NIGHT LOW LEVEL TERRAIN FOLLOWING PROFILE AND TRAINING BUNDLE DROP AND ASSAULT LANDINGS.
(6) 220930Z JAN 80 DEPART [redacted] VIA [redacted] WEST AND [redacted] FOR [redacted] E
D. MISSION OBJECTIVES: ENHANCE UNIT CAPABILITIES THROUGH UNIT ORIENTATION AND TACTICAL TRAINING IN THE [redacted] AREA.
E. PARTICIPATING UNITS:
(1) USAFE
(2) USAFE FORWARD [redacted] A, E
(3) [redacted] DET

PAGE 4 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~ ~~NOFORN EYES ONLY~~
(4) 322 ALD
F. UNIT TASKING:
(1) CDR USAFE FORWARD [redacted] WILL SUPPORT MC130 OPS AS E

REQUIRED.
(C) (2) CDR [redacted] DET CDR WILL SUPPORT AND CONDUCT OPS AS DIRECTED/REQUIRED. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT OTHER OPERATIONS AS MAY BE DIRECTED. A
(3) CDR 322ALD/MACE WILL PROVIDE MC130 MAINTENANCE SUPPORT PERSONNEL AS REQUESTED BY [redacted] BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE AIRLIFT FOR ADDITIONAL MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. A
5. (U) ~~(TS/NF)~~ RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: PRESCRIBED UNPROTECTED MC130 PEACETIME PROCEDURES WILL APPLY.
6. (U) ~~(TS/NF)~~ REPORTS: USAFE FORWARD CDR WILL REPORT TO USAFE CAT :

A. SITREP DAILY A/O 2400Z TO ARRIVE HQ USAFE NLT 0100Z NEXT DAY.
B. MC130 TRAINING EVENTS ACCOMPLISHED
C. PROBLEM AREAS. AS REQUIRED

7. (C) ~~(TS/NF)~~ COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS:

A. [redacted] DET CDR WILL COORDINATE MISSION ROUTE, PARA DROPS, AND DEPARTURE, ARRIVAL AND TURNING POINT TIMES WITH OMC [redacted] USAFE LIAISON OFFICER NLT 48 HRS PRIOR TO DAY OF MISSION. A, E
B. MISSION FLIGHT PLANS WILL BE FILED WITH [redacted] AT [redacted]
C. DIRLAUTH ALCON THROUGH USAFE CAT FOR PUPOSES OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
8. (C) ~~(TS/NF)~~ COMMUNICATIONS:
A. CDR [redacted] WILL MAINTAIN HF MONITOR FROM RHEIN MAIN DURING DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OPS FOR RECALL OR DIVERT INSTRUCTIONS.
B. JCSE DEPLOYED COMMUNICATIONSTEAM AT [redacted] [redacted] WILL PROVIDE BACKUP HF/SSB MONITORING SERVICE FOR THE MC-130 DURING DEPLOYMENT/ REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS FOR RECALL OR DIVERT INSTRUCTIONS. JCSE WILL USE CALLSIGN ASSIGNED FROM AFKAI-1 BLOCK I018, LINE 9 AND MC-130 WILL USE MISSION NUMBER C/S UMA 1840-47. FREQUENCIES TO BE MONITORED ARE 8168 KHZ A, E

PRIMARY AND 15895 KHZ SECONDARY. ALL TRANSMISSIONS WILL BE UNSECURE VOICE, UPPER-SIDE-BAND MODE.
C. MC130 WILL DEPLOY WITH FULL COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO INCLUDE KY-28 SECURE VOICE AND MODE 4

S/F EQUIPMENT.
D. HF TRANSMISSIONS FROM WADI KENA WILL BE IAW REF C.
9. PUBLIC AFFAIRS: PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED. PUBLIC AND NEWS QUERIES CONCERNING THIS OPERATIONS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AND FORWARDED TO USAFE CAT.
10. ~~(TS/NF)~~(C) SECURITY:
A. POINT AND OTHER PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WILL BY PROVIDED BY U.S. PERSONNEL AT [redacted] E
B. CONDUCT MC130 OPS IAW COMBAT TALON SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE. NO FOREIGN GOVT DISCLOSURES, BRIEFINGS OR STATIC DISPLAYS ARE AUTHORIZED.
C. ACCOMPLISHED WITH STRICT NEED TO KNOW AND MINIMUM NECESSARY DISCLOSURE CRITERIA.
REVW 17 JAN 2010
#0025

NNNN

[redacted]

E-1-128

PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT: IRAN

1. (S) Purpose. This plan outlines a concept for employment of psychological operations (PSYOP), [redacted] and other appropriate measures in support of resolution of the present crisis in Iran on terms favorable to the interests of the United States.

2. (U) Situation.

a. (U) (S) Militant Iranian terrorist have seized US citizens in Tehran. Their actions have generally been supported by governmental and religious groups within the country, although there are tenuous indications that some individuals in these groups favor release of the US personnel.

b. (U) Subsequent to the Iranian terrorist action, the USSR has invaded Afghanistan. The Soviet actions are of concern to Iran in both a religious and political context, as well as to the US and most other non-Soviet/Warsaw Pact countries.

c. (U) The potential effects of US actions against Iran are of great concern to our Allies, friends and other nations of the world.

3. (U) Assumptions.

a. (U) (S) The principal decision makers who can authorize release of US citizens held in Iran are the Ayatollah Khomeini and/or the terrorists holding the prisoners.

b. (U) (S) Information conveyed to Khomeini is screened by his advisors who are kept informed by the Iranian intelligence service and by public commercial media.

c. (U) (S) The terrorists holding the US citizens have access to and use significant world public media, both as a source of information and as a means of communication.

4. (U) Target Groups

a. (U) (S) Primary

(1) Terrorists holding US citizens

(2) Groups that can influence Ayatollah Khomeini

(3) Ayatollah Khomeini

b. (U) (S) Secondary

(1) USSR

(2) Nations of the Middle East and Southwest Asia

(3) Other nations of the world

[redacted]

SECRET

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

5. (U) Objectives

a. (U) (S) Convince primary groups that Iran is more directly and seriously threatened by the USSR than by the US, and that the US citizens should be released now.

b. (U) (S) Reduce the support within Iran for the militant terrorists.

c. (U) (S) Convince those who advise the Ayatollah Khomeini that Iran cannot defend itself against modern military forces and that use of US military force is likely only if US citizens are harmed.

d. (U) (S) Preserve operations security and the element of surprise for rescue or retaliatory actions.

e. (U) (S) Enhance foreign respect for US in the long term, and gain the degree possible of understanding for the US use of force should it prove necessary.

6. (U) Perceptions (See Tab A).

7. (U) Concept.

a. (U) (S) General. Perceptions to be conveyed to the target groups and specific actions desired from each target will be clearly defined. Measures to evoke desired perceptions will be identified. Multiple measures will be employed in a mutually supportive manner. Some measures will be totally overt in nature, others will be designed so they will become known over time, and some perceptions will be induced through non-public channels.

b. (U) Organization.

(1) (S) Planning. A small group of perception management planners drawn from DOD, OJCS, the Services, [redacted] other concerned government departments and agencies will identify as clearly as possible the specific target groups that can influence the Ayatollah Khomeini, the Revolutionary Council, and the terrorists holding the US citizens. They will refine the perceptions to be conveyed to exert influence on the target groups, and plan a series of actions to evoke the desired perceptions.

(2) (U) (C) Decision to Execute. The National Security Council will approve perception management plans and will direct execution.

(3) (S) Supervision of Planned Actions. A flag or general officer from the OJCS and a senior official [redacted] will coordinate execution and evaluation of approved actions, and will report results to the National Security Council. The planning group will act as staff to these individuals. As necessary and dictated by operational security and compartmented access requirements, other working groups may be required to execute the overt aspects of perception management plans.

c. (U) Measures to be examined. (Not all inclusive)

(1) (U) (S) Radio broadcasts. Facilities include Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), clandestine radios (if available) and military PSYOP radios (if proximate sea or land basing is possible). Radio propaganda broadcasts, particularly military PSYOP broadcasts, would present an overt demonstration of US psychological resolve.

(2) (U) (S) Radio Communication Transmissions. Transmission and/or intrusion on radio communication frequencies used by Iran for the delivery of specific messages; US high frequency (HF) transmissions designed for intercept by Iranian SIGINT facilities.

(3) (U) (S) Leaflets. May be delivered by hand, mailed to individuals in Iran, dropped from aircraft, used to wrap, or inserted in, material being shipped to Iran, hand delivered to the proximity of Iranian embassies, etc.

(4) (U) (S) Letter Writing Campaigns. Letters sent to selected Iranian individuals; content white, gray or black propaganda.

(5) (U) (S) Person-to-Person Contacts. Attaches, diplomatic contacts, business contacts, intelligence liaison, others; used for controlled "leaks," rumor campaigns, etc.

(6) (U) (S) Expatriate Iranians in US and other nations. Organize and mobilize sympathetic groups, convey material by rumor, press release, etc.

(7) (U) (S) Military Demonstration of Capabilities. Flyovers, electronic interference and jamming of radios and radar, simulated operations using communications deception to pointedly portray Iranian vulnerabilities, and operations using flares, chaff and multiple aircraft.

(8) (U) (S) Audio Cassettes. Production and dissemination of audio cassettes carrying messages by opposition religious and political figures.

(9) (U) (S) Sea-float Operations. Use of float techniques to deliver messages to population centers along the Persian Gulf.

(10) (U) (S) Actions by Other Nations. Cooperative statements by Allied and friendly nations, induced actions and statements by Soviet/Warsaw Pact nations.

(11) (U) (S) Double Agents. (if available)

(12) (U) (S) Covert Actions. (if feasible)

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

TAB A

PERCEPTIONS: POTENTIAL THEMES

1. (U/S) Terrorists holding US citizens have objectives that serve their own self-interest.

- Links to non-Iranian terrorist groups

- Links to communist elements

- Enhancement of personal power

- Hardship, unemployment and anarchy in Iran partly due to their acts.

- Irrational to expect US and other nations to concede to threats.

2. (U/S) US is united in seeking release of US citizens. Most of the world community supports this position.

- US government responds to the will of the people.

- Thousands of US citizens are directly and adversely affected because of terrorist actions (families of servicemen 30-40,000, etc).

- Nations are duty bound to protect their citizens.

- US has learned patience and the need to deal with foreign nations with respect for their national beliefs and traditions through experience.

- US does not desire to use military force against Iran, nor to retaliate if US citizens released unharmed. Force will be used if US citizens harmed.

- UN resolutions, statements by national leaders.

- Rescue of prisoners deemed impractical.

3. US desires peaceful relations with other nations.

- Many ethnic groups in US society, inequites exist, evolution of more equitable outlook.

- Religious tolerance

- Recognition of limits of military power.

- Working through UN and in consultation with allies.

- Humanitarian actions by the US (Orphanages adopted by ships, Army civic action (Korea, Germany, etc) Air Force mercy missions (Turkey, Iran, etc)).

~~SECRET~~

- Respect for treaties and lawful behavior.

4. The Soviet Union threatens Iran

- Treaty permitting Soviet intervention in Iran.

- Brezhnev doctrine.

- Soviet actions against Afganistan (also earlier actions against East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia).

- Soviet use of proxy force (Angola, Ethiopia, Korean War, Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia, Afganistan, Yemen).

-- Isolation of Iran

-- Historical threat from north, Russians, Mongols.

-- Soviet repression of religious groups, fear of uprisings.

-- Soviet gradual assumption of full control (liberator/protector, takeover of police and military, execution of moderate leaders, assumption of police state powers); imposition of communist rule dependent on military force.

5. Civil War brings death, destruction, and risk of Soviet intervention.

- Disputes among religious and ethnic groups (cite historical examples).

- Indicate specific targets that if destroyed by civil war, would bring great suffering to the full nation (these should be targets the US can destroy easily).

- Cite Cambodia and Laos, use of poison gas, starvation, loss of doctors, collectivization of farms, etc).

6. Iran's military posture deteriorating (for Iranian military and political leaders).

- Lack of spare parts and maintenance

- Desertions

- Loss of leadership

- Balance of sea and air power

- Demonstrations of US air superiority without inflicting damage.

SECRET

VZCZCDVA067
OO RUEAIIF
DE RUEIZJC #0087 0901310
ZNY TTTTT
O 391300Z MAR 80
FM JTF/RICE BOWL
IO [redacted]
B
~~T O P S E C R E T~~ CITE J3 0087
SUBJECT: EXECUTE ORDER -- SAR EFFORT (S)

REF: JCS 2600GZ MAR 80

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20NOV92
DETERMINE CL BY DOD/mcl
DECL DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
REVIEW FROM [redacted]

THE FOLLOWING EXECUTE MSG IS RETRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED AT 291815Z MAR 80

1. (U) ~~(TS)~~ THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

2. (U) ~~(TS)~~ MISSION /EXECUTION:

A. (U) ~~(TS)~~ MISSION IS AS OUTLINED IN JCS 262206Z MAR 1980.

B. (S) ~~(TS)~~ DEPLOY ONE FULTON EQUIPPED MC-130 AIRCRAFT AND

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0087 ~~T O P~~ S E C R E T
A QUALIFIED CREW TO [redacted] TO ARRIVE BETWEEN 1530Z AND 1630Z ON [redacted] A SECOND MC-130 AND QUALIFIED CREW SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY ON 31 MARCH 1980 TO ARRIVE [redacted] BETWEEN 1530Z AND 1630Z. THIS AIRCRAFT WILL BE BACKUP SUPPORT FOR THE [redacted] OPERATION IF REQUIRED.

C. (S) ~~(TS)~~ [redacted]
A585336. [redacted] WILL PROVIDE A FINAL BRIEFING UPON ARRIVAL AT [redacted]

D. (S) ~~(TS)~~ COORDINATION INSTRUCTION:

(1) (S) ~~(TS)~~ TARGET DATE. [redacted] IN THE EVENT TIME IS UNAVAILABLE TO EXECUTE I [redacted] MISSION WILL BE DELAYED UNTIL [redacted] UNLESS LIFE OR DEATH NECESSITY FORCES OPERATING IN

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

DAYLIGHT HOURS.

(2) (S) DURATION OF OPERATION [redacted]

PAGE 3 RUEIZJC 0087 ~~S~~ S E C R E T
(S)(U) ROE. AIRCRAFT WILL HAVE NO RESCAP PROTECTION. USE OF ONBOARD ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES EQUIPMENT IS PERMITTED FOR AIRCRAFT DEFENSE.

3. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

A. (U) MOVEMENT OF MATERIALS WILL BE BY UNIT AIRCRAFT.

B. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION REGARDING THIS OPERATION IS NOT, REPEAT NOT, AUTHORIZED.

C. (U) ALL REPORTS MUST BE VIA SECURE MEANS.

4. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

A. (S) [redacted] USCINCEUR IS SUPPORTING COMMANDER. OPCON WILL PASS TO CHIEF OF STATION, [redacted] UPON ARRIVAL AT [redacted] IAW JCSM 13-67, PAGE 3 PARA 6C. OPCON REVERTS TO USCINCEUR UPON RELEASE BY [redacted] FOR RETURN OF

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0087 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~
AIRCRAFT AND CREWS TO HOME STATION.
REVW 28 MAR 2000 REAS 6
BT
#0087

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP~~ SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Risk Assessment

Reference: a. Memorandum, CJCS to [redacted] 19 Jan 80

b. Memorandum, JCS/J3 to CJCS, 22 Jan 80

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON DADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

1. ~~(TS)~~ BACKGROUND:

a. Reference ALPHA requested [redacted] MC-130 operations.

b. Reference BRAVO provided CJCS with a status report on actions to date, a detailed list of information requirements, [redacted] a list of special equipment required and brief summary of projected actions.

2. ~~(TS)~~ Purpose of this memorandum:

a. To provide CJCS with a risk assessment [redacted]

b. The probability of being detected during ingress/egress is assessed as being low if due consideration is given to avoiding known population centers, gendarmie posts and radar search areas. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON:

[redacted] The nearest population center is a small village located ~~in excess of~~ 25 road miles southwest.

c. [The probability of detection during the [redacted] is also considered low. [redacted] 4 miles off the Nearest road, 12 miles from the nearest population center. [redacted]

C [redacted] Detection during the [redacted] is also considered low [redacted]

4 z. [redacted] In summary [redacted]

C [redacted] the general low population density [redacted] and the fact that the [redacted]

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

i-118

24 January 1980

I-118

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Addendum to 22 Jan Memo, [redacted]

Reference: Memorandum, CJCS to DCI (CM489), 19 Jan 80

1. ~~(TS)~~ Background: As stated in 22 Jan. memo, MG Gast conducted a follow-on discussion at [redacted] on 23 Jan 80. The following elements of the task force were represented:

a. CJTF planners
b. [redacted]
c. MC/130
d. Commo
e. Delta
f. Rangers
g. Helicopters
h. Combat Control

C

2. ~~(TS)~~ (C) The discussions covered the following major points:

a. We are looking for an alternate landing/rendezvous site because of our concern over possible discovery/mission compromise at Nain Military. We realize we are sacrificing some safety offered by landing on a runway (Nain) but wish to weigh increased "operational security" against the risk involved in making a road or desert landing.

b. What are the operational requirements of a road or desert landing?

(1) Road: We reviewed photography of some possible stretches of road east of Nain that

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 NOV 92
DECLASSIFIED BY ~~[illegible]~~ DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

offer some possibility. Operators believe it is necessary to have either a 10,000' straight segment or 5,000' with a suitable taxi-off/turn around area. They prefer 75' width but could accept less if shoulders are good. Weight bearing capacity must be sufficient to support 6/MC-130s at 145,000 lbs. There should be no night time surface traffic.

(S) (2) Desert: While no specific area was studied, the basic requirements were established and passed to the photo interpreters for an area search. If a suitable area is identified [redacted] it was determined that accurate evaluation of weight-bearing capacity is critical. Making these evaluations and then testing their accuracy will become part of an exercise plan. We will also test various means of identifying/marking the landing zone with such items as radar reflectors, remotely activated beanbag lights, heat absorbative materials for FLIR and portable TACAN. As an alternate to remote activation, we discussed parachute insertion of combat control personnel to activate the systems or mark the landing area. Attendant to this discussion we evaluated the requirement for dispatching a DOD representative [redacted] We determined that while [redacted] the presence of a USAF combat controller would enhance this capability; and, more importantly, provide the JTF with a mission member familiar enough with the landing zone to parachute in and activate the marking devices. Finally, we identified the requirement for [redacted] to assure accuracy [redacted] It was agreed that if the mission personnel were uninjured and could move south, we could attempt recovery with the RH-53. If the personnel cannot do this, the MC-130 STAR System would be used. A detailed plan will be developed and submitted for final approval.

d. Tasking: The discussion finished with the identification and assigning of tasks which would help prepare for a [redacted] mission:

(S) (1) Acquire moon, wind, and weather charts [redacted] and JTF).

(U) (2) Test and refine field marking devices (Delta, Combat Controller and MC-130).

(S) (3) Recommendations on use of DOD representative (JTF and [redacted]

C

(S) (4) SAR Plan (JTF and [redacted]

(U) (5) Photography (JTF).

JAMES B. VAUGHT
MG USA
Commander, JTF

[redacted] SECRET SOD SUSPENSE SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	CONTROL NUMBER
CJCS	TOP SECRET	[redacted]

SUBJECT:

Military SAR Support, [redacted]

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X	X		

REMARKS

1. [redacted]

2. (U) The highest risk associated with [redacted] anticipated to be the [redacted] coast).

3. (U) An evaluation** of available rescue aircraft reveals that the only craft capable of effecting rescue along the entire [redacted] is the MC-130.

4. (U) If military SAR support is to be provided, recommend that USCINCEUR be tasked to provide necessary support.

5. (U) Recommend the attached message be approved for release.

[redacted]

** Point Paper on Military SAR Support

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ OADR
Declassified ON:

ACTION OFFICER	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
[redacted] USA	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
SOD, J-3	J-30 P						
EXT 55078	DDSC						
	TM CHF						
	[redacted]						
	[redacted]						
DATE OF PREPARATION							
26 Mar 80							

SECRET

OPLAN: SAR FOR RECOVERY OF CREW FROM IRA[redacted]

Concept of Operations: The blue line (see attachment) is the [redacted] In the event [redacted] a rescue mission can be launched to pick up the crew. The primary means for recovery would be a RH-53D helicopter from the USS Nimitz. This helicopter has a 300 NM mission radius from the coast-in point (assumption - launch ship within 50 NM off coast). This mission would require that the [redacted] move to a pickup point within the red arc (300 NM) shown on the attachment.

Alternate means of rescue would be by MC-130 using a Fulton Rig. The MC-130 would be able to make a pickup anywhere along the [redacted] This alternative would probably require pre-positioning of a MC-130 and refueling aircraft for the recovery mission.

Communications: Th[redacted] Rescue information to include pickup coordinates, would be relayed to USS Nimitz from [redacted] for RH-53D helicopters. If alternate method used, the MC-130 would require a [redacted] with the Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft. Additionally, flares, strobe lights and visual panels will be carried. Call signs and codewords will be assigned.

Attachment: Map of Southern Iran

I-116

SUMMARY

1. Eight RH-53's departed NIMITZ as mission ready aircraft. The aircraft were properly maintained and the pilots were satisfied that the aircraft were ready for the mission. During the mission, two aircraft became unflyable as a result of unpredictable component failures. Helo #6 landed short with indications of an impending main rotor blade failure, and helo #2 experienced a secondary hydraulic system failure. Helo #5 returned to the aircraft carrier because of a failed heading indicator and inoperative TACAN which, due to the extreme environmental conditions, did not permit continued flight to the refueling area. Since only five flyable aircraft arrived at the refueling area, the mission was aborted.

2. Based on the information provided by the flight crews, the factor having the greatest impact on all aspects of the mission was the sandstorm encountered enroute to the refueling area. The severity and duration of this unforecasted sandstorm was in itself a criterion for aborting a mission that required visual conditions enroute. Visual conditions did not exist for over three hours of the route. Flight conditions were described by all the aircraft commanders as the worst they have ever experienced and a phenomenon they had never encountered before. They all reported frequent entry into unusual attitudes with airspeeds varying between zero and 140 KIAS. Continuous maneuvering was required to avoid mountainous terrain. The entire flight reference problem in this environment was compounded by the night vision goggles and the desire to maintain formation, or at least to maintain sight of each other. This was a crucial requirement in order to provide an organic rescue capability.

3. Helo #5 experienced the same environmental conditions that plagued the helos that successfully reached the refueling area. However, the impact was more severe, since this aircraft was flying with a failed heading indicator, no TACAN, and AFCS problems. The pilot of helo #5 reached a point where he could proceed no further under the existing conditions, and elected to return to the carrier. The pilot of this aircraft has not yet returned and was not debriefed. Unfortunately this aircraft was carrying all of the available spare parts for the group.

4. If the weather had been VMC, helo #6 still probably would have encountered a failed rotor blade and would have been left in the desert. Helo #2 still probably would have experienced a secondary hydraulic system failure and continued to the refueling site. Of greatest significance, if the weather had been VMC, #5 probably would have flown to and located the refueling site. The spare parts carried by #5 which included a hydraulic pump, would have made helo #2 flyable. This would have resulted in a total of seven flyable helos, one more than required to continue the mission.

~~SECRET~~

10B08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

(E) Six mission helos were deployed by C-5 to [redacted] and were then flown to the USS KITTY HAWK 28 November.

A [redacted] deployment for a possible minesweeping mission.

- NIMITZ deployed from the Mediterranean on 4 Jan to relieve KITTY HAWK in the Indian Ocean. Two additional RH-53Ds were placed on NIMITZ.

- Eight helos were the number required to insure six for launch. Six was the mission requirement at that time.

- High priority support for these helos and their maintenance crews was provided by using a special code associated with operation EVENING LIGHT.

- Normal maximum gross operating weight for the RH-53D is 45,000 pounds. NAVAIRSYSCOM was requested to provide a maximum capability for a special lift mission and a waiver [redacted] pounds was granted.

- The requirement for an eight helo launch was decided last week based on new mission planning, added equipment, and increasing temperatures along the mission route.

- The severe sandstorm was not forecast. It caused navigation problems and pilot disorientation in all helos.

- The crew of helo number 5 apparently became disoriented in the sandstorm due to flight and navigational equipment failures and returned to NIMITZ. It is noted that this information was not obtained first hand from the aircraft commander. This helo had the spare parts on board. The helo flight leader stated that if number five had arrived at the refueling site, his crews could have provided seven mission capable helos at that point.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRAINING SUMMARY

- Experienced H-53 pilots and aircrewmen were selected and provided with extensive training for this mission.
- Initially, training was conducted to perfect functional techniques such as night unlighted zone landings, use of night vision goggles, long range DR navigation, and night refueling in landing zones.
- Seven major training exercises were conducted by the JTF which included complete rehearsals of all JTF components associated with the mission.
- At mission time, the helo crews were highly trained, motivated, and totally confident in their ability to complete the mission.

MAINTENANCE SUMMARY

- All mission related and safety of flight aircraft systems were full mission capable at the time of launch.

- Management of supply support and the maintenance effort aboard the NIMITZ was considered to be excellent, in view of the constraints required by the mission. There were no significant or unusual supply/maintenance problems encountered by HM-16 other than normal H-53 discrepancies.

- HM-16 was provided a 90 day pack-up kit, in addition to the normal 30 day pack-up kit. Dedicated civilian technical representatives were on-board throughout the preparation and execution phases of the mission to support all aircraft systems.

- Maintenance/material histories of each aircraft do not indicate an unsatisfactory reliability or maintainability trend. Therefore, any correlation with the reported problems encountered on the mission cannot be made.

- Following is a summary of the mechanical problems encountered by the helos enroute to the refueling area:

  Helo #1 - No problems.

  Helo #2 - 2nd stage hydraulic pump failure two hours after take off. Helo continued to the landing zone (LZ).

  Helo #3 - 1st stage hydraulic quantity low upon landing at the LZ. This was not an abort discrepancy.

  Helo #4 - No problems.

  Helo #5 - Returned to NIMITZ with failed heading indicator, no TACAN, and AFCS problems.

  Helo #6 - Cockpit indication of possible impending rotor blade failure was visually confirmed upon landing in dry desert salt lake. In addition, the 2nd stage hydraulic pressure reduced to zero (causes unknown).

  Helo #7 - No significant problems encountered.

  Helo #8 - Intermediate gear box chip-light early in flight. No abort. Historically, helo transmissions produce chip-lights from metal filings and gear tooth break-in following installation.

- The dedication and determination of the flight crews and all shipboard personnel involved with the supply/maintenance effort was reported to be outstanding.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

The following chronology of events was derived from the debrief of the helo pilots who participated in the hostage rescue mission:

A. Period between flight crew arrival aboard NIMITZ and departure on mission (Arrived 19 Apr and departed 24 Apr).

- All flight crews except one had a familiarization ride aboard an RH-53 the first night aboard NIMITZ.

- On the second night five flight crews flew as crew of the helos they would fly on the mission. Three other crews flew the third night.

  -- One helo which had not flown for 100 days flew a 30-40 minute flight.

  -- All aircraft were down for painting on 22 April.

- Aircraft had not been flown on an extended flight profile. Crews considered the short marriage with the new helos and minimum number of flights less than optimum.

- All aircraft were given a final turnup after painting and all discrepancies were repaired.

  -- Hangar deck firefighting foam/water washdown was accidently activated. Four helos were affected but quickly received a fresh water washdown and were turned up with no discrepancies.

    --- No major discrepancies resulted and it is considered that the incident was not a factor.

- Opinion of the pilots:

  -- Helos were in excellent condition mechanically.

  -- All discrepancies were corrected and written off.

B. Period between departure of RH-53s from NIMITZ and arrival in refueling area.

- All helos were up and ready on 24 April.

  -- Lift off occurred at 1506Z.

  -- 46,500 lbs gross weight.

- Just north of first turn point, helo crews encountered a severe sand storm.

-- Upon entering the storm:

--- #3,4,5,7 continued on through.

--- #1 and 2 made 180 degree turn and came out.

---- #1 and 2 landed and regrouped.

---- Pilots thought all helos would return to VFR conditions. However, when it became apparent the others had continued on, #1 and 2 lifted off and continued mission.

---- #8 continued mission as a single unit.

- Helos at times climbed to 9000' and were still not on top of sand storm.

- Enroute weather severely deteriorated after first turn and helos entered the sand storm. Crew members could not see any ground references.

-- Vertigo was common among all crews. Unusual attitude recoveries were common.

-- High outside air temperatures were encountered.

-- Night vision goggles could not be used by pilot flying helo. One pilot wore goggles and watched lead helo, and gave pilot flying aircraft heading and altitude corrections.

-- Crewmembers also wore goggles (total crew concept).

-- At one point, helo #8 descended to 25' to get bearings and could not break out.

- Helo pilots caught glimpses of C-130 proceeding to refueling point.

- Had to continue once past half way point because of fuel considerations.

-- Crews knew fuel was available at refueling point.

- Helos were in sandstorm three hours.

-- #3 and 4 split up about 100 miles out because of inability to stay in wing position.

-- While awaiting decision, helo #3 struck C-130.

--- Fireball resulted.

--- Ammunition exploded.

--- Secondary explosion caused damage to helos parked in vicinity.

#4 received windshield damage.

#1 main fuel cell split open.

#2 damage unknown but pilot heard helo being hit by objects.

- C-130's were approaching critical fuel state.

-- Decision made to abandon helos and board C-130s.

--- Some classified material left behind.

-- Helo crewmembers boarded C-130s and departed area.

D. Enroute [redacted]

- Muster taken and all helo crewmembers were accounted for.

- Second muster taken and confirmed initial muster.

E. Sand storm major problem encountered.

- #5 turned back because of instrument discrepancies - could have made refueling site in VFR condition.

- Sandstorm caused delays and disrupted timing.

- Composition of [redacted] loose sand was 3"/9" deep.

- Because of loose sand, helos would have had to make a rolling take off on the road.

- High temperatures in area also made take off difficult.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBIS 33

IRAN: ARMY COMMANDER CLAIMS ANOTHER U.S. BODY FOUND

LB021046 TEHRAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN PERSIAN 1027 GMT 2 MAY 80

(EXT) ACCORDING TO A PARS NEWS AGENCY REPORT, THE COMMANDER OF THE 77TH ARMY DIVISION IN KHORASAN, WHO IS IN CHARGE OF THE OPERATIONS IN ROBAT-E KHAN, NEAR TABAS, AND WHO IS NOW IN THAT AREA, TODAY IN A TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH THE PARS NEWS AGENCY SAID:

YESTERDAY, ANOTHER CHARRED BODY OF ONE OF THE AMERICAN INVADERS WAS DISCOVERED INSIDE ONE OF THE DESTROYED AMERICAN PLANES AND WAS TRANSFERRED TO TEHRAN. THE COMMANDER OF THE 77TH ARMY DIVISION OF KHORASAN ADDED: ALSO, ONE OF THE AMERICAN HELICOPTERS WHICH HAD LANDED IN THIS AREA WAS TAKEN TO TEHRAN YESTERDAY AFTER THE NECESSARY REPAIRS WERE MADE.

2 MAY 1101Z TC/CH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CIA OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

Declassified by: DDO NMCC 20 Nov 92

DRAFT

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO JTF OPLAN 1-80 (OPERATION RICE BOWL).

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOI: As of Late JAN 80
Drafted in Late Dec 79

#193

CONTENTS

Para

1 MISSION, BACKGROUND, AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Mission pg. -1-
b. Background pg. -1- through -3-
c. Concept of Intell Operations pg. -3-

2. SITUATION

a. General Situation pg. -4-
b. Characteristics of the Area pg. -5- through -6-
c. Hostage Distribution (Emb) pg. -7- through -9-
d. Enemy Forces (Emb)
(1) Internal pg. -10- through -11-
(2) External pg. -11- through -13-
e. Ministry of Foreign Affairs pg. -13- through -15-
f. Enemy Command & Control pg. -16-
g. Enemy Courses of Action pg. -17- through -18-
h. Enemy OB (General) pg. -18- (see Appendix (9)
i. Weather and Terrain pg. -18- (see Appendices 7 and 10)

3. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

a. Direction pg. -19-
b. Collection pg. -20- (see Appendices 2,5,6,7,8)
c. Processing pg. -20-through -21-
d. Production pg. -21-
e. Dissemination pg. -21-
f. Counterintelligence pg. -21- (see Appendix 3)
g. Mapping, Charting and Geodesy pg. -22-
h. Communications Requirements pg. -22- through -23-
i. Medical pg. -23-

4. ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE TASKS

a. Military Services pg. -23-

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

b. [redacted] pg. -24-
c. [redacted] pg. -24-
d. DOS pg. -24-
e. DIA pg. -24- through -25-
f. [redacted] pg. -25-
g. DMA pg. -25-
h. Coordinating Instr pg. -25

5. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS

SERE pg. -26-

[redacted]

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO JTF OPLAN 1-80 (OPERATION RICE BOWL)

1. (U) (~~TS~~) MISSION, BACKGROUND, AND CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

a. (U) (~~TS~~) Mission. To collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate accurate and timely intelligence information in support of operational forces assigned to rescue those hostages held in or near the American Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, Iran.

b. (~~TS~~) Background. Intelligence operations are structured and conducted to support the CJCS, COMJTF and his staff, and operational components of the rescue force. These components include Special Forces Operational Detachment - Delta; [redacted] (Ranger); [redacted] 1st Special Operations Wing (USAF); and Helicopter Element (Provisional) - a joint Marine Corps - Navy task organization.

(1) (U) (~~TS~~) The JTF was established by verbal order of the CJCS on 12 November 1979. Intelligence support planning commenced immediately utilizing the working spaces of the Special Operations Division, J-3. A Joint Planning Staff had been involved in preliminary assessment of the Iranian hostage situation since 7 November 1979, and members of this staff provided the cadre for the RICE BOWL headquarters element.

(2) (U) (~~TS~~) Initially, analytic and collection activities

relied heavily on the in-being DIA Iran Task Force located in the National Military Intelligence Center. The DIA Iran Task Force ~~had begun~~ began producing a daily intelligence summary in Working Paper format on 5 November 1979. This summary, specifically designed for the use of the JCS J-3, was distributed through DIA (DB) channels. As the composition and concept of operations of the JTF took form, J-2 developed its own daily intelligence summary for use within the staff and by component consumers. Secure communications links - both voice and teletype - were employed to disseminate intelligence information. The J-2 summary was based on an independent analysis of intelligence products and raw data provided by a variety of national assets.

[redacted]

JCSE opened [redacted] secure links to the Ranger, Fixed-wing, and Helicopter elements. This net served to expand intelligence support to operational components and reduced the necessity for courier services. On 14 November 1979, JTF published its first intelligence summary specifically keyed to the operational mission.

(4) (TS) In planning for intelligence support, the J-2 developed a broad list of required information and

products. This list provided a framework for refinement and expansion over time and included increasingly specific data on the area of operations, civilian population, political situation, regular and irregular enemy forces, areas of critical concern, terrain and weather, and information on the hostages and their captors. See paragraph 3 (Activities) below and Appendix 1 (EEI) to this Annex for substantive details.

(5) (TS) From the outset, JTF has used the DIA Iran Task Force and the DIA JCS Support Element (JSI) as primary points of contact for tasking wihin DOD and external liaison. Through this mechanism, a working relationship has been established with other intelligence agencies/organizations including [redacted] These relationships ~~have~~ evolved into a pattern of direct support arrangements based on Need to Know 'read-in' of a limited number of personnel external to the RICE BOWL staff.

(6) (TS) (U) USAF/AFIS Soviet Awareness Task Force, Bolling AFB, VA, provided area background information on the Soviet Union and linguistic support in specialized situations.

c. (TS) (U) Concept of Intelligence Operations. (TS) COMJTF manages all intelligence related activities for RICE BOWL through JTF J-2. Tasking, analysis, and dissemination is centralized. Collection and production are decentralized. COMJTF is supported by the full range of national intelligence assets available to the Department of Defense and cooperating departments and agencies of the United States Government.

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. (U) SITUATION

a. (U) General Situation.

(U) ON 4 NOVEMBER 1979 MEMBERS OF AN IRANIAN STUDENT GROUP SWARMED ON TO THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND IN TEHRAN, TOOK THE EMBASSY EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE AND STATED THEY WOULD HOLD THE EMPLOYEES HOSTAGE UNTIL THE USG RETURNED THE SHAH TO IRAN FOR TRIAL. THE TAKE-OVER WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT BLOODSHED. APPROXIMATELY 62 AMCITS AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF IRANIAN AND 3RD COUNTRY CITIZENS WERE INITIALLY HELD. SHORTLY AFTER THE TAKE-OVER, THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL WERE RELEASED. ON 19 NOVEMBER THE "STUDENTS" BEGAN TO RELEASE SELECTED HOSTAGES, LARGELY NON-WHITE AMCIT MALES, AMCIT FEMALES AND 3RD COUNTRY NATIONALS. THE REMAINING AMERICAN HOSTAGES INCLUDE TWO WOMEN AND 48 MALES. THE "STUDENTS" REMAIN ADAMANT IN THEIR DEMANDS FOR THE RETURN OF THE SHAH AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE IRAN GOVERNMENT (REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL) HAVE REFUSED TO HONOR THE INJUNCTION OF THE WORLD COURT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND RETURN THE EMBASSY TO AMERICAN CONTROL.

(U) IN ADDITION, BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE "STUDENTS" HAVE STATED THEY PLAN TO PUT THE REMAINING HOSTAGES ON TRIAL FOR ESPIONAGE. ALTHOUGH THE LABEL "STUDENTS" IS USED IN THE MEDIA AND IN THIS REPORT WHEN REFERRING TO THE PRINCIPAL CAPTIVES, THE LABEL IS NOT CORRECT

[redacted] C

C

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. (U) Characteristics of the Area. .... THE EMBASSY COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN CENTRAL TEHRAN (UTM 39S-WV-383518//GEOGRAPHIC 4230N/5125E). THE COMPOUND AREA CONSISTS OF 27 ACRES OF FLAT TERRAIN SHAPED IN BASICALLY A RECTANGLE PATTERN RUNNING NORTH/SOUTH. THE COMPOUND IS BOUNDED ON THE SOUTH BY TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD WHICH IS A MAJOR EAST/WEST THOROUGHFARE; ON THE EAST BY ROOSEVELT STREET, (A RELATIVELY BUSY NORTH/SOUTH ROAD); ON THE WEST BY AMERICA AVENUE AND THE NORTH BY ARDALAN STREET. THE MAIN BUILDING (CHANCERY) RUNS EAST/WEST AND FORMS THE BASE LINE REFERENCE POINT. THE CHANCERY FACES ON TAKHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD. THE COMPOUND CAN BE DIVIDED INTO FOUR GENERAL AREAS, GROUPED AROUND TWO PLAYING FIELDS LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF THE COMPOUND. THE CHANCERY AND MOTOR POOL AREA ARE TO THE SOUTH. THE WAREHOUSE, TEMPORARY APARTMENTS AND SUPPLY AREA ARE TO THE NORTH. THE COMMISSARY, CONSULATE STAFF COTTAGES AND OLD POLICE QUARTERS ARE TO THE WEST. THE AMBASSADOR'S AND DCM RESIDENCES ARE LOCATED IN THE EASTERN HALF OF THE COMPOUND WHICH IS FORESTED WITH HIGH TRUNKED PINE TREES. THE NOTHWEST SEGMENT OF THE EMBASSY COMPOUND ABUTTS AN IRANIAN ARMY DEPOT. THE COMPOUND IS SURROUNDED BY A SERIES OF WALLS AND FENCES WHICH RESTRICT INTERIOR VISIBILITY FROM THE SURROUNDING STREETS. STREET AND BUILDING LIGHTS ARE LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE COMPOUND AND SURROUNDING AREAS BUT MANY ARE NOT FUNCTIONING.

(1) (U) THE COMPOUND IS LOCATED IN DOWNTOWN TEHRAN IN THE MIDST OF A MIXED BUSINESS AND RESIDENTIAL AREA, WITH RELATIVELY EASY ROAD ACCESS FROM THE NORTH AND EAST. SEVERAL HIGH BUILDINGS IN THE AREA PROVIDE GOOD VANTAGE POINTS FOR VIEWING THE INTERIOR OF THE COMPOUND. A MAJOR SPORTS COMPLEX WITH LARGE STADIUM AND SEVERAL PLAYING FIELDS IS LOCATED NORTHEAST OF THE COMPOUND DIAGONALLY ACROSS ROOSEVELT AVENUE. A LARGE PARKING LOT IS ALSO LOCATED EAST OF THE COMPOUND ON ROOSEVELT, MIDWAY BETWEEN THE STADIUM AND TASHT-E-JAMSHID BLVD.

(2) (U) THE BUILDINGS FACING THE COMPOUND ON THE SOUTH (TAKHT-E-JAMSHID) ARE MOSTLY OFFICE BUILDINGS WITH SOME RESIDENTS. ON THE WEST SIDE THE PRINCIPAL STRUCTURES APPEAR TO BE FOUR SMALL BUT AFFLUENT PROFESSIONAL OFFICE BUILDINGS SURROUNDED BY TREES AND BACKED BY TWO LARGE PARKING LOTS. THE NORTH SIDE OF THE COMPOUND BACKS INTO A MIDDLE CLASS RESIDENTIAL AREA CONSISTING OF THREE BLOCKS OF MULTI-STORY APARTMENT HOUSES.

(3) (U) ACTIVITY RELATED TO THE EMBASSY TAKEOVER IS LARGELY LOCALIZED WITHIN A TWO BLOCK RADIUS OF THE COMPOUND EVEN WHEN MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ON GOING.

(4) (U) TRAFFIC IN THE CITY IS HIGHLY CONGESTED BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0600-2300 DURING THE ISLAMIC WORK WEEK (SAT-WED) DECREASING IN VOLUME ON THE ISLAMIC WEEKEND (THURS-FRI) ALTHOUGH TRAFFIC ACTIVITY IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE THURSDAY NIGHT UNTIL 0200 FRIDAY MORNING.

(5) (U) THE EMBASSY IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 5 KM WEST OF THE NEAREST AIRFIELD (DOSHAN TAPPEH AFB WHICH IS A NON-[redacted] TWO OTHER AIRFIELDS ARE WITHIN 10KM, GHALI-MORGHI [redacted] IS 8KM SSW AND MEHRABAD INTERNATIONAL [redacted] IS LOCATED 10 KM WSW.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(TS)

TOP SECRET

C. HOSTAGE DISTRIBUTION (Embassy)

(TS)

(1) THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT AS TO THE PROBABLE LOCATION O[redacted] THE U.S. HOSTAGES IS BASED UPON A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THIS OFFICE AS OF 28 JAN 19[redacted]. AN OVERALL CONFIDENCE FACTOR OF [redacted] HAS BEEN ASS[redacted]GNED TO THE ASSESSMENT.

C

(2) [redacted]

C

(3) [redacted]

(4) [redacted]

(5) [redacted]

(6) [redacted]

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

D. ~~GUARD FORCE DISTRIBUTION~~ (U) Enemy Forces (Embassy)

(U) (1) (S) COMPOUND INTERNAL SECURITY.

THE SITUATION IN THE COMPOUND HAS NOW SETTLED INTO A ROUNTINE WITH DEMONSTRATIONS PERIODICALLY STAGED OUTSIDE THE CHANCERY/ MOTOR POOL GATE ON TAKHTE-JAMSHID BLVD. CROWD SIZE VARIES FROM 50-75 CURIOSITY SEEKERS TO SEVERAL THOUSAND AT LUNCH/ PRAYER TIME OR WHEN ANNOUNCEMENTS GO OUT VIA THE RADIO AND THE LOCAL PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM.

(A) [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~



(2) COMPOUND EXTERNAL SECURITY.

(A) GENERAL:

THIS IS AN OVERVIEW OF PERIMETER SECURITY THROUGH THE FIRST THREE WEEKS OF JAN 1980.

(B) EAST WALL: ROOSEVELT (MOBAREZAM) AVENUE

IRREGULAR POSTS AND ROVING PATROLS ALONG ROOSEVELT HAVE BEEN REPLACED WITH FOUR CHEST-HIGH SANDBAG POSITIONS. THESE ARE AT THE ARDALAN INTERSECTION AND ACROSS FROM THE INTERSECTIONS WITH VARZANDEH, KMAZANEH, AND ATAROD. THERE IS A ROPE RUNNING ALONG THE SIDEWALK WEST OF THE JUBE, AND PEDESTRIANS ARE NOT PERMITTED ALONG THE WEST SIDE OF THE STREET. THERE IS GENERALLY ONE GUARD PER POSITION, EXCEPT FOR THE ARDALAN POSITION, WITH TWO. THE POSITIONS ARE REPORTEDLY STRENGTHENED AT NIGHT, WITH AN EXTRA MAN IN SOME POSITIONS. THERE MAY BE SOME SURVEILLANCE BY INDIVIDUALS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES IN THE GENERAL AREA, POSSIBLE SAVAMAH AGENTS.

(C) SOUTH WALL: TAKHT-E-JAMSHID (TALEGHANI)

THERE ARE GENERALLY TWO GUARDS ON EACH OF THE FIVE SOUTH GATES. THE TWO GUARDS AT THE SOUTHEAST GATE ARE REPORTED TO INCREASE TO FOUR AT NIGHT. SANDBAG POSITIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED NEAR THE ENTRANCE TO AMERICA ALLEY AND APPROXIMATELY 40M EAST OF THE MOTOR POOL GATE.

(D) WEST WALL:

-- AMERICA ALLEY (KUTCHE AMERICA):

AMERICA IS BLOCKED WITH LIGHT BARRICADES AT BOTH ENDS, WITH ONE GUARD AT EACH POINT. AT THE SOUTH END, THERE IS SIMPLY A POLE ACROSS THE ROAD. PEDESTRIANS AND LOCAL VEHICLES ARE STILL ALLOWED ACCESS.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-- KUTCHE BIST METRI: (EAST-WEST ALLEY IN FRONT OF CONSULATE)
ARAK STREET, THE WESTERN CONTINUATION OF BIST METRI, WAS PREVIOUSLY BLOCKED AT THE INTERSECTION OF FORSAT, ONE BLOCK WEST OF THE INTERSECTION OF AMERICA. THIS HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED RECENTLY. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PASDARAN HAVE BEEN SEEN IN A BUILDING ON THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF FORSAT AND ARAK. THESE MAY NOT BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN GUARDING THE COMPOUND. ALONG BIST METRI ITSELF, ONE GUARD HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE CONSULATE PARKING LOT.

-- KUTCHE DAH METRI (ALLEY RUNNING NORTH TO BIJAN)
ONE SANDBAG POSITION HAS BEEN REPORTED ON THE ROOF OF THE OLD POLICE GUARD BARRACKS ALONG THE WEST WALL (UNOCCUPIED AS OF 21 JAN). ONE GUARD WAS REPORTED ON THE WEST GATE AS OF THE SAME DATE. PREVIOUS REPORTING (20 NOV) HAS PUT THE STRENGTH AT THIS GATE AT 4-6 PASDARAN.

(E) NORTH WALL (ARDALAN) AS OF 21 JANUARY
ONE GUARD IS PROBABLY AT EACH END OF ARDALAN, AND ONE ON THE NORTH WALL ALONG ARDALAN. TRACKS IN THE SNOW LEADING NORTH FROM THE DCM RESIDENCE COULD INDICATE A SECURITY POSITION INSIDE THE NORTH WALL. CONVERSELY, IT COULD BE THAT SUPPLIES ARE BEING PASSED OVER THE WALL TO THE OUTSIDE POSITION, OR THE TRACKS COULD BE THE RESULT OF SOME OTHER UNDETERMINED ACTIVITY. SIX TO TEN PASDARAN (12 DEC) HAVE BEEN REPORTED ON BIJAN GATE, BUT TWO TO FOUR WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE ACCURATE. A STEEL SAW-HORSE TYPE BARRIER PARTIALLY BLOCKS ARDALAN AT ITS EAST END AT NIGHT. PEDESTRIANS AND LOCAL VEHICLES ARE STILL ALLOWED THROUGH.

(F) OFF-DUTY/REACTION FORCES
FIFTY PASDARAN, PROBABLY OFF-DUTY COMPOUND GUARDS, HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE APARTMENTS ON THE NORTH SIDE OF KUTCHE BIJAN. ANOTHER REPORT INDICATES A REACTION FORCE OF APPROX 100 MILITARY TROOPS IN FISHERABAD BARRACKS (TO THE NORTHWEST OF THE COMPOUND). THE SOUTH-EASTERN MOST BUILDING AND THE THIRD BUILDING NORTH OF THIS BUILDING ARE THE ONLY TWO WAREHOUSE TYPE STRUCTURES WHICH APPEAR TO BE HEATED. THIS BRINGS TO FOUR, THE NUMBER OF POSSIBLE BILLETING LOCATIONS FOR SUCH A REACTION FORCE:
-- SOUTH WALL BKS EASTERN SEGMENT (GRID REF P12-N12)
-- SOUTH WALL BKS WESTERN SEGMENT (GRID REF H12-J12)
-- NO 4 EAST WAREHOUSE (GRID REF O-17)
-- SOUTHEASTERN MOST BUILDING (GRID REF O-14)

(G) OTHER EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES
REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE STUDENT GUARDS AND PASDARAN ARE AVAILABLE FROM SEVERAL LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PRINCIPAL FORCES AND THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES ONCE THEY HAVE RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OR HAVE HEARD A MAJOR DISTURBANCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE COMPOUND ARE SHOWN BELOW:

(1) WITHIN 4-7 MIN: FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

(2) WITHIN 10-15 MIN: REINFORCEMENTS FROM STUDENT HQS AND PASDARAN KOMITEH, STRENGTH 75-100, FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.

(3) WITHIN 15-20 MIN: 100-300 PASDARAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS.

TOP SECRET

(4) WITHIN 20-30 MIN: PASDARAN REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

(5) WITHIN 20-30 MIN: [redacted]

(6) WITHIN 30-40 MIN: PASDARAN BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

(7) WITHIN 45-60 MIN: IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

(8) WITHIN 60 MIN: A HAWK SITE [redacted] COULD REACT AND ATTEMPT A LAUNCH AGAINST ANY ORBITTING AIRCRAFT.

(9) WITHIN 60 MIN: HELICOPTERS FROM [redacted] OR FIGHTERS FROM [redacted] COULD LAUNCH AND ATTEMPT TO INTERDICT THE FORCE AT THE COMPOUND OR EXTRACTION AIRFIELD IF THE LOCATION BECOMES KNOWN.

e. Hostage Location and Situation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(1) (U) (TS) Location and Background. When the militant terrorists stormed the U.S. Embassy Compound, three American diplomats were in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These three - Tomseth, Howland, and Charge d'Affair Laingen - were placed under 'protective custody' of the Iranian Government and refused permission to leave the building. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is located

~~TOP SECRET~~

approximately 2.3 kilometers Southwest of the American Embassy compound. The main MFA building is an old ornate structure running East-West and facing the Ministry of War northward across Forughi Street. The MFA complex is bounded on the ~~North~~ South by Kheyaban-e Muzeh, on the East by Rudaki Street, and on the West by Kheyaban-e Marshal Stalin (Coordinates: 35 41N/05 12E). A second building housing MFA staff offices is also located in this area. Laingen, Howland, and Tomseth have been held on the third (top) floor of the old building in a diplomatic reception area commonly ~~ref~~ referred to as the "Hall of Mirrors". Their location has not changed since 5 November 1979. Normal entry to the hostage location is via ground level at the East end of the building near a "U-shaped" parking court. The entrance CONSISTS OF A ~~door is~~ double DOOR OF clear glass. No walls or fences impede access. ~~Upon~~ Upon entering this door, visitors to the diplomatic reception area normally turn left and ascend a staircase which leads to a long central hallway on the second floor. Here, one must turn right and proceed down the hallway to a second stairway at the West end of the hall. ~~Upon~~ Upon reaching the third floor, the visitor turns left into the reception area in front of the Hall of Mirrors.

(2)(TS) Security Measures. Guards within the MFA are low ranking conscripts possibly assigned from the normal guard component attached to the Ministry of War. They are probably armed with light infantry weapons. During

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

daylight hours, the total guard force appears to consist of three such soldiers and a single [redacted] who is probably unarmed. The status of nighttime patrol guard forces is unknown but probably does not exceed a walking sentry post outside the building and one or two guards inside. There are no [redacted] indications of sophisticated [redacted] alarms at the MFA. Reaction to any attempt to rescue the American hostages would come first from the estimated [redacted] security detail for the Ministry of War. We assess the capability of this element to rapidly intervene in any such contingency as low. The National Police Headquarters is located several hundred yards away, however, and a Pasdaran Komiteh headquarters is about 1 kilometer to the Northeast. Forces from these areas could react to any alarm at the MFA within 15-20 minutes.

TOP SECRET

6. ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

(1) PRIOR TO INITIATION OF RESCUE OPERATIONS

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

(1) MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION, I.E. HOLD ALL HOSTAGES PENDING RETURN OF THE SHAH.

(2) BEGIN TO EXECUTE HOSTAGES AS MEANS OF APPLYING PRESSURE ON US.

(3) MOVE HOSTAGES FROM AMEMB COMPOUND TO PRISONS OR OTHER LOCATIONS IN TEHRAN.

(4) RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES WITHOUT TRIAL.

(5) RELEASE MAJORITY OF HOSTAGES; HOLD REMAINDER UNDER THREAT OF TRIAL.

(6) CONVENE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO INVESTIGATE CHARGES OF U.S. IMPROPRIETIES.

(7) RELEASE ALL HOSTAGES AFTER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL PUBLISHES ITS FINDINGS.

(8) GRANT CLEMENCY TO ALL HOSTAGES AFTER INDIVIDUAL ESPIONAGE TRIALS.

(9) RELEASE MAJORITY OF HOSTAGES FOLLOWING ESPIONAGE TRIALS; SENTENCE THOSE FOUND GUUILTY TO PRISON TERMS OR DEATH.

(B) PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, 30-45 DAYS, THE IRANIANS WILL MAINTAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION, CONVENE THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, AND PREPARE FOR INDIVIDUAL TRIALS. THEY WILL NEITHER RELEASE ALL THE HOSTAGES NOR COMMENCE ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS. (NOTE: THE POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE IRANIAN HIERARCHY CONTINUES. THE "STUDENTS" AT THE COMPOUND, THE IRG, KHOMEINI AND THE CLERGY, AND OTHER GROUPS ARE VYING FOR POWER. LEFTIST ELEMENTS WITHIN EACH OF THESE GROUPS ALSO ARE MAKING THEIR INFLUENCE FELT. GIVEN THESE POLITICAL CONDITIONS, THE POSSIBILITY OF UNEXPECTED AND/OR ILLOGICAL BEHAVIOUR BY ANY OF THESE GROUPS WITH REGARD TO THE HOSTAGES IS HIGH. FOR THE TIME BEING, THOUGH, THE "STUDENTS" ARE IN CHARGE AT THE COMPOUND, AND THEIR ACTIONS/PRONOUNCEMENTS STILL HAVE THE PRIMARY IMPACT ON THE HOSTAGES' WELL-BEING.)

(2) DURING ASSAULT PHASE

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

(1) SURRENDER HOSTAGES TO THE US RAID FORCE WITH MINIMAL RESISTANCE.

(2) RESIST THE RAID FORCE WITH ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS AND PERSONNEL.

(3) KILL HOSTAGES ONCE THE RAID FORCE IS DISCOVERED.

(4) REINFORCE PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND WITH KHOMITEH AND/OR IRANIAN ARMY ELEMENTS.

(5) ENGAGE US PERSONNEL IN AND NEAR THE COMPOUND WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS.

(B) PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN PERSONNEL IN THE COMPOUND ARE NON-MILITARY AND HAVE ACQUIRED ONLY LIMITED MILITARY TRAINING. NEVERTHELESS, SUFFICIENT MILITARY-TRAINED INDIVIDUALS ARE PRESENT WHO WILL OFFER A CREDIBLE RESISTANCE DURING THE ASSAULT PHASE. GUARD PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO RESIST THE ASSAULT FORCE WITH SMALL ARMS, GRENADES, AND POSSIBLY MINES. SOME PERSONNEL WHO ARE GUARDING THE HOSTAGES WILL ATTEMPT TO KILL THE HOSTAGES WITH SMALL ARMS/GRENADES, ONCE THE RAID FORCE IS DISCOVERED. IRREGULAR FORCES IN TEHRAN WILL ATTEMPT TO REINFORCE THE COMPOUND AS SOON AS THE ALARM IS GIVEN. THE POSSIBILITY THAT MILITARY AIR ASSETS WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT PERSONNEL AT THE COMPOUND EXISTS, BUT IS NOT CONSIDERED LIKELY.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) DURING EXTRACTION

(A) POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

(1) PROVIDE TOKEN OR NO RESISTANCE.

(2) ENGAGE US AIRCRAFT WITH AAA/SAM/FIGHTERS ENROUTE TO EXTRACTION AIRFIELD.

(3) ENGAGE US FORCES AT EXTRACTION AIRFIELD WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS/GROUND ELEMENTS.

(4) PURSUE AND ATTEMPT TO DESTROY US AIRCRAFT WITH AAA/SAM/FIGHTERS FROM EXTRACTION AIRFIELD TO AREAS OUTSIDE OF IRANIAN AIRSPACE.

(B) PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION

THE CAPABILITIES OF THE IRANIAN ARMY/AIR FORCE ARE LIMITED. HOWEVER, ONLY ONE DETERMINED FIGHTER/HELICOPTER PILOT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO WREAK HAVOC ON THE RAID FORCE DURING EXTRACTION. THE LIKLIHOOD OF IRANIAN MILITARY EFFORTS TO ENGAGE RAID FORCE AIRCRAFT OR CONDUCT GROUND ATTACK OPERATIONS WITH FIGHTERS/ATTACK HELICOPTERS AGAINST THE EXTRACTION AIRFIELD IS CONSIDERED HIGH; IF THE US PRESENCE AND PURPOSE IS DETECTED AND REPORTED AND EXCESSIVE TIME IS EXPENDED AT THE AIRHEAD AFTER EXTRACTION BEGINS. (NOTE: THE MINIMUM REACTION TIME IS ESTIMATED TO BE 60 MINUTES, WITH THE MOST PROBABLE BEING 90 MINUTES. REACTION TIMES ARE CALCULATED FROM THE TIME THAT THE COMPOUND ASSAULT ENTERS THE OVERT ACTION PHASE, AND IS FURTHER QUALIFIED BY THE ASSUMPTION THAT US FORCE PRESENCE AND PURPOSE AT THE AIRHEAD BECOMES KNOWN TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES IN TEHRAN. ALTHOUGH ATTEMPTS TO INTERCEPT EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT ARE POSSIBLE, THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY LOW IF PROPER PRECAUTIONS (RADIO SILENCE, LOW ALTITUDE, RADAR AND POPULATION CENTER AVOIDANCE) ARE EMPLOYED BY THE EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT.

(U)

A. (~~TS~~) Enemy Order of Battle. See Appendix 9 to this Annex for a general discussion of Iranian ground, air, and naval military capabilities as they impact on the RICE BOWL mission.

(U)

4. (~~TS~~) Weather and Terrain. See Appendices 7 (~~Weather~~ Weather Intelligence) and 10 ~~(Key Areas Geographical Areas of Intelligence Interest)~~ (SITUATION DATA ON SUPPORTING OPERATIONAL LOCATIONS) for detailed discussion of Weather and Terrain considerations in the planning and execution of RICE BOWL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

3. (U) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

a. (TS) Direction. Intelligence Activities are directed by COMJTF [redacted] through the designated J-2. A variety of sources have been employed to satisfy collection and production requirements. Tasking, analysis and dissemination are centralized within the JTF J-2. Where outside support agencies are required, DIA (JSI) will serve as the primary point of contact for establishment of liaison. Direct support arrangements and procedural mechanisms [redacted] been established with [redacted] DMA, and [redacted] Access to unclassified media products such as videotapes of television news broadcasts is through DIA (JSI). Tasking of [redacted] is coordinated with and validated by the Director of Current Operations, J-3 prior to submission to [redacted] through DIA. JTF J-2 provides general guidance to force component intelligence elements and satisifies component EEI's through national level assets as appropriate.

(1) (U) EEI. See Appendix 1 to this annex.

(2) (TS) New Requirements. New requirements generated either by COMJTF or his subordinate commanders will be pricritized and managed by JTF J-2. Tasking of support elements for collection and production of intelligence products resulting from new requirements will be in accordance with the established procedures for intelligence activities as detailed in paragraph 3.a above.

b. (S) Collection. Collection management is centralized within JTF J-2. Subordinate and supporting elements conduct intelligence collection activities within their areas of expertise using available resources. Agencies conducting collection in support of RICE BOWL may be informed of the JTF mission, organization, and functioning on a "must-know" basis only. Collection requirements, regardless of source generation, will normally be validated by COMJTF prior to tasking outside agencies. Guidance on specialized forms of collection activity is provided as indicated below.

(1) Reconnaissance. See Appendix 5 to this Annex.

(2) [redacted]

(3) Human Intelligence (HUMINT). See Appendix 6 to this Annex.

(4) Weather Intelligence. See Appendix 7 to this Annex.

(5) Open Source Intelligence. See Appendix 8 to this Annex.

(6) Ground and Water-based sensors. Not applicable.

(7) Reporting. Reporting procedures will be in accordance with Part 9, Volume II, DIAM-58-11 as modified for RICE BOWL purposes by COMJTF. Reporting will be by secure means only.

c. (S) Processing. JTF J-2 and subordinate command intelligence elements will process and evaluate intelligence information collected in support of RICE BOWL. In general, all analysis

[redacted]

of intelligence information having specific bearing on the operational mission will be accomplished by JTF J-2. Raw, unevaluated intelligence data will be forwarded to component commands only when the situation demands near real time transmission. Coordination of the evaluation process is continuous.

d. (TS) Production. Production of intelligence products is decentralized within the national community. DIA (JSI) provides primary point of contact for those outside agencies which have not previously established ~~working~~ direct support mechanisms with COMJTF.

e. (TS) Dissemination. COMJTF serves as centralized point of dissemination for all intelligence information and products associated with RICE BOWL. Dissemination below the ~~XTEX~~ CJCS/JTF level will be ~~accomplished~~ by secure lateral means. Independent dissemination of intelligence by component commands is not ~~authorized~~ authorized during the planning or deployment phases of the operation. During the execution phase, critical intelligence information may be laterally disseminated on a secure basis, when failure to do so could adversely affect the accomplishment of the mission.

f. (U) Counterintelligence. See Appendix 3 to this Annex.

~~TOP SECRET~~

g. (TS) Mapping, Charting and Geodesy. Defense Mapping Agency will provide direct MC&G support to COMJTF. Products already in being include general navigational charts, Iranian road maps, Tehran City plan, Joint Operational Grpahics, and special charts of key mission routes/areas developed from current photography. DMA also provides data reduced coordinates of vital areas and facilities for navigational purposes. A single point of contact has been established and all requests for DMA support are coordinated [redacted] by JTF J-2. Distribution of MC&G is centralized at JTF headquarters with mission component intelligence elements serving as local agents for their respective organizations. ~~In addition to graphics, [redacted] NPIC has constructed of models of the American Embassy Compound and vicinity, Nain Military Complex, and the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which are available on an as required basis.~~

h. (U) Communications Requirements.

(1) (TS) The appropriate unified commands, Services, and Defense Communications Agency will provide separate and secure circuits for transmission of intelligence ~~and operational~~ data in both voice and hard copy.

(2) [redacted] SA/CSS have developed secure intelligence circuits direct to JTF headquarters [redacted] has a similar direct circuit to SFOD-D. JCSE provides direct secure OpsComm links with other components of the JTF.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) Copies of intelligence messages associated with RICE BOWL will not be disseminated outside JTF channels on other than a "must know" basis. Disclosure of communications support structure, operating procedures, etc. is not authorized.

i. (TS) Medical Intelligence. Medical intelligence support will be provided by the Services on an as required basis. DIA (JSI) serves as primary point of contact for medical information available through Department of State.

4. ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE TASKS:

a. Military Services will:

(1) (TS) Provide intelligence support to COMJTF during all phases of the operation in the areas of personnel, equipment, transportation, communications, weather, special security requirements, and training/exercise areas.

(2) (TS) Provide intelligence personnel augmentation to JTF or operational component staffs as required based on COMJTF requirements.

(c) (TS) Provide secure working spaces and systems support to deployed elements of JTF at sea or in the field.

~~2. Chief of~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(TS)



d. Department of State. Provides information on hostages, third-country evaluations of situation, and specific data on details of construction and normal operating procedures within U. S. Embassy, Tehran prior to seizure. Provides information on status, location, welfare and other pertinent details regarding personnel held at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehraa. Supports COMJTF with periodic analysis of hostage situation from DOS viewpoint.

e. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Provides intelligence support to ~~XXXXX~~ COMJTF from all appropriate assets. Serves as point of contact for external liaison requirements and requests. Augments JTF J-2 with personnel assets for operation of CCMJTF (Rear) during deployment and execution

~~TOP SECRET~~

phases of RICE BOWL.

f. [redacted]

g. Defense Mapping Agency. Provides direct mapping, charting and geodesy support (MC&G) to COMJTF. Produces special products on a time-sensitive basis to assist in mission planning and execution. Develops Evasion and Escape navigational charts/maps for RICE BOWL. Provides navigational data such as Data Reduced Coordinates to subordinate operational components of JTF through JTF T-2.

h. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) DIA serves a focal point for all national level intelligence and counterintelligence support to COMJTF. Assists in establishment of direct working relationships within the intelligence community.

(2) Serves as executive agent for certification of security clearances and access to compartmented information for personnel assigned to JTF.

(3) Initiates required actions to disseminate any intelligence or intelligence-related products developed by or for RICE BOWL including this Annex or portions thereof as appropriate.

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. (~~S~~) MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS: SERE. COMJTF ensures that all operational personnel assigned to RICE BOWL are indoctrinated in Survival, Evasion, ~~Escape, and~~ Resistance to Interrogation techniques, and Escape, and are properly briefed on avenues of egress from Iran. Component commanders are responsible to COMJTF for the training of their respective units in SERE. JTF J-2 develops appropriate items of equipment for SERE in [redacted]

Appendices:

1 - Essential Elements of Information (EEI)
[redacted]
3 - Counterintelligence (CI)
4 - Areas of Critical Concern
5 - Reconnaissance
6 - Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
7 - Weather/Climatological Intelligence
8 - Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
9 - Enemy Order of Battle (OB)
10 - Situational Data on Supporting Operational Locations
[redacted]
11 - Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS, JTF-80
Special Operations Division, J
The Joint Staff
Washington, DC

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO JTF OPLAN 1-80 (TS)
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

REFERENCE: Appendix 1, Essential Elements of Information to Annex B, Intelligence, to JCS CONPLAN 0300, dated 13 August 1979

1

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS, JTF-80
Special Operations Division, J-3
The Joint Staff
Washington, DC

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO JTF OPLAN 1-80 ~~(TS)~~ (U)
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (U) GENERAL:

(U) (C) A. During the preexecution phase, Military Service counterintelligence agencies will accomplish their counterintelligence missions within their respective areas of jurisdiction in accordance with established service policies and procedures.

B. (U) To insure a smooth transition from preexecution to execution phase, in terms of counterintelligence activities and responsibilities, subordinate and supporting commanders will insure that COMJTF is apprised of appropriate counterintelligence activities within their areas of responsibility.

C. (U) Counterintelligence and security factors will be integrated into all phases of operational planning by all elements.

(U) (C) 2. Requests by COMJTF for counterintelligence personnel and equipment support will be made directly to DIA. All US military counterintelligence organizations will provide maximum support required to

3. (U) Measures will be taken to insure that information concerning deployment and employment planning, staging bases, troop movements, and routes is appropriately safeguarded until such information is approved for release by competent authority. Prior arrangements will be made with commanders of staging bases to insure the security of troop movement information.

(U) (S) 4. JTF will forward pertinent data from SATRAN extension messages to field elements to be used when developing training plans at the effected

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted] SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, JTF-80
Special Operations Division, J
The Joint Staff
Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO JTF OPLAN 1-80 (TS)
HUMAN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (U)

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. (TS) Human source intelligence is vital to the planning and conduct of RICE BOWL. [redacted] Without accurate, timely, and detailed human source intelligence, RICE BOWL's mission becomes immeasurably more difficult.

2. (U) HUMINT ORGANIZATIONS:

a. [redacted] The following organizations will provide HUMINT support to RICE BOWL based on currently operative working mechanisms.

(1) [redacted]

(2) (TS) US Air Force provides information, personnel, and equipment support to COMJTF through Air Staff OSI Liaison single point of contact and Commander, 7602 Intelligence Group, Fort Belvoir, VA.

(3) (TS) US Army provides information, personnel and equipment support to COMJTF through US Army Operational Group, INSCOM, Fort Meade, MD.

(4) (TS) US Marine Corps provides information and personnel support to COMJTF through single point of contact, Headquarters, US Marine Corps (Code INT), Washington, DC.

3. (C) COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, FUNCTIONS, AND PLANS

a. (TS) [redacted]

For purposes of planning and assessment of the overall accuracy of RICE BOWL intelligence products, COMJTF will designate an immediate action [redacted] composed of JTF J-2 personnel. This team will be validated by DIA and will initially [redacted]

JTF J-2 will designate personnel to review and analyze [redacted] The Services will provide access to [redacted] within CONUS. [redacted]

b. (TS) COMJTF coordinates access to active duty and retired US military personnel [redacted] possessing intelligence information regarding the [redacted] RICE BOWL target through DIA (JSI).

c. [redacted]

e. (TS) COMJTF coordinates conduct of HUMINT operations by appropriate Service intelligence organizations in support of RICE BOWL.

4. (U) EEI, TARGETS, AND OTHER COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

a. (U) EEI. See Appendix 1, to this Annex.

b. (U) Priorities of collection:

(1) (TS) U. S. Embassy Compound and vicinity, Tehran; Ministry of Foreign [redacted] Affairs and vicinity, Tehran.

(2) (TS) [redacted]

(3) (TS) Facilities/Areas of Critical Concern (see Appendix 4 to this Annex).

(4) (TS) Iranian military and paramilitary organizations which could react to the conduct of RICE BOWL.

(5) (TS) [redacted] or other third-country facilties which could [redacted] detect/monitor activities associated with RICE BOWL.

5. (U) COORDINATION

a. (TS) JTF J-2 coordinates all HUMINT activities associated with RICE BOWL. Planning, direction, analysis, and dissemination of HUNINT is centralized. Collection and production is decentralized. Subordinate elements conduct HUMINT operations based on prior coordination with COMJTF. Counter-intelligence support will be coordinated through DIA.

6. (U) MISCELLANEOUS

[redacted] JTF provides sanitized HUMINT to other subordinate elements as required.

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS, JTF-80
Special Operations Division, J-
The Joint Staff
Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO COMJTF OPLAN 1-80 ~~(OPERATION RICE BOWL)~~ (TS) WEATHER INTELLIGENCE (U)

1. (TS) SITUATION:

a. (TS) Background. RICE BOWL requires extremely reliable enivornmental support in the areas of climatology and weather forecasting. Since the area of operation stretches from [redacted] to Northern Iran, a wide variety of frontal conditions and incipient weather patterns will play a decisive role in determining the feasibility and timing of mission launch ~~coordination~~ and subsequent actions.

b. (U) Capabilities.

(1) (U) (TS) Detachment 2, Headquarters, Air Weather Service provides direct environmental support to COMJTF through a single point of contact who is familiar with the operational details and requirements of RICE BOWL.

(2) (U) (TS) Detachment 2, Headquarters, Air Weather Service has identified a qualified officer for assignment from SAC headquarters to COMJTF forward element upon deployment of ~~the~~ RICE BOWL operational forces.

c. (U) Supporting Capabilities.

(1) (TS) Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) provides deployable terminal and associated communications to support COMJTF during deployment and execution phases of RICE BOWL.

d. (U) Assumptions

(1) (TS) That the United States' capabilities to monitor weather patterns and other environmental data will not be markedly degraded during the delpoyment or execution phases of RICE BOWL.

(2) (TS) That historical information on climatolcigal subjects impacting on the Area of Operations is reasonably accurate and can serve as a guide baseline for current planning purposes.

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. (TS) MISSION. To provide continuous accurate and timely support environmental information to COMJTF, his staff, and subordinate operational elements during all phases of RICE BOWL.

3. (TS) EXECUTION:

a. (U) Concept of Operations

(1) (TS) General. Detachment [redacted] Headquarters, Air Weather Service provides direct specialized environmental support to COMJTF throughout the organization, planning, exercise, deployment, and execution phases of RICE BOWL. Detachment [redacted] provides a single point of contact for environmental information support and devlops plans for support of deployed elements of the JTF.

(2) (TS) Deployment. On order, Air Weather Service deploys minimum of one qualified weather officer with appropriate supporting equipment to [redacted] for duty with Headquarters, JTF. Provides for near simultaneous deployment of contigency terminal for Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) to same location. Maintains continuous environmental support to JTF (Rear) through ~~currently~~ current mechanisms.

(3) (TS) Employment. Commencing with arrival of Air Weather Service support package at [redacted] provide climatological and forecasting support to COMJTF on 24 hour per day basis until completion of execution phase of RICE BOWL.

b. (U) Tasks.

(1) (U) Climatology.

(a) (TS) Provide current listing of all weather stations and related facilities operational in Iran and Saudi Arabia with their capabilities for observation and reporting of atmospheric conditions in the RICE BOWL area of operations.

(b) (TS) Provide COMJTF with Staff Summary brief concerning DMSP contingency terminal capabilities.

(c) (TS) Prepare recommendations on concept of environmental support to RICE BOWL for approval by COMJTF.

(d) (TS) Prepare and provide basic environmental support package for exercises and rehearsals associated with RICE BOWL .

(e) (TS) Provide detailed climatological briefing and back-up products for winter season in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman, Persian Gulf, Sudan, and [redacted]

(f) (TS) Prepare monthly rainfall study for Iran based on available historical files.

(g) (TS) Provide climatological wind profile for vicinity Tehran, Iran from [redacted] surface to 5,000 ft. AGL.

(h) (TS) Provide visibility, light, and tide data for Persian Gulf and Iran on a monthly basis.

(i) (TS) Provide density altitude and temperature data for western Iran from surface to 10,000 feet AGL.

(j) (TS) Prepare land route climatology for major avenues of approach from [redacted] to vicinity Tehran, Iran.

(U)
(2) Weather Forecasting

(a) (TS) Provide mission-related weather forecasting for support of exercise, deployment and execution phases of RICE BOWL.

(b) (TS) Provide iceing forecasts for mission routes and for notional routing to/from [redacted] to Tehran, Iran.

(c) (TS) Provide route segment weather forecast and wind direction/speed validity data on daily basis.

(d) (TS) Provide wind data with 24-48 hour probabilities to support possible leaflet dropping operations associated with RICE BOWL.

(e) (TS) Be prepared to provide daily weather forecast briefings to COMJTF or his desginated representative.

c. (TS) Coordinating Instructions. Environmental support mechanisms relating to RICE BOWL will be established by mutual agreement of COMJTF and Headquarters, Air Weather Service. All environmental products will be disseminated through JTF channels.

4. (TS) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISITICS:

a. During pre-deployment phases of RICE BOWL, administration and logistical support responsibility reside with Headquarters, Air Weather Service.

b. (TS) During deployment and execution phases of RICE BOWL, JTF will provide or coordinate that degree of administrative and logistic support necessary to accomplish the ~~RICE BOWL~~ mission.

c. (U) An after-action report will be prepared by the Detachment [redacted] Headquarters, Air Weather Service

single point of contact for RICE BOWL.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL (U)

a. (U) Command. See Annex J, Command Reltionships.

b. (U) Signal. See Annex K, Communications and Electronics.

HEADQUARTERS, JTF-80
Special Operations Division, J-3
The Joint Staff
Washington, DC

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO JTF OPLAN 1-80
OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

1. (U) GENERAL: The international media periodically obtains and reports in the open press information of significant intelligence interest. Because of the media's reputation for factual and unbiased reporting, the international press corps often can obtain access to areas closed to US government agencies. The international press corps can frequently interview individuals who would not wish to provide information directly to the US government. Exploitation of such media reporting can provide valuable original information or corroboration of other intelligence sources.

2. (U) TASKING:

A. DIA: provide reporting of significant information obtained from international press; provide FBIS reports; provide background data from open source publications, as required.

B. [redacted]/DOS/USMC: provide reporting of significant information obtained from international press reports.

C. [redacted]

D. (C) NMCC: provide video tapes of daily TV network news broadcast for analysis by the JTF.

E. (TS) The JTF will acquire still photographs, as required, from selected video tapes of events in Iran.

SECRET NO FORN

TOP SECRET [redacted]

HEADQUARTERS JTF-80
Special Operations Division, J
The Joint Staff
Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO JTF OPLAN 1-80 (TS)
ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE (U)

1. (SNFD) [redacted] SITUATION.

a. The Iranian Armed forces continue to experience a wide range of problems stemming from the collapse of the Imperial Government and the ongoing revolutionary turmoil in Iran. Low morale, suspicion of civilian authority, periodic and ongoing leadership purges, lack of spare parts, and incipient insurgent movements among ethnic minorities all play a role in the diminished combat effectiveness of the Services.

b. (SNFD) The siezure of the American Embassy in Tehran, heightened tensions along the Iraqi and Pakistan borders, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have provided some impetus to increasing the readiness status if not capabilities of some armed forces units. Despite the foregoing, Iran's Services and irregular forces - particularly the Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran)- retain the capacity for violent armed reaction to any foreign operations conducted within Iranian territory or contiguous [redacted] waters or air space.

2. (SNFD) REGULAR FORCES.

A. [redacted]

TOP SECRET [redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS, JTF-80
Special Operations Division J-3
The Joint Staff
Washington, DC

APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO JTF OPLAN 1-80 (TS)
MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY

1. The following maps will be used in planning by the JTF:

A. GNC: 12

B. JNC: Sheets 22, 23, 35

C. ONC: Sheets G5, M6, M7

D. TPC: Sheets [redacted]

E. JOG: Series 1501/1501 Air, Sheets: [redacted]

2. DMA will provide special MC&G products as required, to include:

A. Photo products with one-time grid:

(1) US Embassy Compound

(2) Mehrabad complex

(3) Nain EW Training Site

(4) [redacted]

B. Iran road maps

C. Tehran street maps

D. [redacted] maps (ONC composite)

E. JOG NI-39-3/4 composite

F. Tehran city safehaven graphic

TOP SECRET

I-192

USAFINTEL 400-10 VOL I 31 January 1981

SWA 05/06 (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) E&E Factors: Borders/Security Forces

SUMMARY: As this section was being compiled in late 1980, the military, political, social, and economic conditions in the three countries which comprise Southwest Asia were in a state of considerable flux owing to rapidly developing current events to include:

- The American hostage situation in Iran;
- Armed conflict between Iran and Iraq was continuing with no prospect of abatement;
- The Soviet Union was conducting military operations [illegible] Afghan insurgents and there was little perceived chance for [illegible] of hostilities;
- In Pakistan, the regime was taking measures to [illegible] ead [illegible] changes within the context of establishi[illegible] list Islamic state. If this process were to follow the [illegible] her Islamic nations, there would be many attendant implications for relations with Western-oriented states.

Because of the volatile nature of these and other conditions, it is difficult to state precisely the exact nature and degree of change that could be anticipated in the security structures of the countries involved. The predictability of a nation's response to perceived or actual threats depends on the stability of governmental and societal institutions and leadership within the country. In the case of Iran, the leadership of existing military and police organizations to a large extent has been suppl[illegible] revolutionary groups with an unknown or even [illegible]. In Afghanistan, subversion and occupation by [illegible] the replacement of personalities [illegible] partisans and guerrillas, [illegible] fluctuation in the potential response [illegible] prediction and appraisal of security forces and [illegible] employed in precarious and subject to the vagaries [illegible] therefore, estimates of border and internal security forces [illegible] tion, and modus operandi were based on best [illegible] the extant forces, including those pre-existing [illegible] in intact following the upheavals and reorganizations [illegible] activities, those new revolutionary entities which are a threat [illegible] included insofar as they can be defined. Owing to the transitory nature of some of the forces involved, it is very likely that other security threats as yet unreported will exist. It is also probable that future changes in the security forces and the society itself will alter the manner in which such troops may be allocated in the future.

SWA 05/06.01 (~~FOUO~~) Geographical Factors and Conditions for Movement

Southwest Asia covers an area of approximately 923,000 miles. Iran contains 363,000 square miles, Afghanistan contains 250,000 square miles and Pakistan contains 310,000 square miles. The area is roughly one-third the size of the US and has a total population of approximately 126 million people. The area has been divided arbitrarily into eleven geographical regions for convenience in evaluating cross-country movement and concealment.

Opposition and resistance to the pro-Soviet regime was increasing among the peoples of Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion. Heavyhanded suppression of religious leaders, attempted imposition of social and land reforms, and the visible presence of Soviet soldiers in the country aroused the anger and suspicion of the traditionally devoutly Muslim population. Land reforms posed a threat to traditional tribal loyalties, interfered with the grazing rights of nomadic groups, and broke up the time-honored system of moneylending between farmer and landowner. Social reforms were viewed as attempts to repress the clergy, break up family ties, and eradicate the practice of purdah (the seclusion of women). The abovementioned government policies were interpreted as an attack on Islam and a threat to the fiercely-held independence. Of the ethnic groups engaged in insurgency, the Pushtuns pose the greatest threat to the Soviet-backed regime because of their traditional value for revenge (badal), which continues to intensify with the increasing number of government instituted purges, imprisonments, executions resulting from the Soviet invasion and counter-insurgency operations. There are at least six major Pushtun exile groups based in Peshawar, Pakistan. However, constant feuding and lack of coordination have seriously hindered their ability to support the insurgency movement in Afghanistan. These groups receive most of their funds from Saudi Arabian and Pakistani sources. The ethnic groups displaying the most organized and effective resistance are the Hazaras, Turkomans and Tajiks. In addition, there have been wholesale desertions in the Afghan army, with many soldiers turning upon their Soviet comrades and then joining the rebels.

The Afghan insurgents have been extremely harsh in their treatment of the captured Soviet personnel, submitting them to savage torture before death. Some Soviet personnel are immediately executed upon capture. If a U.S. serviceman were captured by Afghan rebel forces, his primary concern would be to convince his captors as quickly as possible that he is an American, not a Russian. A U.S. serviceman captured by government forces faces potential interrogation and exploitation by both the Afghans and their Soviet backers.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan is a country comprised of several linguistic and cultural regions, basically corresponding to provincial boundaries, in which particular ethnic groups predominate and where the inhabitants adhere to a lifestyle often quite distinct from and sometimes antithetical to those practiced in other regions of the country. Over 50 languages and dialects are spoken in the country. Pakistani society is composed of the following major ethnic groups (with the approximate percentage of the total population they represent): Punjabis - 67 percent; Sindhis - 13 percent; Pathans - 9 percent; and Baluchi - 2.5 percent. The remainder of the population is comprised of smaller ethnic groups such as the Brahuis, Chitralis, Shina and Balti. As a result of such vast ethnic and cultural diversity, opposition to the central government can and does include ethnic, religious, and political-ideological dissidence.

The two most serious ethnic dissident movements are found within the Pathan and Baluchi minorities. Opposition to the government does exist among other ethnic groups but it does not present a serious threat. Pakistan's borders arbitrarily bisect the historic homelands of the Pathan and

Baluchi tribes. The Pathans share cultural and tribal affinities with the Pushtuns of Afghanistan, while the Baluchi share the same affinities with the Baluchi tribes of Iran and Afghanistan. Both groups are known for their love of independence. Some of their grievances center on charges of discrimination on the part of the central government, which is dominated by the Punjabis, against provincial interests and aspirations. The major complaint is that their regions lag behind in economic progress due to a lack of development funds from the central government. Also, both groups fear an eventual loss of their distinct cultural identity. In addition, the Baluchi resent government efforts to suppress their lucrative smuggling activities. Pathans have three different views as to the goals of their cause: (1) the unification of all Pushtuns into a separte state - Pushtunistan; (2) the establishment of an autonomous province in Pakistan for speakers of the Pushto language; (3) the reunification of Pathan tribes into Afghanistan. Afghan leaders have been sympathetic with and supportive of the Pathan movement. A Baluchi movement for an independent Baluchistan has been supported by the USSR, Iraq and Afghanistan. Minor incidences of guerrilla insurgency have occurred, but tribal feuds, banditry, political apathy and resentment of any central authority have caused major disaffection among the tribal groups.

Religious antagonisms can lead to outbursts of communal violence and protests directed at the government. Although less than one percent of the population are adherents of Hinduism, mistreatment of Muslims in India by the Hindu majority can lead to reprisals against the Pakistani Hindus by the Muslim majority. Potential areas of conflict exist among Muslims themselves. Conservative-fundamentalist Muslims have sought to oust the Ahmadiya Sect from the Islamic community because of their heretical beliefs. Anti-Ahmadiya riots occurred in both 1953 and 1974. The Shiite minority (approximately 20 percent of the Pakistani Muslims) is a cause for concern among government officials. They fear the possibility of Shiite fanaticism, as depicted in the Iranian revolution, being adopted by the Shia adherents in Pakistan. Friction between conservative-fundamentalist and modernist Muslims is another potential area of conflict. The fundamentalists focus their efforts on the creation of a theocratic state, Islamification of society, opposition to Western values and modernization, and orthodoxy among Muslims. The modernists frequently use the Koran as justification for many of their programs. A wide variety of religious-political groups, ranging from ultra right-wing conservative to leftist oriented, exist within the state. Friction between these groups is a distinct possibility.

Economic conditions have led to dissatisfaction and discontent among the members of the intelligentsia as well as the urban poor. The Pakistani economy is unable to provide enough employment opportunities for college graduates, while poverty among the majority of urban dwellers together with underemployment and low per capita income, poses a threat to internal security and stability.

USAFINTEL 400-10 VOL I 31 January 1981

SWA 19 (S/NOFORN) Survival Factors: Indigenous Medical Care

SUMMARY:

IRAN

Although Iran's public health services improved during the 1960s and 70s under the reign of the Shah, they have deteriorated appreciably since his ouster and the subsequent commencement of the Khomeini regime. Reportedly, over 3,000 physicians, to include most foreign doctors, had fled the country by the summer of 1979, and indications are that medical schools are nearly at a standstill. Overall, the quality of public health services is considered poor and far below European or American standards. As with other countries in SWA, urban populations receive the best medical care available; the rural majority the worst. In an attempt to provide better and more equalized health care, the government is trying to decentralize its services throughout the country. Under this program, improvements in the province of Western Azerbaijan has been encouraging and will hopefully serve as a model for the remainder of the provinces. Also, the introduction of mobile rural health clinics, each serving an area of from 30 to 50 villages, is narrowing the gap between urban and rural health care. In spite of this ambitious undertaking, rural medical service is hampered by poor roads and rough terrain, a shortage of well-trained personnel who are willing to work in rural areas, and morale problems among the better-trained conscripts. In the society at large, medical problems are heightened by mostly unhealthy housing, an unbalanced diet, a growing drug problem, unsanitary food processing, widespread superstitious "folk medicine," widespread ingnorance of personal hygiene, and inadequate public sanitation services.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan's medical care system ranks among the poorest in the world. It suffers from very limited capabilities and very poor management of the inadequate resources which do exist. Overall, the quality of medical care for the urban and rural masses is very poor and has most likely deteriorated even more since the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan has an acute problem of health service distribution. Comprising 85 percent of the total population, rural inhabitants do not have access to a health care program of even minimal standards. However, serious efforts have been made to improve rural health care, with the start of a nationwide immunization program against tuberculosis, tetanus, diptheria and whooping cough. Improving Afghanistan's health care problems will be difficult for many reasons. Logistically, Afghanistan's rugged terrain of mountains and deserts makes the bringing of medical care to many villages very difficult. Even more important, many Afghans are used to the more traditional "folk medicine." They are resistant to change and their reluctance to seek modern medical assistance frustrates the best intentions of government-sponsored programs. As in other countries in SWA, health problems are aggravated by the environmental factors of poor diet, unsanitary food processing, the lack of potable water, and inadequate sewage treatment and disposal.

dominant. Upward mobility is somewhat greater in Pakistan than in India, but the great majority of Pakistanis live at such a marginal level of existence that they cannot hope to amass the resources needed to elevate their social status.

Islam, the state religion and major unifying force within the country, permeates all aspects of Pakistani life. 97 percent of the population are adherents of Islam. Islam is the raison d'etre for the existence of the state. Religious leaders play an important role in society as teachers and formulators of public opinion. Like their Muslim brethren in Afghanistan and Iran, Pakistani Muslims believe in omens, astrology, charms and evil spirits. Many of the people are fatalistic, accepting their destiny as the will of Allah.

SWA 21.01 (S/NOFORN) Inadvertent Peacetime Intrusion

The treatment that a captured American serviceman could expect to receive in Southwest Asia will depend heavily upon which group captures the serviceman and that particular group's perception as to whether the United States was involved in military actions against the captors, neighboring Islamic countries or groups with which they were aligned. For additional information as to the treatment that a serviceman might expect in each of the three countries during peacetime intrusions or open hostilities, see Section 23.

SWA 21.01.01 (S/NOFORN) Knowledge of Intrusion

There has been a dramatic increase in the activity of all governmental agencies involved in intelligence and security in each of the three countries under discussion. This has been caused by: hostilities between Iran and Iraq; Iranian concern over the possibility of U.S. attempts to rescue the American hostages held in the U.S. Embassy; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet-backed efforts to curtail insurgent operations within the country; and Pakistan's concern that the presence of several Afghan exile groups within Pakistan could conceivably draw Pakistan into open conflict with the USSR. Due to increased security precautions and emphasis on the expeditious handling of communications, it must be assumed that an evader's presence would probably become known rather quickly by either friendly or hostile forces.

SWA 21.01.02 (~~FOUO~~) Possibilities for Evading Custody

Chances for evading custody in Iran, Afghanistan or Pakistan at the present time, even in the more remote areas of these countries, are limited, as explained in Section 21.01.01. For a discussion of security hazards presently existing in these three countries, see Section 05.

SWA 21.01.03 (~~FOUO~~) Probable Reactions of Inhabitants

The reactions of local inhabitants, as indicated earlier, cannot be determined with any certainty. It would depend on the group's perception as to whether the serviceman's actions were in support of, or in opposition to, the captor's objectives. See Section 23, Captivity Factors, for more detailed information.

31 January 1981 USAFINTEL 400-10 VOL I

SWA 21.01.04 (S) Contact with Authorities

Detained intruders would probably be transported with little delay to locations with English-speaking authorities. Initially, there would be questioning of a military nature, such as unit of assignment, location, mission or circumstances surrounding the intrusion. Additional information relating to the exploitation/interrogation of American servicemen is contained in Section 23.

SWA 21.01.05 (S/NOFORN) U.S. Diplomatic Activities

U.S. relations with the country detaining the American servicemen can be expected to impact greatly on U.S. abilities to obtain their release. Relations with each of the countries under discussion are presently in a state of transition.

IRAN

The American Embassy in Tehran is presently in the hands of a group of Islamic militants who have held American diplomatic personnel captive for over one year. The United States has, to date, been unable to obtain the release of the hostages, and both countries have broken off diplomatic relations and resorted to working through third parties.

AFGHANISTAN

The United States has, to date, not recognized the new Soviet-backed Afghan government. Under the present circumstances it must be anticipated that any negotiations for the release of the captured servicemen would be very difficult. It is reasonable to assume, based upon available information, that the Soviets would try to exploit the servicemen for propaganda purposes to the greatest extent possible.

PAKISTAN

The United States Embassy in Pakistan is located in its capital, Islamabad. Additionally, the U.S. maintains consular offices at Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar. Relations between the United States and Pakistan during the last few years have been tenuous at best, and, while the presence of a U.S. Embassy could provide a focal point for negotiations, it would not guarantee the success of the negotiation process and the immediate release of the servicemen. See Section 23 for further details.

SWA 21.02 (FOUO) Cultural Do's and Don'ts

The peoples of Southwest Asia maintain traditional social customs, conventions and religious beliefs and practices which differ considerably from those found in the United States and Western Europe. American customs,

is one of the poorest ratios recorded on earth. Additionally, there is one physician for very 16,100 people. Poor distribution of services in rural areas compounds Afghanistan's public health problems. Although 85 percent of the Afghan people are rural, realistically only 15 percent of this group has access to medical health facilities. Furthermore, only 15 percent of the nation's doctors practice in the rural areas. Many of the rural masses turn to "mullahs" or "hakims" (more trational folk medicine practitioners) to receive treatment, albeit very primitive. As mentioned previously, the government has begun to expand public health programs through mass immunization campaigns against communicable diseases, with a goal to have the more prevalent diseases under control by 1983. There is also a major effort directed against malaria. Scientists are trying to develop new toxins against the disease-carrying insects which have apparently developed immunity to DDT. Compounding the problem of a shortage of doctors is an inadequate medical training program which is crude by international standards. Physicians who graduate from Afghan medical schools usually cannot pass entrance examinations if they want further training abroad. Additionally, few good foreign medical personnel work in Afghanistan. Poor management and coordination further reduces the effectiveness of the few assets available. In a natural disaster or national emergency, the Red Crescent Society, an affiliate of the International Red Cross, would reportedly assume nationwide responsibility but would not increase the public health service's effectiveness. The military would not be of significant help.

PAKISTAN

The public health service is under the direction of the Minister of Health and Social Welfare. In addition, public health services are also provided by various Christian missionary groups, civic associations, and the Red Crescent Society. It has been estimated that there is only one doctor for every 5,120 people. Furthermore, there is a concensus of opinion that the doctor shortage is further aggravated by doctors going abroad and by those remaining being poorly distributed. Statistics indicate that 80 percent of all doctors work in urban areas, which only contain 30 percent of the total population. To begin alleviating the problem of doctor distribution, the government has been assigning newly-graduated doctors to the rural areas. This program is also supplemented by the Health Guard Program, in which paraprofessionals (similar to mainland China's "barefoot doctors") provide service to the rural area. In time of disaster and national emergency, the military could also supplement civilian facilities. Finally, there are many local practitioners who practice a type of folk medicine. They are recognized by the government and respected by their respective local populations. Compulsory immunization programs against smallpox, tuberculosis and cholera are important first steps in reducing the incidence of major communicable diseases.

SWA 19.02 (S/NOFORN) Military Medical Services

IRAN

[redacted]

Although military services and facilities are better than their civilian

counterparts, they are poor by Western standards. Theoretically, medical doctors provide acceptable inpatient and outpatient service to military personnel, their dependents, and retirees. In reality, adequate care is not provided, largely because of the shortage of doctors. Not only are many doctors conscripted, but also many are involuntarily forced to remain in the military when their original terms of obligation expires. Although military doctors are forbidden to practice privately, many do have illegal private practices which cut into their regular practice. This is an important source of discontent for military personnel and their dependents. In the field, medical units are 100 percent mobile [redacted] The military medical logistics system is antiquated, graft-ridden and slow. It is barely adequate to meet routine needs, and during the current Iranian/Iraqi war it is proving to be inadequate.

AFGHANISTAN

In the past the military hospital facilities in the Kabul area have been able to provide adequate medical care for service personnel during peacetime. Since the Soviet invasion, medical care has reportedly improved, with the Soviets taking full control and manning two of the existing facilities. One is used by Soviet officers and high-ranking Afghan officers and officials. The other provides medical care only for Soviet enlisted personnel --not for Afghan enlisted servicemen, who must utilize their own inadequate facilities and be treated by badly-trained personnel. Afghan military medical services are provided for active duty military personnel only, not for dependent families, retirees, or even disabled veterans. Unless the Soviets provide substantial assistance it is incapable of realistic field operations. Additionally, it has very limited facilities and a poor supply system. Maintenance of facilities and equipment is lacking and improvisation passes for planning. Much of the existing materiel is wasted through inefficiency. In addition, there are no blood banking operations. Afghan military medical services are believed to have had only a few days worth of surplus materiel, which has surely been exhausted since the Soviet invasion. At this time, medical care for the Afghan low-ranking officer or enlisted serviceman would probably be rated as minimal at best.

PAKISTAN

Iran was heavily dependent on imports from the United States for its basic medical materiel needs and, as a result, drugs, medical equipment and other medical materiel are reported now to be in short supply. The Iranians produce only about 15 percent of their local needs and are self-sufficient in only a few serums and vaccines. The levels and locations of associated medical stockpiles throughout the country are unknown but thought to be insignificant, particularly in light of the current Iranian/Iraqi war.

AFGHANISTAN

Although Afghanistan does export a limited supply of herbal medicines, it has a very small pharmaceutical industry which is basically incapable of supplying its own vital needs, and the country must therefore import medicine and equipment. A German-owned plant produces several important drugs, and the Soviet Union supplies several vaccines and serums. Medical materiel stockpiles are assumed to be minimal.

PAKISTAN

Although Pakistan has some pharmaceutical [illegible] not self-[illegible] even imports [illegible] some locally manufactured unsophisticated instruments [illegible] the country must [illegible] orts. Pak[illegible] for imports [illegible] ease deficient [illegible] materiel [illegible] in warehouse[illegible] manufacturers [illegible] all quantit[illegible] daily needs are [illegible]

SWA 19.04 (~~Cont~~) Environmental Health Problems

IRAN

Inadequate diet, mass ignorance of personal hygiene and health practices, and very poor public sanitation are the three major factors affecting public health in Iran. The problems of mass ignorance concerning personal hygiene and health practices are deep-rooted and will be hard to correct. The urban upper class is very sophisticated with regard to modern medicine and health practices, but it comprises only a small minority of the population, which is overwhelmingly poor and ignorant. In both urban and rural areas, housing

SWA 23 (S/NOFORN) Captivity Factors

NOTE: The information contained in this Section covers the topics normally covered in Sections 23-27 of SERE Guides. In this Guide, they are grouped together to facilitate their use. This will not alter the basic utility of the SERE Guide format.

OVERVIEW

IRAN

U.S. military personnel isolated in Iran are likely to encounter hostility from the local populace. Iran's post-revolutionary leaders have adopted a strong anti-U.S. bias which has become widespread because of its extensive treatment in the public media. Even among groups which might retain pro-U.S. attitudes or among factions which oppose Tehran's present leadership, there is a chance that suspicion and paranoia towards foreigners would incite fears and threats, and prisoner treatment might be harsh. Captured aircrews should make every effort to convince their captors of their U.S. military status and to avoid provocative behavior.

As a consequence of the Shah's western orientation, most of Iran's populace is rather well informed on what constitutes the norm of humane treatment. Extreme measures leading to death, permanent injury or disability would probably be avoided. In the event that the United States was involved in direct military action instead of merely economic sanctions or a rescue attempt of other prisoners, the religious leaders in Iran would certainly be more vociferous in denouncing the United States. Under such conditions, or in the event of circumstances resulting in the death or injury of Iranians, treatment of U.S. prisoners would become much more severe.

In cases where U.S. servicemen are captured in remote areas and transferred to government control, it could be expected that the transfer might take several days, thereby allowing the opportunity for a measure of natural friendship between captors and captives to develop. Under such circumstances, and especially if the captors held anti-government views, there is a chance that the servicemen would be accorded better treatment. The possibility of such on accurrence would be heavily dependent on geography, time, the political affiliation of the captors and the absence of revolutionary guard personnel, who have been widely assigned to the parmilitary, police and armed forces to insure their control by the present government. Information regarding the presence of captured American servicemen could be expected to be relayed quickly to the revolutionary forces, and it is doubtful that circumstances would permit captors sympathetic to the prisoners' plight the opportunity of actually according the servicemen a safe haven.

Immediate medical care available to injured American servicemen could be expected to be very limited. It is anticipated that injured personnel would be most likely airlifted from their point of capture and taken as soon as possible to one of the major hospitals in the Tehran area. Iranian governmental officials could be expected to provide the servicemen with the best medical aid possible in order to keep them alive for subsequent propaganda and exploitation purposes.

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

Security Marking/Handling Instructions Removed

Any negotiations for the release of captured servicemen could be expected to be of extended duration. Decisions relating to prisoner treatment would be slow in coming due to the requirement that such matters be worked through a laborious process of representative committees, each of which can be expected to try to use the prisoner issue as a means for the retention or expansion of their own power base. Significant decisions relating to prisoner treatment can be expected to lie with the Ayatollah Khomeini or, in the event of his demise, a committee of Ayatollahs of lesser stature.

The demise of Ayatollah Khomeini would not necessarily cause the downfall of the revolutionary government in Iran, nor could it be expected to result in the release of any captured U.S. service personnel. The momentum of the revolution, the strategic placement of Ayatollah Khomeini's associates, the new constitution and the dominance of religious figures in the new parliament and cabinet would provide a basis for a successor regime which would have to be dealt with to effect a prisoner release.

The death of Khomeini would most likely result in the creation of an informal coalition of the most senior religious and governmental figures, which would be held together at first by their desire to protect their power and the ideals of the revolution. The Council of Guardians, the President, a few senior members of the clergy and one or two top military figures would be able to at least temporarily keep the government operating. However, such a condition could not be expected to last very long since it would contain too many ambitious men and too many political and religious schisms. One group would eventually acquire control. It is doubtful that it would be possible during this interim period to effect a prisoner release, since each group would be reluctant to identify itself with a moderate stance on the prisoner release issue.

Deleted per 5-U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

AFGHANISTAN

The treatment of U.S. service personnel in Afghanistan will be dependent on several factors including (but not limited to) whether the U.S. is at war with Afghanistan or another Islamic country as well as the attitude of the particular group which captured the servicemen. During a wartime situation in which the U.S. was engaged in a war against a unified Afghanistan and not a Soviet-controlled "puppet state", it is believed that U.S. service personnel would be treated with extreme harshness by the Afghan people and conceivably could be summarily executed after being brutally tortured. Should a U.S. pilot fall into Soviet or Afghan Government hands, at the present time it is probable that the aircrew member would be treated as a prisoner of war and interned, or, in the event of an inadvertent overflight error, accused of being a spy and temporarily detained for propaganda purposes. It can be anticipated that American servicemen would be thoroughly exploited by the Afghan government with Soviet assistance. Wounded service personnel would probably be offered limited medical aid at the point of capture and then transported to Kabul for treatment.

Insurgent forces, on the other hand, might possibly offer assistance to U.S. service personnel and help them exfiltrate from Afghanistan,

Security Marking/Handling Instructions Removed

survivors as Americans. U.S. servicemen should make every effort to convince their captors of their U.S. military status and to avoid provocative behavior. Some insurgent groups might automatically assume that the downed servicemen were Soviet personnel and summarily execute them as they have reportedly done with Soviet military personnel in the past. Other insurgent groups have been more interested in the extraction of information for intelligence purposes and would be more inclined to keep prisoners alive. Members of some insurgent groups are reported to have taken great pains to extensively torture their captives, and this factor might allow U.S. personnel additional time to either be recognized as non-Soviet personnel or to properly identify themselves as Americans. As the insurgent forces have increased contact with Soviet personnel they can also be expected to become better qualified at distinguishing Soviet forces from the military forces of other countries and therefore be inclined to show greater restraint in disposing of their captives.

The medical facilities of the insurgent forces are generally non-existent or extremely limited, and insurgent forces could be expected to attempt to transport injured U.S. service personnel as quickly as possible across the Pakistan border for treatment. The medical facilities available to Afghan government forces in remote areas are also limited. It can be expected that injured American servicemen, assuming that there were only a small number involved, would probably be removed by Afghan or Soviet officials to one of two hospitals located in the Kabul area. The Academy Military Medical Science Hospital, located near the American Embassy, is being used for the treatment of high-ranking Afghan officials and Soviet officers. The military 1st Hospital, located near the Indian Embassy, is being used for the treatment of Soviet enlisted personnel. Both hospitals are reported to have excellent medical staffs and equipment as well as facilities that would afford the security needed for the temporary safeguarding of prisoners whom the Soviets valued as future subjects for propaganda exploitation.

PAKISTAN

The reception that U.S. personnel could expect in Pakistan would be directly related to the Pakistani perception of U.S. military action. If the U.S. action was viewed as being contrary to Pakistan's national interests, (i.e. military action against a brother muslim country) then the chance of a hostile reception would be greatly enhanced. If, however, the U.S. military action was perceived as being in support of Pakistan, that is, countering a Soviet military offensive against Pakistan, or resulting from an inadvertent overflight, U.S. personnel would expect to receive a friendly reception accompanied by adequate medical attention.

One factor which might prove to be very important would be the speed with which the American service personnel could be extricated from Pakistan. The present government is very susceptible to world publicity and pressures generated by other Islamic countries. The longer American service personnel remained within Pakistan the greater would be the probability that the servicemen would be permanently interned or brought to trial for alleged crimes against the Islamic community.

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

Security Marking/Handling Instructions Removed

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

SWA 23.01 (S/NOFORN) Captivity Factors: Interrogation/Exploitation

SUMMARY:

IRAN

The country of Iran is presently in a state of turmoil. The effectiveness of both its intelligence and security forces has been greatly diminished since the Ayatollah Khomeini took control of the government. Iran's armed forces, paramilitary personnel and law enforcement agencies have been demoralized. Iran's intelligence services have been effectively disembowelled by the executions of the trained intelligence personnel who were formerly employed by SAVAK, the Shah's intelligence service. The new intelligence service, SAVAMA, is still in its formative stages and at present lacks the leadership and authority to carry out its assigned responsibilities.

AFGHANISTAN

The country of Afghanistan is now involved in civil war. The central government is completely dominated by the Soviet Union. Islamic insurgent forces are operating primarily within the remote mountainous regions of Afghanistan but have also penetrated into its major urban centers.

The effectiveness of Afghanistan's intelligence and security forces has in the past been extremely poor. Under Soviet guidance and direction the intelligence and security services can be expected to improve substantially. Additionally, East German personnel are also reportedly involved in the training of Afghanistan personnel.

Afghanistan's intelligence and security forces can be expected to be generally poorly-trained and poorly-motivated. They have limited capabilities in mounting sustained searches for evaders and utilizing modern interrogation/exploitation techniques. However, an evader may be faced with Soviet expertise and techniques.

PAKISTAN

The country of Pakistan is presently under martial law. The martial law regulations grant Pakistan's intelligence and security forces broad discretionary rights with regard to limiting individual rights and privileges. During the most recent period of martial law, there has been a sharp increase in activity on the part of all agencies involved in intelligence and security functions. This increased activity is the result of Afghanistan's becoming a Soviet-dominated state and the concern of Pakistan's leaders that their country might be drawn into Afghanistan's civil war.

Pakistan's intelligence and security forces are generally well-trained and highly-motivated. They are capable of mounting sustained searches for evaders and utilizing modern interrogation/exploitation techniques.

rity Marking/Handling
nstructions Removed

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
WARNING NOTICE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

SWA 23.01.01 (S/NOFORN) Organizations Responsible

Iran's National Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAMA)

Iran's intelligence organization prior to the revolution was referred to as SAVAK and was formed under the guidance [redacted] SAVAK had both internal and external functions. Its external mission was to gather intelligence in foreign countries, conduct covert activities, and monitor activities of Iranian dissidents abroad. Its internal security function was to uncover foreign agents and anti-regime elements and counter their activities.

After the fall of the Shah's government, the provisional government created a new internal security organization, the Research Committee. The name of the Research Committee was subsequently altered when Ayatollah Khomeini assumed control of the government. The Iranian National Security and Intelligence Organization is now referred to as SAVAMA. SAVAMA is a tightly-knit organization that has gained the respect of Khomeini by identifying and killing former members and operatives of the Shah's security forces. SAVAMA's primary mission is to counter foreign clandestine activities in Iran. [redacted]

SAVAMA at present is still in the formative stages. There is a general lack of leadership and direction within the security services. Additionally, some of the functions of SAVAMA have been assumed by the revolutionary council and neighborhood paramilitary forces supportive of the revolutionary guard. [redacted] There is also concern that political ramifications would result from reviving an agency similar to that which had been denounced as a tool of the Shah's tyranny.

Afghanistan's Intelligence and Security Services

Until recently, four organizations were primarily concerned with intelligence collection and interpretation in Afghanistan. One of these was the Department of National Protection, which reported directly to the Prime Minister and had primary responsibility for counterintelligence, counter-subversion and counterinsurgency activities. Another was the Directorate of Intelligence in the Department of Police and Gendarmerie within the Ministry of Interior. The other two organizations were the Reconnaissance and the Intelligence departments in the Ministry of National Defense, which were responsible for the collection of military intelligence. In

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

the past Afghanistan's internal intelligence network was marked by ineffective operational methods, a heavy reliance on paid informants, insufficient regard for operational security and accuracy of information, and inadequate communication systems. Coordination among the intelligence and security forces in the past was also reported to be very poor. There was virtually no central direction and each agency interpreted its own responsibilities as it saw fit. This resulted in considerable overlapping of functions and duplication of effort.

The Afghanistan Intelligence and Security Organization developed under Soviet direction is entitled XAD and is responsible for all internal security and military intelligence. XAD is comprised of two subdivisions--the Internal Section and the Military Intelligence Section. Unlike its predecessor organizations XAD has been given centralized control over intelligence resources and is receiving direct guidance on its operations from trained Soviet personnel. Under Soviet tutelage, XAD possesses almost unlimited authority to draw upon law enforcement agencies and the intelligence components of other ministries.

Foreign servicemen picked up by Afghan Army or paramilitary forces such as the gendarmerie or police units might be questioned briefly by such forces but would be turned over to XAD as soon as possible. XAD has been assigned the responsibility of interrogating foreign nationals who have been suspected or charged with the commission of crimes against the Afghan government in the past, and it can be anticipated that the potential interrogation/exploitation of U.S. service personnel would be assigned to XAD. XAD's actions with regard to the interrogation/exploitation of PWs would be controlled and directed by Soviet personnel.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET

SWA 23.01.02 (S/NOFORN) Potential Intelligence Collection Objectives

Initial collection objectives would most probably include information concerning the circumstances surrounding the prisoner's capture, his mission, his unit, his instructions and possible infiltration and exfiltration routes. Continued interrogation would probably be used to acquire more specific information concerning communications systems, weapons systems, tactics, personnel, locations of units other than his own, effectiveness of forces and order of battle information. Interrogators could be expected to be continuously seeking biographic data on the prisoner, other prisoners and his superiors for use in other interrogation sessions or for propaganda use.

SWA 23.01.03 (S/NOFORN) Potential Propaganda Exploitation Objectives

IRAN

The Iranian government has in the past pursued a vigorous but ineffective prisoner propaganda program. While Iranian propaganda specialists have had marked success in gaining access to foreign television networks for propaganda purposes, those in charge of the propaganda programs have been woefully uninformed about American attitudes and the correct methodology on how to shape American public opinion. Propaganda activities such as the burning of the American flag, the parading of a blindfolded American prisoner before angry crowds and the public display of the uncovered charred remains of the U.S. service personnel who tried to rescue Embassy hostages have not demoralized the American public as intended, but have acted to unify and anger American citizens and heighten their criticism of the Khomeini regime.

However, it can be expected that media appearances involving prisoners as well as films of "showcase detention factilities" would be utilized to try to influence world opinion. Prisoners in some instances could be expected to be blindfolded and taken out of their interrogation facilities in order to excite large demonstrations of people. The filming of such events by Iranian and foreign news media personnel must be anticipated. Recent trials of individuals in Iran have reportedly been filmed for future public dissemination. Iranian propaganda specialists and members of the Revolutionary Guard to whom the prisoner would probably be entrusted for security purposes could be expected to try to use news media officials for propaganda purposes. In the past, Iranian officials have selected prisoners and

SECRET

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

ecurity Marking/Handling
Instructions Removed
31 January 1981

then sought to interrogate them before foreign film crews without the news media being able to ask any questions. Foreign newsmen fortunately have rejected such attempts and have held out for televised interviews in which they themselves could participate.

In addition to their exploitation for propaganda purposes, it can be anticipated that any captured American documents would be used in conjunction with the possible trial of some of the captured American servicemen as spies. Propaganda exploitation of captured U.S. servicemen would probably be handled by propaganda exploitation specialists [redacted]

(C)

AFGHANISTAN

Attempts by the Afghan government to exploit prisoners through its news media have been only marginally successful and in some cases have resulted in damage to the government's image. However, Soviet personnel now control Afghanistan's news media and have total control over the Ministry of Information and Culture. Virtually all of the information being generated by the government of Afghanistan is being produced by Soviet writers and propaganda specialists. Soviet advisors have also been assigned as editors for Afghanistan's newspapers. Therefore, it should be anticipated that any propaganda exploitation of downed American service personnel would be controlled by Soviet propaganda specialists and would be much more sophisticated than in the past.

Under Soviet tutelage, recent Afghan propaganda has included public confessions by captured opposition leaders who have also encouraged insurgents to turn themselves in to authorities. The films of American businessmen arrested by authorities have been shown on both Soviet and Afghanistan television to try to convey the impression of U.S. involvement in internal hostilities. Extensive film coverage has been taken of the release of political prisoners and made available for public consumption. Some prisoners have been subjected to televised "show trials" and interviews which have depicted the prisoners as spies in order to make maximum propaganda use of their captivity.

PAKISTAN

[redacted]

Declassified per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

[redacted]
rity Marking/Handling
structions Removed
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
WARNING NOTICE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

SWA 23.01.04 (S/NOFORN) Potential Indoctrination Objectives

Exploitation of PWs for intelligence information and propaganda purposes would take precedence over attempts to politically indoctrinate PWs. Reported incidents suggest that indoctrination of detainees is not a primary objective. It is doubtful that any concentrated effort would be made to convert U.S. personnel to Islam. This does not rule out other related forms of political exploitation. U.S. personnel can expect to be subjected to repeated conversations with authorities which could include efforts to convince them through reason or by verbal harrassment to reject anti-regime ideas and positions prior to their exit from the country. Efforts could include the following: sophisticated efforts to break down their resistance to propaganda or intelligence exploitation through attempts to convince them that their war-connected actions were illegal, immoral, contrary to U.S. traditions, or done at the request of "capitalists" who had no stake in the conflict; and attempts to discredit U.S. military traditions, leadership, regulations, the Code of Conduct, or service capabilities in such a fashion as to create doubt, anxiety or dissension among their fellow prisoners. Propaganda exploitation and prisoner indoctrination themes could be expected to be closely related, with the ultimate goal being more to control the prisoner in such a manner as to facilitate a "trial" of his country's national policies before the public news media rather than to change the prisoner's personal values.

In Afghanistan, it is possible, however, that servicemen interned in a more permanent facility could conceivably be subjected to a political indoctrination program operated by the Afghans under Soviet guidance and direction.

SWA 23.01.05 (S/NOFORN) Interrogation/Exploitation Methods

IRAN

Iranian interrogators have an established record for the use of extreme interrogation and exploitation methods which have ranged from physical and mental deprivation to torture. In the past, prisoners have been subjected to intensive beatings, homosexual rapes, electric shock treatment and other forms of torture. Recently, American Embassy personnel, while not subjected to torture, have been isolated, blindfolded, initially subjected to long periods of time in which their arms have been tied behind their backs, verbally abused, subjected to forced periods of silence, kept in semi-darkened rooms, subjected to deprivation of sleep (lights burning all night), and subjected to intense interrogation.

Captured U.S. service personnel should anticipate that they will be initially questioned by whatever group takes them prisoner. This could include, among others, the Revolutionary Guard, the Gendarmerie, the Iranian Army, SAVAMA, the Police or neighborhood revolutionary committees. Because of the strained relations between the U.S. and Iran, U.S. servicemen could

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

expect harsh treatment from members of any of the groups. Initial exploitation objectives can be expected to be directed at the obtainment of tactical or time-sensitive information related to the individual's unit and mission. More detailed and extensive interrogations can be expected after the PW is transferred to a more permanent internment facility.

There is no way to predict the patterns which interrogations might follow. Some of the more sophisticated techniques have included the following: Initial preparation of written questions and written answers subsequently followed by detailed review of the answers; intensive, repetitious questioning; alternating threats of punishment and promises of better treatment by different interrogators or teams of interrogators; and the witnessing of mock executions. In the past, the intelligence and security services have also made extensive use of paid informers who have been planted in prison cells. Recently, the Islamic revolutionary prosecutors have reportedly restricted the use of funds for paid informers and are relying more on the use of other techniques to include tape recordings which simulate the sounds of torture of other prisoners. However, the use of English-speaking informants cannot be discounted, as it is likely that some of the exploitation personnel will have attended American universities and will have an excellent command of the English language, while a few others (formerly with SAVAK), will have been trained by U.S. Intelligence Services.

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

AFGHANISTAN

At present, the Afghan government is totally dominated by the Soviet Union. While it is anticipated that the interrogation of U.S. servicemen would probably be conducted by Afghan intelligence personnel acting under Soviet direction and control, it is possible that Soviet advisors might directly participate in such interrogations "at the request of the central government." In the past, the Afghan Intelligence and Security Forces have relied very heavily on informants. Such informants have included individuals of all backgrounds and education levels. Children have also been used as informants. Listening devices have been used, but only to a limited extent. The recruitment of informants has been accomplished through coercion, appeals to patriotism or the promise of money or other gratuities. Some informants are paid a small monthly stipend or are compensated for each piece of information produced.

Since the Soviet invasion, detailed information about Afghanistan's interrogation and exploitation methods has been scarce. However, the Soviet Union has attained an all-encompassing and pervasive interest in Afghanistan, and a close Soviet-Afghan relationship can be expected in the future to be an important factor in the exploitation of captured PWs and their treatment. With Soviet assistance, Afghan intelligence and security personnel will be more proficient, and the use of all standard methods of interrogation can be expected. Should the standard approaches not work, the use of less sophisticated methods to soften prisoner resistance can be anticipated. American businessmen and other foreign nationals arrested by authorities have reportedly been subjected to physical and psychological mistreatment designed to extract "confessions."

[redacted]

SWA 23.01.06 (S/NOFORN) Interrogation Facilities

[redacted] It should be expected that interrogators at the major security or detention centers will have access to electronic monitoring devices, that lighting conditions will be controlled, and that isolation cells will be available. Interrogation rooms can be expected to be very austere, containing in some cases only straight-back chairs and floor lamps. Field interrogation conditions can be expected to be much less sophisticated.

SWA 23.01.07 (S/NOFORN) Exploitation Personnel

IRAN

Due to internal unrest in Iran and the many diverse groups which could conceivably be involved in the interrogation/exploitation of captured U.S. servicemen, it is difficult to anticipate with any degree of certainty the personal characteristics or traits of interrogation personnel who might be utilized to extract intelligence or military-related information. However, interrogation/exploitation personnel can be expected to include some English-speaking individuals who have been educated in the United States and who have an excellent knowledge of U.S. lifestyles. Others may include individuals now employed by SAVAMA who were formerly employed by the Shah's intelligence and security services, or Army J-2 staff, trained by U.S. intelligence or law enforcement agencies.

If there were a small number of captured American servicemen, exploitation personnel could be expected to be selected from Ayatollah Khomeini's militant revolutionary followers or those who were in full agreement with the "ideals" of the Islamic Revolution. An interrogation committee would most probably be set up to manage the exploitation of PWs and would probably contain a small core leadership of Islamic fundamentalists who might make decisions on a consensus basis. Major participants in the exploitation program from both the standpoint of security and exploitation could conceivably include the revolutionary guard force and even a few of the militant students who were left in charge of the American Embassy personnel. Members of the latter group are reported to be politically reliable but rigid,

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

[redacted]

Physical debilitation (including bronchial pneumonia, jaundice, etc) has resulted from prisoners being subjected to harsh and primitive prison conditions. Interrogations have been marked by incessant questioning, deprivation of sleep, accusations of being "spies" or having committed criminal acts, promises of special treatment and other inducements including offers of asylum in East Germany. Reports indicate that the interrogation of prisoners has in some cases been accompanied by severe beatings and electric shock treatments. Although there have been no documented instances of physical torture being used against Americans in Afghanistan, evidence does support the fact that torture has been used by Afghan exploitation personnel against other nationalities to extract information, and executions of some prisoners have taken place.

Assuming that English-speaking personnel were available, it is possible that American PWs might be initially questioned at the time of capture, but it is more probable that PWs would be passed very quickly up the line to XAD personnel in order that detailed interrogation could be conducted under the supervision of trained Soviet personnel. During the initial period of interrogation, prisoners in Afghanistan have generally been subjected to extensive sessions, in some instances lasting as long as 16 hours a day over a 10 day period. The sessions have included direct questioning and the submission of written questions which the prisoner was forced to answer. Some interrogation sessions have begun with the captors demanding that the prisoners write a detailed history (to include personal background) leading up to their capture.

PAKISTAN

[redacted]

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

overzealous, self-righteous and absolute in their thinking. The militants tend to exhibit inflexibility and view most issues in rather stark, uncompromising terms, and it is doubtful that Khomeini would allow the militants to assume control over the prisoners. It is more probable that a prisoner committee would be established, with members ranging in political orientation from Muslim fundamentalists loyal to Khomeini to Marxist radicals using the revolutionary movement to further their different political ends. The Islamic fundamentalists at the present time could be expected to exert prominent influence with respect to decisions relating to the prisoners. Revolutionary Guard force personnel armed with machineguns would most likely be used to provide overall security for the PWs and to handle logistical problems related to transfer of the PWs between alternative locations. If the number of PWs captured were sizeable, the revolutionary guards would probably initially seek assistance from their affiliated neighborhood committees or alternatively from intelligence and security services which have demonstrated reliability and loyalty to the Islamic revolution.

AFGHANISTAN

Historically most of the senior positions in the Afghan intelligence security services have been held by individuals who have had prior miltiary experience. The chief factor in past years which has impaired the efficiency of the Afghan Intelligence and Security Services has been the absence of educated personnel at the lower and middle levels of command to plan and execute assignments. Dishonesty, bribery and other forms of corruption have been a constant problem. Security personnel have distorted information and fabricated reports in order to please their superiors. Training of Afghan intelligence and security forces has been conducted primarily within the country at places such as the national police academy located in Kabul.

[redacted]

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets have taken control of all training, and assistance is now also being provided by East German officials. With the present Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, interrogators will likely be either civilian or military personnel (low or high ranking) acting under the direction of Soviet or East German personnel. Interrogation personnel can be expected to have a reasonably good command of the English language. During interrogation sessions, especially those that are military-oriented, Soviet officials or representatives probably will be present or in close proximity. It can be expected that monitoring devices will be used to provide the Soviets with accurate and complete accounts of any information extracted. Personnel of the Afghan Intelligence and Security Services are now undergoing intensive training in the Soviet Union, and newly-graduated personnel can be expected to be better qualified than in the past, carefully selected for political reliability, and less susceptible to the receipt of false or misleading information.

Depending on the number of PWs, additional exploitation personnel could be needed for interrogations. In such a scenario, PWs would probably be initially screened and those thought to possess valuable intelligence would be segregated for interrogation by more experienced personnel. In the

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

event of large numbers of detainees, less-qualified Afghan military or civilian personnel could be expected to be involved in the interrogation phase. In the event of an internment of a large number of PWs, the regular prison guard force might be supplemented by personnel, determined to be loyal, from Afghanistan's Gendarmerie (a paramilitary police force) which has been utilized in the past to assume security duties previously assigned to other services. In the past, the capabilities of the Gendarmerie have been extremely limited and its performance inhibited by inadequate training, poor logistical support, obsolete equipment and corruption. However, the Soviet Union is presently engaged in upgrading the qualifications of Gendarmerie personnel, and it should be anticipated that, with the Soviets in charge of the Afghan prison system, the Gendarmerie will be more attentive to their assigned responsibilities.

PAKISTAN

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

[redacted]

SWA 23.02 (S/NOFORN) Prisoner Treatment

SUMMARY:

IRAN

The treatment of prisoners in Iran can be generally described as extremely harsh by any standard, characterized by poor food in insufficient quantities, very poor sanitation, limited medical services, and overcrowding of inadequate facilities. Inadequate medical treatment and the poor quality of sustenance has caused malnutrition, food poisoning, and chronic illness. The treatment of captured U.S. servicemen will depend greatly upon whether the Iranians perceive the captured servicemen as victims of an inadvertent overflight or as military forces involved in aggressions against Iran.

[redacted]

Under present circumstances, captured U.S. servicemen could be expected to receive very harsh treatment. It can be anticipated that PWs will initially be interrogated and then immediately isolated in separate cells or rooms. Depending upon the numbers involved, captured servicemen may be interned in military or civilian facilities. Buildings such as the American Embassy in Tehran have special significance for Iranians as "symbols of capitalistic tyranny" and could be used for internment purposes. Under some circumstances, PWs may be initially kept with both hands and feet tied. Communications between prisoners will not be permitted and prisoners will be denied all information about outside events. A prisoner's sleep will be controlled and deliberately kept short and intermittently broken by intensive questioning. Guard personnel will be rotated often to heighten the depersonalization process.

Efforts would be undertaken to increase PW fears, tensions and sense of abandonment. Even the smallest infraction can be expected to be dealt with extremely harshly. In some cases, prisoners have been placed in solitary confinement for periods of up to three or four months. It is possible that a distinction will be made with respect to the younger, lower-ranking service personnel, who may receive less harsh treatment than senior officials. Minority servicemen might also receive better treatment depending upon how their captors perceive their involvement in the events preceding their capture. Treatment of PWs may not necessarily be affected to any appreciable extent by the public news media or world opinion calling for fair treatment. However, as with the internment of U.S. PWs in North Vietnam, better treatment of PWs could result from the Iranian perception of a need to improve its image in the light of world opinion.

Mail privileges and visits from the Red Cross or members of the clergy will be carefully controlled and permitted only when deemed advantageous for propaganda purposes. Requests by newsmen to verify the condition of the detainees would most likely be denied "for security reasons" as they have in the past, and PWs can expect extended periods of captivity.

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

AFGHANISTAN

The treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan has traditionally been extremely harsh, and has been characterized by poor food in insufficient quantities, very poor sanitation with minimal toilet facilities, an absence of medical services, and gross overcrowding and poor management of inadequate housing facilities. Prison staff personnel are usually recruited from the lower socio-economic strata and often include rejects from the military services who often have little knowledge of or interest in efficient prison administration. Afghanistan's prisons are so overcrowded that the government has had to confiscate private homes to use as temporary detention facilities. Prisoners in some facilities have been forced to sleep in shifts, with two shifts being forced to stand while one sleeps. These conditions are said to allow a prisoner only two to three hours of sleep per night. Prisoners are normally issued two blankets, and they are often forced to sleep on the floor due to the inadequate number of cots or beds. Political prisoners have normally been confined in communal cells unless they are believed to possess significant information or are considered to be "hard core", in which case they are confined in individual cells and isolated from the general prison populace. Due to the present overcrowding, political prisoners

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

have been comingled with criminal prisoners rather than segregated from one another.

Prison routine varies depending upon the internment facility and the severity of the offense committed. In the past, prisoners in large facilities and those convicted of felonies and "crimes against the state" have been assigned to work details, while political prisoners have been subjected to more stringent controls. Reports from previously detained individuals suggest that the norm of prisoner treatment in Afghanistan is deliberately harsh, primitive and debilitating. Prisoners released recently from Afghan prisons have told of the evidence of torture, including mangled or extracted fingernails, missing fingers, scarred bodies and emaciated physical conditions.

PWs can anticipate that prison conditions in part will be controlled by the attitudes and the objectives of prison personnel and interrogators, the numbers of PWs within the facility, and their captor's perception of the value of the PWs for military or propaganda purposes. There is evidence to indicate that Afghan officials would not totally ignore international concerns about human rights and that the treatment PWs could expect to receive would be less severe than that accorded their own nationals. Uncooperative prisoners considered to be a threat to Afghanistan's security have reportedly, in some cases, been summarily executed without a trial, and it would be important to establish a record of the servicemen held captive in order to afford them as much protection as possible. It is felt that U.S. service personnel would probably be protected from executions and would instead be exploited for their propaganda value.

PAKISTAN

Generally, prison conditions can be expected to be substantially below western standards and characterized by poor food, very poor sanitation, limited medical services and frequent overcrowding of prisoners. In the past, prison conditions in Pakistan have varied greatly according to the size of the prison, the classification which the legal authorities have assigned to the prisoner at the time he was placed in judicial custody, and the individual's position or rank. For a more detailed discussion of Pakistan's prison classification system, see Section 23.03.
Generally speaking, prisoners who have been held in national security cases have been treated well and seldom subjected to physical abuse. In Pakistan, the distinction between different classes of prisoners will be an important factor with regard to the use of physical force used on a detainee. Some subjects in criminal cases who have lacked money or influence have been

Security Marking/Handling Instructions Removed
[redacted] Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
WARNING NOTICE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

subjected to very rough treatment by the police. Prisoners from the upper socio-economic strata or those with money to buy good treatment have generally been treated well and not normally subjected to physical abuse.

SWA 23.03 (S/NOFORN) Confinement Facilities

SUMMARY:

IRAN

Iran's prison system was originally constructed along the lines of the French penal system. In the past, the Iranian prison system has been officially under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, with the Ministry of Interior and the armed forces also playing an important role in its operation and management. There have been three classifications of prisons in Iran: (1) police jails, which have been operated under Gendarmerie supervison in rural areas and under the supervision of SAVAMA and the National Police in urban areas and which have been used for preventive detention and short-term prisoners; (2) court prisons, which have been operated under the criminal courts and used primarily for sentences of intermediate duration; and (3) penitentiaries operated under direct military supervision and used for long-term sentences and the internment of political and criminal prisoners. It is reported that almost every city and town has a prison, although in most cases the facility could be used only for temporary detainment and not for the permanent incarceration of prisoners.

Detailed information on the organization of the Iranian penal system now being operated by the new revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini is not available. Iranian officials are now reportedly engaged in a review of the country's prison system with the intent of reorganizing it in accordance with new Islamic revolutionary concepts. There are several prisons in or near Tehran as well as in the outlying provinces. The major prisons that have been used in the past for internment of political prisoners or for criminals requiring maximum security have been Qasr, formerly a police prison, and Evin and Komite prisons, which formerly were run by SAVAK.

Generally, Iran's prisons are seriously overcrowded. This condition has been caused by the large numbers of individuals that were charged with having committed crimes against the revolution or as being operatives of the Shah. Mismanagement has also contributed to the problems of existing prison facilities. [redacted] In some of the prisons, the Revolutionary Council has recently attempted to centralize control over the respective intelligence and security services to make the management of the penal

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

system more efficient. In Komite Prison, control of the Department of Police, Iranian Army, SAVAMA and gendarmerie personnel have been centralized through the use of a joint committee known as the ""Komite".

It must be anticipated that captured U.S. service personnel would be interned at different facilities to complicate possible rescue attempts. However, should the Islamic leaders decide to try PWs as "spies" or for "war crimes", it is conceivable that the detainees would be interned together in one heavily-guarded facility. Maximum security facilities available at Evin and Komite prisons make them prime candidates for use by the Iranians in the detention and possible trial of captured U.S. service personnel.

AFGHANISTAN

Detailed information on the organization of the Afghan penal system is not available. In the past, prisons have been administered under the National Jail and Prison Regulation Act. Prisons were located in each of the provincial capitals and were maintained and run by different provincial police organizations. Under a recent reorganization the prison system has been transferred from the Department of Security to the Logistics Department of the Ministry of Interior. Soviet officials now occupy the senior positions in every Ministry, including the Ministry of Interior, except for the Afghanistan Foreign Ministry, where one holds the post of Deputy Director. The Afghanistan penal system is now controlled by the Soviets, who have reportedly acted recently to centralize control of the prisons and, in some instances, to countermand previous orders given by high-ranking Afghan prison officials. Due to the present Soviet/Afghan relationship, the Soviets would most likely make all decisions relating to U.S. PWs, to include the conditions of their internment.

There are several provincial prisons in Afghanistan. The major prison used for the detention of political prisoners or for those prisoners requiring maximum security precautions is Policharki prison. Two other prisons which have been regularly used in the past for the detention of less important political prisoners have been the provincial prions located in Herat and Samagan. [redacted]

PAKISTAN

Detailed information on the organization of the Pakistan penal system, presently being operated by officials under recently enacted martial law provisions, is not available. There are several prisons in Pakistan. The prisons are generally overcrowded and poorly managed. Prison personnel are fairly well-trained but receive very low pay and are inclined to use physical force against prisoners interned in the lower cell classifications. The major prison used for political prisoners is Rawalpindi Prison. Inadvertent peacetime intruders would, if interned, probably initially be held in the higher-graded cells within Rawalpindi Prison.

SWA 23.03.01 (S/NOFORN) Specific Confinement Facilities

The confinement facilities listed below are described for purposes of illustration. More detailed information on some of the facilities is available. Users requiring additional information should contact the originating agency. Some of the information pertaining to the specifics within the prisons has not been corroborated.

IRAN

EVIN PRISON - is located in the northern part of Tehran approximately one mile west of the Royal Tehran Hilton Hotel. Evin is believed to be the primary prison used for the internment of political prisoners. Due to its modern security systems, it would be the most likely facility used for the internment of captured American service personnel. Reportedly, Evin is administered by the revolutionary committees with revolutionary guard force personnel in charge of prison security. Although very little information is available, it is reported to be the most modern of Iran's prisons and is said to contain a labyrinth of passageways that can be used to isolate, secure, and transfer prisoners between different cells within the internal complex.

KOMITE PRISON - has been one of Iran's most notorious prisons and has been used in the past to house criminal as well as political prisoners. [redacted] The prison is a three and one-half storied, heavily-guarded structure enclosed within a high wall. Normal access into the prison is gained through a narrow entranceway at the front of the prison. The prisoner is brought through the main gate, and led immediately to a screening area secured by an iron door which is just inside the main gate. At this time, the prisoner's personal belongings are taken from him, including his socks, belt and shoes. The prisoner is then led blindfolded through a second iron door which opens into a circular courtyard. If the prisoner were not blindfolded as he exited the door, he reportedly would see opposite him a flight of stairs and to their right, rooms with

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

windows on the first floor. To the left of the stairs, there is believed to be a corridor which leads to the prison showers, which are located at the end of the corridor. Directly ahead he would see the two top floors of the prison and a half-story structure on top. Each of the two top floors has a balcony attached to it overlooking the courtyard. The prison cells together with several interrogation rooms are reportedly located in rooms on each of the first three floors. The cells are divided into wards. There are six wards on the three floors. Wards 1, 3 and 5 are located on one side; wards 2, 4 and 6 on the other. Wards 1 and 2 are located on the first floor and are reported to include Komite's solitary confinement and maximum security cells. The cells usually contain no furniture and prisoners are given one blanket. It is believed that there are twenty-three cells located in each of the first floor wards. The cells on the third floor (wards 5 & 6) are believed to be larger than those found in the first two floors. Communications between prisoners in Komite has been limited mainly to speaking to those that share the same cell or with those who share an adjacent cell. (C)

[redacted]

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

QASR PRISON - is located north of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. This prison is reportedly capable of handling up to 2,500 prisoners. It appears that Qasr is administered by the police although Revolutionary Guard force personnel may also be involved in the security and operations of the prison. Qasr has been used by the Council of Revolutionary Tribunal for the incarceration, trial and, in some cases, the execution of senior civilian and military officials employed by or affiliated with the Shah's regime. Complaints about poor prisoner handling have reportedly resulted in the recent transfer of most of the prison's political populace to Evin Prison. At present, Qasr is believed to house only criminal prisoners. Information with regard to the internal structure of the prison and the locations of the cells is not available, although it is belived to contain a large courtyard in the center of the prison, a mosque, a small hospital and a prison library. Confinement facilities for the incarceration of female prisoners are also reported to be present.

AFGHANISTAN

POLICHARKI PRISON - is located approximately 25 miles to the east of Kabul. The Jalabad road, leading to Pakistan, serves as the main access road to the prison. Policharki Prison was originally designed to accomodate 3,266 prisoners, including special facilities for 390 dangerous and recalcitrant types and 414 female prisoners. Policharki today is heavily overcrowded. The prison population recently has been estimated to number between 6,000 and 15,000 prisoners. Five or six prisoners are being housed in small one- to two-man cells in the center prison area. Other prisoners are being kept in larger units in an adjacent building with 120 or more prisoners in cells measuring 20 by 30 meters. The bulk of the prisoners are ex-military personnel, parchamist party workers and individuals arrested in Kandha

Province. Foreign nationals are also reported to have been interned at Policharki. The prison reportedly is heavily guarded, with three check points reached before arriving at the main gate to the prison. The main entrance to Policharki is through a gate located off of Jalabad Road. Two security posts are found at this entrance, which leads through an inner security wall and on to a small circular lawn area. Once entry is obtained, one must go through a second inner security wall to enter the main prison facility, which is octagonal in shape. Guards are posted on the inside of each of the security walls and Soviet tanks guard the entry to the main gate. Four watch towers are found at the corners of the outer perimeter wall and are believed to contain anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. Tanks and armored personnel carriers are located on the inside of the prison grounds as well as directly outside the main prison gate. Numerous guards armed with pistols and AK-47 assault weapons are assigned to each cell block. Additionally, Soviet soldiers man machine gun emplacements at the main gate and are posted at various locations throughout the prison. The prison complex contains several buildings in addition to the main, octagonal-shaped structure, which is reportedly used to house prisoners requiring maximum security. It is composed of 8 separate wings, each of which could be sealed off very quickly to isolate the spread of prisoner outbreaks of violence. Female prisoners are segregated from male prisoners and are housed in a separate building located outside the main octogonal prison facility but within the internal security wall. In addition to the regular guard force "special military guard squads" are also assigned. Reportedly, these units are segregated from the regular force and assigned special security functions, purportedly to include the handling of executions. Soviet transport planes have reportedly been used for the transport of prisoners from the outlying areas to the Policharki Prison.

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

PAKISTAN

RAWALPINDI PRISON - is located in the city of Rawalpindi and is Pakistan's primary penal institution. It has traditionally been used for important political prisoners and others who have required maximum security. Rawalpindi Prison, as with other Pakistani prisons, is managed through the use of regiments or levels of prison conditions normally organized from an A to C, with grade A prison cells representing the best conditions that the average prisoner could hope to receive under optimum conditions. Prisoners in grade A cells do not normally share cells with others and the cell normally contains some type of toilet facility. In some cases, prisoners are even allowed to have their own servants prepare their food for them. Prisoners in grade B cells generally have limited sanitation facilities and the cells are used to house prisoners of lesser social position or importance. Although several prisoners are normally housed together, political prisoners are normally segregated from hardcore criminals. Sometimes a Chowkidar (watchman) is assigned to cook the prisoners' food and clean the cell. Grade C cells are normally badly overcrowded, and prisoners are often forced to sleep on the bare floor without blankets. Political prisoners are often interned with hardened criminals. Grade C cells have very poor sanitation facilities and normally only a bucket is provided. Prisoners, with the

exception of those in solitary confinement, are allowed to receive food and clothing in packages which have been carefully searched for weapons or other contraband. The terms of a prisoner's confinement will also determine whether the prisoner is assigned to work details ranging from hard labor to light work assignments such as chair weaving. With the exception of prisoners in solitary confinement, prisoners are also allowed exercise walks around the prison grounds. It is possible for a prisoner to seek a higher prison classification by applying to the courts or having judicial authorities make an independent determination that his poor physical condition or position warrant an upgrading. The more influence a prisoner can bring to bear on the government officials, the better will be his chances for improved conditions. The granting of improved conditions has not always meant that a prisoner's sentence would eventually be commuted. [redacted]

(C)

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

SWA 23.04 (S/NOFORN) Legal Status of Prisoners

In order to comprehend the manner in which justice would be administered in Southwest Asia, it is necessary for one to understand the legal ramifications of Iran's new Islamic Constitution and its impact on Iran's executive, legislative and judicial bodies. Also vital are Afghanistan's adoption, at Soviet direction, of a set of interim Constitutional provisions referred to as "The Basic Principles", and recent developments in Pakistan's implementation of more stringent martial law provisions.

SWA 23.04.01 (S/NOFORN) Administration of Justice

IRAN

The Iranian constitution theoretically guarantees the protection of individual rights. The language of the constitution, at least in theory, limits the degree to which the government may proceed in depriving citizens of their liberty. However, in practice, constitutional guarantees have been consistently ignored and the government has used wide discretion in the enforcement of laws and the use of coercion to insure compliance. The new government has ignored international accords and asserted that any decision with respect to prisoners will be controlled by the Iranian Parliament and the application of Islamic Law.

In December of 1979, the Iranian people approved, by referendum, a new constitution for Iran. In addition to being poorly drafted, confusing and dogmatic, the new constitution is an instrument of tyranny. Either directly or indirectly, more power has been vested in one man than in any other constitution found in effect throughout the world. The constitution, which is based upon the writings of Khomeini, represents a continued effort to change Iran from a monarchy into an Islamic society similar to the world of Islam after Muhammad's death in the 7th century.

The basis of the new constitutional enactments is that Islam, as interpreted by Ayatollah Khomeini, who was appointed as the leader (Fagih)

Security Marking/Handling Instructions Removed
[redacted]
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
WARNING NOTICE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

of Iran, will resolve all disputes, fill any void and lead the way to a just and perfect political system. Under the constitution, Khomeini has been given the widest possible powers imaginable. As the leader of the Iranian people, Khomeini appoints the religious jurists on the Council of Guardians, a body which approves all legislation passed by the National Assembly. He also appoints the highest judicial authorities, who must themselves be religious jurists. In his capacity as Commander of the Armed Forces, he may appoint or dismiss the commanders of the three military services, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Commander of the Revolutionary Guards. At the suggestion of the Council of Guardians, Khomeini may order a mobilization of the armed forces and declare war. He also approves the competence of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic and may dismiss the President after a finding by the Supreme Court that the President has violated the Law.

The Constitution provides for a Parliament comprised of 270 deputies. The number of deputies is subject to change every ten years depending on shifts and decreases and increases in population. The term of office is for four years. Except for one representative each for the Jewish and Zoroastrian faiths, one member for Asyrians, and two members for Armenians, the entire membership of Paliament must be Muslims. It has been given the exclusive right to pass laws and ratify certain transactions. However, this right is severely limited by provisions which provide for the establishment of the Council of Guardians, which has the power to decide whether a law is in contradiction to the constitution. Ayatollah Khomeini's power of veto over the Legislature also extends to the judicial apparatus through the use of a similar mechanism. The power of the President (Constitutional principles 123 to 129) and the Prime Minister (Constitutional principles 134 and 136 to 139) are almost nonexistent.

The Constitution provides for the establishment of a judicial system "based on Islamic rules." The highest judicial body is called the "High Council of the Judiciary" and consists of the head of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General and three "religious and just judges" chosen by their own group of peers. The head of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General must be religious jurists (mujtahids) whose piety and knowledge of Islamic law authorizes them to make interpretations of the law, which in turn have the force of the law. The High Council of the Judiciary is charged with establishing necessary organizations within the Ministry of Justice, determining the procedures for selecting the members of the Supreme Court, preparing other bills having to do with the judiciary, and appointing and dismissing judges. The term of office for the Council is 5 years, but members can be reelected at anytime. Procedures for the election of members are to be established by a separate law.

The Constitution provides a statement as to the independence of the Judiciary, but other provisions insure that Ayatollah Khomeini or a successor regime has veto power over all the actions of the judiciary. Both the head of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General are appointed by and subject to dismissal by Khomeini. The three remaining members are required to be members of the clergy who will share his views. The language of the constitution makes it clear that even in the absence of Khomeini the decisive

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

vote in the judiciary will be held by the Islamic clergy. In brief, the country is to be governed by Ayatollah Khomeini during his lifetime and afterwards by a council of Islamic clergy. The constitution grants the clergy the widest possible powers. Any successor to Khomeini will retain Khomeini's powers and have the ability to control the judiciary through appointments to the Judiciary Council and the legislature through appointments to the Council of Guardians. Any decision relating to the trial, sentencing or imprisonment of captured American service personnel can be expected to be conducted at the direction of and with the approval of Ayatollah Khomeini or a successor group of senior religious leaders.

AFGHANISTAN

At present, the Afghanistan government is totally dominated by the Soviets and is operating under an interim set of constitutional provisions referred to as the "Basic or Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." The "Basic Principles" provide the new Revolutionary Council of the DRA, or, more accurately, its Praesidium, with almost absolute power. The "Basic Principles" carry the authority of a provisional constitution and will remain in force until the ratification of a new DRA constitution by the Loya Dirga (Afghanistan's General Assembly). Until a new constitution is ratified, the Revolutionary Council will continue to be the most powerful governmental authority with the exception of the Soviet advisory group.

Any decisions relating to the trial, sentencing or imprisonment of captured American service personnel can be expected to be conducted in accordance with directions from the Revolutionary Council. Its members have been carefully screened and approved by the Afghan Soviet advisory group, which supervises and directs all significant decisions made by the Revolutionary Council. The Revolutionary Council's authority is extensive. It has the power to approve all laws and is responsible for the appointment of all judges. The Revolutionary Council also serves as the final court of appeals. The President of the Council is held to be the Chief of State, and in this capacity he serves as the country's Prime Minister unless he chooses to appoint one. Several decrees have been recently issued by the Revolutionary Council which, at least traditionally, would impact on a prisoner's rights. The third decree issued by the Revolutionary Council relates to articles pertaining to judiciary procedures. Article 1 of the thrid decree declares that, with the exception of constitutional laws and regulations, all other laws and regulations shall remain in force provided that they are "applicable and compatible" with the issuances and decrees of the Revolutionary Council. Articles II and VI deal with the establishment of a new judiciary system, which will include a High Judiciary Council headed by a Minister of Justice. The duties of the New Ministry of Justice are still to be detailed and will be subject to review and approval by the Revolutionary Council.

The implementation of death sentences rendered by the Revolutionary Council under Articles II and VI must be approved by the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. Articles VII and VIII of the third decree provide for the establishment of a Revolutionary Court which will be responsible to the Revolutionary Council. Procedures allow the new court to conduct trials in the various provinces, thus alleviating the burden of transferring

Dated por 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

Handling
oved

all prisoners to Kabul. Trials are to be carried out in accordance with revolutionary decrees. Under the revolutionary decrees, any civil or military prisoner that commits or has been determined to have committed any offense either against the revolution, against the interests of the people, against national interests, or has in some way endangered the domestic or foreign interests of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is considered to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Military Courts. Under the broad mandate of the new decrees, the Revolutionary Military Courts have been given virtually unrestricted power to try any case. It is believed, therefore, that trial of foreign military personnel would be handled by the Revolutionary Military Courts.

PAKISTAN

The Pakistani constitution guarantees the protection of individual rights. As written, the statutes and regulations pertaining to the limits to which the government may proceed in depriving individuals of their liberty are inadequate to guarantee individual rights. There are numerous loopholes in the language of the constitution and its subordinate legislation which allow the government wide discretion in the enforcement of the law and the use of coercion to ensure such enforcement. Additionally, the present government has declared a state of martial law and Pakistan's courts are in disagreement with respect to its effect on and interpretation of the constitution as it relates to the safeguarding of prisoner rights. Some Pakistani courts, especially those courts directly controlled by the present government, have taken the position that the enactment of martial law suspended constitutional rights to the extent that any constitutional "privileges" contradictory to the orders issued by Pakistan's martial law administrators were rendered null and void. The Sind High Court challenged this decision and held that the government's enactment of martial law ("the law of necessity") cannot be used to limit or abrogate individual liberties that are guaranteed by the constitution. The Sind High Court has taken the position that, under the constitutional powers of judicial review, every executive action in the country is amenable to judicial review and that the burden is on government officials to satisfy the courts that the law permitted the action and was lawfully taken. More recently, the government has enacted constitutional amendment 212(A), which authorizes military courts to try offenses against martial laws and forbids any appeal by the civilian courts of the martial law decisions. New provisions of the martial laws grant sweeping authority to the military courts which give them immunity from review by civil courts, even Pakistan's Supreme Court.

SWA 23.04.02 (S/NOFORN) Civilian and Military Courts

SUMMARY: The degree to which civilian courts are actually functioning within each of the three countries is uncertain. Revolutionary military courts in Iran have usurped most, if not all, of the power of the judiciary. Afghanistan has recently established a high judiciary council as its highest court and is utilizing revolutionary tribunals to control all legal matters related to activities which impact on the security of the country.

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

The jurisdiction of Pakistan's civilian courts has been seriously impaired by recent martial law edicts that deny the right of appellate review of the decisions of the martial law tribunals. However, there are indications that some of the functions held by the judiciaries of each of the countries will remain, to some extent, as vestiges for the new authorities, and therefore it is necessary to have a general knowledge of the judicial systems now in a state of transition.

IRAN

CIVILIAN COURTS. During the Shah's regime, the Supreme Court of Iran was the highest civilian court. Under the new constitution, the highest judicial body will be a "High Council of the Judiciary" consisting of the head of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General and three "religious and just judges". The High Council of the Judiciary is now charged with reorganizing the existing judicial system and establishing a system that will be based on Islamic rules. Located in Tehran, the Supreme Court consists of the Attorney General, a public prosecutor and eleven branches comprised of four justices each. The Supreme Court has had jurisdiction of appeals in criminal cases involving punishment from two months' imprisonment to execution, and has typically resolved jurisdictional disputes in the lower courts.

The next lower level of courts, to include the provincial courts, courts of appeal, courts of assize and criminal high courts, has operated in provincial capitals as courts of appeal in civil and criminal cases. The provincial courts have also served as courts of first instance for criminal cases where the punishment has included over two years' imprisonment. In hearing criminal cases, three judges have normally been seated unless the offense involved a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death, in which case five judges have traditionally heard the case. There have been no juries. Traditionally, serious felonies were handled by provincial courts while misdemeanors were heard in county courts consisting of several judges, an investigating officer and a prosecuting attorney. The next lowest ordinary tribunals were referred to as district courts. Each district court has had one judge who tried civil cases involving less than 50,000 rials and criminal cases with maximum sentences up to one month imprisonment, generally referred to as minor offenses or contraventions. Iran's judiciary is now undergoing reorganization, with the greatest change taking place in the development of the preeminence of the revolutionary courts over the established courts and the enforcement of the principles of Shariat laws in lieu of Iran's secular laws.

REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. The constitution now provides for military or revolutionary tribunals to be established for the investigation of crimes related to national security by members of the military, gendarmerie, police security forces and the Revolutionary Guard. "Other crimes" committed by military or security personnel supposedly are to be handled by the regular courts of the Ministry of Justice. In any case, the Provost Marshal and his military courts are now considered a part of the unified judiciary system and come under its principles.

There is uncertainty as to whether military or civilian courts would

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

Security Marking/Handling Instructions Removed
[redacted] Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
WARNING NOTICE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

be used for the trial of captured American service personnel. The issue appears to be moot, since the actions as well as the decision of either court would be controlled by Ayatollah Khomeini or a revolutionary committee appointed by him and applying Islamic law. However, there are major differences between the manner in which civilian courts have conducted themselves historically and the operations of the new revolutionary courts. Based upon Ayatollah Khomeini's predilection to use the revolutionary courts for the trial of political prisoners to include foreign nationals, captured American servicemen if to be tried, would probably be brought before revolutionary tribunals.

REVOLUTIONARY COURT PROCEDURES. Defendants in the revolutionary courts are now tried under the Sharia, Islamic law which is based primarily upon the Koran, rather than under Iran's penal code. Trials within revolutionary courts are conducted by a five man panel of judges. Verdicts in the trials, some of which have lasted less than one hour, have been rendered by a majority vote of the judges. The sentence is handed down by the senior judge and carried out immediately after Khomeini has been notified. There are no appeals. Although the new regulations allow for defense attorneys, they have been noticeably absent. The guidelines also allow for "open courts", but, in practice, attendance has been limited to witnesses, relatives of the accused and reporters from pro-government newspapers. Additionally, members of the foreign press have reportedly been admitted on occasion.

Islamic theories of evidence before the revolutionary courts suffer from inherent defects in that they are based on a presumption that a respectable Islamic man would not willingly tell a lie and therefore must e presumed to be telling the truth. The influence of faulty memory, or testimony colored by personal bias is not taken into consideration in the process. Also, the detrimental effect of prosecution attorneys being able to ask leading questions is not recognized. The public record lists only the charges and the sentences. The reasoning behind the sentences is normally unavailable for attorneys involved in other litigation before the same court. It is argued that there are no requirements for a statement of the evidence upon which the decision is based because it is one that has been reached by Islamic judges applying Islamic law and consequently is inherently fair to all the parties concerned.

It is quite conceivable that the trial of captured U.S. servicemen might be held within one of the prison mosques at Evin, Qasr or Komite, thereby affording the captors maximum security precautions as well as symbolic religious connotations for the Islamic people. Revolutionary trials have regularly been held in some of the mosques, such as the mosque within Qasr Prison. Iranian religious leaders have argued for the use of mosques on the basis that they are meant to serve not only a religious function but also for "political education and communication with the people."

The legal setting is one of extreme prejudice for those accused and is peculiar to Islamic justice. The walls of most of the courtrooms have been covered with pictures of Iran's religious leaders and with highly emotional pictures or paintings depicting victims or members of the Iranian populace affected by the accused's actions. Witnesses as well as spectators are searched as they enter the courtroom. Men and women are seated separately on opposite sides of the courtroom. The trial is normally convened

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

with the chanting by a choir boy of a few verses of the Koran followed by the audience chanting Allah Akbar (God is Great). If the defendant is prepared to recount his transgressions and confess, the proceedings begin with a confession or statement by the defendant, interrupted occasionally by questions from the justice ministry prosecutors. Normally the prisoner's testimony follows a pattern of chronicled, arduous and lengthy interrogation to carefully extract names, places and events. If the defendant is not prepared to confess, the proceedings commence with a highly emotional statement from prosecuting attorneys followed by numerous government witnesses testifying against the accused. The official language and script of the Islamic Republic is Persian. Official documents, correspondence and statements submitted to the court probably would be in Persian. Portable cassette tape recorders are used to record testimony. Witnesses are sworn to the Koran. The accused is usually permitted an opportunity to speak, but often his testimony is met with outbursts from the audience or derisive laughter. The absence of legal counsel to speak in behalf of the accused is not a basis for delaying or preventing the trial. Islamic legal precedents are dispositive of the issues as well as any procedural matters brought before the court. In Islam, a peculiar institutional combination of Islamic legal systems and the absence of a traditional hierachy accounts for the absence of an appellate process which is present in almost all other legal systems.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan's controlling judicial body is its revolutionary council, which operates under an interim set of constitutional provisions titled the "Basic or Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." Under the new principles, the highest court in Afghanistan is the High Judiciary Council headed by the Minister of Justice. Afghanistan's lower courts have been replaced by revolutionary military courts which are to be responsive to the needs of Afghanistan's revolutionary council. It can be anticipated that the courts would handle any legal matters brought before them in accordance with procedures outlined by the revolutionary decrees which have been approved by the Soviet Union. Very little detail is available with respect to the operations of the revolutionary courts. Reports indicate that the courts are not abiding by judicial due process and are instead following summary martial procedures.

Afghanistan, even without Soviet intervention, has typically adhered to the application of secular laws over the Islamic Shariat religious laws. Afghanistan's former constitution essentially set up a secular state which enjoined its courts to try cases in light of the constitution and the laws of Afghanistan. However, the constitution did recognize the Sharia Hanafi School of Jurisprudence, but only in regard to those issues which were not resolved through the application of Afghanistan's existing laws and regulations. It is anticipated that Afghanistan would only resort to the traditional Shariat legal concepts in the trial of captured U.S. service personnel if it was determined by governmental officials, at Soviet direction, that the use of Islamic law concepts would result in the attainment of support for its position from other Islamic countries and any propaganda objectives it sought to achieve.

[redacted] Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
[redacted] NOTICE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

ity Marking/Handling
structions Removed

PAKISTAN

Based upon current Pakistan/U.S. relations, it is believed that Pakistan would abide by its commitment as a signatory of the Geneva Convention articles relating to prisoners of war and would not move to try captured American servicemen. Should Pakistan make a determination to try American service personnel, it could proceed either through the use of its civilian courts or the revolutionary courts now operating under its Martial Law provisions. Very little information is available with respect to the operations of Pakistan's martial law courts. Reports indicate that the courts are not strictly adhering to judicial due process and are resolving legal issues in a summary fashion along the lines of the traditional Islamic Sharia Law concepts. Although appeals have been allowed for decisions rendered by martial law courts to Pakistan's civilian courts, recent constitutional amendments will probably curtail this process.

More detailed information is available with respect to the operations of the civilian courts. In the past, Pakistan's highest tribunal, the Supreme Court, had original, appellate, and advisory jurisdictions, but did not include original, or first instance jurisdiction dealing with criminal cases. The criminal courts of first instance have consisted of three categories, including the three high courts, courts of sessions at district headquarters, and three lower levels of magistrate courts. All magistrates in a district have been subordinate to the district magistrate, who also functions as the deputy commissioner. As prescribed in the Pakistan Code of Criminal Procedure, an offense punishable by imprisonment not to exceed one month has been triable by a third-class magistrate. An offense punishable by imprisonment not to exceed six months may be disposed of by a second-class magistrate. A felony carrying a possible sentence of imprisonment not to exceed two years, solitary confinement, or flogging with a maximum of thirty lashes, has normally been under the jurisdiction of a first-class magistrate or the judge of a court of sessions. The sessions judge is able to hand down any of the sentences prescribed by law, to include the death sentence, but it must be confirmed by the high court. A criminal case may be committed to higher courts by either a second-class or a first-class magistrate if he is satisfied, upon a pretrial inquiry, that there is a prima facie case for trial before a jury or with assessors (lay advisers). In certain instances, a serious case may be referred directly to the appropriate high court by the advocate general of the provincial government if he has the approval of the governor. As the highest criminal court, the high court may direct the transfer of a pretrial inquiry or trial pending in any subordinate tribunal to another of equal or superior jurisdiction in the interests of securing fair and impartial justice.

Trials have generally been classed in two categories, summons (if a finding of guilty is rendered, have been punishable by a maximum of six months imprisonment) and warrant (death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment exceeding six months). Prosecution has been handled by police officers in magistrate courts, by a public prosecutor before a court of sessions, and by the provincial advocate general before a high court. In summons cases, the particulars of the alleged offense are stated orally to the accused, and no formal charge need be prepared in writing. If the accused pleads guilty, his admission must be recorded "as early as possible

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

In the words uttered by him." The accused has the right to counsel, but the court is not required to appoint one if he fails to assert his right. In certain cases, the magistrate may dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to be represented by counsel. In a court of sessions the judge has the discretionary power to reject the jury decision, even though it was unanimous, if he was of the opinion that the verdict was not supported by the evidence and hence might constitute a miscarriage of justice. If the jury verdict is not accepted, the sessions judge must refer the case to the high court as an appeal without recording the judgment of aquittal or conviction and must state the reason for his action. Upon review, the high court renders a decision.

Historically, the justices of the Pakistani high courts have tried to insulate themselves from executive or military pressure and, until recently, have been successful. As a result of recent martial law provisions, the replacement of certain members of the judiciary and pressure that is being brought on them, even high courts appear to be losing their independence. The pressure exerted on lower court judges has been even more blatant. Members of the lower courts have been subjected to harassment, verbal abuse, and suspension from office. Military guards have also been stationed at some judges' residences to insure judicial pronouncements favorable to the government's position. Additionally, the Attorney General has recently appeared on behalf of the government during legal proceedings. The latter action has put tremendous pressure on members of the judiciary, since the Attorney General also serves as the Law and Parlimentary Affairs Minister, the individual responsible for the appointment of justices to the bench as well as the judicial authority charged with initiation of disciplinary proceedings against judges who are "alleged to have abused their judicial powers." Based upon current trends, it is anticipated that, unless circumstances change, there will be a further concentration of authority in the military courts at the expense of the civilian judiciary, producing a diminishment of appellate procedures and the abridgement of the right of Habeas Corpus.

The effectiveness of the Pakistani lawyer's role in safeguarding individual rights has been mixed. In ordinary political overtones, lawyers have generally provided effective and determined advocacy for their clients and have, by Asian standards, developed a reasonably good sense of trial advocacy. The lawyer's role in highly charged cases with political overtones is much more circumspect. Pakistani lawyers are hesitant to take highly charged political cases and could be expected to be extremely reluctant to represent captured American servicemen. Any defense of the rights of American captives would be handled by Pakistani lawyers assigned by the court and carefully screened by the central government.

In capital offenses, lawyers are appointed by the court for an accused and paid for by the State. The accused is normally provided an opportunity to select a lawyer for his defense from a list provided by the court. The public defense system does not operate for non-capital crimes. However, civilian counsel has been made available for some individuals recently called before summary military tribunals. The question of when and whether prisoners are tried in cases having political overtones has been more dependent on outside political developments than courtroom legal debate and precedents. Legal technicalities in such cases are generally held to be irrelevant.

Deleted per 5 USC 552(b)(1)

Security Marking/Handling Instructions Removed
[redacted] Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
WARNING NOTICE
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

SWA 23.04.03 (S/NOFORN) Rights Accorded Civil or Political Prisoners

IRAN

Ayatollah Khomeini has asserted that the rights of accused persons in Iran are to be controlled by Islamic law and not by international agreements entered into prior to the revolution. An understanding of the Islamic laws and general legal precedents is extremely important in understanding Iran's treatment of its own political prisoners as well as captured American service personnel. Other than the right to hold ideas, the right of habeas corpus and the right to trial, there are no other absolute rights provided for the Iranian people. Every other right mentioned in the constitution is either conditioned or curtailed. For example, "life, property rights, etc.," are immune from interference "except in circumstances provided by law." Publications and press are free in the expression of issues "unless they are contrary to Islamic rights or public rights." Mail censorship, wiretaps and investigations are forbidden "unless done in accordance with law." The determination of what is legal is to be determined in all cases by Ayatollah Khomeini and his revolutionary Islamic jurists. Although the investigation of political crimes are to be held openly before a jury in the courts of the ministry of justice, it is for the court to determine whether the matter also has criminal aspects which might limit the rule's application as well as the people being allowed to be present because of "security considerations" or the possibility of "overcrowding."

Under the Iranian laws, a person accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent and the use of torture to extract information is forbidden. An accused individual is also reported to have the right to counsel. However, a series of contradictions lies in the fact that the absence of defense attorneys who, in most cases, would be fearful of representing an individual against whom the State has filed charges, will not result in the delay of a trial. Compromise of legal issues is always the right of litigants "except if it allows what (Islam) has forbidden or forbids what (Islam) has allowed." Witnesses for the prosecution are presumed to be truthful and can be asked leading questions. Witnesses for the parties are to be those who have been determined by authorities to be just and pious and as Islamic persons shall be sworn to the Koran. The question of an involuntary confession or the case of torture shall be determined by an Islamic revolutionary committee appointed by Khomeini or members of the judiciary which owe their allegiance to him. Similar ambiguity exists in a provision relating to the rights of non-Moslems in Iran. The constitution provides that non-Moslems must be treated with "good moral conduct and Islamic justice" and that their rights must be respected. However, a further provision notes that "this principle will be applicable to those who do not get involved in anti-Islamic activities and in conspiracies hatched against the Islamic Republic of Iran." Under the latter situation, such individuals are in effect deemed to have waived their right to judicial protection.

AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan makes it very difficult to predict, at present, what legal rights would be accorded to a civil, political or war

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

prisoner. Reports indicate that traditional laws relating to political prisoners are being totally ignored, prisoners are being treated extremely harshly, some prisoners have reportedly been tortured and summarily executed without charges ever being brought against them, and some prisoners have reportedly been physically removed to the Soviet Union. Individuals accused of criminal offenses have in the past been tried according to provisions in Afghanistan's penal code which made provision for legal counsel for an accused, confrontation of witnesses, and appeal procedures. The Basic Principles are now, at least theoretically, used as guiding regulations for civil and criminal procedures.

The controlling regulations within the Basic Principles relating to rights of an accused, enable government officials to detain individuals for investigation without charges being lodged. Once the investigation phase has been completed the dossiers of accused individuals are submitted to the court for judicial consideration through the special revolutionary prosecutor's office. Other sections of the criminal code have a bearing on the procedures relating to the presentation of evidence, the use of confessions, sentencing procedures, and terms of imprisonment. In practice, revolutionary decrees are being used as justification for procedures that have already been taken or are about to be taken against political and non-political prisoners. Under the umbrella of such decrees several thousand prisoners have been held without trial or charges and some have been summarily executed. The new Afghan Constitution, proposed by the revolutionary council, is reported to include provisions relating to the independence of the judiciary, openness of judicial sessions, trial in the native language of the accused, the right to defense of the accused, and an explanation of the reasons for judicial decisions. However, notwithstanding the expressed intent of the new constitution, it is extremely doubtful that the above provisions will have any real meaning in light of the present actions of members of the Revolutionary Council and its Soviet advisors which have restricted individual rights and freedoms. The new constitution is reported to include a section that will define more specifically the powers of the Revolutionary Council and its Presidium. The Presidium will be constitutionally charged with the supervision of the judiciary to insure the proper observance of laws and decrees and in making recommendations with respect to pardons or the investigation of punishments relating to individuals incarcerated in Afghanistan's prison system.

There are three general categories of original charges customarily levied against persons accused of punishable acts in Afghanistan. These include: (1) encroaching on the achievements of the revolution; (2) encroaching on the internal security of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; and (3) encroaching on the national sovereignty and independence of the country. Foreign nationals interned in Afghanistan have normally been accused of endangering the territorial integrity of Afghanistan. Under established guidelines, serious cases involving a death sentence are to be referred to Kabul for disposition. Based on current reports, it is doubtful whether approval for many of the executions has been coordinated with officals in the Revolutionary Council in Kabul. With respect to summary executions of some types of prisoners, authority appears to have been limited to officials in the provinces.

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

[redacted]

It can be anticipated that decisions relating to captured American service personnel would not be unilaterally entrusted to provincial authorities but would be directly controlled by members of the Revolutionary Council. The Council could be expected to be the judicial body that negotiators would have to deal with in trying to effect the release of captured service personnel. Release could not be effected at present without Soviet support and approval. Generally, the Afghan constitution, as amended, gave modern legal codes priority over Islamic Shariah law. However, the possibility exists that members of the Revolutionary Council might turn, at least in part, to Islamic laws to justify actions taken against captured service personnel, although revolutionary edicts and martial law provisions now in existence or subsequently enacted by the Revolutionary Council will most probably serve as the primary legal basis for the internment and treatment of prisoners. A general knowledge of Islamic Shariah concepts is necessary for an understanding of legal concepts that could affect a captured American serviceman's treatment in Afghanistan.

PAKISTAN

In order to fully comprehend rights which might be accorded to domestic civil and political prisoners, it is necessary to distinguish between rights set forth in the constitution and the recent restrictions placed on constitutional rights by the enactment of martial law in Pakistan. The fundamental rights of Pakistani citizens are set forth in Pakistan's constitution, which guarantees that the government may not deprive citizens of freedom except in cases specified by law. Both the citizen's person and home are deemed inviolable, and search of the home and seizure of property are permissable only in cases specified by law. Under the constitution, the right to public trial is guaranteed, although it is recognized that the law may specify exceptions to the principle. An accused person is guaranteed the right to legal counsel and to have a defense counsel, either of his own choice or one appointed by the court. Other rights include freedoms of speech, press and assembly.

The Pakistani criminal code was designed to reflect the guiding principles expressed in the constitution and to implement the constitutional obligations of the State and citizens and to protect the rights of individuals. Criminal procedures require that an accused must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours after arrest. Generally, magistrates have been willing to grant remands only if they are satisfied that the person held has not been subjected to third degree methods. Even if bail is not granted, Pakistani civilian courts, in most cases, have transferred the accused from police custody to judicial custody. Once a prisoner is transferred to judicial custody the prisoner has been placed in jail and thereafter has been subject to more formal prison rules and regulations.

Notwithstanding constitutional provisions and the traditional criminal procedures, it is now possible under martial law edicts to detain an individual without charges being filed if the the individual is believed to have committed a crime or other acts prejudicial to the safety of the country. The detention of political prisoners without charges has become quite common. Under recent changes to the Martial Law Orders, the reasons for the detention or restriction of the individual's liberties need not be

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

conveyed to the accused or his legal representative. The normal period of preventive detention is 90 days. At the end of this time, the individual is required to be brought before a commission for judicial review. The reviewing commission normally consists of a judge, a representative of the executive and one other person "impartially" selected by the government. The judge is empowered to render a decision after receiving the recommendations of the other panel members. The period of preventive detention can be extended if the judge determines that the circumstances clearly warrant such a finding. A writ of petition is normally used by opposing counsel to question the legality or constitutionality of a particular martial law regulation. Habeas corpus petitions can also be used to try to expedite the review before the judicial panel. After charges have been filed against a prisoner, it is possible for his counsel to seek a trial date so that the charges can be heard.

The question whether important political defendants in Pakistan are tried and either convicted or freed depends more on outside political developments than on courtroom legal debate. Trials may be before a civilian or military court, but normally charges against individuals held under martial law provisions relating to preventive detention are held before summary military tribunals. The decisions of such courts have been the subject of judicial appeal to Pakistan's higher courts. Under new governmental directives, such appeals will apparently no longer be allowed.

Under the most recent amendment to Article 199 of the constitution, the High Courts are forbidden to: rule on the validity or effect of any martial law regulation, or order, or military court decision; entertain any judicial proceeding which might fall under military jurisdiction; make any issuance of process including a writ of information against any martial law administrator; or issue any order that would have the effect of nullifying any past, present, or future martial law practice or policy. Additionally, the most recent constitutional amendment declares that all martial law orders and regulations issued since July 1977 were validly made and are enforceable. Lastly, the amendment creates a Federal Shariat Court that is mean to insure that Islamic law will be the controlling influence in the courts.

Procedural rights will be controlled by the decison to try an individual before the regular courts or the martial law tribunals. Rights to cross examination, for example, differ depending on whether the trial is conducted under summary trial procedures or the procedures customarily used in the higher courts. Under martial law rules, the defendant's attorney is required to act as "a friend of the court" and speak through the accused, while under the regular judicial procedures the defendant's attorney is allowed to more fully crossexamine the government witnesses. Under earlier rulings it was not possible for a summary military tribunal to impose the death penalty without the issue being reviewed by a higher court. There is uncertainty now with respect to whether the summary military tribunals on their own authority will be able to impose death penalties.

SWA 23.04.04 (SANOFORN) Islamic Law - General Legal Sources

The description that follows does not fully do justice to Islamic law precepts or procedures but is meant to briefly outline legal sources that could considerably influence Islamic jurists faced with questions relative to

Imam is as binding as the direct word of God received through Muhammad. Therefore, when Khomeini quotes a hadith, as he has done in his treatise Islamic Government, he is not relating a parable or narrating a story to make a point. He is instead quoting something that has the force of law. There has been a wholesale fabrication of "traditions" from almost the earliest period as "companions" sought to decide what the prophet had said or would have said. Many of the traditions were attempts to interrelate the controversies of earlier times with more current problems. Attorneys have attempted to reexamine the traditions to try to determine the authenticity of the hadith. Unfortunately, such a reexamination inherently suffers from a presumption of truth based on the fact that a respectable man does not willingly tell a lie. Factors such as faulty memories or personal bias become discounted in the critical review process.

The Ijtihad represents the interpretations which the Mujtaheds have made with respect to the Koran and the Islamic treatises.

The Agl is human reason or intellect. Agl permits the truth to be discovered by an Islamic jurist when texts differ or contradict each other. Under Islamic law, legal rules made by Agl must be regarded as parts of the Shariah and it is argued that people must obey them. However, Shia jurists reject the private use of reason as a rule of law.

The Ijma, or consensus, is used by both Sunnis and Shias as a source of law, but they define it differently. The Sunnis recognize the consensus of the community and the consensus of the great law teachers. For the Shia, Ijma means "agreement of those who interpret in their religious judgments the commands of the imams on a particular question" (i.e., the mujtaheds). Islamic legal sources are therefore made up of the Koran itself, reference works that provide guidance on Koranic principles, and the practical treatise of the mujtaheds.

It should be noted that the "legal sources" that followed the Koran and the Sunni were introduced at least a century after the Prophet and were built upon the opinions of individual jurists. They are clearly subordinate to the first two primary Islamic legal sources. The questions of the sources that the jurists relied upon in making a decision and the opinions derived are always open to reconsideration as to their compliance with the Koranic and prophetic texts and the fulfullment of their ultimate goals.

SWA 23.04.04.01 (S/NOFORN) Islamic Law - Application to PWs and Interpretation of/Regard for the GCPW

IRAN

In order to find the appropriate legal sources relevant to the treatment of prisoners of war, one must, according to Islamic principles, look to three

sources, i.e. the Koran, the "Koranic Pinciples" and the "practical treatises." The Koran would provide the text which would be appealed to for relief. The Koranic commentaries would also have to be searched, since the commentaries would provide the opinons of Islamic scholars on the "real" meaning of the Koranic verse in question. In many cases, the commentaries could be expected to differ widely according to whether the commentary was primarily by a theologian, a jurist, a philosopher or a mystic. None of the commentaries are in English. A Persian language commentary is most likely to be in Shiite, while an Arabic commentary is most likely to be either Sunni or Shiite. Additionally, the "practical treatises", or books of case law which describe the way the Shariah has actually been applied in the past, would also have to be reviewed. The latter books would be of critical importance in understanding the rights that conceivably might be accorded to captured American servicemen or hostages.

SWA 23.04.05 (S/NOFORN) Criminal Punishment Legally Imposed

IRAN

Shiite law, as administered by Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers in Iran today, is harsh and uncompromising. A significant amount of the punishment being meted out to officials of the former regime is reportedly conducted out of revenge for which a religious coloration is sought. Nonetheless, the severity of the judgments has had precedent in situations where the clergy in Iran has held significant power. Unfortunately, Shiite justice need not be what Khomeini has made it. During periods when an uncompromising fundamentalist has not been preeminent, clerical justice has been less severe. It is important to note that whether Khomeini's fundamentalism prevails or not, the texts of the Shia Islam will be critical to any consideration relating to
treatment or punishment of captured American servicemen for the forseeable future.

There are no special obligatory penalties under Islamic law for prisoners, even those charged with espionage. In approving executions by the revolutionary courts, Ayatollah Khomeini has invoked a concept summed up in the Persian phrase "MUSSED I AL-ARD" or, the "corrupt of the earth." Khomeini has interpreted the phrase to refer to people who have committed an act against God. Two standard charges that have been made against nearly all of those executed by the Khomeini regime have been "spreading corruption on earth" and "warring with God." The statements are derived from a verse in the Koran. A common interpretation of the language is that "one who wages war" is anyone who resorts to armed violence and "spreading corruption" means disturbing public security in some manner (i.e. by terrorizing the Iranian people). Commentators have indicated also that there is no higher corruption than taking the life of a Muslim or violating their honor.

Legal punishments have included death and dismemberment. The manner of execution is optional under Islamic law, otherwise Khomeini's use of the firing squad would be an innovation and consequently forbidden. However, there is some debate about the manner of dismemberment, but it is usually

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

Security Marking/Handling
Instructions Removed

held by Iranian jurists that dismemberment should involved the right hand and the left foot. One commentator insists that the thumb and heel should remain, but others are not so charitable. Other commentators believe that punishment by amputation is meant to apply only to punishment for simple theft, while "theft with killing" requires dismemberment followed by crucifixion. Exile of prisoners has also been used by some of Iran's jurists as a judicial sentence. The precise meaning of "exile" has been debated, and it is important to note that such a sentence can actually refer to the drowning of the individual rather than the prisoner being forced to leave the country or being forced to reside in a particular remote section of the country. There is also the unsettled question of the meaning of the sentence of crucifixion and whether the sentence is to precede or follow execution. Under Islamic law, whippings are recognized as legal punishment. The whippings can be public or private. The number of times an individual is whipped is normally fixed by the judge according to his individual perception as to the severity of the crime.

Because of the importance of the issue, the imposition or execution of any sentence against captured American servicemen can be expected to be conducted only with the approval of Ayatollah Khomeini or, in his absence, with the consent of a revolutionary committee composed of lesser Ayatollahs.

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

AFGHANISTAN

Punishment meted out to wrongdoers under Afghan criminal laws has traditionally been extremely severe. Afghanistan's penal code is based on the Shariah law, derived from the Koran, and distinguishes three types of crimes: those calling for punishment according to the Koran (i.e. theft, drinking (murder, personal injury, etc.); and other crimes with punishments which have ranged from reprimand to death. Traditionally, the two methods of execution in Afghanistan have been hanging for criminals and the use of firing squads for the execution of political offenders.

PAKISTAN

Since the imposition of martial law, the Pakistani government has endorsed the establishment of a traditional Islamic legal system (NIAZM-I-ISLAM), including the use of punishments codified in the Shari law. Under existing martial law provisions, harsh penalties have been administered for the commission of even minor crimes. Prisoners have been subjected to severe disciplinary actions for breach of prison regulations. Public whippings and amputation have been reconstituted as forms of punishment.

Public whippings have been used in many instances in order to deter others from committing similar acts. They are normally conducted by fellow prison inmates sentenced to life terms. These inmates have been rewarded with extra rations for "successful" floggings. A physical or medical attendant is normally available to stop the whipping if an individual's life appears to be in jeopardy. The usual flogging sentence ranges between 5 and 15 lashes and is accompanied by a sentence to hard labor in one of the country's penal institutions. Under Pakistani law, individuals over age

Security Marking/Handling
Instructions Removed

45 are exempted from whippings and normally have their faces painted black, they are then given either additional work details or placed in solitary confinement. Public whippings today are considered by Pakistani authorities to be less severe than initially administered under Pakistan's martial law provisions due to the fact that the traditional cat of nine tails has been replaced by the less lethal malacca canes.

Under existing martial law provisions, amputation is permissable only for offenses involving theft, dacoity (armed robbery by not less than 5 men) and robbery. Under Pakistani law, amputation as a form of punishment cannot be combined with any other punishment. Under Islamic law the amputation has to be done by a qualified surgeon while the prisoner is under local anethesia. The surgery is normally done in public or in jail as directed by the military court prescribing this punishment. Under normal procedures, a right handed person would have his left hand amputated or vice versa. Despite the government's implementation of the new, harsher Islamic penalties (i.e public whippings, amputation and public hangings), the judiciary has demonstrated great reluctance in the past to execute such sentences.

Aiders and abetters in the commission of a crime, under martial law, are normally awarded the same punishment as prescribed for the primary offenders. Pakistan upholds the use of the death penalty in certain cases including sabotage and resisting or injuring any member of the civil or military forces or any civilian police official. Death can also be used as the maximum punishment for dacoity. The death penalty is normally inflicted by hanging but can be carried out "in such other manner as directed by the court in a particular case."

SWA 23.05 (S/NOFORN) Geneva Convention Signatory

IRAN

Iran was one of the original signers of the Geneva Convention articles relating to treatment of prisoners of war. However, Ayatollah Khomeini has asserted that Iran is not bound by agreements which are violative of Islamic law and has refused to abide by such international agreements as the following: the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; the 1973 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally-protected persons (including diplomatic agents); the 1955 US-Iran Treaty of Amity; and the charter of the United Nations.

Nothing under Islamic law precludes immunity by treaty and Iran, as a signatory of these conventions, is legally bound by their terms not only under International Law but also under Shariah Law. It is highly unlikely under present conditions that Ayatollah Khomeini would recognize or abide by the provisions of the Geneva Convention or any similar treaty in all its respects unless its application suited his objectives.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan was one of the original signers of the Geneva Convention articles relating to prisoners of war. Current information indicates that Afghan

Deleted per 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)

officials are not adhering to legal standards with respect to the treatment of captured insurgents within their own country. It is uncertain whether they would feel compelled to adhere to the Geneva Convention articles in all respects regarding captured American service personnel. The Afghan government is totally dominated by the Soviet Union, and it can be expected that any application, or lack thereof, of the articles relating to PWs will be conducted with the direct or indirect consent of Soviet officials.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan was one of the original signers of the Geneva Convention articles relating to treatment of prisoners of war. It is anticipated that unless circumstances in Pakistan substantially change, that Pakistan would adhere to such principles with regard to the treatment of captured American service personnel.

SWA 23.06 (S/NOFORN) International Red Cross Supervision/Inspection of PW Camps

SUMMARY: The degree to which officials in each of the three countries would cooperate with the International Red Cross or the United Nations with respect to captured American service personnel cannot be stated with any certainty.

IRAN

Based upon the lack of cooperation Iranian officials have demonstrated with respect to hostages held at the American Embassy, it is believed that Iran would cooperate only to the limited extent that its own actions served to enhance its propaganda exploitation objectives.

AFGHANISTAN

Based upon reported information, it is believed that Afghan officials would cooperate with the International Red Cross or other similar agency only if such action was first approved by the Soviet Union and then only to the extent that its cooperation could serve to further the exploitation objectives of the Soviet Union and/or Afghanistan.

PAKISTAN

In the past, the International Red Cross or Amnesty International have been granted permission to interview political detainees at Rawalpindi and other penal facilities. The controlling factor appears to be whether the charges levied against an accused are political or criminal. Both organizations have been allowed to interview political prisoners. Political prisoners who have subsequently been charged by government officials with the commission of criminal acts have been denied the above visitation rights.

~~SECRET~~

J

Item Number: ___

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Maps - Radar Overprints

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - March 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (TS) J2 obtained radar prediction templates from USAF [redacted] of all known radars in Iran.

2. (U) Templates provided were 1:2,500,000 scale.

3. (S) Maj [redacted] A-2, [redacted] took templates to DMAAC, St. Louis AF station, to be reduced and overprinted on 1:2,000,000 JNC special map.

4. ( ) Radar predictions were reduced and adjusted as necessary with one additional prediction done with [redacted] and maps.

COMMENTS:

1. (TS) 1SOW has produced 3 additional radar predictions based on map correlations and curvature of earth graphics.

2. ( ) J2 has supplied precise positioning of radars through [redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO ____
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted] Multiple Sources

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: LtCol [redacted], Cpt [redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

1SOW - Maj [redacted] - A-2, AV 872-6220

DMAAC - Mr. [redacted] (314) 263-4806 (AV 693)

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

G DMA - Col [redacted] - HQ DMA - 254-4426

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Radar OP JNC.
2. Radar Prediction Graphics

[redacted]

SECRET



SECRET

Use the low-altitude chart when both antenna height and target height are below 2000 feet. In all other cases, use the high altitude chart. Place a straightedge between the desired antenna height (at the left of the chart) and the target height (at the right of the chart). Read the radar-horizon distance in nautical miles at the point where the straightedge intersects the center line of the chart.

SECRET

RADAR HORIZON NOMOGRAMS

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

J-(116)

Item Number: ____

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Ground Route Photo Book

TIMEFRAME: February - April 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (U) J2 and SFOD-D determined that truck drivers/monitors who would be transporting SFOD-D to the Embassy Compound required familiarization with the truck route.

2. (U) RICEBOWL-associated personnel who had driven the route were not available to brief drivers/monitors.

3. (S) Therefore, J2 developed a "book" for use by drivers/monitors to gain some knowledge prior to deployment of the route and principal reference points along it. The "book" was a looseleaf binder consisting of [redacted]

4. (S) Three "books" were produced. One was maintained by JTF. Two were provided to SFOD-D.

COMMENTS: Although the "book" was valuable, a ground reconnaissance would have been optimum. No amount of

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 20 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted] DOD, NMCC
☐ DECL OR DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified BY: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS: [redacted] (Item

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: MAJ [redacted] (USA), ODCSOPS, DA
CPT [redacted] (USA), DIA

Attachments:
Ground Route Photo Book (Original) (SEP)

THIS ROUTE BOOK IS DESIGNED TO FAMILIARIZE DRIVERS, MONITORS, AND OTHER PERSONNEL WITH THE GROUND ROUTE FROM THE HELICOPTER-TRUCK TRANSFER POINT TO THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND IN TEHRAN.

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET