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Thursday, June 5, 1980

NEW YORK TIMES
DELAYED

WASHINGTON STAR 5 JUNE 1980 Pg 10

Congressional Probers Seek Tapes Of Aborted Hostage Rescue Bid

Pentagon May Seek Executive Privilege

By John J. Fialka
Washington Star Staff Writer

Congressional investigators have asked the Pentagon for copies of the tapes of communications that went on between Washington and the ground force during the aborted mission to free the hostages in Tehran.

A Pentagon spokesman said that the request had been received and "was being addressed" by Defense officials. He would not say who had made the request.

Other Pentagon sources said that because the tapes contain sensitive information about the raid and the tactics to be used on it, Defense Secretary Harold Brown may opt to deny the tapes to Congress on grounds that they are covered by executive privilege.

Such a defense, which can only be raised by the president, may have already been blunted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreeing to turn over evidence concerning the raid to another investigating group, one appointed by the Joint Chiefs that includes three retired senior officers.

A response that the tapes are covered by executive privilege could also lead to an embarrassing parallel with the Watergate era, during which the Nixon administration fought long and hard to prevent the public release of tapes of conversations between President Nixon and key aides.

Investigators familiar with the raid say that the communications tapes exist and that they should be the best evidence of what went on during the crucial moments before and after the decision to abort the raid.

The tapes should be able to settle two persistent rumors still circulating in Washington about the April 24 raid. The Army Times has quoted Pentagon sources who have heard the tapes as saying that the complex command structure of the raiding party resulted in a "logjam" of communications and that the raid ended in organizational chaos after a helicopter crashed into a C-130 transport.

There have also been rumors that the raid was terminated after the movement of Soviet aircraft [illegible] Tehran and a Soviet communication about [illegible] aid with the White House. Brown and other defense officials have said that communications was "outstanding" during the raid, and they have scoffed at assertions that the Soviets may have played a role in the ha[illegible] withdrawal of the raid.

(See CONGRESSIONAL, Pg 3)

BALTIMORE SUN
5 JUNE 1980 Pg 5

Soviet is accused of adding to arms aimed at Europe

Bodo Air Force Base, Norway (Reuter)—The top defense officials from the United States and Britain said yesterday that the Soviet Union had increased the number of nuclear missiles aimed at Western Europe.

U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown said the Soviet Union now has nuclear cruise missiles on its submarines in the Baltic.

British Defense Secretary Francis Pym told reporters that Soviet three-headed, SS-20 missiles were coming out at the rate of one every five days, instead of one a week six months ago.

Two-thirds of them were aimed at Western Europe and one-third at China, according to Western military sources.

The two men spoke after a two-day meeting of the defense officials of 12 countries taking part in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's nuclear planning group.

Mr. Pym said the Soviet Union has slowed down phasing out its older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, which the SS-20s are due to replace.

The defense officials of the 12 countries taking part in the nuclear planning group expressed concern in their final communique over the retention of Soviet SS-4s and SS-5s.

"This, coupled with the continuing deployment of the SS-20 missiles, might lead to an even larger Soviet superiority in long-range theater nuclear forces in the mid-80s than previously anticipated," they said.

The officials called on the Soviet Union to respond positively to NATO's offer in December to negotiate controls on this type of weapon.

They said the Soviet Union "was instead advancing unacceptable preconditions, which would perpetuate inequality, to any negotiations or even preliminary arms-control exchanges."

The West's proposal to negotiate was made at the same time that NATO decided in Brussels in December to deploy almost 600 Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe to counter the Soviet SS-20 and Tupolev-26 backfire bombers.

The offer was conveyed twice to the Soviet Union by the United States and was rejected both times.

Soviet officials have denounced the plan as an attempt by NATO to gain military superiority in Europe and alter the military balance between the power blocs.

(See SOVIET, Pg 3)

WASHINGTON STAR
5 JUNE 1980 Pg 1

Gen. Jones Denies Deal To Resign

Sen. Helms Refuses To Back Off Claim

By Lisa Myers
Washington Star Staff Writer

Gen. David Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, denied yesterday that he privately agreed to resign if Ronald Reagan is elected president in order to avert a protracted struggle over his renomination.

But Sen. Jesse Helms, R—N.C., refused to back down on his claim that Jones had cut such a deal to head off a potentially bloody political fight over his appointment to a second two-year term as the nation's premier military official. "There's no question that it was set up," Helms said. "I don't know what the game is."

Two other senators, one a Democrat and one a Republican, said they also had been told that Jones had agreed to tender his resignation in January if President Carter isn't reelected. Both said their information did not come from Helms.

Jones, in a written statement, said he made "no agreements or commitments whatsoever with any member of Congress about submitting a resignation in the event of a change of administration." Such an arrangement would be "inconsistent" with the law, which states that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs "serves at the pleasure of the president," the four-star Air Force general maintained.

The middleman in the dispute, Sen. John Warner, R-Va., refused to comment pending Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on Jones' confirmation. "In the interest of national defense, Sen. Warner will not join in public debate of this matter," his office said.

It was Warner who initially broached the possibility of such an arrangement to Helms on the Senate floor Monday and who told Helms

(See GEN. JONES, Pg 3)

HELEN YOUNG, CHIEF, CURRENT NEWS BRANCH, 697-8765 DANIEL FRIEDMAN, ASSISTANT CHIEF
FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH SERVICES OR DISTRIBUTION CALL HARRY ZUBKOFF, CHIEF, EXECUTIVE AGENCY SERVICE, 695-2884

General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, flatly denied today the report in this morning's Washington Star about a "deal" with some members of Congress to resign if Governor Ronald Reagan is elected President.

General Jones stated that he has made no agreements or commitments whatsoever with any member of Congress about submitting a resignation in the event of a change of administration.

Public Law states that the Chairman of the JCS "serves at the pleasure of the President." General Jones said that, "Any arrangements with members of Congress to resign in the future would be inconsistent with this statute."

He went on to say, "The integrity of the Chairman's office is an overriding consideration and I consider it totally inappropriate for senior military officers to adopt the tradition of political appointees of offering resignations whenever an Administration changes."

UP-047
R W
(JONES)'''
WASHINGTON (UPI) - GEN. DAVID JONES, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, TODAY DENIED A PUBLISHED REPORT THAT HE HAD MADE A DEAL WITH SOME LEGISLATORS TO RESIGN IF RONALD REAGAN IS ELECTED PRESIDENT.
IN A WRITTEN STATEMENT, JONES SAID HE HAD MADE NO AGREEMENTS OR COMMITMENTS WITH ANY MEMBER OF CONGRESS ABOUT SUBMITTING A RESIGNATION IN THE EVENT OF A CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION.
HE NOTED THAT BY LAW THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF "SERVES AT THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT."
"ANY ARRANGEMENTS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO RESIGN IN THE FUTURE WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THIS STATUTE," JONES SAID.
HE ADDED: "THE INTEGRITY OF THE CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE IS AN OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION AND I CONSIDER IT TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS TO ADOPT THE TRADITION OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES OF OFFERING RESIGNATIONS WHENEVER AN ADMINISTRATION CHANGES."
EARLIER TODAY, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT TODAY CALLED THE NEWS ACCOUNT "TOTALLY INCORRECT."
QUOTING CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES, WASHINGTON STAR PENTAGON REPORTER LISA MYERS SAID JONES AGREED TO RESIGN IN EVENT OF A REAGAN VICTORY "IN RETURN FOR A PLEDGE FROM KEY CONSERVATIVES NOT TO WAGE A PROTRACTED FIGHT AGAINST HIS RENOMINATION."
UPI 06-04 12:22 PED

The first request for the tapes was made by Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on behalf of a committee member, Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C. In a letter to Helms, however, Church made it clear that his committee was not about to launch an investigation into the anatomy of the raid.

While committee staffers would not comment on the details of their investigation, sources close to the committee said that Sen. Gary Hart, D-Colo., recently turned to Stennis during a closed hearing and said "well, if there are such tapes, why don't we have them?"

A more serious request for the tapes is being pressed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, where several members have asked for more information about the aborted raid.

Another committee member, Sen. Henry Jackson, D-Wash., has also vowed to press the Pentagon for better information about the raid. "The very fact of their withholding information raises the suspicion of things that might be embarrassing in terms of planning," Jackson said.

Among the questions being raised by Jackson and others is whether there were any so-called "generic flaws" or fundamental Pentagon problems reflected in the planning of and the subsequent failure of the raid. An example of this would be the Pentagon's tendency to set up overelaborate command structures and plans.

Another suspected flaw is a tendency by high-level commanders to dominate every facet of the ground activity from afar through sophisticated communications systems. The tapes would show whether this took place as the problems began to multiply at Desert I, the refueling point for the first phase of the three-phased mission.

Registration Foes Launch Effort To Talk Carter Proposal to Death

By Lisa Myers
Washington Star Staff Writer

Senate opponents of President Carter's draft registration plan yesterday launched a last-gasp effort to talk the bill to death, and the Senate's only woman vowed to try to expand the proposal to include women as well as men.

Senate Democratic and Republican leaders said it is only a matter of time before the Senate gives final approval to the $13.3 million House-passed measure to begin registering 19- and 20-year-old men at post offices this summer. Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker said that, despite a filibuster, passage could come as early as the middle of next week.

In opening debate, Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd said reinstitution of registration, abandoned in 1975, would be a signal to the Soviet Union and U.S. allies "of our determination to place our armed forces in a state of preparedness in the event of a military emergency." He argued that it also "will demonstrate our resolve to back up our foreign policy pronouncements with military strength."

But Sen. Nancy Kassebaum, R-Kan., claimed that registration is largely symbolic and "only has substance as a symbol if it is universal." Its primary value, she said, is as "a tool of education" for young people in reminding them of their commitment to the nation.

"That benefit will be neutralized in the devisive debate that will ensue if we mandate a discriminatory and unfair registration scheme," Kassebaum said.

The House and the Senate Armed Services Committee have overwhelmingly rejected registering women. Sen. Robert Dole, R-Kan., predicted that the full Senate will follow suit. "She's very persuasive, but I doubt she's that persuasive," he said of Kassebaum.

Although some proponents of registration have sought to avoid the issue of including women on the ground that it would delay implementation of a plan, Kassebaum noted that there are strong constitutional arguments for including women. A number of legal scholars maintain that a men-only registration plan would be ruled unconstitutional by the courts when opponents mount a promised legal challenge.

The Kansas Republican emphasized that her amendment — cosponsored by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., — deals only with registration of women, not with drafting them or sending them into combat.

Claiming to have a solid base of 30 votes, Kassebaum said her amendment has "a fair chance provided we can get over some of the parliamentary problems."

Byrd said he expects to file a petition to choke off the filibuster by the end of the week. Baker said proponents aren't likely to muster the required 60 votes in the first attempt to invoke cloture but that the votes will materialize on the second or third try.

Sen. Mark Hatfield, R-Ore., leader of the filibuster, said registration would have "a very divisive impact" on the country and wouldn't solve military manpower problems. He noted that it is opposed by all presidential candidates other than Carter.

EN. JONES--CONT'D

over lunch Tuesday that Jones had agreed.

Helms suggested that Jones' denial was "a face-saving thing."

"I think they want it to go away and that Jones will tender his resignation in January if Governor Reagan is elected," the senator said. "We'll just wait and see."

At the White House, Carter press secretary Jody Powell said that the prospect of opposition from some of the Pentagon's staunchest allies has not changed the president's mind about renaming Jones, whom critics deride as "Jimmy Carter's patsy."

"As far as I know, the president intends to go ahead with the Jones nomination," Powell said.

Despite feelings that Jones has subjugated the best interests of the nation's military to the political desires of the White House, Senate critics do not have the votes to defeat his nomination.

If Jones does step down after only six months of a two-year term, it would constitute a sharp departure from precedent. Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs traditionally have served out their full terms even when presidents have changed. Carter, for example, inherited Gen. George S. Brown and did not get to name his own chief until June 1978.

Jones said it is important that the tradition be upheld. "The integrity of the chairman's office is an overriding consideration and I consider it totally inappropriate for senior military officers to adopt the tradition of political appointees of offering resignations whenever an administration changes," he said.

Helms said that though the president always has the power to fire a chief, the purpose of the private agreement was to spare Reagan the hassle.

"I don't want Reagan to be in a position to have to fire the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It causes a flap and all that," Helms explained. "It's so much easier to pick up a resignation and say 'you sure have served well and goodbye.'"

Helms said that while he still opposes Jones as a "political general," he does not plan to marshall forces in the Senate to wage an all-out war against his confirmation. "Instinct tells me he will resign in January anyway."

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
5 JUNE 1980 Pg 3B

U.S. Navy chief visits Turks

Reuters

ANKARA — Adm. Thomas Hayward, U.S. chief of naval operations, arrived yesterday on a four-day official visit. He will hold talks with the Turkish armed forces chief of staff, Gen. Kenan Evren, and acting Defense Minister Huseyin Ozalp, the Turkish general staff said.

WASHINGTON POST
5 JUNE 1980 Pg 32

Brown Cites Soviet Cruise Missiles

BODO AIR FORCE BASE, Norway—U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown said the Soviet Union now has nuclear cruise missiles on its submarines in the Baltic Sea. Brown's British counterpart, Francis Pym, said the Soviet three-headed SS20 missiles are being produced at the rate of one every five days instead of the one a week six months ago.

The two spoke after a two-day meeting of the defense ministers of 12 countries taking part in the NATO nuclear planning group.

SOVIET.....CONTINUED

NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns said at a news conference that the defense ministers this time had decided to appeal to the Soviet Union collectively instead of letting the United States speak in the name of the alliance.

Three NATO countries did not take part in the meeting: France, which pursues an independent nuclear policy; Iceland, which has no armed forces; and Luxembourg.

Woolsey applauded the House of Representatives for turning back efforts to cut funding for the MX missile system. Unfortunately, he chose not to discuss some of the problems with that system.

One basic problem is that the "multiple protective shelter" (MPS) deployment scheme for MX relies on deception. The Air Force must have a high degree of confidence that no possible espionage can uncover the location of a missile. This will be difficult at best to ensure, and without this degree of confidence the MPS protective system is worthless.

Another problem is that the system depends on Soviet restraint in building warheads. There is little to make one believe that the Soviet Union will forgo the ability to destroy the entire MX system. Without SALT II, it can certainly achieve this ability. The United States would then be forced to defend or expand the already gargantuan MX system.

The cost alone of the MX project should give lawmakers pause. The Air Force's baseline $33 billion figure does not include costs for warheads, operating expenses, aid to impacted states, cost overruns and inflation. The final figure may be closer to $100 billion.

As Mr. Woolsey states, "It's not easy to love the MX." Indeed, it is amazing that Congress stands for it at all.

STEPHEN M. WHEELER

Washington

Missile Overhaul of Joint Chiefs May Be at an End

From a Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Backstage negotiations appeared Tuesday to have ended a Senate challenge to the nomination of Gen. David C. Jones to a second two-year term as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), who declared last week that he would filibuster against the nomination, said he has agreed to drop his opposition in return for a promise by Jones to resign in January if President Carter is not reelected.

Jones promoptly denied through a spokesman that he had made any such promise.

Sen. John Tower (R-Tex.) and John W. Warner (R-Va.), who have been negotiating with Jones, said the general did not say flatly he would resign but rather that he would step aside if whoever is President next January wanted someone else in the job.

"Under the law, the chairman of the JCS serves at the pleasure of the President and Jones realizes that," Tower said. "He would gracefully step aside if the President wanted someone else."

Tower said further that it is now his opinion "that there will not be substantial opposition" to the Jones nomination.

Helms, asked about the Jones denial and the comments of Tower and Warner, said he will seek clarification from the two senators but added that he thought it is a matter of "semantical hair-splitting."

"I know what I mean, and now I've got to find out what Sen. Tower and Sen. Warner mean, but I think we mean the same thing," he said. "I think they're trying to save face for the guy."

Helms had said last week that he would filibuster against Jones' nomination part on grounds the general is a "White House puppet" who has failed to stand up for the military.

Asked Tuesday if he would now oppose Jones, Helms indicated he will not fight further.

"I think it will work out all right," he said.

UP-022

R W

(JONES)

WASHINGTON (UPI) - THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT TODAY DENIED AS "TOTALLY INCORRECT" A PUBLISHED REPORT THAT AIR FORCE GEN. DAVID JONES, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, PRIVATELY HAS AGREED TO RESIGN IF RONALD REAGAN IS ELECTED PRESIDENT.

QUOTING CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES, WASHINGTON STAR PENTAGON REPORTER LISA MYERS SAID JONES AGREED TO RESIGN IN EVENT OF A REAGAN VICTORY "IN RETURN FOR A PLEDGE FROM KEY CONSERVATIVES NOT TO WAGE A PROTRACTED FIGHT AGAINST HIS RENOMINATION."

JONES RENOMINATION AS JCS CHAIRMAN IS PRESENTLY HUNG UP IN THE SENATE WHERE SOME CRITICS HAVE LABELED HIM "A PATSY FOR JIMMY CARTER."

A PENTAGON SPOKESMAN SAID THE STAR STORY WAS "TOTALLY INCORRECT."

"GENERAL JONES HAS NOT OFFERED TO RESIGN," HE SAID.

THE STAR STORY SAID, "UNDER AN EXTRAORDINARY DEAL BROKERED BY SEN. JOHN WARNER, R-VA., JONES WOULD BE CONFIRMED, BUT HE WOULD SERVE ONLY SIX MONTHS OF HIS TWO-YEAR TERM UNLESS CARTER IS RE-ELECTED."

IT QUOTED SEN. JESSE HELMS, R-N.C., CHARACTERIZED AS A "LEADER OF THE DUMP-JONES MOVEMENT," AS SAYING, "GENERAL JONES HAS AGREED TO TENDER HIS RESIGNATION IN JANUARY IF GOVERNOR REAGAN IS ELECTED. WITH THAT, I'M NOT GOING TO RAISE ANY RUCKUS ABOUT THE NOMINATION."

JONES WAS RECENTLY RENOMINATED BY CARTER FOR A SECOND TWO-YEAR TERM AS THE NATION'S TOP MILITARY OFFICIAL.

UPI 05-04 10:27 AED

Angola Growing Uneasy With Soviets

By David Lamb
Los Angeles Times

LUANDA, Angola—Officials are reluctant to discuss it publicly, but dissatisfaction is growing in the government with the Soviet Union's role in Angola and its meager assistance to Angola's failing economy.

Many Angolans say privately that they believe their country is being short-changed in its marriage with Moscow. And they add that no divorce is in sight. As long as civil war rages and as long as guerrillas continue to use Angola as a base to fight for Namibian independence from South Africa, Angola needs its Soviet and Cuban allies to bolster its defenses.

"We can't cope with our problems now, economically, militarily, politically," said an Angolian academic. "So what do you think would happen if we cut our lifeline to the one country thats been an ally from the start? You don't have to be Marx to figure it out."

"It's difficult to find a single government official who is happy with the Russians," a Western ambassador said. "Everyone knows the country is going to hell in a handbasket and they look around and about all they can see the Russians doing is handing out guns and pictures of Marx and Lenin."

Privately, many officials confirm the ambassador's assessment. A top adviser to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who would neither elaborate nor be identified, said, "I don't think our future is with the Russians."

These officials complain that the massive Soviet bloc presence, which came here to bolster the current government during the height of the bitter civil war in 1975, has not prevented steady economic deterioration. They grumble that the Soviets are aloof and isolated from the Angolan community—the Soviets have their own beach in Luanda and do not mix socially—and many Angolans wonder aloud whether Moscow is really interested in promoting regional stability and economic development.

Intelligence sources estimate that 5,000 Soviets, military and civilian, are stationed in Angola. They put the number of Cubans at 27,000, about 20,000 of them soldiers, and the number of East Europeans at more than 5,000. No attempt is made here to hide the Soviet presence.

"We need the help of our friends, and it is difficult for me to understand why some countries keep saying Angola is controlled by the Soviets and Cubans," said the deputy defense minister, Col. Juliao Mateus Paulo. "The president here is Angolan, the ministers are Angolan, the troops are Angolan. The reason these countries keep harping about the Soviets and Cubans must be simply that they don't like our politics, which are Marxist."

The ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, is divided into three distinct groups, intelligence sources said. The first and smallest is hard-line pro—Moscow; the second is unhappy with Moscow's grip on Angola and would like to see the emergence of a purely African

(See ANGOLA, Pg 6)

WASHINGTON POST 5 JUNE 1980 Pg 1

U.S., Saudi Concern Increasing At Soviet Arms Aid to N. Yemen

By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service

HODEIDA, North Yemen—The presence of Soviet arms and military advisers in North Yemen is increasing steadily, and the government says it has no intention of stopping the flow despite concern in Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The influx grows from determination within President Ali Abdullah Salah's government and officer corps to strengthen the armed forces from whatever sources are available to a country with Yemen's limited financial resources.

It reflects a history of military aid from the Soviet Union combined with North Yemen's resolve to remain independent of its wealthy Saudi neighbors, whose attempts to steer Sanaa away from the Soviet Union often have been heavy-handed.

Against this background, President Carter's decision in March 1979 to dispatch under emergency procedures 15 Northrop F5E fighters and 64 M60 battle tanks, a gesture urged by the worried Saudis, appears now to have been too little, too late and too closely tied to Saudi Arabia to make a difference in North Yemen.

Instead, the size of the direct Soviet effort has largely eclipsed the U.S. arms and their value as a symbol of Western and Saudi support.

If North Yemen is weaned away from Saudi Arabia and the West, it would represent a major setback for American efforts to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East, right in the backyard of the world's leading oil exporter. Outright alignment with the Soviet Union by North Yemen would be seen elsewhere in the Arab world as another loss of face and influence by the United States on top of developments in Iran and Afghanistan.

In addition, North Yemen is strategically placed to provide a possible site for military control of the mouth of the Red Sea.

Soviet ships are regularly unloading Mig 21 and SU-22 warplanes along with T-55 tanks and other military equipment at this humid Red Sea port—even as Yemeni pilots learning from two American instructors make practice landings in the F5Es at Sanaa airport 150 miles northeast.

Migs and Sukhois, painted in camouflage, line up at the main airport here. Nearby on the coast, a Soviet-supplied radar and antiaircraft battery rises beside the road stretching along a 12-mile sandspit protecting Hodeida's deep-water harbor where the Soviets land their arms.

Analysts in the capital estimate that North Yemen has received 15 SU-22 ground-attack jets and 10 Mig 21 fighters since February in a deal in which Moscow has promised 40 Mig 21s and 20 SU22s.

In addition, soon after the American tanks began arriving, Soviet T55 tanks started showing up. First came 200 Polish-made T55s, military analysts say, and since then at least 300 more from the Sovite Union's own stocks.

Also recently arrived from the Soviet Union, they say, are 65 multiple rocket launchers and 18 selfpropelled antiaircraft guns, with four 24 mm cannons that spit out 900 rounds a minute. Moreover 70 armored personnel carriers sent by Carter have been joined by Soviet armored cars.

Along with the weapons have come Soviet military experts to train Yemenis in their use. About 230 Soviet military advisers are reported to be working in North Yemen. The schedule of future arms deliveries has led to predictions that the number will rise.

Up to 70 U.S. military personnel were in North Yemen last year to train Yemenis on the American weapons. But that number has dropped to eight, including the two instructor pilots, U.S. sources say, in addition to U.S. teams that come and go and a dozen civilian technicians.

It was because Saudi Arabia urged and financed the deal for American aircraft to strengthen North Yemen against Marxist South Yemen that the Saudi rulers became particularly upset when the Soviet arms started coming. Their worries were hightened by talks that for the first time showed signed of improving relations between the Marxists in Aden and the Senaa government.

Since then, North Yemen has offered repeated assurance to Saudi Arabia that the flow of Soviet arms and advisers does not mean a change in Sanaa's traditional policy of nonalignment, and that the unity talks do not mean a drift toward a Soviet-oriented alliance with the south.

But Prime Minister Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani and Foreign Minister Hassan Makki said in separate interviews this week that the North Yemeni assurances have not included a specific promise to send the advisers home as reported last March in Saudi Arabia.

"Everybody got angry, but we thought they shouldn't," said Abdul Ghani. "We have got arms from the Soviet Union since the 1950s. . .As long as there is a job to do, there will be advisers to do it."

Echoing this theme, Makki said: "We have our own interests. They have their own interests. They are our neighbors. They have their own interests. They are our neighbors, but our interests may not always be the same. I will never say to them the Soviets not to come because somebody is not happy that they are here. I will never accept that someone tells us how to deal with other countries."

At the same time, both officials emphasized that Salah's government has assured the vigorously anticommunist Saudis that the Soviet advisers are in North Yemen only for weapons training and maintenance, and that their departure will be considered when their job is finished.

"We gave all these assurances that

(See N. YEMEN, Pg 6)

ANGOLA -- CONTINUED

system that favors neither East nor West; the third and largest group, which includes Dos Santos, flows with the currents of the moment and appears to be generally befuddled by the problems facing Angola.

For the Soviet Union, Angola represents an important springboard for trying to influence events in southern Africa. Many diplomats here said Moscow is putting pressure on Angola to divorce itself from the Western proposal for a settlement in Namibia and to return to a policy of confrontation. Angola supported the West's plan to end the civil war in Zimbabwe and also has backed the West's proposal on Namibia, long known as Southwest Africa.

Despite substantial Soviet military investment here, Angola's economy is failing badly. The cities are turning into slums, medical care is lacking, some of the schools are closed because of the shortage of books, agricultural production has fallen 75 percent since independence from Portugl in 1975, meat is rationed and long food lines form for even essential commodities.

The Soviet bloc has not been very successful in solving those problems. Czechoslovakia recently sold Angola 1,500 cars but no spare parts. The Cubans have taken over programs in which they have little experience—such as petroleum distribution—and have been forced to turn them over to Western experts.

Angola also pays for the Bloc's services. It provides the rent and utilities for the Soviets' housing, pays $600 a month for every Cuban school teacher, allows the Soviet Union to keep 75 percent of the fish cauhgt off the Angolan coast and repays its debt for weapons with most of its income from oil and coffee. For each dollar earned, a European economist said, Angola spends 60 cents on he military or on meeting its financial commitments to Moscow.



By Dave Cook—The Washington Post

Largely out of economic necessity, Angola has been gradually reestablishing it s contacts with the West during he past two years. It recently spent $7 million on a new embassy in Paris. European businessmen and technicians are arriving in substantial numbers; the Portuguese who fled at the time of independence are starting to trickle back; the national airline's jet fleet consists of six U.S.-made Boeings, and a U.S. charter company, Trans-International Airlines of Oakland, has the aviation contract for Angola's diamond industry.. et

One of Angola's biggest new trading partners is Brazil, which shares a Portuguese colonial heritage and—common language with Angola. Brazilian exports to Angola have increased from $4 million three years ago to an estimated $90 million this year.

The Angolan government is recognized by all black African government except Senegal and by most Western governments except the United States. Although the daily newspaper are full of virulent attacks on the United States, talks with Washington continue and Angola is eager to win recognition from the Carter administration.

WASHINGTON POST
5 JUNE 1980 Pg 25

Carter Backs Selling Reactor to Morocco

Reuter

President Carter has sent Congress a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement that would permit Morocco to buy a research reactor and atomic fuel from the United States, State Department officials said yesterday.

Congress has 60 days in which it can reject the agreement by a majority vote of both houses.

Officials said the agreement would clear the way for Morocco to go ahead with a contract with General Atomic Co. of San Diego to buy the reactor.

The reactor is to be used for research at a university in Rebat.

WASH STAR 5 JUN Pg 12

W. Germans to Tighten Security at U.S. Facilities

FRANKFURT, West Germany — U.S. and West German officials said yesterday they are stepping up security at American buildings that have become targets of German youths linked to leftist terrorist groups. The latest such attack came Monday in Frankfurt, when youths ran into the city's America House, one of seven U.S. buildings promoting American culture in West Germany, and sprayed the walls with slogans.

N. YEMEN -- CONTINUED

there is no shift in policy," the prime minister said. "The equipment, whether it comes from the United States or the Soviet Union."

Saudi Arabia nevertheless became so irritated about the Soviet arms deal and the unity talks that it unofficially suspended aid to North Yemen in December and January. As a result, some soldiers and civil servants got paid late.

Independent sources estimated that the Saudi government and royal family distribute $250 million as budget aid annually to North Yemen and a similar amount for special development projects and discreet payments of their own to ministers, officers, and tribal sheiks whose influence is considered valuable in Riyadh.

Jarred by the halt in Saudi funds, Salah sent envoys to Saudi Arabia to try to repair the damage. A Yemeni diplomat said Salah authorized Makke to tell them that "in principle" North Yemen accepted a phaseout of the Soviet advisers.

After the talks the Saudis resumed their aid. Nothing was said about when the advisers would leave, however; and the Yemeni diplomat said there are no signs this will be soon.

Anxious for more definite word, the Saudi defense minister, Prince Sultan Ibn Abdul Aziz, and foreign minister, Prince Saud Ibn Faisal, paid an unusual joint visit to Sanaa May 13 for talks with Salah.



By Dave Cook—The Washington Post

Abdul Ghani and Makke both said this review of Yemeni-Saudi relations satisfied the Saudis, ensuring continued aid. Several diplomats in Sanaa have noticed signs of another potential cash pinch in the government, however, and they say Sultan and Saud flew home with less of a guarantee than they had sought.

The Saudis traditionally have thought of North Yemen as a close ally and a buffer against South Yemen, ruled by Marxists and closely tied to the Soviet Union. Thus their nervousness remains close to the surface as North Yemen deals directly with the Soviet Union and improves its relations with Aden.

The obligation to deal with Washington through Saudi intermediaries has irritated the independent-minded Yemeni government. A high Yemeni official complained that at one point in the training program every U.S. instructor was accompanied by a Saudi "as if the Americans did not know what they were doing by themselves."

By contrast, the Soviet Union has made a point of direct contacts and swift fulfillment of its promises. Yemeni officials said Moscow even diverted an arms ship at sea on its way to another country to make sure one shipment arrived in Yemen before deadline.

R. James Woolsey WASHINGTON POST 5 JUNE 1980 Pg 19

How Much for Defense?

When President Carter decided last week to urge the House—successfully, as it turned out—to reject the conference committee's compromise budget resolution because it allocated too much to defense, he shifted a layer of the subterranean crust of American politics.

Congressional Budget Office's most recent estimate of the spending implications of the administration's own 1981 defense appropriations request indicated that the compromise resolution exceeded the president's by only about $600 million, or four-tenths of 1 percent. Split the difference—say, around $2 billion—and call it close enough for government work. Was this potential difference the real source of the dispute? Various executive-branch officials professed, largely anonymously, to be concerned less about the overall amount of 1981 spending than about too much being spent down the road for expensive weapons and not enough for manpower and maintenance.

But such concerns are almost totally irrelevant to the first budget resolution, the one that was being debated. The appropriate vehicles for those fights are the authorization and appropriation bills. There was nothing in this resolution that would have kept the 1981 defense increase from being allocated, for example, entirely to better pay for the career enlisted people who are now leaving the armed services in droves. Carter had said, on board the Nimitz 24 hours before, that he *did* want to spend more on that problem next year—by implication an extra $700 million—but apparently he wants that to come from further cuts in other defense programs.

Set aside the major issues about policy and weapons that are the focus of most of the defense budget debate. You support the draft and don't want to spend more on military pay for first-term enlisted people to attract volunteers under the All-Volunteer Force? Fine, but you still need to keep the career force—you need able sergeants to run an army no matter how you obtain recruits, voluntarily or involuntarily. You don't like the MX? You want to buy small fighter planes or small ships instead of large ones? Fine, but you still have to maintain what you have and let pilots fly enough to stay proficient. You still need adequate ammunition and communications that can't be jammed.

These sorts of career pay increases and readiness improvements are beginning to draw strong support not only from the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also from a number of legislators across a broad political spectrum—including, for example, Sens. Tower and Kennedy—thus raising the possibility of reversing Congress' past penchant for cutting readiness funds. And even if you look solely at the military equivalent of fixing potholes in the city streets and paying policemen a living wage, defense needs in these non-controversial areas dwarf the increase Carter opposed and could not begin to be paid for by other defense cuts.

For example, a one-time expenditure merely to bring the pay of career military people (under half of those in uniform) up to the same real level it was when the All-Volunteer Force was introduced in 1972—to make up for their pay having been held 10 percent to 15 percent below the inflation rate for the last eight years—would cost $2 billion to $3 billion. And bringing ammunition stockpiles, maintenance on existing weapons, fuel for adequate training exercises and communications improvements up to reasonable levels from their currently depressed states would add around another $7 billion to $10 billion.

Nice but unaffordable? The administration's proposed defense budget for 1981 would hold spending to 5.3 percent of the gross national product. During the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s—before the Vietnam War—the nation spent 8.5 percent of its GNP on defense. Defense has no automatic and perpetual claim on its early '60s share of GNP and, given some growth in our economy, we do not need to maintain defense spending at that rate in order to defend ourselves adequately—even in the face of the large Soviet arms surge of recent years.

But the share of GNP *is* a reasonable measure proposed that we increase defense's share of GNP to 6 or 7 percent. The middle of that range would be only about a third of the way back from the level of military spending we have now to the level we supported under President Kennedy—roughly an additional $35 billion annually. Adding that much in one year would probably entail some waste, but the much more modest increases that were proposed by the budget conference committee were nowhere close to this. They would have taken defense's share from 5.3 percent of GNP only up to around 5.4 percent, at most—maybe 1/40th or so of the way back from today's relative defense burden to that of the Kennedy administration.

Could something else have been afoot? The New York Times reported unnamed administration officials' speculating hopefully that President Carter would, by his opposition to the defense increase, undercut Rep. John Anderson's appeal to similarly minded voters. But whatever his objective, by so protecting his left flank on defense spending (if that is, in fact, the flank Anderson ultimately decides to threaten), Carter has created future problems for himself that he cannot easily correct, at least not credibly and quickly. Some polls now show over 60 percent of those who respond favoring real increases in defense spending and over 50 percent doing so even if higher taxes are required to get the job done—a staggering change from the handful who backed such steps four or five years ago. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations polls have shown, for example, that for some time the people—the real people—have been about twice as supportive of increased defense spending as have "opinion leaders" such as professionals, journalists and, apparently, at least some political strategists.

In assuaging such increasingly followerless opinion leaders, Carter may have alienated a rather larger number of simpler folk who believe that weakness invites at least being walked on and, at worst, war. In moving over toward the left-hand shoulder, he has abandoned much of the middle of the road on the defense issue and has given many traditional Democrats—already unhappy with the economy—an added reason to vote against him. If he gets the nomination in August and if his subsequent attacks on Ronald Reagan for being too far to the right on national security issues fail to bring a number of Democrats back into the fold, he may remember the week after Memorial Day with deep regret.

The writer, formerly undersecretary of the Navy, practices law in Washington and is contributing editor of the Armed Forces Journal.

The Zumwalt - Bagley Report JOURNAL OF COMMERCE 5 JUNE 1980 Pg. 4

US Developing New Class of Warships

By ELMO R. ZUMWALT JR.
and
WORTH H. BAGLEY

A new class of warships is a key element in the U.S. Navy's program to regain a three-ocean capability to deal with the Soviet navy's three-ocean threat.

The keel for the first such ship, USS Ticonderoga, was laid on Jan. 21 at the automated Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss. This first of 21 now planned will be delivered in early 1983. It is a triumph of technology and congressional power.

Ticonderoga's major contribution will be a fleet air defense capability to destroy a high percentage of the Soviet aircraft and missiles which today give Moscow the advantage in a global naval war.

Today's warship radars rotating mechanically can detect a target only at the instant the constantly rotating radar beam sweeps by it. Thus, there are limited detection opportunities for a rotating radar. A separate tracking radar then has to "lock on" and engage each target.

On the other hand, Ticonderoga's Aegis computer controlled weapon system has a radar which transmits in all directions simultaneously. Seeing in all directions, it can, within seconds, detect, track, and engage many aircraft and missiles while continuing to search the skies for others.

Once Aegis detects a target, its range, speed, and direction are computed and processed. A defensive response is selected automatically. A missile can be automatically fired against the target. Or the commanding officer, watching instant, comprehensive displays of the enemy targets, can override and fire when he desires.

After launching, an Aegis missile is guided by radar until close to the target. Then the missile shifts to receive and follows signals "bounced" off the target by another radar. Destruction of the target is almost certain.

Ticonderoga's Aegis incorporates amazing new electronics redundancy. Many elements can become inoperative, but the system remains effective.

To deal with the occasional target that eludes Aegis, Ticonderoga class warships will have two Phalanx Close-In Weapons Systems which fire a constant stream of pellets, whose axis of fire is constantly corrected by radar to produce hits.

The latest detection equipment will locate, and anti-submarine rockets and torpedoes will destroy, enemy submarines.

Two missile launching systems can destroy distant ships with Harpoon cruise missiles.

There is room to add, in 1983, a capability against distant land targets, thus reducing reliance on carrier aircraft, if President Carter backs the Tomahawk long-range cruise missile development.

The latest sophisticated electronics equipment for jamming, anti-jamming, and detection will be on board.

JACK ANDERSON WASHINGTON POST 5 JUNE 1980 Pg. E-25

It's Pork Barrel Time on the Hill

The patriotic rhetoric that is accompanying the Pentagon's pending massive budget increase serves to obscure a sordid, politics-as-usual fact of life: The American flag is being wrapped around one of the biggest peacetime pork barrels in history.

While Senate and House hawks raise shrill alarms about Soviet military superiority, the private talk in Capitol cloakrooms centers on more practical considerations—how to ensure fat defense contracts for home states and congressional districts. Here are some examples of the superpatriot's salesmanship:

• The powerful Texas delegation—led by Rep. Jim Wright, the House Democratic leader, and Sen. John Tower, ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee—is demonstrating once again that it can bring home the bacon. Without even a vote, Wright succeeded in getting approval of $10 million to study expansion of production of the F111 fighter-bomber, which General Dynamics builds in his district. When the White House eliminated $112.9 million for A7K attack planes produced by the Vought Corp. in Grand Prairie, Tex., the Texans bullied the administration into restoring the money.

• Fairchild Republic's plant in Hagerstown was to have closed production of the A10 antitank plane this year after delivering a final order of 103 aircraft. But under pressure from the Maryland delegation, the administration agreed to increase the production run to 198 A10s and extend it over four years. Rep. Beverly Byron (D-Md.) even managed to secure a $30 million House authorization to produce a new two-seater version.

• Frank Saltinshek used to be the House Armed Services Committee counsel. Now he's a lobbyist for Grumman Aerospace Corp. A legislative aide told my associate Peter Grant that Saltinshek "is hovering around constantly" and "calls every day." His efforts apparently paid off: The House granted Grumman $500 million of the Pentagon budget increase.

• A weapon's performance sometimes runs second in importance to political clout. Northrup's F18 plane, for example, has had problems with landing gear malfunction, leaky fuselage and faulty wing design. But Rep. Charles Wilson (D-Calif.), in whose district Northrup manufactures the F18, had no difficulty getting approval for an increase in this year's plane order from 48 to 72, at an additional cost of about $500 million.

• The House Armed Services Committee staff, noting that the Patriot missile had performed properly in only five of its last 12 test shots, cut back its budget by $90 million. But the missile's builder, Raytheon, is in a district next to House Speaker Tip O'Neill's. After a few words in the right places, the committee reinstated the $90 million. One Capitol Hill veteran remarked wryly: "The 'Speaker's lobby' is appropriately named."

Iranian Jews—When I reported last March that about 100 Iranian Jewish refugees were having trouble getting visas to enter the United States, the State Department denied the story. Thousands of Iranian minority refugees, including Jews, had been allowed into the country in recent months, the department said.

New evidence, however, confirms my original story. One of the nation's most distinguished Jewish leaders, who dislikes publicity and requested that his name be withheld, wrote me a letter on the subject. The Iranian Jews who were allowed into the United States, he wrote, were often those who had been to this country before and held valid reentry visas enabling them to return within four years.

But he indicated that several first-time applicants were running into bureaucratic red tape at our Paris and London consulates—just as I reported.

In addition, a confidential internal State Department document confirms my report that Foggy Bottom officials can't decide how to handle the Iranian Jewish refugees stranded in Europe. When immigration authorities tried to get some guidance on the subject, the State Department failed to send a key representative to discuss the situation.

My report brought quick, if temporary, results. Less than two weeks after it was published, cables were sent to U.S. consular officials instructing them to show "sympathy and understanding" in processing entry applications from Iranian Jews and other minorities.

But since April 7, when President Carter announced tighter restrictions on Iranians, even those with long-standing visas are having problems getting into the United States.

GENERAL NEWS SUMMARY

FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

JUNE 5, 1980 **Pg. 1**

World-Wide

CARTER AND KENNEDY AGREED to meet today at the White House.

A Kennedy aide said the meeting will "establish lines of communication." It comes amid signs that Tuesday's voting might have aided independent John Anderson. While Carter won a nominating majority, his campaign was jolted by losses in five of eight Democratic primaries, including California and New Jersey.

Strategists for Ronald Reagan said they are rewriting his general campaign plan to tap Anderson's support. Exit polls of California voters showed Reagan would win easily in a three-way race but Anderson would edge Carter.

Carter said he expects Kennedy "will carry his delegates and deep belief in the issues to the convention."

The defeat of Proposition 9 doesn't mean California's tax revolt is dead, analysts said. They suggested that concern about government-service cuts figured in rejection of the plan to halve the state income tax. State voters also turned down an oil-company tax and dumped Democratic Rep. Charles Wilson, who is cited in a House ethics case.

* * *

Ayatollah Khomeini accused Carter of trying to cover up U.S. wrongdoing in Iran. Ramsey Clark, attending Iran's anti-America conference in defiance of a Carter travel ban, said he agreed to head an American inquiry into alleged U.S. crimes. Iran's president asked the former Attorney General to form the panel.

Swiss trade with Iran should be kept "within normal limits," officials in Bern said. The government said its neutrality and representation of U.S. interests in Tehran bar it from joining U.S. economic sanctions against Iran.

* * *

Gunmen in Belfast killed John Turnley, 40, Protestant leader of the Irish Independent Party. Police said they believed the Northern Ireland politician, who favored unity with Ireland, was shot by right-wing Protestants.

* * *

Arab merchants in East Jerusalem were detained overnight by Israeli military officials to ensure that they opened their shops. Strikes had been called to protest Monday's car-bomb attacks on two West Bank Arab mayors. Israel ordered protection for other West Bank mayors.

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An Iraqi embassy was attacked by two gunmen in Rome, who killed one employe and planted a time bomb that was defused three minutes before it was set to explode. Embassy guards wounded and captured one gunman, who identified himself as an Iraqi. His accomplice escaped.

* * *

Italian Premier Cossiga's government is expected to remain in power through the seven-nation Venice summit late this month. Cossiga is charged with indirectly helping a suspected terrorist evade capture. Italian Communists plan to force a parliamentary review, but say the inquiry could take months.

* * *

More than 200 South Koreans arrested during the Kwangju uprising were released by the military-dominated government. Last month's insurrection against martial law in the southern provincial capital left at least 170 people dead. Authorities said 524 people still are being held.

* * *

Afghanistan is stepping up a draft to replenish its army, which has been hit by desertions and civil war casualties, Western diplomats said. But they asserted that the conscription drive by the Soviet-backed government is meeting resistance.

* * *

The shooting of Vernon Jordan was witnessed by two persons other than Martha Coleman, an FBI agent said. But a police spokesman said neither witness was able to provide new information. Mrs. Coleman, who drove Jordan to his motel before the shooting, agreed to take a lie detector test, investigators said.

* * *

Tornado-ravaged Grand Island, Neb., was patrolled by National Guardsmen as the search for bodies continued. At least three persons were killed and more than 150 others injured when as many as seven twisters roared through the city.

* * *

A stay of execution was granted for condemned killer Jack Potts by a federal judge in Atlanta. Potts had reversed an earlier decision not to appeal his conviction.

* * *

Key West, Fla., was deluged with sealift boats carrying Cuban refugees. One captain, who returned to Florida from Cuba with an empty ship, said Cuban officials told him they wouldn't allow any more foreign-registered vessels to participate in the sealift.

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

Ib Ohlsson—Newsweek

Manoocher—Sipa-Black Star

Sending ten helicopters instead of eight would have raised the chances of success by only 2.7 per cent—and required another C-130 transport.



The helicopter that returned would have run out of fuel if the carrier Nimitz had not raced closer to the shore to meet it.

Mission planners did not know that giant dust clouds called* haboobs *can linger over the Iranian desert for hours. Thus, the helicopter pilots were unprepared for the unusual cloud of fine dust—and had no idea what it was.

Dr. Sherwood B. Idso

pilots about *haboobs*. And when a photograph of Iran taken by the NOAA 6 weather satellite just two minutes before the mission began showed no storms within 50 miles of the flight plan, the experts concluded that weather would not be a problem. The pilots, totally unprepared for the experience of flying through a *haboob*, thus began their mission in a state of much confusion and consternation.

Disoriented: In the midst of the *haboob*, the No. 5 chopper lost its gyro when a blower that cooled the gyro's power source burned out. Unable to see the ground through the dust, the chopper's pilots became so disoriented that they nearly crashed. Rather than try to negotiate a 9,000-foot ridge that lay between them and Desert One, they decided to turn back—even though they didn't have enough fuel to reach the Nimitz. Breaking radio silence, they told Seiffert of their decision. He relayed it to Vaught, who relayed it to the carrier, which reversed course and began speeding toward the Iranian coast to cut the distance the stricken helicopter had to cover. They barely made it. One of the choppers ran out of fuel moments after setting down on the Nimitz's deck.

The gyro failure wasn't the No. 5 chopper's only problem. There was also a burnout of its tactical navigation system. What's more, its omni-directional radio receiver failed to pick up the signal transmitted by the Iranian navigational station at Daraband, which is where the helicopters were to cross the 9,000-foot ridge. Had the receiver worked properly, the No. 5 chopper would have been able to negotiate the ridge even without its gyro.

The Pentagon still isn't sure why so much of chopper 5's equipment failed. Investigators thought they had discovered the reason for the gyro burn-out when they found a flak jacket and duffel bag blocking an air duct inside the helicopter. But the crewman who used the gear insisted he had stowed it properly—and that it may have been tossed in front of the duct in the frantic final moments as the crew scampered about the cabin for life jackets. Pentagon experts also dismissed the idea that the helicopter had been damaged on the Nimitz the morning of the mission when a marine—ironically, one of the eight who later died at Desert One—accidentally set off a firefighting system that doused the craft in a foam and salt-water solution.

The six remaining helicopters were supposed to meet the C-130s at Desert One by 11:30 p.m. But because of the *haboob*, it was 1:10 a.m. before all had landed. At that point, Kyle discovered that the No. 2 chopper had lost its second-stage hydraulic pump and was unable to take off again. The malfunction had actually occurred two hours earlier. If radio communication had been permitted, the pilot of the stricken helicopter might have been able to inform Kyle of his problem long before any of the choppers got to Desert One. Kyle could have aborted the rescue at that point and started sending the five functioning choppers back to the Nimitz as soon as they had been refueled. That would have eliminated much of the congestion and confusion at the desert staging area that later led to tragedy.

No Spare: Normally, the faulty pump could have been replaced in 45 minutes. But even though the same pump had broken down before in practice, no one had brought along a spare. The Sea Stallions were carrying 5,000 pounds more than their recommended maximum payload—and there simply wasn't room to take along a backup for every part that could possibly fail. Based on an actuarial study of which parts were most likely to break down again, mission planners concluded that the need for a spa

[redacted]p, which weighed 13 pounds, was [redacted]ginal.

With yet another helicopter out of action, Vaught asked Kyle and commando leader Col. Charlie Beckwith to consider continuing the mission with just five choppers. There were two ways of doing that: they could leave behind some 6,000 pounds of men and matériel, or they could try to load everything onto the already overladen remaining choppers. Neither alternative was acceptable, and Kyle and Beckwith decided the mission should be scrubbed. Their recommendation was accepted by President Carter. But the team hadn't rehearsed an abort—and the lack of training may have contributed to the final tragedy. "We had never practiced to abort and get on the C-130s," Beckwith said later.

Two of the six C-130s had already taken off when disaster struck. But before the third could taxi to its takeoff position, a helicopter directly behind it had to be moved. The chopper's pilot, Maj. James Shaefer, was ordered to bank left and away from the C-130 and fly to a refueling position behind another of the transport planes. Shaefer acknowledged the order and started to bank left. Then he apparently became disoriented. He reversed his [redacted]rse, banked right and crashed into the [redacted]30. Both craft burst into flames.

Overruled: The intense heat thrown off by the burning C-130 forced the crews of the two helicopters nearest the crash to abandon ship. One crewman wanted to go back to his chopper to retrieve classified material that had been left behind, but Kyle said no. When the last of the C-130s was airborne, Kyle asked Vaught to send in fighter planes to destroy the abandoned choppers and their classified contents. But Washington denied the request on the ground that if any Iranians near the site—such as the passengers of the bus that had been stopped—were killed in the process, the militants in Teheran might take reprisals against the hostages. It was the only time since planning for the mission had begun that Washington had overruled a military recommendation.

In hindsight, it is easy to say that the mission planners should have sent ten helicopters instead of eight, that they should have known about the duration of *haboobs* and briefed the pilots accordingly, that they should have trained for an abort, that they should have taken an extra hydraulic pump to Desert One. But with the exception of the lack of planning for an abort, each of those decisions represented a reasonable trade-off between the need for maximum flexibility on the one hand and speed and secrecy on the other. "There had to have been some mistakes made," concedes Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas Hayward. But in the end, the mission was done in at least as much by an incredible streak of bad luck.

A broader and more troubling question is whether the mission should have been undertaken in the first place. Pentagon planners were never certain how many militants the commandos were likely to encounter at the embassy. The attack force had no secret weapons: the operation would almost certainly have involved a fierce shoot-out. The Pentagon estimated that even if the commandos had made it to the embassy compound undetected, as many as fifteen of the hostages—and up to 30 of the commandos—would have been killed or injured in the getaway. Thus, there was a chance that only 38 hostages would have been rescued safely—at a cost of 45 casualties. In a mission that involved a series of uneasy compromises, that might have been the most disturbing trade-off of all.

Chopper pilot Schaefer arrives home for burn treatment: No evacuation plan

Steve Krauss—Sygma

Church on the stump: Spiraling acrimony in

Endangered

Republicans have their best chance in years of capturing the U.S. Senate. A net shift of only ten seats in November could give them control—and more than a dozen Democratic senators face tough re-election campaigns. Conservatives have chosen five liberals as special targets: Birch Bayh of Indiana, Frank Church of Idaho, Alan Cranston of California, John Culver of Iowa and George McGovern of South Dakota. NEWSWEEK'S *John J. Lindsay toured Idaho to assess the odds against Church, and Pamela Ellis Simons visited Iowa to scout the campaign against Culver. Their reports:*

Frank Church and his Republican opponent, U.S. Rep. Steven Symms, came face to face at a rain-soaked fishermen's breakfast near St. Anthony, Idaho—and the soggy amiability of their encounter belied the spiraling acrimony of this year's Senate campaign. To Symms and his sympathizers on the right, Church is an apostle of "appeasement," a "dangerous man" and a "liar." To Church, the New Right itself is increasingly the issue—particularly the campaign being waged against him by the ABC (Anybody But Church) committee and its Washington parent group, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC). "Symms and the ABC and NCPAC have been linked to one common objective—to attack Frank Church," he complains. Slightly ahead in the polls but on the defensive nonetheless, Church, 55, must hope that ABC's attacks will boomerang; his fifth Senate term—and chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee—may depend on it.

ABC and NCPAC resolutely deny connection with the Symms cam-

New Light on the Rescue Mission

What caused the failure of the disastrous American attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran? NEWSWEEK'S *David C. Martin has unearthed previously unpublished details of the aborted mission. His report:*

The placid waters of the Gulf of Oman were fading into twilight as the eight RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters lifted off the deck of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier U.S.S. Nimitz last April 24. The helicopters hovered briefly at 400 feet, grouping themselves into a loose, diamond-shaped formation, then swung north at 120 knots toward the Iranian coastline 50 miles away. On the Nimitz's bridge, an officer picked up a scrambler phone. In an instant, he was connected to an Egyptian air base about 300 miles south of Cairo where the task force's commander, Maj. Gen. James Vaught, was standing by. Operation Eagle Claw, he told Vaught, was under way as scheduled at five minutes past 7, local time.

The helicopters' initial destination was the staging area called Desert One—an abandoned salt flat in Iran's Dasht-e-Kavir desert about 600 miles north of the coast and 250 miles from Teheran. At Desert One, they would rendezvous with six C-130 transport planes that had left Egypt two hours earlier carrying men, equipment and the fuel for the next leg of their journey—a 270-mile dash under cover of darkness to a mountain hide-out code-named "Figbar" just 50 miles southeast of Teheran. They were supposed to arrive at Figbar before dawn and hunker down there for the day, waiting until nightfall to attempt the actual rescue. The mission had been in the works for more than six months. Early on, the planners had considered sending in the commandos by truck from Turkey. They also thought about launching the raid from a carrier task force in the eastern Mediterranean. But the back desert route was considered the best option.

The Odds: Planners figured the mission required a minimum of six Sea Stallions. According to their calculations, there was a 96.5 per cent probability that if eight choppers were dispatched from the Nimitz, at least six would make it to Figbar. Sending ten Sea Stallions would have raised the probability to 99.2 per cent. But that would have required an additional C-130 to refuel them, raising the risk of detection. In the end, the planners decided that the extra 2.7 per cent edge simply wasn't worth it.

The copters were twelve minutes behind schedule when they crossed the Iranian coast in a gap between two radar stations, at Jask and Chah Bahar. That was because the Nimitz had to steam further away from the coast than planned in order to keep at least 200 miles away from a Soviet spy ship stationed near the Strait of Hormuz.

The first sign of trouble came about an hour into the mission, when the pilot of the No. 6 helicopter flashed a light indicating he was setting down. Operating under a prearranged buddy system, the No. 8 chopper landed with him. In the No. 1 helicopter, flight leader Lt. Col. Edward Seiffert had no way of telling what had happened. The only means of in-flight communication between the helicopters was a nonsecure high-frequency radio that was supposed to be used only in the direst of emergencies. Since no one broke radio silence, all Seiffert could do was to report over his secure scrambler phone to Vaught and deputy task-force commander Col. James Kyle, who was riding in the lead C-130, that two of his helicopters were down. The No. 8 chopper's tail had been damaged on the Nimitz—and it had spent so much time in the shop that it was known as the "hangar queen." But it was the No. 6 chopper that had been disabled by a loss of pressure in one of its rotor blades. Its crew and classified material were transferred to the No. 8 chopper, which took off and soon caught up with the formation.

Even if the plan had worked, the Pentagon estimated casualties of up to 15 hostages and 30 troops.

The mission's planners had expected at least one chopper to break down. From the beginning, the Sea Stallion was something of a compromise choice for the rescue mission. The Army's CH-47 helicopter might have been better suited for the long, arduous overland journey to Desert One and beyond. But preparing the CH-47 might have raised suspicions: why were eight Army choppers being transferred to an aircraft carrier?

As the remaining seven choppers were nearing "Turnpoint Four," a navigational point near the town of Bam, they ran into a strange floating fog of dust. Normally, dust storms are sand swirls accompanied by strong winds. But this dust storm was different. "There was no blowing sand, no wind, no significant turbulence or any other indications of a sandstorm," reported a later Pentagon paper. "The phenomenon was suspended dust." A fine talcum-like powder, it sifted into the cockpits, coating the pilots' lips and raising the temperature from an already uncomfortable 88 degrees to a nearly intolerable 93 degrees.

Manoocher—Sipa-Black Star

The Pentagon anticipated that the mission might have to be called off. But the rescue team never practiced executing an order to abort—and that may have contributed to the final tragedy.

As soon as they hit the dust, Seiffert's lead chopper and its buddy landed. The other five helicopters didn't see them. Instead, they flew on. Realizing he ha[d] left behind, Seiffert took off again[.] Ironically, the mission could have been abo[rted] at that point, since the dust cloud had reduced visibility so badly. But because the dust cloud resembled no sandstorm the pilots had ever experienced—and because the C-130s ahead of them had radioed back no warnings—they pressed on, convinced they would emerge from it at any moment.

'Haboob': What they had encountered was a *haboob*, a rare though hardly unknown meteorological phenomenon in which gusts generated by thunderstorms kick up great masses of dust many miles away. *Haboobs* occur in the southwestern United States, where the dust usually settles back to earth within ten minutes. But in Iran, where the dust is much finer, a *haboob* can linger in the air for hours. The 1970 CIA intelligence summary that the mission's weather forecasters used mentioned *haboobs* only briefly and said nothing about their duration. Had the planners searched through the archives of weather satellite photos at the University of Wisconsin, they might have turned up evidence of long-lasting Iranian *haboobs*. But the mission's urgency—as well as security requirements that kept personnel to a minimum—did not permit such in-depth research. Security concerns also nixed an idea to se[t] clandestine weather station in the I[ran] desert that might have detected the *ha-boobs*. (As many as 1,000 people knew enough about the mission to compromise it—and one loose-lipped sailor on emergency leave almost did.)

In any case, no [one]

year's economic summit in Tokyo. To help ease the impact of oil prices on the developing world, the allies were likely to [illegible] initiatives by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to persuade the OPEC oil barons to "recycle" some of their petrobillions to Third World nations bogged down in debt. But the draft communiqué did not mention a more ambitious proposal by the prestigious Brandt Commission on North-South problems: to start up a massive Global Development Fund for quicker relief of Third World financial pains.

Loggerheads: Although the United States and its allies were in step on economic policy, they were walking miles apart on political strategy. The allied response to Iran and Afghanistan has not been as tough as Carter would like. Last week he and Schmidt were at apparent loggerheads over an issue that struck closer to home: the plan to counter Moscow's missile buildup in Central Europe by deploying 572 Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles on NATO soil. Last April, Schmidt vaguely proposed that "it would be useful for peace if no deployment were made on both sides" until 1983, when the installation of the NATO nukes is to begin. Meanwhile, he said, East and West should negotiate mutual limitations on missiles. Some U.S. officials [illegible]d that Schmidt was proposing to [illegible]" NATO into a strategic disadvantage. They also feared that even a hint of West German wavering would spread to Belgium and the Netherlands—which were reluctant from the start to accept the new missiles on their territory.

Schmidt's impending visit to Moscow next week made the matter seem particularly urgent. Two weeks ago, Carter fired off a tough letter to the German Chancellor cautioning him against talking to the Russians about any freeze on tactical nuclear weapons. Schmidt said last week that the letter was "astonishing," and an American official who had read it admitted: "It was pretty gruff, direct to the point of rudeness, in terms of how such things are written. There were no frills at the beginning or the end, no 'looking-forward-to-seeing-you-next-week-Helmut' kind of thing."

The letter had been drafted in an interagency meeting led by aides to national-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. It was toned down a bit by Carter, who among other things deleted the word "unacceptable" in one passage. Schmidt took offense nonetheless. His Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, made an angry phone call to Secretary of State Edmund Muskie. Schmidt himself placed much of the blame on Brzezinski. "Our Polish friend in Washington mistrusts us more than our Polish friends in Warsaw," he told aides.

The West German Chancellor insisted that Bonn would stand behind its decision to deploy the cruise missiles. Only hours before Carter's letter arrived, Schmidt sarcastically told visiting U.S. Sen. Joseph Biden that the U.S. "can depend on the bloody Germans." Last week, he told The Washington Post that his proposal on missiles was "in the mainstream of Western thinking." He said he "found it difficult to understand" why his suggestion "should have created such fuss in Western circles."

AP

At the Colosseum: These days politicians, not Christians, get thrown to the lions

At their meeting in Venice, Carter and Schmidt conducted a "cordial and very intense" airing of their differences, according to one source. Afterward, Carter told reporters: "We have absolutely no doubt that he and the Federal Republic of Germany are completely committed to carry out the agreement" to deploy the new missiles. Furthermore, said Carter, "we both agree completely that the Soviets must withdraw all their troops from Afghanistan." Schmidt expressed unqualified agreement with everything Carter had said. "I never thought that we did not agree," said the Chancellor. But if the two men had managed to smooth over their latest dispute, it also was widely assumed that what one German official called their "serious chemistry problem" remained as bad as ever.

The trouble in the Western Alliance, however, goes deeper than mere bad blood between leaders. As the West's strategic stakes expand beyond Europe to the Mideast oil fields and the markets of the developing world, some Europeans are questioning whether NATO itself, with its narrow focus on the defense of the North Atlantic, works well enough anymore. In Venice, French and British leaders planned to float the idea of a new NATO mechanism: a panel of American, British, French and German ambassadors charged with coordinating Western military and diplomatic activities beyond Europe. To many friends of the United States, the papering-over of political differences in Venice and the unresolved doubts about Jimmy Carter's leadership only increased the need for some better way to conduct the business of the West.

STEVEN STRASSER with THOMAS M. DeFRANK and RICH THOMAS in Carter's party, SCOTT SULLIVAN in Venice and bureau reports