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JOINT OVERVIEW  
OF  
OPERATION URGENT FURY

1 MAY 1985

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INTRODUCTION (U)

(U) During the period 14 October to 1 November 1983, the United States planned and conducted Operation URGENT FURY to protect and evacuate US citizens and foreign nationals from Grenada. Our actions were taken in concert with members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).

(U) Grenada, under Prime Minister Bishop, had maintained close ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union since 1979. Several hundred Cuban advisors and military construction personnel were known to be on the island. On 13 October 1983, ultra-leftist Deputy Prime Minister Coard, supported by General Austin, jailed Prime Minister Bishop. On 14 October, after a series of National Security Council (NSC) meetings, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to begin planning for military support of a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). On 19 October, despite widespread demonstrations in support of Bishop, he and several key supporters were executed. Civil strife resulted, and the safety of American citizens was placed in doubt.

(U) On 21 October, based on evaluation of events in Grenada, the NSC modified its guidance to add neutralization of Grenadian Armed Forces, stabilization and, as requested by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, restoration of democracy in Grenada. The operation was scheduled to begin before dawn on 25 October.

(U) Major forces were provided by all the Services. The USS INDEPENDENCE Carrier Battle Group and Marine Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group 1-84 (en route to Lebanon) were diverted. Army Rangers, and two brigades of the 82d Airborne Division participated in the operation. Air Force AWACS, F-15, C-130, and C-141 elements were all deployed on short notice.

(U) The combat units were selected for several specific reasons. First, the numerical superiority provided sufficient force to ensure the success of the mission in the shortest possible time with the least risk to military and civilian personnel. Second, the mix of forces was based on the unique abilities of each unit, their readiness, and training. Third, and most important, the forces were immediately available for contingency force deployment.

(U) The essence of the plan was simplicity. The Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) would conduct an amphibious/heliborne assault to secure the northern portion of the island in the vicinity of Pearls Airport and the town of Grenville.

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Simultaneously, US Army Rangers were to conduct an airborne assault on the Port Salines Airfield to secure the airfield and the surrounding area. One brigade of the 82d Airborne would follow the Rangers. The 82d Airborne and the Rangers would then secure the Southern half of the island, rescue US citizens, and conduct peacekeeping operations. A second brigade of the 82d Airborne was tasked as the Reserve Force to aid in stabilization of the island nation and to conduct peacekeeping operations as needed. The 82d Airborne was also tasked to relieve the MAU, which would then resume its deployment to Lebanon.

(U) The USS INDEPENDENCE Battle Group would provide close air support and naval gunfire support. Air Force AC-130 aircraft would also provide close air support. Air Force units deployed to Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, in concert with naval air and surface units, would deter Cuban involvement.

(U) During the operation the mission of the MAU was modified to add an amphibious/heliborne assault at Grand Mal Bay to secure the city of St. George's and rescue Governor-General Scoon.

(U) Between 25 October and 2 November, US and OECS forces accomplished all assigned missions. Over 600 US citizens and 80 foreign nationals were safely evacuated, approximately 700 Cubans were captured, and several tons of Soviet-made weapons and ammunition were seized.

(U) On 2 November, the combat operation was terminated, and US and OECS soldiers turned to assisting the people of Grenada in rebuilding the island and establishing a functioning democratic government.

(U) Over 6,000 US and OECS men and women ranging from combat soldiers to military police to clerks participated directly in the operation and performed in a superlative manner. A wide variety of equipment and systems from infantry weapons to sophisticated communications and reconnaissance systems (some untried under combat conditions) were employed successfully. Operation URGENT FURY also afforded the armed forces the ability to examine areas where improvements could be made.

(U) The lessons learned from Operation URGENT FURY have provided valuable data to support ongoing programs and serve as the impetus for new initiatives. This overview of URGENT FURY is structured to separate the lessons learned from isolated observations which cannot be validated. This approach avoids an overreaction to one-of-a-kind incidents which were unique to the Grenada operation.

[REDACTED]

(U) This document provides an overview of the major joint lessons learned from Grenada and the ongoing programs or new initiatives that complement the lessons learned. The information contained in this overview report draws extensively from the USCINCLANT Operation URGENT FURY Report and is grouped into five major functional areas: Joint Planning and Training; Coordination and Interoperability; Command, Control and Communications; Intelligence; and Support Functions.

JOINT PLANNING AND TRAINING (U)

(U) Initial planning for URGENT FURY was based on the requirement to protect and evacuate American citizens in either a permissive or non-permissive environment. Other countries had also requested US assistance in evacuating their citizens from Grenada. Noncombatant evacuation operations in a potentially hostile environment were complicated by the presence of the largely uninvolved civilian population of Grenada.

[REDACTED]

These precautions were necessary to minimize the risk to the evacuees and the combat forces.

[REDACTED]

(U) The CAS proved flexible and effective in providing the planning framework for URGENT FURY. CAS procedures permitted the rapid relay of clear taskings to subordinates. For example, the following is an extract from the URGENT FURY EXECUTE ORDER:

(U) "...conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/friendly

government participants, assist in restoration of a democratic government on Grenada."

(U) The Rules of Engagement for all participants were concise and read as follows:

- Use force and weapons as may be essential to the accomplishment of the mission.
- Minimize the disruptive influence of military operations on the local economy commensurate with the accomplishment of the mission.
- Execute essential tasks rapidly with minimum damage and casualties.

(U) Many of the planning deficiencies noted in various observations can be attributed to the time constraints placed on the planning process. The use of an existing CONPLAN with modifications may have alleviated many of the planning deficiencies which occurred. One of the curiosities of the lessons learned was the frequent comment that "it could have been better had more planning time been allowed." In fact, in a crisis there is almost never enough time to do all the planning. Coincidentally, all the evidence indicates that given more time, the enemy would have been much better prepared.

(U) JCS and USCINCLANT staff planning was performed effectively. The force list, concept of operation, deployment, overall organizational structure, and ability of the various commanders and their staffs to adapt to a changing situation without losing sight of their objective were all noteworthy. The fact that a joint operation of the complexity of Operation URGENT FURY was successfully mounted on short notice is testament to the quality of joint planning between the Services.


(U) Sound suggestions for improving training were noted. The need to train Army MEDEVAC helicopter pilots to land on Navy ships was emphasized. Even before Grenada, the two Services were conducting training programs, and Army pilots had participated in several joint Service training periods to practice night landings aboard Navy ships. Prior to the operation, the Army and Navy

exchanged officers in both operational units and as instructors in schools. A Memorandum of Agreement between the Army and the Navy is being staffed to formalize arrangements for helicopter training and instructor qualifications.

(U) The Services use schools and exchange programs to teach subjects such as CAS, NEO, airspace management, law of land warfare, close air support, communications, flight training, and many others. However, one of the most effective methods of enhancing joint training is joint exercises. The JCS/CINC exercise program provides the opportunity to evaluate joint training and procedures in a realistic environment and to identify needed improvements.

(U) Operation URGENT FURY generated a renewed emphasis on a wide range of Service interoperability programs. A sample of joint planning and training initiatives is listed below:

- (U) The Modern Aids to Planning Program (MAPP) is designed to help make modern hardware, software, and processes available to the CINCs to improve war plan development and assessment.



- (U) JCS sponsors or directs 60-80 exercises annually involving all CINCs and Services.

#### COORDINATION AND INTEROPERABILITY (U)

(U) The lessons learned pertaining to interoperability dealt with three major areas: communications, fire support, and planning.

(U) Several observations were made in the USCINCLANT report regarding communications difficulties. The observations centered around equipment incompatibility and procedural differences. The question that must be answered for each type of joint combat

operation is: Who must communicate with whom and by what means? This effort must also include the development of appropriate standards for future systems.

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(2) The Inter-Theater C3 (ITC3) communications security (COMSEC) package was established to permit forces from different communication nets to have a common set of COMSEC equipment and procedures during joint operations. This package contained key lists for most common tactical COMSEC equipment plus authentication and call sign tables and OPCODES. Some forces did not hold all components of this package. Other units held them, but did not deploy them to Grenada. The composition and distribution of the ITC3 COMSEC package is being reexamined to ensure that contingency forces have appropriate documents.

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(2) The use of VINSON (tactical secure voice equipment) posed problems because the equipment had not been fully fielded. For example, portions of the 82d Airborne Division had only been equipped with VINSON during the weekend prior to the start of URGENT FURY. Moreover, VINSON had not been installed on all ships and aircraft (USN or USAF). (Modifications to these platforms are extensive and are normally accomplished during major scheduled maintenance/overhaul.) The Navy and Air Force are expediting installation of VINSON. OJCS will continue to refine interoperability requirements and monitor the Services' adherence to published standards.

(U) Interservice fire support coordination was observed to be excellent in some areas and a problem in others. The most frequent observation concerned the interface between the Army ground forces and naval gunfire and aviation support. The ground force commander had all of the following fire support systems available for employment: organic mortar fire, organic artillery fire, helicopter gunships, AC-130 aircraft, naval gunfire support, and carrier air support. While only limited naval gunfire support was used, this was also true of artillery fire support. Both naval gunfire and artillery are area fire weapons and, in some instances, their use would have been inconsistent with the Rules of Engagement. The coming use of J-Fire (Joint Application of Fire Power System) and increased joint training should reduce fire support problems.

(U) Coordination between the Navy and Marine Corps and between the Army and the Air Force was excellent. Although there were some coordination and communication problems between the Army and Navy, there is also evidence that coordination worked well. For instance, during the operation at Point Salines airfield, both Navy A-7s and Air Force AC-130s joined the Rangers in destroying three armored personnel carriers and neutralizing a Cuban force which had pinned down a Panger squad.

[REDACTED]

(U) During the operation, the most valued fire support system was the AC-130 aircraft. One AC-130 was continually on station. The AC-130 was the most accurate short response fire support system available. For the Army it was the easiest system with which to coordinate and communicate. The requirement to "minimize damage and casualties" was also a key consideration. The ground force commanders picked an accurate system with which they were familiar and with which communications were the easiest.

(U) Since Grenada, the Army and the Navy have developed a better working relationship with regard to fire support coordination, as exemplified by joint training between the 82d Airborne and the 2d MAF ANGLICO teams during recent field exercises.

(U) Observations made after Grenada criticized the Services' ability to communicate and operate together during combat operations. Although communications difficulties existed (see the section on Command, Control, and Communications), there were good examples of inter-Service coordination. For instance, Army Rangers deployed in Marine helicopters to rescue the students at the True Blue Campus and Army helicopters transported wounded personnel to Navy ships. The latter issue was a point of interest in the after-action reports. Few Army aviators are qualified for shipboard landings, and training needs to be increased. However, Army pilots did make ship landings during the operation. There were procedural problems and differences in technique; however, they were overcome by diligence and the application of common sense.


(U) Interoperability is an issue of concern to all Services. The experience of Grenada served to support many ongoing joint initiatives. Some of the major, ongoing interoperability initiatives are:

- (U) The 22 May 1984 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Army and the Air Force identified 31 warfighting issues on which the two Services are cooperating. They include such items as Identification-Friend or Foe (IFF) systems, Joint Tactical Missile System, Air Liaison Officers and Forward Air Controllers Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, and Intratheater Airlift. The Navy is working with the Army and Air Force on 11 of the issues.
- (U) The Air Land Forces Application (ALFA) Agency is working on nine areas such as Joint Night Air-Ground Combat Operations, Joint Airspace Management System, Joint Rear Battle, and Joint Application of Fire Power.

- (U) The Joint Logistics Techniques and Procedures Board is working to solve unit and direct support logistic problems such as those experienced by the CINCs during joint exercises.
  
- (U) Seventeen major initiatives in the broad category of Command, Control and Communications Systems (C3S) are ongoing. They include the JCS Master Navigation Plan, the Joint Special Operations Forces C3 Interoperability Program, the TRI-TAC program for tactical switched communications equipment, the Joint Communications Support Element to provide communications support from a Joint Task Force HQ to subordinate component headquarters, and the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems to standardize message text formats and procedures for exchange of tactical information.


(U) While interoperability can always be enhanced in joint operations and exercises, there are many ongoing initiatives to improve joint planning, procedures, training, doctrine, and equipment.

INTELLIGENCE (U)



COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3) (U)

(U) Communications planning was affected by short planning time, significant mission changes, and restrictions on information dissemination. The mission and forces were expanded from the initial noncombatant evacuation operation to the executed combat mission. The rapid changes in forces had a major impact on C3 planning because the C3 systems and networks in support of the executed mission did not fully adjust from those designed to support a NEO mission. This was partially responsible for some communications nets being overcrowded while others were under utilized.



(U) Where no better or quicker methods exist, a courier system should be implemented for delivery of essential traffic. Use of portable HF and TACFAX equipment can enhance existing capability. A portable AUTODIN terminal will provide the added dimension of having AUTODIN access in the area of operations. High priority will be placed on developing this capability.



[REDACTED]

(4) From a C3 perspective, one solution is to develop a "generic" C3S annex for various envisioned operations that can be modified quickly. A generic joint communications plan has now been written by USCINCLANT.

SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (U)

(U) In any crisis action situation, the logistics community should be involved in the early phases of planning and in implementing the plan.

(4) One observation noted that airhead and Navy Logistics Detachment (LOGDET) planning for URGENT FURY did not include adequate communications and security personnel, portable storage facilities, and POL temporary storage capability. These would have helped solve the logistic problems in the austere environment of Grenada. While lack of these facilities was troublesome at times, mission success was not affected. The Navy LOGDET shared available assets and provided adequate support. The normal procedure of attaching small sister Service teams to larger units was followed to provide organic support. Future LOGDET requirements will be tailored to meet operational needs.

(U) Logistic units operating from Barbados and Point Salines, Grenada, provided adequate support. Units were staged with no serious problems. The runway at Point Salines was under construction at the time of the operation, resulting in runway lighting problems and lack of ramp space. The lighting problem was corrected and air landing of troops and equipment was accomplished in an efficient manner.

(4) The USCINCLANT report recommended that the CINC's airlift validator be involved in early stages of planning and that airlift requests be processed through proper channels for validation and prioritization. USCINCLANT has been designated as the single airlift agent for future contingencies where they are the supported CINC. This action also initiated a change to JCS Pub 15.

[REDACTED]

This plan identifies the personnel and assets needed to support any future crisis.

[REDACTED]

CONCLUSION (U)

(U) Although review of lessons learned has identified the need for improvement in selected areas, Operation URGENT FURY was, by any reasonable measure, an unqualified success. Guidance and policy were concise and clear as were the orders given by the NCA, the JCS, the CINC, and the JTF commander to the forces involved. The clearly defined Rules of Engagement permitted mission effectiveness with minimal civilian casualties.

(U) The use of an existing plan with modifications is preferable to developing a new plan under severe time constraints. Use of an existing plan may prevent omitting important aspects, provide for flexibility during the operation, and prevent planning problems such as occurred in Operation URGENT FURY. Although time available for planning the operation was constrained, the plan which evolved made the best use of the forces allocated, and their capabilities, training, and readiness.

4 (U) The procedures established for crisis situations generally proved adequate for responding to a situation involving highly sensitive and time-critical requirements, even though the JDS was not used. The changes to the JDS, especially the provisions for close-hold planning and communications, will result in significant improvements. Other changes such as increasing the use of force modules and changes to the CAS, will further aid in making the planning system responsive to contingency operations.


(U) The military personnel assigned, attached, or in liaison positions during the operation, especially those who had joint tour experience, were very effective. The combat and combat support personnel involved in the operation, from all Services, performed in an outstanding manner.

(U) Lastly, and of perhaps the greatest importance, the NCA and the JCS (and their staffs) permitted the chain of command at lower levels to accomplish tasks in the manner that they judged most appropriate for the situation without undue intervention. This philosophy allowed the trained professionals on the scene to use their experience, expertise, and familiarity with the situation to accomplish the mission.

DOC 1



# OPERATION URGENT FURY REPORT



#181

OCTOBER 25 - NOVEMBER 2, 1983

Enclosed is the report by Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT) on Operation URGENT FURY, the rescue mission which evacuated American citizens from Grenada. USCINCLANT was the operational commander in charge of URGENT FURY. This report includes lessons learned during the operation and has been declassified by the USCINCLANT staff. The material deleted from this report remains classified in the interest of national security.

NOTE: Various pages from this report have been intentionally left blank.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
THE ATLANTIC COMMAND  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

3000/FF16-6/J3

06 FEB 1984

[REDACTED]

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command  
To: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: Operation URGENT FURY Report

Encl: (1) Executive Summary  
(2) Chronology  
(3) Detailed Lessons Learned

[REDACTED]

1. Operation URGENT FURY was a rescue mission which evacuated U.S. citizens from the Island of Grenada. Although hostilities were limited from 25 October to 2 November 1983, peacekeeping efforts are continuing through the present time frame. Enclosures (1) through (4) are submitted to provide significant lessons learned from the operation. Enclosure (1) is an executive summary of the most important aspects of the operation, enclosure (2) identifies major events in chronological sequence, enclosure (3) is a compilation of major lessons learned submitted to this headquarters by component commanders,

[REDACTED]

*W. L. McDonald*

W. L. McDONALD

Copy to:  
CSA  
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CMC  
CINCMAC  
CINCSAC  
USCINCRD  
CINCARLANT  
CINCAFLANT  
COMUSFORCARIB

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OPERATION URGENT FURY

LESSONS LEARNED

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. [REDACTED] URGENT FURY, a joint combat operation conducted in the eastern Caribbean island of Grenada, was accomplished in a most successful manner. Combat operations commenced at dawn on 25 October 1983 and hostilities ceased on 02 November 1983. Peacekeeping operations are continuing. The outcome of this military mission reaffirmed the outstanding professionalism, dedication and flexibility of all the forces involved in this effort.

2. [REDACTED] The planning effort for URGENT FURY was compressed into an extremely short time period. During the planning phase, the mission was also expanded from one of a naval presence/show of force and possible non-combatant evacuation operation, to a full-scale effort to neutralize the opposing military forces on Grenada. The final mission statement, contained in the JCS Execute Order, directed USCINCLANT to:

[REDACTED]

"conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/friendly government participants, assist in restoration of a democratic government on Grenada."

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] Forces from all U.S. military services participated in the operation, and were assisted by a peacekeeping force from the organization of Eastern Caribbean States, Jamaica and Barbados. Other U.S. agency involvement (State, CIA) was also incorporated in the final plan for the operation.

[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] USCINCREC, CINCPAC [REDACTED] were designated supporting commanders to USCINCLANT by JCS. Commander, Joint Task Force [REDACTED] (CJTF [REDACTED]) was activated on 23 October to provide operational Command and Control of URGENT FURY forces. Several subordinate task force commanders were assigned to conduct specific tasks during the execution phase of the operation. When CJTF [REDACTED] was deactivated on 03 November,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Enclosure (1)

[REDACTED]

Commander, U.S. Forces Grenada (COMUSFORGRENADA) assumed operational control of all U.S. forces in Grenada. The Caribbean Peacekeeping Force was placed under the operational control of the Governor General of Grenada, who assumed the responsibility as head of the interim government on the island.

5. [REDACTED] During Operation URGENT FURY, the island of Grenada was divided into two operational sectors. The concept of operations called for an amphibious assault at Pearls Airfield in the northern sector by the U.S. Marines (TF [REDACTED]) while the U.S. Army Rangers and Special Forces (TF [REDACTED]) were assigned Point Salines Airfield and other specific targets in the St. Georges area of the southern sector. The 82nd Airborne Division (TF [REDACTED]) was the designated reserve force tasked to relieve TF [REDACTED] on order. After the initial assault, CTF [REDACTED] was assigned to continue stabilization/peacekeeping operations in Grenada as COMUSFORGRENADA. CTF [REDACTED] was the operational commander of U.S. Air Forces at Roosevelt Roads, PR, where Tactical Air Command F-15 and AWACS aircraft were positioned to provide surveillance and defense against possible interference by Cuban forces. [REDACTED] the USS INDEPENDENCE Battle Group, was assigned to provide air and surface support in the vicinity of Grenada. Tactical and strategic reconnaissance aircraft [REDACTED] provided intelligence collection and surveillance support for the operation. The U.S. Coast Guard provided Search and Rescue (SAR) support.

6. [REDACTED] Operation URGENT FURY was executed according to the plan, with the following exceptions:

a. [REDACTED] TF [REDACTED] encountered much stronger resistance from Cuban and Grenadian forces in the southern sector than anticipated. Elements of TF [REDACTED] were withdrawn from the north and re-inserted near St Georges to provide assistance to elements of TF [REDACTED] in that area. TF [REDACTED] was activated just prior to H-Hour and was inserted at Point Salines shortly after the initial assault to reinforce and later relieve TF [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] TF [REDACTED] was also used to conduct an amphibious assault operation on the island of Carriacou, north of Grenada, in reaction to reports of enemy activity there.

7. [REDACTED] CJTF [REDACTED] was disestablished on 03 November, and CTF [REDACTED] now acting as Commander, U.S. Forces Grenada, assumed operational control of all U.S. forces in theater.

8. [REDACTED] Statistical Summary. During the course of Operation URGENT FURY, the Grenadian Peoples Revolutionary Army (PRA) was

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

neutralized and over 1000 Grenadians were detained for screening. Forty-five Grenadians were killed in action and 337 wounded. There were approximately 800 Cubans on the island when the operation was conducted, most of whom participated in combat action against U.S. and CPF forces. Twenty-five Cubans were killed in action, 59 were wounded and the rest detained and repatriated to Cuba. U.S. forces suffered 18 killed and 116 wounded in action. No CPF personnel casualties were sustained.

9. [REDACTED] The operation in Grenada was successfully completed in a relatively short time. In any endeavor, regardless of the outcome, there are areas where improvements must be made. Any changes made on the basis of Lessons Learned should carefully note the extremely short planning time preceding this operation. It should also be noted that the level of the opposition encountered by U.S. combat forces in Grenada was relatively unsophisticated. The following is a summary of major lessons learned, subdivided by category (as contained in enclosure (3)):

a. [REDACTED] Command and Control.

(1) [REDACTED] The Combined Task Force Commander's Fly-Away Staff concept worked well. Given more time, additional representation in other areas of expertise would be provided to the Joint Task Force Commander.

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED] Liaison officers should be provided by component commanders to planning and operating staffs as early as possible.

(4) [REDACTED] The CJTF commander generated frequent voice and hardcopy SITREPS during the hostilities phase. These reports were extremely beneficial, ensured consistency and minimized redundancy.

b. [REDACTED] Operations.

(1) [REDACTED] Tactics.

(a) [REDACTED] The requirement to suppress enemy AAA when conducting airborne operations is emphasized.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) [REDACTED] The significant advantage of a Navy/Marine amphibious force with its self-contained combat power and support capability was again clearly demonstrated.

(2) [REDACTED] Training. There is a need for cross-service training of Army helicopter crews on naval ships.

[REDACTED]

(4) [REDACTED] Maps/Charts. The charts and maps available for this operation were inadequate and inaccurate. Confusion resulted from a variety of maps and grid systems used by the assault forces. Better coverage of potential contingency areas [REDACTED] must be obtained on a priority basis. Early notification of Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) is also essential to ensure that timely support is provided.

(5) [REDACTED] Reconnaissance. URGENT FURY operations highlighted the need to increase our capabilities and assets in this area.

[REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED] Planning: Planning for URGENT FURY followed the Crisis Action Procedures specified in JOPS Vol. IV. These procedures proved adequate for the situation, but, of necessity, the actual planning time was drastically compressed. As a result, a number of participants became involved late in the planning process.


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Additional planning observations included:



(1) [REDACTED] The need for qualified liaison officers at the supported commander's headquarters early in the planning process. Their presence at USCINCLANT HQ was indispensable in the planning and execution of URGENT FURY.

(2) [REDACTED] CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT should be permanently activated for planning and operations to enhance the interface between the CINC and the component commanders.




(4) [REDACTED] Requirements to support Grenadian refugees were not anticipated.


(5) [REDACTED] The requirements for POW handling and processing, and the handling of captured material were not initially addressed in sufficient detail.

(6) [REDACTED] The Rules of Engagement (ROE) for URGENT FURY gave the operational commander the flexibility to employ his forces within the constraints of "minimum damage" and "force necessary" to accomplish the mission.


d.



(1)



(2)



(3)



[REDACTED]

(4) [REDACTED]

(5) [REDACTED] Replace the AN/PRC-77 with a lighter weight radio more suitable for back-pack operations.

(6) [REDACTED]

(7) [REDACTED] Procure additional Super High Frequency (SHF)/Ground Mobile force (GMF) satellite terminals.

(8) [REDACTED] Continue to use the joint exercise program to identify interoperability problems and material shortfalls. Highlight the artificialities required to conduct exercises, and require post-exercise reporting on interoperability issues among participating forces.

e. Logistics.

(1) [REDACTED] Simplify the Joint Deployment System (JDS) procedures in order to handle short fused and close hold/compartmented operations.

(2) [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] importance of the airfield facility at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, PR was vividly demonstrated, particularly in view of the present instability in the Caribbean region. [REDACTED] airfields may not be readily available for similar future operations elsewhere. Access to Roosevelt Roads remains a [REDACTED] requirement.

(3) [REDACTED] The need for long-range VOD and COD capability to support naval forces operating at sea was again demonstrated.

f. Medical. Medical support provided during this operation suffered from the short timeframe available from planning to execution. Command and unit interface procedures for regulation and control of inter/intra-theater patient flow were never established.

g. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] Security Assistance / Disaster Relief / Civil Affairs.

(1) [REDACTED] Early introduction of a Public Health Team is required to resolve public health questions.

(2) [REDACTED] Captured Material Exploitation Center (CMEC) packets should be included in command contingency plans.

(3) [REDACTED] Early deployment of a Disaster Area Survey Team (DAST) with DOD/DOS interface is a requirement.

(4) [REDACTED] In addition, the approval process of the Security Assistance program should be streamlined.

j. [REDACTED] Public Affairs. Handling of the media prior to and during the early stages of the operation drew heavy criticism from the press. The absolute need to maintain the greatest element of surprise in executing the mission to ensure minimum danger to U.S. hostages on the island and to the servicemen involved in the initial assault dictated that the press be restricted until the initial objectives had been secured. The rescue of the hostages was completed on the second day and the island was then opened to the press. Thus, media participation in the operation was restricted initially based on the military assessment of the importance that the element of surprise played in the successful execution of the mission and the consideration for the lives of both hostages and servicemen involved in the operation. Exclusion of the press did not reflect a conscious decision at this level.

[REDACTED]

OPERATION URGENT FURY

CHRONOLOGY

INITIAL PLANNING. (13-21 October 1983)

13 Oct:

- Maurice BISHOP, Prime Minister of Grenada, overthrown and placed under house arrest.

14 Oct:

- JCS "what if" phone call to USCINCLANT J3 requesting possible options for show of force/presence operations in the vicinity of Grenada and possible non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).

18 Oct:

- USCINCLANT crisis action team activated. Continued developing courses of action.

19 Oct:

- Prime Minister BISHOP killed.

20 Oct:

- JCS Warning Order for non-combatant evacuation operations.
- USCINCLANT Commander's Estimate submitted [REDACTED]
- CJCS briefed at USCINCLANT headquarters on Commander's Estimate.
- USCINCLANT directed USS INDEPENDENCE CVBG and the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG 1-84), which were underway in the Atlantic enroute to the Mediterranean, to close Grenada.

21 Oct:

- [REDACTED] planners participated in preliminary discussions and planning conference at USCINCLANT headquarters.
- [REDACTED]

Enclosure (2)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FINAL PLANNING: (22-24 October 1983).

22 Oct:

- Planners [REDACTED] conducted planning conference at USCINCLANT Headquarters to develop detailed concept of operations.

[REDACTED]

- JCS issued Execute Order for Operation URGENT FURY.

23 Oct:

- Admiral MCDONALD, USCINCLANT, briefed the concept of operations to the JCS in Washington and received approval.
- CJTF [REDACTED] activated.
- USCINCLANT OPORDER for URGENT FURY issued.
- E3A and F-15 aircraft deployed to Roosevelt Roads PR to detect and deter any Cuban aircraft flights transitting from Cuba to Grenada.

24 Oct:

- CJTF [REDACTED] conducted planning conference with component commanders and representatives from CIA and the Department of State at USCINCLANT headquarters. (Note: The Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the Commander of the Landing Force (CLF) did not attend as they were already at sea enroute to the area.)
- CJTF [REDACTED] departed Norfolk for the area of operations and embarked in USS GUAM, flagship for CJTF [REDACTED] and CATF.
- Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF) staged in Barbados.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- JCS amended the Execute Order to include the CPF in the operation and the requirement to assist in the restoration of a democratic government on Grenada.

EXECUTION. (25 October - 03 November 1983).

25 Oct:

- [REDACTED] forces, staging from bases in CONUS, conducted an airborne assault on the Point Salines airfield at dawn. Determined enemy resistance included anti-aircraft and ground fire. AC-130 aircraft provided air support to the engaged forces and ABCCC aircraft provided command and control requirements [REDACTED].
  - [REDACTED] forces secured Point Salines airfield in a timely manner and allowed follow-on airland operations by C-130 aircraft.
  - [REDACTED] Forces conducted simultaneous operations to seize Radio Free Grenada, the Governor's residence to secure Governor General SCOON, and Richmond Hill Prison to secure political prisoners. None of these missions were accomplished as the relatively lightly armed forces met significant and determined enemy resistance.
  - At 0530, simultaneous with the [REDACTED] assault at Point Salines, TF [REDACTED] conducted amphibious assault operations at Pearls airfield and Grenville in northern Grenada. Enemy resistance was encountered, but both objectives were quickly secured. Air elements of TF [REDACTED] supported operations at the Governor General's residence with COBRA gunships.
  - The CPF arrived in Grenada at 1100.
  - [REDACTED] forces secured the True Blue campus of the Medical College and released 130 U.S. citizens. The presence of additional U.S. citizens at the Grand Anse Campus of the medical college was identified late in the day.
  - At 1400, 82D (TF [REDACTED] forces began airland insertion at Point Salines airfield.
  - At 1900 local, TF [REDACTED] conducted a surface amphibious assault at Grand Mal beach in southern Grenada to assist TF [REDACTED] and TF [REDACTED].
- [REDACTED]

- 
- By the end of the day, 250 Cubans had been captured and were assembled at Point Salines airfield with several hundred Grenadian refugees.

26 Oct:

- TF [redacted] consolidated at Point Salines airfield and commenced operations in Morne Rouse area, meeting heavy resistance.
- TF [redacted] conducted a dawn air amphibious assault to link-up with the Marine surface assault units at Grand Mal and conduct operations at the Governor's residence and Fort Frederick.
- Later in the afternoon, TF [redacted] and [redacted] conducted operations to rescue the U.S. citizens at the Grand Anse campus.

27 Oct:

- TF [redacted] conducted operations to secure the Police Academy Center at Grand Anse and the Calivigny Military Barracks complex, the latter being supported by naval gunfire and close air support from the INDEPENDENCE CVBG.
- TF [redacted] conducted operations against Fort Adolphus, Fort Lucas and Richmond Hill Prison. One company of TF [redacted] Marines secured the Mt. Horne Agricultural station near Pearls airfield.

28 Oct:

- TF [redacted] conducted operations on Lance Aux Epines peninsula to ensure the safety of 202 U.S. citizens and then linked up with TF [redacted] at Ross Point Hotel near St. Georges.
- CPF began taking up security positions in St. Georges.

29 Oct:

- TF [redacted] conducted reconnaissance in force at Richmond Hill, Mt Hartman Estate and Egmont peninsula. No resistance encountered; considerable equipment and ammunition recovered.
- 

- [REDACTED]
- CPF shared security responsibilities at Pearls airfield with TF [REDACTED].

30 Oct:

- TF [REDACTED] conducted operations at Jeudy with no resistance.
- TF [REDACTED] conducted operations at Gouyave, Victoria and Sauteurs, encountering no resistance.
- CPF consolidated positions at St. Georges and Pearls airfield.

31 Oct:

- TF [REDACTED] assumed responsibility of Pearls airfield and conducted operations at the Grand Etang Camp, meeting no resistance.
- TF [REDACTED] backloaded onto amphibious ships.

01 Nov:

- TF [REDACTED] conducted search operations for enemy units, logistic bases, while continuing to provide security for Cuban detainees and Grenadian refugees.
- TF [REDACTED] conducted an amphibious operation on Carriacou island and met no resistance. Large stores of weapons and ammunition were found; 17 Grenadians taken prisoner. All military objectives were secured.

02 Nov:

- TF [REDACTED] continued operations on Grenada and relieved TF [REDACTED] forces on Carriacou Island.
- TF [REDACTED] chopped to COMSECONDFLT and resumed transit to the Mediterranean.
- Hostilities declared at an end.

03 Nov:

- CJTF [REDACTED] disestablished.
  - CTF [REDACTED] assumed operational control of all U.S. forces in Grenada as COMUSFORGRENADA.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

04 Nov-15 Dec:

- USFORGRENADA conducted peacekeeping duties throughout Grenada. These efforts included security of key facilities, search and patrol operations, and redeployment of combat forces and combat support forces as the situation stabilized.
- COMSECONDFLT conducted surveillance operations off the coast of Grenada to prevent infiltration of unauthorized forces.

04 Nov:

- Commenced repatriation of Cuban prisoners.

05 Nov:

- Personnel from the Soviet Embassy evacuated from Grenada.

06 Nov:

- E3A and F-15 operations from Roosevelt Roads PR terminated; TF [REDACTED] shifted operations to Barbados.

07 Nov:

- Pearls airfield reopened to commercial traffic.

08 Nov:

- Completed repatriation of Cuban prisoners.

13 Nov:

- 41 suspected Cuban bodies transported to Cuba.

15 Nov:

- Detention facility at Point Salines closed. All Grenadian detainees transferred to Richmond Hill Prison in custody of Grenadian authorities.
  - Governor General SCOON installed an interim government on Grenada.
- [REDACTED]



23 Nov:

- TF  disestablished.

08 Dec:

- U.S. Coast Guard assumed surveillance responsibilities for waters in the vicinity of Grenada.

15 Dec:

- COMUSFORCARIB assumed operational control of remaining U.S. Forces in Grenada from COMUSFORGRENADA.



OPERATION URGENT FURY

LESSONS LEARNED

COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND  
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511



Enclosure (3)

[REDACTED]

OPERATION URGENT FURY  
LESSONS LEARNED

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECTION I

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Force Composition

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: CJTF Battle Staff.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: A 17 man CJTF [REDACTED] Fly-Away Staff was selected from COMSECONDFLT staff to provide specific functional capabilities for the URGENT FURY operation. Navy/Marine/Air Force personnel were augmented by an Army Major General (CG 24 Inf Div) and representatives from State Department, CIA, CTF [REDACTED]. The Major General was appointed Deputy CJTF [REDACTED]. The CTF [REDACTED] and CTF [REDACTED] reps provided timely coordination with an on-scene working knowledge of their parent organizations as well as the ability to communicate (the only source) with the respective headquarters. The CTF [REDACTED] rep was assigned from the Military Airlift Command (MAC) and as a result of his expertise, the airlift operations were virtually automatic. However, the need for an Air Force and Army tactical air liaison on the scene with CJTF [REDACTED] is a valuable lesson to be learned for future operations. The State Department Representative provided meaningful insight and counsel on the local as well as the political situations. Such proved to be invaluable and critical to tactical decisions.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That similar augmentation must be made to any relatively small JTF fly away staff in operations similar to URGENT FURY. More key staff personnel would be necessary to sustain longer operations.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY. COMSECONDFLT.



2. **ITEM:** Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF).

a. **COMMENTS:** Initially, the role and composition of the CPF was not clear. During preliminary and final planning, the control of the CPF was not coordinated with CJTF and created early confusion on the planning for inserting the CPF. Once missions and locations were assigned and liaison effected, the hard problems dissolved. CJTF recommended that the CPF be placed in direct support of the Governor General. This was received by the CPF in a positive manner.

b. **RECOMMENDATION:** That close liaison must be maintained with the Task Force Commander when additional forces are being coordinated by another commander.

c. **COGNIZANT ACTIVITY.** USCINCLANT, JCS.



[REDACTED]

Reports / Reporting

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: CJTF Reporting.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Reporting requirements were reviewed early on in anticipation of a high tempo operation and the need for critical real time information.

(1) [REDACTED] Command Circuit - A prominent command "speak with authority" voice circuit was established early on the command circuit. Its purpose was to provide commanders with consistent timely updates, an avenue for issuing directions, and the availability of requesting assistance in a steady informed manner. Specifically, it established command identity during hot tactical situations.

(2) [REDACTED] Essential Event Narrative SITREPS - An officer was assigned the specific responsibility of producing "as occurring" narrative SITREPS to keep higher authority informed.

(3) [REDACTED] A tactical decision team, consisting of the Deputy, Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Fleet Marine Officer, and Intelligence Officer was present to review, plan, and recommend courses of action.

(4) [REDACTED] Force Commander Conferences were held each day and daily Force Intentions were directed to subordinate Commanders for the following day's operations.

(5) [REDACTED] Constant dialog was maintained with USCINCLANT and key staff members to anticipate new plans and requirements. Additionally, USCINCLANT Staff minimized the growing petition of admin requirements on the tactical net. Even so, the need for continuous updated ship positions in a relatively confined area overburdened this command circuit at times.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That a single combined situation report, provided by the CJTF Commander, be established to provide a "single source" view of operations. These SITREPS should be frequent and generally brief. Imposition of specific or formatted messages unnecessarily complicates and delays combat reporting and formatted messages should not be required, particularly in the early stages of an operation.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]



SECTION II


OPERATIONS

Coordination


1.  ITEM: Airspace management lacked coordination.

a.  COMMENTS: Air assets, provided from a variety of sources, each performing several missions, were not always properly coordinated. This created a number of problems which, while surmountable under the circumstances, could have proven more serious in the face of hostile air. These problems included:


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
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(3)



(4)



b.  RECOMMENDATION: That coordinated airspace management procedures be fully established in the planning phase and if that is not possible, the size of the operation must be reduced.

c.  COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.





2. ITEM: USCINCLANT/JCS [REDACTED] Teams in Grenada.

a. COMMENTS: Several USCINCLANT/JCS [REDACTED] teams (i.e., Security Assistance Control Team (SACT)) were on Grenada without establishing coordinated liaison with COMUSFOR Grenada. They lacked sufficient personal combat equipment and transportation to sustain their operations.

b. RECOMMENDATION:

(1) [REDACTED] CDR, USFORCES be notified prior to deployment of all country teams.

(2) [REDACTED] Country teams immediately establish and maintain liaison with COMUSFOR.

(3) [REDACTED] Country teams be properly equipped with individual combat equipment and self-sustaining in transportation requirements.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: JCS, USCINCLANT.





Tactics

1.  ITEM: Helicopter Operations.

a.  COMMENTS: Helicopters are highly vulnerable to well-aimed ground fire, including unsophisticated AAA. Rules of Engagement and concern for civilian casualties resulted in minimum suppression of enemy AAA. Without the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), the risk is unacceptable.

b.  RECOMMENDATION: That training exercises continue to emphasize that suppression of enemy AAA is an absolute necessity for the effective conduct of helicopter operations.

c.  COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: JCS, USCINCLANT, CINCARLANT.

[REDACTED]

Training

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Laws of Land Warfare.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: There is need to improve the quality of laws of land warfare training. Particular emphasis should be placed on the protection of private property. Uncertainties regarding disposition of public property (whether belonging to host country government or combatant/enemy force) should be clarified. Procedures for requisitioning vehicles, private homes, etc. should be established and widely publicized. Prior to deployment, U.S. forces receive specific guidance on the laws of land warfare. This training should include, but not be limited to, field application of provisions of the GENEVA and HAGUE Conventions as they apply to recognition, usage, protection, and ultimate disposition of property.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That U.S. forces receive specific indoctrination and training in the laws of land warfare.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: CINCARLANT.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] ITEM: MEDEVAC Aircrew Training.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: MEDEVAC operations at night became a great concern because Blackhawk pilots had not been trained to land on sea borne helicopter platforms and were denied permission to land. This reduced the number of MEDEVAC helicopters that could bring wounded personnel to the USS GUAM, the primary medical facility for the operation.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That U.S. Army MEDEVAC aircrews receive night shipboard landing qualification training. (Note: Waiver of qualification should be considered in life-saving situations.)

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, CINCARLANT.

[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] ITEM: Forward Air Controller (FAC)/Close Air Support (CAS) Joint Interoperability.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Tactical Air Close Air Support capabilities were not fully understood by all Forward Air Controllers.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: Liaison officers be exchanged between all air components. All USAF FAC's should be familiar with Navy CAS platforms and capabilities. Joint exercises should include this training as part of the Schedule of Events.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

5. ITEM: Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).

a. COMMENT: Evacuee locating information was not available except that they were generally located in the St. Georges area. During execution of the operation, interviews with the first evacuees provided location information for other potential evacuees. Considerable problems with locating and protecting evacuees in urban environments were forestalled by the resourceful performance of U.S. forces in the initial assault. An expansion of NEO play in joint exercises to include planning problems, locating evacuees in situations approximating reality (rather than beginning NEO exercises with the evacuees pre-assembled in convenient locations), and accounting for evacuees based on incomplete information will improve the effectiveness of the exercise.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That NEO play in joint exercises be expanded to provide realistic training scenarios.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Amphibious Task Force Operations.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: URGENT FURY clearly demonstrated the flexibility and sustainability of naval (Navy/Marine) forces in combat operations. The force used in URGENT FURY was particularly successful due in large part to their combat readiness. This force was enroute to a Mediterranean deployment for which it had undergone significant preparations. The availability of such a combat ready force is not routinely the case [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: Increase the number of Atlantic Fleet amphibious ships to provide the capability for maintenance of an Atlantic Amphibious Ready Group.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: CNO, SECNAV, SECDEF.



Maps / Charts

1.  ITEM: Map Coverage and Conflicting Grid Systems.

a.  COMMENTS: During URGENT FURY, as many as four different grid systems on three different maps were being used by operational forces. The confusion caused by these multiple grids was considerable.

b.  RECOMMENDATION: That the senior command closely monitor maps produced and issue guidance to the field on maps/grids authorized for use. That subordinate commands having map reproduction capabilities coordinate all mapping efforts with USCINCLANT. Early notification of DMA is required in order to develop the best possible map coverage.

c.  COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: USCINCLANT, DMA, CINCARLANT, CG FMFLANT.

[REDACTED]

SECTION III

PLANNING

Involvement

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Liaison officer augmentation to supported commander staff.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: That USCINCLANT was able to put this operation together within a significantly compressed time period was due in large part to the superb performance of a number of liaison officers dispatched to USCINCLANT Headquarters by supporting commands.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That supporting commands dispatch liaison officers to the headquarters of the supported commander as early as possible in the planning process. Additionally, liaison officers from component commands should be provided to the Joint Task Force staff. The receiving command should be prepared to arrange for transportation, billeting and office space for these liaison officers. Liaison officers should be familiar with the supporting staff command organization and operational procedures.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] ITEM: Activation of CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT were activated for operations at the beginning of the operation. Once activated, both staffs responded with liaison officers in support of the operation:

[REDACTED]

Staff liaison at the operational level was greatly improved during URGENT FURY operations.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT be permanently activated for operations and planning.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: JCS.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] ITEM: URGENT FURY Planning.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: CJTF [REDACTED] was activated at 0800Q 23 Oct for a D-day at 0500Q 25 Oct. There were 45 hours from activation to the initial assault. [REDACTED]

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

(4) [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That early involvement by the commander tasked to perform the mission be accomplished to ensure maximum opportunity to cover essentials necessary to get the job done. Mutual capabilities among other services involved in a joint exercise must be adequately provided.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Considerations

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: The mission and capabilities of USMC Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Command (ANGLICO) Detachments deployed with 82nd Airborne Division, as directed by USCINCLANT, was unclear to USAF elements of the Division's Fire Support System.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: The purpose of attaching ANGLICO elements to the 82nd Airborne Division was to provide the Division with Navy/Marine Corps personnel and communications equipment necessary to request/control naval gunfire and naval close air support. While attached to Army units, ANGLICO teams become part of the Division's fire support system.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: Review joint agreements and doctrine to ensure that roles, responsibilities and chains of command are clearly understood.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: CINCAFLANT, CINCARLANT.

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] ITEM: Divisional combat units need to be accompanied by a CORPS support package to be inserted immediately at the start of hostilities or overseas operations.

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That the essential elements of a Staff support package (logistics, intelligence, public affairs, medical, prisoner affairs) be introduced into the area of operations as soon as possible after hostilities commence.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

3. ITEM: AC-130 Operation.

a. COMMENTS: The AC-130 was an effective Close Air Support weapon; it played a significant role in reducing the effectiveness of enemy AAA positions during the initial airborne assault. The accuracy of the weapons systems reduced collateral damage throughout the island operations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

Procedures

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: JOPS Vol IV Crisis Action System (CAS)/Joint Deployment System (JDS).

[REDACTED]

(SAAM) management procedures had to be refined as the operation progressed. MAC's airlift support using SAAM procedures was superb. [REDACTED] procedures were used to minimize airlift requirements and respond immediately.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That the effectiveness of the Crisis Action and Joint Deployment System procedures be reviewed and tailored to meet contingencies with which we frequently deal.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: JCS, JDA.

[REDACTED]

Prisoners of War (POW)

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: 82nd Combat Engineers were tasked to construct a POW Camp that would meet medical, sanitary, and security standards.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: The materials needed to construct the camp were acquired from numerous locations and units in the area. Completion took several days due to the lack of readily available equipment, causing a delay in moving the Detainees to an acceptable facility. Personnel and logistics support were drawn from combat forces.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That a prepackaged POW Camp including authorized tentage, light sets, barbed wire, communications equipment, showers, sleeping pads, scaffolding for towers, isolation booths, portable latrines, food stockage, clothing, medical supplies, hygiene items be available for all military operations. Package should also contain governing directives and standard forms for collection of required information.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: CINCARLANT.

2. [REDACTED] ITEM: POW's.

[REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That prisoners be evacuated from the combat area and placed under the control of trained organizations [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: JCS, USCINCLANT, CINCARLANT.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] ITEM: Intelligence exploitation of captured material.

[REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that operational planning includes provision for early introduction of large numbers of intelligence personnel to handle exploitation of captured material. Further, ensure that adequate intelligence management arrangements are made to preclude these details from adversely impacting tactical intelligence support to combat forces.

d. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, JCS.



4. ITEM: Use of U.S. Army combat forces for peacekeeping duties.

a. COMMENTS: Use of combat forces for personnel, residence and vehicle searches is inappropriate. Aggressiveness of combat forces, coupled with lack of civil police training make their use inappropriate for peacekeeping/stability operations. In this case, MP's should have been introduced into Grenada earlier.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That military police or similarly trained personnel be used in peacekeeping missions to the maximum extent possible.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.



[REDACTED]

SECTION IV  
COMMUNICATIONS

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Communications Equipment.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Equipment problems were encountered during URGENT FURY operations which require action by higher headquarters and service activities. Problems reported included the following:

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED] Satellite-capable AN/WSC-3 radios were in short supply. The requirement to equip units with the capability to guard more than one satellite command net necessitated crossdecking of assets.

(4) [REDACTED]

(5) [REDACTED]

(6) [REDACTED]



4. ITEM: Communications for Command and Control.



(1)



(2)




b. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That deploying units provide a communications representative to Joint conferences; that units deploy with sufficient equipment to communicate with external commands; and the units include communications requirements in predeployment planning.


(2) That record communications services be managed by some command other than the in-country combat commander, unless management, maintenance and operator personnel are provided for this specific purpose.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: XVIII Airborne Corps.





8. **[REDACTED]** ITEM: Joint Communications Planning.



b. **[REDACTED]** RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) **[REDACTED]** Continue to coordinate and rehearse the CJTF **[REDACTED]** COMMO Plan during joint exercises. (CJTF **[REDACTED]** USCINCLANT N6)

(2) **[REDACTED]** Add a billet to the USCINCLANT (N6) Division for a Joint Communications Planner who would deploy to the appropriate JTF headquarters. (JCS, USCINCLANT J0126, N6)

c. **[REDACTED]** COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: As indicated.



[REDACTED]

SECTION V

LOGISTICS

Procedures

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Area Clearance.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Numerous personnel/groups staged through Barbados and/or arrived at Point Salines Airfield unexpectedly and without prior coordination. While these supporting personnel were necessary, they all too often arrived without proper equipment, and invariably required assistance for food, lodging, transportation, etc. As a result, they created an administrative burden which added to the already considerable rear echelon support requirements.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: Establish area clearance and entry procedures in operations orders to preclude various support problems. CJTF should initially provide this function, with responsibility delegated to USFORCOUNTRY as soon as feasible.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

2. ITEM: Logistics Control.

a. [REDACTED]

b. RECOMMENDATION: That timely and simplified JDS procedures be developed for short fuse crises, and procedures developed to handle close hold/compartmented operations. (See Item 1, Section III, Procedures, page III-8).

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: JCS, JDA, USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

3. ITEM: Like Item Turn-over.

a. COMMENTS: At times, units were arriving in the Area of Operations (AO), while other units were departing from the area with the same type vehicles, equipment, etc. A scheme to allow certain equipment owned by redeploying units to be turned-over to deploying units would save transportation dollars and conserve limited airlift assets.


b. RECOMMENDATION: That an investigation into the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a means for accountable turn-over of like equipment between deployers and redeployers be conducted.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: HQ DA.



4. ITEM: Requests for MAC Airlift.

a. COMMENTS: The operation began with 82nd Airborne requesting airlift directly from HQ MAC with the validation being concurrently provided by USCINCLANT. Upon cessation of hostilities, USCINCLANT terminated this and returned SAAM validation authority to component service commands. For Army Rapid Reaction and Emergency SAAMs, this required submission of hard copy message requests through FORSCOM (CINCARLANT) to MTMC for passengers and DARCOM for cargo to obtain validation. Since Army procedures do not permit Rapid Reaction or Emergency SAAMs to be validated by CINCARLANT, this caused delays in SAAM submissions to HQ MAC and confusion during the initial shift from USCINCLANT validation to service component validation.



b. RECOMMENDATION: That Army validation procedures for Rapid Reaction and Emergency SAAMs be modified to allow CINCARLANT validation after SAAM validation authority is transferred to service component commands.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: HQ DA, HQ MAC, CINCARLANT.



[REDACTED]

5. ITEM: Validation of Airlift Requirements.

a. COMMENTS: JCS PUBS 2 and 15 and JOPS VOL IV provide guidance on supported CINC interest in airlift requirements definition and validation. During URGENT FURY, several units requested airlift directly to HQ MAC, 21AF, or MAC units without going through the supported CINC airlift validators. Furthermore, some requests were incomplete or identified airframe requirements rather than cargo and passengers to be moved. While such requests were eventually properly rerouted and coordinated, the confusion caused additional time delays and contributed to the saturation of limited secure communications. The supported CINC must maintain coordination of airlift activities to ensure that airlift capability is applied to properly support the CINC's concept of operations.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That the CINC's airlift validator must be involved in early stages of planning and deploying units must route airlift requests through proper channels for validation and prioritization.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT, CINCARLANT, CINCAFLANT.

[REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED] ITEM: MAC Augmentation to Supported Commander Battle Staff.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: The close and continuous coordination of airlift requirements with the Military Airlift Command was feasible only with the augmented presence of MAC personnel on the USCINCLANT Battle Staff. The necessity to submit, validate and prioritize hundreds of competing airlift requests on an around-the-clock basis in the early stages of contingency operations made the MAC augmentation group invaluable to the critical, time-sensitive airlift flow. MAC personnel augmentation to the supported Commander's Battle Staff is a requirement in the proper execution of airlift flow in any "no-plan" contingency operation.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That the MAC augmentation personnel report expeditiously to the supported commander's battle staff in any "no-plan" contingency operation.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, HQ MAC.

[REDACTED]

Facilities

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Base Support/Logistics.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: All AFLANT units were impressed by the base support provided by NAS Key West, NAS Roosevelt Rds PR and NAVFAC Antigua. Bare base concepts were used to support units operating from Barbados and Point Salines, Grenada. Coordination problems were encountered with the deployment, operation, and maintenance of runway lights and VASI system at Point Salines. The initial care and feeding of the personnel who deployed with these systems was also a problem.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That a long range plan be developed for air bases in the Caribbean basin to support joint contingency operations in that area. AFLANT and ARLANT review low intensity scenarios to ensure base service support is available to small sister service teams operating without organic support.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, CINCAFLANT, CINCARLANT.

[REDACTED]

2. ITEM: Establishment of an airhead and USN Logistic Detachment (LOGDET).

a. COMMENTS:

(1) [REDACTED] Secure voice communications did not exist between the USN LOGDET at Barbados and the operating fleet units, making it difficult to determine exact requirements and priorities.

(2) [REDACTED] No official naval message terminal was available to the LOGDET to keep them abreast of requirements and tasking, or for them to relay their own status and requirements.

(3) [REDACTED] There were no storage facilities at Barbados for the storing and protection of incoming material/equip and outgoing retrograde. An open ramp was used which created aircraft ground traffic, security and environmental problems.

(4) [REDACTED] The availability of Material Handling Equipment (MHE), primarily forklifts, was very limited at Barbados. There was no MHE organic to the LOGDET and the civilian airline forklift was shared to assist the DET. This arrangement was inadequate and not dependable.

b. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) [REDACTED] That airhead planning in support of contingency operations include the following:

(a) Communicators and security personnel in the LOGDET structure.

(b) Secure voice communications with the operating units, and the capability to receive and transmit official naval messages.

(c) Portable/prefab storage facilities for the LOGDET.

(d) While not a problem during URGENT FURY, portable, temporary storage capability for fuel should be included in contingency planning.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: CINCLANTFLT, COMNAVAIRLANT.

[REDACTED]

3. ITEM: Logistic Support at Roosevelt Roads.

a. COMMENTS: If an increased tempo of operations in the Caribbean is to be sustained, Roosevelt Roads will have to provide supply and refueling support for around the clock, short notice operations. Aircraft/ship refuelings compete for civilian and military resources after normal working hours and repair parts support is minimal.

b. RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that contingency planning includes manning for refueling after hours in Roosevelt Roads during Caribbean operations. Provide direct and rapid repair parts support for ships operating in the Caribbean from NSC Norfolk and increase repair part supplies common items in Roosevelt Roads.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, COMNAVFORCARIB, COMNAVAIRLANT, COMNAVSURFLANT.

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] ITEM: Reception Capability.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Planners must be cognizant of airlift flow constraints. In the case of Grenada, the major constraint was reception capability at Point Salines airfield. Indications are that the unrestricted airlift flow from Pope AFB caused considerable backlogs and confusion because of the restricted reception capability at Grenada. As aircraft and troops formed a queue at Pope AFB, considerable resources were poorly utilized.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That Logistics planners design airlift flows so as not to exceed the limiting constraint.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, HQ MAC, CINCARLANT.

[REDACTED]

Personnel Reports / Reporting

. [REDACTED] ITEM: Personnel Status Reports were not routed from the area of operation to XVIII Airborne Corps or ARLANT (FORSCOM).

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Personnel reports were not forwarded to XVIII Airborne Corps or ARLANT until Headquarters, U.S. Forces RENADA was established. This left home stations and supporting bases of deployed forces without knowledge of personnel needs in the area of operation. Once personnel reports arrived at XVIII Airborne Corps and were subsequently forwarded to ARLANT, a dual reporting system was created. Reports to XVIII Airborne Corps were forwarded IAW Field Standard Operating Procedures (FSOP). Reports to USCINCLANT were not standardized, thus figures were not synchronized. ARLANT information requests varied daily and often concerned battalion or company strength figures reflecting attempts to micro-manage personnel statistics.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That standardized personnel reporting requirements and dissemination procedures for joint operations be developed.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, INCARLANT.

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] ITEM. Casualty Reporting/Casualty Figures.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Accurate assessment of enemy casualty figures is virtually impossible in early stages of combat operations and counts should be considered preliminary until operations have stabilized ashore. Requests for accurate casualty data from JCS, U.S. Embassy personnel and the press could not be honored until 10 NOV 83, eight days after official end of hostilities. While emphasis on such figures is understood, the considerable effort required and the secure circuit time consumed to provide this preliminary data dictate that such requests be minimized. Additionally, formal procedures and guidance for reporting preliminary reports and figures need to be promulgated to all in the supported CINC's initial operations order and only one source, the supported CINC, should disseminate reported data to all concerned.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: CINCs review casualty reporting procedures. To maximum extent feasible, defer casualty counting until the operational situation permits accurate compilation. Any preliminary reporting should be consolidated by supported CINC as a single source document and disseminated in a timely manner to all concerned.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: JCS, USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

Personnel Augmentation

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Replacement regulating detachments were not used.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Replacements for forces deployed in a contingency such as operation URGENT FURY could be handled easily by direct requests from deployed units to home stations. Aircraft were plentiful and casualties were such that they could be absorbed without activating a massive replacement operation. One function that would be provided by a replacement regulating detachment would be an accurate count of arriving and departing troops by unit. This function was not accomplished until elements of the 1st COSCOM arrived to supplement the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group operations.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That an airfield liaison team from a replacement regulating detachment be attached to the A/DACG to provide personnel accounting capabilities in reduced scope operations such as URGENT FURY.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] ITEM: Airfield Security.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Base and airfield security requirements increased significantly during operation URGENT FURY. NAVSTA Roosevelt Roads was capable of providing continued enhanced base security, and enhanced security for the aircraft was provided by an augmentation of trained Air Police. Such augmentation is essential for adequate security of deployed aircraft.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: Air Police augmentation be provided for any future operations or exercises at forward staging bases.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT, CINCAFLANT, HQ MAC.

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] ITEM: Transportation Funding.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Transportation funding lessons learned are just now beginning to surface. The need to fly missions without delays for funding considerations with the anticipation that funding reconciliation will follow was paramount to success. However, after the fact determination of which service will fund which SAAM flights, especially in light of nonexistent USCINCLANT transportation funds, will present reconciliation/ funding assignment problems for months. To further complicate funding, SAAMs used by the Peace Keeping Force, State Department, CIA, and other agencies will make assigning a funding responsibility to a particular service more difficult.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That transportation expenditures be referred to the SECDEF level for equitable distribution throughout the services and other using agencies, (i.e. SECSTATE, CIA, etc.).

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: JCS

[REDACTED]

SECTION VI

MEDICAL

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: MEDEVAC Coordination.

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That AIREVAC liaison procedures be promulgated via hard-copy message to ALCON prior to the immediate need for such flights. In addition, the Primary Casualty Receiving Ship should designate a single point of contact to coordinate AIREVACS with the Air Force representative. OPREP 1 should include planning/guidance to accomplish this coordination.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, HQ MAC.

[REDACTED]

. ITEM: There was no readily available MEDEVAC capability for EPWs/Detainees.

a. COMMENTS: On several occasions, the Red Cross and the Cubans relayed the need for immediate evacuation of the EPWs/Detainees to a capable medical facility.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That procedures (to include communications) for handling urgent MEDEVAC of EPWs/Detainees be developed and promulgated as early as feasible.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, HQ MAC, INCARLANT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] ITEM: Graves Registration Unit.

a. [REDACTED]

b. (U) RECOMMENDATION: OORDER should include Army Graves Registration Unit as a supporting force and set forth procedures for activation.

c. (U) COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

SECTION VII

INTELLIGENCE [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Basic Intelligence (Ashore).

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Available basic intelligence was generally adequate for overall planning purposes. Estimates of Grenadian personnel and equipment strengths were sufficiently accurate, and estimated number of Cuban personnel was within an acceptable range of uncertainty. Although time was required to fully generate all available intelligence material for ashore planning (e.g., photography and pertinent studies), delivery times were acceptable. [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, JCS.

[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] ITEM: Non-Combatant Evacuation Order (NEO) Related Intelligence.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: NEO related intelligence was inadequate as rescue operations began. The three separate locations of the medical students were not known to military planners at the start of URGENT FURY. NEO type information is critical to both the intelligence and operations planners.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: Update Neo-type data on a priority basis, especially in areas which are potential trouble spots.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: State Department, CIA, DIA, USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

SECTION VIII

PSYOPS

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Air Movement Flow.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: The air flow of PSYOP assets was uncoordinated during the majority of URGENT FURY. Although USCINCLANT directed PSYOP assets be moved to the area of operations immediately, they remained at the point of departure for approximately 72 hours awaiting aircraft assignment.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That priority of movement for PSYOP assets be closely coordinated between requesting and receiving commands.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, CINCARLANT.

[REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] ITEM: Command and Control of PSYOP (Initial Planning Stage).

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: For quick contingencies with a short planning period, there is a need for a Crisis Planning Team comprised from the staff of the supported CINC and augmented by the [REDACTED]. This team must be capable of addressing the full spectrum of PSYOP activities.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That the supported CINC be augmented by a liaison team from the [REDACTED] to conduct PSYOP planning on a continuous basis, from beginning to cessation of hostilities.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: Supported CINC.

[REDACTED]

SECTION IX

SECURITY ASSISTANCE / RELIEF / CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Interface between relief agencies and Civil Affairs (CA) Teams.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Problems surfaced such as food, medical supplies, housing, and clothing for Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees (DPRES) that CA teams were unable to control without help from other agencies. CA Teams on the ground were able to handle the problems for short periods of time only.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That agencies such as the International Red Cross should be linked up with the CA teams in the area upon arrival in-country to facilitate processing of DPRES.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] ITEM: Necessity for Public Health Team.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Many questions were asked about sanitation and other general health areas that personnel from the 96th CA BN did not have the expertise to answer. Public health questions relating to food, waste disposal, water supplies, and housing of DPRE's and POW's could not be answered.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That Public Health Teams or personnel from appropriate medical facilities be deployed and attached to Civil Affairs Teams in the AO to handle such problems.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] ITEM: Units were not familiar with requirements to obtain local national labor.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: The requirements to obtain local national labor are specified in DA Pamphlet 590-89. The provisions of this pamphlet apply to all services. Units arrived in country without appointed labor officers/NCO's, Class A agents, or a thorough understanding of how to employ and pay local, national labors.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That all units involved in contingency planning incorporate requirements to obtain local national labor and contracting officers into their standard operating procedures and have unit personnel trained and appointed to perform this function.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT, CINCARLANT.



4. **ITEM:** Defense Requirements Survey Team (DRST).

a. **COMMENTS:** This team never had a clear mandate to act vis-a-vis the operational or Security Assistance (SA) command chains. A joint DOD/SECSTATE effort, the team entered the theater without notification to military commanders. The work of the team definitely increased the "level of consciousness" at DOD/SECSTATE levels on CPF SA programs, and its final report provided a comprehensive basis for future SA activities. However, the coordination of call-up, mandate to act, and relationships with operational and SA chains of command need to be improved.

b. **RECOMMENDATION:** That a concept for future actions of this type, fully developing the role of DRST, should be addressed.

d. **COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY:** USCINCLANT, JCS.



[REDACTED]

SECTION X  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. [REDACTED] ITEM: Press Briefings.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: A designated press briefer should be available to brief media regarding latest unclassified operational matters.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That an officer familiar with on-going operations be designated to conduct daily briefings.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: CINCLANTFLT, USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] ITEM: Media Flights.

a. [REDACTED] COMMENTS: Control of arriving/departing media was extremely difficult for assigned PAO personnel.

b. [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: That a processing cell should be established to coordinate travel requirements of press members associated with any future military contingency operations.

c. [REDACTED] COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. ITEM: Internal Press Credentials.

a. COMMENTS: Initially, USCINCLANT did not issue press identity cards to accredited/registered journalists. This made accounting for members of the press difficult and took away one control element from personnel on the ground. In future operations, journalists should register and receive an appropriate command unique identification card. This procedure will assist in registering/accounting for members of the media, and be useful during security checks within the area of operations.

b. RECOMMENDATION: That internal press credentials be provided to all media members.

c. COGNIZANT ACTIVITY/AGENCY: USCINCLANT.