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A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION FLOW IN THE JOINT STAFF DURING THE 1962 CUBAN CRISIS

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FOREWORD

This Enclosure is part of a study of command and control processes involved in the Cuban crisis of October 1962. The scope of the entire study is as follows:

Basic Paper

Enclosure A - Historical Analysis of the Substance of Command and Control Actions, Their Circumstances, and Their Implications

Enclosure B - Procedural Analysis of J-3 Command and Control Operations

Enclosure C - Functional Analysis of Command and Control Information Flow in the Joint Staff

Enclosure D - Analysis of Command and Control in the Service War Rooms in Support of Joint Staff Operations

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ENCLOSURE C

A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION FLOW IN THE JOINT STAFF DURING THE 1962 CUBAN CRISIS

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ENCLOSURE C

A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION FLOW IN THE JOINT STAFF DURING THE 1962 CUBAN CRISIS

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS

1. This analysis is a part of a larger examination of command and control aspects of the 1962 Cuban crisis. The overall study also includes historiographic, procedural and organizational analyses. The purpose of the present functional analysis of information flow is to define more clearly: (a) the actual role played by Joint Staff offices; (b) the technical or functional nature of crisis operations; (c) the limitations and constraints on staff office operations; (d) the size and nature of the staffing effort required; and (e) the amount of time and effort expended in fulfilling required functions. This study is not intended to evaluate the adequacy of Joint Staff operations, but is intended to provide information which may be used by the Joint Staff in making their own decisions as to the adequacy of their procedures.

2. This functional analysis also seeks to develop detailed information concerning the nature and characteristics of the Joint Staff functions performed, one major purpose being to allow comparisons in several different types of crisis situations. For this purpose, this study provides lists of the staff functions performed, the information-processing requirements, the transmission and handling time for telegraphic message traffic, and the levels of decision and approval for the staff actions. Similar lists already have been developed for the Dominican Republic crisis of 1961;[1] lists relating

[1] WSEG, "A Functional Analysis of Joint Staff Involvement in the June 1961 Dominican Republic Crisis," 25 September 1962. TOP SECRET.

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to the Laos crisis of 1960 to 1961[1] are in preparation. The purpose of this research is to provide a broader perspective from which the Joint Staff can isolate desirable and undesirable features of its own organization and procedures established to ready the Joint Staff for various kinds of crisis situations.

3. The primary data that have been made available for the functional analysis of the Cuban crisis consist of the Joint Battle Staff (JBS) files: (a) 4,000 telegraphic messages in incoming, outgoing and subject files; (b) daily listings of major actions under consideration and previously taken, recorded in a Master Check List with some supporting comments; (c) miscellaneous Directors' memoranda and working papers; and (d) JCS Cuba "Greens". In addition, records and chronologies which reflect the supporting actions taken by the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been made available by the Services.

4. Records of informal communications -- such as telephone conversations, direct verbal instructions, and informal working papers passed to and from the JBS and other Joint Staff offices -- were not made available for incorporation into this analysis. It must be expected, therefore, that if the details of actions taken by informal means of communication were known, some conclusions drawn from analysis of those formal records which were made available might have to be modified. Furthermore, references in messages filed by the JBS have led to the location of 42 additional pertinent telegraphic messages not contained in the JBS files, indicating that a larger body of message

[1] WSEG, C-I No. 2, Enclosure: "Telegraphic Message Traffic Summary," TOP SECRET.

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traffic than the one researched may exist. It is known that at least a few EXCLUSIVE JCS-In and -Out messages were never released to the JBS or incorporated into the J-3 records.

5. Information flow research has involved analysis of each type of available data to indicate: (a) the purpose of each piece of paper; (b) the subject matter; (c) the type of staff action involved; (d) the office performing each action; (e) the time required for action; and (f) the pattern of coordination, decision, and approval. Abstracts of this information have been integrated into summary tables in order that the findings could be presented in meaningful form. In performing this functional analysis, three aspects of information flow were selected for additional detailed critical review. Supplementary studies of delays in message traffic routing and of Master Check List operations have been made. In addition, an attempt has been made to integrate all types of data developed on the handling of staff actions concerning the subject of Air Defenses. This has been done in order to illustrate how the types of findings developed through functional analysis of information flow can be applied to planning for meeting future Joint Staff crisis requirements.

6. In view of the length of time required to review and classify each piece of paper in the JBS files and the large number of pertinent messages available, detailed analysis of the telegraphic message files has been confined to a sample of approximately 1,600 messages originating between 16 and 28 October 1962. This sample includes all messages filed by the augmented Cuban Watch, beginning on 17 October, and all messages filed during the first week of Joint Battle Staff operations. (The personnel and the files of the

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augmented watch became the nucleus of the Battle Staff when it was activated.)[1] All other available data have been researched through at least this same time period. Where necessary, additional data have been researched through a subsequent time period corresponding to the life of Joint Staff Cuban crisis operations, which terminated on 6 December 1962. These data include total telegraphic traffic counts, actions concerning JCS "Greens", and actions related to Miscellaneous Staff Memoranda.

7. The period analyzed in detail (16 through 28 October) was in many ways the crucial period of Joint Staff Cuban crisis operations. Major procedural and functional problems were faced and largely solved in this period. The tenor of staff activity was distinct during this period, since it was on 28 October that the Soviets agreed to U.S. demands for the removal of their offensive weapons from Cuba. Thereafter, there was a rapid decrease in the probability that U.S. military action more drastic than the quarantine would be required. Selection of the period 16 through 28 October for intensive analysis also permitted an examination of the effects of security requirements on Joint Staff activities under two different types of conditions. Prior to the President's 22 October public address, during the week in which most political decisions concerning the U.S. response to the crisis were made, special security restraints concerning military preparations were in effect. After the President spoke, security aspects of Joint Staff operations reverted to their normal pattern.

[1] For more detail on the augmentation of the Cuban Watch and the phase-over to Joint Battle Staff operations, see Enclosure B, "Procedural Analysis of J-3 Command and Control Operations."

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8. The body of data developed in this functional analysis is presented in two Appendices to this Enclosure; the results, in the form of Summary Observations, are presented immediately below. Appendix A is the detailed analysis of information flow for the period 16 through 28 October. It consists of a review of the salient characteristics of overall message traffic flow, followed by specific analyses of the incoming traffic which furnished the basis for Joint Staff actions, the Joint Staff actions themselves, and end-product JCS-Out messages which resulted from the various Joint Staff actions. Appendix B examines the selected aspects of information flow mentioned previously, including analyses of delays in message traffic routing, staff preparation and use of the Cuban operations Master Check List, and a staff action-requirement analysis of Air Defense problems.

9. Summary observations concerning the scope and nature of Cuban crisis operations within the Joint Staff, as reflected by the research into information flow, are presented below. It must be emphasized that these observations are based primarily on data contained in the Joint Battle Staff files. Certain other categories of relevant data -- telephone traffic, reconnaissance and intelligence message flow, and action papers held in Action Officers' personal files -- have been utilized only indirectly. References to such data contained in the Joint Battle Staff files have been taken into account, although the actual data were not released for inclusion in this analysis. The following summary observations are grouped under headings corresponding to those sections of the Appendices from which the observations were derived. Thus, the headings indicate where the details on which the observation is based are presented.

SALIENT FINDINGS

10. At the beginning of the crisis, extreme security restrictions precluded normal utilization by the JCS of the staff-support capability of the Joint Staff in generating the required initial military planning and operations.

11. In the absence of normal staff support, preparation of early JCS actions had to rely mainly on check lists, outline plans, and other staff work already in existence before the crisis occurred.

12. The informational value of the Master Check List for staffing purposes varied in kind and over time: the listing of "Actions to be Considered" was of utmost usefulness at first, but decreased rapidly once the initial JCS directives had been issued; the record of "Actions Taken," although misleadingly incomplete, was nevertheless the only source of some information required in staffing.

13. [

]

14. [

]

15. To compensate for prevailing information-flow delays, Joint Staff efforts to keep abreast of developments depended on field commanders' estimates and expectations as well as on their reports of what had in fact already occurred.

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16. [

]

17. The greatest demand for staff support occurred immediately following issuance of initial JCS directives to implement action in the field and primarily involved requests for amplification.

[

]

18. Special channels to limit distribution of messages, established in the first days of the crisis for security reasons, proved difficult to change after security was relaxed. Some results were: (a) that information contained in key communication between field commands was sometimes received by the JCS days late via readdressed copies; and (b) in the case of the Joint Battle Staff, full background information on early developments was never received.

19. [

]

20. Although the Services had primary responsibility for force following and performed it for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff was instructed also to follow in detail the movements of U.S. and Soviet forces for the JCS.

21. Owing to variations in the kind of information submitted by the CINCs in response to DEFCON orders, it was not possible to determine from some of their reports whether the required DEFCON had indeed been achieved.

SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS

FROM ANALYSIS OF OVERALL MESSAGE TRAFFIC FLOW

22. On 17 October, the Joint Staff formally acknowledged the existence of the Cuban crisis through the establishment of an augmented Cuban Watch. On 22 October, this augmented Watch became the Cuban Battle Staff. The period from 16 through 22 October was the phase of the crisis during which the highest echelons of national decision making were considering alternative courses of action and developing the details of the U.S. response. It was a period marked by extreme security precautions within the Joint Staff. Much of the incoming message traffic was closely held by a Joint Staff group especially cleared for staffing Cuban operations. "Hot" action messages were hand-carried by general officers, and many messages were held in action officers' personal files, so that regular Watch and Battle Staff personnel did not have access to them. Some of these messages were later placed in JBS files; others never were.

23. The message distribution, filing and retrieval system supporting subordinate staff operations did not meet the requirements imposed by staff functions in the emergency. This inadequacy seriously limited Battle Staff capabilities. As has been mentioned already, the initial files turned over to the Battle Staff on 22 October were incomplete. Moreover, high-echelon staffing continued thereafter and prevented normal file build-up. Ultimately, after most of the message traffic began to be made available to the Battle Staff, two methods of filing were used. Initially, a master file was set up by message Date-Time Groups (DTGs). Files classified by subject and/or message source were subsequently attempted. The subject file resulted in messages being filed under the first subject staffed, making it extremely difficult to relate a message containing other subject matter to

a second action subject. There were very few cases where messages were filed by both DTG and subject, or by more than one subject. The messages filed by DTG before the subject files were established were never incorporated into the subject files.

24. [

]

FROM ANALYSIS OF INCOMING MESSAGES

25. More than two-thirds of the Cuban messages received by the Battle Staff were messages directly addressed to the JCS, as distinguished from Information (Info) Copies. Eighty-one percent of the messages directly addressed to the JCS were reports concerning the status of forces. Intelligence, operational readiness, and force movement and change-of-operational-control (CHOP) reports to the JCS were overwhelmingly direct addressings. The JCS was informed on all other staff area subjects by at least as many Info Copy reports as direct addressings. Sixty percent of all direct addressings other than status of forces reports were requests for JCS assistance, and more than half of these were for approval of specific proposals of action by commanders in the field.

26. Certain relationships between the Joint Staff and other offices are apparent in the interchange of telegraphic messages. For example, most subdivisions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) were usually quite careful to pass on OSD information to the CINCs via the JCS. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), was the only OSD office to address messages directly to the CINCs, rather than using the regular procedure of requesting the JCS to pass on their information. [ ]

27. Six-hour SITREPs were required of all CINCs directly concerned or indirectly affected by the Cuban situation, in order that the Joint Staff could be kept informed of developments on a timely basis. Normal precrisis reporting procedures established for the CINCs did not satisfactorily inform the JCS of developments on certain subjects in the Unified and Specified Commands. Special procedures were devised for reporting on airlift capabilities, special movements of forces, and extreme concentrations of aircraft on air bases. [ ]

28. The prime purpose of addressing Info Copies of messages to the JCS was to inform the JCS of actions taken or coordination effected by field commanders responsible for implementing JCS-directed actions. Info Copies sent to the JCS contained vital

information of direct interest to the JCS. Such messages required as careful a screening on receipt by the Joint Staff as did most messages addressed directly to the JCS, in order to get them quickly into established channels for use of incoming information.

The review procedures applied in the field to determine requirements for readdressal thus seem to have been well worthwhil

29. The initial orders given by field commanders in response to JCS directives were given limited distribution in the field, in order to minimize potential "leaks," and there was an unusuall small number of coordinating messages passed between subordinate theater forces. Much of this message traffic, necessary to Joint Staff knowledge of the reactions of theater forces to JCS directives,

Even after relaxation of the special security measures invoked prior to 22 October, the channels established prior to that time to minimize message distribution in the field proved hard to break. The Join Staff continued to receive key information

establishing criteria and procedures designed to make the JCS a direct or Info addressee of many types of messages which, at present, do not automatically include the JCS in the list of initial recipients.

30.

Enclosure C

FROM ANALYSIS OF JOINT STAFF CUBA ACTIONS

31. The largest volume of incoming messages containing requirements for JCS action or guidance was received immediately followin transmission to the field of initial JCS directives concerning the nature of the U.S. response to the crisis. These incoming messages resulted in the largest requirement for staff work in the Joint Staff of any period of Cuban crisis operations.

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33. At least five JCS "Greens" concerning Cuba were in some phase of staffing every single day from 19 October through 4 December 1962 (i.e., for the entire life span of the Battle Staff and augmented Cuban Watch). The peak staffing effort for JCS "Greens" was on 25 October with twelve in the staffing process. Seven J-3 Staff memoranda concerning Cuba were completed on 25 October, along with the greatest number of miscellaneous staff memoranda produced on any one day. Both JCS "Greens" and Joint Staff memoranda provided essential background for follow-up staff actions after JCS orders were given. Early distribution of these data was as important to the Battle Staff as early distribution of the JCS outgoing messages giving these orders.

34. The Operations Directorate (J-3) had the largest workload of all staff offices in terms of: (a) numbers of JCS-Out message drafted; (b) numbers of staff memoranda written for the JCS pertaining to actions required; and (c) numbers of JCS "Greens" drafted. Outside of intelligence operations, operations of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) were the most highly secured and generated the largest number of "JCS" messages not released to Battle Staff personnel.

FROM ANALYSIS OF JCS-OUT MESSAGES

35. JCS-Out messages reached a peak for the entire crisis on 22 October with 28 messages sent concerning Cuban operations. A total of 75 JCS-Outs originated during the period 21 through 23 October. This total was 50 percent higher than the total for any other three-day period during the crisis, and it was about double the daily average for the week preceding the crisis. More

than three-fourths of all JCS-Out Cuba messages through 22 October were classified TOP SECRET. On 23 October, the proportion of outgoing TOP SECRET messages dropped to one-third of the total and continued thereafter at about this fraction.

36. Several security problems were brought to the attention of the JCS for decisions. One arose concerning the "release of special intelligence planning information" for use at the air crew level in connection with [ ] In another, MATS use of normal flight plan and movement messages in connection with classified airlift operations required approval by the JCS. Although the Joint Staff may expect these types of problems involving security to occur again in many types of possible future crisis situations, it is probably best to plan for clearing each one on an ad hoc basis as such problems arise.

37. Through 23 October, only slightly more than one-half of the Cuba JCS-Out messages were drafted by the Joint Staff action personnel (subordinate to the Directors) who usually are responsible for preparing such drafts. [ ] percent of the messages were drafted at the Director level or above, with the Director of the Joint Staff personally drafting the [ ] With the relaxation of special security precautions on 23 October, normal staffing procedures began to be applied, although personnel from the Office of the Chief, Naval Operations (OPNAV) drafted most JCS messages pertaining to the naval quarantine. However, even after formal staffing became the norm, because of the very high level of "approval" needed for most JCS-Out messages concerning Cuba, staff officers' knowledge of the JCS actions taken was extremely limited. This problem arose because there was no procedure for timely feedback from the office where the JCS remained in nearly continuous session (the Gold Room) to the action officers who delivered draft messages to the door.

Interviews indicate that usually action officers had difficulty determining whether changes were made in their message drafts or whether the messages were sent at all. Often confirmation of JCS action was obtained by the Battle Staff when a hard copy of an Out message was distributed through normal channels.

38. [redacted]

]

FROM ANALYSIS OF MESSAGE TRAFFIC ROUTING DELAYS

39. [redacted]

]

FIGURE 1. Flow of Incoming Telegraphic Messages for Joint Staff Action

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[redacted]

40. [redacted]

[redacted]

41. [redacted]

[redacted]

FROM ANALYSIS OF MASTER CHECK LIST OPERATIONS

42. The Master Check List (MCL) of "Actions to be Considered" was extremely useful for the initial implementation of almost all

actions ordered by the JCS. Its usefulness decreased very rapidly for further staff actions after implementing orders were sent. This should be expected, because subsequent theater requirements are bound to be those which were not anticipated; otherwise, the implementing actions would have provided for them. After about three days of Cuban crisis operations the nature of these MCL listings changed from specific JCS agenda items to much more general agenda items for staff consideration.

43. The MCL listing of "Actions Taken" served as a general reference paper for keeping members of the Joint Staff up-to-date on the overall picture. It was far less useful as an action-following log. It was of limited usefulness to Battle Staff and action personnel because: (a) listings were often included several days late; (b) many actions falling in the same categories as the types recorded were not listed; and (c) only certain types of Joint Staff actions were recorded.

FROM ANALYSIS OF AN APPLICATION OF INFORMATION FLOW RESEARCH

44. Empirical evidence obtained through the analysis of information flow can assist in the development of check lists for possible future crisis operations. Such research can particularly point up those procedural and planning requirements which, if staffed in advance, may obviate many days of coordination with agencies external to the Joint Staff, should the same problem area arise in subsequent crisis situations. Cuban crisis air defense actions have been analyzed in this study for development of such check lists. External coordinations are shown to be the most time-consuming staff functions. Examples of important potential advance coordinations include Federal Aviation Agency preparation of air regulations for establishment of Military Emergency Zones (MEZs) and development of plans for Security Control of Air Traffic (SCAT Plans).

APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE C

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CRUCIAL PERIOD
16 THROUGH 28 OCTOBER

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APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE C

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CRUCIAL PERIOD
13 THROUGH 28 OCTOBER

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APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE C

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CRUCIAL PERIOD 16 THROUGH 28 OCTOBER

1. This Appendix presents the results of a functional analysis of information flow in the Joint Staff during the crucial period of 1962 Cuban crisis operations. First, an overall picture of the magnitude of information flow is presented, based on an examination of telegraphic message traffic. Incoming messages are then examined in detail, separating for analytical purposes messages directly addressed to the JCS from messages passed to the JCS as Information Copies. Joint Staff actions resulting from incoming information are next reviewed and analyzed, based on an examination of staff action memoranda (e.g., J-3Ms) and JCS "Greens." Finally, end-product JCS-Out messages are examined, first from the point of view of subject matter, and then as a source of data on the staff functions of message preparation, review and approval. Critical observations are included in the text as subjects arise. Summary observations found in Enclosure C are not repeated here.

OVERALL MESSAGE TRAFFIC FLOW

2. The scale of Joint Staff activity in crisis operations is dependent upon the nature and magnitude of information flow. This section will examine the magnitude of information flow as reflected by incoming and outgoing telegraphic message traffic filed by the augmented Cuban Watch and the Joint Battle Staff (JBS). Although telephone traffic proved not to be researchable, it is the opinion of JBS members that the following analysis fairly represents the shape of Cuban crisis activity in the Joint Staff.

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3. There was no one complete JBS "master file" of JCS incoming or outgoing messages, and as a result it has been impossible to assure a complete message count. Incoming messages were filed by the JBS in JCS-In folders, in folders grouped by CINCs, and in action folders held by individual staff officers. When only one copy of a message was available for filing, the file category into which it was placed was somewhat arbitrary, differing from action officer to action officer and from day to day. A complete cross-referencing of all JBS files released for study was prepared in the course of performing this analysis of information flow. However, a complete set of the files maintained by action officers was not available for incorporation into the cross-reference index. Furthermore, it is known that some messages were never received by the JBS. Nevertheless, the bulk of the messages received by the JBS appear to be filed in JCS-In, JCS-Out and CINCLANT, CINCSTRIKE and CINCARIB folders, from which the following message counts originate.

4. A further complication in making message counts lies in deciding what traffic was "Cuban." The JBS itself had difficulty in cases where CINCPAC and CINCEUR operations might or might not be affected by preparations for [ ] Many messages were filed and later marked "NOT CUBA". The general inclination of the JBS seemed to be to include, rather than exclude, questionable subject matter. For the purpose of this study, all messages filed are counted as Cuban traffic unless specifically marked otherwise by the JBS.

5. Prior to the President's announcement of U.S. plans for the quarantine on 22 October, much of the message traffic was very closely held by a Joint Staff group specially

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cleared for handling Cuban operations. The extent to which these messages, held by various individuals and groups within the Joint Staff prior to clearance to the JBS for access to Cuban traffic were turned over to the JBS is unknown. The extent to which access to other types of Cuban information was denied is also unknown. However, 42 messages referenced in JCS-Out and -In messages but not in JBS files have been found in J-3 Research, Records and Analysis (R&R) files, indicating receipt by the Joint Staff. These 42 have been included in message counts.[1]

6. [redacted]

7. The results of message counts are summarized in Figure 1, where JCS-In and -Out messages are charted by date of message origin from the start of augmented Cuban Watch activity, through the life of the JBS, and until termination of the final augmented Cuban Watch.

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[1] For a more detailed description of procedures which were followed by the JBS for processing message traffic, see Enclosure B, "Procedural Analysis of J-3 Command and Control Operations," Appendix A, "Processing Message Traffic."

[2] Memo for Secretary of Defense from Director, NSA, Subject: "Program Change Proposal for CRITICOMM System Improvement," 29 April 1963, SECRET.



FIGURE 1. Daily Message Traffic Flow to Cuba Joint Battle Staff

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8. It is apparent from Figure 1 that incoming Cuban crisis message traffic peaked on 25 October, with daily traffic to the JBS exceeding 130 messages per day from 22 October through 31 October. Figure 1 is believed to represent fairly accurately the relative traffic load on the JBS. However, it does not represent the relative workload on any particular staff office or on the JBS, since the nature of the incoming traffic changed considerably between the 23rd and 25th of October. The effect of this change on the JBS will be discussed subsequently (see paragraphs 18 and 19 below). By contrast, JCS-Out messages peaked on 22 October, with initial phase orders concerning Cuban crisis planning. The nature of these messages also changed after 23 October, as unanticipated requirements became the rule rather than the exception.

Origin and Receipt of Cuban Crisis Message Traffic

9. The shape of the crisis included a build-up phase (through 23 October), a peak phase (through 30 October), and a long tapering-off period (while the U.S. was assured of Soviet intentions to remove offensive weapons from Cuba).[1] The following discussion of the crucial period first examines the build-up phase.[2] In Table I, the number of messages concerned with Cuban operations originating in each six-hour period is recorded for: (a) incoming messages addressed to the JCS (sometimes referred to as "Action" messages, sometimes "JCS addressed" messages, sometimes "JCS ADDEE"); (b) incoming messages passed to the JCS as "Info Copies"; and (c) messages originated by the JCS (i.e., "JCS-Outs").

[1] See Enclosure A, "Historical Analysis of the Substance of Command and Control Actions, Their Circumstances, and Their Implications."

[2] For a discussion on the formulation of U.S. policy in response to the Soviet move in Cuba, see Enclosure A, op. cit., Chapter II, "The U.S. Decision."

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TABLE I. Origin of Cuban Crisis Message Traffic

DATE OCT. 1962	Z-TIME PERIOD	NUMBER OF MESSAGES ORIGINATED: JCS Incoming-Direct Addressee	JCS Incoming-Info Copy	JCS Out	Period Totals	Daily Totals
17	Prior to 2400	3	6	3	12	12
18	0-0600	0	0	0	0	
	6-1200	0	0	0	0	
	12-1800	2	4	1	7	
	18-2400	1	5	3	9	16
19	0-0600	1	4	0	5	
	6-1200	2	4	0	6	
	12-1800	2	2	3	7	
	18-2400	3	9	11	23	41
20	0-0600	3	5	2	10	
	6-1200	1	0	0	1	
	12-1800	9	3	4	16	
	18-2400	4	9	0	13	40
21	0-0600	7	12	8	27	
	6-1200	3	2	3	8	
	12-1800	6	7	4	17	
	18-2400	8	7	11	26	78
22	0-0600	15	13	4	32	
	6-1200	10	2	3	15	
	12-1800	9	17	9	35	
	18-2400	36	22	12	70	152
23	0-0600	38	27	9	74	
	6-1200	8	13	1	22	
	12-1800	18	5	3	26	
	18-2400	20	26	8	54	176
TOTALS		209	204	102	515	515

10. This table indicates that during the first week of Cuban crisis operations, approximately four messages were received for each one that went out from the JCS. The number of JCS addressed incoming messages received was approximately the same as the number of JCS Info Copies arriving. However, the trend was from a relatively small percentage of incoming traffic being directly addressed to "JCS" in the first few days to a definite majority on the 22nd and 23rd of October. The relative load on the Cuban Watch, with a more than tenfold increase in message traffic between the 18th and 23rd, is apparent.

Appendix A to
Enclosure C

11. It is very difficult to relate actual origin of message traffic described above to receipt of messages by Joint Staff action offices. Analysis of this relationship in this study must be based on time of receipt of messages which were subsequently entered into JBS files. This is a very important proviso. It is known that once the JBS has given more-or-less carte blanche access to Cuban crisis traffic, approximately at the time of the President's speech (2300Z, 22 October), advance copies of incoming traffic were almost invariably routed to the Current Actions Center (CAC). It is also known that up until 23 or 24 October, an unknown number of advance copies were picked up by "Cuba Committee" members and hand-carried to senior Joint Staff officers with no further access (if any) to the JBS members or to anyone else in the CAC. Many of these advance copies of messages never got into JBS files. Some were reviewed briefly by the Chief of the CAC, some were copied and held for the JBS files, and others were first seen when hard-copy distribution was made.

12. Insofar as incoming messages were concerned, this problem was largely resolved by the 24th and 25th of October. By that time it was recognized that the JBS should have access to advance copies on receipt in order to be able to perform those staffing functions it was being asked to fulfill. However, the problem as it pertained to JCS-Out messages not staffed (drafted or coordinated) by the JBS continued for a considerably longer period. The result is that JBS Cuba files are a mixture of advance copies, thermofax prints of advance copies, and hard copies of messages.

13. Only 54 percent of the message file copies for this period are stamped with "Time Received JWR." Therefore, the "Time Received JWR" has been approximated for unstamped messages under the assumption that there was the same statistical distribution

for unstamped copies as for stamped copies of the same type. (Their distributions are examined in some detail in Table II below.) Estimates of minimum time possible for receipt by the JBS, based on the time messages were received in Washington Communication Centers, are attempted in the study of routing delays in Appendix B. Only Navy messages, which record the time of receipt in Washington, and Army hard copies, which sometimes record the time advance copies were forwarded, have been examined. These times are of some importance in analyzing the speed of Joint Staff reaction to requests from the field.

TABLE II. Time Lag From Origin of Cuban Crisis Message Traffic to Receipt by JBS

(For Messages Logged 17 to 23 October 1962)

MESSAGE TRAFFIC	JCS INCOMING-DIRECT ADDRESSEE	JCS INCOMING-INFO COPY	JCS OUT-

14. The data that are available in JBS files with regard to time lags between origin and receipt of messages are summarized in Table II above.

15. These data form the basis for the approximations presented in Figure 2. The very long time from origin to receipt of the slowest Info Copy is due to readdressing of a message after

DATE — OCTOBER 1962 (ZULU TIME)

FIGURE 2. Message Traffic Build-up at Start of Cuban Crisis (Time of Origin Compared with Time of Receipt in Joint Staff)

FIGURE 2
APPENDIX A TO
ENCLOSURE C

receipt to include the JCS. Eight such messages were not readdressed to the JCS for more than 48 hours after receipt. (A more detailed study of readdressed messages will be made when "Info Copies" are discussed later in this Appendix.)

16. The time-of-receipt data in Figure 2 were compiled on the assumption that the time recorded on JBS file copies represents the time messages became available to the JBS. It therefore becomes a conservative extreme estimate -- i.e., it is almost certain that messages were available for JBS reference and use at the times recorded. Some unknown fraction of message traffic was available, at least to some extent, at earlier times since advance copies usually were available between two to four hours prior to hard-copy production and distribution.

17. [

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Nature of JCS-In Cuban Crisis Message Traffic

18. It was noted above that the nature of incoming message traffic changed considerably between 23 and 25 October. Data pertinent to this change are included in Table III.

TABLE III. Nature of JCS-In Cuban Crisis Message Traffic

	NUMBER OF MESSAGES RECEIVED (By October 1962 Date of Origin)

19. [

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[1]See Enclosure D, "Analysis of Command and Control Functions of the Service War Rooms and Their Interrelationship with Joint Staff Operations," Appendix C, "CNO Flag Plot."

[2]Joint Operational Reporting System.

[3]For a more detailed description of the preparation of SITREPs by the JBS, see Enclosure B, "Procedural Analysis of J-3 Command and Control Operations," Appendix A, "Situation Reports (SITREPs).

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INCOMING MESSAGES

MESSAGES WITH JCS AS DIRECT ADDRESSEE

20. Telegraphic messages addressed to the JCS prior to 29 October 1962 concerning the Cuban crisis and filed by the JBS have been categorized by time of origin, office of origin, time of receipt in the CAC (if recorded), by message purpose, by subject operation, and by staff area concerned. The details of classification are discussed below, along with message counts within each classification.

Principal Offices Originating Cuban Crisis Messages Directly Addressed to JCS

21. Table IV indicates by date and primary offices of origin the flow of incoming messages directly addressed to the JCS. All others sending 10 or more messages to the JCS are combined into one listing on this table. [

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TABLE IV. Principal Offices Originating Cuban Crisis Messages Directly Addressed to JCS

PRINCIPAL OFFICES OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF MESSAGES SENT - BY DATE (OCTOBER 1962)												
	8-17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	Total
SAC Aircraft	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	112	42	37	42	233
CINCLANT Ships	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	6	59	71	63	216
CINCLANT	3	2	5	10	10	33	23	3	8	4	3	4	108
CINCSAC	-	-	-	-	1	8	5	16	14	6	9	6	65
CINCONAD/NORAD	-	1	-	3	3	7	9	8	8	3	4	4	50
Embassies and Attaches	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8	-	11	16	4	40
CS Army	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	3	6	5	5	6	33
CIA	-	-	-	-	4	3	5	2	12	-	3	2	31
CINCPAC	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	6	3	3	4	4	27
CINCARIB	-	-	-	1	3	4	11	1	2	2	-	1	25
CINCEUR	-	-	-	1	1	2	2	3	5	2	3	2	21
CINCAL	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	3	2	4	4	17
CINCSTRIKE	-	-	2	1	1	-	6	3	2	-	1	1	17
COMASWFORLANT	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	3	4	1	2	12
CINCNELM	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	1	-	3	3	12
OSD-PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	3	-	2	11
COMATS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	1	4	10
41 Others	-	-	1	1	1	4	7	8	9	13	21	11	76
TOTAL	3	3	8	17	24	70	84	87	194	163	186	165	1004

With the exception of messages concerning [redacted] only 12 offices subordinate to CINCs addressed messages directly to the JCS, and these all appear to be in response to JCS orders or queries. Eighty percent of all traffic to the JCS as a direct addressee, other than that from offices subordinate to the CINCs, was from the Service Chiefs, the CINCs themselves, and Department of Defense (DOD)/JCS agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Defense Communications Agency (DCA)).

Types of Cuban Crisis Messages to JCS as Direct Addressee

22. The types of messages sent to the JCS by each office of origin are recorded in Table V. Message types have been classified in terms of the purpose of each message, first separating notifications to the JCS from requirements for assistance.

23. Notifications consist of information reports to the JCS: of orders given to subordinate commanders, of action taken, of coordination effected, of the status of forces (e.g., SITREPs and Status Reports (STATREPs)), and of commanders' concepts of operations. The great majority of these notifications are in response to orders from the JCS, either replying directly to a JCS request for information or informing the JCS of orders given, actions taken, or coordination effected as ordered by the JCS. All of the notifications classified as "Concepts of Operations" are responses of

TABLE V. Types of Cuban Crisis Messages to JCS as Direct Addressee

PRINCIPAL OFFICES OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF MESSAGES								
		NOTIFICATIONS TO JCS					REQUIREMENTS ON JCS		
	Total Messages	Orders Given	Actions Taken	Coordination Effected	Status of Forces	Concepts of Operations	For Approval	For Actions	For Guidance
SAC Aircraft	233	-	-	-	233	-	-	-	-
CINCLANT Ships	216	-	-	-	216	-	-	-	-
CINCLANT	104[a]	3	6	2	28	6	41	13	5
CINCSAC	65	-	2	1	57	1	2	2	-
CINCONAD/NORAD	50	-	5	-	26	4	11	2	2
Embassies and Attaches	40	-	-	1	39	-	-	-	-
CS Army	33	-	1	-	32	-	-	-	-
CIA	31	-	-	-	31	-	-	-	-
CINCPAC	27	2	2	-	19	1	2	-	1
CINCARIB	25	-	2	2	12	-	3	5	1
CINCEUR	21	-	1	-	14	-	1	2	3
CINCAL	17	-	2	-	15	-	-	-	-
CINCSTRIKE	17	-	2	1	6	-	6	1	1
COMASWFORLANT	12	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-
CINCNELM	11[b]	1	1	-	9	-	-	-	-
OSD-PA	11	4	1	-	4	-	-	2	-
COMATS	10	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-
41 Others	76	7	3	10	47	1	5	3	-
TOTAL	999	17	28	17	810	13	71	30	13

[a]Plus 4 correction messages.

[b]Plus 1 correction message.

commanders to JCS requests for guidance as to their opinions, preferences and prejudices prior to JCS planning decisions.

24. "Requirements on the JCS" consist of messages specifically requesting approval of actions planned in the field, asking the JCS to take specific actions to support commanders' operations (e.g., ordering airlift), or asking for JCS guidance or clarification with regard to JCS orders given or implied. Actually, most of the messages classified and counted as "Requirements" contain information informing the JCS of those aspects of situation background which, in the opinion of the sender, justify his case for stating the requirement. To this extent, therefore, such messages are also "notifications", but all messages laying a specific requirement on the JCS have been classified and counted only as "Requirements."

25. Table V indicates that 81 percent of the messages addressed directly to the JCS were reports concerning the status of forces in the field. These force-following messages made up the largest part of messages sent by every office of origin except CINCLANT. Details concerning the distribution of status of forces reports are presented in Table XIX.

26. For all types of messages addressed directly to the JCS other than status of forces reports, three-fifths were requirements for JCS assistance, and 62 percent of these requirements were for approval of specific proposals by commanders in the field. Requirements from offices of origin

tallied under "Others" included one message from the President, with a request to pass on the President's apology to General Norstad (CINCEUR) for not bringing him in on the early phase of Cuban planning.[1] CNO's one formal message to the JCS was a "backup" request to extend the runway at Key West Naval Air Station, previously asked for by CINCLANT. Its intent appears to have been primarily to make the request a matter of record. More detailed discussion of requirements will be deferred for separate analysis leading to Joint Staff actions and JCS response to these requirements.[2]

27. A few additional comments with regard to notifications to the JCS may be in order. It is interesting, from a procedural point of view, that four OSD-PA messages were notifications to the JCS of orders given directly to the CINCs concerning public relations.

Operational Subjects of Cuban Crisis Messages Directly Addressed to JCS

28. Table VI introduces the classification "Operational Subject" of messages. This classification is intended to

[1]

[2]See paragraphs 46 to 49 below.

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TABLE VI. Operational Subjects of Cuban Crisis Messages Directly Addressed to JCS

Appendix A to
Enclosure C

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29 [

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30. [

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[1] See Enclosure A, op. cit., Chapter IV, "Implementing the Military Course of Action: The First Phase," for a discussion on deployments undertaken to support the President's program of action.

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Staff Area Subjects of Cuban Crisis Messages Directly Addressed to JCS

31. Table VII attempts to indicate the staff area most directly concerned with the subject of each message directly addressed to the JCS, and thereby, the Joint Staff office (J-1, J-2, J-3, etc.) most concerned. More specific breakdowns were attempted for staff areas three through five and have been recorded in Table VII whenever more than two messages were counted in a subcategory.

32. Table VII indicates that almost half of all messages received were intelligence reports.

Three-fourths of normal operations messages concerned readiness, and movements and change of operational control (CHOPs) of forces. Logistic support, policy and communications messages followed in number received in that order.

[1]For an analysis of the naval quarantine of Cuba, see Enclosure A, op. cit., Chapter V, "The Naval Quarantine."

TABLE VII. Staff Area Subjects of Cuban Crisis Messages Directly Addressed to JCS

STAFF AREA SUBJECTS	NUMBER OF MESSAGES								
		NOTIFICATIONS TO JCS					REQUIREMENTS ON JCS		
	Total Messages	Orders Given	Actions Taken	Coordination Effected	Status of Forces	Concepts of Operations	For Approval	For Actions	For Guidance
Personnel	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-
Intelligence	480	-	-	-	479	-	-	-	1
Operations									
Readiness	200	3	10	1	179	5	1	-	1
Movements and CHOPs	128	1	10	2	96	-	16	2	1
Planning	38	5	1	2	-	6	17	3	4
Mission Assignments	45	3	3	2	28	2	4	1	2
Exercises	5	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	1
Logistics									
General	16	-	-	2	-	-	8	4	2
Airlift	17	-	1	1	6	-	2	7	-
Sealift	5	-	-	-	1	-	2	2	-
Nuclear	4	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-
Policy									
General	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-
Public Affairs	22	4	1	-	4	-	8	4	1
Foreign Relations	11	-	-	-	8	-	3	-	-
Communications	22	-	2	6	6	-	5	3	-
TOTAL	999[a]	17	28	17	810	13	71	30	13

[a]Plus 5 correction messages.

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33. Thirteen percent of the messages concerning operations were requirements on the JCS. These requirement messages made up 49 percent of all requirements laid on Joint Staff offices. Twenty-four of the 38 messages concerning operations planning placed requirements on the JCS. All of the five messages concerning exercises were requests to the JCS to approve cancellation of exercises. More than three-fourths of the 42 messages concerning logistics were requests for JCS assistance, as were 18 out of 36 messages concerning policy.

MESSAGES RECEIVED BY THE JCS AS INFO COPIES

34. One of the most important sources of information to the Joint Staff as to what is going on in the field and for general situational background is Info Copies of messages passing between other military commands and other U.S. government offices. Such messages are often used by the CINCs and Services to inform the Joint Staff that JCS orders are being implemented or how guidance is being translated into actions.

35. These messages can be of considerable importance to the Joint Staff.

Origin of Cuban Crisis Messages to JCS as Info Copies

36. Traffic in messages addressed to the JCS as Info Copies during the initial phase of the Cuban crisis is recorded in Table VIII by message originators. Forty-three percent of these messages were sent by CINCLANT or his subordinate commanders. Traffic from USAF offices (including CSAF, MATS, SAC and TAC) was the second largest grouping, 20 percent of the total. There was relatively even distribution of messages among the other CINCs and Services. In total, messages sent by 68 offices are on file for the first eleven days of crisis operations. One of the facts of most interest in this table is the relatively small number of State messages sent to the JCS for their information.

Types of Cuban Crisis Messages to JCS as Info Copies

37. Table IX presents statistics concerning JCS Info Copies classified according to message type. The same categories of message types were utilized in the preparation of Table IX as were applied to the statistical analysis of messages directly addressed to the JCS.[1] However, the significance of the categorization of messages as "requests" is quite different. In this instance, JCS Info Copy requests are requests from subordinate commanders to their immediate superiors for approvals, actions and guidance. Unlike the "requests" tabulated in Table V, they do not

[1] See Table V, page 37.

TABLE VIII. Origin of Cuban Crisis Messages to JCS as Info Copies

PRINCIPAL OFFICES OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF MESSAGES SENT - BY DATE (OCTOBER 1962)												
	8-17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	Total
TAC/AFLANT	2	1	-	2	2	6	7	3	6	7	8	5	49
CINCLANT	1	1	9	6	1	7	6	2	2	2	4	2	43
Embassies and Attaches	-	-	-	1	2	1	14	4	9	2	-	3	36
CINCLANT Ships	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	27	3	-	-	32
CINCLANTFLT	-	-	1	1	5	6	4	1	3	1	3	3	28
CSAF	-	4	-	1	2	6	2	2	1	3	2	5	28
CNO	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	6	2	2	1	3	17
CSA	-	1	-	-	4	3	3	-	1	2	2	-	16
CINCONAD	-	1	-	1	2	1	4	2	1	3	-	-	15
CINCPAC	1	-	2	-	1	1	5	1	1	-	2	-	14
CINCSTRIKE	1	-	-	-	1	1	4	4	-	-	-	1	12
CINCSAC	1	-	1	3	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	2	11
COMATS	-	-	-	-	2	6	3	-	-	-	-	-	11
CONARC/ARLANT	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	3	-	1	-	1	9
CINCFMFLANT	-	-	1	1	-	3	1	-	-	2	-	-	8
CINCARIB	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	3	1	1	-	-	8
14 Other Navy Offices	-	-	2	1	2	4	3	5	5	1	3	-	26
6 Other CINCLANT Offices	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	2	9	3	-	-	20
11 Other USAF Offices	-	1	2	-	-	-	2	-	2	3	1	9	20
6 Other DOD Offices	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	3	-	3	11
5 Other CINCEUR Offices	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	4	1	4	-	11
4 Other State Offices	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	2	-	3	9
4 Other Army Offices	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	5
2 Other CINCPAC Offices	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	4
TOTAL	6	9	19	17	28	54	71	46	79	42	30	42	443

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constitute requirements on the JCS. As far as the Joint Staff is concerned, then, the "requests" tabulated in Table IX are simply notifications about the types of problems being dealt with by subordinate commanders.

TABLE IX. Types of Cuban Crisis Messages to JCS as Info Copies

MESSAGE TYPE	NUMBER OF MESSAGES
Orders Given	194
Status Reports	102
Coordination Effected	55
Requests for Actions	28
Requests for Approvals	22
Actions Taken	19
Concepts of Operations	12
Requests for Guidance	10
Message Correction	1
TOTAL	443

38. It is apparent from Table IX that the largest category of JCS Info messages are notifications of orders given by subordinate commanders. Reports of Coordination Effected are generally concerned with coordination of actions specifically directed by the JCS. Thus, they serve the purpose of eliminating the preparation of a separate report to the JCS that the coordinating action is being carried out. Status reports passed on to the JCS as Info Copies are generally of similar format and content to specific reports which the JCS had asked for from the CINCs. These status reports are submitted sometimes in lieu of a separate specific report by the CINCs, as are Info Copy reports of Actions Taken.

Operational Subjects of Cuban Crisis JCS Info Copy Messages

39. JCS Info Copies are tabulated in Table X by the operational subject of each message.

TABLE X. Operational Subjects of Cuban Crisis JCS Info Copy Messages (6 to 28 October 1962)

40. The table indicates that the subject of the largest number of messages was [ ] More than one-third of the Info Copy messages concerned preparations

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for implementing [ ] Messages concerning air defense operations are the only other group amounting to as much as 5 percent of the total Info Copy traffic.

Staff Area Subjects of Cuban Crisis JCS Info Copy Messages

41. [

]

42. [

]

Readdressing of Cuban Crisis JCS Info Copy Messages

43. Twenty-one percent of the initial phase JCS Info Copies filed by the JBS were not originally addressed to the JCS. These messages were either readdressed to the JCS by one of the message recipients or forwarded from one of the Service

TABLE XI. Staff Area Subjects of Cuban Crisis JCS Info Copy Messages

war rooms per JCS request through message center SOPs. The sources of these readdressed Info Copies are shown in Table XII.

TABLE XII. Readdressing of Cuban Crisis JCS Info Copy Messages (8 to 28 October 1962)

READDRESSING OFFICE	NUMBER OF MESSAGES READDRESSED TO JCS
Army War Room	28
Navy Flag Plot	27
CINCLANT	19
Air Force Command Post	15
CINCARIB	1
CINCPAC	1
CINCEUR	1
COMFIFTEEN	1
TOTAL	93

44. These readdressed Info Copies were a very important source of JBS (and JCS) information. Four of the five earliest messages (dated 8 to 16 October) concerning preparations for Cuban crisis operations were readdressed to the JCS after the augmented Cuban Watch went into effect on 18 October. Two messages originating on 22 and 23 October were readdressed and received by the JCS on 25 and 28 October, at which times they were still of enough interest to be immediately readdressed by the JCS for transmission to the White House. Twelve other readdressals were forwarded to the White House prior to 28 October. It appears that, in cases where readdressals were required, procedures for getting certain key information from the field to the JCS caused considerable delay.[1]

[1] Data on delays in transmission of messages other than readdressals are found in paragraphs 122 to 128.

JCS-IN REQUIREMENTS MESSAGES

45. For the period through 28 October, all JCS-In messages in the JBS files placing requirements on the JCS, as well as some additional incoming messages located through references to them in JCS-Out messages, have been abstracted and classified as part of the analysis of Joint Staff actions during the Cuban crisis. These requirements messages have been sorted by date, by office of origin, by operational subject and by staff area affected in the tables which follow.

Origin of Cuban Crisis Messages Placing Requirements on JCS

46. Table XIII indicates the sources of requirement messages by date of message origin. Requirements were placed on the JCS by 18 offices, with CINCLANT responsible for originating half of the total. The peak of activity was reached 22 October, but more than 10 requirements for JCS action originated each day from 19 through 24 October. The 9 and 11 October requirements were staff actions underway when the crisis situation broke and, like several later requirements, were significantly affected by crisis operations planning.[1]

Operational Subjects of Cuban Crisis Messages Placing Requirements on JCS

47. Table XIV examines the operations which were subjects

[1] For a description of some of the problems imposed on the Cuban Battle Staff by messages requiring action, see Enclosure B, "Procedural Analysis of J-3 Command and Control Operations," Appendix A, "Coordination of Staff Action."

TABLE XIII. Origin of Cuban Crisis Messages Placing Requirements On JCS

PRINCIPAL OFFICES OF ORIGIN	NUMBER OF REQUIREMENTS MESSAGES - BY DATE (OCTOBER 1962)														
	9	11	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	Totals
CINCLANT	1	-	1	2	5	10	6	18	7	4	2	3	2	5	66
CINCONAD	-	-	-	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	-	1	-	1	14
CINCARIB	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	3	1	1	3	-	1	13
CINCEUR	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	2	2	-	1	-	-	-	8
CINCPAC	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	5
CINCSAC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	1	-	5
CINCSTRIKE	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	5
JACE	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2
JTF-8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
NSA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
OSD/ASD/PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
Others (1 each)	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	2	-	1	-	1	7
TOTALS	1	1	2	3	10	13	12	28	18	16	7	8	3	9	131

TABLE XIV. Operational Subjects of Cuban Crisis Messages Placing Requirements on JCS

[

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Staff Area Subjects of Cuban Crisis Messages Placing Requirements on JCS

48. Table XV indicates the staff area affected by requirements messages for [

]

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Enclosure C

TABLE XV. Staff Area Subjects of Cuban Crisis Messages Placing Requirements on JCS

[redacted]

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TOTAL INCOMING MESSAGES

49. In summing up information flow to the Joint Staff by telegraphic messages, a comparison of messages directly addressed to the JCS and those received as Info Copies will serve to point up the sources of Joint Staff data. Since receipt of the Info Copies involves significant delay over receipt of messages on which the JCS is a direct addressee, the timeliness of data sources also is indicated in these comparisons. Comparisons by the office of origin, by operational subjects, and by staff-area subjects are made in Tables XVI, XVII and XVIII, respectively.

Sources of Incoming Cuban Crisis Message Traffic

50. [

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[1] See Enclosure D, "Analysis of Command and Control Functions of the Service War Rooms and Their Interrelationship with Joint Staff Operations."

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TABLE XVI. Sources of Incoming Cuban Crisis Message Traffic

Operational Subjects of Incoming Cuban Crisis Message Traffic

51. Similar relationships are evident in Table XVII, in that:

a. CINCAL, CINCNELM and worldwide operations were coordinated almost exclusively by direct addressings to the JCS;

b. Operations subordinate to major U.S. Cuban actions were coordinated chiefly through Info Copies to the JCS; and

c. Primary Cuban actions resulted in 20 to 45 percent of all messages on these subjects being reported to JCS by Info Copy.

Out-of-pattern large percentages of Info Copies concerning Tactical Air and European operations appear to be due to CINCAFLANT's basic chains of command to CINCLANT and of support to CSAF, and of a relatively large number of subordinate CINCEUR offices directly contacted by Washington offices concerning Cuban crisis operations.

Staff Area Subjects of Incoming Cuban Crisis Message Traffic

52. Table XVIII indicates that intelligence, readiness, and movement and CHOP reports, all to J-3, account for 81 percent of all direct addressings to the JCS. All other staff area subjects consist of at least as many Info Copy reports as messages directly addressed to the JCS. If the assumption that direct addressings keep the Joint Staff better informed than Info Copies is valid, J-1, J-4, J-5 and J-6 were less "current" on developments connected with their areas of responsibility than was J-3. The Operations Directorate itself was less informed on planning and mission assignments in the field than they were on the status of forces.

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TABLE XVII. Operational Subjects of Incoming Cuban Crisis Message Traffic

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Enclosure C

Status of Forces Reports

53. The types of messages in terms of functions performed by the messages (e.g., authorizations, approvals, requirements, etc.) are not directly comparable between Direct Addressings and Info Copies. However, in total, 63 percent of all incoming messages were notifications concerning the status and actions of friendly and potential enemy forces. Most were formatted reports, and initially, largely in the JOPREP series. Early in crisis planning, JOPREPs were requested every six hours to help keep the Joint Staff informed. Additional six hour reports were ordered beginning 22 October to cover all movements concerned with Cuban crisis operations. Other specialized reports were subsequently requested to cover MERSHIP and Soviet submarine activity. A breakdown of these categories of notifications received by Direct Addressings and Info Copies is recorded below.

TABLE XIX. Status of Forces Reports

54. An attempt has been made in Table XIX to separate the types of reports normally received and processed in the Joint Staff from those specifically required by the Cuban crisis situation. It appears that the special crisis-related reports nearly tripled the volume of reports available to the Joint Staff.

JOINT STAFF CUBA ACTIONS

55. The first half of this Appendix has been concerned with the flow of information to the Joint Staff. The remainder is concerned with Joint Staff actions taken and the end-product results of these actions. No action records per se have been made avilable, so actions taken have been deduced from various products of these actions. Data analyzed include JCS "Cuba Greens", JBS records of miscellaneous Director's memoranda (e.g., J-3Ms) and JCS-Out messages.

CUBA GREENS

56. Most of the short-term JCS Cuba actions requiring formal staffing were reported in the 2304 series of JCS papers. [ ] The 2304 series has been individually reviewed, and a summary of each Cuba paper in the series is tabulated at the end of this Appendix as Annex A. This annex reflects the office requesting and the office taking Joint Staff action, the time required, and any action assignment resulting from each paper of the JCS-2304 series developed from 12 October through mid-December.

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[1] See Enclosure A, op. cit., Chapter I, "Precrisis Military Contingency Planning."

57. Of the 53 JCS "Greens" summarized, 21 resulted in formal submission to the Secretary of Defense for information or action. Seventeen resulted in action assignments on Joint Staff offices, and seven in action assignments on Service Chiefs. Eight of these JCS papers resulted in JCS-Out messages, in most cases assigning action of some type to a CINC.

58. The data available are too spotty to say much about the requirement origins, staffing offices, or decision levels, or to say anything meaningful about time required in the Joint Staff. However, on the assumption that requirements were received in chronological order, the number of actions being considered in the Joint Staff (i.e., in some phase of staffing) has been graphed in Figure 3 to indicate the shape of the Cuba "Greens" staffing effort over the duration of JBS operations. High levels of activity are apparent for 22 through 29 October, on 6 November, and 14 through 20 November. The fact that at least five JCS "Greens" concerning Cuba were in some phase of staffing from 20 October through 27 November is also of some interest.

MISCELLANEOUS STAFF ACTION RECORDS

59. As part of the JBS files, records of miscellaneous staff actions were maintained. As for the Cuba "Greens", these records provide a source of data as to staff actions required during the Cuban crisis. A review and tabulation have been made and a summary for each paper is listed at the end of this Appendix as Annex B. Of the 53 records maintained in this file, 36 are records of J-3 actions and eight are J-5 actions. Ten records are of actions concerned with staffing in JCS-In messages and resultant JCS responses. Ten of the J-3 actions resulted in "J-3M papers" and 12 resulted in "J-3 Ops" papers.

STAFFING OF JCS 2304 SERIES CUBA GREENS



4-26-63-1

DRAFT 2

FIGURE 3
APPENDIX A TO
ENCLOSURE C

60. An attempt was made to illustrate an expected increase in J-3 memoranda during the period of greatest Cuba staff activity by plotting J-3M numbers against time. The results, however, were nearly a straight line over the months of October and November 1962. Since the J-3Ms pertaining to Cuba made up only about 5 percent of those issued, the graph appears to indicate that there is a nearly continuous equal production of J-3Ms. This number is largely independent of the "crash" actions of the moment. This implies that within J-3, crisis situations change the subject matter but not the volume of production.

JCS-OUT MESSAGES

61. JCS-Out messages represent a formal end-product of Joint Staff actions. Information has been received giving the background on a situation, a requirement for staff action has been submitted or implied, and the requirement has been recognized within the Joint Staff. Staff action is taken and a draft message is prepared, coordinated, approved, and transmitted as a JCS-Out message.

62. Background information leading up to JCS-Out messages is received from many sources, one of which is the incoming message traffic previously reported. Other sources include formal support from the Services, telephone calls, and briefings and personal conversations. These sources have not been studied for Cuban crisis operations, and this paper is confined to analysis of the extent to which formal incoming messages determined and affected JCS-Out messages.

63. A good deal of information with regard to Joint Staff operations can be obtained from analysis of JCS-Out messages. The remainder of this Appendix will examine the nature of

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staffing problems and actions resulting in JCS-Out messages, as indicated by the messages themselves.

64. Flow of JCS-Out messages by date for initial phase Cuban crisis operations is examined in the next two tables. Table XX examines Cuban crisis message traffic relative to total JCS-Out traffic during the period.

TABLE XX. Cuban Crisis Message Traffic Relative to Total JCS-Out Message Traffic (16 to 28 October 1962)

DATE OCTOBER 1962	NUMBER OF JCS-OUT MESSAGES	
	Total JCS-Out	Number Concerning Cuban Operations
16	10	1
17	19	2
18	18	4
19	38	14
20	9	6
21	28	26
22	45	28
23	35	21
24	41	21
25	32	12
26	39	17
27	24	18
28	20	16
TOTAL	358	186

65. This table indicates that Cuban crisis operations became the prime subject of all JCS-Out traffic on Saturday, 20 October. Handling of preparations for Cuban operations made up 93 percent of the Out messages the following day,

as Joint Staff general offices began a seven-day week senior staff Cuban Watch. The increases in JCS-Out messages on Friday, 19 October, Monday, 22 October, and Friday, 26 October, do not appear to be even indirectly related to Cuban operations. These traffic increases are probably normal end-of-work-week and accumulated weekend Joint Staff business.

66. [redacted]

[redacted]

Addressing of JCS-Out Messages

67. Tables XXII and XXIII are concerned with the offices to which JCS messages were directed: to what extent they were addressees, and on what subjects. As would be expected, CINCLANT was by far the largest recipient of JCS-Out messages, being directly addressed on 56 percent of these messages, and kept informed of JCS actions by Info Copies on an additional 25 percent of the JCS-Out traffic. CINCONAD was the next largest recipient of direct addressings, being single or co-addressee on 25 percent of the JCS messages and informed on 10 percent additional. CSAF was the second

TABLE XXI. Primary Operational Subjects of JCS-Out Messages Concerning Cuban Crisis Operations - By Date

DATE OCT. 1962	NUMBER OF MESSAGES SENT ON EACH OPERATIONAL SUBJECT											
	Invasion	Air Defense	Quarantine	Tactical Air	World-wide	SIOP	Counter-insurgency	GTMO Defense	Reconnaissance	Latin America	Miscellaneous	Total
16	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
17	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2
18	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	4
19	4	5	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	14
20	3	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	6
21	9	5	1	3	2	1	1	2	-	-	2	26
22	6	3	6	4	4	2	1	1	-	-	1	28
23	8	3	3	3	2	1	-	-	-	-	1	21
24	8	2	4	3	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	21
25	1	2	2	1	2	1	-	-	1	1	1	12
26	2	1	3	2	3	3	2	-	-	-	1	17
27	5	1	2	1	1	2	3	-	1	1	1	18
28	1	1	4	2	2	2	2	-	-	1	1	16
TOTAL	49	25	25	22	18	12	11	5	4	4	11	186

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TABLE XXII. Addressing of JCS-Out Messages Concerning Cuban Crisis Operations (16 to 28 October 1962)

PRIMARY ADDRESSEES	NUMBER OF TIMES ADDRESSED			
	Total	As Single Addressee	As Co-Addressee[a]	Info Copies
CINCLANT	150	62	42	46
CINCONAD	58	16	27	15
CINCSTRIKE	58	4	29	25
CINCPAC	53	10	28	15
CINCARIB	53	13	28	12
CINCSAC	50	11	22	17
CSAF	70	4	32	34
CSA	60	1	27	32
CNO	55	1	24	30
CMC	47	0	23	24

Total Single Addressee Messages:	130
Total Multiaddressee Messages:	56
Total Info Copy Messages:	146
Total "Exclusives":	9

Other Single Addressees:

AMEMB Honduras (for Lt. Gen. Burns)	- 1 message
USARMA Honduras	- 1 message
JUSMAG Madrid	- 1 message
COMATS	- 1 message
U.S. CINCEUR	- 2 messages
CJTF-8	- 2 messages

[a]Includes 12 messages to all CINCs and Services.

Appendix A to
Enclosure C

TABLE XXIII. Distribution of JCS-Out Cuban Crisis Messages to Primary Addressees By Subject Operation (16 to 28 October 1962)

	NUMBER OF TIMES DIRECTLY ADDRESSED ON SUBJECT OPERATION											
PRIMARY ADDRESSEES	Invasion	Air Defense	Quarantine	Tactical Air	World-wide	SIOP	Counter-insurgency	GTMO Defense	Reconnaissance	Latin America	Miscellaneous	Total
CINCLANT	32	6	20	15	18	-	-	4	3	-	6	104
CINCONAD	1	20	3	1	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	43
CINCARIB	2	1	7	-	17	-	8	1	1	4	-	41
CINCPAC	12	1	3	1	17	1	-	1	-	-	2	38
CSAF	3	4	2	1	17	-	5	1	-	-	3	36
CINCSAC	1	-	3	-	18	9	-	-	2	-	-	33
CINCSTRIKE	8	2	3	3	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	33
CSA	3	3	2	-	17	-	3	-	-	-	-	28
CNO	1	2	2	2	17	-	1	-	-	-	-	25
CMC	1	2	2	-	17	-	-	1	-	-	-	23
TOTAL	64	41	47	23	173	10	17	8	6	4	11	404

largest informed office, receiving either by direct address or Info Copies more than one-third of the JCS-Out messages concerning Cuba. CINCs CONAD, STRIKE, PAC, CARIB and SAC, and the Service Chiefs of Staff were all informed on roughly one-third of the Cuban Out traffic. The CINCs were generally direct addressees of JCS-Out messages. The Services received a slightly larger number of JCS-Out messages as Info Copies than as direct addressings.

68. Twenty offices in all were directly addressed on the JCS-Out messages concerning the initial phase of the Cuban crisis, and 43 other offices were sent Info Copies. Except for one Info Copy to CINCAL and two messages to CINCEUR, CINCs EUR, AL and NELM were recipients of only those messages sent "to all CINCs and Service Chiefs". Two of these messages were among the nine "Exclusives" originated during the period. All but one of the "Exclusives" were sent prior to 22 October 0300, and were largely prompted by extra security precautions imposed on the Joint Staff. Three of the "Exclusives" were addressed "CJCS Sends". All were eventually released to the JBS except for two "SACSA Sends".

69. Eleven of the twelve messages addressed to all CINCs and Service Chiefs have been classified in Table XXIII as referring to worldwide U.S. operations. The other message was worldwide notice of preliminary plans for the naval "blockade" of Cuba. Worldwide operations consisted of going on DEFCON 3, instituting MINIMIZE worldwide, postponing the HIGH HEELS II critique, allowing cancellation of exercises by the CINCs, and worldwide SITREPs for any area affected by Cuban operations. One of these messages was of special significance from a procedural point of view, in that 36 minutes after a TOP SECRET order to implement MINIMIZE went out, a second message followed, downgrading the order to CONFIDENTIAL.

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70. [redacted]

[redacted]

Purposes and Operational Subjects of JCS-Out Messages

71. JCS-Out messages are classified in Table XXIV by the types of messages sent and are counted by type for each operational subject. It is apparent that almost two out of every three JCS-Out messages required action by recipients, being either Orders Given or Approvals of recommended actions. Notifications consisted of messages informing subordinate commanders of actions taken by the JCS or Joint Staff to coordinate field activities. These actions were usually in response to a request from the field for airlift or for augmentation of forces or equipment by transfer from another command. These coordinating actions were required most often in connection with preparations for invasion.

72. [redacted]

[redacted]

TABLE XXIV. Types of JCS-Out Messages Concerning Cuban Crisis Operations - By Subject

PRIMARY OPERATION/ SUBJECT	NUMBER OF MESSAGES OF EACH TYPE SENT

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73. Guidance requested was primarily in connection with this extreme concentration of forces and their resulting vulnerability. Although only eight messages were clearcut disapprovals of actions requested, several of the Approval messages modified suggestions from the field, or approved requests only in part. With the exception of guidance given worldwide, the other ten Guidance Given messages were in response to specific requests for concepts of planned operations. Apparently, most of the requests from subordinate commanders for clarifications of JCS-Out messages were handled by telephone rather than by formal JCS-Out messages.

Staff Area Subjects of JCS-Out Messages

74. The Staff area subjects of initial phase Cuban crisis JCS-Out messages are broken down by operational subjects of messages in Table XXV. Fifty-four percent of the JCS-Outs were in the J-3 area of operations, and 20 percent of the JCS-Out messages concerned movements and CHOPs of forces. All messages concerning the subject of air defense were in the Staff area of Operations, and every operational subject required at least one message in the J-3 area.

TABLE XXV. Staff Area Subjects of JCS-Out Messages Concerning Cuban Crisis Operations - By Subject Operation

STAFF AREA SUBJECTS	NUMBER OF MESSAGES SENT ON EACH OPERATIONAL SUBJECT

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support. [redacted]

75 [redacted]

[redacted]

Security Aspects of JCS-Out Messages

76. The last two messages referred to reflected security problems arising in the initial phase of Joint Staff Cuban crisis operations. Table XXVI illustrates the high degree of security reflected in classification of JCS-Out messages concerning the initial phase of this crisis.

77. Up until 20 October, two-thirds of the Out messages concerning Cuban operations were classified TOP SECRET. This percentage increased until 23 October, when it dropped to one-third TOP SECRET after the President's address.

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TABLE XXVI. Security Classification of JCS-Out Cuban Crisis Messages

DATE OCT. 1962	TOTAL JCS-OUT	NUMBER CLASSIFIED AS TOP SECRET	SECRET	CONFI-DENTIAL	UNCLAS-SIFIED
16	1	1	--	--	--
17	2	1	1	--	--
18	4	3	1	--	--
19	14	9	3	2	--
20	6	4	1	1	--
21	26	21	3	2	--
22	28	23	2	3	--
23	21	8	10	1	2
24	21	6	11	3	1
25	12	5	4	1	2
26	17	3	6	4	4
27	18	6	10	2	--
28	16	5	6	2	3
TOTAL	186	95	58	21	12

Staff Preparations of JCS-Out Messages

78. Tables XXVII through XXIX are concerned with some of the staffing functions performed in the generation of JCS-Out messages concerning Cuban crisis operations. These tables and accompanying discussion reflect information recorded in the messages themselves: who "sent" the message (i.e., directed that such a message be sent), who drafted the basic message which was subsequently accepted or modified, and who reviewed and approved the final draft for transmission. Further details of staffing, such as coordination effected in developing the draft and obtaining approval, are not normally recorded on the file copy, nor are records of messages staffed in varying degrees but never sent. (For

TABLE XXVII. Action Officers for JCS-Out Cuban Crisis Messages, By Message Senders

ACTION (DRAFTING) OFFICER	NUMBER OF MESSAGES ORDERED SENT BY										
	CJCS	JCS	DJS	VDJS	J-3	J-4	J-5	J-6	SACSA	SAMAA	TOTAL
CJCS	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
DJS	-	30	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
VDJS	-	9	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
J-3	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	4
J-4	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
J-5	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
SACSA	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Secretary JCS	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
OCJCS	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
ODJS	-	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
CNO	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
OPNAV Staff	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
J-1 Staff	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
J-3 Staff	-	22	2	1	33	-	-	-	-	-	58
J-4 Staff	-	1	-	-	3	7	-	-	-	-	11
J-5 Staff	-	6	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	9
J-6 Staff	-	2	1	-	1	-	-	8	-	-	12
SACSA Staff	-	6	1	2	-	-	-	-	7	-	16
SAMAA Staff	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
TOTAL	4	108	6	5	38	7	2	8	7	1	186

TABLE XXVIII. Action Officers for JCS-Out Cuban Crisis Messages, By Operational Subjects

ACTION	NUMBER OF MESSAGES DRAFTED ON SUBJECT OPERATION

TABLE XXIX. Types of JCS-Out Cuban Crisis Messages, By Message Sender

MESSAGE SENDER	NUMBER OF MESSAGES OF EACH TYPE SENT							
	Orders Given	Approvals	Notifi-cations	Guidance Given	Guidance Requested	Reports Requested	Dis-approvals	Total
CJCS	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	4
JCS	52	27	7	9	7	2	4	108
DJS	1	3	2	-	-	-	-	6
VDJS	-	3	-	2	-	-	-	5
J-3	8	6	14	-	4	3	3	38
J-4	3	1	-	-	-	3	-	7
J-5	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	2
J-6	2	-	5	-	1	-	-	8
SACSA	4	-	2	-	-	-	1	7
SAMAA	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	73	40	30	14	13	8	8	186

these reasons, among others, the tables do not reflect the relative workload on staff offices in generating JCS-Out messages.)

79. Table XXVII indicates that 59 percent of the JCS-Out messages during the initial phase Cuban crisis operations were drafted by the usual Joint Staff action perconnel (subordinate to the directors). J-3 personnel were the principal action officers. J-4, J-5, J-6 and Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) staff personnel drafted similar numbers of messages, each handling about one-fifth of the number of J-3 staff actions. There were no J-2 actions on JCS-Out messages recorded in JBS files.

80. Approximately one-third of the JCS-Out messages were drafted by senior staff personnel at the Director level or above. The Director, Joint Staff (DJS) wrote the largest number of these, with the Vice Director, Joint Staff (VDJS) and JCS Secretary also personally drafting significant numbers of JCS-Out messages. The remaining 10 percent of the JCS-Outs were drafted by lower echelon personnel not subordinate to the Js or SACSA, and not in the normal staffing chain (i.e., OCJCS, ODJS, OPNAV personnel). The JCS specifically ordered almost two-thirds of the messages to be sent. Of the nine other offices sending out messages, J-3 was the only one ordering more than 5 percent of the total traffic, sending 20 percent.

81. Table XXVIII indicates the writers of JCS-Out messages for each subject operation of the messages. No specific categorization of responsibilities is apparent, except for the CNO and OPNAV personnel writing only quarantine messages. Other offices seem to be pretty well-rounded in their subject

responsibilities. Similarly, all subjects required efforts of several different offices, with only the J-3 staff responsibility for SIOP messages appearing significant.

82. The characteristics of the "staffing" actions for JCS-Out messages during the initial phase of operations were due to a very large extent to extreme security measures being taken. Through the 22nd of October, the Director, J-3, for example, was not at liberty to discuss certain actions being taken with his staff, and there are indications that the DJS did not feel free to discuss certain JCS actions with his Directors. Through 21 October, exactly half of the JCS-Out messages concerning Cuban operations had been drafted by personnel other than those subordinate to Joint Staff Directors and Special Assistants.

83. On the big day, 22 October, more than two-thirds of the Cuban crisis Out messages were drafted by upper and special echelons. The relaxation of extreme security measures occurred on 23 October after the President's public address, when 16 out of 21 JCS-Out messages were drafted by subordinate staff officers in the normal chain of command, two more by OPNAV personnel coordinating quarantine instructions, one by ODJS personnel, and only two by the VDJS.

84. The relation of message senders to types of JCS-Out messages is shown in Table XXIX. All types of messages were ordered by JCS and all types, except for Giving Guidance, by J-3. Only most senior personnel ordered passing of guidance to the field, and three of the four "CJCS Sends" messages were in the Guidance Given category. Two-thirds of the JCS-Out messages were ordered sent by echelons higher than the Directors.

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85. All JCS-Out messages require approval for transmission, and approval is evidenced on message copies by signature. Messages addressed as "DJS Sends" or "J-3 Sends", or by any of the Directors, were almost always approved by the person named as sender, his "Exec" or his Military Secretary. In messages addressed "JCS Sends", the DJS or VDJS generally approved the contents of the message. However, when a "JCS Sends" message was drafted by a Director, the JCS Secretary, or SACSA, the writer usually approved his own message.

86. Of 55 "JCS Sends" messages written by the Secretary, the Directors, SACSA, the DJS or VDJS, 48 were approved by the writer. The DJS approved one message prepared by the VDJS, two by J-3, one by J-5, and two by the CNO. The VDJS approved one message written by SACSA for the JCS.

87. Thirty "JCS Sends" messages drafted by subordinate Joint Staff officer personnel were approved by the DJS or VDJS, including five messages written within the ODJS. Fifteen other "JCS Sends" messages were written by subordinate Joint Staff officers, and these were approved by the Directors, Deputy Directors, or Executive Secretary of the staff office drafting the message (i.e., J-3 for J-3 staff, SACSA for SACSA staff, etc.). Eight "JCS Sends" messages were drafted by OPNAV personnel. Five of these were approved by the DJS, two by the VDJS and one by J-3.

89. The stringent security precautions adopted at the upper echelons of the Joint Staff for handling of the initial phase of Cuban crisis operations made for difficult working conditions for the Battle Staff, especially with regard to JCS-Out messages. The high echelons drafting messages, and staffing by offices outside the normal staff flow (OPNAV and ODJS), prevented the usual dissemination of knowledge in

Joint Staff Directorates and in the JBS of probable forthcoming actions. This often resulted in the JBS being called upon by field commands for coordination of implementing actions ordered by the JCS, but of which the JBS had no knowledge.

89. This problem persisted in slightly different form after the 22nd of October, even though formal staffing became the norm. Action for a JCS-Out message would be assigned to a subordinate staff officer, but knowledge of changes in his draft action recommendation and final approval and transmittal action were often unknown to the JBS until after a query was received from a field command as to some facet of the transmitted message. There was no procedure for short-term feedback from the CJCS office where senior staff members were working (the "Gold Room") to the JBS action officer who hand-carried his draft message to the door and saw it disappear inside. Thus, for example, on 23 October, 11 messages drafted by subordinate staff officers were subsequently approved in the Gold Room by the DJS or VDJS. This undoubtedly affected efficiency of personnel on the Cuban Battle Staff.[1]

[1]See Enclosure B, "Procedural Analysis of J-3 Command and Control Operations," Appendix A, "Briefing and Debriefing."

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A

ACTIONS AND ACTION ASSIGNMENTS
REFLECTED IN CUBA "GREENS"

ANNEX A

ACTIONS AND ACTION ASSIGNMENTS REFLECTED IN CUBA "GREENS"

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ANNEX A (CONTINUED)

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CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MISCELLANEOUS STAFF ACTIONS RECORDED IN JBS FILE

ANNEX B

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MISCELLANEOUS STAFF
ACTIONS RECORDED IN JBS FILE

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ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF INFORMATION FLOW

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ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF INFORMATION FLOW

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APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE C

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF INFORMATION FLOW

1. Three aspects of the functional analysis of information flow described in Appendix A have been studied in much greater detail. Results of these selected studies are presented herein. Telegraphic message traffic routing delays are examined first. The second section of this Appendix examines the Cuban crisis Master Check List operations in more detail. Finally, a set of Joint Staff action requirements pertaining to contingency air defense action is developed and analyzed. As in the case of Appendix A, critical observations are included in the text as occasion warrants; summary observations are found in the main Enclosure and are not repeated here.

TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE TRAFFIC ROUTING DELAYS

2. It is noted in Table II of Appendix A that for messages addressed to the JCS between 10 and 23 October, on the average, eight hours and ten minutes elapsed between origin and receipt by the JBS. Similarly, delay on receipt of JCS-Info Copies by the JBS averaged eight hours and 29 minutes. A more detailed study of the routing delays has been attempted for naval message traffic, since hard copies of messages passed over naval communication nets record the time a message is received in Washington. This allows calculation of delay in transmission relay (from time of origin to time received in Washington), and calculation of time required for reproduction and transmission of hard copies to the CAC (from time received in Washington to time stamped "Received JWR").

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3. Results obtained for the relatively slack period of 19 to 21 October, the critical days of 22 to 23 October, and the greatest traffic-load day of 25 October are recorded in Table I. Messages addressed directly to the JCS are segregated from Info Copies, and average times are approximated for total routing of advance and hard copies to the CAC.

TABLE I. Routing Delays in Naval Message Traffic Concerning Cuba to the JCS

	DATE - OCTOBER 1962			
	19-21	22	23	25
Message Transmission				
JCS Direct Addressee:				
Median time from origin to receipt in Washington - min.	147	195	156	153
No. messages in sample	19	26	22	9
No. major delays (> 10 hours)	2	5	5	1
JCS Info Addressee:				
Median time from origin to receipt in Washington - min.	189	142	199	142
No. messages in sample	30	10	14	33
No. major delays (> 10 hours)	0	3	7	6
Hard Copy Reproduction and Distribution				
Median time from message receipt in Washington to hard copy receipt in JWR - min.	246	264	267	226
No. messages in sample	28	29	32	43
Approx. Time from Message Origin To Receipt in JWR - Min.				
JCS Direct Addressee:				
Advance Copy	149	197	158	155
Hard Copy	393	459	423	379
JCS Info Addressee:				
Hard Copy	435	408	466	368
Message Precedence				
Percent Operational Immediate or higher precedence	59	76	68	86

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4. Unfortunately, these data concerning Cuba message transmission times are very difficult to interpret in detail, because they are isolated from non-Cuba traffic data and because they are a function of unrecorded parameters, such as backlog loads at relay stations. However, they are informative empirical evidence of times actually taken for these functions, and apparently are largely unaffected by assigning high precedence to messages. In the period examined in detail (19 through 25 October) approximately 75 percent of all messages addressed to the JCS had precedences of Operational Immediate, Flash or Emergency. This compares with a cold war norm of approximately 25 percent of incoming messages having precedences of Operational Immediate or higher. There is no clear relationship between below and above average message transmission times and message precedence, source location, or time of day of message origin. A wide variation in effect of some of these variables is apparent, and is illustrated in Figure 1 for a sample day in this crisis period.

5.



FIGURE 1. Time for Transmission of Cuban Traffic for JCS over Naval Nets
25 October 1962

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Rangewise, the fastest 25 percent of all transmissions were received on all days in about 1:45. The slowest 25 percent varied by day from more than 5-3/4 hours to more than 6½ hours required for transmission.

6. It is probable that the decrease in transmission time for JCS direct addressee messages on 23 October was due to imposition of MINIMIZE at 222300Z. However, the increase in relay time for Info Copies on 23 October cannot be charged to MINIMIZE. Also, the relatively long message reproduction time for 19 to 21 October is not explainable from these data. [ ] The decrease in message reproduction time on 25 October reflects increased effort assigned.

7. Cuban traffic passed over [ ] communications nets on 25 October has been examined and records compiled for times from origin to receipt at the CAC. One-hundred and seventeen [ ] messages to JCS averaged about 30 minutes faster than the [ ] communications that day in total time elapsed. Twenty-four [ ] messages for which the JCS was a direct addressee were 20 minutes faster yet. Info Copies to JCS on both [ ] systems averaged six hours more in total time en route than [ ] Info Copies.

8. [ ]

[ ]

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CUBAN OPERATIONS MASTER CHECK LIST

9. The Master Check List (MCL) was prepared by General Operations Division of J-3 during the Cuban crisis but was an integral part of Battle Staff operations. The MCL served to notify the JBS of actions up for JCS consideration each day, and was used as an Actions Status record by the JBS. The MCL consisted of a list of "Actions to be Considered" for each day plus two days in the future, and a list of "Actions Taken" for each previous day back to 20 October 1962. It was first published for the Cuban crisis on 21 October, up-dated several times daily for the first few days, and then up-dated once daily for the duration of Cuban crisis operations.

10. The MCL copy kept up by the JBS is of particular interest because of log notes recorded by JBS members as to the status of Actions Underway. From 21 to 25 October, the JBS copy of the MCL was used as an Action-Following log. After 26 October only sporadic notes were made in the MCL by the JBS and no other record of action following has been found. The MCL did serve, however, as a permanent record of Actions Taken, and was used by the JBS continuously for reference (rather than as a working paper).

11. For this analysis, the MCL covering the period 21 to 31 October was studied carefully. Its usefulness changed considerably as the ability to anticipate action requirements decreased. By 23 October, in the seventh issue of the MCL, a list of eight items "to be considered every day" had evolved.

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These items made up a continuously increasing percentage of all items to be considered from then on, constituting 88 percent of the items listed for consideration by 31 October.

12. A numerical presentation of the MCL listings of "Actions to be Considered" and "Actions Taken" is made in Table II. Since each day's MCL listed items to be considered for "today," "tomorrow," and the next day, the "relative listing date" columns have been used in this table to show the change in items over time. Thus, on 21 October nine actions were listed to be considered on 23 October, and these appear in the "-2" relative date column for 23 October. By the morning of 23 October 17 additional actions had been added to be considered that day (26 in all), and these appear in the "0" relative date column for 23 October.

13. "Actions Taken" on any particular day were recorded when the MCL action officer either found out about them or was cleared to announce them. The relative times actions were listed are noted on the right side of Table II. For example, on 24 October three actions taken on 23 October were listed in the MCL. By 28 October five actions taken on 23 October were recorded (listed in the "+5" relative date column of the table for 23 October).

14. Table II provides some feel for the magnitude of the actions under staff consideration at any one time (reading diagonally on the left side of the table) and the degree to which staff officers were informed of actions taken. The degree to which actions taken were anticipated in MCL lists of "Actions to be Considered" is not apparent from this table but is shown in Table III.

TABLE II. MCL Action Records

ACTION DATE		NUMBER OF ACTIONS RECORDED								
		"To Be Considered"			"Actions Taken"					
		Relative Listing Date			Relative Recording Date					
October 1962	MCL Designation	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	Eventually
20	P-Day -2				25	25	25	25	25	33[c]
21	P-Day -1			15	13	13	13	13	13	8[c]
22	P-Day		11	15	10	10	10	10	11	
22:1900 EDT	P-Hour		8	10	5	5	5	5	5	4[d]
23	P-Day +1	9	9	26[a]	3	4	4	4	5	
24	P-Day +2	3	8	10	4	4	6	7	7	
25	P-Day +3	10	11	16	4	9	10	10	10	
26	P-Day +4	7	15	15[b]	8	9	9	9	9	
27	P-Day +5	14	16	11	13	14	14	14	14	
28	P-Day +6	15	11	13	16	16	16	16		
29	P-Day +7	10	10	11	11	13	13			
30	P-Day +8	10	10	12	7	7				
31	P-Day +9	10	9	8	7					

[a]Includes list of 8 items "to be considered every day."

[b]Includes 2 new items (thus dropping 2 items from preceding day's list).

[c]Number revised on 27 October.

[d]Number revised on 28 October.

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TABLE III. MCL Anticipation of Action Requirements

Date October 1962	Actions Taken That Were Listed for Consideration That Morning	Total Actions Taken	Percent That Were Listed	Total Actions Listed For Consideration That Morning	Percent That Were Taken
21	13	13	100	15	87
22	16	16	100	25	64
23	5	5	100	26	19
24	4	7	57	10	40
25	3	10	30	16	19
26	3	9	33	15	20
27	6	14	43	11	55
28	5	16	31	13	38
29	2	13	15	11	18
30	3	7	43	12	25
31	0	7	0	8	0

15. The first four columns on the left side of Table III examine the degree to which actions taken on each day of October were anticipated by listing in the MCL that morning as "Actions to be Considered." It is apparent that through 23 October all actions taken had been listed for consideration that morning. This percentage drops off significantly for the rest of the month, however, as more and more actions resulted from requirements placed on the JCS as unanticipated contingencies arose.

16. The last two columns on the right side of Table III indicate the extent to which staff planners were attuned to JCS assessment of priority action requirements. Although for the first three days of the MCL publication all actions taken were listed for consideration, the numbers listed for consideration were increasing and the percent of those listed that were taken was dropping rapidly.

Smaller numbers of actions were listed for consideration after the 23rd, but the percentage of those listed that were taken averaged only 27 percent for the last eight days of October.

17. The data presented in the two preceding tables are reflected in what appears to be a change in character of the MCL listings of "Actions to be Considered" by 25 October. Until then, these are written as actions for the JCS, e.g., "Direct CINCLANT to prepare for protection of U.S. shipping." The following note appears in longhand on the JBS MCL 24 October list of Actions to be Considered that day: "Actually very little consideration given to these items today by JCS." On 25 October, many of the Actions to be Considered are worded for the JBS or Joint Staff, e.g., "Ascertain status of request to grant CINCEUR authority to [redacted]. .," and "Ascertain status of request for authority to requisition commercial ships." These are hardly JCS agenda items.

18. The MCL listings of Actions Taken are inconsistent with regard to categories of actions reported. A large number of actions represented by JCS-Out messages are not reported. Sometimes JCS messages containing minor details are listed; sometimes fairly general actions are not. Sometimes JCS referrals (e.g., to SecDef or CNO) are reported; more often, they are not. It is not the purpose here to critique the sources of information or the criteria for including listings in the MCL per se, but it is apparent that the MCL listings were not a self-sufficient reference for the JBS.[1]

[1] For further detail on collecting and coordinating information for the MCL, see Enclosure B, "Procedural Analysis of J-3 Command and Control Operations," Appendix B, "General Operations Division."

APPLICATION OF INFORMATION FLOW RESEARCH TO AN AIR DEFENSE CHECK LIST

19. The development of lists of requirements laid on the Joint Staff, and the tracing of the Staff response to each (initial action assignment, approval of recommended staff action, coordination effected internally and externally, final action and final approval) provide empirical evidence of the staff functions and of the time which might be required for such functions in future crisis situations. Such information lends itself to the development of check lists for possible future operations and to critical review of staff problems to determine which require improved procedures or preplanning to minimize time in providing Joint Staff decisions to the field.

20. Unfortunately, the research process mentioned above is extremely time-consuming in the data collection and collation phases. It must be performed well in advance of the time a crisis situation might require use of check lists or revised procedures for Joint Staff decision making. Furthermore, determination of these problems requiring preplanning will, by definition, be of little value if brought forward only in the heat of an actual crisis situation. In short, the value of this type of research lies only in having it done prior to a crisis requiring its use.

21. The following study has been performed to show what might be obtained if the Joint Staff directs such an effort to supplement check list procedure development. Studies of the following type would be more applicable if carried out under the eyes of a Joint Staff action officer or monitor responsible for the check list. Further, the ability to trace lower echelon actions in the following study might have

been greatly improved if a small amount of additional information concerning JCS-Meeting referrals of action were made available.

22. The example chosen of development of a check list involves a study of air defense requirements and the actions taken by the Joint Staff during the Cuban crisis as the consequence of the existence of these requirements. All data found in JBS files concerning air defense actions through 28 October 1962 have been summarized by individual actions in the Annex. Action requirements are listed by time of origin, noting the subject of the action, the office originating the requirement and the time of origin in terms of the time the requirement left the office of origin (e.g., DTG of requirement messages). The next two columns list the time the final staff action product left the Joint Staff (usually the DTG of a JCS-Out message) and the approximate number of hours it had remained in the Joint Staff. (This approximate time for staffing each requirement also takes into account the time of Joint Staff receipt of incoming requirements.)

23. The next two columns of the Annex indicate the office assigned action in the Joint Staff and the type of initial action product developed. If coordination external to the Joint Staff was effected, this is noted with data available pertinent to the time required for action by offices outside the Joint Staff. The remaining columns describe the final action taken and the highest echelon which reviewed and approved each Joint Staff action.

24. The nature of air defense requirements for Joint Staff action is our first concern. Review of the requirements listed in the Annex indicates that they lend themselves to groupings by subsystems integral to air defense operations

(i.e., weapon systems, control systems, etc.). If one wishes to determine what staff actions must go into a check list for this contingency, a list of types of action taken for each type of subordinate air defense system provides a convenient framework. Table IV is an example of the product of such an analysis. Joint Staff actions concerning allocations and missions might be expected for each subsystem. This table indicates how often such action problems arose.

25. Table IV indicates that Joint Staff decisions were required as to types, numbers, sources and deployments of surface-to-air missiles, fighter-interceptors, antiaircraft artillery, low-altitude radars, support personnel, and communications equipment. Allocation of HAWK and HERCULES SAM units covered the largest number of air defense actions. Determining specific locations for deployment of air defense subsystems was the type of action most often required. Requests for estimates of adequacy were the primary actions concerning geographic areas of our overall air defense system.

26. Two types of planning information are developed by this type of analysis. The preceding paragraphs have examined the specific actions required to prepare our air defenses for contingency operations which might have resulted from the Cuban crisis. A second type of information worth knowing is the length of time required for various types of staff actions, and what factors made for brief or lengthy Joint Staff response to air defense requirements.

27. It is apparent from examination of the Annex that the length of time required for Joint Staff actions is dependent primarily on the degree of external coordination required.

TABLE IV. Air Defense Subjects Requiring Joint Staff Action

SUBJECTS	NUMBER OF JOINT STAFF ACTIONS ON EACH SUBJECT										
	WEAPON SYSTEMS			CONTROL SYSTEMS			SUPPORT SYSTEMS			OVERALL AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS	
Joint Staff Actions Required as to:	Surface to Air Missiles	Inter-ceptors	Anti-aircraft Artillery	SSM Radar	Low Altitude Radar	FAA Control	Nuclear Weapons	Personnel	Communications	South-east U.S.	CARIB Facilities
Types	2	2	1		1				1		
Numbers	2	2	2		1				1		
Source	4	1	1		1				1		
Deployment	6	3	2		1						
Method of Movement	3										
OPCON	2	2	1	1					1		
Mission (Rules of Engagement)						1				1	
Readiness (Alert Status)		1								1	
Estimate of Adequacy										3	2
Plans Development						1				1	
Public Relations										1	
Reporting Procedures										1	

To examine these requirements more closely, action subjects are listed with coordinating offices in Table V. Although it would not be expected that coordination on these subjects would take the same length of time in another crisis situation, the time utilized is listed as useful empirical information.

28. It might be expected that the same types of coordination with the Secretary of Defense which appear in Table V would be required on key planning decisions and on interactions of military with political planning in another crisis situation. Times required for such decisions would not be similar, necessarily. For example, the longest time for OSD action was due to political indecision concerning the desirability of implementing air quarantine operations. OSD review of the outline plan for the air defense role in an air quarantine would have undoubtedly proceeded faster if the U.S. had implemented an air quarantine. The other OSD actions appear to be reasonably illustrative of time required for important decisions. Authorizing CONAD OPCON of the Moorestown radar appears to be a good example of a "sticky" minor item passed up the chain of command for decision.

29. During the Cuban crisis, Air Force and Army coordinations were related to the fact that the Secretary of Defense had designated the Service roles in air defense. It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the Joint Staff would have requested Service coordination on these subjects if the Secretary of Defense had not designated responsibilities so firmly. It is likely that these subjects would be coordinated in the same manner, but Joint Staff participation is normally more active in items such as planning than was the case during the Cuban crisis. There were at least twelve actions where coordination with the CINCs and JTF-8 was effected by the Joint Staff. On the average, each of these coordinations

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TABLE V. Major Coordination Requirements on Joint Staff Air Defense Actions

resulted in one day's delay in final Joint Staff action. Coordination with FAA was time consuming, and appears to be an area where advance planning might speed air defense preparations significantly.

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX B

JOINT STAFF AIR DEFENSE ACTIONS

ANNEX

ANNEX (CONT.)

ANNEX (CONT.)