INTRODUCTION
With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the level of nuclear threat confronting the United States was reduced significantly. Yet, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, an estimated 30,000 nuclear warheads were spread among the former Soviet republics. Approximately 3,200 strategic nuclear warheads were located outside of Russia on the territories of Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine. Political, social, and economic upheaval heightened prospects that the former Soviet republics would not be able to provide for safe disposition of these nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The dangers posed by this situation were clear: diversion or unauthorized use of weapons, diversion of fissile materials, and possible participation of Soviet weapons scientists in proliferation efforts in other countries. Despite significant positive changes occurring in the New Independent States (NIS), these weapons continued to pose a threat to U.S. national security.
Taking advantage of an historic opportunity, Congress initiated the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in November 1991 to reduce the threat to the United States from these weapons of mass destruction. Often referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, this congressional effort provided the Department of Defense authority and funding for the CTR program. Through the CTR program, DoD provides assistance to the eligible states of the former Soviet Union to promote denuclearization and demilitarization and to reduce the threat of WMD proliferation.
A DYNAMIC PROGRAM
Legislation in each of FYs 1992 and 1993 provided the Secretary of Defense with $400 million in transfer authority from DoD funds for the CTR program. Congressional actions subsequently reduced the authority by $330 million. In both FY 1994 and FY 1995, DoD requested and was granted $400 million in direct appropriations for a total of $1.27 billion in obligation authority. In FY 1995, an additional $18 million of FY 1992 and FY 1993 funding authority expired and $20 million of the FY 1995 authority was withdrawn. Actual authority, considering the withdrawn or expired funding, is $1.236 billion in CTR assistance in the form of signed agreements and other support to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan. By the end of FY 1994, DoD obligated $434 million and by the end of FY 1995, over $866 million.
To keep up with the increase in implementation activity, a CTR Program Office was created within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This office helps plan future assistance activities supporting CTR goals, manages the day-to-day business of working with representatives in recipient nations to identity specific needs, and oversees the contracts. American firms are used whenever possible, which is in most cases. Having the CTR program provide goods and services -- rather than cash -- allows the United States to confirm that this assistance is being used for denuclearization prevention efforts.
The CTR experiences in Ukraine illustrates both the challenges of arranging for assistance and the benefits of cooperation. Notwithstanding Ukraine's pledge in the Lisbon Protocol of 1992 to become a non-nuclear weapons state, the actual process of withdrawing warheads to Russia was not agreed upon until the United States concluded the Trilateral Agreement with Russia and Ukraine. Critical to the success of these negotiations was the United States' promise of CTR assistance. The agreements to begin the CTR program were not concluded until December 1993 -- two years after discussions began.
CTR PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the CTR program were established by Congress and provide guidance for U.S. implementation of the program. These are:
These objectives are inextricably linked to each other, as are the corresponding CTR program activities. Meeting the objective of safeguarding nuclear weapons in Russia, for instance, will also help prevent proliferation, a growing concern in light of recent reports of nuclear smuggling.
CTR program activities generally fall into four categories in accordance with these objectives. First, destruction and dismantlement activities accelerate the destruction and dismantling of weapons of mass destruction, their launchers, and their infrastructure in the four eligible NIS: Belarus, Kazakstan, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. Destruction and dismantlement activities provide actual equipment, training, and services required to implement dismantlement decisions as leverage to encourage these countries to dismantle.
Second, through chain of custody and nonproliferation activities, the CTR program decreases the proliferation dangers from the nuclear warheads and fissile materials that remain in the NIS and represent a potential threat to the United States. During the difficult period of transition in these states, the continued security and custody of nuclear weapons and materials is vitally important to both the United States and the NIS.
Third, CTR supports demilitarization efforts which decrease the long-term threat by reducing the capacity and economic pressures in the NIS to continue to produce weapons of mass destruction. The CTR defense conversion industrial partnership projects are an effort to convert former WMD factories to civilian production, thereby reducing possible future nuclear threats. In addition, the CTR-supported International Science and Technology Centers (ISTCs) in Russia serve as a clearinghouse for projects to engage NIS weapons scientists and engineers in peaceful civilian work. The transformations created through the defense conversion industrial partnership arrangements and the ISTCs prevent proliferation by reducing both the supply of WMD available for foreign sale or diversion and the incentives for relying on such sales for income and by providing job alternatives for weapons scientists who might otherwise be tempted to sell their expertise abroad.
Lastly, the CTR program supports other programs such as the expansion of defense and military contacts with the NIS. When the Soviet Union dissolved, its republics were left with structures, forces, and equipment not well suited to their new-found sovereignty. The United States, through defense and military contacts, has been able to assist in the development of democratic and civilian control of military departments and the restructuring and downsizing of defense capabilities to better reflect these new nations' current needs. For example, the CTR program sponsors regular exchanges on defense strategy and attempts to instill transparency of budgets and programs. These countries will remain important players in world events, and the United States defense establishment, as well as the American people as a whole, benefit greatly from the close contacts with its military and defense counterparts. These contacts are part of U.S. efforts across the board to expand the domain in which U.S. security interests coincide, rather than conflict, with those of the NIS. Although differences will still occur, development of long-term institutional relationships contributes to improving substantive professional dialogue on important defense and military issues, in addition to facilitating denuclearization and nonproliferation activities.
PROGRESS IN CTR IMPLEMENTATION
To meet CTR program objectives, assistance is provided to Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine pursuant to umbrella agreements that establish an overall legal framework for CTR assistance activities. Each of these four umbrella agreements provides a system of rights, exemptions, and protections for United States assistance personnel and for CTR activities, and designates executive agents to implement CTR assistance programs for each government. The designated U.S. executive agent is the Department of Defense. Each of the four umbrella agreements authorizes the conclusion, by the executive agents, of implementing agreements that are subject to and governed by, the terms of the umbrella agreement and provide more detailed terms for specific assistance projects.
As of October 1995, 34 such implementing agreements have been concluded by the Department of Defense: 12 with ministries of the Russian Federation; eight with ministries of the Republic of Kazakstan; seven with ministries of Ukraine; and seven with ministries of Belarus. In addition, four separate memoranda of understanding between the Department of Defense and counterpart defense ministries address defense and military-to-military relations.
The CTR program has grown impressively, particularly over the past two years, with the baseline obligation rate increasing over four-fold from about $105 million at the start of FY 1994 to about $434 million at the end of FY 1994 and doubling in FY 1995. To date, DoD has notified Congress of proposed obligations totaling $1.236 billion from funds authorized for FY 1992 to FY 1995 for specific projects for the eligible states. More importantly, the total assistance committed under agreements concluded with DoD and for which implementation is actually underway is now $760 million, of which $300 million has been disbursed. The chart above illustrates CTR obligations through the end of FY 1995.
The CTR process from negotiation, to project formulation, to requirements definition, to final execution involves many steps in the respective state-to-state relationships as well as within the U.S. government. Congress directed American contractors be used for CTR support to the extent feasible and agreements with recipient governments make U.S. contracting laws applicable to CTR activities. Accordingly, DoD contracting for CTR goods and services is based on Federal Acquisition Regulations. In the final analysis, CTR benefits the U.S. economy by providing additional jobs for American workers and expanded markets for U.S. corporations. The United States is not the only country providing assistance to the NIS for dismantlement and is closely coordinating its assistance efforts with its allies through NATO and G-7 forums. This eliminates needless duplication and meets the needs of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus.
Furthermore, in order to ensure assistance provided under CTR is used as intended, the CTR agreements include provisions for the United States to conduct audits and examinations (A&E) of the assistance provided. The United States has conducted nine A&Es in the NIS (Belarus (4), Russia (2), Ukraine (2), Kazakstan (1)); one A&E is projected for every month through FY 1996 (Belarus (1), Russia (6), Ukraine (4), Kazakstan (1)). It is important to note that CTR A&Es are not arms control inspections, but formal checks to ensure goods and services provided through the Nunn-Lugar program are used for the intended, agreed-upon purpose.
REDUCING THE THREAT
CTR activities contributed significantly to threat reduction over the past four years. United States offers of assistance under the program were instrumental in convincing Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine they could shoulder the economic, political, and technical burdens of weapons dismantlement and demilitarization. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the CTR program has assisted the four NIS possessing portions of the Soviet nuclear arsenal with the elimination (or, in the case of Russia, reduction) of WMD; proliferation prevention efforts; and the dismantlement and transformation of WMD-associated infrastructure.
Through the provision of equipment and technical expertise, the CTR Program supports Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan in implementing their status as non-nuclear weapons states (in accordance with START I and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)) and facilitated Kazakstan's becoming free of all nuclear weapons in the spring of 1995. Since the inception of the CTR program, the following positive developments in the NIS have occurred:
Future CTR assistance is planned to help Russia meet its START II obligations in weapons reductions. CTR is assisting Russia in meeting and accelerating its START Treaty obligations and in preparing to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention, once the latter enters into force. CTR assistance has expedited Russia's compliance with START levels by contributing to the following developments:
CTR assistance has helped with the establishment of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Support Office in Moscow. CTR assistance procured a U.S. prime contractor to plan for chemical weapons (CW) destruction. In addition, CTR assistance sponsored a joint evaluation of Russian CW neutralization technology.
CTR assistance contributed to the enhancement of safety, security, and control of fissile material and nuclear weapons in Russia:
U.S. assistance in this area helps give Russian authorities the confidence to proceed with warhead consolidation and eventual dismantlement. Thus, CTR not only helps to alleviate physical bottlenecks, but also provides an incentive towards improvements in security.
CTR contributed to additional proliferation prevention efforts. To date, over 11,000 former Soviet weapon scientists and engineers once engaged in WMD research are now or soon will be employed on peaceful, civilian research projects supported by the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow, thus reducing the threat of the transfer of WMD expertise to potential proliferant states. The Project Sapphire mission in November 1994 to remove 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to the United States from poorly secured storage in Kazakstan was partially funded through CTR.
The CTR Program is a vital political instrument and a venue for discussion. The cooperative nature of CTR enhances defense and military-to-military contacts and promotes the evolution of the NIS into free-market democracies. The January 1994 Trilateral Accord among Ukraine, Russia, and the United States and the accession of Ukraine to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state are landmark achievements made possible, in part, by the successes and prospects of CTR assistance.
Conditions of instability, uncertainty, and strife still exist within the NIS. The CTR Program is responding to these challenges with a program plan designed to continue and accelerate WMD threat reduction through FY 2001. CTR materially and observably reduced threats to the United States and provides the means for continuing to do so in the future.
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
These successes come not as the result of isolated donations of equipment, but are a product of the close interaction between representatives of the United States and the recipient nations, and among the types of assistance provided. This integrated approach highlights the importance of all elements of the program to the goals it seeks to achieve.
CTR efforts in Ukraine demonstrate the nature and impact of this multipronged approach. The assistance projects noted previously are only part of the story for Ukraine. The complete picture must be understood as a process of demonstrating to Ukraine that its security would be better served without nuclear weapons than with them. A key juncture in that realization came about in December 1993 when Ukraine and Russia could not agree on a course of warhead removal, and many in Ukraine doubted U.S. willingness to assist them in the course it chose. The United States was able to broker a deal in which the Ukrainians started the process of returning weapons to Russia, and Russia agreed to provide nuclear reactor fuel to Ukraine as compensation for the value of the fissile materials returned. The Trilateral Agreement had four related components: transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement, compensation for fissile materials, security assurances to Ukraine, and CTR assistance. This landmark agreement was cemented, as already noted, by U.S. pledges to provide assistance to Ukraine in its dismantlement efforts under the CTR program.
In an effort to speed the specific action that eliminated much of the direct threat in Ukraine to the United States -- removing warheads from missiles -- the United States offered to accelerate delivery of materials useful for early deactivation. The fruits of this effort were dramatically visible when the Secretary of Defense visited a missile facility at Pervomaysk, Ukraine, in March 1994. There he inspected an ICBM silo from which 10 warheads had been permanently removed. This provided a vivid example of the effectiveness of CTR in helping to neutralize a nuclear system which until very recently had posed a threat to the United States.
These very tangible initial successes provide the foundation upon which further CTR assistance for the dismantlement and destruction of SS-19s is built. CTR assistance was directed to remove potential choke points in the long and difficult process of dismantling the SS-19 ICBM silos located on Ukrainian territory. Some examples of the program's successes in this regard include:
The CTR program also sponsored a continuous series of defense and military contacts which went far to assure Ukraine that the United States (and the West) had an interest in Ukraine's stability and success beyond eliminating nuclear weapons from its soil. The United States has provided expertise and support in helping Ukraine develop a national armed force that reflects its sovereign needs, through visits to U.S. training centers and other activities that have made tangible America's commitment to Ukrainian security.
Individuals whose careers have been spent in the nuclear weapons arena must understand they have a viable future in a denuclearized Ukraine. The soldiers and civilians who devoted their lives to the production, operation, and maintenance of nuclear weapons are in the process of working themselves out of their jobs. If the United States and Ukraine mutually desire the elimination of the nuclear weapons, the economic and social consequences of dismantling the entire complex must be addressed. Two aspects of the CTR program provide some limited assistance in this regard, at the cost of only 14 percent of the entire Ukrainian program. At the missile bases in Pervomaysk and Khmelnitsky in Ukraine, the former officers of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces are the very people who are helping close the base. These military people have no other homes, and Ukraine requires that housing must be provided before they can be demobilized. The pace of dismantlement is therefore inhibited by the inability of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to provide the required housing. The CTR program is helping to solve this problem as part of a defense conversion program under which a former shipbuilding plant and missile silo factory will produce, with American partners, housing for these demobilized missile officers, and later for commercial sale. In January 1996, the United States transferred to the Ukrainian government an initial set of housing units completed with CTR funds for decommissioned Strategic Rocket Force officers. Providing profitable employment for former defense workers further reduces arguments for continued manufacture of missile components, and discourages them from taking their skills elsewhere. At the same time, U.S. businesses gain access to a new market for their goods.
This integrated approach addresses the full scope of the challenge facing these nations in completing their arms control agreements and preventing further nuclear dangers from threatening themselves or others. The absence of any one part of the effort would detract seriously from other aspects and reduce their overall effectiveness.
FUTURE PRIORITIES
In spite of the progress made by the CTR program in all areas of threat reduction, a great deal of work still needs to be done. The program will continue to provide Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine with destruction and dismantlement assistance directed toward accelerating strategic offensive arms elimination. CTR assistance will be used to support ongoing deactivation and dismantlement of strategic nuclear systems -- missiles and launchers, such as silos, heavy bombers, and missile carrying submarines -- according to START I and the January 1994 United States-Russian-Ukrainian Trilateral Agreement. It will also support and accelerate elimination of Russian strategic delivery systems under START II.
The CTR program will also continue to provide assistance to enhance the safety and security of nuclear materials with emphasis on strengthening the entire chain of custody from eliminating and dismantling the weapons, to design and construction of a fissile material storage facility in Russia, and to monitoring the storage of the plutonium resulting from dismantlement. Plans call for CTR to provide additional assistance to the Russian Ministry of Defense to strengthen the regime of weapons security and control by building upon existing Russian national material control and accounting and physical protection policies and practices to assist in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Specifically, future CTR assistance will assist Russia in developing programs and national resources to ensure the effective regulatory oversight of material control and accounting and physical protection policies and strengthen effective technical support for material control and accounting and physical protection policies -- including resources for training, developing, and implementing technologies and equipment.
Another key CTR project involves assisting Russia to destroy the 40,000 metric tons of declared chemical weapons agent inherited from the Soviet Union. Without substantial technical and monetary assistance from the United States and other countries, Russia will have difficulty meeting the Chemical Weapons Convention destruction schedules. Through the CTR program, the United States is considering substantial assistance in the design and construction of a prototype chemical munitions destruction facility, capable of destroying 500 metric tons of nerve-agent-filled artillery munitions per year.
CONCLUSION
The CTR program represents a small investment when compared to the overall size of the DoD budget and to the costs of major U.S. defense systems. This modest investment, $1.236 billion since FY 1992, has contributed to significant reductions in the threat posed by the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. Continuing the CTR program will allow the United States to pursue not only the objectives specific to this program, but also overarching objectives and interests bearing on U.S. national security and global nuclear stability. The future payoffs can be enormous: denuclearization of Ukraine and Belarus (Kazakstan is already nuclear weapons free, thanks in part to CTR assistance); accelerated Russian strategic arms reductions to START II levels; initiation and acceleration of the destruction program for Russian chemical weapons; enhanced security, safety, and control of nuclear weapons and fissile material in Russia; progress in moving the WMD scientific and industrial infrastructure in the NIS to civilian commercial activities; and increased defense and military-to-military contacts. All of this will be made possible by a program whose FY 1996 budget of $298 million represented less than two-tenths of one percent of the entire DoD budget.
The United States spent billions, perhaps trillions, of dollars during the Cold War defending against Soviet weapons of mass destruction. CTR assistance has made substantial progress in reducing the threat from these weapons and in helping to ensure new threats will not arise. The CTR program is a modest investment with a big payoff for U.S. security. By maintaining this program of defense by other means, the United States will continue to enhance its national security now and in the future.
