INTRODUCTION
In December 1993, pursuant to Presidential Directive, the Secretary of Defense launched the Department's Counterproliferation Initiative. This initiative was undertaken in light of the growing threats to U.S. security and national interests posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery. In many of the world's regions where the United States is likely to deploy forces -- Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East -- potential adversaries are pursuing the development or acquisition of NBC weapons. The American experience in the Gulf War made manifest the implications of NBC proliferation for defense planning. For DoD to do its job in the post-Cold War era, it must take seriously the potential NBC dimension of future conflicts. U.S. forces must be properly trained and equipped for all potential missions, including those in which opponents might threaten or use NBC weapons. The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative is designed to meet these challenges.
The primary goal of U.S. policy is to prevent NBC proliferation from occurring in the first place. The Department's activities contribute in many ways to achieving this goal. Military preparations for operations in an NBC environment make clear that threats or use of NBC weapons will not deter the United States from applying its military power in important regions. Effective capabilities to counter proliferation devalue the potential political and military benefits of NBC weapons for a would-be proliferant. In addition, capabilities developed for the battlefield to deal with NBC proliferation -- especially intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance means -- can be brought to bear in support of international regimes, export controls, and other international monitoring efforts to prevent the spread of NBC weapons and related technologies.
IMPLEMENTING THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE
Over the past year, the Department achieved significant progress toward fully integrating counterproliferation issues into its mission, including military planning, acquisition, budgeting, intelligence, international cooperation, and support to arms and export control regimes. Activities have built upon the formal policy guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense in May 1994 and the follow-on guidance contained in internal planning and programming documents. These documents have been revised to reflect the Department's role in the entire spectrum of U.S. government activities related to NBC proliferation -- from supporting diplomatic efforts to prevent or contain proliferation to protecting the United States and its friends and allies, and their military forces, from NBC attacks should they occur.
The Department's current focus on the integration and implementation of DoD counterproliferation policy is a sign of the maturity of the initiative. Similarly, the fact that DoD is now grappling with specific military planning issues demonstrates that the Department has moved well beyond questions of broad policy to determining the most effective measures to achieve its objectives. Maintaining the current momentum and direction of the counterproliferation initiative thus becomes a top priority.
Assigning Responsibilities for Counterproliferation Missions
One of the most important steps taken last year toward fully integrating counterproliferation into the functions of the Department was the completion of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study, which gave the geographic commanders in chiefs (CINCs) principal responsibility for the counterproliferation mission. The Unified Command Plan has been revised to reflect this new role for the geographic CINCs and directs that operational planning address the military challenges posed by NBC proliferation. In mid-1996, the the Roles and Missions Senior Advisory Group will review, among other items, the Joint Staff's provisions to ensure that counterproliferation planning is addressed in the CINCs' operational plans.
Developing Integrated Force Requirements for Counterproliferation
The Department has also worked to ensure that the views of the regional commanders are fully factored into assessments of what capabilities are needed to support counterproliferation. Making use of the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, which was established by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prioritize CINC requirements in specific functional/mission areas, the Department created a Deterrence/Counterproliferation JWCA team to identify CINC counterproliferation priorities. This JWCA team developed a list of 14 priorities:
These results have provided an important basis for this year's budget request and, in particular, the Counterproliferation Support Program.
The Department's effort to counter proliferation threats is not limited, however, to identifying needed military hardware. An equally important part of the job is to adapt joint doctrine, planning, training, and exercise policies in light of the operational implications of the threat or use of NBC weapons. The regional commands are now working with Joint Staff and civilian counterparts to assess more fully how regional proliferation risks may affect doctrine and military operations in a theater. A more thorough understanding of how accomplishing routine military tasks may be affected by the presence of NBC weapons and associated delivery vehicles will, in turn, help DoD better define hardware requirements and the proper emphasis to be placed on various capabilities, including theater missile defenses (TMD), passive defenses, counterforce, and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I).
The Department has also made extensive use of wargames and related activities in 1995 to build a common understanding among the military community about warfighting issues associated with NBC proliferation. Hundreds of U.S. (and some allied) civilian and military personnel participated in Global 95, a wargame sponsored by the U.S. Naval War College that featured prominently the military issues arising from chemical and biological weapons use in a major regional conflict. Nimble Dancer, a CJCS-sponsored wargame, addressed similar questions. The Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University is also examining how doctrine and military operations might be adapted to address these challenges.
Reviewing Technologies to Respond to Proliferation Risks
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1995 established the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) to identify and review existing and proposed technologies for nonproliferation and counterproliferation. The CPRC, based on its mandate, focuses on programs underway or proposed by DoD, the Department of Energy (DoE), and the Intelligence Community. The CPRC establishes priorities and makes recommendations for programs designed to address risks posed by NBC proliferation. Part of the CPRC progress is the preparation of a comprehensive annual report which details the ongoing counterproliferation efforts across the Services and agencies. The May 1995 CPRC Report represents the most complete and recent accounting of counterproliferation and related activities within DoD, DoE, and the Intelligence Community.
Establishing Core DoD Programs -- The Counterproliferation (CP) Support Program
The Department has a large number and variety of programs currently planned that are either directly part of counterproliferation or are strongly related. The CP Support Program is a significant part of DoD's overall program of acquisition and research and development to counter the spread of NBC weapons and their delivery means. The CP Support Program has several important mandates, including to:
While the program is only a year old, early successes have been achieved. The CP Support Program's funding has allowed for the deployment of much needed capabilities to Service/CINC users and accelerating the development of key technologies that address shortfalls.
Highlights of the CP Support Program
The various technology and acquisition projects supported by the CP Support Program are divided into five general mission areas. The following section highlights present and future efforts in each of these areas, drawing specific attention to capabilities already deployed or accelerated.
PREVENTION
The focus in this area is on developing intelligence-gathering systems for the military to support the U.S. national security goal of preventing NBC proliferation in the first place. For example, DoD has deployed the specific emitter identifier (SEI), a capability that enables the identification and tracking of ships at sea that may be carrying NBC-related cargoes. The first SEI hardware was delivered to the Navy for use on patrol aircraft in the Middle East six months ahead of schedule.
PASSIVE DEFENSE
Current CP Support Program funding supports Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps efforts that include the development of long- and short-range standoff biological detectors, point bio-detectors, a Surface Acoustic Wave chemical detector, and individual and collective protection equipment. Important programs that have been significantly accelerated by the CP Support Program include:
Potential future passive defense enhancement includes remote detection of chemical aerosols through multi/ hyper-spectral sensors and exploration of innovative bio-detection technologies.
ACTIVE DEFENSE
Theater missile defense is an essential element of DoD's approach to countering risks posed by NBC weapons delivered by cruise and ballistic missiles. The U.S. theater missile defense program is managed and funded by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). From a counterproliferation perspective, boost phase defense is critical to defending against NBC-armed ballistic missiles. As described in Part IV, the current program is focused on defense against ballistic missiles. The program calls for near-term improvements to existing systems, development of a new core set of TMD capabilities, and exploration of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) and other risk reduction activities to complement the core programs.
COUNTERFORCE
The counterforce effort consists of a cluster of programs to identify, characterize, and neutralize above-ground hardened or underground NBC-related facilities such as factories, laboratories, and storage sites. In addition, the ability to predict accurately and mitigate the collateral effects of U.S. strikes on NBC facilities forms a core of DoD's counterforce capability. Collateral effects prediction software and hardware are being developed by DNA and the first set of predictive tools has been delivered to the U.S. European Command. An important area of work focuses on the Counterproliferation ACTD. The ACTD will allow the operational community to evaluate emerging capabilities to defeat or eliminate an opponent's NBC weapons, while minimizing collateral damage in doing so. This project demonstrates the Department's efforts to bring together the acquisition and operational communities, with the theater commander, to develop jointly a strategy and concept of operations for addressing the challenges posed by NBC proliferation. In FY 1997, the CP Support Program intends to expand counterforce efforts to include detection and defeat of critical mobile targets (such as Scud missile launchers) as well as the destruction of nuclear weapons infrastructure.
COVERT/TERRORIST NBC THREATS
Present CP Support Program efforts include the prepositioning of NBC-related explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) equipment for counterterrorist use, advanced technology to counter covert NBC threats, and supporting operations plans and training exercises related to NBC incidents. Especially significant progress has been made in the EOD area -- through the CP Support Program, nuclear EOD equipment has been deployed to several sites in the United States and overseas to heighten readiness and reduce response times in dealing with potential threats. The first additional set of nuclear EOD equipment has been shipped to the European theater for prepositioned forward storage.
Improving Intelligence Support for Counterproliferation
The U.S. Intelligence Community, with a leading role played by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), is improving its ability to provide DoD leaders the detailed information necessary to support efforts to discourage NBC acquisition, to deter the threat or use of NBC weapons by a proliferant, and to protect against potential NBC attacks on the United States, U.S. forces, and U.S. friends or allies. A high priority is being placed on assessing the intentions, programs, operational practices, and supporting infrastructure of countries of concern such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, as well as countries who are also of concern as suppliers (like North Korea). This underwrites DoD prevention efforts and provides a basis for military force structure development. Greater attention is also being given to operational intelligence (such as the location and characterization of NBC facilities, target vulnerability, early warning tracking data) and its timely dissemination, both of which are critical for planning defenses and responses to NBC threats.
Cooperating with International Partners in Addressing Shared Risks
The Department is continuing to work with America's long-standing allies in Europe and in the Pacific region to develop common approaches on counterproliferation. Notably, the Department played the leading role in moving counterproliferation to the top of NATO's agenda.
The NATO Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), co-chaired by the United States and a European ally (currently the United Kingdom), was established in 1994 to determine the range of alliance and national capabilities needed in light of proliferation risks. In November 1995, the DGP presented its key findings to NATO defense and foreign ministers. It stressed the importance of developing a core, integrative set of capabilities (including doctrine and training) that provided a basis for continuing capability enhancements and force improvements as proliferation risks evolve. This core set of capabilities includes:
In many of these areas, NATO already has, or is on the way to developing, the requisite capabilities. DGP findings are intended to give impetus and added rationale for fielding such capabilities, as well as to demonstrate how supplementing this nucleus of capabilities with other means -- including layered defenses against TBM attack, special munitions for NBC agent defeat and hardened NBC targets, computer modeling and simulation, and medical countermeasures -- would strengthen the alliance's overall ability to discourage NBC proliferation, deter the threat of use of NBC weapons, and protect against NBC attacks.
In the Pacific region, U.S. friends and allies have also recognized the growing security risks posed by proliferation. DoD has collective defense arrangements with many in the region, and conducts combined operations with their militaries. Some Pacific partners have also participated in -- and will likely do so in the future -- international coalition operations in which the presence of NBC weapons has been a factor. For these reasons, DoD has been working with such key allies as Japan and Australia to forge common approaches to improving military capabilities and doctrine in the face of NBC risks.
These international activities demonstrate that the United States is not alone in its concerns for the defense dimension of proliferation. The Department remains committed to building international partnerships with allies and friends whose security and national interests are threatened by NBC proliferation.
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION NORMS
Indefinitely Extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) established certain obligations for both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states regarding the transfer, manufacture, or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Treaty mandated a review and extension conference, which was held in April-May 1995, at which time the parties agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely and unconditionally. As in previous preparatory meetings, DoD representatives played a strong role in the extension conference. The decision to extend the NPT indefinitely is accompanied by a commitment to NPT Principles and Objectives which includes a call for Treaty universality, transparency in export controls, and a strengthened NPT review process.
Negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The President has directed the U.S. government seek to conclude negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by April 1996, to report the treaty to the United Nations General Assembly in the summer, and to have the treaty ready for signature in fall 1996. A CTBT will strengthen the global norm against proliferation of nuclear weapons and constrain the development and validation of new nuclear weapons by proliferant states and the nuclear weapons states. The United States will continue to ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile. DoD is a key player in developing U.S. positions for these negotiations.
Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention
Opened for signature on January 13, 1995, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) currently has 159 signatories and will enter into force 180 days following the deposit of the 65th ratification with the United Nations (47 had ratified as of March 6, 1996). The Administration has submitted the CWC to the Senate for ratification. Since February 1993, the CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) has been meeting to complete the details necessary to have the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fully operational at entry into force. DoD continues to participate actively in the PrepCom, providing experts on key implementation matters such as inspection procedures, data management, and inspector training. As mandated under the CWC, DoD will declare and destroy the U.S. chemical weapon stockpile, as well as the non-stockpile items (former production facilities, training weapons, and so forth) covered by the Convention.
Enhancing the Biological Weapons Convention
The President has directed that the United States promote new measures that provide increased transparency of potential biological weapons-related activities and facilities in an effort to help deter violations of and enhance compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). DoD participates in the U.S. delegation to the BWC Ad Hoc Group mandated by the September 1994 Special Conference and plays an important role in U.S. efforts to develop off-site and on-site measures for consideration by the Group. The United States strongly supports the development of a legally-binding protocol of such measures to strengthen the BWC.
ENHANCING TECHNOLOGY SECURITY AND EXPORT CONTROLS
America's military technological advantage is a critical force multiplier that serves to deter aggression and, where deterrence fails, enables U.S. forces to fight and win with minimum casualties. The central purpose of DoD's technology security program is to preserve this important advantage by preventing the transfer of dangerous arms and dual-use technologies to countries that pose a threat to international security. Likewise, the program ensures that when such goods are transferred, it is done in a prudent and responsible manner that neither endangers national interests nor compromises U.S. military superiority.
Of necessity, DoD's technology security program is multifaceted, incorporating both arms as well as dual-use goods and technologies. Export controls -- both national as well as international -- play an important role in this process. While it remains U.S. policy to prohibit and curtail the proliferation of NBC technologies, the United States recognizes that the sale and export of conventional weapons and associated technologies is not inherently threatening or destabilizing. In fact, many such transfers support legitimate defense requirements of allies and friends, promote burdensharing, and increase interoperability with U.S. forces. Such exports also serve to maintain a strong and responsive U.S. defense industrial base.
A number of important enhancements to DoD's technology security program have taken place during the past year. The Administration has promulgated a comprehensive Conventional Arms Transfer policy. DoD played a central role in developing the Presidential Decision Directive, which establishes clear guidelines and specific factors to be considered before arms transfers are approved. DoD is equally involved in analyzing selected categories of dual-use technology, assessing the impact on national security should such technology be transferred, and developing appropriate policies to guide the U.S. export review process.
For example, the Department of Defense played a key role in establishing new U.S. export controls on high-performance computers. DoD conducted an assessment of national security applications for computers and examined trends in computer technology. These findings were used to design and focus controls on those computers that are controllable and can be used in important national security work. In the face of a rapid advance and diffusion of computer technology worldwide, the revised computer controls will achieve two objectives: first, they will continue to allow the United States to deny access, by destinations that pose national security and proliferation risks, to controllable computing power needed for critical military or proliferation applications; and second, they will ensure that the superiority of the U.S. computer industrial base is protected by controlling only the controllable, and by not creating market niches for less responsible suppliers by unnecessarily impeding U.S. exports.
The United States clearly recognizes that it is not the only supplier of arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Accordingly, considerable effort is made to harmonize U.S. export policies and practices with other suppliers in order to make export controls more effective and, where exports are appropriate, to ensure a level playing field for American industry. On December 19, 1995, the United States and 27 other governments agreed to the establishment of a new international regime to replace the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). The new regime is to be known as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. (Wassenaar is the town outside the Hague where agreement on the new regime was reached.) Participants have agreed to control globally all items set forth on a basic list of dual-use goods and technologies and on a munitions list. Although just an initial framework that will need to be elaborated and defined more fully, the Wassenaar Arrangement is expected to increase transparency and responsibility for the global market in conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Other examples of multilateral collaboration include active support and participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), and the Australia Group.
TREATY ACTIVITIES -- THREAT REDUCTION THROUGH ARMS CONTROL
The United States is party to a number of formal agreements with states of the former Soviet Union or the former Warsaw Pact relating to the control of weapons of mass destruction and other armaments. While these treaties have their origins in the Cold War, they remain important by providing legally binding mechanisms for reducing (and in some cases eliminating) categories of arms, as well as enhancing confidence and international stability. The Department of Defense is responsible for ensuring U.S. compliance with its international arms control obligations, and plays a key role in the development of U.S. policies regarding treaty negotiation, ratification, verification, and implementation. A unique DoD element, the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), performs inspection, escort, and monitoring functions associated with verification of a wide range of arms control treaties and agreements.
START I
The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed in 1991, entered into force in December 1994. This landmark treaty, originally concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, provided for the first actual reductions in the superpowers' deployed strategic offensive arms. Following the December 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, the states of Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine became parties with the United States to the START I Treaty through the Lisbon Protocol. In documents associated with the signing of the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine agreed to eliminate all strategic offensive arms from their territories within the START seven-year reduction period and to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states. On December 5, 1994, Ukraine formally acceded to the NPT, as Kazakstan and Belarus had previously done, and the five START I parties then exchanged instruments of ratification, bringing START I into force.
Under the terms of START I, the sides are to reduce by December 5, 2001, their deployed accountable strategic warheads by over 40 percent, and their accountable strategic delivery systems by about one-third, from 1990 levels. The sides began efforts to achieve these goals well ahead of entry into force of the Treaty, and continued their activities related to the elimination of ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers throughout 1995. By the end of 1995, over 1,500 strategic warheads and 760 missile launchers and bombers had been removed from START accountability in Belarus, Kazakstan, Ukraine, and Russia. As a result of the eliminations, the former Soviet states are already well below the first intermediate ceiling on deployed missile launchers and bombers and their associated warheads, several years ahead of the required schedule. The United States, for its part, has removed warheads and missiles from all the missile launchers to be eliminated under START I and has retired and moved to a central elimination facility all heavy bombers earmarked for dismantlement under the Treaty. The United States has also eliminated 700 strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers or about 57 percent of the deployed delivery vehicles which will be reduced under START I, thus meeting the first START I intermediate ceiling on launchers and accountable warheads almost three years ahead of schedule, and the second intermediate limit on launchers and ballistic missile warhead almost five years early.
The entry into force of START I ushered in a verification regime of unprecedented complexity and intrusiveness. In addition to verification by national technical means, data notifications, missile flight test telemetry exchanges, and other cooperative measures, the Treaty provides for 12 types of on-site inspections and exhibitions, as well as continuous on-site monitoring activities at specified facilities. Beginning in March 1995, the Treaty parties began conducting on-site inspections at a large number of current and former strategic installations in the United States and former Soviet Union. By the end of 1995, the United States had hosted over 60 such on-site inspections at DoD facilities by START inspectors representing the former Soviet states. DoD representatives also played key roles on U.S. delegations during meetings of the START Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). The JCIC, convened periodically in Geneva, provides a forum for the five START parties to discuss issues relating to compliance with START obligations and agree on practical measures to improve the Treaty's viability and effectiveness.
START II
The START I Treaty set the stage for a subsequent agreement between Russia and the United States further reducing strategic offensive arms, known as START II. This Treaty, signed by President Bush and President Yeltsin in January 1993, provides for the elimination, by January 1, 2003, of the most destabilizing category of strategic weapons -- heavy and all other intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) -- and will result in the reduction of deployed strategic warheads to no more than 3,500 on each side, approximately one-third of pre-START levels. With the Senate's vote to ratify START II, the United States now hopes for early action by the Russian legislature to approve the treaty. DoD has worked closely with other agencies in encouraging members of the Russian State Duma and Federation Council to vote in favor of START II ratification. The Administration looks forward to exchanging instruments of ratification of START II as soon as possible, after which the parties will proceed to deactivate strategic systems to be reduced under the Treaty under the terms of a joint statement issued by President Clinton and President Yeltsin in September 1994. The Department of Defense will take a lead role in establishing the schedule and method used for implementing these strategic force deactivations after START II enters into force.
Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces
The Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the INF Treaty, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, entered into force in 1988. It required the elimination of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. All such declared missiles were eliminated by mid-1991. The INF Treaty is of unlimited duration, prohibiting production and possession of missiles subject to its terms. Its inspection regime, consisting of short-notice inspections at former INF facilities and continuous portal monitoring of certain missile production facilities, remains in force. DoD officials are key participants in these inspection and monitoring activities, and take part in the INF Special Verification Commission (SVC), at which the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine meet to discuss and resolve Treaty implementation and compliance issues. During 1995, DoD representatives were heavily involved in negotiations with the Russian Federation to develop procedures for continuous monitoring of new ballistic missile production at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant.
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Successive administrations have supported the continued viability of the ABM Treaty as important to preserve and enhance U.S. national security. As a cornerstone of strategic stability, the Treaty has made an important contribution to the extraordinary progress in reducing strategic offensive arms. Although the ABM Treaty does not address TMD systems per se, it does require that non-ABM components (which would include TMD) not be given capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not be tested in an ABM mode. The Administration believes that clarification of the distinction between ABM systems, which are limited by the ABM Treaty, and non-ABM systems, which are not so limited, is necessary. The Administration further believes that such a clarification should be pursued through negotiations with Russia and any other New Independent States that choose to be parties to the Treaty as successors to the USSR. An agreement that clarifies the distinction between ABM and other ballistic missile defense systems will help to ensure the continued viability and effectiveness of the ABM Treaty as the United States pursues development and deployment of effective TMD systems for the protection of its forces overseas, allies, and friends.
ABM Treaty compliance is not imposing any constraints on the planned capabilities of the TMD systems the United States is pursuing. The Department has concluded -- and reported to Congress separately -- that the third upgrade to Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3), the Navy Lower Tier, the Navy Upper Tier, and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) demonstration/validation flight test program as currently designed and planned, will be compliant with the ABM Treaty.
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in November 1990, entered into force in November 1992. The Department of Defense continues to play a very active role in the verification and compliance activities associated with the CFE Treaty. These efforts are necessary to realize the Treaty's contribution to stability through reducing levels of conventional armaments throughout Europe and ensuring that there can be no destabilizing concentrations of forces in the region. The Treaty reached a milestone date in November 1995, when all 30 parties were required to achieve their mandated levels of equipment holdings. Toward this goal, over 50,000 pieces of military hardware were destroyed. In 1995, the On-Site Inspection Agency participated in over 60 inspections under the Treaty in states of the former Warsaw Pact and escorted foreign teams during eight inspections of U.S. forces in Europe. The Treaty is now in the 120-day residual level validation period of on-site inspections to confirm notified equipment holdings.
NATO allies have also been working to address concerns expressed by Russia and some other Treaty parties regarding the limits on equipment located in the flank area of the CFE zone of application. The United States and NATO have conducted intensive discussions with Russia and other parties about the importance of resolving their concerns in a manner that preserves the CFE Treaty and results in no diminution of the security of any Party to the CFE Treaty. On November 17, 1995, in Vienna, all 30 parties to the Treaty reached agreement on the makeup of a flanks solution, including a map realignment, an equipment withdrawal schedule, and constraints on forces in the realigned areas. Discussions to conclude the details of an agreement are continuing.
Open Skies Treaty
DoD is continuing preparations for implementation of the Open Skies Treaty, signed in March 1992. The Treaty will permit participating states to overfly other parties and collect photographic and other specified data, thereby strengthening stability and cooperative security though increased openness and transparency. The U.S. Open Skies aircraft, operated by the USAF and staffed by OSIA, has participated in 12 trial flights in 1995, including four with foreign participants. The treaty is awaiting ratification by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to enter into force.
The On-Site Inspection Agency
The On-Site Inspection Agency is a joint-Service defense agency tasked with ensuring U.S. readiness for and implementation of inspection, escort, and monitoring activities related to verification provisions of several conventional and strategic arms control treaties and agreements. Tracing its inception to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, OSIA began operations in January 1988 in response to a Presidential directive. OSIA drew on various U.S. government agencies for expertise to provide inspection, escort, and monitoring teams comprised of team chiefs, weapons specialists, linguists, technical experts, and as needed, policy experts to implement the INF Treaty's inspection regime.
In 1990, the OSIA charter was expanded twice. The first change included responsibility for operational planning and preparation for implementation of on-site inspection provisions under the CFE Treaty, START, the Chemical Weapons Agreements, and the Nuclear Testing Treaties -- the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. Later that year, President Bush assigned overall management and support of in-country nuclear test monitoring to OSIA. Agency experts continue to prepare for the inspection provisions of the START II Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty, as well as conduct the audit and examination provisions of the implementing agreements under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The OSIA teams record the quantities and use of equipment provided to the former Soviet Union states to support nuclear arms dismantlement efforts. OSIA also provides technical insight, based on its extensive operational expertise and experience, in the appropriate fora during treaty negotiations.
During the 120-day baseline inspection period for START I that began last March, OSIA teams conducted 74 missions at 72 sites in the four former republics of the Soviet Union -- Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan -- where strategic offensive arms are located. The European Operations Command, an OSIA component at Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany, conducts inspections and escort and liaison missions under the CFE Treaty; inspections and escort missions under Confidence- and Security-Building Measures such as the Vienna Document 1994; and escort missions for the INF Treaty.
OSIA also serves as Executive Agent for DoD support to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq, fulfilling Security Council Resolutions 687 and 715. In this capacity, the Agency tasks, as needed, departmental components for procurement or provision of DoD equipment, services, manpower, and facilities to further UNSCOM goals.
The Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP), a security and countermeasures program under the auspices of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, is run on a day-to-day basis by the OSIA Security Office. As Executive Agent for DTIRP, OSIA works closely with its peers in U.S. industrial facilities and at military installations targeted for on-site inspections. Agency technicians, trained in arms control security awareness techniques, develop site-specific procedures that help ensure foreign inspection team access does not result in the loss of proprietary of sensitive information.
OSIA personnel plan for implementation and will escort inspection teams to DoD CW storage, former production, research and development, and demilitarization facilities in accordance with the provisions of both the CWC and Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Agency officials assist other DoD activities with CW implementation readiness planning, to include conducting mock inspections at DoD facilities. OSIA also provides escort and interpreter support to the DoD program aimed at establishing a viable Russian CW destruction program under the CTR Program.
Four Arms Control Implementation Units (ACIUs), established by OSIA, serve as forward posts for arms control and defense-related functions and provide vital liaison functions with U.S. embassies in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and Almaty. These units also provide support for the CTR Program.
CONCLUSION
By means of the Counterproliferation Initiative and key involvement with implementing and verifying arms control treaties and agreements, DoD is focused squarely on the challenge of reducing the dangers from weapons of mass destruction and improving international stability and security, while maintaining capabilities to respond to any threat. The Department's aggressive leadership in counterproliferation and threat reduction, manifest through numerous concrete programs and activities, has yielded substantial results, and will continue to be vital in achieving national objectives in this area.
