INTRODUCTION
The United States' strategy of engagement and enlargement requires forces that are able, in concert with regional allies, to fight and win two major regional conflicts (MRCs) that occur nearly simultaneously. This requirement, established in the Bottom-Up Review, remains the most significant factor in determining the overall size and structure of U.S. general purpose forces. The Bottom-Up Review also calls for forces capable of meeting a wide range of challenges, including sustaining credible overseas presence, remaining prepared to conduct contingency operations, and maintaining strong nuclear deterrence as well as deterring and preventing the effective use of biological and chemical weapons. To meet these challenges effectively, U.S. forces must be positioned forward or ready to deploy rapidly to distant regions to achieve their objectives quickly and decisively.
MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS
During the Cold War, U.S. defense planning focused on winning a large-scale war in Europe. With the changes in the global security environment, the United States today must plan for the more likely scenario of fighting and winning regional conflicts on the scale of the 1991 Gulf War or a potential conflict in Korea. In contrast to the Cold War, the timing and location of these regional conflicts are uncertain, and the bulk of required U.S. forces will not be in theater prior to the outbreak of conflict. Even in areas of great U.S. interest and high threat, where some equipment is prepositioned and troops are forward deployed, most U.S. forces will deploy from the United States. U.S. defense plans therefore must ensure selected forces can quickly project power from the United States into threatened regions to secure U.S. interests and help allies defeat hostile regional powers. Moreover, the sustainment of U.S. power projection forces -- in the absence of a large, forward-stationed logistics structure -- will require the development and employment of new logistics technologies.
Often in these MRCs, the United States will be fighting as the leader of a coalition, with allies and friends providing some support and combat forces. In fact, DoD expects that regional allies will fight along with U.S. forces, and that friends and allies from beyond the crisis area will contribute forces to any MRC. However, U.S. forces must be sized and structured to preserve the flexibility and the capability to act unilaterally if necessary.
Detailed analyses of possible future MRCs suggest that the following forces will be adequate, under most conditions, to successfully fight and win a single MRC, assuming that DoD continues to make critical programmed enhancements to strategic lift, equipment prepositioning, and other force capabilities and their supporting assets:
The United States could commit more forces than these in the event of unlikely or unforeseen circumstances, particularly if initial U.S. defensive efforts fail. The need to hedge against such eventualities is taken into account in designing the overall active and Reserve force structure.
A wide range of analytical efforts undertaken by the Department of Defense since the Bottom-Up Review further examined the adequacy of the force structure discussed above and refined its underlying analyses. Among these efforts were several assessments performed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) of U.S. military posture in Korea and Southwest Asia, conferences among the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, and the following:
While these efforts recommended some adjustments to the defense program, they all concluded that the force structure and programs that constitute the Bottom-Up Review-based defense program remain sufficient to enable the United States, in concert with regional allies, to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Hence, the Department will continue to implement that program.
OVERSEAS PRESENCE
A second broad class of military operations that determine the overall size and shape of U.S. forces is overseas presence. Although all Services contribute substantially to a U.S. overseas presence posture, overseas presence needs impose requirements for naval forces that exceed those needed for MRCs alone. Therefore, programmed force levels for the Navy and the Marine Corps were developed based on their roles in overseas presence missions as well as their requirements for two MRCs.
The United States will continue to maintain a robust overseas presence in several forms:
Stationing and deploying U.S. military forces overseas in peacetime remain essential elements of the United States' National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. As noted above, the U.S. military's peacetime overseas presence is the single most visible demonstration of America's commitment to defend U.S. and allied interests in key regions throughout the world. The presence of U.S. forces helps shape the international security environment by deterring adventurism and coercion by potentially hostile states, reassuring friends, enhancing regional stability, and underwriting the larger strategy of engagement and enlargement. It thus strengthens the U.S. role in the affairs of key regions.
Maintaining a sufficient level of U.S. military forces in Europe is essential to preserving U.S. influence and leadership. The reassurance that a visible and capable U.S. military presence provides both to America's traditional allies in Western Europe and to its new Partners for Peace in the East aids in the development of a stable and democratic post-Cold War Europe. President Clinton underscored U.S. resolve to sustain U.S. presence in Europe by pledging to maintain approximately 100,000 troops stationed in Europe, augmented by forward-deployed naval forces in surrounding waters. In consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, DoD determined that 109,000 troops are required at this time. This level of presence is sufficient both to respond to plausible crises and to provide tangible evidence of America's commitment to preserving regional stability. In addition, this force level permits active participation in multinational training while minimizing the likelihood of having to deploy additional forces from the continental United States (CONUS) in the early stages of an emerging regional crisis. Such a force will also anchor both NATO's deterrent capability and the Alliance's ability to respond to out-of-area contingencies.
In the East Asian-Pacific region, the United States is in an unparalleled position to be a stabilizing force in the multipolar regional balance that has followed the Cold War. Because the United States is a powerful but distant state, its forward-deployed forces are viewed by regional actors as a reassuring presence. Any significant diminution of the U.S. military presence in the East Asia-Pacific, absent a corresponding reduction in potential threats there, would risk creating the perception of a regional power vacuum. This, in turn, could touch off a regional arms race, threatening vital U.S. economic, political, and security interests.
The United States is thus committed to maintaining its current level of approximately 100,000 troops in Asia, most of whom are forward-stationed in Japan and Korea. These include an Army division consisting of two brigades and a fighter wing-equivalent of U.S. Air Force (USAF) combat aircraft on the Korean Peninsula; and a Marine Expeditionary Force, an aircraft carrier battle group, an amphibious squadron, and one and a half fighter wing-equivalents of USAF combat aircraft in Japan. This force visibly demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the region, deters aggression by potentially hostile states, and allows for rapid and decisive U.S. action should deterrence fail.
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the U.S. response to Iraq's sudden deployment of Republican Guard divisions close to Kuwait in October 1994 showed a substantially improved ability to project U.S. military forces rapidly into the region and have them ready to fight soon after their arrival. America's quick response was the result of several specific steps taken since the end of Operation Desert Storm:
These measures, combined with programs such as the squadron of Maritime Prepositioning Ships located in the Indian Ocean, gave U.S. forces the ability to respond quickly to the Iraqi threat. The close military-to-military relationships built up over many years with each of the GCC states created the environment that allowed host countries to accept the United States' crisis deployment promptly and support it effectively. DoD will continue to build on this solid base of cooperation by prepositioning equipment for a second heavy brigade and a division base in Qatar (including a tank battalion set of equipment by early 1996), maintaining the number of land-based combat and support aircraft deployed to the region, prepositioning additional stocks of preferred munitions in-theater, stationing mine countermeasures ships in the Persian Gulf, and further enhancing its program of training and exercises with U.S. security partners in the region.
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are extensive and varied, and a strong U.S. defense capability is essential to the region's security. For example, the United States' trade with Latin America is growing faster than trade with any other region. The U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) provide crisis reaction forces, serve as partners in cooperative regional security, and symbolize the U.S. commitment to regional security. Potential missions for U.S. forces in the region include support to counterdrug operations, counterterrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, smaller-scale combat operations, and disaster relief. U.S. forces also continue to exercise with regional friends and allies, helping to build cooperative security mechanisms and encouraging Latin American militaries to support civilian control, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.
The United States will continue to operate bases and facilities in the Republic of Panama until the year 2000 and is fully committed to implementing the Panama Canal Treaty. The two governments agreed to hold exploratory talks to discuss possible stationing of some U.S. forces in Panama beyond December 31, 1999. USACOM operates a base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which has proven valuable in handling migrant flows from Haiti and Cuba.
U.S. security and economic interests in Africa are not as prominent as those in other regions, and the United States has no bases in Africa. Yet in recent years, U.S. forces have been called upon to serve in large-scale peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in Somalia and Rwanda and to evacuate U.S. citizens from Liberia. With the continuing possibility of conflicts and humanitarian disasters in Africa, it is important that the United States helps African states, particularly the new South Africa, develop more effective capabilities for conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief.
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
The final set of operations for which DoD must shape its non-nuclear forces involves a variety of contingencies that are less demanding than MRCs but still require significant combat forces and capabilities. Such operations range from smaller-scale combat operations and multilateral peace operations to counterterrorism activities and humanitarian assistance operations.
In some cases, the United States will advance its interests by providing military forces to selected allied/coalition operations, some of which may support UNSC Resolutions. Further, the United States will continue to participate directly in UN peace operations when it serves U.S. interests. However, the United States will maintain the capability to act unilaterally when important U.S. interests are at stake.
Over the past decade, the United States has conducted an array of major contingency operations of the following types: peace operations, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, maritime escort, counterterrorism, reprisal attacks, deterrence of aggression, intervention to support democracy, sanctions enforcement, no-fly zone enforcement, migrant rescue and support, search and rescue, and deployments to quell domestic civil disturbances.
In 1995, such contingency operations included crisis response in the Persian Gulf; humanitarian relief, peace operations, and sanctions enforcement in and around the former Republic of Yugoslavia; enforcement of the no-fly zone over southern Iraq; humanitarian relief in northern Iraq; migrant operations in the Western Hemisphere; operations to restore democracy in Haiti; and extraction of UN troops from Somalia.
The forces for these operations are provided largely by the same general purpose and special operations forces needed for MRCs and overseas presence, although some specialized training and capabilities may be required. This means that the United States will not be able to conduct sizable contingency operations at the same time it is fighting in two MRCs.
OVERALL FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
Based on the comprehensive assessment of U.S. defense needs in the Bottom-Up Review, DoD has determined that the force structure shown below, which will be reached by the end of the decade, can carry out America's strategy and meet its national security requirements.
| Table I-1 | ||
| Force Structure | ||
|---|---|---|
| End FY 1996 | BUR-Based Plan End FY 1999 | |
| Army | ||
| Active Divisions | 10 | 10 |
| National Guard Divisions | 8+ [a] | 5+ [b] |
| Navy | ||
| Aircraft Carriers [c] | 11/1 | 11/1 |
| Airwings (AC/RC) [c] | 10/1 | 10/1 |
| Attack Submarines | 80 | 45-55 |
| Ships | 359 | 346 |
| Air Force | ||
| Active Fighter Wings | 13 | 13 |
| Reserve Fighter Wings | 7 | 7 |
| Bombers | 201 | 178 |
| Marine Corps | ||
| Active Personnel End Strength | 174,000 | 174,000 |
| Reserve Personnel End Strength | 42,000 | 42,000 |
| [a] In addition, 15 brigades have been designated as Enhanced Brigades. | ||
| [b] Current plans call for 42 Brigades, including 15 Enhanced Brigades. | ||
| [c] Dual entries in the table show data for active/reserve forces, except for carriers, which depicts active/operational reserve carriers. | ||
If a major regional conflict erupts, the United States will deploy a substantial number of forces to the theater to augment those already there in order to quickly defeat the aggressor. If it is prudent to do so, limited U.S. forces may remain engaged in a smaller-scale operation, such as a peacekeeping operation, while the MRC is ongoing; if not, U.S. forces will be withdrawn from contingency operations in order to help constitute sufficient forces to deter and, if necessary, fight and win a second MRC. If a second MRC were to break out shortly after the first, U.S. forces would deploy rapidly to halt the invading force as quickly as possible. Selected high-leverage and mobile intelligence, command and control, and air capabilities, as well as amphibious forces, would be redeployed from the first MRC to the second as circumstances permitted. After winning both MRCs, U.S. forces would assume a more routine peacetime posture. As mentioned earlier, this force structure is not intended to support simultaneous U.S. involvement in two MRCs as well as sustained active force involvement in sizable contingency operations.
SIZING U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES
Current and planned U.S. nuclear force structure under START II is based upon recommendations made in the Department's Nuclear Posture Review, approved by the President in September 1994. This force structure reflects the reduced role nuclear weapons now play in U.S. security strategy. However, the Russian parliament has not yet ratified START II, and it is uncertain when it will do so. Thus, the United States is protecting, at affordable cost, options to maintain U.S. strategic capabilities under START I levels until Russia ratifies START II and reductions are underway. In 2003, under START II limits, U.S. strategic nuclear forces will be comprised of the following forces:
CONCLUSION
In the post-Cold War era, the United States plays the leading role in organizing coalitions of like-minded states to defend and advance common interests, to promote common values and norms, and thus, to create a world in which Americans can be secure and prosper. The force structure outlined above supports this strategy of engagement and enlargement. Together, these first-rate military forces underwrite security partnerships, help shape the international environment by their presence and activities, and deter and defeat aggression in a variety of settings.
