INTRODUCTION
Maritime forces -- the Navy and Marine Corps -- play a critical role in America's defenses. Deployed continuously in regions vital to U.S. interests, these forces provide a rapid means of responding to crises, while helping to deter aggression against the United States, its allies, and friends.
Acting independently or as part of joint military operations, maritime forces perform a full range of missions, from supporting humanitarian relief efforts to prosecuting major regional conflicts (MRCs). In times of crisis, they enable the United States to control access to and use of the sea; to bring military power rapidly to bear against naval, air, or land targets from points far at sea or close to shore; and to insert and support ground forces, as necessary. In MRCs, where they could provide the first U.S. response, maritime forces deliver early and strong combat power, while supporting the deployment of follow-on forces. Key to their effectiveness in these diverse roles is the ability of maritime forces to sustain themselves in forward locations for prolonged periods and to operate independent of foreign basing and overflight rights.
The lethality, adaptability, and independence of maritime forces make them well-suited to post-Cold War needs. As demonstrated during the Gulf War, maritime forces complement land-based air and ground forces in carrying out the U.S. military strategy.
Recognizing the importance of these contributions, the FY 1997 budget and associated Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) provide resources to improve the caliber of U.S. maritime forces, both people and equipment. The budget preserves combat readiness while continuing the quality of life enhancements initiated last year. At the same time, the budget recognizes the need to replace aging elements of the fleet while modernizing specific combat systems in response to emerging threats. Thus, the core elements of the recapitalization plan submitted last year are sustained in the FY 1997 budget, with appropriate adjustments to reflect congressional action on the FY 1996 request and other developments. The modernization programs planned for FY 1997-2001 will result in ready, technologically advanced maritime forces able to meet the diverse challenges that lie ahead.
MISSIONS
Consistent with the post-Cold War military strategy defined in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), maritime missions now focus on regional, as opposed to global, threats. The primary mission of maritime forces remains to deter aggression against the United States, its allies, and friends. A second mission -- forward presence -- serves as a link between deterrence and regional contingencies. Through routine deployments in forward areas, maritime forces promote stability and help to deter conflicts, while enhancing capabilities for joint operations with other U.S. and allied forces. Should crises arise, forward-deployed ships, aircraft, and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces provide rapid-response capabilities that can prevent tensions from escalating and more dangerous conflicts from erupting.
Forward deployments play a pivotal role in the U.S. defense strategy. Maritime forces, either on the scene at the outset of a crisis or arriving shortly thereafter, can serve to deter potential aggressors from taking hostile action. These forces also provide critical capabilities at the earliest junctures of a conflict. Recent wargames and analyses have shown that the early introduction of maritime forces can be crucial to the outcome of conflict scenarios. The timely arrival of these forces can influence whether an aggressor can be contained early in a crisis, before the situation deteriorates to a level requiring a more massive response.
Given the post-Cold War emphasis on regional conflicts, maritime forces now concentrate heavily on coastal, or littoral, operations. Such operations could include the projection of power from the sea, either as part of a limited strike using carrier-based aircraft or Tomahawk cruise missiles or as a component of a full-scale amphibious assault. In addition, maritime forces must maintain control of the sea in order to pursue other objectives, including support of land operations. Finally, for the successful prosecution of any conflict, maritime forces must utilize space-based reconnaissance assets, electronic warfare, and other intelligence assets to provide timely information about an aggressor's activities, and deny the same advantages to the enemy.
To fulfill these diverse and difficult responsibilities, maritime forces train for tasks ranging from air, surface, and undersea warfare to land attack. Additionally, these forces participate in numerous exercises with other U.S. and allied forces. These activities enhance combat proficiency, while strengthening capabilities for joint operations.
In 1995, the Navy and Marine Corps (both active and reserve elements) participated in operations spanning the full range of naval missions. Teamed with other U.S. and allied forces, maritime forces provided continued support for UN operations in Southwest Asia and the Balkans. The missions of these forces included enforcing no-fly zones, undertaking maritime interdiction operations, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, conducting air and Tomahawk missile strikes against Serbian ground targets. Maritime forces also provided support for humanitarian operations conducted by the United Nations in Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and contributed to relief efforts for communities damaged by hurricanes in the Caribbean and southeastern United States. Maritime forces also played a key role in operations to counter drug traffic in the southern approaches to the United States, and they participated in numerous multinational exercises.
THREATS
U.S. forces could face serious challenges when conducting contingency operations in littoral areas. Potential threats include:
In recognition of these and other emerging threats, the FY 1997 budget and FYDP provide the equipment and training necessary to counter potential regional adversaries and ensure the effective performance of U.S. maritime missions.
FORCE STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITIES
The maritime force structure includes Navy ships, aircraft, and shore elements, along with Marine Corps air and ground forces. Major categories of ships in the force include aircraft carriers, attack submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, and ballistic-missile submarines (discussed in the Strategic Nuclear Forces chapter). Augmenting these ships are various other vessels that perform support and logistical functions. These auxiliary ships enable maritime forces to remain on patrol for extended periods, with little or no shore support. The aviation component of the force consists of Navy and Marine tactical aircraft, land-based maritime patrol aircraft, sea-based helicopters, and various support aircraft. (Tactical aircraft are discussed in the Aviation Forces chapter.) Shore elements supporting maritime operations range from command centers to port repair facilities. Marine forces, stationed on land and at sea, provide a rapid means of projecting U.S. combat power in response to fast-breaking crises. These forces are specially trained and equipped for expeditionary operations ranging from personnel evacuations to amphibious assaults.
As explained below, the maritime force structure is driven predominantly by the need to maintain forward presence and to perform a wide range of peacetime and crisis response operations. The force structure also supports the BUR warfighting strategy, which calls for the ability to prosecute two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. To that end, the BUR set an FY 1999 warfighting objective of 10 aircraft carriers and about 45 attack submarines within an overall force goal of 346 ships.
As explained in the BUR, maritime forces would play a critical role in each of the four phases of an MRC:
Beyond setting wartime requirements, the BUR reaffirmed the need for maritime forces to conduct routine peacetime deployments. Accordingly, the force structure includes one additional active carrier -- beyond the wartime requirement -- to meet peacetime needs, plus an operational reserve carrier to support training requirements and undertake limited deployments. This yields a total force of 12 carriers -- 11 active and one reserve. To meet near-term presence demands in addition to warfighting requirements, the BUR determined that a force of 45-55 attack submarines would be required through FY 1999. Assessments and programming decisions subsequent to the BUR have modified the projected fleet size to about 330-346 ships by FY 2001; the range provides flexibility for future programming decisions regarding primarily the surface combatant force.
The Navy deploys one carrier battle group (CVBG) and one amphibious ready group (ARG) with an embarked, special operations-capable Marine expeditionary unit on a nearly continuous basis in three separate theaters: the western Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the North Arabian Sea. Thus, at any given time, roughly three CVBGs and three ARGs are on patrol in forward areas. In the event that neither a CVBG nor an ARG were near the scene of an unfolding crisis, an equivalent force could be deployed to the vicinity on short notice.
Maintaining a continuous CVBG presence in each theater would require a force of 14 aircraft carriers; current policy, however, provides for somewhat less than continuous presence in each theater. Thus, a carrier battle group will operate in a theater for part of a year. During the remainder, a CVBG would be a few days away, or tethered to that theater. The current policy of tethered presence is supportable by a force of 11 active carriers.
While the fundamental building blocks of the maritime force structure remain CVBGs, ARGs, and Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs), these force elements do not simply mirror their Cold War counterparts. As described in last year's report, changes have taken place in both the structure and the employment of maritime forces. Due largely to their inherent flexibility, maritime units can be employed in varying combinations and can undertake missions in conjunction with other forces, depending on the needs of a given operation. A noteworthy example was the deployment of Army troops to Haiti aboard the aircraft carriers USS America and USS Eisenhower during the 1994 Operation Uphold Democracy. Forces will continue to be tailored in the future to meet the needs of specific operations.
Given the policy of tethered presence, the maritime force planned for FY 1997 and beyond provides an adequate rotation base for peacetime deployments, while maintaining contingency forces in a sufficient state of readiness to deploy in a matter of days. These forces could be employed in any conflict, with four to five carrier battle groups and one to two MEFs available to support operations in a single MRC.
Force Structure
In FY 1996, the maritime force structure will include the following:
| Table IV-3 | |
| 1996 Force Levels | |
|---|---|
| Ballistic-Missile Submarines | 17 |
| Aircraft Carriers | 11/1 |
| Attack Submarines | 80 |
| Surface Combatants | 115/10 |
| Amphibious Ships | 42/2 |
| Mine Warfare Ships | 11/5 |
| Logistic Force Ships | 65 |
| Total Battle Force Ships | 359 |
| NOTE: Entries with two numbers separated by a slash give active followed by reserve force counts. | |
Reflecting the post-Cold War drawdown of forces, the U.S. battle force, constituting 359 ships in FY 1996, will decline to between 330 and 346 ships in FY 2001. The range reflects uncertainty over the number of active surface combatants in service at the end of the FYDP. This smaller but modernized force will provide the capabilities necessary to accomplish BUR warfighting and peacetime presence objectives. The mix of ships will change, however, relative to today's structure. By the end of the FYDP, the Navy will have reduced its attack submarine force to fewer than 55 ships, down from 80 in FY 1996. Conversely, the Navy may retain in the force an as-yet-undetermined number of guided-missile frigates now scheduled for early retirement. These plans are discussed in greater detail in the Modernization section.
Capabilities
Maritime forces provide capabilities for a broad range of military operations, from peacetime presence to crisis response to major conflicts. Deployed independently or as part of a joint force, maritime ships and aircraft fulfill command and control functions, maintain dominance over the battle area, project combat power ashore, and contribute to the sustainment of deployed forces.
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND SURVEILLANCE
The successful conduct of military operations relies heavily on the collection and dissemination of information. Maritime forces possess extensive command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities exploitable from space, sea, or land. Onboard high-capacity, multimedia communications allow joint force commanders to receive information from both centrally-managed national and joint support systems and from tactical surveillance systems such as maritime patrol aircraft, carrier-based aircraft, submarines, and surface combatants. Surveillance systems for maritime forces permit near real-time delivery of data in support of joint operations. Conversely, command and control warfare systems deny the effective employment of similar capabilities by an opposing force.
BATTLESPACE DOMINANCE
Successful maritime operations require control of the sea and the surrounding airspace. Equally critical in littoral areas, maritime forces must be able to deny an adversary access to the sea. U.S. maritime forces are well-equipped to execute these tasks: aircraft carriers with their air wings, as well as Aegis-equipped surface combatants, maintain air superiority and protect neighboring airspace, while submarines, surface combatants, maritime patrol aircraft, and mine warfare forces provide additional capabilities to control the surface and undersea environments.
POWER PROJECTION ASHORE
Consistent with the warfighting strategy detailed in the BUR, maritime forces must be capable of securing the sea and projecting lethal firepower ashore, either in support of initial operations or as part of a larger counteroffensive. Carrier-based aircraft and cruise missile-equipped surface ships and submarines provide this firepower. Marine expeditionary forces, embarked on amphibious ships or supported ashore from maritime prepositioning ships, extend the landward reach of littoral power-projection operations. Taken together, naval strike and expeditionary warfare forces can mass firepower and ground maneuver units to spearhead joint or multinational operations.
FORCE SUSTAINMENT
The decline in overseas bases increases the value of maritime force sustainment capabilities. A comprehensive logistics support system serves as the foundation for worldwide naval operations. It includes airlift and sealift forces, replenishment ships, mobile repair facilities, and advanced logistic support hubs. The Navy maintains about 40 combat logistics force ships to provide fuel, food, munitions, and other supplies to task forces at sea. Another 20 to 25 mobile logistics and support vessels can establish temporary support sites in forward areas. Complementing these forces, afloat prepositioning ships, maintained continuously on station near potential trouble spots, carry equipment and supplies for U.S. troops who would deploy in a crisis. Finally, sealift forces deploying from the continental United States would deliver additional combat and support elements. Combat logistics support forces thus contribute not only to the sustainability of maritime forces, but to the deployment and operation of other U.S. forces. See the Mobility Forces chapter for details on maritime prepositioning and sealift ships.
READINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY
In order to accomplish their assigned missions, maritime forces receive regular and rigorous training. To maximize combat proficiency, peacetime deployments and associated operating tempos mirror potential contingency operations. Navy and Marine forces deploy on the ships they would use in war, to the places where war may break out, and with the weapons and equipment needed to win. Imperative to the successful prosecution of any future contingency is the retention of the high levels of readiness and competency demonstrated during recent operations. The FY 1997 budget accomplishes this goal.
The budget funds depot maintenance activities, munitions, spare parts, and other supplies at levels sufficient to sustain forces in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Average ship operating tempos, measured in steaming days per quarter, have remained identical to last year's levels for deployed ships. Steaming days for the nondeployed fleet have been reduced an average of two days per quarter relative to the level last year. These reductions have been made by consolidating exercises and training operations, thereby saving time devoted to transit and preparations. This will not adversely affect overall fleet readiness.
| Table IV-4 | ||
| Steaming Days per Quarter | ||
|---|---|---|
| Nondeployed Fleet Units | Deployed Fleet Units | |
| Atlantic | 29 [a] | 50 |
| Pacific | 25 | 51 |
| [a] The higher tempo relative to Pacific forces reflects longer transit time to training areas and Caribbean operations. | ||
Finally, the Navy has addressed a growing problem with the nondeployed operating tempo of Atlantic fleet surface combatants. Over the past few years, the combination of a reduced force structure, continued deployment requirements, and unforeseen contingencies has driven these ships' operating tempo above fleet averages. In response, the Navy has allocated 16 surface combatants to form a Western Hemisphere Group (WHG). These cruisers, destroyers, and frigates will be employed to meet specific Atlantic mission requirements, including counterdrug operations, refugee contingency missions, South American deployments, and opposition forces for training exercises. With specific ships now allocated to these missions, battle groups scheduled for deployment can focus nondeployed steaming time on training. Although the ships of the WHG will not deploy routinely with battle groups, they can be utilized for contingencies in forward areas if needed.
During 1996, maritime forces will participate in approximately 175 major unit exercises, more than 90 percent of which will involve joint operations with other U.S. or multinational forces. These deployments improve the ability of maritime forces to conduct forward presence missions; they train U.S. forces to operate efficiently together; and they strengthen bilateral and multilateral security relationships with U.S. allies.
MODERNIZATION
The Navy continues to recapitalize its fleet consistent with the program objectives established last year. In general, the average age of the fleet is currently acceptable. However, some ship categories -- such as amphibious forces, logistics ships, and surface combatants -- are growing in age and are in need of replacement. Recapitalization addresses this need.
The Navy is modernizing those weapon systems, ships, and aircraft that will be retained in service through technology upgrades and life extension programs. These efforts address existing and projected shortfalls in capabilities to counter emerging threats.
The sections that follow present highlights of modernization programs for maritime forces. As this report went to press, funding needed to support the Department's recapitalization initiatives was under review. Annual production rates and funding objectives for some programs addressed in this chapter could change as a result of subsequent reprogramming requests. Moreover, other changes could be made as a result of subsequent reprogramming requests. The figures given here reflect the status of programs at the time of the report's publication; adjusted figures, where applicable, will be included in the President's budget submission to Congress.
Shipbuilding
The FY 1997 budget has been adjusted, relative to last year's plan, to reflect congressional action on the FY 1996 budget request. Highlights of the FY 1997-2001 shipbuilding program are presented in Table IV-5.
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Consistent with BUR objectives, the Navy will maintain a force of 12 aircraft carriers -- 11 active and one reserve -- throughout the FYDP period. By the end of the FYDP, the carrier force will consist primarily of Nimitz-class nuclear-powered ships. The Navy will take delivery of its next two carriers, CVN-74 and CVN-75, in FY 1996 and FY 1998, respectively. A third new carrier, CVN-76, authorized in FY 1995, will join the fleet in 2002. With CVN-76's delivery, only one conventionally-powered carrier -- the USS Constellation -- will remain in the active force. An additional conventionally-powered carrier, the USS Kennedy, will serve as an operational reserve and training ship, and will also be available for limited deployments. Specific plans for aircraft carrier construction beyond CVN-76 await the completion of Navy studies. The future shipbuilding profile will reflect the need to replace the USS Constellation, as well as older nuclear-powered carriers, while maintaining a long-term force of 11 active carriers.
| Table IV-5 | ||||||
| FY 1997-2001 Shipbuilding Program | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY 1997 | FY 1998 | FY 1999 | FY 2000 | FY 2001 | FYDP Total | |
| New Construction | ||||||
| Replacement Aircraft Carrier | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 [a] | 0 [a] | 0 |
| SSN-23 | 0 [b] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 [b] |
| NSSN (Attack Submarine) | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| DDG-51 (Guided-Missile Destroyer) | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 15 |
| LHD-1 (Amphibious Assault Ship) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| LPD-17 (Amphibious Transport Dock) | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| ADC(X) (Fast Combat Support Ship) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| TAGS-60 (Oceanographic Research) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| T-AGOS-23 (Ocean Surveillance Ship) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Conversions/Major Overhauls | ||||||
| CVN-68 (Nimitz) Refueling Overhaul | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| AOE SLEP | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| [a] About $630 million is programmed as a down payment on a replacement carrier to be procured after FY 2001. [b] About $807 million is needed to complete funding of the SSN-23, for which $700 million was appropriated in FY 1996. | ||||||
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
The Navy maintains an amphibious fleet capable of lifting two and a half Marine brigade equivalents during wartime and sustaining roughly three forward-deployed MEUs in peacetime. To preserve that capability, the FY 1997 budget and associated FYDP will provide a force of 43 active and two reserve ships by FY 2001. The active vessels include 41 lift ships (two of which are maintained in reduced operating status) and two command ships. A large number of vessels in the fleet have been in service for almost 30 years and are nearing the end of their projected lives. This fact is reflected in the rising age of the fleet, which averages 18 years in FY 1996, growing to 21 years by FY 2001. Modernization programs for amphibious forces therefore have the dual goals of replacing aging vessels and adding the new capabilities needed to meet emerging requirements.
Two new LHD amphibious assault ships and two new LSD dock landing ships will join the amphibious force by FY 1998. Another new LHD, authorized in FY 1996, will be delivered in FY 2001. This ship will constitute the Navy's twelfth large-deck amphibious assault ship, the number required to support ARG deployments. In the interim, the USS Guam will be retained in the force into FY 1998, one year longer than previously planned, in order to satisfy forward presence requirements and support personnel operating tempo goals.
The LPD-17 amphibious transport dock ship represents the key to the recapitalization of the amphibious force. This 12-ship program will replace the capabilities provided by 27 active and reserve ships projected to reach the end of their service lives after the year 2000. LPD-17s, in combination with newer LSDs and LHDs, will constitute the core of the modernized amphibious force beyond the FYDP.
ATTACK SUBMARINES
Reflecting the overall drawdown in U.S. forces, the Navy is reducing its attack submarine (SSN) force from 80 vessels in FY 1996 to 53 by FY 2001. A force of about 45 SSNs will be maintained over the longer term. These ships perform a wide range of missions, including strike, intelligence collection and surveillance, antisubmarine and antisurface warfare, special warfare, mine warfare, and battle group support.
The SSN force is relatively modern, averaging just over 13 years in age during FY 1996-2001. The force's relative youth reflects the introduction of more than 20 Improved Los Angeles (SSN-688I)-class submarines since the late 1980s, combined with continuing retirements of older SSN-637s. Since the end of the Cold War, attack submarine construction has been dramatically curtailed, with only three units of the Seawolf (SSN-21) class authorized since FY 1989. The lead ship will be delivered in FY 1996; a second unit is scheduled for delivery in FY 1998. Congress authorized partial funding for SSN-23, the third and final submarine of this class, in FY 1996. The FY 1997 budget provides the balance of funds to complete construction of the ship.
The New Attack Submarine (NSSN) program will provide a lower-cost alternative to the Seawolf with enhanced capabilities for littoral operations. The FY 1997 budget provides advance funding for the lead ship, to be procured in FY 1998. The NSSN will incorporate technology improvements from the Seawolf program, providing an affordable replacement for SSN-688s scheduled to reach the end of their 30-year service lives after the year 2002.
SURFACE COMBATANTS
In FY 1996, the surface combatant force will include 115 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates in the active fleet, plus 10 frigates in the Naval Reserve. The active fleet will average 11 years in age, increasing to 14 years by FY 2001. More than one-third of the active ships in 1996 will have the Aegis combat system with the SPY phased-array radar. That figure will rise to more than 50 percent by FY 2001, reflecting the entry of new destroyers into the fleet. Thirty-four of these vessels will be new DDG-51s. The FYDP provides funds for 14 additional DDG-51s, to be delivered after 2001.
The force goal in FY 2001 for active and reserve surface combatants could range between 126 and 138 ships, depending on future funding priorities and operational requirements. In order to meet operating tempo goals for the active force, the Navy plans to retain two FFG-7-class frigates in FY 1996 and a third in FY 1997 that were previously scheduled for early decommissioning. Decisions on retaining other FFGs now scheduled to retire beyond FY 1997 will be made on a year-by-year basis, as dictated by the tempo of operations. Naval Reserve ships are programmed to decrease from 10 frigates in FY 1997 to eight in FY 1998-2001.
The long-term surface combatant goal is currently under review. Requirements based on forward presence, historical operating tempos, and possible contingency scenarios are being examined. The Surface Combatant of the 21st Century (SC-21) program, which was approved for concept development last year, will provide replacements primarily for older DD-963s starting around the year 2010. As part of this program, the Navy is undertaking a three-year study of total combatant requirements, in which it is evaluating a wide range of concepts to meet projected needs.
COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCES
The fourth AOE-6-class fast combat support ship will be delivered in FY 1998, bringing the total inventory of AOEs to eight. These ships provide munitions, bulk petroleum, oil, lubricants, and other provisions to battle forces at sea. The Navy will procure a fifth ship of this class early in the next century to meet longer-term requirements. The Navy also plans to procure a new class of support ships, designated ADC(X), beginning in FY 2000. These ships will replace aging ammunition and dry cargo ships. Ongoing studies are examining a wide range of concepts to meet the logistics support requirements of battle groups at sea.
MAJOR FLEET SUPPORT SHIPS
The FY 1997 budget reduces the force of tenders from 10 active ships in FY 1995 to three by FY 1999. One additional ship will be placed in reduced operating status by FY 1999. This latter ship could be activated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) if needed in a crisis. A force of three active tenders will provide adequate repair capabilities for routine peacetime presence operations, serving as a hedge against the unavailability of overseas basing facilities. The combination of active ships and the MSC tender fully supports MRC requirements.
Weapon Systems
TOMAHAWK
Tomahawk cruise missiles, carried by submarines and surface ships, enable seaborne forces to launch attacks against surface and land targets from distant ranges, in all types of weather. The Navy has taken steps in recent years both to increase the effectiveness of the Tomahawk system and to strengthen mission planning capabilities. Improvements in the former area were demonstrated during the September 1995 missile strikes against targets in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Tomahawks destroying or damaging all of their intended targets with no collateral damage. The FY 1997 budget provides funds for additional improvements in Tomahawk mission planning capabilities. Programmed enhancements include the Tomahawk Afloat Planning System and the Advanced Tomahawk Weapon Control System, scheduled for introduction within the next several years. These upgrades will allow forces at sea to plan and modify land-attack missions more rapidly than is currently possible.
Longer-term upgrades to the Tomahawk missile are being pursued as part of the Tomahawk Baseline Improvement Program (TBIP). TBIP will enhance the terminal guidance, precision strike, and hard-target penetration capabilities of Tomahawk missiles. The program is currently in the engineering and manufacturing development phase, with initial testing scheduled to start later this year. The improved missiles are scheduled for production beginning in FY 1998.
STANDARD MISSILE
An upgraded version of the Standard surface-to-air missile (SM-2 Block IV) entered production in FY 1995 as part of a consolidation of production within the Standard Missile Company. Compared with earlier Standard models, SM-2 Block IV missiles provide a larger engagement envelope against advanced antiship cruise missiles. Development continues on two other versions of the Standard -- the SM-2 Block IIIB, which will enhance fleet air defenses, and the SM-2 Block IVA, which will provide an area (lower-tier) theater ballistic missile defense capability. Details on the latter program are provided in the Ballistic Missile Defense chapter of this report.
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE SYSTEMS
To meet emerging threats, the Navy is enhancing the self-defense capabilities of its warships. Efforts in this area are being pursued under the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Ship Self-Defense (SSD) programs.
CEC consists of hardware and software improvements designed to strengthen the air defenses of naval task groups. Ships with these upgrades will be able to pass detailed targeting information to other ships within a task force in near real time, thereby enhancing rapid response capabilities against enemy attacks. Early tests have demonstrated CEC's potential to contribute to fleet defenses. The FY 1997 budget provides funds to install CEC equipment in two Aegis cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and one large-deck amphibious ship. Funding through the remainder of the FYDP supports the modification of an additional 26 ships, including aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and amphibious vessels. The remaining ships in the program will be upgraded by 2010.
SSD comprises a set of programs designed to improve active and passive ship self-defense capabilities. Upgrades to the Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), combined with installation of the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) systems on destroyers and amphibious ships, will add depth to current air defense capabilities. Other initiatives in this area include quick-reaction combat capability enhancements, ship signature reductions, improved integration of shipboard weapons, an improved electronic warfare decoy system, and the introduction of infrared sensors. The Navy also has begun a study to investigate the difficulties inherent in operating shipboard sensors in littoral environments. Results from this study will help define future modernization programs that might be needed to enhance threat detection and ship self-defense capabilities.
The Navy also is making improvements in its ship-based torpedo defenses. The FY 1997 budget continues development of the Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) system, which will be installed on aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and amphibious ships during routine maintenance periods.
LIGHT AIRBORNE MULTIPURPOSE SYSTEM (LAMPS)
The Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) combines the SH-60B helicopter with computer-integrated shipboard equipment to expand the range and capabilities of surface combatants for antisurface, antisubmarine, surveillance, and targeting missions. The SH-60B will be renamed the SH-60R; it is undergoing a service life extension program as well as significant sensor and weapon upgrades to improve its ability to operate and survive in littoral environments. The LAMPS is fully integrated into the Navy's surface combatants and is being added to the Flight IIA version of the DDG-51, which began construction in FY 1994.
NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT
Acknowledging projected shortfalls in this mission area, the Navy has programmed additional funds to strengthen its surface fire support capabilities by the end of the FYDP. Specifically, the FY 1997 budget and associated FYDP provide $216 million, an increase of $68 million over last year's plan, to design and procure an advanced 5-inch projectile. This weapon will be capable of traveling approximately 60 nautical miles and delivering a variety of munitions with accuracy. Moreover, the added funding supports tests of various surface-to-surface missile systems in the fire support role. In combination, these initiatives will deliver needed improvements to the fleet while sustaining a strong research and development program.
Surveillance and Communications
The FY 1997 budget includes funds for critical upgrades to naval C4I systems, such as the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (Link 16), the Naval Tactical Command System Afloat, Extremely High Frequency Polar Satellite Communications, commercial satellite communications, and the Digital Wideband Transmission System. These upgrades will provide a common tactical picture for commanders, facilitate communications with forces ashore, and improve the accuracy, correlation, and fusion of tactical data. The result will be to strengthen command and control capabilities in joint operations and enhance the ability of aircraft carriers to support joint force air component commanders.
P-3C MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT (MPA)
The FY 1997 budget provides for an MPA force of 12 active and eight reserve squadrons. These aircraft provide multimission support for naval task groups at sea through their ability to conduct antisurface, antisubmarine, surveillance, and mining operations. With P-3C aircraft no longer in production, modernization initiatives are focusing on service life extensions and upgrades of existing aircraft. Ongoing and planned programs will extend the operational life of P-3C aircraft to about 50 years, deferring the need to fund a replacement aircraft until the year 2015. The Anti-surface Warfare Improvement Program, initiated in FY 1994, is utilizing commercial off-the-shelf technologies to improve the surveillance, combat identification, and antiship mission capabilities of the P-3C force.
| Table IV-6 | ||||
| Selected Modernization Programs | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Dollars (Millions) | ||||
| System | FY 199 5Actual | FY 1996 Actual | FY 1997 Budgeted | FY 1998 Planned |
| SSN-23 | ||||
| RDT&E | 162.5 | 123.2 | 110.9 | 48.7 |
| Procurement | -- | 674.5 | 773.1 | -- |
| New Attack Submarine (NSSN) | ||||
| RDT&E | 455.6 | 442.4 | 487.6 | 454.7 |
| Procurement | -- | 775.2 | 287.0 | 2,702.1 |
| DDG-51 Destroyer | ||||
| RDT&E | 895.0 | 91.9 | 89.3 | 100.5 |
| Procurement | 2,642.0 | 2,194.2 | 3,319.3 | 2,247.9 |
| Tomahawk | ||||
| RDT&E | 83.0 | 165.3 | 136.4 | 125.9 |
| Procurement | 267.8 | 117.3 | 96.3 | 162.3 |
| Standard Missile | ||||
| RDT&E | 14.3 | 22.0 | 1.6 | 1.4 |
| Procurement | 244.7 | 127.7 | 204.1 | 1.4231.4 |
| Cooperative Engagement Capability | ||||
| RDT&E | 153.8 | 257.9 | 165.6 | 151.1 |
| Procurement | -- | -- | -- | 84.5 |
| Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile | ||||
| RDT&E | 45.3 | 63.5 | 37.5 | 49.3 |
| Procurement | 64.3 | 72.8 | 44.7 | 82.1 |
| Rolling Airframe Missile | ||||
| RDT&E | 17.9 | 25.2 | 20.0 | 18.0 |
| Procurement | 66.4 | 67.8 | 49.9 | 33.2 |
| P-3C AIP Program | ||||
| RDT&E | -- | 7.9 | -- | -- |
| Procurement | 8.6 | 143.4 | 52.3 | 92.0 |
Mine Countermeasures
The FY 1997 budget and associated FYDP increase funding for mine countermeasure (MCM) programs by $53 million relative to last year's plan; more than two-thirds of the additional money will go toward force modernization. The added funding supports development and procurement of the Remote Minehunting System and Airborne Mine Neutralization System as well as shallow-water mine countermeasures, such as the Shallow Water Assault Breaching System. The funding addition will also enhance the readiness and sustainability of mine countermeasure forces.
The budget also provides funding for the continuous deployment of four MCM-class ships overseas -- two in Japan and two in the Persian Gulf. This initiative will provide critical mine clearance capabilities at the earliest stages of a conflict, a capability identified in recent wargames as critical to the successful prosecution of an MRC. Forward-deployed MCM ships, in conjunction with early-arriving mine countermeasure helicopters, will allow naval forces to secure the sea and clear the way for sealift ships.
FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
Freedom of navigation for U.S. maritime forces is discussed in Appendix I.
CONCLUSION
The FY 1997 budget supports the maritime strategy and programs implemented as a result of the Bottom-Up Review. The budget continues essential modernization programs, while preserving force readiness and sustaining quality of life initiatives. Taken as a whole, these programs will enable maritime forces to successfully execute their missions, while protecting and advancing the interests of the United States.
