Exec Home Page Table of Contents Bottom of Page Next Page


Chapter 1

U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

Since the founding of the Republic, the U.S. government has always sought to secure for the American people a set of basic objectives:

On the eve of the 21st century, the international environment is more complex and integrated than at any other time in history. The number and diversity of nations, organizations, and other actors vying for influence continue to grow. At the same time, the global economy is increasingly interdependent. Not only does this offer the United States the promise of greater prosperity, it also ties the security and well-being of Americans to events beyond their borders more than ever before. Today, incidents formerly considered peripheral to American security -- the spread of ethnic and religious conflict, the breakdown of law and order, or the disruption of trade in faraway regions -- can pose real threats to the United States. Likewise, new opportunities have arisen for the United States, in concert with other like-minded nations, to advance its long-term interests and promote stability in critical regions.

In order to shape the international security environment in ways that protect and advance U.S. interests, the United States must remain engaged and exert leadership abroad. U.S. leadership can deter aggression, foster the peaceful resolution of dangerous conflicts, underpin stable foreign markets, encourage democracy, and inspire others to create a safer world and to resolve global problems. Without active U.S. leadership and engagement abroad, threats to U.S. security will worsen and opportunities will narrow. If the United States chooses not to lead in the post-Cold War world, it will become less able to secure the basic objectives outlined above.

Threats to the interests of the United States, its allies, and its friends can come from a variety of sources. Prominent among these are:

Many of these threats are global in scale and cannot be adequately addressed unilaterally, either by the United States or any other single nation state. Thus, the United States will need to secure the cooperation of a number of groups, nations, and international organizations to protect Americans from such threats.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The Administration's National Security Strategy acknowledges both the inescapable reality of interdependence and the serious threats to U.S. interests posed by actors beyond its borders. To protect and advance U.S. interests, the American government must be able to shape the international environment, influencing the policies and actions of others. This mandates that the United States remain engaged abroad, particularly in regions where its most important interests are at stake. At the same time, it is essential that U.S. allies and friends share responsibility for regional and global security. The United States and its allies must work together to help build a more peaceful and prosperous world. This means, among other things, taking pragmatic steps to enlarge the world's community of free-market democracies. As the President's National Security Strategy states, "The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper."

The three principal components of the U.S. strategy of engagement and enlargement are:

  • Enhancing security. The United States must maintain a strong defense capability and promote cooperative security measures.

  • Promoting prosperity. The United States will work with other countries to create a more open and equitable international trading system and spur global economic growth.

  • Promoting democracy. The United States will work to protect, consolidate, and enlarge the community of free-market democracies around the globe.

    These goals underscore that the only responsible strategy for the United States is one of international engagement. Isolationism in any form would reduce U.S. security by undercutting the United States' ability to influence events abroad that can affect the well-being of Americans. This does not mean that the United States seeks the role of global policeman. But it does mean that America must be ready and willing to protect its interests, both now and in the future.

    As the United States moves into the next century, being militarily ready means that U.S. forces must be prepared to conduct a broad range of military missions without being spread too thin. This will require sustaining a high level of training and morale and maintaining modern, reliable equipment and facilities.

    The Administration has also argued for balance between defense and domestic priorities. While these priorities may compete for resources in the short term, they are wholly complementary in the longer term. The United States cannot be prosperous if its major trade and security partners are threatened by aggression or intimidation; nor can it be secure if international economic cooperation is breaking down, because the health of the U.S. economy is interwoven with the global economy. So prudence dictates that U.S. strategy strike a balance -- America's overall budget must invest in future prosperity and productivity while avoiding the instabilities and risks that would accompany attempts to withdraw from its security responsibilities in critical regions.

    The forces and programs developed in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, as outlined in this document, will provide the capabilities needed to support this ambitious strategy. U.S. forces today are without question the best in the world. The Administration's defense program will keep them that way.

    REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES

    The security relationships established by the United States and its allies and friends during the Cold War are essential to advancing America's post-Cold War agenda. To meet the unique challenges of the post-Cold War era, the United States seeks to further strengthen and adapt these partnerships and to establish new security relationships in support of U.S. interests.

    In Europe, the end of the Cold War has brought new opportunities and new challenges. Hand in hand with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, the United States has sought to promote a free and undivided Europe that will work with the United States to keep the peace and promote prosperity. In the new security architecture of an integrated Europe, NATO is the central pillar and is complemented by the European Union and a strengthened Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP), unveiled at the January 1994 NATO Summit, has provided a means for expanding and intensifying political and military cooperation throughout Europe. NATO members and partners have participated in more than a dozen PFP exercises and hundreds of other training, planning, and consultation activities. PFP serves as a pathway for nations to qualify for NATO membership; for those partners that do not join NATO, PFP will constitute a strong link to Europe's preeminent security organization and concrete proof that the alliance is concerned about their security. Partnership for Peace and gradual NATO enlargement bolster efforts by Central and Eastern European nations and the New Independent States to build democratic societies and strengthen regional stability. Other efforts, including U.S. military programs like the European Command's Joint Contact Team Program and Marshall Center, similarly advance U.S. defense engagement with Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States.

    The Secretary of Defense has made building cooperative defense and military ties with Russia, Ukraine, and the other New Independent States one of the Department of Defense's highest priorities. Moving away from the hostility of the Cold War and reducing its lethal nuclear legacy will be neither instantaneous nor easy. Steady, continued engagement that focuses on mutual security interests will be the cornerstone in building constructive relationships with the New Independent States. Through the pursuit of a pragmatic partnership, the United States will strive to manage differences with Russia to ensure that shared security interests and objectives take priority. A central objective is to encourage Russia to play a constructive role in the new European security architecture through the development of NATO-Russia relations and through Russia's active participation in PFP.

    The East Asian-Pacific region continues to grow in importance to U.S. security and prosperity. This region has experienced unprecedented economic growth -- growth that in 1994 increased U.S. trade in the region to $435 billion and supported 2.8 million American jobs. The security and stability provided by the presence of U.S. military forces in the East Asian-Pacific area over the past 40 years created the conditions for such tremendous economic growth. Security, open markets, and democracy, the three strands of the President's National Security Strategy, are thoroughly intertwined in this region.

    Today, the United States retains its central role as a force for stability in East Asia-Pacific, but it has begun to share greater responsibility for regional security with its friends and allies. The United States constructively participates in and supports regional security dialogues. It actively encourages efforts by East Asian-Pacific nations to provide host-nation support for U.S. forces, contribute to United Nations (UN) peace operations, and participate in international assistance efforts throughout the world. While these regional initiatives are important, there is no substitute for a forward-stationed U.S. military presence -- essential to both regional security and America's global military posture -- or for U.S. leadership like that which brought together the broad coalition that convinced North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons program. The United States will remain active in this vital region.

    The United States has enduring interests in the Middle East, especially pursuing a comprehensive Middle East peace, assuring the security of Israel and U.S. principal Arab partners, and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. The United States will continue to work to extend the range of Middle East peace and stability. Integral to that effort is the Administration's strategy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran for as long as those states pose a threat to U.S. interests, to other states in the region, and to their own citizens. Maintaining the United States' long-standing military presence in Southwest Asia is critical to protecting the vital interests America shares with others in the region.

    The United States will stay engaged in the security of South Asia militarily as well as diplomatically and economically. Defense relationships with India and Pakistan can support broader U.S. interests and objectives, including nuclear and missile nonproliferation and global peacekeeping. The challenge the Department faces is to develop defense relationships in ways that reduce tensions in South Asia and protect U.S. vital interests in the adjacent areas. U.S. bilateral relationships with individual South Asian nations can advance and flourish without diminishing or tilting U.S. ties to other nations in the region.

    The overarching U.S. objectives in the Western Hemisphere are to sustain regional stability and to increase regional cooperation. A more stable and cooperative environment would help ensure that recent strides in democracy, free markets, and sustainable development can continue and that further progress can be made by the nations of the region. As in other regions, DoD is working to enhance the sharing of responsibility for mutual security interests with its friends and allies in the Western Hemisphere. Contributions might include cost-sharing for U.S. deployments, the provision of non-U.S. forces to coalition operations, support for international development and democratization, and the contribution of personnel or resources to UN peace operations.

    Although, at present, the United States has no permanent or significant military presence in Africa, the United States does desire access to facilities and strengthened relations with African nations through initiatives that have been or might be especially important in the event of contingencies or evacuations. The United States has significant interests in Africa in countering state-sponsored terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of conventional weapons, fissile materials, and related technology. The United States must continue to work with the continent's nations to help secure U.S. interests.

    Africa also provides fertile ground for promoting democracy, sustaining development, and resolving conflict. The United States does not seek to resolve Africa's many conflicts but rather to empower African states and organizations to do so themselves. It also supports the democratization and economic growth that are necessary for the long-term stability of the region. The United States actively participates in efforts to address the root causes of conflicts and disasters that affect U.S. national interests before they erupt. Such efforts include support for demobilization of oversized militaries, demining, effective peace operations, and strong indigenous conflict resolution facilities, including those of the Organization of African Unity and subregional organizations.

    In all these regions, nations contribute to global and regional security in a wide variety of ways; the notion of responsibility sharing reflects the broad range of such contributions. In addition to providing host-nation support for U.S. forces, states can contribute to international security by maintaining capable military forces, assigning those forces to coalition missions like Operation Desert Storm, NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to UN peacekeeping operations, and providing political and financial support for such shared objectives as international economic development or the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. friends and allies have taken on increased shares of the burden for international security, providing, for example, over 245,000 troops to Operation Desert Storm and $70 billion to the United States and other coalition members to help defray their expenses in the war. Yet room for more equitable and cost-effective responsibility sharing remains. The Department of Defense is committed to working with Congress and with U.S. friends and allies toward this goal.

    U.S. MILITARY MISSIONS

    As stated in the National Security Strategy, the Bottom-Up Review, and the National Military Strategy, the Department of Defense will field and sustain the military capabilities needed to protect the United States and advance its interests. The United States is the only nation capable of unilaterally conducting effective, large-scale military operations far beyond its borders. There is and will continue to be a great need for U.S. forces with such capabilities, not only to protect the United States from direct threats but also to shape the international environment in favorable ways, particularly in regions critical to U.S. interests, and to support multinational efforts to ameliorate human suffering and bring peace to regions torn by ethnic, tribal, or religious conflicts.

    Supporting the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement requires that the United States maintain robust and versatile military forces that can accomplish a wide variety of missions, as delineated in the Bottom-Up Review:

    Finally, to meet all these requirements successfully, U.S. forces must be capable of responding quickly and operating effectively. That is, they must be ready to fight. This demands highly qualified and motivated people; modern, well-maintained equipment; viable joint doctrine; realistic training; strategic mobility; and sufficient support and sustainment capabilities.

    Deterring and Defeating Aggression

    The focus of U.S. planning for major regional conflict is based on the need to be able to project power and to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile regional powers. Today, such states are capable of fielding sizable military forces that can cause serious imbalances in military power within regions important to the United States, with allied or friendly states often finding it difficult to match the power of a potentially aggressive neighbor. Such aggressive states may also possess WMD. Hence, to deter aggression, to prevent coercion of allied or friendly governments and, ultimately, to defeat aggression should it occur, the United States must prepare its forces to assist its friends and allies in confronting this scale of threat.

    U.S. planning for fighting and winning these MRCs envisages an operational strategy that, in general, unfolds as follows (recognizing that in practice some portions of these phases may overlap):

    The United States will never know with certainty who the next opponent will be, how that opponent will fight, or how the conflict might unfold. Moreover, the contributions of allies to the coalition's overall capabilities will vary from place to place and over time. Thus, balanced U.S. forces are needed in order to provide a wide range of complementary capabilities and to cope with the unpredictable and unexpected.

    U.S. military strategy calls for the capability, in concert with regional allies, to fight and decisively win two MRCs that occur nearly simultaneously. This is the principal determinant of the size and composition of U.S. conventional forces. A force with such capabilities is required to avoid a situation in which an aggressor in one region might be tempted to take advantage of a perceived vulnerability when substantial numbers of U.S. forces are committed elsewhere. More fundamentally, maintaining a two-MRC force helps ensure that the United States will have sufficient military capabilities to defend against a coalition of hostile powers or a larger, more capable adversary than is foreseen today.

    U.S. forces fighting alongside their regional allies are capable of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous MRCs today. With programmed enhancements to U.S. mobility/prepositioning assets, as well as improvements to surveillance assets, accelerated acquisition of more effective munitions, and other key improvements, U.S. military forces will maintain and improve upon this capability.

    Stability Through Overseas Presence

    The need to deploy or station U.S. military forces abroad in peacetime is also an important factor in determining overall U.S. force structure. In an increasingly interdependent world, U.S. forces must sustain credible military presence in several critical regions in order to shape the international security environment in favorable ways. Toward this end, U.S. forces permanently stationed and rotationally or periodically deployed overseas serve a broad range of U.S. interests. Specifically, these forces:

    Through foreign military interactions, including training programs, multinational exercises, military-to-military contacts, and security assistance programs that include judicious foreign military sales, the United States can strengthen the self-defense capabilities of its friends and allies. Through military-to-military contacts and other exchanges, the United States can reduce regional tensions, increase transparency, and improve its bilateral and multilateral cooperation. (See Appendix J, Military Assistance.)

    By improving the defense capabilities of its friends and demonstrating its commitment to defend common interests, U.S. forces abroad enhance deterrence and raise the odds that U.S. forces will find a relatively favorable situation should a conflict arise. The stabilizing presence of U.S. forces also helps to prevent conflicts from escalating to the point where they threaten greater U.S. interests at higher costs.

    Contingency Operations

    U.S. defense strategy also requires that military forces be prepared for a wide range of contingency operations in support of U.S. interests. Contingency operations are military operations that go beyond the routine deployment or stationing of U.S. forces abroad but fall short of large-scale theater warfare. Such operations range from smaller-scale combat operations to peace operations and noncombatant evacuations. They are an important component of U.S. strategy and, when undertaken selectively and effectively, can protect and advance U.S. interests.

    The United States will always retain the capability to intervene unilaterally when its interests are threatened. The United States also will advance its interests and fulfill its leadership responsibilities by providing military forces to selected allied/coalition operations, some of which may support UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions (e.g., U.S. participation in coalition sanctions enforcement and no-fly zone enforcement in Southwest Asia). Further, the United States will continue to participate directly in UN peace operations when it serves U.S. interests. UN and multinational peace operations can help prevent, contain, and resolve conflicts that affect U.S. interests. When it is appropriate to support a multinational peace operation, participating U.S. forces benefit from the authority and support of the international community and from sharing costs and risks with other nations.

    SMALLER-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

    The United States will maintain the capability to conduct smaller-scale combat operations unilaterally, or in concert with others, when important U.S. interests are at stake. These operations generally are undertaken to provide for regional stability (e.g., U.S. operations in Grenada), promote democracy (e.g., U.S. operations in Panama and Haiti), or otherwise respond to conflicts that affect U.S. interests.

    PEACE OPERATIONS

    Peace operations include peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping involves deployment of military and/or civilian personnel with the consent of all major belligerent parties in order to preserve or maintain the peace. Such operations are normally undertaken to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting political settlement. Peace enforcement is the application of military force, or the threat of its use, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions to maintain or restore international peace and security, or address breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. Such operations do not require the consent of involved states or of other parties to the conflict. These operations are authorized by the UNSC or a regional organization. They may be conducted by the United Nations, by a multinational coalition led by a member state or alliance, or by a regional organization.

    The United States has an interest in supporting UN peace operations as a means of sharing the burdens of protecting international peace and security. Of the approximately 70,000 personnel serving in UN blue-helmeted peace operations, about 5 percent are American. Previously, the United States was assessed 30.4 percent of the annual cost of UN peace operations; in FY 1996, the United States will be assessed only 25 percent of these costs. The price, in manpower and money, to protect America's interests around the world would be much greater without the burdensharing of the United Nations and its member states.

    Members of the U.S. armed forces have been involved in UN peacekeeping missions since 1948. At the end of 1995, 3,305 U.S. military personnel were participating in UN blue-helmeted operations. During the year, significant U.S. participation was limited to three of 17 missions -- Croatia (UNCRO), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP), and in Haiti (UNMIH). (A small number of U.S. armed forces also served as military observers or headquarters staff in other UN peace operations.) The United States also continues to support non-UN peace operations, such as the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai and the Military Observer Mission in the border region between Peru and Ecuador.

    Recent experiences in multilateral peace operations demonstrate that the United Nations, regional organizations, and member states have much to learn about how to conduct these types of operations effectively. First, the increasing size and complexity of peace operations (including the significant differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement) and the sheer number of operations currently underway severely challenge the current capabilities of the international community to respond effectively. Second, any large-scale peace operation likely to involve combat should be conducted by a capable coalition or regional organization. Recent experience also has demonstrated the need to fully integrate -- at the national and international levels -- political, military, economic, and humanitarian actions in peace operations, ensuring that military forces are adequately supported by nonmilitary efforts. Finally, DoD and other relevant agencies have also learned and applied important lessons about planning a smooth transition from a coalition operation to a UN-led peace operation.

    With the certainty that U.S. and allied interests will continue to be challenged by conflict, DoD has taken steps to establish more capable institutions and procedures to conduct peace operations. For example, the Department is working with the United Nations to improve its peacekeeping capabilities on issues ranging from communications and information architecture to contracted service and materiel support. The U.S. military helped train the staffs of two UN peace operations that began in 1995 -- Haiti (UNMIH) and Angola (UNAVEM III). In both cases, this contributed significantly to the potential success of the missions.

    In addition, U.S. forces continue to enhance their capabilities for conducting these operations, especially in the areas of doctrine development and training. The Joint Staff has recently issued Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), providing guidance to all Services and combatant commands on the conduct of peace operations and other types of MOOTW. The Army has published Field Manual 100-23, a comprehensive manual on peace operations, and the U.S. Army Infantry School is completing a training support package that will guide brigades and battalions in the conduct of peace enforcement operations. The Marine Corps is completing the MOOTW Supplements to its Small Wars Manual, and the Air Force has drafted Air Force Doctrine Document 3, Military Operations Other Than War, which addresses air and space power involvement in all types of MOOTW. Finally, the Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations and the Joint Electronic Library of Peace Operations reference materials are also available.

    As peace operations doctrine has emerged, training also has focused more directly on peace operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a peace operations wargame for potential Joint Task Force commanders from the unified commands in June 1995. U.S. forces conducted several peace operations rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center, preparing units for service in Haiti and hosting a pioneering exercise (Cooperative Nugget) with more than a dozen other member nations of the Partnership for Peace program. At the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany, U.S. and Dutch forces have trained for deployments to MOOTW environments. Many PFP and in-the-spirit-of-PFP exercises focus on peace operations-related training, from maritime embargoes to contingent battalions controlled by multinational headquarters. In Hawaii, the U.S. Pacific Command conducted a peace operations seminar in June 1995 that fostered dialogue between many Pacific rim nations. Also, U.S. forces have conducted an array of significant wargames and training, including multiphased exercises on MOOTW for civilian and military leaders and their staffs (such as the U.S. Marine Corps' Emerald Express).

    Lessons learned from past operations, discussions with other militaries, and information gained from joint exercises and peace operations training have given U.S. military forces a more detailed understanding of how better to tailor training for the requirements of peace operations.

    OTHER KEY MISSIONS

    U.S. military forces and assets will also be called upon to perform a wide range of other important missions. Some of these can be accomplished by conventional forces fielded primarily for theater operations. Often, however, these missions call for specialized units and capabilities.

    Humanitarian and Refugee Assistance. U.S. military forces and assets are frequently called upon to meet urgent humanitarian needs created by manmade or natural disasters, including food shortages, migrant and refugee problems, and the indiscriminate use of landmines. Assisting countries with such needs, and thereby promoting good will, is integral to the U.S. strategy of engagement and enlargement. Humanitarian assistance not only provides relief, but also helps victims of violence and disaster return to the path of recovery and sustainable development. These programs support the regional unified commanders in chief's peacetime engagement strategy of promoting political and economic stability in their respective areas of responsibility.

    During FY 1995, 104 countries benefited from DoD humanitarian assistance, and the United States conducted several major humanitarian operations, including:

    In support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, DoD has also helped provide assistance to victims of domestic disasters. Disaster responses to the Midwest floods, the Oklahoma City bombing, and Hurricanes Marilyn and Opal have placed U.S. forces in stricken areas to help provide support, infrastructure repair, and restoration of critical services.

    Combating Terrorism. To protect American citizens and interests from the threat posed by terrorist groups, the United States needs units available with specialized counterterrorist capabilities. From time to time, the United States might also find it necessary to strike terrorists at their bases abroad or to attack assets valued by the governments that support them.

    Countering terrorism effectively requires close day-to-day coordination among Executive Branch agencies. The Department of Defense will continue to cooperate closely with the Department of State; the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Central Intelligence Agency. Positive results come from integrating intelligence, diplomatic, and legal activities and through close cooperation with other governments and international counterterrorist organizations.

    The United States has made concerted efforts to punish and deter terrorists and those who support them. Such actions by the United States send a firm message that terrorist acts will be punished, thereby deterring future threats.

    Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. The United States government's responsibility for protecting the lives and safety of Americans abroad extends beyond dealing with the threat of terrorism. Situations such as the outbreak of civil or international conflict and natural or manmade disasters require that selected U.S. military forces be trained and equipped to evacuate Americans. For example, U.S. forces evacuated Americans from Monrovia, Liberia, in August l990, and from Mogadishu, Somalia, in December 1990. In l991, U.S. forces evacuated nearly 20,000 Americans from the Philippines in the weeks following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo. In 1994, U.S. forces helped ensure the safe evacuation of U.S. citizens from ethnic fighting in Rwanda.

    Counterdrug Operations. The Department of Defense, in support of U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEAs), the Department of State, and cooperating foreign governments, continues to participate in combatting the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. The Department strives to achieve the objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy through the effective application of available resources consistent with U.S. law.

    The Department supports the counterdrug mission in five key areas:

    Countering the Spread and Use of WMD

    Beyond the five declared nuclear weapons states, at least 20 other nations have acquired or are attempting to acquire WMD -- nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons -- and the means to deliver them. In fact, many of America's most likely adversaries already possess chemical or biological weapons, and some appear determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a hostile power threaten not only American lives and interests, but also the United States' ability to project power to key regions of the world. The United States will retain the capacity to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use of WMD, so that the costs of such use will be seen as outweighing the gains.

    Addressing the threat of WMD proliferation is no small challenge. The United States has a balanced, multitiered approach to counterproliferation, including enhancing U.S. capabilities in the following areas:

    The United States also continues to face potential nuclear threats from the New Independent States. Russia maintains a large and modern arsenal of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Even after the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II is ratified and enters into force, Russia will retain a formidable strategic nuclear arsenal of up to 3,500 deployed warheads as well as several thousand non-strategic nuclear weapons which are not subject to START II. Moreover, strategic nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union still lie outside of Russia. Perhaps more threatening is the risk that the materials, equipment, and know-how needed to make nuclear weapons will leak out of the New Independent States and into potentially hostile nations.

    The United States seeks Russia's full implementation of the START accords. The United States also will continue to press for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan as pledged by the leaders of those countries in accordance with START I and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States will continue to: provide assistance under the Nunn-Lugar program for the destruction of WMD and removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine and Belarus; ensure the safe and secure storage of nuclear weapons and materials; and help prevent the proliferation of WMD, their components, related technology, and expertise within and beyond national borders. These counterproliferation goals require a strong relationship with Russia and all the New Independent States.

    U.S. nuclear forces remain an important deterrent. In order to deter any hostile nuclear state and to convince potential aggressors that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile, the United States will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by potentially hostile political and military leaders. This requirement is fully consistent with meeting America's current arms control obligations.

    CONCLUSION

    America's defense strategy aims first and foremost to protect the life, property, and way of life of its citizens. Its success ultimately relies on a combination of the nation's superior military capabilities, its unique position as the preferred security partner of important regional states, and its determination to influence events beyond its borders. By providing leadership and shaping the international security arena, the United States, along with its allies and friends, can promote the continued spread of peace and prosperity. Only by maintaining its military wherewithal to defend and advance its interests and underwrite its commitments can the United States retain its preeminent position in the world.


    ExecSec Home Page Table of Contents Top of Page Next Page