Readiness pervades almost all of the Department's activities. It is not just one of DoD's functions that can be independently managed like any other program. Readiness involves a complex range of diverse elements that, when viewed in the aggregate, depicts the force's capability to operate in a post-Cold War environment of instability and new security challenges.
DoD must be able to define, measure, assess, project, and manage readiness. Successfully accomplishing these functions involves a very complex set of interactive tasks which, in many cases, break new ground for the Department of Defense. The key is to identify those policy, budget, and operational levers that are integral to force readiness and can be used to maintain and manage readiness.
With this in mind, the Department has undertaken a broad range of initiatives -- policies, budget actions, organizational structures -- which, taken in total, represent an aggressive program to accomplish something the Department has never done before -- actively manage and report on the readiness of U.S. armed forces from a DoD-wide perspective. That this is being done during a historic reduction in forces makes it all the more challenging.
Readiness is the Department of Defense's number one priority. Thus it is committed to taking those steps necessary to ensure its forces are ready to execute their missions. This chapter lays out the concepts, initiatives, and programs the Department has developed to help achieve its readiness goals.
READY TO DO WHAT?
The Department's first priority is maintaining U.S. military forces ready to fight -- to execute the elements of the National Security Strategy and win the nation's wars. U.S. forces must be manned, equipped, and trained to deal with the dangers to U.S. national security, including response to major regional conflicts, overseas presence operations, and other key missions.
Forces for each of these functions must meet standards in terms of the:
Forces ready to fight means an appropriate force structure, modernized equipment, maintenance and logistics support, and the requisite trained and motivated personnel.
TODAY'S FORCES ARE READY
To achieve its number one priority, DoD leadership has focused attention on the lessons learned from hollow periods of the 1970s and early 1980s and has taken deliberate steps to prevent a recurrence. Previous incidences of hollowness were reflected in a force that was, on average, less educated, trained, equipped, sustained, or strategically mobile.
In contrast with the post-Vietnam drawdown and resulting hollow forces of the 1970s and early 1980s, today's forces are among the best ever fielded. The central reason is the quality of people that the military recruits, trains, equips, and retains. Lessons learned from previous periods of hollowness are clearly reflected in the quality and capability of today's force. Moreover, the high readiness of the force continues as the Department completes its carefully managed drawdown from the Cold War levels of the late 1980s.
WHY READINESS IS NUMBER ONE
There are two compelling reasons to make readiness the first priority, even at the expense of other important uses for the Department's resources. First, the dramatically changed and dynamic international security environment has forced the United States to adjust its policies and programs for meeting evolving security challenges around the world. There is a complex array of new and old challenges that offers the United States new opportunities to exercise global leadership to enhance the security of its friends and neighbors and to promote democratic institutions of government.
As the only nation capable of deploying and conducting sustained large-scale operations beyond its borders, the United States is viewed as a valued regional security partner throughout the world. As such, the national security strategy of engagement incorporates the premise that the United States will be involved in a diverse range of operations other than war. United States national interests and resources will dictate the pace and extent of its military engagement abroad. As demonstrated recently in Korea, Haiti, and Southwest Asia, readiness is essential to fulfilling America's engaged foreign policy where threats can be deterred through rapid power projection.
If, in considering such options, U.S. forces were incapable of executing their missions, policy choices would be seriously circumscribed. The American people would lose confidence in their military's competence, and adversaries would be tempted to pursue aggressive paths. In short, a force not ready would compel the United States to pursue a more passive, less engaged approach to world affairs. A force not ready would encourage its enemies to expand the level of international chaos that the United States wishes to diminish. A force not ready could lead the nation to suffer the consequences of defeat if it engaged a capable adversary.
Second, readiness is a very important factor in the morale and job satisfaction of the men and women of America's armed forces. A ready force is one that offers men and women the opportunity and challenge to perform tasks that they were trained to carry out. There is no greater frustration for those in any profession than assigning them important responsibilities and then denying them the tools and training needed to practice their trade. Challenging and rewarding opportunities attract and retain high quality personnel.
READINESS CHALLENGES
In today's political, fiscal, and operating environments, achieving and maintaining DoD readiness goals are a challenge. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States is drawing down its forces and lowering its defense spending. In the past, however, as the United States drew its forces down, hollowness crept in. That is being prevented this time.
Challenges to maintaining readiness rest primarily with three variables: people, equipment, and training -- a deficit in any one will degrade readiness. It takes resources and time to develop and sustain ready forces. Readiness is cumulative over time; it takes 20 years to develop individual military leaders, 7 to 11 years to develop and field technologically superior equipment, and one to two years of sustained training to get units to their required readiness levels. Decay in resources and people would lengthen the amount of time it takes to rebuild readiness.
DoD has analyzed the challenges to the readiness of its post-drawdown forces in three dimensions: near-, medium-, and long-term. These challenges to readiness will determine how ready the force will be well into the 21st century.
NEAR-TERM CHALLENGES
During FY 1994, U.S. forces engaged in several operations not planned for in the budget. The conduct of these operations made important contributions to U.S. security and foreign policy. U.S. forces performed magnificently in all these operations, an unmistakable testimony to the high quality of U.S. personnel in uniform and the readiness of their units. As illustrated below, however, these operations entailed additional costs, totaling $1.9 billion, to the Department of Defense.
There were several factors associated with financing this amount for unplanned operations which led to a decline in readiness of some late-deploying units.
First, the funds provided for readiness in the FY 1994 budget had little margin to spare. As the year progressed, locality pay, retirement adjustments, and the like -- bills that must be paid -- chipped away at the margin.
Second, DoD entered FY 1994 with several ongoing engagements -- in Somalia, Bosnia, Southwest Asia -- that were not funded in its budgets. Then in late January 1994, the crisis triggered by North Korea's threats of nuclear proliferation led to increased deployments to that region. In March 1994, Congress approved supplemental appropriations that provided financial relief for some of these engagements. Nevertheless, the higher-than-usual activity of U.S. forces began to tax their readiness.
Third, the United States concluded FY 1994 with a series of new engagements -- Rwanda, Haiti, Cuba -- followed by deployments early in FY 1995 to deter and repel Iraq's maneuvers near the Kuwaiti border. DoD promptly requested reimbursement for these operations through supplemental appropriations and warned of the potential declines in readiness in light of these circumstances.
The basis for this warning was well founded. The increased activity levels of U.S. forces required additional funding, causing a cash flow deficit. The Department was forced to make up this deficit by cutting training, maintenance, and supplies from nondeployed units. DoD prudently targeted selected units to meet this requirement.
In November 1994, the Department's senior leadership learned that three Army reinforcing divisions reported changes in readiness to lower C-3 ratings (this rating is the unit's assessment of its ability to execute its wartime missions; C-1 is the highest rating, C-4 is the lowest). Several Navy and Marine air squadrons, that would deploy later in a crisis, reduced or curtailed training. In addition, Air Force units reduced stocks of spare parts.
The Response
The Department's response was immediate and in two forms --
better financing and better processes. Since taking office, the President has
taken steps needed for financial support of the readiness of U.S. forces.
Three times he increased the funds available to the Department of Defense to
ensure that his budget would sustain sufficient readiness, and three times he
has requested supplemental appropriations to support readiness. DoD's response
in adding money when needed demonstrates the Department's commitment to force
readiness.
The Department anticipates incurring substantial costs for unplanned operations above funds appropriated for FY 1995. In conjunction with this FY 1996 budget request, therefore, the President submitted a supplemental appropriations request to finance these costs.
To place this action in perspective, a brief discussion of how readiness budget problems can arise is in order.
A review of contingency costs suggests funds to pay for operations would, at first glance, seem manageable. As the following chart shows, about 1 percent of the overall defense budget ($2.6 billion) is needed to pay such costs and would, therefore, seem to be absorbed easily. In reality though, this amount can be a very large portion of the funds actually available.
To begin with, financing unplanned operations must, by law, come from the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) account. The $2.6 billion is 3 percent of O&M funds -- a larger portion, but still an amount that could be accommodated. Within the O&M account, however, there are practical limits on flexibility to move money around. As the next chart indicates, there is no flexibility to use approximately half of the O&M funds to pay for unplanned operations. There also is only limited flexibility to use almost a quarter of the O&M budget. Of the O&M funds where there is flexibility, absorbing a $2.6 billion bill translates to a 10 percent reduction in available funding to support training and maintenance. The impact of diverting these funds is consequential since the loan of these funds degrades readiness. To minimize such impact, the Department borrows against fourth quarter activities in order to sustain readiness for as long as possible. However, if supplemental appropriations are not received by the end of the second quarter, when planning is well underway for fourth quarter training, activities in the fourth quarter will be seriously degraded.
Consequently, absorbing the full $2.6 billion for unplanned operations in the fourth quarter of FY 1995 could result in a reduction of readiness funds by 40 percent. Clearly such a drastic cut would have an unacceptable impact on unit readiness.
Supplemental budget requests alone, however, may not be sufficient. If, in pursuing security interests, DoD were to engage in unplanned operations beyond those now anticipated, and if they occurred in the later part of the fiscal year, unit readiness could still suffer. No matter how quickly the Department requested, and Congress approved, supplemental appropriations to cover these added expenses, short-term cash flow deficits would likely occur, to the detriment of readiness.
To avoid the impact of late supplementals and to minimize the damage from contingencies that could occur late in the fiscal year, the Department requested a new fiscal authority to preserve readiness. This authority would allow the Department to incur obligations, beyond existing appropriations, to preserve readiness. This Readiness Preservation Authority (RPA) would be applied only under the following limited conditions:
Having such authority would enable the military departments to continue training and other readiness programs that otherwise might have to be curtailed or canceled while waiting for supplemental appropriations. With the addition of this new authority, DoD is confident that the cash flow problems which triggered a decline in readiness experienced late last fiscal year will not be repeated.
Beyond this fiscal year, DoD's military and civilian leaders believe that the FY 1996 budget will provide sufficiency for readiness. Again, however, this sufficiency rests on the timeliness of any supplemental appropriations needed to reimburse the expenses of unplanned operations.
In addition to improving the Department's financing, the Deputy Secretary directed that DoD's assessments of the current readiness of the force be candidly and promptly conveyed to the public and Congress. He directed the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as the Department's spokesperson on current readiness, giving a clear, unvarnished picture of the U.S. military's readiness so that there can be a fully informed discussion of any actions needed to correct problems that may arise.
MEDIUM-TERM CHALLENGES
Sustaining United States forces in the medium-term involves a focus on the most essential portion of the force -- the people. No weapon system is better than the people who operate and maintain it. Therefore, recruiting and retaining quality people significantly affect readiness. In recruiting, the Department is meeting its recruiting goals, posting the third-best recruiting year ever. In keeping people, DoD currently enjoys high retention rates among servicemembers. Moreover, the Department has taken several steps to improve quality of life (QOL) in the medium-term so that the Services can continue these positive trends.
QOL programs support readiness in three ways. First, they help to retain the best people -- well-trained people, people who are competent in their skills, and people who have high morale. Second, QOL programs enable people to go on deployment with the assurance that their families will be taken care of -- a particularly important factor with a more mature and family-oriented All-Volunteer Force. Third, quality of life helps the Department recruit good people. Addressing these important goals is reflected in the Secretary of Defense's initiative to add $2.7 billion over six years to directly improve the quality of life for its servicemembers. The $2.7 billion for these initiatives, which is in addition to money initially programmed in the budget, will improve compensation, living accommodations, and family and community support. The following Quality of Life chapter specifically details these enhancements.
LONG-TERM CHALLENGES
In part, meeting the near- and medium-term challenges will help bolster the force in the long-term. The primary focus of the long-term challenge is to provide technologically superior equipment to United States forces to improve their chances of success in future conflicts.
Additionally, the opportunities for meeting United States long-term goals lie in three areas: aggressive divestiture of infrastructure, effective acquisition reform, and creative reengineering of how the Department does its business. For instance, actions taken today to streamline the Department will prove a great benefit in the long-term. Some successful examples are BRAC 1995, civilian drawdowns, real property maintenance and depot maintenance enhancements, and widespread use of modeling and simulation to enhance training and acquisition.
MEETING THE CHALLENGES -- GUIDING PRINCIPLES
To have forces ready to fight and succeed in the climate of these challenges requires creating and implementing a new approach that breaks the readiness business-as-usual mold. DoD's approach to meeting the challenge follows three guiding principles -- understand it, organize around it, and stay ahead of it.
Understand It
Planning for sufficient readiness is, to begin with, a matter of ensuring that DoD allocates the proper amount of resources -- defense dollars -- to give U.S. forces the requisite ability to carry out U.S. defense strategy. On the face, this is a quite simple concept -- input dollars, output readiness to execute U.S. defense strategy. It masks, however, immense complexity in application.
Readiness dollars can be allocated for a vast variety of readiness assets -- everything from flying hours to train pilots, to fuel to keep the fleet steaming, to spare parts to keep tanks running. In the current state of understanding, much is known about how dollars translate into the thousands of assets needed for readiness. But much more must be known about how these assets combine together into an overall force ready to fight. In short, as funding allocations are changed among these assets, will a more-ready or less-ready force be produced overall?
To ensure that U.S. military forces have the proper allocation of funds for readiness, DoD must improve its understanding and definitions of readiness and readiness-related programs and increase its knowledge of how the allocation of funds will affect the future readiness of its forces. To this end, the Department has launched an intense effort to develop and apply analytical tools that translate readiness funding inputs into estimated outputs of future readiness of forces.
For example, the Air Force has a model that projects mission-capable rates (the percentage of time that a weapon system is capable of performing at least one of its designed missions) for aircraft, based on spares funding levels. The Army is evaluating this model for possible adaptation for its helicopters and ground combat systems. Using the model, the Army determined that the best way to improve Black Hawk helicopter readiness was to increase maintenance personnel rather than increasing spare parts funding. Application of the model also showed that maintenance funds should be shifted from the M1A1 main battle tank to the Bradley armored troop carrier to balance better the readiness of both.
The Navy has developed two models to project mission-capable rates for aircraft and the material condition for surface ships. Both are multi-variable models, permitting the Navy to assess the impact on readiness of changes to factors such as force structure, spares and maintenance funding, and personnel manning. The Air Force is currently reviewing the analytic framework of the Navy's aviation model for possible inclusion into their model. These are important results, and they demonstrate the type of resources-to-readiness modeling the Department is attempting to develop for all readiness areas.
Organize Around It
Within the Department of Defense, the Services are responsible for the preparation of forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations other than war. The Services are responsible for recruiting, organizing, training, educating, and equipping mission-ready forces. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as the principal military advisor to the President, sets the strategic direction of the armed forces and, along with the Commanders in Chief (CINCs), is responsible for joint readiness as well as the ability to integrate, synchronize, and employ joint forces and support assets to execute assigned missions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is charged with ensuring the development of the appropriate policies and allocation of resources needed for these military organizations to carry out their responsibilities.
In order to integrate the many functional areas and organizations that must pull together to support the Secretary's commitment to protecting force readiness, the Department has formed the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). This committee is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and includes the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), the Service Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Under Secretaries and selected Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The committee meets monthly, and most of its first year has focused on putting form to the program for carrying out the Secretary's readiness initiatives. For example, one of these initiatives was the development of a joint readiness reporting system, which was implemented in December 1994.
More recently, the SROC has focused on current and near-term future readiness. The events of last year suggested a need for senior leadership to follow closely the readiness health of the force today. In response, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the SROC to consider monthly current readiness reports by the VCJCS and the Chiefs of Staff of the Services. These reports form the basis for uncovering problems and correcting them before they can affect the overall readiness posture of the force.
The SROC is supported in its deliberations by the Readiness Working Group (RWG), which is co-chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness and the Director of Operations (J-3) of the Joint Staff. The principal focus of this committee is to ensure that the directions of the SROC are carried out, although it serves as a useful forum to integrate readiness issues that do not require top-level management.
In addition, the CJCS approved the expansion in the focus of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC is chaired by the VCJCS and includes the Service Vice Chiefs of Staff. It will now proactively consider readiness, sustainment, recapitalization, and integration issues and make recommendations to the CJCS and the Deputy Secretary. In the past, the JROC concerned itself solely with warfighting requirements issues.
In support of the JROC, the Joint Staff, as part of its Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process, is coordinating an initiative that will include an assessment of current and future readiness. The JWCA process, which assesses nine joint force enablers (Strike; Air Superiority; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Overseas Presence; Command and Control (C2) and Information Warfare; Deterrence/Counterproliferation; Strategic Mobility; Ground Maneuver; and Joint Readiness), will provide a systemic process for integrating individual capability assessments into an overall assessment of force readiness.
Finally, the new National Military Strategy of selective and flexible engagement, involving a broad range of activities to address and help shape the evolving strategic environment, requires increased emphasis on joint doctrine and education. Joint readiness to meet the challenges of a new era mandates an educated officer and civilian Department of Defense corps with an understanding of the current environment and a realistic but intellectually challenging vision of future military roles and capabilities. In the current strategic landscape, the Department of Defense must maintain a professional military education system that produces leaders to execute today's missions while simultaneously developing visionary Service, joint, and national strategies.
Stay Ahead of It
Along with sound understanding and solid organization, the Secretary of Defense also recognized that the Department continues to need advice on how to stay ahead of readiness. Thus he established the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Readiness, known as the Readiness Task Force (RTF), to provide him with advice, recommendations, and supporting rationale which address the following areas:
The RTF reviewed a broad range of readiness topics and looked in depth at numerous specific aspects of readiness. The June 1994 report of the RTF highlighted areas that they believe the Department of Defense should focus on to provide the ready forces needed, today and tomorrow, to respond to likely challenges in the changing world environment. The report also addressed its concerns in each of these areas and suggested approaches for dealing with them. The RTF will continue to meet quarterly, or at the call of the Secretary of Defense, to review the status of actions to implement its recommendations and/or address other readiness issues as directed.
Over the past year, in conducting its activities, the Readiness Task Force met as a group frequently, and its members visited numerous sites to gather information for its report. Significantly, the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense met with the Task Force at many of their group meetings so that the department could take timely action, rather than wait for formal reports. In addition, the RTF met with the CJCS and the Service Chiefs as they developed observations and recommendations. They also maintained a dialogue with General Accounting Office representatives who conducted a congressionally-directed effort to define key military readiness factors. As a result of these collaborative efforts, steps to implement many of the recommendations made in the RTF report already are underway.
The United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) established the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC) to train Joint Task Force (JTF) battle staffs for continental United States (CONUS) forces. The JTASC's primary mission is to support and assist CINCUSACOM to develop, conduct, and assess full-scale JTF exercises and rehearsals using modeling, simulation, networked simulators, and other state-of-the-art technologies. When fully operational, the JTASC will improve and measure joint readiness, provide a laboratory for the improvement of joint tactics, and establish a secure CONUS joint environment for the demonstration of new technologies. These activities will be an important element in assessing and improving the readiness of JTFs.
In addition to these activities, and related to the RTF recommendations, the Joint Staff has developed a number of very specific directives and initiatives for assessing, improving, and monitoring readiness and the management of JTF operations. Among these are:
Other joint initiatives are underway. A joint program office has been established to develop a common modeling and simulation architecture. This initiative, referred to as the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS), initially will address interoperability between the next generation of constructive simulations (wargaming) models, and over time, expand to address live (instrumented weapon/systems, people, and training centers) and virtual (weapon systems) simulators. All four Services have agreed to coordinate interoperability standards for instrumented training systems. In addition, DoD expects to increase the modeling and simulation capabilities embedded in C2 systems so that the warfighters can train on their operational equipment in the way that they will fight.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S THREE READINESS INITIATIVES
In the first SROC meeting, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed three high priority readiness initiatives in order to improve the Department's management of readiness. These initiatives are:
FY 1996-2001 PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS
Despite the challenges in precisely projecting U.S. readiness and sustainability needs in uncertain times, the readiness programs and budgets being submitted to Congress represent the best estimates possible based on the substantial knowledge and experience within DoD today, and they represent resources sufficient to keep U.S. military forces ready to fight and to execute U.S. policy successfully.
Future programs and budgets were developed using the direction provided through prior years planning. The principal guidance affecting readiness is outlined below:
This requires components to maintain appropriate levels of manning; training; and equipment procurement, distribution, and maintenance (to include deploying units and their support) for the most demanding deployment schedules.
ASSESSMENT OF READINESS FUNDING
The resources in the FY 1996 budget will provide sufficient readiness for America's armed forces, provided that:
For the outyears of the program beyond FY 1996, DoD's focus is on maintaining adequate readiness, specifically, with an eye toward determining if those elements of readiness critical to the execution of U.S. defense strategy are sufficiently funded. For example, DoD has fully funded OPTEMPO and personnel programs. At the same time, the Department has attempted to maintain overall program balance to ensure, for example, that other programs (e.g., base operations, facilities maintenance) have sufficient funds and therefore will not undermine other critical readiness programs.
America's armed forces are the backbone of U.S. national security strategy, and they are ready today to carry out this strategy. To do so, they must prevail in several diverse missions: major regional conflicts, strategic nuclear deterrence, overseas presence, and smaller contingencies.
Accomplishments over the past year provide compelling evidence that the force is ready. Forces have deployed in a number of operations, often to shape particular situations so that future conflicts will be less likely. In each case, the United States' men and women in uniform performed magnificently. Their accomplishments are testimony to the payoff the nation receives for the investments of this and past administrations in their readiness.
Readiness remains the Department's first priority. Within this priority, the most essential component is people. The nation asks much of its men and women in uniform and owes much in return for their dedication and sacrifice. The quality of life initiatives, briefly discussed herein and highlighted in the next chapter, emphasize the Department's commitment to them.
For FY 1996 and beyond, the Department will maintain its forces as ready to carry out the strategy of the Bottom-Up Review. Still, more work needs to be done to implement proposed programs and budgets. The policies and programs enumerated in this section demonstrate the initiative and energy with which the Department is breaking new ground to address these challenges and will set the stage for ensuring readiness for the future. Thus, success down the road depends on fully funded future budgets, taking care of people, and conducting sufficient training to ensure that tomorrow's forces are ready to fight.
