



STATEMENT OF

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Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss the Department of Defense's countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) efforts. The Department is building on its legacy of counterproliferation and threat reduction work while adjusting activities to meet new proliferation challenges and emerging threats. I welcome the opportunity to discuss these developments with you today.

It is a special honor to appear with two colleagues with whom I work very closely: the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Ken Myers, and the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Ms. Anne Harrington.

DTRA and the office I oversee – OSD-Policy's Global Strategic Affairs organization – serve complementary roles in the development, execution, and oversight of the Department's CWMD mission. In general terms, my office develops strategy and policy guidance, manages interagency and international relationships, and sets Department CWMD priorities. DTRA is the entity responsible for implementing the CWMD strategic guidance which my office has developed. DTRA accomplishes this mission with acquisition oversight of the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological programs. As a practical matter, all of these DoD components execute responsibilities at all levels in close coordination with each other, and with Combatant Commanders, especially U.S. STRATCOM.

Our missions are executed with essential support from the Department of State, and in cooperation with Ms. Harrington and her team at NNSA. I do not claim complete success in all we do, but it is not an exaggeration to say that the U.S. government's CWMD "community" is a successfully integrated interagency team.

Global Environment and DoD's Strategy

The threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains complex. The intent of states and non-state actors to acquire WMD, combined with the availability of sensitive materials and increased access to scientific expertise make WMD more accessible than ever to potential adversaries.

President Obama made clear in his April 2009 speech in Prague that overcoming the threat posed by WMD –especially the nexus between WMD and terrorism – requires a comprehensive approach. This is reflected in the broad strategic framework that guides our efforts.

- The 2009 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, a comprehensive approach to prevent or respond to the proliferation and use of biological weapons by states or non-state actors. A key part of this strategy is a broad effort to increase capability worldwide to conduct effective and timely disease surveillance and to improve capacity to counter both naturally occurring and deliberately-caused disease outbreaks through the application of targeted and proven tools for biological risk management.
- The 2010 National Security Strategy, which outlines a comprehensive nonproliferation and security agenda, including reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal and reliance on nuclear weapons, promoting regional stability, and ensuring the effectiveness of our deterrent and defensive capabilities.

- The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which devotes more attention to this challenge than any prior defense review, establishes “Preventing Proliferation and Countering WMD” and “Defending the United States and Supporting Civil Authorities at Home” among the Department’s top six priority mission areas.
- And the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which seeks to better align our nuclear policies and posture to our most urgent priorities –preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation while ensuring the maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

In support of these efforts, the Department of Defense is aligning its CWMD programs to become more flexible and responsive. Here our approach is three-fold: First, we are supporting the Administration’s broader effort to reinvigorate multilateral nonproliferation initiatives and treaties. Second, we seek to secure or eliminate WMD threats at their source and in transit. Third, we seek to enhance our ability to detect and respond to emerging threats, and to ensure our troops, along with coalition partners, can fight and win in an environment contaminated by chemical, biological, radiological or other hazards. These three lines of effort can be summed up as touchstones: *leadership, partnership, and innovation.*

Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regimes

This area of effort is about enhancing U.S. *leadership* in global non-proliferation forums.

For years we have worked with our allies and partners to develop a nonproliferation infrastructure that can reduce our collective vulnerability to these weapons. The current network of initiatives, regimes, and treaties offers important tools for advancing this critical agenda. The Administration’s efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime through the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are instrumental to raising barriers to WMD proliferation. In this area we are not naïve: the worst actual or potential proliferators won’t meet non-proliferation obligations under any circumstance. However, a number of nations face choices about their role in the world’s WMD non-proliferation “conversation”; with strong U.S. leadership we can convince them from staying on the sidelines, or worse, from becoming proliferators themselves.

We are actively working to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The May 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed parties’ commitment to the Treaty and significantly achieved consensus on an Action Plan for future progress. This Action Plan endorsed a balanced approach to advance the three pillars of the regime: nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. DoD will continue to actively participate with State and our interagency colleagues in international activities to implement this Plan. The United States’ “negative security assurance” set forth in DoD’s 2010 Report of the Nuclear Posture Review is clear: “The U.S. will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” This assurance underscores the security benefits of adhering to, and complying fully with, the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In addition, the Administration is committed to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT would limit countries without nuclear weapons from confidently deploying such weapons; it would hinder existing nuclear powers from developing

new types of warheads. As a sign of our commitment to the CTBT regime, we will continue to maintain our unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, and will remain fully engaged in development of the Treaty's verification regime. At the same time, we remain committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for our security and that of our allies.

We also seek a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that would ban production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. DoD continues to support discussions among technical experts in the UN Conference on Disarmament. These discussions are not a substitute for actual negotiations, but hopefully they will foster greater appreciation of key technical issues.

Further, we are engaged actively in efforts to ensure that the upcoming Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference strengthens the global norm against possession and use of biological weapons. We hope to expand membership in the Convention and strengthen its implementation to meet the bioweapons challenges of the 21st century. As part of this effort, DoD has taken steps to increase the transparency of our biological defense activities; the United States is encouraging other treaty parties to do the same.

Finally, the Administration recognizes the importance of multilateral activities and mechanisms that help to prevent proliferation, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Since its creation in 2003, nearly one hundred countries have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, which commits signatories to take action individually and cooperatively, as necessary to interdict WMD related materials in transit to states of proliferation concern. The PSI also continues to help build states' individual and collective ability to fulfill this commitment, using military exercises, table top workshops and ship-boarding training. This year we are focusing our efforts to promote key interdiction capabilities, identify resources to support these capabilities, and design strategies to proactively engage nations in the capacity-building process.

Last year the UN Security Council imposed the toughest sanctions to date against Iran. As with the case of North Korea, the Security Council called on states to inspect suspicious cargo bound from or to Iran at airports, seaports, and on the high seas. This illustrated the utility of PSI and related activities to non-proliferation success. UN members are now obligated to block North Korean and Iranian transfers of WMD and related cargoes, to include missile parts, explosives, and other nuclear-related technology. Exercises and training provided under the PSI help increase the international community's collective capability to execute these activities.

United States multilateral non-proliferation leadership was punctuated last year by the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, attended by 47 countries. The momentum and specific non-proliferation accomplishments generated by the Summit were impressive, and we are supporting the Republic of Korea as it prepares to host the next Nuclear Security Summit in Spring 2012.

Reducing and Eliminating Threats

This area of effort focuses on our essential *partnership* with governments dealing with legacies of WMD on their territory, or which are interested in building the capacity to prevent WMD and related materials from crossing their borders illicitly.

Since its inception in 1992, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has worked with states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) to address nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical threats. Since 2005, CTR has evolved to keep pace with

the changing global security environment, and that evolution has accelerated recently. In December 2010, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determined that CTR partnerships with Iraq, India, China, and the countries of Africa will assist the United States in achieving long-standing nonproliferation goals, as well as sustaining long-term partnerships that enhance security. The Secretary's action adds to his 2009 determination to pursue CTR cooperation with Afghanistan and Pakistan. This work beyond CTR's "traditional" area of operations in the FSU reflects opportunities we see for expanded partnerships on WMD security issues. Four principles guide evolution of CTR as we expand geographically: integration, responsiveness, stewardship, and cooperation.

Integration. In the past, CTR was often the lead U.S. interlocutor with a foreign government on a particular project. In the future, CTR needs to build on work that other U.S. and international agencies have accomplished, taking care to leverage others' success without reinventing-the-wheel. This is especially true in CTR's expanding bio-engagement.

Responsiveness. CTR has typically taken a very methodical approach to its activities. Should the need arise, we are revising procedures to in order that we can be agile enough to accept targets of opportunity and flexible enough to utilize CTR in new regions and for new projects.

Stewardship. We are working closely with DTRA to ensure that partner countries can join effectively in sustaining the capacity that many new CTR projects are intended to create.

Cooperation. CTR is about protecting U.S. interests. However, we increase our risks when our solutions are devised with an inside-the-Beltway perspective. We can better leverage partners' local creativity to meet common goals.

Having just described the principles governing CTR's geographic expansion, it is worth highlighting two other points of principle. First, we are expanding the program beyond its traditional area of activity because we believe that a threat persists which CTR can help address. CTR has built important interagency relationships and global experience working in remote locations; this is a valuable asset we are redeploying in relevant, modernized ways in pursuit of U.S. interests. Second, our geographic expansion of CTR does not necessarily imply significantly increased costs. We appreciate Congress's support last year for a substantial increase in CTR's budget. We believe that step addressed a prior mis-match between CTR's missions and resources. However, at this time we believe the FY2012 budget request and the program's future years projected baseline is well-balanced against likely demands. DoD will do its part in the national deficit reduction effort, and we are prepared to make hard choices in the CTR program should they be necessary.

The President has requested \$508.2 million for CTR in fiscal year 2012. This figure supports a variety of counter-WMD efforts described in my testimony, within the context of Secretary Gates' imperative to maximize efficiencies in the Department. DTRA and the National Nuclear Security Administration have also presented balanced requests, well-synchronized across the CWMD community. I urge the Committee's support for these requests; I'd like to highlight a few of the activities these funds will support.

CTR's strategic nuclear systems elimination work in the FSU has largely been concluded; however, work continues in Russia as ballistic missiles, launchers, and ballistic missile submarines are being dismantled in verifiable fashion. With the entry into force of the New

START Treaty, we anticipate that the Russian Federation will request continued CTR assistance to ensure strategic systems are properly disposed of with no residual proliferation-sensitive components remaining.

CTR also assists Russia with safe, secure, and environmentally sound destruction of a portion of its nerve agent stockpile that is most vulnerable to theft or diversion. Russia is responsible for meeting its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention; CTR's involvement focuses only on the most dangerous, most proliferable portion of the former Soviet stockpile and related infrastructure. Our current chemical weapons-related work in Russia involved primarily technical assistance: we are ensuring proper maintenance at the Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility constructed by CTR, which began eliminating chemical weapons in March 2009. This protects our investment, as well as the contributions of other donor countries.

Through CTR's work in Russia, DoD is contributing to the "site-level" approach of the interagency strategy for the President's global nuclear lockdown agenda, described by my DOE colleague. CTR continues to assist Russia with transport of nuclear warheads from operational locations to dismantlement facilities or more secure, consolidated storage sites. We are also assisting Russia with secure transport of spent naval fuel that is both enriched and vulnerable to a degree that gives rise to proliferation concern. CTR's successful partnership with the Department of Energy and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (MOD) to secure warhead storage sites also continues. Although primary activity for this effort (the so-called "Bratislava Initiative") concluded some years ago, CTR is ensuring that Russia can sustain the modernized physical protection systems that were installed for the long term. This sustainment work is nearing completion, and we are working with DOE to transition responsibility for their sustainment to the Russian Federation.

CTR considers each Russian request independently; not all requests for support are granted. We continue to believe that engagement with Russia through the CTR program supports U.S. non-proliferation and strategic interests. Moreover, cooperation with Russia funded through CTR has endured as a steady, open channel even when the success of other aspects of the US-Russia relationship have been inconsistent.

We are also leveraging our nuclear security experience in the former Soviet Union to support the implementation of the "country-level" and "global-level" approaches of the global nuclear lockdown strategy. Alongside DOE and other interagency stakeholders, CTR is supporting a "Center of Excellence" for Nuclear Security in China, and will participate with India in the nuclear security component of its Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership, both announced at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. Through these Centers we hope to be able to exchange nuclear security best practices, demonstrate equipment, and contribute to national and regional training programs. DoD is also active in multilateral nuclear security collaborations, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, as well as the Nuclear Security Summit process.

The most dynamic area of CTR activity for the foreseeable future will be biodefense. CTR's Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) (formerly designated Bio-Threat Reduction Program) is pursuing four lines of effort. First, CBEP consolidates and secures collections of especially dangerous pathogens that might serve as the source for biological weapons. Second, CBEP provides laboratory safety enhancements and training to prevent

accidental release of especially dangerous pathogens. Third, CBEP strengthens partner countries' detection, diagnostic, and reporting systems with training, technology upgrades, and improvements to laboratory detection networks. Finally, CBEP promotes collaborative research projects to increase capacity to understand and recognize the most dangerous pathogens. Collectively, these four areas help address the growing human and animal biodefense challenge which we believe has heretofore lacked appropriate resources and attention from U.S. agencies with national security missions. CBEP activities are synchronized with the National Security Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, specifically, its goals of strengthening global health security, obtaining timely insight on emerging outbreaks, reducing the potential for exploitation of life sciences material and technology, and reinforcing norms of safe and responsible conduct.

The Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) continues to partner with countries of the FSU and is active in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. In Georgia, we recently opened a new Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) and are in the process of helping it become an internationally recognized center for disease surveillance and diagnostics. A similar effort is under way in Kazakhstan. And in Ukraine, the CBEP consolidate Ukraine's human especially dangerous pathogens at an upgraded, secure facility, with an eye toward taking similar action for Ukraine's animal especially dangerous pathogens.

Earlier, I mentioned Secretary Gates' approval of CTR expansion to Africa for biodefense work; and I'd like to say a bit more about why DoD views Africa as a priority for this kind of engagement. Africa is a continent that is rich in indigenous, naturally-occurring especially dangerous pathogens, which local scientists and health professionals must work with on a routine basis. Limited funding for training, infrastructure and other needs means that this work is all too often performed with less than ideal safety and security standards in place. Security of borders is also a challenge in many parts of Africa. These factors make Africa a tempting destination for both state and non-state organizations that seek biological weapons.

The United States and its allies have had a long-standing public-health presence in Africa, a base of experience and familiarity that facilitates CTR's activities on the continent. Potential African partner governments are both enthusiastic and creative about the opportunities for Nunn-Lugar CTR program activities, and we are working with them to pursue a regional approach for our cooperative engagement program that would have a lasting impact beyond traditional bilateral relationships. The U.S. military has important relationships in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, so we view our activities as directly supporting U.S. troops' security, in addition to furthering larger non-proliferation goals. Our work has been aided greatly by the support of State Department colleagues and country teams as CTR managers build relationships in the program's first major expansion outside the FSU.

While securing WMD materials at their sources is an important component of the CTR program, our strategy requires a layered defense against WMD proliferation threats. CTR's WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) can enhance partners' ability to detect and interdict WMD "on the move" through provision of detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities. DTRA's International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) complements the capital-intensive investments of the WMD-PPP program through its modest "train and equip" efforts. ICP is unique in its legislative authority to partner explicitly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in furtherance of deterring the proliferation of WMD across the FSU, the Baltic States, and in Eastern Europe. We are

currently working to determine how best to expand both border security programs to new partners.

Detecting and Responding to Emerging Threats

This area of activity will depend for success on *innovation* in technology, intelligence, and planning; innovation which we will need to foster. Our attention in this regard has focused on re-looking the nation's defenses against the threat of loose nuclear material, plus consideration of new defenses against emerging biological threats.

As President Obama said in his April 2009 Prague speech, "the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons.... Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal" a nuclear weapon. The President's charge to Executive agencies was to look again at what heretofore had been viewed as a reliable whole-of-US government response should we suspect a terrorist organization has obtained one or more nuclear devices. Faced with such a threat, we will potentially need a globally-synchronized response to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of nuclear weapons. This could include activities such as securing material at the source, intercepting material on the move, and increasing defenses to protect against an attack on the homeland.

The threat of nuclear terrorism is also closely intertwined with state challenges. For instance, the instability or collapse of a nuclear-armed state could quickly lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons or materials well beyond the country of origin and involve multiple state and non-state actors as it moves. Our plans for these potential challenges need to be revised to reflect the ever-increasing velocity of information, new challenges and capabilities in intelligence collection, and enduring technical hurdles related to nuclear detection and forensics.

Within DoD, we seek to synchronize a layered defense against these threats that includes enhanced protective posture of the homeland; better identification of likely proliferation pathways; and, new abilities to detect and characterize sources and properties threats. We can be certain that in a nuclear or other WMD crisis, all these activities would be occurring simultaneously, under withering media scrutiny. Our focus in DoD is to improve capacity among top leaders, the Combatant Commanders, and the providers of key expertise to coordinate efforts as a potential threat is tracked from remote parts of the globe.

The emerging biodefense threat lacks the signature characteristics of a "loose nuke," but is no less dangerous.

An important priority of the President's National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats is increasing capability to conduct effective and timely disease surveillance worldwide. This will improve our capacity to respond successfully to both naturally occurring and deliberate disease outbreaks. A 2009 report by the National Research Council noted that countries which lack the public health infrastructure necessary to detect, diagnose, and report naturally occurring disease outbreaks are substantially less able to effectively deal with a bio-terror attack. I spoke earlier of efforts of the CTR program to address the bio-surveillance shortfall. In addition, we have worked with the Army and Navy to restructure DoD support for its overseas laboratory system beginning in FY12. These labs are DoD's primary means to discover novel pathogens or characterize pathogens that are not generally found in the United States. Within the military medical community these labs have long been well-known for their intrepid work protecting U.S.

military members from disease. The innovation we will implement in 2012 is to begin leveraging these important facilities for non-proliferation purposes, as an addition to their original clinical missions.

Other innovations reflect an array of concerns about the changing WMD threat and how best to prepare our troops and coalition partners to confront it:

- The revolution in biotechnology and the chemical industry is undermining our confidence in defenses currently protecting our forces. With growing access to expertise, equipment and precursors needed to produce new chemical or biological compounds, we sought more RDT&E funding to develop improved countermeasures, personal protection gear, and research new decontamination techniques to mitigate the effects of novel chemical and biological agents.
- We have recognized a need for innovation in our military organizational capacity to counter WMD threats. The 2010 QDR called for a new standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination which will serve as a permanent, joint advocate for training, exercising and refining military tactics, techniques and procedures related to WMD elimination. The Secretary designated U.S. Strategic Command as the lead, and the command is currently completing its mission analysis. The standing headquarters will greatly increase DoD's capability to locate, characterize, secure, disable or destroy hostile WMD capabilities in a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment.
- We have also made a down-payment on innovative approaches to building partners' WMD defense capabilities. For FY12, the DoD budget request includes a small start-up fund for "counter-WMD Cooperative Defense Initiatives." These funds are dedicated for each Geographic Combatant Command to provide an initial capacity for interoperability among U.S. forces and regional partners, and ensure partner nations can survive an attack, eliminate further threats, and manage the humanitarian consequences of a WMD attack. This initiative is supported strongly by our COCOM counterparts and we look forward to reporting to Congress in future years on its progress.
- Finally, at NATO, the new Strategic Concept adopted by Heads of State and Government at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to further develop NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. At the United States' behest, the Strategic Concept directed NATO to assess how it can improve capacity to counter proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. DoD is working closely with State to assist NATO in this important effort.

Conclusion

Congress has provided authorities and resources which allow DoD to address the WMD threat to our troops and our people. It is an evolving threat that spans traditional counter-proliferation and non-proliferation responses. Our mission is to ensure that DoD's responses stay ahead of the threat in order that our troops and those of our coalition partners can fight and win in a WMD environment, and that our people are protected from WMD threats. We are committed to working closely with our interagency and international partners, and with the Congress in this endeavor.