I.
Introduction
1. The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects, under Article 8, subparagraph 3 (a), reads,
inter alia, as follows:
“If,
after a period of ten years following the entry into force of this Convention,
no conference has been convened in accordance with subparagraph 1 (a)
or 2 (a) of this Article, any High Contracting Party may request the Depositary
to convene a conference to which all High Contracting Parties shall be
invited to review the scope and operation of this Convention and the Protocols
annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments of this Convention
or of the existing Protocols. States not parties to this Convention shall
be invited as observers to the conference. The conference may agree upon
amendments which shall be adopted and enter into force in accordance with
subparagraph 1 (b) above.”
2. On 16 December 1993, the General Assembly, by its resolution 48/79,
welcomed the request to the Secretary-General to convene at an appropriate
time, if possible in 1994, in accordance with article 8, paragraph 3,
of the Convention, a conference to review the Convention and encouraged
the States parties to request the Secretary-General to establish as soon
as possible a group of governmental experts to prepare the review conference
and to furnish needed assistance and assure service, including the preparation
of analytical reports that the review conference and the group of experts
might need. It also called upon the maximum number of States to attend
the conference, to which the States parties may invite interested non-governmental
organizations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross.
3. On 22 December 1993, States Parties to the Convention submitted a letter
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, requesting him, in his
capacity as depositary of the Convention, to convene a Conference of the
High Contracting Parties to review the provisions of the Convention. In
the letter, the States parties also requested that a group of experts
be established with a view to facilitating preparations for this Conference
(document CCW/CONF.I/8/Rev.1, paragraph 3).
4. Accordingly, the Secretary-General established the Group of Governmental
Experts to Prepare the Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects. The Group of Governmental Experts held four sessions in Geneva
as follows: the first session took place from 28 February to 4 March 1994,
the second from 16 to 27 May 1994, the third from 8 to 19 August 1994
and the fourth from 9 to 20 January 1995. A summary of the work of the
Group of Governmental Experts as well as on participation in the Group’s
sessions is contained in document CCW/CONF.I/8/Rev.1, paragraphs 4 to
8.
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II. Organization
5. In accordance with the decision of the Group of Governmental Experts,
the first phase of the Review Conference was held in Vienna from 25 September
to 13 October 1995 at the Austria Center Vienna and the Vienna International
Centre. On 25 September, the Conference was opened by the Chairman of
the Group of Governmental Experts, Mr. Johan Molander (Sweden), who was
subsequently elected by acclamation as President of the Conference.
6. At its 1st plenary meeting, on 25 September 1995, the Conference also
unanimously confirmed the nomination of Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, Deputy Director
of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, as Secretary-General
of the Conference. The nomination had been made by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, following an invitation by the Group of Governmental
Experts. At its 11th plenary meeting, on 22 April 1996, the President
informed the Conference that the Secretary-General of the Conference,
Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, was unable to attend the second resumed session and
proposed that Mrs. Hannelore Hoppe, Senior Political Affairs Officer of
the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, assume the responsibilities
of Acting Secretary-General of the Conference. The Conference endorsed
this proposal.
7. At its 1st plenary meeting, the Conference, in accordance with its
Rules of Procedure, unanimously elected 10 Vice-Presidents from the following
States Parties:
|
Austria
| Russian
Federation
|
|
China
| Slovakia
|
|
France
| Tunisia
|
|
India
| Ukraine
|
|
Mexico
| United
States of America
|
|
8. At the same meeting, the Conference also unanimously elected
the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the three Main Committees, the
Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, as follows:
|
| Main
Committee I
| Chairman
| Mr.
Tibor Tóth (Hungary)
|
|
| Vice-Chairman
| Mr.
Jaap Ramaker(Netherlands)
|
| Main
Committee II
| Chairman
| Mr.
Jorge Morales Pedraza (Cuba)
|
|
| Vice-Chairman
| Mr.
Richard G. Starr (Australia)
|
| Main
Committee III
| Chairman
| Mr.
Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany)
|
|
| Vice-Chairman
| Mr.
Peter Poptchev (Bulgaria)
|
| Drafting
Committee
| Chairman
| Mr.
Mark J. Moher (Canada)
|
|
| Vice-Chairman
| Mr.
Taoufik Jabeur (Tunisia)
|
| Credentials
Committee
| Chairman
| Mr.
Zdzislaw Galicki (Poland)
|
|
| Vice-Chairman
| Baron
Alain Guillaume (Belgium)
|
9. The Conference also appointed, on the proposal of the President, representatives
from the following three States Parties as members of the Credentials
Committee: China, Finland and Pakistan.
10. At its 8th plenary meeting, on 13 October 1995, the Conference adopted
by consensus the text of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol
IV).
11. At the same meeting, the Conference decided by consensus, that in
view of the additional time needed to complete its work on Protocol II,
it would continue in resumed sessions, to be held from 15 to 19 January
1996 and from 22 April to 3 May 1996, with a view to concluding the review
and the amendment of Protocol II. The interim reports of the first phase
of the Conference, held in Vienna, and of the first resumed session, held
in January 1996 in Geneva, are contained in documents CCW/CONF.I/8/Rev.1
and CCW/CONF.I/11, respectively.
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III. Participation
12. Representatives of 44 States Parties to the Convention participated
in the first phase of the Conference (25 September to 13 October 1995,
Vienna), as follows:
|
| Australia
|
|
| France
|
| Norway
|
|
| Austria
|
|
| Germany
|
| Pakistan
|
|
| Belarus
|
|
| Greece
|
| Poland
|
|
| Belgium
|
|
| Hungary
|
| Russian
Federation
|
|
| Bosnia
and
|
|
| India
|
| Slovakia
|
|
| Herzegovina
|
|
| Ireland
|
| Slovenia
|
|
| Bulgaria
|
|
| Israel
|
| Spain
|
|
| Canada
|
|
| Italy
|
| Sweden
|
|
| China
|
|
| Japan
|
| Switzerland
|
|
| Croatia
|
|
| Latvia
|
| Tunisia
|
|
| Cuba
|
|
| Liechtenstein
|
| Ukraine
|
|
| Cyprus
|
|
| Mexico
|
| United
Kingdom of Great
|
|
| Czech
Republic
|
|
| Mongolia
|
| Britain
and Northern Ireland
|
|
| Denmark
|
|
| Netherlands
|
| United
States of America
|
|
| Ecuador
|
|
| New
Zealand
|
| Uruguay
|
|
| Finland
|
13. In accordance with Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure, representatives
of the following 40 States not parties to the Convention participated
in the first phase of the Conference as observers:
|
| Albania
|
|
| Indonesia
|
| Republic
of Korea
|
|
| Angola
|
|
| Iran
(Islamic
|
| Republic
of Moldova
|
|
| Argentina
|
|
| Republic
of)
|
| Romania
|
|
| Bolivia
|
|
| Jordan
|
| Saudi
Arabia
|
|
| Brazil
|
|
| Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya
|
| Singapore
|
|
| Burundi
|
|
| Luxembourg
|
| South
Africa
|
|
| Cambodia
|
|
| Morocco
|
| Sudan
|
|
| Chile
|
|
| Mozambique
|
| Syrian
Arab Republic
|
|
| Colombia
|
|
| Nicaragua
|
| Thailand
|
|
| Egypt
|
|
| Oman
|
| Turkey
|
|
| Ethiopia
|
|
| Paraguay
|
| United
Republic of Tanzania
|
|
| Gabon
|
|
| Peru
|
| Venezuela
|
|
| Holy
See
|
|
| Philippines
|
| Viet
Nam
|
|
| Iceland
|
|
| Portugal
|
|
14. In accordance with Rules 46, 47 and 48 of the Rules of Procedure,
representatives of the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations
Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the European Community,
the League of Arab States, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and
the Sovereign Order of Malta participated in the Conference as observers.
In accordance with Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure, representatives
of 66 non-governmental organizations attended public meetings of the Conference
and its Main Committees.
15. At the first resumed session (15-19 January 1996, Geneva), representatives
of the following 43 States Parties to the Convention participated in the
session:
|
| Australia
|
|
| Germany
|
| Norway
|
|
| Austria
|
|
| Greece
|
| Pakistan
|
|
| Belgium
|
|
| Hungary
|
| Poland
|
|
| Bulgaria
|
|
| India
|
| Russian
Federation
|
|
| Canada
|
|
| Ireland
|
| Slovakia
|
|
| China
|
|
| Israel
|
| Slovenia
|
|
| Croatia
|
|
| Italy
|
| Spain
|
|
| Cuba
|
|
| Japan
|
| Sweden
|
|
| Cyprus
|
|
| Latvia
|
| Switzerland
|
|
| Czech
Republic
|
|
| Liechtenstein
|
| Tunisia
|
|
| Denmark
|
|
| Malta
|
| Ukraine
|
|
| Ecuador
|
|
| Mexico
|
| United
Kingdom of Great
|
|
| Finland
|
|
| Mongolia
|
|
Britain and Northern Ireland
|
|
| France
|
|
| Netherlands
|
| United
States of America
|
|
|
|
|
| New
Zealand
|
| Uruguay
|
16. In accordance with Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure, representatives
of the following 33 States not parties to the Convention participated
in the session as observers:
|
| Afghanistan
|
|
| Honduras
|
| Portugal
|
|
| Algeria
|
|
| Indonesia
|
| Republic
of Korea
|
|
| Angola
|
|
| Iran
(Islamic
|
| Romania
|
|
| Argentina
|
|
|
Republic of )
|
| Singapore
|
|
| Armenia
|
|
| Jordan
|
| South
Africa
|
|
| Bolivia
|
|
| Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya
|
| Syrian
Arab Republic
|
|
| Brazil
|
|
| Luxembourg
|
| Thailand
|
|
| Burundi
|
|
| Morocco
|
| Turkey
|
|
| Chile
|
|
| Nicaragua
|
| Union
of Myanmar
|
|
| Colombia
|
|
| Nigeria
|
| Viet
Nam
|
|
| Egypt
|
|
| Peru
|
|
|
|
| Holy
See
|
|
| Philippines
|
|
|
17. In accordance with Rules 46, 47 and 48 of the Rules of Procedure,
representatives of the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations
Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the
League of Arab States, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the
Sovereign Order of Malta participated in the session as observers. In
accordance with Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure, representatives of
25 non-governmental organizations attended public meetings of the session.
18. At the second resumed session (22 April to 3 May 1996, Geneva), representatives
of the following 51 States Parties to the Convention participated in the
session:
|
| Argentina
|
| Germany
|
| New
Zealand
|
|
| Australia
|
| Greece
|
| Norway
|
|
| Austria
|
| Guatemala
|
| Pakistan
|
|
| Belarus
|
| Hungary
|
| Poland
|
|
| Belgium
|
| India
|
| Romania
|
|
| Brazil
|
| Ireland
|
| Russian
Federation
|
|
| Bulgaria
|
| Israel
|
| Slovakia
|
|
| Canada
|
| Italy
|
| Slovenia
|
|
| China
|
| Japan
|
| South
Africa
|
|
| Croatia
|
| Jordan
|
| Spain
|
|
| Cuba
|
| Laos
People's
|
| Sweden
|
|
|
|
|
Democratic Republic
|
|
| Cyprus
|
| Latvia
|
| Switzerland
|
|
| Czech
Republic
|
| Liechtenstein
|
| Tunisia
|
|
| Denmark
|
| Malta
|
| Ukraine
|
|
| Ecuador
|
| Mexico
|
| United
Kingdom of Great Britain
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
and Northern Ireland
|
|
| Finland
|
| Mongolia
|
| United
States of America
|
|
| France
|
| Netherlands
|
| Uruguay
|
19. In accordance with Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure, representatives
of the following 36 States not parties to the Convention participated
in the session as observers:
|
| Afghanistan
|
| Holy
See
|
| Singapore
|
|
| Algeria
|
| Honduras
|
| Syrian
Arab Republic
|
|
| Angola
|
| Iceland
|
| Thailand
|
|
| Armenia
|
| Indonesia
|
| Turkey
|
|
| Azerbaijan
|
| Iran
(Islamic
|
| Union
of Myanmar
|
|
| Bolivia
|
|
Republic of)
|
| Venezuela
|
|
| Burundi
|
| Luxembourg
|
| Viet
Nam
|
|
| Cambodia
|
| Morocco
|
| Zambia
|
|
| Chad
|
| Mozambique
|
| Zimbabwe
|
|
| Chile
|
| Nigeria
|
|
| Colombia
|
| Peru
|
|
| Egypt
|
| Philippines
|
|
| El
Salvador
|
| Portugal
|
|
| Ethiopia
|
| Republic
of Korea
|
20. In accordance with Rules 46, 47 and 48 of the Rules of Procedure,
representatives of the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations
Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the
League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization
of the Islamic Conference, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and
the Sovereign Order of Malta participated in the session as observers.
In accordance with Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure, representatives
of 70 non-governmental organizations attended public meetings of the session.
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IV. Financial Arrangements
21. At its 1st plenary meeting, on 25 September 1995, the Conference adopted
the arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference, as contained
in document CCW/CONF.I/GE/22/Rev.1, in accordance with Rule 16 of the
Rules of Procedure.
22. At its 9th meeting, on 15 January 1996, the Conference adopted the
arrangements for meeting the costs of the resumed sessions, as contained
in document CCW/CONF.I/10, in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of
Procedure.
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V. Work
23. Under the Presidency of Mr. Johan Molander, the Conference held 14
plenary meetings: eight meetings during its first phase in September/October
in Vienna; two meetings during the first resumed session in January 1996;
and four meetings during the second resumed session in April/May 1996.
In addition, the Conference held a number of informal meetings.
24. At its 1st plenary meeting, on 25 September 1995, the Conference adopted
its agenda (CCW/CONF.I/2) and its Rules of Procedure, as orally amended,
(CCW/CONF.I/1). At the same meeting, the Conference adopted its programme
of work and decided to distribute its work among the three Main Committees
as follows:
(a) Main Committee I: Review of the scope and operation of the Convention
and its annexed Protocols, consideration of any proposals relating to
the Convention and preparation and consideration of the final documents;
(b) Main Committee II: Consideration of any proposal relating to the Protocols
annexed to the Convention;
(c) Main Committee III: Consideration of proposals for additional Protocols
to the Convention.
25. At its 2nd meeting, on 26 September 1995, the Conference received
a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations which was delivered
through a video broadcast. At the first and the second resumed sessions,
additional messages from the Secretary-General of the United Nations were
delivered by Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Director General of the United Nations
Office at Geneva.
26. During the first phase of its work, the Conference held a general
exchange of views from 26 to 28 September 1995. A number of delegations
as well as non-governmental organizations participated in that exchange
of views. At the opening meeting of the second resumed session, on 22
April 1996, statements were made by a number of delegations as well as
non-governmental organizations.
27. Main Committee I held 17 meetings: eight during the first phase of
the Conference in September/October 1995, in Vienna, and nine meetings
during the second resumed session in April/May 1996 in Geneva. Its report
(CCW/CONF.I/MC.I/1), together with the draft Final Declaration of the
Review Conference (document CCW/CONF.I/WP.1/Rev.1), were submitted to
the Conference at the 13th plenary meeting, on 3 May 1996, at which time
the Conference took note of the report.
28. Main Committee II held 10 meetings from 26 September to 10 October
1995 in Vienna. Pursuant to the decision taken by the Conference on 13
October 1995, work during the first resumed session in January 1996 in
Geneva focussed on Articles 2-6 of Protocol II and the Technical Annex
and was carried out in the framework of open-ended informal consultations
of the President of the Conference. In addition, a meeting of military
experts was convened by the President on 18 January 1996, with a view
to addressing relevant issues.
29. At its 10th plenary meeting, on 19 January 1996, the President submitted
to the Conference a revised version of the President's text (CCW/CONF.I/WP.4/Rev.l),
incorporating certain changes to Articles 2-6 and the Technical Annex
of the draft amended Protocol II contained therein for the consideration
of delegations, and to serve as a basis for the work of the concluding
session of the Review Conference. The amended version of the President's
text reflected the stage of negotiations as seen by the President and
did not commit any delegation.
30. At its 11th plenary meeting, on 22 April 1996, the Conference, at
the recommendation of the General Committee, decided that, in view of
the developments during the first phase of the Conference in Vienna and
subsequent developments at the first resumed session in January, work
on Protocol II and its Technical Annex should be transferred to the Plenary
and should continue in the form of consultations of the President and
Friends of the Chair. Consequently, the Conference agreed that the President
would continue consultations on the outstanding technical issues, i.e.
new draft Articles 2-10 of Protocol II and the new draft Technical Annex
as contained in document CCW/CONF.I/WP.4/Rev.1. Mr. Max Gevers (Netherlands)
was appointed as Friend of the Chair on new draft Article 8 on "Transfers".
Mr. José Viegas Filho (Brazil) was appointed as Friend of the Chair on
new draft Article 11 on "Technological cooperation and assistance". Mr.
Mark J. Moher (Canada) was appointed as Friend of the Chair on new draft
Article 13 on "Consultations of High Contracting Parties" and on new draft
Article 14 on "Compliance". The leaders of the delegations of India and
the United Kingdom were entrusted with the task of undertaking consultations
on new draft Article 12 on "Protection from the effects of minefields,
mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices".
31. At the 12th plenary meeting, on 30 April 1996, the President presented
to the Conference the amended Protocol II and the Technical Annex (document
CCW/CONF.I/CRP.19), which also incorporated the results of the consultations
of the Friends of the Chair. At the same meeting, the Conference agreed
to transmit it to the Drafting Committee for its consideration on the
understanding that this did not commit any delegation to the amended Protocol.
32. Main Committee III held five meetings from 26 September to 6 October
1995 and submitted its report (CCW/CONF.I/4) to the Conference at its
7th meeting, on 12 October 1995, annexed to which was the draft text of
the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons. At the same meeting, the Conference
took note of this report and decided to transmit it to the Drafting Committee
for its consideration.
33. The Credentials Committee held three meetings during the first phase
of the Conference between 28 September and 11 October 1995 and submitted
its report (CCW/CONF.I/6*) as orally amended, to the Conference at its
8th meeting, on 13 October 1995. At the same meeting, the Conference took
note of this report. During the second resumed session, the Credentials
Committee held three meetings, between 24 April 1996 and 2 May 1996 and
submitted its report (CCW/CONF.I/CC/1) to the Conference at its 13th meeting.
At its 14th meeting, the Conference approved the report of the Committee
and adopted the draft resolution contained therein.
34. The Drafting Committee held one meeting on 12 October 1995. The Chairman
of the Drafting Committee presented an oral report on the work of the
Committee during the first phase of the Conference at the 8th plenary
meeting, on 13 October 1995. During the second resumed session, the Drafting
Committee held one meeting on 30 April 1996 and two meetings on 1 May
1996. The Chairman of the Committee made an oral report to the Conference
at its 13th meeting. At the same meeting, the Conference took note of
this report, which was later circulated as document CCW/CONF.I/DC/1.
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VI. Documentation
35. A list of the documents of the Conference is contained in part II
of the present document.
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VII. Decisions and Recommendations
36. At its 8th plenary meeting, on 13 October 1995, the Conference, by
consensus, adopted the text of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons
(Protocol IV) (CCW/CONF.I/7) which is annexed to this document (Annex
A). On 12 December 1995, the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
in accordance with his function as depositary of the Convention and its
Protocols, circulated Protocol IV to all States.
37. At its l4th plenary meeting, on 3 May 1996, the Conference adopted
by consensus the amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices which is annexed to the
present document (Annex B).
38. At the time of adoption of the amended Protocol II, a number of States
Parties made statements with regard to the provisions of this Protocol.
Those statements are reflected in the summary records of the meeting.
39. At the same meeting, the Conference adopted by consensus the Final
Declaration of the Review Conference, as orally amended, which is annexed
to the present document (Annex C).
40. Also at the same meeting, the Conference adopted its final report.
41. The Conference recommends the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol
IV) and Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, to States Parties
with a view to achieving the early entry into force of those instruments
and the widest possible adherence to them. The Conference further recommends
to all States that have not yet done so to take all necessary measures
to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention, including Protocol
I, Protocol III, Protocol IV and Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996.
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Annex
A
ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE
OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY
INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS
ARTICLE
1: ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
The following protocol shall be annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (“the
Convention”) as Protocol IV:
“Protocol
on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV)
Article
1
It is prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed, as their
sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent
blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye
with corrective eyesight devices. The High Contracting Parties shall not
transfer such weapons to any State or non-State entity.
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Article
2
In the employment of laser systems, the High Contracting Parties shall
take all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness
to unenhanced vision. Such precautions shall include training of their
armed forces and other practical measures.
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Article
3
Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate military
employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical
equipment, is not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol.
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Article
4
For the purpose of this Protocol ‘permanent blindness’ means irreversible
and uncorrectable loss of vision which is seriously disabling with no
prospect of recovery. Serious disability is equivalent to visual acuity
of less than 20/200 Snellen measured using both eyes.”
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ARTICLE 2: ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Protocol shall enter into force as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4
of Article 5 of the Convention.
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Annex
B
PROTOCOL
ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES, BOOBY-TRAPS AND
OTHER DEVICES AS AMENDED ON 3 MAY 1996 (PROTOCOL II AS AMENDED ON 3
MAY 1996) ANNEXED TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS
ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE
EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS
ARTICLE
1: AMENDED PROTOCOL
The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps
and Other Devices (Protocol II), annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects ("the
Convention") is hereby amended. The text of the Protocol as amended shall
read as follows:
"Protocol
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3
May 1996)
Article
1 Scope of application
1. This Protocol relates to the use on land of the mines, booby-traps
and other devices, defined herein, including mines laid to interdict beaches,
waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of
anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways.
2. This Protocol shall apply, in addition to situations referred to in
Article 1 of this Convention, to situations referred to in Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This Protocol shall not apply
to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not
being armed conflicts.
3. In case of armed conflicts not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to
the conflict shall be bound to apply the prohibitions and restrictions
of this Protocol.
4. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting
the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the Government, by
all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the
State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the
State.
5. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict
or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in
the territory of which that conflict occurs.
6. The application of the provisions of this Protocol to parties to a
conflict, which are not High Contracting Parties that have accepted this
Protocol, shall not change their legal status or the legal status of a
disputed territory, either explicitly or implicitly.
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Article
2 Definitions
For the purpose of this Protocol:
1. "Mine" means a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other
surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or
contact of a person or vehicle.
2. "Remotely-delivered mine" means a mine not directly emplaced but delivered
by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from
an aircraft. Mines delivered from a land-based system from less than 500
metres are not considered to be "remotely delivered", provided that they
are used in accordance with Article 5 and other relevant Articles of this
Protocol.
3. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine primarily designed to be exploded
by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate,
injure or kill one or more persons.
4. "Booby-trap" means any device or material which is designed, constructed,
or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a
person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs
an apparently safe act.
5. "Other devices" means manually-emplaced munitions and devices including
improvised explosive devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which
are actuated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse
of time.
6. "Military objective" means, so far as objects are concerned, any object
which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage.
7. "Civilian objects" are all objects which are not military objectives
as defined in paragraph 6 of this Article.
8. "Minefield" is a defined area in which mines have been emplaced and
"mined area" is an area which is dangerous due to the presence of mines.
"Phoney minefield" means an area free of mines that simulates a minefield.
The term "minefield" includes phoney minefields.
9. "Recording" means a physical, administrative and technical operation
designed to obtain, for the purpose of registration in official records,
all available information facilitating the location of minefields, mined
areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices.
10. "Self-destruction mechanism" means an incorporated or externally attached
automatically-functioning mechanism which secures the destruction of the
munition into which it is incorporated or to which it is attached.
11. "Self-neutralization mechanism" means an incorporated automatically-functioning
mechanism which renders inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated.
12. "Self-deactivating" means automatically rendering a munition inoperable
by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example, a
battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition.
13. "Remote control" means control by commands from a distance.
14. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and
which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and
which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with the mine.
15. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of mines
into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control
over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing
emplaced mines.
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Article
3 General restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices
1. This Article applies to: (a) mines; (b) booby-traps; and (c) other
devices.
2. Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict is, in accordance
with the provisions of this Protocol, responsible for all mines, booby-traps,
and other devices employed by it and undertakes to clear, remove, destroy
or maintain them as specified in Article 10 of this Protocol.
3. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any mine, booby-trap or
other device which is designed or of a nature to cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering.
4. Weapons to which this Article applies shall strictly comply with the
standards and limitations specified in the Technical Annex with respect
to each particular category.
5. It is prohibited to use mines, booby-traps or other devices which employ
a mechanism or device specifically designed to detonate the munition by
the presence of commonly available mine detectors as a result of their
magnetic or other non-contact influence during normal use in detection
operations.
6. It is prohibited to use a self-deactivating mine equipped with an anti-handling
device that is designed in such a manner that the anti-handling device
is capable of functioning after the mine has ceased to be capable of functioning.
7. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this
Article applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against
the civilian population as such or against individual civilians or civilian
objects.
8. The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is
prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:
(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective. In case
of doubt as to whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school,
is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it
shall be presumed not to be so used;
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective; or
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.
9. Several clearly separated and distinct military objectives located
in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration
of civilians or civilian objects are not to be treated as a single military
objective.
10. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from
the effects of weapons to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions
are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking
into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian
and military considerations. These circumstances include, but are not
limited to:
(a) the short- and long-term effect of mines upon the local civilian population
for the duration of the minefield;
(b) possible measures to protect civilians (for example, fencing, signs,
warning and monitoring);
(c) the availability and feasibility of using alternatives; and
(d) the short- and long-term military requirements for a minefield.
11. Effective advance warning shall be given of any emplacement of mines,
booby-traps and other devices which may affect the civilian population,
unless circumstances do not permit.
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Article
4 Restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines
It is prohibited to use anti-personnel mines which are not detectable,
as specified in paragraph 2 of the Technical Annex.
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Article
5 Restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines other than remotely-delivered
mines
1. This Article applies to anti-personnel mines other than remotely-delivered
mines.
2. It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies which
are not in compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and self-deactivation
in the Technical Annex, unless:
(a) such weapons are placed within a perimeter-marked area which is monitored
by military personnel and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure
the effective exclusion of civilians from the area. The marking must be
of a distinct and durable character and must at least be visible to a
person who is about to enter the perimeter-marked area; and
(b) such weapons are cleared before the area is abandoned, unless the
area is turned over to the forces of another State which accept responsibility
for the maintenance of the protections required by this Article and the
subsequent clearance of those weapons.
3. A party to a conflict is relieved from further compliance with the
provisions of sub-paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b) of this Article only if such
compliance is not feasible due to forcible loss of control of the area
as a result of enemy military action, including situations where direct
enemy military action makes it impossible to comply. If that party regains
control of the area, it shall resume compliance with the provisions of
sub-paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b) of this Article.
4. If the forces of a party to a conflict gain control of an area in which
weapons to which this Article applies have been laid, such forces shall,
to the maximum extent feasible, maintain and, if necessary, establish
the protections required by this Article until such weapons have been
cleared.
5. All feasible measures shall be taken to prevent the unauthorized removal,
defacement, destruction or concealment of any device, system or material
used to establish the perimeter of a perimeter-marked area.
6. Weapons to which this Article applies which propel fragments in a horizontal
arc of less than 90 degrees and which are placed on or above the ground
may be used without the measures provided for in sub-paragraph 2 (a) of
this Article for a maximum period of 72 hours, if:
(a) they are located in immediate proximity to the military unit that
emplaced them; and
(b) the area is monitored by military personnel to ensure the effective
exclusion of civilians.
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Article
6 Restrictions on the use of remotely-delivered mines
1. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines unless they are recorded
in accordance with sub-paragraph 1 (b) of the Technical Annex.
2. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines which
are not in compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and self-deactivation
in the Technical Annex.
3. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines other than anti-personnel
mines, unless, to the extent feasible, they are equipped with an effective
self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanism and have a back-up self-deactivation
feature, which is designed so that the mine will no longer function as
a mine when the mine no longer serves the military purpose for which it
was placed in position.
4. Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping
of remotely-delivered mines which may affect the civilian population,
unless circumstances do not permit.
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Article
7 Prohibitions on the use of booby-traps and other devices
1. Without prejudice to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict relating to treachery and perfidy, it is prohibited in all circumstances
to use booby-traps and other devices which are in any way attached to
or associated with:
(a) internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals;
(b) sick, wounded or dead persons;
(c) burial or cremation sites or graves;
(d) medical facilities, medical equipment, medical supplies or medical
transportation;
(e) children's toys or other portable objects or products specially designed
for the feeding, health, hygiene, clothing or education of children;
(f) food or drink;
(g) kitchen utensils or appliances except in military establishments,
military locations or military supply depots;
(h) objects clearly of a religious nature;
(i) historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute
the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; or
(j) animals or their carcasses.
2. It is prohibited to use booby-traps or other devices in the form of
apparently harmless portable objects which are specifically designed and
constructed to contain explosive material.
3. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3, it is prohibited
to use weapons to which this Article applies in any city, town, village
or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which
combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to
be imminent, unless either:
(a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective;
or
(b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for example,
the posting of warning sentries, the issuing of warnings or the provision
of fences.
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Article
8 Transfers
1. In order to promote the purposes of this Protocol, each High Contracting
Party:
(a) undertakes not to transfer any mine the use of which is prohibited
by this Protocol;
(b) undertakes not to transfer any mine to any recipient other than a
State or a State agency authorized to receive such transfers;
(c) undertakes to exercise restraint in the transfer of any mine the use
of which is restricted by this Protocol. In particular, each High Contracting
Party undertakes not to transfer any anti-personnel mines to States which
are not bound by this Protocol, unless the recipient State agrees to apply
this Protocol; and
(d) undertakes to ensure that any transfer in accordance with this Article
takes place in full compliance, by both the transferring and the recipient
State, with the relevant provisions of this Protocol and the applicable
norms of international humanitarian law.
2. In the event that a High Contracting Party declares that it will defer
compliance with specific provisions on the use of certain mines, as provided
for in the Technical Annex, sub-paragraph 1 (a) of this Article shall
however apply to such mines.
3. All High Contracting Parties, pending the entry into force of this
Protocol, will refrain from any actions which would be inconsistent with
sub-paragraph 1 (a) of this Article.
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Article
9 Recording and use of information on minefields, mined areas, mines,
booby-traps and other devices
1. All information concerning minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps
and other devices shall be recorded in accordance with the provisions
of the Technical Annex.
2. All such records shall be retained by the parties to a conflict, who
shall, without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, take all
necessary and appropriate measures, including the use of such information,
to protect civilians from the effects of minefields, mined areas, mines,
booby-traps and other devices in areas under their control.
At the same time, they shall also make available to the other party or
parties to the conflict and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
all such information in their possession concerning minefields, mined
areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices laid by them in areas no longer
under their control; provided, however, subject to reciprocity, where
the forces of a party to a conflict are in the territory of an adverse
party, either party may withhold such information from the Secretary-General
and the other party, to the extent that security interests require such
withholding, until neither party is in the territory of the other. In
the latter case, the information withheld shall be disclosed as soon as
those security interests permit. Wherever possible, the parties to the
conflict shall seek, by mutual agreement, to provide for the release of
such information at the earliest possible time in a manner consistent
with the security interests of each party.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 10
and 12 of this Protocol.
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Article
10 Removal of minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other
devices and international cooperation
1. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all minefields,
mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices shall be cleared, removed,
destroyed or maintained in accordance with Article 3 and paragraph 2 of
Article 5 of this Protocol.
2. High Contracting Parties and parties to a conflict bear such responsibility
with respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other
devices in areas under their control.
3. With respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other
devices laid by a party in areas over which it no longer exercises control,
such party shall provide to the party in control of the area pursuant
to paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent permitted by such party,
technical and material assistance necessary to fulfil such responsibility.
4. At all times necessary, the parties shall endeavour to reach agreement,
both among themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with
international organizations, on the provision of technical and material
assistance, including, in appropriate circumstances, the undertaking of
joint operations necessary to fulfil such responsibilities.
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Article
11 Technological cooperation and assistance
1. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have
the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation
of this Protocol and means of mine clearance. In particular, High Contracting
Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance
equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
2. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to provide information to the
database on mine clearance established within the United Nations System,
especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine
clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of
contact on mine clearance.
3. Each High Contracting Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance
for mine clearance through the United Nations System, other international
bodies or on a bilateral basis, or contribute to the United Nations Voluntary
Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.
4. Requests by High Contracting Parties for assistance, substantiated
by relevant information, may be submitted to the United Nations, to other
appropriate bodies or to other States. These requests may be submitted
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit them
to all High Contracting Parties and to relevant international organizations.
5. In the case of requests to the United Nations, the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, within the resources available to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, may take appropriate steps to assess the situation
and, in cooperation with the requesting High Contracting Party, determine
the appropriate provision of assistance in mine clearance or implementation
of the Protocol. The Secretary-General may also report to High Contracting
Parties on any such assessment as well as on the type and scope of assistance
required.
6. Without prejudice to their constitutional and other legal provisions,
the High Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate and transfer technology
to facilitate the implementation of the relevant prohibitions and restrictions
set out in this Protocol.
7. Each High Contracting Party has the right to seek and receive technical
assistance, where appropriate, from another High Contracting Party on
specific relevant technology, other than weapons technology, as necessary
and feasible, with a view to reducing any period of deferral for which
provision is made in the Technical Annex.
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Article
12 Protection from the effects of minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps
and other devices
1. Application
(a) With the exception of the forces and missions referred to in sub-paragraph
2(a)(i) of this Article, this Article applies only to missions which are
performing functions in an area with the consent of the High Contracting
Party on whose territory the functions are performed.
(b) The application of the provisions of this Article to parties to a
conflict which are not High Contracting Parties shall not change their
legal status or the legal status of a disputed territory, either explicitly
or implicitly.
(c) The provisions of this Article are without prejudice to existing international
humanitarian law, or other international instruments as applicable, or
decisions by the Security Council of the United Nations, which provide
for a higher level of protection to personnel functioning in accordance
with this Article.
2. Peace-keeping and certain other forces and missions
(a) This paragraph applies to:
(i) any United Nations force or mission performing peace-keeping, observation
or similar functions in any area in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations; and
(ii) any mission established pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter of
the United Nations and performing its functions in the area of a conflict.
(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested
by the head of a force or mission to which this paragraph applies, shall:
(i) so far as it is able, take such measures as are necessary to protect
the force or mission from the effects of mines, booby-traps and other
devices in any area under its control;
(ii) if necessary in order effectively to protect such personnel, remove
or render harmless, so far as it is able, all mines, booby-traps and other
devices in that area; and
(iii) inform the head of the force or mission of the location of all known
minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in the area
in which the force or mission is performing its functions and, so far
as is feasible, make available to the head of the force or mission all
information in its possession concerning such minefields, mined areas,
mines, booby-traps and other devices.
3. Humanitarian and fact-finding missions of the United Nations System
(a) This paragraph applies to any humanitarian or fact-finding mission
of the United Nations System.
(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested
by the head of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall:
(i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out
in sub-paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and
(ii) if access to or through any place under its control is necessary
for the performance of the mission's functions and in order to provide
the personnel of the mission with safe passage to or through that place:
(aa) unless on-going hostilities prevent, inform the head of the mission
of a safe route to that place if such information is available; or
(bb) if information identifying a safe route is not provided in accordance
with sub-paragraph (aa), so far as is necessary and feasible, clear a
lane through minefields.
4. Missions of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(a) This paragraph applies to any mission of the International Committee
of the Red Cross performing functions with the consent of the host State
or States as provided for by the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and, where applicable, their Additional Protocols.
(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested
by the head of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall:
(i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out
in sub-paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and
(ii) take the measures set out in sub-paragraph 3(b)(ii) of this Article.
5. Other humanitarian missions and missions of enquiry
(a) Insofar as paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article do not apply to them,
this paragraph applies to the following missions when they are performing
functions in the area of a conflict or to assist the victims of a conflict:
(i) any humanitarian mission of a national Red Cross or Red Crescent society
or of their International Federation;
(ii) any mission of an impartial humanitarian organization, including
any impartial humanitarian demining mission; and
(iii) any mission of enquiry established pursuant to the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and, where applicable, their
Additional Protocols.
(b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested
by the head of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall, so far
as is feasible:
(i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out
in sub-paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and
(ii) take the measures set out in sub-paragraph 3(b)(ii) of this Article.
6. Confidentiality
All information provided in confidence pursuant to this Article shall
be treated by the recipient in strict confidence and shall not be released
outside the force or mission concerned without the express authorization
of the provider of the information.
7. Respect for laws and regulations
Without prejudice to such privileges and immunities as they may enjoy
or to the requirements of their duties, personnel participating in the
forces and missions referred to in this Article shall:
(a) respect the laws and regulations of the host State; and
(b) refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial
and international nature of their duties.
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Article
13 Consultations of High Contracting Parties
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to consult and cooperate with
each other on all issues related to the operation of this Protocol. For
this purpose, a conference of High Contracting Parties shall be held annually.
2. Participation in the annual conferences shall be determined by their
agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The work of the conference shall include:
(a) review of the operation and status of this Protocol;
(b) consideration of matters arising from reports by High Contracting
Parties according to paragraph 4 of this Article;
(c) preparation for review conferences; and
(d) consideration of the development of technologies to protect civilians
against indiscriminate effects of mines.
4. The High Contracting Parties shall provide annual reports to the Depositary,
who shall circulate them to all High Contracting Parties in advance of
the conference, on any of the following matters:
(a) dissemination of information on this Protocol to their armed forces
and to the civilian population;
(b) mine clearance and rehabilitation programmes;
(c) steps taken to meet technical requirements of this Protocol and any
other relevant information pertaining thereto;
(d) legislation related to this Protocol;
(e) measures taken on international technical information exchange, on
international cooperation on mine clearance, and on technical cooperation
and assistance; and
(f) other relevant matters.
5. The cost of the Conference of High Contracting Parties shall be borne
by the High Contracting Parties and States not parties participating in
the work of the conference, in accordance with the United Nations scale
of assessment adjusted appropriately.
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Article
14 Compliance
1. Each High Contracting Party shall take all appropriate steps, including
legislative and other measures, to prevent and suppress violations of
this Protocol by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.
2. The measures envisaged in paragraph 1 of this Article include appropriate
measures to ensure the imposition of penal sanctions against persons who,
in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of this
Protocol, wilfully kill or cause serious injury to civilians and to bring
such persons to justice.
3. Each High Contracting Party shall also require that its armed forces
issue relevant military instructions and operating procedures and that
armed forces personnel receive training commensurate with their duties
and responsibilities to comply with the provisions of this Protocol.
4. The High Contracting Parties undertake to consult each other and to
cooperate with each other bilaterally, through the Secretary-General of
the United Nations or through other appropriate international procedures,
to resolve any problems that may arise with regard to the interpretation
and application of the provisions of this Protocol.
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Technical
Annex
1. Recording
(a) Recording of the location of mines other than remotely-delivered mines,
minefields, mined areas, booby-traps and other devices shall be carried
out in accordance with the following provisions:
(i) the location of the minefields, mined areas and areas of booby-traps
and other devices shall be specified accurately by relation to the coordinates
of at least two reference points and the estimated dimensions of the area
containing these weapons in relation to those reference points;
(ii) maps, diagrams or other records shall be made in such a way as to
indicate the location of minefields, mined areas, booby-traps and other
devices in relation to reference points, and these records shall also
indicate their perimeters and extent; and
(iii) for purposes of detection and clearance of mines, booby-traps and
other devices, maps, diagrams or other records shall contain complete
information on the type, number, emplacing method, type of fuse and life
time, date and time of laying, anti-handling devices (if any) and other
relevant information on all these weapons laid. Whenever feasible the
minefield record shall show the exact location of every mine, except in
row minefields where the row location is sufficient. The precise location
and operating mechanism of each booby-trap laid shall be individually
recorded.
(b) The estimated location and area of remotely-delivered mines shall
be specified by coordinates of reference points (normally corner points)
and shall be ascertained and when feasible marked on the ground at the
earliest opportunity. The total number and type of mines laid, the date
and time of laying and the self-destruction time periods shall also be
recorded.
(c) Copies of records shall be held at a level of command sufficient to
guarantee their safety as far as possible.
(d) The use of mines produced after the entry into force of this Protocol
is prohibited unless they are marked in English or in the respective national
language or languages with the following information:
(i) name of the country of origin;
(ii) month and year of production; and
(iii) serial number or lot number.
The marking should be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental
effects, as far as possible.
2. Specifications on detectability
(a) With respect to anti-personnel mines produced after 1 January 1997,
such mines shall incorporate in their construction a material or device
that enables the mine to be detected by commonly-available technical mine
detection equipment and provides a response signal equivalent to a signal
from 8 grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass.
(b) With respect to anti-personnel mines produced before 1 January 1997,
such mines shall either incorporate in their construction, or have attached
prior to their emplacement, in a manner not easily removable, a material
or device that enables the mine to be detected by commonly-available technical
mine detection equipment and provides a response signal equivalent to
a signal from 8 grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass.
(c) In the event that a High Contracting Party determines that it cannot
immediately comply with sub-paragraph (b), it may declare at the time
of its notification of consent to be bound by this Protocol that it will
defer compliance with sub-paragraph (b) for a period not to exceed 9 years
from the entry into force of this Protocol. In the meantime it shall,
to the extent feasible, minimize the use of anti-personnel mines that
do not so comply.
3. Specifications on self-destruction and self-deactivation
(a) All remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines shall be designed and
constructed so that no more than 10% of activated mines will fail to self-destruct
within 30 days after emplacement, and each mine shall have a back-up self-deactivation
feature designed and constructed so that, in combination with the self-destruction
mechanism, no more than one in one thousand activated mines will function
as a mine 120 days after emplacement.
(b) All non-remotely delivered anti-personnel mines, used outside marked
areas, as defined in Article 5 of this Protocol, shall comply with the
requirements for self-destruction and self-deactivation stated in sub-paragraph
(a).
(c) In the event that a High Contracting Party determines that it cannot
immediately comply with sub-paragraphs (a) and/or (b), it may declare
at the time of its notification of consent to be bound by this Protocol,
that it will, with respect to mines produced prior to the entry into force
of this Protocol, defer compliance with sub-paragraphs (a) and/or (b)
for a period not to exceed 9 years from the entry into force of this Protocol.
During this period of deferral, the High Contracting Party shall:
(i) undertake to minimize, to the extent feasible, the use of anti-personnel
mines that do not so comply; and
(ii) with respect to remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines, comply with
either the requirements for self-destruction or the requirements for self-deactivation
and, with respect to other anti-personnel mines comply with at least the
requirements for self-deactivation.
4. International signs for minefields and mined areas
Signs similar to the example attached and as specified below shall be
utilized in the marking of minefields and mined areas to ensure their
visibility and recognition by the civilian population:
(a) size and shape: a triangle or square no smaller than 28 centimetres
(11 inches) by 20 centimetres (7.9 inches) for a triangle, and 15 centimetres
(6 inches) per side for a square;
(b) colour: red or orange with a yellow reflecting border;
(c) symbol: the symbol illustrated in the Attachment, or an alternative
readily recognizable in the area in which the sign is to be displayed
as identifying a dangerous area;
(d) language: the sign should contain the word "mines" in one of the six
official languages of the Convention (Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish) and the language or languages prevalent in that area;
and
(e) spacing: signs should be placed around the minefield or mined area
at a distance sufficient to ensure their visibility at any point by a
civilian approaching the area."
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ARTICLE 2: ENTRY INTO FORCE
This amended Protocol shall enter into force as provided for in paragraph
1 (b) of Article 8 of the Convention.
Annex
C
Final Declaration
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS
ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY
INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS, WHICH MET IN VIENNA FROM
25 SEPTEMBER TO 13 OCTOBER 1995, THEN IN GENEVA FROM 15 TO 19 JANUARY
1996 FOR THE FIRST RESUMED SESSION AND IN GENEVA FROM 22 APRIL TO 3 MAY
1996 FOR THE SECOND RESUMED SESSION, TO REVIEW THE SCOPE AND OPERATION
OF THE CONVENTION AND THE PROTOCOLS ANNEXED THERETO AND TO CONSIDER ANY
PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENTS OF THE CONVENTION OR OF THE EXISTING PROTOCOLS,
AS WELL AS PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS RELATING TO OTHER CATEGORIES
OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NOT COVERED BY THE EXISTING ANNEXED PROTOCOLS
Deeply
concerned that the indiscriminate effects of the irresponsible use
of landmines, particularly anti-personnel landmines, are estimated to
kill or maim hundreds of people each week, mostly unarmed civilians, obstruct
economic development and reconstruction and have other severe consequences,
which include inhibiting the repatriation of refugees and the return of
internally displaced persons,
Gravely
concerned with the suffering and casualties caused to civilians by
the irresponsible use, as well as the proliferation of landmines, booby-traps
and other devices, in particular the acute problem of anti-personnel landmines,
Reaffirming
the need to reinforce international cooperation in the area of prohibitions
or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,
Reaffirming
their conviction that a general and verifiable agreement on prohibitions
or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects would
significantly reduce the suffering of civilians and combatants,
Welcoming
the adoption of an amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices,
Noting
that remotely delivered anti-personnel mines can pose a grave danger to
civilian life and livelihood, especially due to the nature of the delivery
and the consequent difficulty in marking and fencing them,
Reaffirming
also the need to reinforce international cooperation in the area of mine
clearance and to devote greater resources towards that end,
Recognizing
the important role that the international community, particularly States
involved in the deployment of mines, can play in assisting in mine clearance
in affected countries through the provision of necessary maps and information
and appropriate technical and material assistance to remove or otherwise
render ineffective existing minefields, mines and booby-traps,
Expressing
their appreciation of the financial contributions provided by States and
regional organizations to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for
Assistance in Mine Clearance and for the contributions in kind provided
to the demining stand-by capacity of the United Nations,
Noting
the national moratoria and other unilateral measures on halting the production,
export, transfer or sale, on reducing stockpiles and on adopting legislation
aimed at the total elimination of anti-personnel landmines,
Noting
also that a number of States have further abstained from the acquisition,
production, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines,
Noting
the fact that a growing number of States, international, regional and
non-governmental organizations do their utmost to achieve urgently the
total elimination of anti-personnel landmines,
Conscious
of the urgent need to counter the silent and invisible threat to human
sight posed by the threat of blinding laser weapons,
Welcoming
the adoption of Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons as a codification
and progressive development of the rules of international law,
Noting
that a number of issues could be considered in the future, for example
at a review conference, taking into account scientific and technological
developments, including the questions of prohibition on the use, production,
stockpiling and transfer of blinding laser weapons and the question of
compliance with regard to such weapons, as well as other pertinent issues,
such as the definition of “permanent blindness”, including the concept
of field of vision,
Recognizing
the specific role of the International Committee of the Red Cross and
encouraging it to continue to work to facilitate further ratification
and accession to the Convention, to disseminate its contents and to lend
its expertise to future review conferences,
Acknowledging
the invaluable humanitarian efforts of non-governmental organizations
in armed conflicts and welcoming the expertise they have brought to the
Review Conference itself,
SOLEMNLY DECLARE:
- Their commitment to respect the objectives and provisions of the Convention
and its annexed Protocols as an authoritative international instrument
governing the use of certain conventional weapons, which may be deemed
to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,
- Their determination to call upon all States that have not yet done so
to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention
and its annexed Protocols and upon successor States to take appropriate
measures so that ultimately this instrument will be universal,
- Their conviction that States should strive towards the goal of the eventual
elimination of anti-personnel landmines, consistent with the terms of
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/70 (O),
- Their commitment to continue to strive for a complete ban on transfer
of all anti-personnel landmines in the context of their eventual elimination
consistent with the terms of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution
50/70 (O),
- Their satisfaction at the adoption of an amended Protocol II on mines,
booby-traps and other devices,
- That the prohibitions and restrictions on the use and transfer of anti-personnel
mines in Protocol II shall facilitate and advance the achievement of the
ultimate goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel mines, consistent
with the terms of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/70
(O),
- The importance they attach to the earliest possible entry into force
of the amended Protocol, and their desire that all States, pending its
entry into force, respect and ensure respect for the substantive provisions
of the amended Protocol to the fullest extent possible,
- Their commitment to keep the provisions of Protocol II under review
in order to ensure that the concerns regarding the weapons it covers are
addressed,
- That nothing in the amended Protocol II shall be invoked as affecting
the Purposes and Principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations,
- Their commitment to ban all remotely delivered mines without effective
self-deactivation features and either self-destruction or self-neutralization
mechanisms and their recognition of the need to strive for a ban on all
remotely delivered anti-personnel mines as viable alternatives are developed
that significantly reduce the risk to the civilian population,
- Their recognition of the importance for the purposes of facilitating
and accelerating mine-clearance of the application of the prohibition
of the use of non-detectable anti-personnel mines,
- Their commitment to reinforce international cooperation for mine clearance,
the development and dissemination of more effective technologies for mine
clearance and the transfer of technology to facilitate the implementation
of the prohibitions and restrictions set out in Protocol II and to seek
to devote the resources necessary for this purpose,
- Their commitment to assist, to the extent feasible, impartial humanitarian
demining missions, operating with the consent of the host State and/or
the relevant States Parties to the conflict, in particular by providing
all necessary information in their possession covering the location of
all known minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices
in the area in which the mission is performing its functions,
- Their recognition that the growing number of national moratoria and
other unilateral measures restricting or halting the production, use,
export, transfer, sale or stockpiling of anti-personnel mines, aimed at
their eventual elimination are encouraging steps,
- That they will encourage efforts of the United Nations and other organizations
to address all the problems of landmines,
- Their satisfaction at the adoption of the Protocol on Blinding Laser
Weapons (Protocol IV) to the Convention,
- Their conviction of the importance of the earliest possible entry into
force of Protocol IV,
- Their desire that all States, pending the entry into force, respect
and ensure respect of the substantive provisions of Protocol IV to the
fullest extent possible,
- Their recognition of the need for achieving the total prohibition of
blinding laser weapons, the use and transfer of which are prohibited in
Protocol IV,
- Their wish to keep the issue of the blinding effects related to the
use of laser systems under consideration,
- Their commitment to follow up the review process begun at the First
Review Conference and, for that purpose, establish a regular review mechanism
for the Convention and its annexed Protocols.
The High Contracting Parties recognize that the important principles and
provisions contained in this Final Declaration can also serve as a basis
for further strengthening the Convention and its Protocols and express
their determination to implement them.
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Review
of the Preamble
Preambular paragraph 3
The Conference recalls the obligation to determine in the study, development,
acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means and method of warfare,
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited
under any rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting
Parties.
Preambular
paragraph 8
The Conference reaffirms the need to continue the codification and progressive
development of the rules of international law applicable to certain conventional
weapons which may be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.
Preambular
paragraph 10
The Conference underlines the need to achieve wider adherence to the Convention
and its annexed Protocols. The Conference welcomes recent ratifications
and accessions to the Convention and its annexed Protocols and urges the
High Contracting Parties to accord high priority to their diplomatic efforts
to encourage further adherence with a view to achieving universal adherence
by the year 2000.
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Review
of the Articles
Article
1
The Conference acknowledges and confirms that the High Contracting Parties
broadened the scope of Protocol II.
Article
2
The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Convention or its annexed
Protocols shall be interpreted as detracting from other obligations imposed
upon the High Contracting Parties by international humanitarian law.
Article
3
The Conference notes the provisions of Article 3.
Article
4
The Conference notes that 58 States have ratified, accepted, acceded or
succeeded to the Convention.
The Conference calls upon States which are not parties to this Convention
to ratify, accept, approve or accede, as appropriate, to the Convention,
thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention.
The Conference, in this context, invites the High Contracting Parties
to encourage further accessions to the Convention and its annexed Protocols.
Article
5
The Conference notes the provisions of Article 5.
Article
6
The Conference underlines the importance of international cooperation
in the field of dissemination of the Convention and its annexed Protocols
and recognizes the importance of multilateral collaboration relating to
instruction, the exchange of experience at all levels, the exchange of
instructors and the organization of joint seminars.
The Conference takes note of an invitation by a High Contracting Party
to a seminar concerning dissemination.
Article
7
The Conference notes the provisions of Article 7.
Article
8
The Conference agrees that future Review Conferences should be held more
frequently, with consideration to be given to holding a Review Conference
every five years. The Conference decides, consistent with Article 8.3 (c)
to convene a further Conference five years following the entry into force
of the amendments adopted at the First Review Conference, but in any case
not later than 2001, with preparatory expert meetings starting as early
as 2000, if necessary.
The Conference welcomes the adoption of the text of an amended Protocol
II in accordance with subparagraph 3 (a) of this Article.
The Conference recalls the provisions of subparagraph 3 (b) of this Article
which stipulates that consideration may be given to any proposal for additional
protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered
by the existing annexed Protocols. The Conference welcomes the adoption
on 13 October 1995 of the text of an additional Protocol on Blinding Laser
Weapons (Protocol IV).
The Conference proposes that the next Review Conference may consider the
question of preparing a possible additional Protocol on small-calibre
weapons and ammunition.
The Conference proposes that the next Review Conference consider the question
of eventual further measures in relation to naval mines and other conventional
weapons, which may be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have
indiscriminate effects.
Article
9
The Conference notes with satisfaction that the provisions of this Article
have not been invoked.
Article
10
The Conference notes the provisions of Article 10.
Article
11
The Conference notes the request by the delegation of China to correct
the original Chinese text of the Convention and its annexed Protocols.
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Review
of the Protocols
Protocol
on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I)
The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol.
Protocol
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices (Protocol II) and Technical Annex to the Protocol
The Conference has comprehensively reviewed the scope and operation of
the original Protocol. The Conference is deeply concerned that despite
the existence of the Protocol, hundreds of people, mostly unarmed civilians,
are estimated to be killed or maimed each week by the indiscriminate effect
of the irresponsible use of landmines, in particular anti-personnel mines;
and also that unarmed civilians continue to be victims of indiscriminate
effects of irresponsible use of booby-traps and other devices. These actions
also obstruct agriculture and economic development and reconstruction,
and inhibit the repatriation of refugees and the return of internally
displaced persons and cause intolerable situations in many parts of the
world,
The Conference concluded that the original Protocol should be strengthened
in a number of areas. The Conference therefore adopts the amended Protocol
which brings about important improvements in such areas as the scope of
its application, general restrictions from the humanitarian point of view,
substantive prohibitions and restrictions on mine use, transfers, compliance
provisions, mine clearance obligations and in the field of technological
cooperation, and anticipates that these and other related issues could
be further addressed at future review conferences with due regard to continuing
humanitarian concerns,
The Conference encourages the High Contracting Parties which defer the
application of the technical requirements as specified in the Technical
Annex to make all best endeavours to comply with such requirements in
accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Technical Annex during the deferral
periods,
The Conference looks forward to the first annual meeting of States Parties
which will be convened pursuant to new Article 13 after entry into force
of the amended Protocol,
The Conference proposes that the Depositary convene, at an early date,
following entry into force of the Protocol, a preparatory meeting for
the first Annual Conference of the Parties under Article 13 of the amended
Protocol. Such a preparatory meeting should elaborate and propose for
the Annual Conference the draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference and
Agenda items which may include review of the operation and status of the
Protocol,
The Conference acknowledges the valuable work of relevant agencies and
bodies of the United Nations; of the International Committee of the Red
Cross pursuant to its mandate to assist war victims and of NGOs in a number
of fields, in particular surgical care and rehabilitation of mine victims,
implementation of mine-awareness programmes and mine clearance,
Protocol
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III)
The Conference takes note of the provisions of this Protocol.
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